ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the connection between costs of interstate war and postwar domestic politics of countries that waged them. Previous research focused primarily on explaining the chances of survival of war leaders by factors like outcome of war, culpability and regime type. This project contends that the variation in level of domestic hostility facing postwar governments also needs explanation, independent of the tenure of individual leaders. This can be operationalized by counting political events that make it harder for an incumbent to govern effectively. This is the logical basis for replacing a dichotomous dependent variable (i.e. survival versus removal of a leader) with a combined count of antigovernment activities over a finite postwar period of five years. The study hypothesizes that the higher the cost incurred by a country in a war, the greater the likelihood that it will witness manifestations of antigovernment hostility. The hypotheses were tested using cross-national data from a sample of warring countries from the period, 1919-1999. Countries that suffered civilian fatalities during war, tended to be at greater

risk of overt anti-government hostility in the postwar period. As a measure of costliness, battle deaths did not work as a predictor of postwar threats faced by governments of warring states. The quantitative analysis was supplemented by case analysis of two countries – Paraguay after the Chaco War (1932-35) and Egypt after the Six Day War (1967). The Paraguayan case demonstrated how counter-elites can successfully exploit popular discontent caused by the costs of the war to discredit and depose a victorious wartime leader and his coalition. On the other hand, Egypt in the aftermath of the 1967 war illustrates that leader turnover is only one among many possible political consequences of war. A factional struggle within the pre-war winning coalition and popular expressions of antigovernment sentiment are possible without resulting in the removal of a wartime leader. Secondly, it shows why outcome has consistently been a powerful predictor of a war's domestic effects.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE WARS

By

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
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Dedication

To my parents, Shaibal and Jayashree Mukherjee and my wife, Poonam

Acknowledgements

Tomes have been written on how to survive in graduate school. However, nothing can prepare anyone for the trials and tribulations that one can face as one goes through the process of acquiring a Ph.D. Despite the struggles, the pleasure and satisfaction that one feels in gradually and painstakingly transforming a vague idea into a legible and coherent document cannot be described in words. As I look back at my experience at College Park, I think the best decision I took was to I sit in on a course offered by Dr. Paul Huth in Spring 2012 in which students were expected to develop either a prospectus or a journal length article. The pressure of weakly deadlines and excellent feedback from Dr. Huth along with a wonderful group of my fellow graduate students was absolutely essential in helping me write the first draft of my prospectus within three months. As the Chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Huth's knowledge, professionalism and calm demeanor has been very helpful to me over the past three years as I went through this emotionally draining process.

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process he has helped me make pragmatic theoretical and methodological choices that were instrumental in helping me finish this dissertation in reasonable period of time. He was never short of absolutely fabulous and detailed comments on any draft that I turned in. He is an extremely efficient person who worked unimaginably hard to mentor me. Dr. Cunningham was the other faculty member who has been tremendously helpful since the early days of this project. He really helped in identifying the weaknesses of the first draft of the prospectus and helped to make it focused. I am also indebted to Dr. Kastner for his periodic suggestions and feedback on the various chapters. Among other faculty members, I would like to thank Dr. Virginia Haufler and Dr. Soo Yeon Kim (now at the National University of Singapore) who were very patient with me as I was dabbling with international political economy in the early part of my graduate program at College Park. I hope that I can return to this research area sometime in the future. I will also remember with fondness another former faculty member, Dr. Dorith-Grant Wisdom, with whom I worked as a teaching assistant. Finally, I would like to thank the entire office staff of the Department of Government and Politics, especially Ann-Marie and Cissy for being so kind and generous.

I would not have been able to pursue and eventually complete my Ph.D. without the unflinching support of Poonam, my wife of eleven years. She has made tremendous sacrifices and I am indeed very fortunate to have her in my life. I would also like express my deepest gratitude to my parents for never giving up on me.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Research Question

On March 1, 1881, the Tsar of Russia Alexander II was killed by a bomb hurled at him by a member of a revolutionary terrorist group called People's Will. He had recently presided over a hard-fought victory in the Second Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78 in which the Russian side suffered 120,000 war-related fatalities and incurred a heavy financial burden.[1] Despite the victory, the Tsar was criticized by the Panslavists and Russian nationalists who were supporters of the war but dissatisfied with his decision to stop at the gates of Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The number of anti-regime activities directed at the Tsar from various quarters worsened after this war. Alexander II was targeted four times by various assassins between January 1878 and March 1881when he was finally murdered (Moss, 2002; Radzinskii, 2005).

The post-war fate of Alexander II motivates an interesting puzzle: Why was the Tsar facing recurring challenges to his rule despite winning a major war?   The literature on war and survival of leaders has made the case that there is an association between war outcome (i.e. victory, defeat or draw) and removal of leaders and post-exit punishment. Despite its various contributions to our understanding of the incentives motivating wartime leaders, this literature has found it hard to explain several cases where the link between war

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[1] Smith (1972) estimates the costs of supporting the 200,000 troops on the front was an average of 174,000 gold rubles a day.

outcome and a leader's postwar fate is either counterintuitive or unclear. The dominance of war outcome as a key predictor of the postwar fate of leaders has led to a neglect of the political effects of the variation in war costs. The possibility that higher costs can alter the dynamic of domestic political competition by creating opportunities for new claimants for power tends to be discounted. This study makes the case that popular discontent associated with costlier wars creates opportunities for rival claimants for power to replace the incumbent. Secondly, previous studies treat removal as the primary indicator of political punishment for a wartime leader without recognizing that leaders differ in terms of their effectiveness in office. Unsuccessful attempts to replace or challenge the leader are as significant as those that are successful. This requires that we pay close attention to indicators of postwar domestic unrest. As any increase in instability and threats to the government forces a leader to allocate greater resources to stay in power, an unstable postwar environment should be treated differently than a stable one. If a war is followed by instability, then that should be part of our calculus in gauging its domestic consequences for the belligerent.

1.2   A Theory on the Impact of War Cost on Postwar Domestic Politics

The effect of war outcomes on the likelihood of "punishment" and "political survival" of wartime leaders has been studied quite extensively. Despite its wide usage and logical validity, the choice of outcome as the primary explanation for the fate of leaders has been questioned in recent times. Chiozza and Goemans, who are one of the most prolific contributors to this literature, have pointed out that for wartime leaders, "outcome factors as only one parameter in a *large array of political forces* that combine to drive the

probability and manner of losing office (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011, p. 61) (Italics mine)." Although they fail to clarify what these political forces might be, they have raised a very crucial issue. In an earlier study, they did not find support for the effect of outcome on the hazard of losing office for democratic leaders (Chiozza & Goemans, 2004). This finding is surprising given that democratic leaders tend to be easier to dislodge than autocratic leaders. Besides outcome, what other parameters of war can help us understand the fate of wartime leaders in particular and postwar domestic politics in general?

The focus on the *causes* of war and the dominance of the democratic peace research program within security studies has resulted in an inattention to theoretical and empirical work on the political *consequences* of war (Rasler & Thompson, 2002). This study hopes to fill this gap by focusing on the political effects of war participation. This dissertation makes the case that besides the outcome of a war, we must also explore the effect of its human and material costs to explain its impact on domestic politics. Costs may supplement or even override the logical impact of outcome on postwar domestic politics. A costly victory may turn out to be equally bad for an incumbent as a defeat where the costs were not very heavy. The costs imposed by war can be sufficient to trigger a domestic backlash against a leader even if he achieves victory. Wartime leaders and governments will find it difficult to distribute the rewards of a costly victory proportionately amongst those who paid the price. While the benefits are ephemeral, the costs of war are tangible for the mass public. This motivates the argument that the costs of war are a crucial predictor influencing the behavior of domestic political actors. The domestic political fallout of a war may vary with the suffering and disruption that it caused in the lives of ordinary

people. Political mobilization against the incumbent may not be easy for opponents even after a defeat especially if his winning coalition is intact.

In sum, the study makes the case that the political effects of war are not limited to the removal of leaders but to all the activities that are directed against the government by individual citizens and groups. Therefore, the response variable is much more complex than what has been assumed by previous studies.   Changing the dependent variable should give us a richer explanation of the dynamics of postwar politics than can be gained by comparing the fate of leaders. The core argument that I advance is that a higher burden of war costs worsens the domestic political problems for any incumbent in the postwar period. It may not even matter whether the leader was in power during wartime. Simply put, the overall domestic environment following costlier wars should be more unstable. In order to test this argument, war costs are used as the main predictor. The dependent variable of survival or leader tenure has been redefined to include a range of anti-government activities undertaken by domestic actors after the termination of war. This should give us an idea of the "second-order" political consequences – other than removal – that governments faced after their country has waged a war.

This dissertation is designed as follows: First, I discuss the gaps in the existing literature on war and political survival that has motivated this study. Second, I will present a theory which argues that higher costs change the incentive structure of different players in a political system thereby worsening the threats facing the government from domestic actors. I also outline some contingent factors that can influence the main effect of war costs on postwar threats. Third, I will discuss the elements of my research design. This will

include the key variables of the model devised to test my theory and the sources of the data used to operationalize them. Next, I will report the results of the statistical tests of my hypotheses. Finally, I will analyze two cases to provide an illustration of how different parameters of war participation influence domestic politics.

2   Theory and Hypotheses

2.1   Review of Literature

In the first chapter, I mentioned that the focus of the previous literature on wartime and postwar domestic politics has primarily been on war outcome. This chapter will review some of this work and explain how this study would build upon previous research. Scholars have previously established connections between factors such as leader culpability, type of role in war (i.e. target versus initiator), regime type and level of repression, war outcome with the likelihood of leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, & Woller, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, & Siverson, 2003; Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Colaresi, 2004; Croco, 2011). These leader-based studies of war share the following assumptions: Involvement in an interstate war is one of the most consequential decisions that can be taken by a leader and sanctioned by his winning coalition. Like any other policy, a leader evaluates war in terms of his private costs and benefits rather than that of the national interest. While making decisions relating to war, leaders are not guided by some rational analysis of their country's strategic imperatives but by a concern for their political future.

Based on these assumptions, one of the critical questions that they have raised is why are some leaders willing to "pay any price" to achieve their war aims while others quit or settle in the face of small losses (Wolford, 2007).   The response of the major studies of leader behavior during wartime can be summarized thus: The costs that a leader is willing to pay for a war depends on their political incentives that are a function of the likelihood of punishment that they expect to face if they were to concede defeat (Chiozza & Goemans,

2011; Croco, 2011; Henk E. Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009). Assuming that leaders know that incurring higher war costs make them unpopular, why do some leaders refuse to terminate wars in response to heavy losses? Croco answers this question by making a distinction between culpable leaders that are clearly associated with the decision of getting into a war or waging it and non-culpable leaders. Culpable leaders tend to stay in a war even if it gets costly and unpopular because they expect to be punished by their domestic populations if they preside over a defeat. They believe that they are better off trying to win even at great cost rather than quit. Such leaders are willing to incur higher war costs than others and reluctant to settle even when faced with rising costs. This is why leaders who face higher settlement costs resist the political pressures to quit when faced with heavy losses during war. Croco has found that culpable leaders are also associated with extreme war outcomes - total victory or catastrophic defeat. She argues that the difference between culpable versus non-culpable leaders can be explained by the former's expectation that he is more likely to be punished for defeat (Croco, 2011). Croco follows most leader-based studies in which punishment is equated with removal from office. Some like Chiozza and Goemans highlighted another kind of political punishment: the way leaders expect to be treated *after* removal. Their case is that a leaders' expectation of his postwar fate can be quite crucial in explaining his war-related policies. An expectation of imprisonment or death after being deposed will motivate leaders differently than the likelihood of a peaceful retirement. When a leader expects to face deadly consequences for bad war performance, he is less likely to make a settlement to terminate the war on unfavorable terms (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011).

Comparing survival rates of wartime leaders and isolating differences in punishment meted out to leaders after being deposed has provided valuable insights on the connection between war and domestic political change. Yet, much more could be known about the qualitative differences between wartime leaders by focusing on the intensity of opposition that they faced during their tenure. Does a war victory strengthen a wartime leader and government at home? How is this political dividend to be measured? What sanctions can a leader face from domestic opponents if he has survived a war defeat? The quick look at the *Archigos* data of Chiozza and Goemans shows that quite a few defeated wartime leaders held on to power for a substantial period after the war ended. If these leaders were not replaced, did they face some other form of punishment? It could be that a leader that survives a defeat becomes weaker in its aftermath even though he manages to hold on to office. What events would characterize a weakened wartime leader? It is certain that among those who survived, some wartime leaders tend to face a tough domestic environment while others tend to enjoy a benign one. What factors would explain this variation? These are some of the questions that this study hopes to answer.

2.1.1 Selectorate Theory and Leader Tenure

The selectorate theory is considered a benchmark on the incentives motivating different actors in a political system. The framework of the domestic distribution of power provided by this theory has contributed immensely to the general theoretical development of the leader-based research program. Unfortunately, this theory's wide-ranging influence has led to the uncritical acceptance of the length of leader tenure as the only significant outcome of interest in the literature on wartime leaders. While it is true that the central goal of an incumbent is "to prevent being replaced by a challenger", it is also true that

leaders also care whether their agenda is being implemented or thwarted by domestic actors. A leader that is under constant threat from domestic opponents must be classified differently than one that is not. Unfortunately, most leader-based studies do not make this distinction very clear and treat all "survivors" as the same.

The selectorate theory classifies the universe of political actors in any country into two groups: (1) The leader of the government and his supporters that constitute the members of the "winning coalition"; (2) The "selectorate" that includes all other residents of the country including the opposition that are participants in the formal or informal processes of political competition or have the potential to assume that role in the future (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Among the selectorate theorists, Siverson (1980) was the first to establish the connection between the outcome of wars and regime change. He found that in the period 1815-1965, 45 out of 184 belligerent states saw a non-constitutional change of government within three years of a war's termination. Moreover, the chance of non-constitutional change was twice as likely for a government that was one the losing side.

Siverson's findings on regime change laid the basis for later studies on war and political survival of leaders in which the default theoretical position was that a defeat in war makes it harder for a leader to stay in power. Later studies from the selectorate theorists also made some rudimentary attempts to assess the effects of costliness of a war on the fate of leaders. For example, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller found substantial association between battle deaths and the probability of violent regime change, irrespective of a war's outcome(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992). In a later study, Bueno

de Mesquita and Siverson concluded that war costs alter the domestic political environment, they limited these implications to whether higher costs are associated with removal of leaders or not (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).

2.1.2   Are all surviving leaders alike?

Chiozza and Goemans' discussion of "ex-post efficiency" of war for a leader and his fellow citizens points to a contradiction between the interests of the ruler and the ruled when it comes to measuring the costs of war: When a leader decides to go to war, "…even though their country-as-a-whole will surely suffer…, under certain circumstances war may pay for leaders (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011, p. 8)." In their various contributions on this subject, Goemans and his collaborators have argued that the expected manner and consequences of losing office (i.e. the private costs of a leader) for defeat in war motivates leader behavior. In other words, a leader who expects to be removed in a regular, constitutional manner faces different incentives during wartime compared to one who foresees removal through irregular, violent methods. Following an impeding defeat, some leaders not only expect to be removed from office but to also suffer additional post-exit punishment in the form of death, imprisonment or exile. This creates a divergence in the interests of leaders and the mass public when it comes to war termination. If a leader fears severe post-exit punishment, he will be less willing to accept defeat and sue for peace even when he suffers heavy losses.

When leader-based studies quantify the benefits that a leader can get from waging war, they only check whether he survived after the war ended. If he was removed then the war did not pay off but if he survived, it did. It is true that survival in office and personal

safety are driving motivations of leader behavior. At the same time, leaders tend to also try their best to minimize intensity of opposition that they face while in office. Several "punishments" can be imposed on a leader by various actors even if they are unable to remove him from office or inflict post-exit retribution. A leader can survive after a war and still be made to pay a political price. In order to judge whether wartime leaders paid any price for their wartime performance, we have to closely examine what happened in their countries after the war ended. Previous studies on war and leader tenure have not considered the variance in the political effectiveness of surviving leaders. Some leaders are strengthened while others are weakened in the postwar period. Specifically, a leader that faces credible and recurring attempts by various domestic challengers to replace him can be classified as ineffective even though he survives a war. If war participation has an impact on a leaders' effectiveness, this must be investigated.

2.1.3 Turnover of wartime leaders: Does costliness matter?

The link between war outcome and leadership turnover is not always straightforward. When a leader is replaced by someone from the same political party or faction, leadership turnover may not have much significance. On the other hand, when a leader is replaced by someone supported by a different faction, it completely changes the domestic political equilibrium of the country.[2] If a war has created opportunities for a new coalition to stake their claims on power, it represents a significant change in the nature of

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[2] In his piece on the nature of regime change in the Arab world, Byman (2005) identifies three ideal types: (1) transition from one leader to another from the same cadre or power base, (2) shift from one group of elites to another and (3) shift from elite based rule to a regime that is more closely aligned with the preferences of the general population

the political competition (Byman, 2005). Hence, any leader that survives in office after a war must be differentiated according to the following criterion: Did involvement in international war strengthen or degrade the incumbent's hold on power? Studying the whole gamut of anti-government events in the immediate postwar period can help in answering this question.

Differentiating wartime leaders according to regime type has been used to explain postwar leadership turnover as well. In this framework, war outcomes serve as the signal for the people (principal) to decide whether to reward or punish the leadership (the agent). Goemans argues that leaders of semirepressive, moderately exclusionary, mixed or anocratic regimes are most likely to be severely punished for either a moderate or disastrous defeat while extremely repressive regimes can survive a moderate loss. Democratic leaders are unlikely to survive even a moderate defeat but would only suffer the cost of losing their office. Goemans argues in repressive regimes, an incumbent is more likely to survive a bad war outcome. Since dictatorial regimes are more willing than democracies and mixed regimes to use repression against their opponents, they can evade this punishment (H. E. Goemans, 2000). However, he did not test whether costliness of wars – irrespective of regime type or outcome – have an independent effect on the likelihood of punishment.

Scholars are beginning to recognize the complexity of postwar domestic politics and the role that war cost may play in explaining what happens after wars are terminated. For example, Colaresi examines the interaction between war costs, regime type and the length of rivalry prior to the outbreak of war on the postwar turnover of leaders(Colaresi,

2004). Although he finds some evidence for the proposition that defeat in a costly war

leads to leadership turnover irrespective of regime type, he is unable to reach any firm

conclusions on this question. He admits that in explaining leadership turnover, "…the

interaction between war costs and regime type may be more complicated than previously

expressed(Colaresi, 2004, p. 722)." Colaresi's contribution is in highlighting that the

costliness of a war and the reaction of groups that bear the brunt of its effects can have

important postwar political consequences. Colaresi's reservations regarding the nature of

this relationship is warranted and it further corroborates the insight of others (Chiozza &

Goemans, 2011; Debs & Goemans, 2010) that the relationship between war outcome and

the political fate of leaders is much more complex than previously suggested (Bueno de

Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al.,

2003). This is the reason that aside from war's outcome, the impact of costs on domestic

politics needs to be investigated in greater detail.

2.1.4   War and domestic dissension

Specifically, we need to theorize as to how war costs influence the behavior of

different players within a political system. A starting point could be to examine the

responses of "mass public" to the costs of war. In his work on war outcomes and military

strategy, Stam has argued that the expression of domestic dissent tend to be a byproduct of

most wars, across all regimes. War-related dissent is exacerbated with rising costs.

Although this is not his main focus, his logic that connects war and domestic dissent is very

useful for developing a cost-based theory of war's political effects. He argues that in all

regimes, it is up to a state's "mass publics" to decide whether the costs of a war justify its

expected benefits. During the war, if this mass public becomes unhappy and shows signs

of withdrawing its support, the government and the leader has two options: either employ coercion to eliminate dissidents or offer inducements to shore up supporters (Stam 1996). Although Stam's logic is useful, some questions remain: Once the costs of war have been incurred and are deemed unacceptable by the "mass public", how do they communicate their unhappiness within the political system? Why does the opposition decide to exploit visible signs of dissension in some cases but not in others? Do expensive wars have lingering political effects on the leader after the war is over? Some of these questions have been addressed in literature on US war participation and domestic politics where the availability of public opinion data makes micro-analysis feasible. The main bone of contention in these studies is whether war costs in the form of casualties and military expenditures erodes public support for the use of force (Baum, 2002; Baum & Groeling, 2010; Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Cotton, 1986; Gartner, 2008a, 2008b; Gartner & Segura, 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, & Barratt, 2004; Gartner, Segura, & Wilkening, 1997; Mueller, 1973). It is not surprising that following the Vietnam War that was marked by strong anti-war protests and political instability; scholars tried to establish that US war involvement tends to be accompanied with social and political dissension (Stohl, 1976) and loss of seats in wartime and postwar elections for the party in power (Cotton, 1986). During the late 1960s and 1970s, some interesting data analysis explored the link between war-related deaths and war termination. Klingberg studied some of the longest-lasting interstate and civil wars during the 1618-1918 period and found that the side that surrendered had lost approximately between 4 and 6 percent of their total population (Klingberg, 1966).

The broader interest in the drawing connections between the lethality and outcome of interstate wars and internal conflict has waned since its heydays in the late 1970s. During that phase, analysts of domestic violence like Skocpol had argued that the destabilizing effects of interstate war on the domestic balance of power in a society can trigger revolutionary changes (Skocpol, 1979).[3] In later years, others like Harvey Starr continued to argue that a connection between the negative consequences of war – popular discontent, erosion of legitimacy of the ruler, strengthened opposition etc. – and revolutionary upheaval does exist, (Starr 1994) there was surprising little interest in empirically analyzing this relationship. Besides the lack of empirical evidence for these claims, it is also questionable whether scholars of postwar domestic politics should only be focusing on revolutions at the expense of other indicators of instability in the aftermath of war. A revolution is a unique process of leader removal in which the leader and his supporters can expect to be violently targeted after their exit from power. Viewing war as a pretext for revolution also end up equating political punishment for a war leader with the termination of tenure and post-exit violence. Scholars recognize that war can generate a range of serious political problems for any leader while he is still in office, ranging in scale from "turmoil" to civil war that do not result in the removal of the leader. In their study, Wilkenfeld and Zinnes (1973) showed that interstate wars tends to worsen preexisting domestic conflicts of the "less intense variety" – demonstrations, strikes – but do not have

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[3] Starr sums up the central logic that motivates this literature: "War-to-revolution may be based upon war as an agent of change, as a factor in the growth of domestic discontent, as a factor in the weakening of governmental legitimacy and/or strength, or as a factor in the changing resource base of opposition groups. Whether a war is won or lost also must be factored into the war-to-revolution relationship (Starr 1994)."

as much impact on more violent forms of domestic dissension – revolutions, guerilla warfare, mass killings, purges and government crises. While Wilkenfeld and Zinnes provide a good first-cut empirical analysis of observable manifestations of various post-war incidents of instability, it is difficult to trust their conclusions given the limitations of their data. This study further investigates the fundamental intuition that had guided their arguments that interstate wars and domestic instability are linked. It hopes to advance this case by further clarifying how these connections are manifested in the form of specific events.

To summarize, two questions have been raised in this review. (1) Other than removal of wartime leaders, what are the other negative political consequences that can be generated by war participation? (2) Besides outcome, can costs explain the nature of postwar political events, specifically those that convey the scale and intensity of the opposition facing the government in power? In the section that follows, I will present my response to these questions and through a theory of war costs and their domestic political consequences.

2.2 A Cost-Based Theory of War and its Political Consequences

The focus of this section of the dissertation would be to articulate a theory that undergirds the hypotheses that follow. The core assertion made in this study is that costlier wars make it more likely that the government would face a whole range of negative "second-order" political consequences. This includes all those events that merit being classified as a major unrest or challenge to the government's authority. These may not result in the removal of the leader or the fall of the government but pose a serious threat to

it. Even if a wartime leader achieves the best possible result (i.e. a military victory and postwar survival), a greater incidence of anti-government activities worsens his domestic political environment which makes it harder to govern.[4] These domestic challenges can be manifested in several forms: threats to a government's territorial control by an insurgency, attempts at violent regime change by a coup and assassination against the leader, the erosion of political support for a government (See Figure 2.1). These challenges arise because a costlier war creates the political conditions under which opponents are able to threaten the incumbent. Even if the attempts by opponents to remove the leader are unsuccessful, he is forced to commit more resources to shore up his support and/or employ coercion in order to stay in power.

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[4] The traditional "expected utility" arguments also recognize that the costs of war can have serious domestic political consequences. For example, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson have argued that they key decision that a leader has to make prior to the start of a war is whether they want to incur these costs or not. Their formal model illustrates that, other things being equal, these costs of war make it harder for a leader to stay in power. Since the incumbent has ultimate responsibility failure of diplomacy that result in war, he is culpable for the lives lost and property that is destroyed. Hence, he is aware that he may pay a price for incurring these costs. Hence, the decision to participate in a war may be endogenous to the "domestic political circumstances" facing them. A leader will avoid getting into wars in which the expected costs are too high because these can threaten his survival. Hence, higher the prospective costs of war the more likely that a leader will look for a diplomatic resolution of international disputes to avoid getting involved in a war (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). However, as Croco, Sullivan and others have argued, leaders often underestimate the expected costs of war (Sullivan 2007). Some leaders tend to have a greater propensity to use force to settle international disputes than others (Wolford 2007). Once a war begins, a leader may feel compelled to persist even at great cost because he fears that quitting may invite severe punishment from the selectorate .

Figure 2.1 Pathway for Postwar Anti-Government Activities

The political benefits that war can bring – acquisition of more natural resources, capture of territory etc. – must be evaluated by analyzing the scale of domestic anti-government activities in the aftermath of the war. In order to test this proposition, all events that can potentially destabilize a government in the postwar period were used as the dependent variable of this study. The logic for doing so is that the understanding the factors that influence the postwar political environment can be far more illuminating than whether the wartime government survived or not.

There tends to be a "rally-around the flag effect" associated with all interstate wars. The initial rally effect tends to evaporate as costs grow during the course of a war. The disquiet with the rising costs of war may not translate into a politically viable opposition to

the wartime regime. This transformation requires political mobilization which takes time. Hence, it follows that the anti-government challenges and attempts at removing the leader are more likely to appear after the conclusion of the war. Although victory could help a leader and his wartime coalition to consolidate their hold on power, it matters what price was paid to achieve that outcome. The lower the price of war, the less likely is the leader and government to face an unstable domestic environment. This study seeks to test the cost of war as the main predictor for the level of domestic political unrest that may follow in its aftermath.

First, I will theorize about how the costs of war can potentially influence the mechanism that generates anti-government events, by changing the preferences of different political actors. Next, I will discuss the two kinds of costs – battle deaths and number of targeted civilians – that may be incurred by a country that wages war. Third, I will outline the theory to support my hypotheses on the impact of these two variables on postwar anti-government unrest. A set of additional hypotheses would explore why the relationship of these war costs with postwar domestic instability could be contingent upon other variables. In the next chapter, I will present the results of a quantitative analysis of these hypotheses.

2.3   Political actors and their preferences

Borrowing the conception of a selectorate and winning coalition proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators, an ideal-type of a political system[5] can be segregated

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[5] The selectorate theory distinguishes the universe of political actors in any country into two broad groups: (1) The leader of the government and his supporters that are the members of the broader "winning coalition"; (2) The "selectorate" that includes all other residents of the country that are participants in the formal or informal processes of political competition or have the potential to assume that role in the future. These also include the challengers or rivals that are interested in replacing the incumbent. A key assertion of this theory is that

into five sub-groups: (1) leader and key officials of the government, (2) the winning coalition that support the leader and directly or indirectly benefit from the status quo, (3) the counter-elites who are credible contenders to replace the incumbent, (4) members of smaller, disparate opposition groups that cannot topple the leader on their own but can make governance difficult, (5) mass public that are not directly involved in competition for political power except as voters in democracies or disenfranchised residents in nondemocratic regimes who give their tacit consent to the ruler. All these actors in a polity have dominant interests and preferences. A leader is primarily interested in extending his personal tenure in office for as long as possible given the constitutional or other constraints prevalent in the political system.

Besides survival, leaders are equally concerned with achieving their policy goals while in office.[6] Specifically, he must implement policies desired by his core supporters whose backing is pivotal for his survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).[7] A leader has to

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when the size of the winning is large, the provision of public goods is more efficient for a leader interested in staying in office. A leader backed by a larger coalition cannot use his taxing and spending power to distribute private goods among individual supporters in return for their allegiance. On the other hand, leaders with smaller winning coalitions can disburse private goods to a privileged group of supporters in exchange for their loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

[6] The selectorate theory posits that a leader is primarily interested in extending his tenure for which he must choose policies that are favored by the "median stake-holder" of the winning coalition. However, this is a very conservative view of the incentives motivating leaders. A leader has to not only satisfy the median stake holder but also recruit new members into his winning coalition.

[7] Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson posit that even in an authoritarian system where voting is not a relevant political activity, a leader still has to be responsive to the preferences of the median powerholder. A leader has to adopt policies that has the support of "… the individual or group that can count on the ability to mobilize more than half of the sum of all stakeholders' utilized power on behalf of its agenda against any possible challenge (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995, p. 843)(Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995: 843)." Their insight reminds us that even in authoritarian regimes, repression alone is not sufficient to stay in

overcome the veto players within the formal opposition as well as the winning coalition who can block his decisions or undermine his authority. Besides retaining his existing backers, a leader has to continuously expand his support base. In order to stay in power, a ruler employs a combination of three tactics: (i) placate new constituents by including them in the winning coalition, (ii) neutralize those opponents that can threaten his survival and (iii) ignore those that cannot pose a real threat. There is a segment of the opposition that is overt, mobilized, violent and aggressive which cannot be reconciled. A leader in a nondemocratic polity is more likely to apply suppressive methods like arrests and mass killing to eliminate such threats. Suppression is also employed to deter potential opponents. In democracies, violent repression is not as acceptable and governments have to find other means of counteracting the opposition.[8] It has been persuasively argued that leaders with larger winning coalitions find it more efficient to provide public goods rather than buying off a narrow constituency(Bueno de Mesquita, 2003). In varying degrees, a combination of the twin tactics of placation and neutralization are employed by all regimes to survive threats and implement their policies. The more intense the domestic threat faced by an incumbent, the more placation and neutralization has to be done by him to stay in power. Leaders can be differentiated by the intensity of challenge they face from domestic opponents.

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power. A leader also has to buy off constituencies that will support it proactively because they benefit from his largesse.

[8] Yet, even democratically elected leaders sometime resort to misusing their law enforcement agencies and the legal system to target and discredit political opponents.

The opposition consists of several cliques and parties who have a common minimum program: replace the current leader with someone more receptive to their preferences. The also try to detract the incumbent from pursuing his agenda while they wait to come to power. Within the broader opposition, the counter-elites are best placed to replace the leader since they have access to resources and organizational capacity necessary to form a new winning coalition. These counter-elites regularly update their beliefs on their chances of capturing power. As they have the most to gain, they are most likely to exploit any political vulnerability that the incumbent might develop due to policy failures.

These counter-elites and their supporters are different from another segment of the opposition: the groups and constituencies that have specific demands and grievances (e.g. secessionist movements, ethnic or religious groups). The mass public is organized along ethnic, regional, occupational or religious identities some of which are mobilized as political groups. Across, these groups, the mass public in any polity share an expectation that the government would protect them from foreign and domestic threats, manage the economy and provide public goods. At the same time, most members of the mass public tend not to possess detailed knowledge on policy questions even in advanced democracies.[9] The political impact of any negative feedback from the mass public to major exogenous events (e.g. natural calamity, economic crisis, war etc.) is heavily dependent by how counter elites channel this sentiment. A variety of mechanisms are available to counter elites to achieve this this goal depending on the nature of the polity.

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[9] Sometimes, constituencies and interest groups campaign for specific issues and set the policy agenda, although the scope of such activities may be restricted in authoritarian systems.

2.4   Different costs of war

In order to achieve political objective through war, a country has to endure casualties on the battlefield and in some cases, targeting of its civilian population. This study posits that both these parameters can have independent effects on the postwar domestic political environment that a government has to manage. (1) *Battle deaths:* Casualties that are suffered by combatants in the battlefield is the most direct, visible and unavoidable cost of any war. The Geneva Convention defines combatants in an interstate war as "all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party to the conduct of its subordinates." The loss of combatants has permanent effects – psychological and economic – for members of their families. Battlefield casualties begin to accumulate as soon as hostilities begin and escalate in proportion to the duration and severity of the war. Since the dawn of the age of nationalism, nation-states have made military service by the male members of society an integral duty of citizenship. The proportion of citizens that can be sacrificed for waging war is not limitless and excessive losses in the battlefield can severely damage the public morale. The record of the twentieth century has shown that there has been a secular decline in the number of battle deaths in interstate wars. This indicates that states are finding it harder to commit to wars in which they incur high casualties. Given the political sensitivity of the number of battle deaths, it can serve as an important metric in analyzing the costs of war participation for a country. (2) *Civilian targeting during war*: A war sometimes involves the deliberate targeting of civilians by the enemy forces. Civilian casualties during war can occur due to starvation blockade, aerial bombing of population centers, threats resulting in forced displacement and collateral damage when military

targets are attacked (Downes 2007). Belligerents have also engaged in intentional mass killing of noncombatants (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Failure to prevent loss of civilian life during war can threaten the incumbent's legitimacy and popularity. Evidence of civilian targeting also tells us where the war was fought: at home near population centers or at front or in distant lands. When hostilities occur near population centers, the stakes automatically are higher because the likelihood of damage to existing infrastructure becomes higher.[10]

2.4.1 Postwar Consequences of War Costs

In order to formulate testable propositions that link specific costs of war – battle deaths and targeting of civilians – with particular forms of postwar domestic political challenges, I theorize about the link between higher war costs the changes in the preferences of political actors. Domestic challenges against the government require that the opponents to the current regime are incentivized to undertake actions that threaten the status quo. The costs of war participation appear as an endogenous political crisis that creates opportunities for the opponents of a regime to unseat it from power.[11] This is

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[10] There is a third parameter of war cost: its economic impact. The financial burden of war involvement can be immense even for wealthy nations. However, there are problems with using this measure. The overwhelming tendency of most states tends to be to postpone paying the economic costs of the war through short-term and long-term loans. Also, in such situations, allies often come to the rescue and bail out nations struggling to pay the costs of war. Therefore, states are able to avoid inflicting the financial burden of war on their citizens. Other issue with examining this parameter is that very often economic problems facing a country are unrelated to war involvement but a legacy of domestic policy decisions taken years ago. Moreover, international events like regional or global financial crises can have a far greater immediate political impact than a spike in defense expenditure associated with the war.

[11] This study extends the Gartner's logic regarding the effects of casualties on wartime public opinion to explain the changing incentives of the different actors in a polity: "When the individual's utility for estimated costs exceeds their estimated value of the benefits, they oppose the conflict (Gartner 2008)."

especially true if the actual war costs turn out to much greater than the prewar estimates outlined by the political leadership. A leader and government that underestimate the costs of war become highly vulnerable to their domestic opponents.

Wars can coalesce the collective will of a national will around a specific national security goal shared by the rulers and the ruled (Schweller, 2009).[12] However, once the costs have accumulated, cohesion can be replaced by dissension and discontent. The coercive mechanisms applied by the state for mobilization of human and material resources for war can generate popular discontent. This provides the soil in which political opponents can exploit popular weariness into domestic political challenges against the ruling establishment. Hence, wartime mobilization can be a double-edged sword. By its very nature, mass mobilization is designed to transmit the costs of war throughout society. War mobilization involves the exercise of coercion by the government to extract resources from the populace. State-sanctioned compulsion is necessary for mobilization because the collective action and free rider problem can be particularly acute during war. Since the benefits of a public good like national defense are nonexcludable, there is great incentive for each individual citizen to avoid paying his share of the cost of war (Stein, 1980). Governmental coercion can come in various guises: conscription or compulsory military service, higher taxes, forced nonmilitary labor (Tilly, 1978). Unlike government

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[12] It is worthwhile to note that the fundamental insight of neoclassical realism is that in order to implement a vision of a grand strategy, the motivation of a leader and the elite is not sufficient. They must get the consent of key domestic constituencies to allocate resources to support their strategic goals (See Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro eds. 2009).

expenditures in peacetime, wartime expenses are visible to the mass public who can calculate the utility of these costs (Stein 1980).

The basic import of this discussion is that the magnitude of the costs that war imposes – battle deaths and targeting of civilians – can alter the "perpetual disposition" of the competing elites as well as most members of the mass public (Jervis, 1976). Most nation states are built on the consensus among the members of the selectorate that supporting a military force by paying taxes is essential for unambiguously valuable public good such as national defense (Stein 1980). It is the tolerance of citizens to suffer specific war costs such as deaths and destruction of population centers that can vary. The capacity of the members of warring states to absorb casualties can be very crucial variable in determining victory and defeat (Mack, 1975). From the perspective of wartime leaders and their military advisors, battle deaths can be a key variable in judging whether a war is going poorly or not. While there might be a threshold of battle deaths beyond which a leader has no choice but to accept defeat (Klingberg, 1966),[13] in some cases reports of military successes can help overcome public weariness with costs in an on-going war (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2009, Stam 1996).[14]

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[13] This is a controversial assertion and the empirical tests on this question have produced mixed results. On the one hand, Klinberg found evidence that modern states find it impossible to continue fighting if their casualties reach 3 to 4 % of their total population. On the other hand, Rosen has discovered that quite a large proportion of defeated states capitulated to their adversary even though their percentage of casualties as a proportion of total population was less than .05 % (Klingberg 1966; Rosen 1972).

[14] According to Gelpi et al. a number of other factors can also impact citizens' support for US military operations besides success: "…the stakes, the costs (both human and financial), the trustworthiness of the administration, the quality of public consensus on the policy goal in question (p. 2). It is just that success matters more than anything else. As I argue later, this may be true for the US but these factors would operate very differently in other countries that get involved in war. The argument of Gelpi and his co-authors that American public bases its support for military operations based on a cost-benefit analysis in which success is

While the leader and his closest advisors pay attention to battle deaths, they are more focused on the war's outcome because they fear that they will suffer severe political and personal consequences if they lose (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). Maintaining the wartime morale in response to rising casualties is an essential ingredient of wartime leadership. The decision to initiate war or to engage with an attacker reflects a consensus among a country's leader and a significant section of the selectorate that paying its costs is better than the status quo. Some sections of the selectorate including members of the winning coalition change their initial support once the costs are incurred. If casualties trigger popular unrest and calls to end the war, the leader is faced with a conundrum. There is persuasive empirical evidence that a culpable leader is unlikely to survive in office if he were to terminate the war on unfavorable terms. Hence, an increase in casualties or other costs during wartime may not be sufficient to compel a leader and his key advisors to concede defeat. Under these circumstances, managing the war effort becomes the highest priority for the government and other items on the domestic policy agenda tend to get neglected. This can be highly risky for whoever is in power (Wilkenfeld and Zinnes 1973). The more time and resources that a wartime leader has to allocate for a war effort, the

the most important criterion is persuasive in the light of the evidence they provide. At the same time, one should not lose sight of the fact that their theoretical claims are limited to the unique context of US domestic politics. There is no reason to assume that the reaction of the mass public to high war costs in other countries will mirror those in the US. Besides the many intricacies of the US political system such as term limits for the President and gerrymandering of Congressional districts, the great power status of the US is a crucial factor in how the issue of war costs plays out in its domestic politics. The US is an advanced democracy that has been a global power for over hundred years. Its political institutions are highly durable that are capable of mediating dissent through institutional and non-institutional mechanisms as well through a public debate among various civil society groups. Another key difference is that except the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the World Trade Center and the Civil War, the US has not experienced mass casualty warfare on its homeland.

fewer assets are available to solve internal problems. If unresolved, these can threaten the leader's survival and allow his domestic opponents to carry out anti-government activities.

Like other issues of public policy, the members of the winning coalition can hold divergent views on the wisdom of waging a war. Those with the closest "affinity" to the war policy may support paying any price to achieve the war aims (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003). However, there would be some who would withdraw their initial support for the war if the country suffers an outright defeat or if the war imposes heavy costs and suffering on the people. These people are more likely than others to defect from the wartime winning coalition in the postwar period. Guided by their interest of self-preservation, they would try to put a distance between themselves and an unpopular war. There is another group which may have privately disagreed with the decision to go to war but went along with the decision due to partisan or professional considerations. Defection at an opportune time can improve their chances of becoming members of another coalition that can stake its claim to power in the postwar period. In sum, what is crucial to understand is that once a country wages war all political actors have to take a stand on whether they support or oppose it. Therefore, a key question that defines political allegiances in the postwar period is whether a war's costs were justified or not.

This is why political management of war also involves achieving strategic goals at the minimum cost possible. If the public perception is that the war's cost was not worth the gains, counter-elites are likely to be encouraged to stake their claim for power. A costlier war may encourage them to forge an alternative winning coalition to challenge the government. It does not matter if the counter-elites overestimate their assessment of their

chances of coming to power. From an incumbents' point of view, what is crucial is whether they undertake actions to overthrow or destabilize him. The incumbent government may also detect these threats and undertake preemptive actions like purges to neutralize them before these emerge. The counter-elites may forge temporary alliances with smaller groups organized on regional or ethnic basis that are not serious contenders for power. These groups have the capacity create turmoil by organizing dramatic events (e.g. guerilla strikes, assassinations of key government officials) that can destabilize the polity. Some of these groups may have long-standing grievances that precede the war. They may form an alliance of convenience with the counter-elites for the limited goal of replacing the current ruler.

Casualties not only influence those that are directly affected (i.e. the armed forces and their families) but also the national morale. Wartime mobilization that emphasizes a sense of unified purpose can foster greater empathy for fellow citizens who are killed or injured in battle. This often translates into expressions of solidarity with the troops. After the war the mass public has to make a judgment about the utility of war (Stam 1996). The number of casualties is one of the measure by which this utility is judged. Higher number of battle deaths has the potential to worsen existing political disagreements between the opponents and supporters of the incumbent. In more open political systems, this would be manifested in the form of "turmoil" – grassroots protest movements, and an increase in the saliency of the war as an election issue (Cotton, 1986; Mueller, 1973; Stein, 1980; Stohl, 1976). Conversely, in more closed political systems it is more likely to appear in the form of violent attempts at regime change such as assassination attempts, localized insurgencies and a coup. It is also likely that nondemocratic governments are better at preempting such

threats by the deliberate targeting of their opponents through purges. Higher casualty can be interpreted by the public as a sign of incompetence of the wartime leader by the mass public triggering events that threaten the government. Finally, higher casualties are more likely to generate elite disagreement on the overall national security policy. Any breakdown of elite consensus will influence the nature of leadership succession and create opportunities for new elites to capture power (Legro 2005).

2.4.2 Post-hoc Assessment of War Costs

After the war is over, casualties and other costs serve as a crucial benchmark for the selectorate to evaluate the utility of the war (i.e. whether these were justified given the outcome). War costs continue to influence the political behavior of the members of leader's winning coalition, the counter-elites, the opposition groups and the attitudes of the mass public in the postwar period. A widespread belief that the costs of war and its benefits are not in equilibrium can translate into attempts at regime change by counter elites and opponents of the current regime. Even if these attempts are thwarted, an open struggle for power can potentially weaken the incumbent. There are other reasons to expect fragmentation of the ruling elite and internal dissension against the leader and the ruling government following wars that turn out to be costlier than expected. The loss of a large number of armed personnel can create resentment against the incumbent within the military. Some senior and mid-level officers can conspire to remove the leader through a coup or assassination. Postwar demobilization of the military can provide a pool of unemployed young men trained in firearms to join the ranks of various contending groups providing an essential ingredient for internal violence.

The core function of any government is the protection of citizens against foreign enemies.   This is why the failure of a government to protect its civilians can have serious political consequences.   Such an occurrence can also influence the political environment after the end of a war. Warring states have found it strategically beneficial to inflict civilian casualties to compel their adversary to submit to their demands and bring about a quicker end to a war (Downes, 2006). Empirical support for this theory underscores the powerful political impact of civilian casualties on war outcomes. A cursory look at the data on interstate wars – especially in the last century – indicates that very few belligerents have managed to sustain a war effort with high levels of civilian casualties.   Many belligerents have acted on the belief that if they can kill sufficient numbers of enemy civilians, their adversary's resolve to continue fighting will be broken. It could be that civilian casualties increase the prospect of internal conflict that all leaders wish to avoid. I make the case in this study that those belligerents whose civilians were targeted are likely to face a more challenging postwar environment than those where these were not. A war in which civilians of a country have come under serious attack is by its very nature going to be more controversial because the costs of war are much harder to conceal.   When civilians are threatened in a meaningful way, it makes it more likely that the political decision to wage war becomes a contentious issue for postwar domestic politics.

Direct attacks on civilians by a foreign power can alter the political dynamic in the specific area where such targeting occurs and change the overall domestic political situation of a country. An escalation in civilian suffering can politicize segments of the mass public that may not have developed clear views on the war. In countries where concentrated pockets of population have long standing grievances against the state, civilian

casualties can worsen this pre-existing dynamic. If the state resources have been

temporarily diminished due to the allocation for war, the prospective rebels, insurgents or

participants in a civil war are incentivized to exploit this window of opportunity and target

a weakened incumbent.   Hence, civilian suffering in a concentrated region increases the

opportunity available for all anti-government political entrepreneurs to try and depose the

current regime.   If opponents are convinced that the current government has been

weakened by war participation, they are more likely to directly confront the regime. If

these groups believe that they can achieve their aims through violence, a government must

allocate resources to counteract them or risk being deposed. Those civilians that are not

directly affected by war may also turn against a government that fails to thwart an assault

on key population centers. When any country suffers civilian casualties during war, it

symbolizes a strategic failure to defend its territorial sovereignty. Even if the eventual

outcome is a victory, civilian deaths are likely to pose a political problem for any

government in the postwar period. Thus, the occurrence of even a few civilian casualties

changes the complexion of a war and by extension, postwar politics.   This is not to say that

the variation in the numbers of civilians killed is not important as well. Thus, the first point

of distinction is whether there was a reasonable threat to the civilian population by a state's

war involvement and the second level of variation is the actual number of killings that

occurred during the war. My argument is that interstate wars in which civilians had

reasonable fear of being harmed by the enemy should be categorized differently than those

where this was not a possibility. This is why I have tried to test for the effect of both these

variations on the number of postwar threats through the hypotheses outlined below.

It could be argued that an average member of the mass public lack the capacity to make a rational cost-benefit evaluation of war as their "individual-level knowledge of central facts of war is weak (Berinsky 2009: p. 124)." However, even if the entire populace of a country does not have equal information about some of the war's "central facts" (e.g. geostrategic stakes, the terms of settlement etc.), the tangible effects of war such as battle deaths and civilian casualties are likely to leave a political impact on any war-affected country . When the effects of war are felt by individuals and communities in any meaningful way, they can no longer remain neutral or indifferent. The members of the mass public have to take a position – positive or negative – on the utility of the war. It is quite possible that if the decision to engage in war was taken by the leader of their partisan or social group, some members of the mass public would continue to support it despite its heavy costs (Berinsky 2009). Even if this were to be the case, mobilization of one section of the population in opposition and consolidation of another section in support for it would only serve to further accentuate the breakdown in domestic consensus on national security. This disaffection among segments of the mass public changes the political calculus of counter-elites as well as the broader opposition that can trigger anti-incumbent mobilization. This study emphasizes that anti-government mobilization is as significant as the survival of a wartime leader or what happens to him after his exit. Any leader that faces recurring postwar challenges will find it difficult to take decisions that align with his preferences in important issue areas. Veto players in the polity would be emboldened to block his decisions. It has been argued that leaders have often waged wars with the intention of consolidating their hold on power. Even when a leader achieves the best possible outcome – victory and postwar survival in office – there are two factors that

determine whether he will get the political benefit from this outcome. First, there is a time lag between a victory in war and distribution of its benefits among the winning coalition. Second, a leader has to ensure that a substantial plurality of citizens have to give their consent – or are coerced – to pay the costs of war. While these costs are immediate, the benefits from a favorable war outcome are prospective (Stam 1996, p. 28). No leader or government can wage war without extracting resources from the citizens. This study posits that the higher the level of extraction required for waging a war, the greater the anti-government unrest in the postwar period. Even if a wartime leader is replaced under the logic of culpability that does not exhaust the possibility that the postwar period would be highly unstable. Costlier wars destabilize the polity by giving opportunities to new counter-elites to bid for power. This change in incentive makes it more likely that they would undertake anti-government activities.

2.4.3 Anti-Government Activities

The outcome of interest in this study is the variation in the number of observable anti-government activities in country that has recently waged a war. I define anti-government activities as those events that make it more difficult for an incumbent to rule effectively. An anti-government activity would be an overt and blatant expression of discontent by an individual or group against a given regime. Anti-government actors can undertake violent actions that target symbols of the state – including senior officials – which may or may not threaten the survival of the government. Or they can precipitate a crisis that creates a policy paralysis. In other instances, the counter-elites can organize a conspiracy to remove the incumbent regime by illegal means. This dependent variable focuses attention away from the crude indicator of survival versus removal of individual

leaders to the degree of "effective control" that a regime enjoys over a given period. The concept of effective control is commonly used in the discipline of international law in the literature on sovereignty to establish whether foreign intervention for domestic human rights abuses is justified or not. A leader that is constantly buffeted by the actions of his domestic opponents that question his legitimacy and threaten his survival cannot be placed in the same category as one who is able to implement his policy agenda with little or no resistance. Both types of leaders are "survivors" but the latter is in a much more effective ruler than the former. This study follows several others in trying to isolate the domestic effects of war participation on leaders and their regimes. Since I firmly believe that all surviving leaders are not alike, I wanted to locate a dependent variable that would capture the variation in their "effective control" over their societies.

In summary, the central thesis of this project is that higher levels of battle deaths and civilian targeting in an interstate war would alter the three parameters that shape domestic political competition in a polity in the aftermath of a war: (1) the opportunities available to challengers to overthrow an incumbent, (2) level of discontent amongst the mass public and (3) defection from the winning coalition. When these parameters are altered, they change the likelihood of anti-government activities in a society. Thus, the three central hypotheses of this study are as follows.

H1a: *The higher the battle deaths, the greater the likelihood of anti-government activities in the postwar period.*

H1b: *Noncombatant casualties increase the likelihood of anti-government activities in the postwar period.*

Figure 2.2: A Model of War Costs and its Political Effects

2.4.4   War Cost and Anti-Government Activities: Contingent Factors

The discussion so far has tried to establish how the scale of costs may be useful explaining the anti-government events after the end of the war. In addition, there are strong theoretical grounds to justify that some factors can interact with war costs to influence its effect on postwar unrest. These include (1) the rules and norms that govern domestic political competition and transfer of power which is correlated with regime type; (2) whether the country was the initiator or the target and (3) the interests at stake in the war.

Regime type

Impact of war costs on postwar political developments can vary depending on the representativeness of political systems. Characteristically, nondemocratic regimes are

much more likely to neutralize the political opposition by force. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson have made the case that the longer an authoritarian leader stays in power, the greater the likelihood of his survival after defeat in war (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). The length of tenure should make the winning coalition of an autocratic leader much more stable making it harder for his domestic opponents to remove him. This is why autocratic leaders are looking to wipe out the opposition by coercion and solidify their credentials with the winning coalition. Under these circumstances, it is less likely that counter-elites would be able to mobilize mass dissension associated with higher war costs.

The norms and means of political competition in a democratic and a nondemocratic polity are likely to be very different. The use of violence by opposition may not be the exact point of distinction across regime types. In fact, a recent study found that nonviolent campaigns tend to emerge more frequently under nondemocratic systems(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). What is important is that in a representative political system with a constitutional mechanism for the transfer of power, opponents can use legally available means to challenge and remove the government over a variety of policy failures. Given that democratic states have tended to avoid fighting high fatality wars, one can infer that the index of costliness is a measure by which democratic incumbents are likely to be judged by their constituents (Valentino, Huth, & Croco, 2010). Since their opponents know this, the costlier the war the more likely they are to undertake actions to destabilize the incumbent. Since barriers to removing an incumbent are lower and the opposition has a high chance of capturing power, democracies are more prone to events that are classified as "threats" in this dissertation. In a democratic polity, there is a greater incentive for political entrepreneurs to exploit symptoms of mass dissension. The counter-elites,

dissatisfied members or the existing winning coalition and smaller oppositional groups and factions are more likely to mobilize against the incumbent when the mass public shows signs of being unhappy with the costliness of the war. This is why overall quantum of the antigovernment activities that would be observed in a democratic polity may be higher than in a nondemocratic regime.

This leads to the following hypotheses:

H2a: *The marginal effects of higher battle deaths on anti-government activities in the postwar period are higher in democracies than in nondemocracies*

H2b: *The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-government activities is higher in democracies than in nondemocracies.*

Initiators versus Targets

Studies of war as well as databases like COW have tried to code belligerents based on who started the hostilities. This is commonly referred to as the "role" of the country in a war. Previous studies on leader survival have reported systematic differences among the two categories of belligerents: initiators and targets. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) found that leader of targeted states have a harder time surviving in office or escaping post-exit punishment while the war was in progress. According to their data, 37 % of leaders that initiated war faced some form of punishment in the form of removal from office, imprisonment, exile or death, while 44% of targeted leaders faced a similar fate. Other studies have compared the war outcomes for these two categories and discovered that initiators tend to be victorious much more often than targets(Wang & Ray, 1994). What

has been established is that the distinction between initiator and target merits further investigation whenever we are studying any aspect of interstate war. It is quite possible that there is something fundamentally different in the consequences faced by targets and initiators after a costly war. If we follow the framework of the expected utility explanations of war, a state and its leader that decides to start a war would do so because of the conviction that its benefits would outweigh its costs. A leader or government that intends to start a war has to make his case to the winning coalition as well as to rest of the selectorate to convince them that he can achieve their pre-war aims at an acceptable cost. On the other hand, the leader of the targeted country only has the option to either submit the initiator's demands or pay the costs of war to defend the status quo.

Hence, the question that has to be examined is as follows: Do costlier wars have a different impact on the number of anti-government actions depending on whether the belligerent was a target or an initiator? I argue that when the political leadership of a country that started the war miscalculates its expected costs, the decision to wage war becomes immensely controversial at home. When the pre-war estimates of war costs declared by the initiator turn out to be wrong, his political "culpability" should be far greater than that of a target. Therefore, those that start wars have a smaller window of opportunity to achieve their strategic goals during wartime. On the other hand, the domestic political dynamic facing a targeted leader that has to incur the costs of war are likely to be different. Under these circumstances, the costs of the war could be blamed on the foreign attacker rather than the leader. Members of the selectorate may be more tolerant of war costs when these are incurred to defend external aggression. The opposition and the counter-elites may feel compelled to support the government in a moment of

national crisis. The counter-elites would find it harder to blame the incumbent for incurring costs of a war that was forced upon him by a foreign power.

If the decision to wage war becomes a controversial issue, then all bets are off. It becomes more likely that opponents of the regime responsible for initiating the war would exploit the war costs for political gain and to attack the incumbent. The unity forged through mass mobilization for protecting one's homeland from a foreign invader may prove more durable and resistant to domestic dissension caused by high war costs. Since the threat from foreign invasion is clearer to an average citizen, there will be greater willingness to accept the hardships caused by such a war. Among countries that initiate the use of force pre-war disagreement among elites is more likely to come out in the open if the costs of war is perceived to be too high by the general public.   If the costs of war exceed pre-war expectations these divisions within the elite are likely to get exposed. On the other hand, a targeted leader that successfully thwarts an invasion can get political credit for protecting the homeland.   When it is clear that a foreign invasion was responsible for the costs of war, the opposition may find it difficult to politically exploit any discontent amongst the mass public. This is the justification for the hypothesis that a government of a targeted country is more likely to escape facing the political challenges that higher costs of war tends to generate. This makes it theoretically plausible to explore the interaction of war costs with whether or not a state was the initiator to theorize that the negative political impact of high levels of costs would be greater for initiators. This argument can be restated in the form of the following hypotheses:

H3a: *The marginal effect of battle deaths on postwar anti-government activities in countries that initiated wars is likely to be higher than those that were targeted.*

H3b*: The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-government activities is higher in countries that initiated wars than those that were targeted.*

High versus Low Stakes in War

While this study focuses attention on the political consequences of war costs, one has to recognize that wars differ in their saliency and consequences.   The adverse political outcomes that are precipitated by the costs of war can be contingent upon the specific nature of the dispute that led to the war. When the dispute is with a long-standing rival or when there are territorial issues or a boundary question, political stakes are likely to be very high. When adversary's war aims are high, heavy losses in war are less likely to be associated with high levels of instability in domestic politics in the postwar period. This is because there is a strong political justification to incur these costs. Great powers can get involved in low-utility wars with relatively weak states in which their costs neither threaten their domestic economy nor their standing in the international order. Powerful states have the resources to absorb the costs of low-utility wars and it is possible that their leaders calculate that their domestic political standing will remain largely unaffected by these costs. The problem is that the strategic benefits from a total victory in a low-utility war tend to be intangible for the general population. This makes it hard for the wartime government to defend the costs that are incurred in such an enterprise.

If the country's war costs are deemed unacceptable by the mass public, then the regime in power is confronted with a political problem. Even when these costs are a miniscule segment of the total assets and resources that the country can feasibly allocate to a war effort, this can have serious political consequences if there is a popular belief that these costs were unjustified. Hence, the scale of costs may be a good predictor of the postwar political consequences faced by a wartime leader and his successors in low-utility wars. Therefore, when the stakes are high a political backlash against the government for excessive war costs is less likely but the chances of such problems are higher when the strategic interests are not that salient. The political environment following a costlier low stakes war is more conducive for the counter-elites trying to wrest power away from the incumbents than a costlier high stakes war. Even if these counter-elites observe some signs of public unhappiness with war costs after a high stakes war they may not find it politically conducive to do so. Based on the above discussion, the contingent effect of high war stakes on the relationship between war costs and postwar anti-government activities can be hypothesized as follows:

H4a *The marginal effect of battle deaths on anti-government activities will be lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one that has waged a low stakes war.*

H4b *The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-government activities will be lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one that has waged a low stakes war.*

3 Data Analysis

3.1 Introduction

This chapter uses quantitative methods to explore the factors associated with a specific kind of political events that follow the end of war – activities of domestic actors that create problems for the incumbent government. The central hypothesis of this study is that the heavier the costs incurred in a war, the more anti-government activities will occur in the postwar period. The data analysis in this chapter compares the number of anti-government actions among countries that participated in wars and attempts to isolate the factors that explain this variation. I understand antigovernment actions to mean any event that makes it harder for a government to rule effectively. These can be in the form of violent attacks or a political crisis caused by defections from the winning coalition. Later, I describe in greater detail how this response variable has been operationalized for this study.

I expected this cross-national comparison to reveal whether heavier war costs influences the likelihood of postwar threats against the government. The results only provided partial support for the central thesis of this study. Countries whose civilians had a reasonable chance of being harmed experienced higher number of anti-government actions – as predicted by hypothesis H1b. On the other hand, battle deaths had no effect on these events. Three contingent predictors – regime type, war stakes and role in war (i.e. initiator vs. target) were also tested for possible interaction with the two war cost variables. For initiators, higher battle deaths seem to have a bearing on the likelihood of postwar threats. If a country expended too many lives after starting a war, then its postwar domestic environment tended to be unstable. Democracies also faced a similar problem if they

suffered civilian casualties. Postestimation analyses of the marginal effects were conducted to further illustrate the effects of these contingent factors.

The impact of war involvement on domestic politics can be analyzed at various levels. It is possible to compare the fate of different wartime leaders by contrasting their lengths of tenure; track changes in citizen attitudes towards war policy through opinion surveys or study relevant domestic events in countries after they have terminated a military engagement. I have adopted third approach to identify the link between the costs of war and its political effects. In the correlates of war (COW) database that I used for this study, an "interstate war" is defined by Small and Singer as any militarized dispute between two independent states with a combined count of at least one thousand battle deaths per year (or twelve-month period) (Small & Singer, 1982). The cut-off for a country to be classified as a war participant was a minimum commitment of 1,000 troops – or 100 battle deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010, p. 75).

COW lists 193 country-level observations of interstate wars between 1919 and 1999. Since some countries fought more than one war at approximately the same time, including all the observations as they appear in the COW dataset was inappropriate for the requirements of this study. This study is focused on explaining the political events within a country after it finished fighting. For example, the US is listed in COW as a belligerent in three separate wars in South-East Asia during the 1965-1975 period: Vietnam War Phase 2 (Inter-state # 163) the Laotian War Phase 2 (Inter-state # 170) and the Communist Coalition War (Interstate # 176) (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Since my main concern was the period following a war, I decided to count some of these instances of war involvement as a single observation in the dataset created for this study. For a few countries that fought interstate wars in quick succession, I decided to count them as a single case of war involvement. For example, the US involvement in Vietnam over the period 1965-1975 and the domestic threat events in the subsequent 5 year postwar period, 1976-81 form a single observation in my dataset. The battle deaths suffered by the US would include all its losses in these three wars in South-East Asia. This is based on the assumption that for the domestic audience in the US, the Vietnam War was a single war episode that ended in 1975 rather than three discrete events. Hence, it does not make sense to count the periods after the end of Laotian and Communist Coalition Wars as unique observations of "postwar periods" although these wars were terminated in 1973 and 1971 respectively. After making these modifications, I was left with 156 country-level observations or war involvement between 1919 and 2004. Table 3.1 lists all the variables included in the model and the number of missing cases. The hypotheses were tested with 114 cases for which information was available.

Table 3.1 List of Independent Variables and Frequency of Missing Cases

Independent Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Ln(Battle Deaths)	1	0.6
Civilian Casualties Dummy	14	9.0
Net Military Expenditure	19	12.2
ΔGDP (%)	15	9.6
Ethnic Fractionalization	3	1.9
Years Since Independence	3	1.9
Population	1	0.6
Regime Type	3	1.9
Defeat Dummy	0	0
Initiator Dummy	0	0
Stakes Dummy	0	0

3.2   Operationalization of War Costs

Battle deaths and civilian fatalities are the two measure of war costs used in the analysis. The assumption behind this choice is straightforward. These are the most observable and direct effects of war involvement for any belligerent. Their political significance can be gauged from the fact that outside of the two world wars, it has been rare for nations in the twentieth century to engage in interstate wars in which their battle deaths exceeded 1% of their total population. This study assumes that the post-hoc assessment of the expected value of war by various domestic actors is influenced by the human costs of war. Some previous studies have analyzed these cost variables to reach conclusions about war termination and postwar survival of leaders. It has been previously argued that that the tolerance to war-related fatalities and the power to inflict them on your enemy often determines who ends up on the winning side (Mack, 1975; Slantchev, 2003). Among the subset of the most lethal wars of the period spanning from 1618 to 1918, Klingberg found that there is a threshold range of battle deaths and civilian casualties − 6 percent of the total population − beyond which no side in a war was able to carry on fighting (Klingberg, 1966). In the leader survival literature, Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators have found that all else being equal, higher battle deaths tend to increase the risk of removal for leaders, across all regime types and outcomes(Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).

The model of war costs outlined in Chapter 3 had articulated that the preferences of the domestic political actors following a war are likely to be influenced by the number of battle deaths and civilian casualties that had been incurred. The higher the battle deaths and civilian casualties, the more actors interested in removing the current regime are incentivized to undertake actions that threaten the incumbent. Domestic actors can

destabilize the internal political environment for the ruler even if they are unsuccessful in

removing him. Therefore, a crucial aspect of the postwar political management for any

wartime leader is to convince a broad section of the selectorate that the war was worth the

cost. Thus, the question that the study seeks to answer is whether the number of military

and civilian casualties influences how opponents react to an incumbent after the war.

The distribution of the raw data for both these casualty measures was found to be

right skewed. In order to normalize the battle data and make it appropriate for analysis,

standard modifications like a log transformation were undertaken. The raw numbers of

battle deaths suffered by a belligerent were converted into a log by adding 1: Log(Battle

Deaths +1). I also tested my models with the log of $\left[\left(\frac{\text{Batte Deaths}}{\text{Number of Armed Personnel}}\right) + 1\right]$. This

was done to account for the variation in the size of the military of different countries in the

sample. The bulk of the information on deaths of combatants has been accessed from the

Correlates of War (COW) database and Clodfelter's volume on wars and casualties

(Clodfelter, 2002; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Where there was a discrepancy between the

two sources, I kept the casualty figure reported by Clodfelter. The data on civilian fatalities

in interstate wars between 1919 and 1999 was retrieved from Downes and supplemented

with information from Valentino et al. (Downes, 2006; Valentino et al., 2010). I follow

Mitchell's (2012) recommendation to generate robust standard errors while running the

models for this analysis where the distribution of the data was very likely to exhibit

problems like heteroscedasticity and absence of normality.

I generated correlation coefficients to identify whether there is any association

among the variables that were included in this data analysis (See Table 3.2). It is notable

that the highest correlation was found to be between battle deaths and civilian casualties.

At 0.54 the correlation between the two war cost indicators can be classified as moderate.

Among the three contingent variables that I expected to impact the relationship between

war cost and postwar antigovernment events, the only concern is with high war stakes'

covariation with the two indicators of war cost – battle deaths (0.41) and civilian casualties

(0.37). Thus, any interaction effect that may be observed between the stakes dummy and

any of the two war cost variables must be treated with caution. At the same time, a

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test in the ordinary least squares (OLS) model did not

detect any multicollinearity problems.

Battle deaths and civilian casualties may tell us something unique about a country

that has waged war. The first thing to note is that civilian deaths in an interstate war are a

rare occurrence. Unlike battle deaths that impact the combat forces and their families, an

incidence of civilian casualties serves as a proxy for some unique characteristics about a

country that took part in an interstate war. First, it can tell us that a segment of the war was

fought inside a country's territorial boundary during which its population centers may have

been deliberately targeted by the enemy. Civilian losses can also occur as collateral

damage when armed forces clash near population centers. While it is theoretically possible

to downplay the scale of battle deaths under some circumstances (e.g. under high repressive

regimes or in wars fought away from home), it is almost impossible to do so when civilians

are targeted. When civilians are hurt due to fighting during wartime, the news of such an

event is harder to suppress as this is also likely to trigger forced displacement out of the

areas that have come under attack. Secondly, an assault on civilians also often comes with

a destruction of the existing domestic infrastructure that is likely to be concentrated around

population centers. This could be the reason why many of the countries have chosen to fight wars away from home precluding any chance of civilian deaths. This is particularly the case with many of the foreign interventions by major powers like the US, UK and their allies during the twentieth century.

With rare exceptions, most countries avoided getting drawn into protracted interstate wars that would put their home population at risk. This could also be the reason that even countries that get into territorial wars with their neighbors, they prefer to sue for peace the moment their civilian populations come under serious threat.   For example, although India and Pakistan have fought four border wars in the six decades since their independence over a variety of highly contentious issues, none of these wars escalated to the point where either side suffered heavy civilian casualties. Approximately 75% of the belligerent states in my sample lost less than hundred civilians in such wars, while 65% had no casualties. Given the large proportion of cases with no fatalities, it was deemed appropriate to covert civilian fatalities into a categorical variable rather than undertaking a log transformation. In any case, a log transformation of a distribution with so many zeroes would not overcome its extreme skewness.

Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix of the Variables in the Data Analysis

	Anti-Govt	Battle Deaths	Civilian Cas.	Log(Net mil exp + 100)	ΔGDP (%)	Ethnic Frac.	Years indep.	Popln.	Democ.	Defeat	Init.	Stakes	No Leader Change
Anti-Government Threats (DV)	1.00												
Battle Deaths	0.03	1.00											
Civilian Casualties (3 categories)	0.20	0.54	1.00										
Log(Net military expenditure + 100)	− 0.18	0.33	− 0.08	1.00									
Δ GDP (%)	0.06	0.09	− 0.09	0.05	1.00								
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.004	0.10	− 0.37	0.18	0.99	1.00							
Years since independence	− 0.06	− 0.37	− 0.02	− 0.11	− 0.24	− 0.22	1.00						
Log(Population)	0.13	− 0.02	− 0.22	− 0.12	− 0.13	− 0.02	0.22	1.00					
Democracy	− 0.03	− 0.22	− 0.24	0.18	− 0.13	− 0.01	0.47	0.10	1.00				
Defeat	0.20	0.24	0.18	− 0.15	0.18	− 0.08	− 0.29	− 0.27	− 0.28	1.00			
Initiator	− 0.08	− 0.08	0.07	− 0.22	− 0.06	− 0.06	0.003	0.14	− 0.01	− 0.09	1.00		
High War Stakes	0.16	0.41	0.38	0.05	0.15	0.20	− 0.26	0.01	− 0.01	0.17	− .1	1.00	
No Leadership Change	− 0.07	− 0.07	− 0.07	− 0.19	0.07	0.09	− 0.14	− 0.02	− 0.38	0.06	0.08	−.03	1.00

I use two types of categorical variables to measure the effect of civilian fatalities on postwar instability against the government. As a first cut, I generate a dummy variable to differentiate countries that suffered a minimum of hundred casualties from the rest. This is to differentiate countries whose civilians had a reasonable fear of being harmed during the war versus those whose civilians were not involved in the fighting at any level. Next, I created a three level variable in which countries that lost no civilians in wars were classified as the base category. The two reference groups signifying the magnitude of civilian losses due to war fighting were (i) those with less than thousand deaths categorized as "low" and those that suffered more than fifteen hundred casualties labelled "significant". These categories may seem arbitrary but I would argue that beyond a certain level, the variation in the fatality numbers does not really carry much meaning for the dependent variable being investigated in this study. In other words, given the rarity of civilian deaths in interstate wars, the negative fallout that can be expected in a country that incurred sixteen hundred noncombatant casualties should be no different than for fifty thousand deaths. What both these numbers tell us is that (a) major battles in the war were fought inside the territorial boundaries of the belligerent and/or (b) a significant section of their noncombatant population suffered the experience of being physically attacked.

3.3   Dependent Variable: Anti-government Events

Previous studies on this subject of postwar domestic politics have not differentiated leader tenure by classes of political events. Leaders and governments were compared based on their length of tenure and post-exit punishment (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011). Leaders that survived but faced a destabilized postwar domestic political environment were placed in the same category as those who were strengthened by their participation in war.

This study takes the view that the incidence and scale of anti-government actions would help us better understand a war's domestic effects rather than survival rates. An incidence of these events indicates an erosion of power and authority of the regime that would not be detected if the response variable is restricted to the turnover of wartime leaders. Therefore, this quantitative analysis tries to explain the variation in the level of threats against the postwar government, instead of the survival rates of wartime leaders.

The observations on the dependent variable are all the threat events that occurred within five years after the final year of the war. The underlying logic of excluding domestic politics during wartime is that mobilizing any significant threat activity against the regime in power requires time and resources. The expectation is that the number of threat events can serve as a proxy for the effectiveness of political control of a government and the severity of anti-government sentiment following the end of the war. The choice of this response variable is driven by the logic that a higher level of unrest during postwar period is a manifestation of the domestic dissension unleashed by a war. This study assumes that removal and post-exit punishment for wartime leaders are not the only negative consequences that a war can produce. The variation in the number of threat events organized by counter-elites or extremist political formations such as insurgent groups in the postwar period can tell us much more about the domestic political environment of these countries.

The *Cross-National Time Series (CNTS)* archive originally created by the late Arthur Banks includes a collection of annual counts of various events that can be classified as threats posed to a government. I infer from the Banks codebook that the following event

categories from this archive can be included in this category: assassination attempt against senior government officials, acts of guerilla warfare, major government crisis short of armed revolt and number of changes (or attempted changes) in government. Unfortunately, the Banks dataset suffers from the following limitations: it only goes back till 1919 and information is missing for the duration of the Second World War (1939-45). This is why the three wars that broke out just prior to the Second World War had to be dropped from the analysis: Third Sino-Japanese War (1937-41), Changkufeng War (1938) and Nomonhan War (1939). An outcome variable *Anti-Government Threats* was created by adding the annual counts of four domestic events from the Banks dataset that occurred in each of the warring countries for a period of five years after they had finished fighting. These four threat events in the Banks dataset can be classified into two categories:

Acts of physical violence against the government: [15]

The Banks dataset provides an annual count of any attempt at killing senior government officials. These can be a symptom of a wider disaffection against the regime in power. Although some assassination attempts could be random acts carried out by lone individuals, these are more likely to be part of larger conspiracy hatched by motivated and mobilized groups. At a minimum, such an event indicates that there is a constituency that is not only interested in removing the leader from office or destabilize the government but has the wherewithal to carry out such plans. Assassination of key officials also indicates

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[15] The Banks' CNTS dataset counts two kinds of episodes of violence directed against the state. Banks does not measure the scale of these events but provides an annual count of the number of times these occurred. These are defined as follows: (a) Assassinations - "The number of assassinations defined as any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician." (b) Guerilla attacks - "The number of acts of guerrilla warfare, defined as any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime."

that the government is threatened by determined opponents willing to undertake a high-risk, low-reward action. Guerilla attacks are another form of anti-government violence which conveys that the presence of groups with resources and capability to brazenly challenge the state's authority. It is plausible that violent events like these are more likely to be the tools of political opposition in autocratic regimes that rely on repression to sustain their rule. In regimes where nonviolent, constitutional expressions of dissent are unavailable, such episodes of anti-government threats are more likely. At the same time, even in democratic regimes segments of the opposition can also be motivated to adopt extra-constitutional methods to weaken an incumbent.

Crisis and Illegal Changes in Governing Elite[16]

Events that are classified as governmental crises pose a serious threat to the survival of a government because individuals and groups that initiate such actions often have access to the corridors of power. A political crisis is often triggered by defections from the winning coalition. Such defections signify a break-up of the existing winning coalition necessary for leadership removal or regime change. These crises are symptoms of struggles for power and are a clear indication of a breakdown in elite consensus on whether the status quo must be maintained. The most extreme form of such a crisis episode is a *revolutionary or involuntary change in the governmental elite*. While forced removal is clearly the worst outcome for the elite faction that currently holds power, even an

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[16] (a) Government crises is described in the Banks data codebook as "The number of major government crises, defined as any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow" (b)Forced changes in government include all "…revolutions, defined as any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government."

attempted revolutionary upheaval can seriously dent the authority they enjoy. The very

fact that a rival group or faction is able to attempt an illegal removal of members of the

governing coalition betrays the weakness of a regime.

Figure 3.1 Postwar Threats against Government , 1919-2004 (N=114)

All these events ranging from nonviolent crises to unsuccessful attempts at regime

change are indications of the loss of a government's grip on power. At the same time, there

is a qualitative difference in the dangers that each poses to regime survival. When a regime

is compelled to remove member of the government in an unconstitutional manner, this

betrays a weakness of state authority that is far more serious than the failure to prevent a

random act of violence. However, all these incidents are a good proxy for antigovernment activities occurring within a country.

3.3.1 Response Variable: Model Fit

To recap, annual counts of four kinds of threat events constitute the dependent variable *anti-government activities*. These included successful and unsuccessful assassinations of senior government officials, guerilla attacks, crisis that did not result in downfall of government and attempts of forced or illegal changes among the governing elite.[17] The observation for each country in the sample is a tally of annual counts over a five year period after its participation in war ended. Therefore, these are discrete values rather than continuous observations. As illustrated below, the data for the components of the combined count of threat events are overdispersed and skewed to the right (See Figure 3.1). When an event count data is overdispersed (as is the case here), it is recommended that a negative binomial regression (henceforth NBR) count model be employed instead of a poisson. This is because the poisson model makes a restrictive assumption that the variance of the response variable be equal to its mean (Long & Freese, 2007; Mitchell, 2012). As the two plots in Figure 3.2 show, the expected versus observed rate in the NBR for the predictors in my model fits much better than the poisson regression model for specific count of postwar threat events. The LR test of overdispersion in the basic model in Table 3.4 supports the case for using the NBR to analyze this data.

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[17] In addition, there are other measures of general "unrest" like protests and workers strikes are also available from the Banks archive. As a robustness check, I added these to the dependent variable and got similar results.

3.4   Contingent Variables

The study makes the case that the impact of war costs on postwar threats against the government and instability may be exacerbated by whether the belliegerent was democratic, an initiator or had vital interests at stake in the war. In the sections that follow, I describe how each of these contingent variables was operationalized in the models that follow.

Regime Type

In studies of war, variation in the representativeness of governmental institutions has been found to have significant effects on a variety of response variables with the democratic peace program emerging as one of the most productive avenues of research. The main reason for using an indicator of democracy to create an interaction term with the war cost predictors is to examine whether the effect of war costs vary with the degree to which the political system allows dissension to be expressed. A regime where opposition activity is tightly regulated is less likely to witness anti-government threats. Hence, it is logical to expect that the effect of the war costs on domestic political events would be conditional upon the type of its political system. It stands to reason that it would be easier for the opponents of the incumbent in a democracy to organize and carry out anti-government activities. The regime type variable is operationalized through the Polity IV score which uses the 21-point scale of representativeness in governmental institutions ranging from - 10 to 10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2001). This was converted into a nonzero scale by adding 11 to the existing distribution of scores. Thus, instead of - 10 the lowest score possible became 1 assigned to the most autocratic regime and 21 was the score

for the most democratic. The final observation for each country was an average score over the five year postwar period after it terminated a war. I have dropped those countries from the analysis that were coded as "transitional" or "collapse of central authority" (i.e. - 66, - 77 and - 88) in the Polity dataset as these are special cases that are beyond the purview of this study. A dummy variable was created using the polity score to classify cases into two categories: democratic (polity score $\geq$ 17) versus non-democratic.

Figure 3.2: Model Fit Comparison, Postwar Threat Events Count

Initiator versus Target

The theoretical category of interest for the hypotheses in this study consisted of all the countries that started wars with the targets as the control group. Higher war costs among initiators is expected to have more powerful positive effect on postwar threats compared to the group of countries that were targets in war. It can be assumed that initiators often enter into war hoping for a quick, low cost and decisive victory. When this does not happen, governments of countries that started a war are more likely to face dissension and by extension, threats. To test this argument, I used a dummy variable in which the state that initiated a war was coded as 1 while a target coded as 0. The data was accessed from the Correlates of War (COW) database. This distinction based on the type of belligerent has been very thoroughly researched in the literature on war and systematic differences between initiators have often been found across a variety of research questions. This makes it imperative that we test whether this categorization influences the relationship between war costs and postwar threats.

War Stakes

Similarly, I expect to find difference in the relationship between war cost and postwar threats between two groups: those countries that were involved in high stakes wars and those that were not. The basic logic for this expectation is that when a country has emerged out of a high stakes, the mass public and the selectorate would be less receptive to counter-elites seeking to attack a government that had incurred heavy costs. I order to operationalize this variable, I used the "war aims of the adversary" data collected by Croco (2011). She developed a 6-point scale to classify the belligerents based on the scope of the

strategic objectives of their adversary in war. Any country with a score greater than 4 was classified as facing an adversary with a "high" war aim. If there was a design by a country's rival in war to annex its territory, attempt regime change or total conquest, then that country is coded as being in a high stakes war. The theoretical expectation is that a country would be less likely to face postwar threats with higher war costs when the stakes are high. When a country faces a danger of annexation or regime change or conquest in a war, regime opponents will not find the postwar environment conducive to exploit the dissension associated with higher costs.

3.5   Control Variables

The level of domestic threats against a government can be the product of several factors that are not hypothesized in this study. In models that seek to make cross-national comparisons of domestic political events, unique attributes peculiar to sub-groups of countries cannot be overlooked. State of the economy and demographic characteristics exemplify such attributes that can have an independent effect on the outcome of interest in this study. In order to account for some of these alternative factors and improve the overall predictive power of the model, the following variables were added:

War outcome: A large proportion of previous studies on postwar domestic politics have found that one of the key predictors of political events such as leadership change in the postwar period is war outcome. Although the empirical evidence is often reliant of the interaction of outcome with factors such as regime type and culpability, this has to be accounted in any model that purports to explain postwar political events. An adverse outcome in war is probably the severest kind of policy failure that an incumbent can face. Even if a leader is punished and a government is removed from office following a defeat,

this may generate additional instability in the polity. Therefore, I would expect a positive association of this measure with postwar threat events whether or not the wartime leader survived beyond the war. I use the correlates of war (COW) database to create a dummy variable by coding all countries that were defeated as 1 and all others as 0 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). As a robustness check, I also used the classification scheme provided by Reiter and his collaborators who have revised the COW dataset in some models (Stam, Reiter, & Horowitz, 2014).

State of the Postwar Economy: The general economic conditions within any country can be expected to influence the political events that occur within it. If a country goes into economic crisis following a war, it would interfere with any independent effect that the costs of war would have had on the likelihood of anti-government activity. The annual GDP percent data (in 1990 International Kheamis Dollars) from the late Angus Maddison and her collaborators (Bolt & van Zanden, 2013) has been used as a control the effect. It is quite plausible to argue that inferior economic conditions can generate domestic political instability. Bad economic conditions can create a hospitable environment for any set of actors that wish to threaten a government. This measure was created by subtracting the annual GDP percentage in year five of the postwar period from year one.

Population: The population data for the countries during the postwar period is from Banks Cross-National Time Series Archive. In general, in studies of internal violence populous countries have been found to be positively associated with domestic instability. Therefore, it makes sense that such a relationship may exist in countries in the aftermath of an interstate war as well. The data was logged to overcome the skewness in the distribution.

Wartime Defense expenditure: In order to assess this, the difference between two values was calculated: (i) the annual defense expenditure of a country in the year prior to the start of the war and (ii) its peak level during the war. These annual expenditure levels were taken from the National Military Capabilities estimates from COW database (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). This is used as a proxy for wartime resource mobilization. A spike in defense spending during wartime may boost a state's capacity to counter and deter internal threats as well. This makes it logical to include this variable in a model that seeks to explain events that threaten the government. In order to normalize the skewness in the military expenditure distribution, I added a constant (100) to get rid of the negative values prior to applying the log transformation: Log(100 + Net Military Expenditure).

Years since independence: This indicates the durability of a national community as a cohesive political unit with the presumption that the longer it has survived the less likely it is to experience political instability. Moreover, it is assumed that this measure would also be a proxy for the stability of state structures and processes which can impact the degree to which the country would experience anti-government threat activity. I have accessed this information from the dataset created by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Ethnic fractionalization: Ethnic diversity of a society is often theorized as being a recurring source of domestic conflict. The argument is that diverse societies find it harder to resolve competing claims among different groups. Disputes over language, representation in government and access to natural resources can take a far more dangerous turn when these are manifested through competing ethnic groups. By extension, governments are more likely to face overt threats in diverse societies. I use the ethnic fractionalization index developed by Fearon and Laitin to operationalize this variable (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Leadership change: The survival of the leader that were in power at the beginning of the war over the entire period of observation of this study (i.e. five years after the end of the war) also needs to be accounted for when studying the level of postwar threats against the government. These leaders either head very stable winning coalitions or have created institutional arrangements that protect them from removal by their rivals. Since leader turnover can be a destabilizing process in any postwar polity that may reflect in the kind of antigovernment events that I use as the dependent variable in this study, controlling for this factor is justified.

3.6   Main Models: War Costs

The goal of this data analysis is to find out how the main predictors in my model (i.e. war costs) are related with the changes in the expected count of antigovernment activities. In order to achieve this objective, I began by running a series of NBR models to analyze the variation in the rate at which these events occurred in different countries following their participation in war. The data on aggregate battle deaths and civilian casualties were used to calculate the severity of war costs. I used different techniques to operationalize the data for these two variables to examine if their relationship with the number of postwar threats is consistent across different model specifications.

I use two formulas to normalize the battle deaths variable prior to testing it: $\text{Log (Battle Deaths} + 1)$ and $\text{Log}\left(\frac{\text{Battle Deaths}}{\text{Number of Armed Personnel}} + 1\right)$. The latter formula was meant to account for the disparity in the size of the armies on the coefficient or levels of significance of the battle deaths variable. For civilian fatalities, I created a dummy variable by converting the data it into a dichotomous variable with countries that suffered more than

100 casualties as the reference group (i.e. coded as 1). Of the 114 countries in the sample, 29 were in this category which is a clear indication that this is a rare occurrence for interstate wars. Secondly, in order to capture the variation among the countries that suffered civilian casualties, I divided the data into three categories according to the numbers of civilians killed: none (0), low (0-1500) and significant (>1500). This created two reference categories within the group of countries that suffered civilian losses and those with zero casualties as the control group.

Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators have also combined some of the same variables from the Banks data in a study on leader survival and likelihood of revolutions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010). Instead of adding the raw annual count they converted these to a standardized score with the formula: $z = \frac{(\text{Log}(1+x) - \text{Mean}(\text{Log}(1+x)))}{(\text{Standard Deviation Log}(1+x))}$ where x is the count of the number of events. This formula normalizes the standard deviation for each of these event count variables to 1. Then they take an average to create a score which is a continuous variable rather than a count outcome (p. 940). Adopting this approach, I created standardized version of my event counts dependent variable and tested models using ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression (Table 3.5). As another robustness check, I created models with information generated by Reiter and his collaborators who have sought to correct some of the misspecifications in the current COW dataset (Stam et al., 2014). Reiter et al. code initiators much more conservatively by researching which states started a war and which ones joined a coalition in an on-going war. Guided by their list, I created two dummy variables for initiators and joiners respectively. Twenty two initiators in my sample were reclassified as either joiners or

targets based on the Reiter et al. database. They also code winners and losers differently

based on their judgment on whether or not the belligerent achieved their immediate war

aims or not. Several of the countries coded as winners in the COW dataset are revised as

having only achieved a "draw" according to these authors. Twelve cases that were coded

as "defeat" from the COW data are classified as a draw by Reiter et al. Finally, eight cases

that were in my sample based on COW are excluded in their dataset based on different

considerations. They argue that the Ifni war of 1958 does not merit being classified as an

interstate war because it did not meet the criteria of the minimum number of combined

casualties. They also exclude all the NATO allies that assisted the US in the Kosovo war

of 1999 because their contribution to the war effort was not sizeable enough. I created

specifications of my parent model alternatively using the COW and Reiter et al.

classifications for initiator and defeat in them.

3.6.1   Results

The results of these models are presented in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. As

the first row in all these tables show, the battle deaths variable did not attain the minimum

level of significance in any of them. Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient for battle

deaths is also consistently negative, contrary to the theoretical expectation of this study.

Even after I used a different transformation technique to modify the battle deaths data,

these results remained largely unchanged. The results in Model 1 and 2 demonstrate that

countries where civilians were seriously threatened were more likely to suffer postwar

threats against the government (Table 3.3). This relationship is significant at the .05 level.

The expected count of postwar threats for a country's government in the reference group

exceeded the base category by 87.6% in Model 1 and by 78% in Model 2, holding all other

variables constant. In order to further clarify the differences between the two categories of

war participants, the average marginal effects on the response variable are also illustrated

in Figure 3.3. All the average marginal effects reported in this chapter were calculated with

the asbalanced option in Stata to account for overdispersion and unbalanced designs.

Figure 3.3 Average Marginal Effects for Civilian Casualties (Model 1)

The average marginal effects are calculated thus: For every case in the sample, the

number of predicted threat events would be calculated as though it suffered high civilian

casualties regardless of whether it did so or not. Next, this process is repeated by

calculating predicted events treating that country as if it did not. In order to derive the

marginal effect, the difference between the average numbers of predicted events between the two categories is calculated for each case (Williams, 2011). if the entire sample consisted of countries whose noncombatants were threatened, then the average number of postwar threat events would have been approximately 10.   With a sample composed fully of countries whose civilians were not threatened, then the average count would have been approximately 5. Therefore, holding all other variables as they are, the number of predicted postwar threat events is likely to be double when a country's civilians were at a reasonable risk of being harmed during war. These results are graphically illustrated with confidence intervals around the two groups of countries. Neither confidence intervals cross the zero line which means that these marginal effects are significant. The confidence interval for the contrasts in predictive margins also barely touches the zero line. Thus, we can be reasonably confident that difference between the two groups is not being recorded due to chance. It is important to note that of the 29 countries that experienced at least hundred civilian casualties, 13 ended up on the losing side. Of these, all except Egypt (Offshore Islands War, 1954), Kuwait (Gulf War, 1990) and Iran (Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88) experienced some anti-government threat activity in the postwar period.

In the remaining four models reported in this section, I used the categorical variable for civilian casualties with three levels – none, low and significant. The results for these models are reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. It indicates that the effect of being in the highest category in terms of the civilians killed (i.e. more than 1500) compared to the base category of having suffered no losses – is significantly greater. The list of these countries and the wars are in Table 3.6. However, the difference between countries in the low category and the control group is not significant. The overall effect of this three level

civilian casualties variable meets the standard of significance ($\beta = 0.31$; *p-value* $= 0.058$), it is the contrast between the two extremes – countries that suffered the highest civilian losses (< 1500) and those that incurred no losses – that is driving this effect for this variable. The average marginal effects plot for these three levels is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Using the postestimation commands for this variable after running these models showed that the average number of predicted threats among countries with no civilian casualties is approximately 5 which increases to 9 in the group with casualties higher than 1500. The result for the difference in the number of events between the countries with significant civilian casualties versus no casualties is within an acceptable level of significance ($p < 0.10$) in nearly all the models that were tested with different specifications.   These include models 5 and 6 where I apply an OLS regression with a standardized version of the dependent variable (Table 3.5). Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that this variable is a reliable predictor of postwar threats.

Among the controls, the defeat dummy and net military expenditure [18] performed remarkable consistency across different models. In all the models that I tried, the sign for both these variables is positive and within the commonly accepted levels of significance, which is usually treated as a sign of robustness. Higher net military expenditure is associated with a lower expected count of postwar threats. It could be that wartime expenditure on defense builds state capacity to deter domestic opposition in the postwar period as well. The government of a belligerent that was defeated was more likely to face threats in the war's aftermath compared to the rest. This result complements the finding of

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[18] Log[(Defense expenditure in last war year – Prewar defense expenditure)+100]

previous studies that war defeat tends to be associated with likelihood of removal of leaders or the fall of governments (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992). The robust results for the defeat variable in this study indicate that this is not only a strong predictor of change of regime and removal of leaders but also indicators of postwar instability. As mentioned earlier, the dummy variable for defeat is coded differently by Reiter et al. for twelve cases in my sample and it excludes eight cases from COW's list of cases that are in my sample. Given that, it is crucial to note that defeat is a persistently strong predictor of postwar threats across various models.

Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression Model, War Costs and Postwar Threats (1919-2004)

Variable	Model 1 (COW)	Model 2 (Reiter et al.)
Log(Battle deaths + 1)	− 0.05	− 0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Civilians threatened (> 100)	**0.64****	**0.61****
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Log(Net military expenditure + 100)	− 0.30**	− 0.37 **
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Δ GDP (%)	0.01	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.006)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.39	0.13
	(0.38)	(0.39)
Years since independence	− 0.001	− 0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Log(Population)	0.16**	0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Polity Score	− 0.015	0.03*
	(0.017)	(0.02)
Defeat	0.55**	0.62**
	(0.22)	(0.21)
Initiator	− 0.19	0.28
	(0.21)	(0.27)
Joiner	_____	0.81**
		(0.36)
High War Stakes	0.08	0.23
	(0.21)	(0.25)
No Leadership Change	− 0.21	− 0.17
	(0.22)	(0.23)
Dispersion Parameter	0.93	0.84
Log likelihood	− 313.93	− 291.61
Probability > χ^2	0.0020	0.0014
Number of Cases	114	106

Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression Model, War Costs and Postwar Threats (1919-2004)

Variable	Model 3 (COW)	Model 4 (Reiter et al.)
Log(Battle deaths + 1)	− 0.05	− 0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Low Civilian Casualties (0 − 1500)	0.40	0.37
	(0.27)	(0.25)
Significant Civilian Casualties ($\geq$ 1500)	**0.64***	**0.82****
	(0.35)	(0.38)
Log(Net military expenditure + 100)	− 0.24**	− 0.29 **
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Δ GDP (%)	0.01	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.007)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.45	0.31
	(0.40)	(0.42)
Years since independence	0.00002	− 0.0011
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Log(Population)	0.12**	0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Democratic Regime	− 0.13	0.16
	(0.23)	(0.27)
Defeat	0.48**	0.52**
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Initiator	− 0.16	0.35
	(0.20)	(0.27)
Joiner	_____	0.88**
		(0.37)
High War Stakes	0.16	0.34
	(0.20)	(0.24)
No Leadership Change	− 0.31	− 0.13
	(0.20)	(0.22)
Dispersion Parameter	0.95	0.8637
Log likelihood	− 314.794	− 292.59
Probability > χ^2	0.0081	0.0075
Number of Cases	114	106

Figure 3.4 Predictive Margins for three levels of Civilian Casualties

Table 3.5:Linear Regression Model (OLS), War Costs and Postwar Threats (1919-2004)

Variable	Model 5 (COW)	Model 6 (Reiter et al.)
$\text{Log}\left(\dfrac{\text{Battle Deaths}}{\text{Number of Armed Personnel}} + \mathbf{1}\right)$	− 0.85 (0.084)	− 0.05 (0.07)
Low Civilian Casualties (0 − 1500)	0.14 (0.17)	0.14 (0.19)
Significant Civilian Casualties (≥ 1500)	**0.49*** (0.27)	**0.46*** (0.27)
Log(Net military expenditure + 100)	− 0.12** (0.05)	− 0.15** (0.05)
Δ GDP (%)	0.001 (0.0007)	− 0.001 (0.004)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.11 (0.23)	− 0.05 (0.24)
Years since independence	0.001 (0.002)	− 0.001 (0.001)
Log(Population)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Polity Score	0.014 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Defeat	0.33** (0.14)	0.37** (0.16)
Initiator	− 0.12 (0.12)	0.22 (0.20)
Joiner	_____	0.42 (0.31)
High War Stakes	0.06 (0.14)	0.17 (0.20)
No Leadership Change	− 0.04 (0.12)	0.006 (0.13)
Probability > χ^2	0.035	0.068
R-Squared	0.1941	0.2081
Number of Cases	114	106

Table 3.6 Belligerents with significant civilian casualties (≥1500) (1919-2004)

Country	War Name	Duration	Postwar threats
China	Second Sino-Japanese War	1931-1933	22
Italy	World War II	1939-1945	29
Iraq	Gulf War	1990-91	14
Greece	Second Greco-Turkish War	1919-1922	7
Azerbaijan	The Azeri-Armenian War	1993-1994	5
Hungary	Soviet Invasion	1956	5
Armenia	The Azeri-Armenian War	1933-1994	5
United Kingdom	World War II	1939-1945	3
USSR	World War II	1939-1945	2
Tanzania	Ugandan-Tanzanian War	1978-79	1
Vietnam	The Vietnam War Phase 2	1965-1975	3
France	Franco-Turkish War	1919-21	17
Iran	Iran-Iraq War	1980-88	0
South Korea	Korean War	1950-53	4

3.7   Interactions

The theory presented earlier also argued that the impact of costs on postwar threats could be conditional on the following factors: type of belligerent, the interests at stake and the degree of representativeness of its political system.   In order to check for multicollinearity among these contingent variables and the war cost predictors – battle deaths and civilian casualties – the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test with the regressors in the model was conducted. The values for the variables were within the accepted range.

In order to understand the effects of contingent factors on the war cost predictors, two sets of interaction models were generated for battle deaths and civilian casualties. A total of six interaction terms were generated:

(i) Log(Battle deaths) × initiator, (ii) Log(Battle deaths) × democratic regime type (iii) Log(Battle deaths) × high war stakes, (iv) Civilian casualty level (none/low/significant) × initiator, (v) Civilian casualty level (none/low/significant) × polity score and (vi) Civilian

casualty level (none/low/significant) × high war stakes. In order to test their joint effect

under different model specifications, several models were created with different

combinations of these three terms in the following order:

Table 3.7: Interaction Terms in Models 2-15

Model 7 :	(i)
Model 8:	(ii)
Model 9:	(iii)
Model 10:	(i) (ii) (iii)
Model 11:	(iv)
Model 12:	(v)
Model 13:	(vi)
Model 14:	(iv) (v) (vi)

The interactions of battle deaths with the three contingent variables were tested

through different model specifications. The results for Models 7-10 are presented in Table

3.8. The overall two-way interaction effect for battle deaths with the initiator dummy[19] is

positive and within the acceptable levels of significance in the various models. On the

other hand, the interaction terms with the polity score and war stakes term performed

poorly irrespective of the combination of variables used.   The results for the joint

interaction term for battle death initiator can only provide preliminary support for my

hypotheses that the effect of battle deaths on postwar threats will vary based on whether a

belligerent was an initiator or not. I had predicted that among initiators, marginal effect of

battle deaths on postwar antigovernment threats would be higher compared to targets

(H3a).   In recent years, scholars have conclusively argued that one cannot rely solely on

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[19] The results reported here are with the initiators coded in the COW dataset. I tested these interactions with the Reiter classification for initiators and found similar results.

the coefficients of a multiplicative term to test a hypothesis that predicts that two or more variables act together to explain an outcome of interest (Berry, Golder, & Milton, 2012; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).   In order to exhaustively investigate interactions between two covariates, one must examine how the "marginal effect" of one variable on the outcome changes across different values of another. This is the approach I adopt to further investigate how the relationship between battle deaths and postwar threats is influenced by whether a belligerent was an initiator or not.

3.7.1   Effect of Battle Deaths on Postwar Threats among Initiators and Targets

Among the 114 warring countries under analysis, 39 were classified as having started a war and the rest were targets in the COW dataset. Among the initiators, 6 managed to avoid any loss to their armed personnel. The overall comparison of the average marginal effects of battle deaths on postwar threat incidents demonstrates that initiators are more likely to face instability in the aftermath of war compared to targets. The battle deaths $\times$ initiator interaction is constituted by a continuous variable, the logged values of battle deaths and a categorical variable, with initiators coded as 1 and targets as 0.

Table 3.8: Interaction of Battle Deaths (Log) with Contingent Factors (N=114)

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Low Civilian Casualties	0.25	0.37	0.38	0.25
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Significant Civilian Casualties	0.52	0.59	0.63*	0.55
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Battle Deaths	− 0.116**	− 0.06	− 0.04	− 0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Battle Deaths × Initiator	0.23***	_____	_____	0.23***
	(0.05)			(0.06)
Battle Deaths ×Democratic	_____	0.0003	_____	0.00003
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Battle Deaths × High Stakes	_____	_____	− 0.069	− 0.04
			(0.10)	(0.09)
Log(Net military expenditure + 100)	− 0.28*	− 0.26*	− 0.25	− 0.27*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Δ GDP (%)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.29
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Years since independence	− 0.001	− 0.19	0.00001	− 0.002
	(0.001)	(0.22)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Log(Population)	0.13	− 0.06	0.13**	0.132
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Polity Score	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Defeat	0.52**	0.51**	0.49**	0.51**
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Initiator	− 1.73***	− 0.15	− 0.15	− 1.70
	(0.42)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.44)
High War Stakes	0.21	0.16	0.74	0.55
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.83)	(0.75)
No Leadership Change	− 0.12	− 0.19	− 0.20	− 0.12
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Dispersion Parameter	0.838	0.95	0.94	0.84
Log likelihood	− 309.29	− 310.80	− 314.53	− 309.19
Probability > χ^2	0.0000	0.0104	0.0130	0.0000

This combination of predictors allows us to compare average marginal effects of battle deaths on the predicted count of threat events between the two categories: initiators and targets. Another way to analyze this interaction is to track the change in marginal effects on postwar threat count at different observations of the battle deaths distribution, among initiators and targets respectively. These are also known as predictive margins. To make the analysis manageable, "representative" values of logged battle deaths were selected and the differences in effects between initiators and targets were generated. The graphical illustration in further confirms these effects. In other words, the predicted threats increase with increases in battle deaths among initiators and decrease with increasing battle deaths for targets Figure 3.5. The average marginal effects for all observations of battle deaths on postwar threats among initiators and targets are illustrated in Figure 3.6. It indicates that the overall marginal effect or slope of battle deaths is negative among targets and positive among initiators.

The derivative (dy/dx) for targets is -0.78 and significant at the 0.05 level. For initiators, it is 0.59 but it has a p-value of 0.249 as is reflected in the confidence interval that crosses the zero line (Figure 3.6). Comparing the slope for postwar threats at specific values of battle deaths for initiators and targets reveals that the average marginal effect of battle deaths on postwar threats for initiators is lower than the targets for a segment of the distribution. Beyond a certain level of battle deaths, the sign for the contrast in effects of battle deaths between initiator and target changes from negative to positive. In other words, initiators are likely to face more postwar threats compared to targets only at higher levels of battle deaths. This illustrates the contrast between initiators and targets quite clearly. Initiators face greater postwar threats compared to targets only at the higher points

in the battle deaths distribution. The plot in presents the contrasts in predictive margins

between initiators and targets as battle deaths increases (Figure 3.7). Overall, there is a

discernible difference between the two groups of belligerents as far as the effects of battle

deaths on postwar threats are concerned. It is clear by looking at Figure 3.5 that an

incremental increase in battle deaths tends to have opposite effects on postwar threats

among initiators and targets respectively. As battle deaths increase, these are likely to

generate more postwar threats for initiators. Among targets, higher battle deaths seem to

have an opposite effect.

Figure 3.5: Predictive Margins for Log(Battle Deaths) for Initiators

Figure 3.6 Average Marginal Effects among Initiators and Targets

Figure 3.7 Contrasts in Number of Postwar Threats between Initiators and Targets by Battle Deaths

Table 3.9: Interaction of Civilian Casualties with Contingent Factors

	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Log(Battle Death)	− 0.045	− 0.04	− 0.05	− 0.038
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.045)
Civilian Casualties (Low)	0.005	0.97	0.36	0.78
	(0.45)	(0.61)	(0.29)	(0.79)
Civilian Casualties (High)	0.13	0.41	0.82	0.13
	(0.48)	(0.57)	(0.40)	(0.54)
Civilian Casualties (Low) × Initiator	0.72	_____	_____	0.81
	(0.60)			(0.59)
Civilian Casualties (High) × Initiator	0.93*	_____	_____	**0.88***
	(0.49)			(0.50)
Civilian Casualties(Low) × Polity Score	_____	− 0.05	_____	− 0.06
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Civilian Casualties(High) × Polity Score	_____	0.02	_____	0.04
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Civilian Casualties (Low) × High Stakes	_____	_____	− 0.04	0.26
			(0.47)	(0.44)
Civilian Casualties(High)× High Stakes	_____	_____	− 0.54	**− 0.80***
			(0.50)	(0.48)
Controls	–	–	–	–
Dispersion Parameter	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.88
Log likelihood	− 313.54	− 313.62	− 314.48	− 311.37
Probability > χ^2	0.0015	0.0003	0.0149	0.000

NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***= p < 0.01; **= p < 0.05;
*= p<.10 (one tailed tests)

3.7.2   Interaction of Civilian Casualties with Contingent Factors[20]

For the civilian casualties' variable with three levels - none, low and significant - a three by two design was created with the three dummy variables: initiator, democratic and high war stakes. I used the polity score as a continuous variable as well as a democratic regime dummy to make predictive margins more meaningful. Prior to investigating these interactions further, I examined the row means of postwar threat events for the different combinations of these two categorical variables. The frequencies showed that this is an unbalanced design as the number of observations is not equal across the cells. With this in mind, I ran the models and the postestimation commands using the "asbalanced" option in Stata which artificially balances an unbalanced design (Mitchell, 2012, pp. 236-237).

A partial output for models $12 - 15$ is presented in Table 3.9. The results for the interaction term for high civilian casualties with initiator and high war stakes seemed to indicate support for the hypotheses laid out in earlier chapters (H3b and H4b). As mentioned earlier, the coefficient and test of significance in the parent model only confirm that there is evidence of a two-way interaction. The p-value for a multiplicative term tells us that the joint interaction is significant and there is a discrete change (from the base level of no casualties $= 0$) in the average marginal effects in one categorical predictor with a discrete change in another. In order to further examine the nature of these two interactions, I compared the adjusted means broken down by the different levels in each of the constituent factors.

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[20] Interaction terms were tested with the two categorical variables for civilian casualties (> 100 versus rest) and the three contingent factors as well.

For the interaction of the three categories of civilian casualties with the initiator dummy, the average marginal effects plot in Figure 3.8 shows the predicted number of events for each level of civilian casualties – none, low and significant. For initiators that experienced significant civilian casualties, the average number of predicted threat events is 13.75. This is the average number of postwar threat events that are predicted by the model if the entire sample of observations were to consist of initiators who had suffered significant civilian casualties. On the other hand, for initiators that did not suffer substantial civilian fatalities the average number of predicted threat events is 4.3. In other words, 4.3 is the average number of threat events are likely to occur if the entire sample consisted of initiators that did not suffer significant civilian casualties (Jann, 2013). The hypothesis H3b specifically suggested that the more civilian casualties a country suffered, the greater would be the number of postwar threat events for initiators. This would require comparing the marginal linear predictions by estimating the effect on the response variable of a discrete change in one covariate – civilian casualties – from none (0) to low (1) and (2) significant while holding the other covariate – role in war – constant at either initiator (1) or target (0). As Figure 3.8 shows, with increasing levels of civilian casualties from none (0) to significant (2), the predictive number of threat events for initiators also increases. Similar effect is illustrated for countries in low stakes wars. Suffering significant casualties in a low stakes war yields more postwar instability than in a high stakes war (Figure 3.10) as well as among democratic compared to nondemocratic countries (Figure 3.9).

The contrasts of marginal linear predictions is another option in Stata that helps us to understand these differences among various categories much more clearly (Stata, 2013). It reveals that among countries that experienced no civilian casualties, the targets face a

higher likelihood of postwar threats than initiators. The F-test for this contrast is significant ($\beta = -0.56$; $F = 3.49$; *p-value* $= 0.06$). Among countries that suffered civilian casualties the signs for the contrast are reversed and initiators are more likely to face threats after war than targets. However, the F-test for the contrast is not significant for these two levels for civilian casualties. In a separate model, I contrasted two categories among initiators: those whose noncombatants were at risk (minimum hundred civilian deaths) versus the rest. The F-test for this interaction is very persuasive ($F = 17.92$, $p = 0.000$). This provides conclusive support for hypothesis H3b that when countries that initiate wars put their civilians in harm's way, it dramatically increases the likelihood of postwar threats in these countries. Using a democratic dummy in the interaction term with civilian casualties also yields similar results. Among countries with the polity score of 6 or higher, the effect of experiencing civilian casualties is highly pronounced. The joint F-test for this interaction is significant ($F = 7.93$; *p-value* $= 0.09$). Among democracies, countries that suffered significant civilian casualties were predicted to experience more postwar threat events than those that suffered none ($\beta = 1.45$; *p-value* $= 0.009$). The marginal effects plot for the interaction of the three levels of civilian casualties with the entire range of observations for polity score bears this out as well (Figure 3.11). For countries with significant casualties, the degree of representativeness seems to correspond with the expected number of postwar threat events.

This effect is further confirmed by contrasting the marginal linear predictions between those countries where at least hundred civilians were killed versus the rest. The F-test confirms that within democracies, the prediction of postwar threats is greater for countries that put their civilians at risk ($F = 8.52$, $p = 0.004$). The F-test for the contrast

between democracies and nondemocracies among countries that lost more than hundred civilians during wartime is also within the range of statistical significance. Democracies experienced more postwar threats than nondemocracies after their civilians are targeted in war ($F = 2.82$, *p-value* $= 0.09$). Using this categorical variable for civilian casualties, I also found that countries that were in low stake wars and lost a minimum of hundred civilians had a higher rate of postwar events than countries whose population were not put at risk ($F= 4.40$; *p-value* $= 0.036$).

Figure 3.8: Predictive Margins at different levels of Civilian Casualties by Role in War

0=None 1=Low 2=Significant

Figure 3.9 Predictive Margins for different levels of Civilian Casualties by Regime Type

Figure 3.10 Predictive Margins for different levels of Civilian Casualties by Stakes in War

Civilian Casualties: 0 = None; 1 = Low; 2 = Significant

Low Stakes   High Stakes

Figure 3.11 : Predictive Margins of different levels of Civilian Casualties by Polity IV Score

Polity IV Score (Rescaled)

None   Low
Significant

3.8   Summary and Discussion

The list of hypotheses and the results of the data analysis are summarized in Table 3.10. The parent models 1−6 only provide a partial support for the basic contention of this study that higher war costs make it more difficult to govern a country. The battle deaths coefficient is not within the range of significance contrary to the expectations of the theory (H1a) although significant levels of civilian deaths are associated with higher level of postwar threats (H1b). Using an alternative categorical variable for civilian casualties yielded similar results. Countries where noncombatants faced the prospect of being harmed were found to be significantly associated with higher incidence of threats compared to the rest. This could be because this variable serves as a proxy for countries whose population centers and domestic infrastructure were attacked during wartime. This shows that a completely different political dynamic operates in countries that have to fight wars inside their territorial boundaries where their civilians can be targeted. It is intuitive that the failure to protect populated areas would generate serious anti-government sentiment in the postwar period which is manifested in the number anti-government events that are observed in the data.

Across a variety of model specifications, the interaction terms that included the initiator dummy and the war cost predictors showed reasonably robust results in the expected direction (H3a and H3b). The record suggests that the more war costs were incurred by those that started a war, the more would be their rate of anti-government activity in the postwar period. This shows that the selectorate and the mass public is less tolerant of higher war costs when political leaders enter wars by choice, making it easier for regime opponents to threaten it. The results for the interaction of war costs with regime

type were much less robust: interaction of battle deaths with regime type (H2a) and war stakes (H4a) failed to reach the level of significance.   The results for the interactions of the civilian casualties' variable with the contingent predictors were relatively more encouraging. Initiators that suffered significant civilian casualties or that put their noncombatants at risk faced the prospect of higher postwar threats. Similar generalizations can be made for democracies and countries that were in low stakes wars. The more representative a political system, the more its postwar government was likely to experience threats from domestic actors if civilians were harmed.

The other key finding was that defeat had a powerful independent effect in all the models. Countries that were defeated tended to face a higher a level of anti-government threats compared to all other war outcomes. This relationship maintained a .05 level of significance across different model specifications. This finding opens up an interesting possibility. It could be that even the successors of defeated wartime leaders – culpable or not – tend to face a challenging domestic environment following the war's termination. My sample does not differentiate cases based whether the wartime leaders or governments survived or not. It would be interesting to examine whether the removal of the culpable leader had any effect on the incidence of threat events in a country that was defeated. If defeated belligerents across categories – initiators, targets, democratic, nondemocratic etc. – report higher postwar threats, it may also suggest that that even if a leader survives a defeat he does not totally escape political punishment. The positive relationship between defeat and postwar threats bolsters the claims made by earlier studies wartime leaders are better off trying to win by paying any price rather than concede defeat. If a country is defeated, threats against the government – greater targeting of key officials, guerilla attacks

and crises tend to follow. The selectorate and the mass public are not likely to react

negatively to war costs if the political leadership avoids defeat.   Even if a culpable wartime

leader is removed following a defeat, anti-government sentiment is likely to be manifested

through threat events directed against the successor. The removal of wartime leader and

government may not be sufficient to completely pacify the backlash generated by the

costliness of a war. The internal conflicts generated by defeat in war can spillover for the

successors of leaders that presided over these events. The same argument holds for civilian

fatalities as well. If a leader fails to protect its civilians, negative consequences are likely

to follow even if these do not result in his removal and post-exit punishment. Even

successors of such leaders will have a harder time governing the country.

Table 3.10: Summary of Results

Support?	Hypothesis
No	**H1a:** *The higher the battle deaths, the greater the likelihood of anti-government activities in the postwar period.*
Yes	**H1b:** *Noncombatant casualties increases the likelihood of anti-government activities in the postwar period*
No	**H2a:** *The marginal effects of higher battle deaths on anti-government activities in the postwar period are higher in democracies than in nondemocracies*
Yes	**H2b:** *The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-government activities is higher in democracies than in nondemocracies.*
Yes	**H3a:** *The marginal effect of battle deaths on postwar anti-government activities in countries that initiated wars is likely to be higher than those that were targeted.*
Yes	**H3b:** *The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-government activities is higher in a country that initiated wars than those that were targeted.*
No	**H4a** *The marginal effect of battle deaths on anti-government activities will be lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one that has waged a low stakes war.*
Partial	**H4b** *The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-government activities will be lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one that has waged a low stakes war*

4   Case Studies

4.1   Introduction

One of the theoretical impetuses for this dissertation comes from the concept of "linkage politics" that was originally propagated by James Rosenau. The linkage approach sought to uncover mechanisms that connect the realms of interstate war with domestic conflict (Wilkenfeld & Zinnes, 1973). It advanced the idea that "the phenomena that originate in one sphere have implications for observable events in another (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1983)." The literature on war and leadership/regime change and survival, which also motivates this study, is part of this tradition. So far, I have primarily examined the "linkage" between the variation in costs of interstate war – battle deaths and civilian casualties – and the threats and challenges faced by postwar governments.

In Chapter 2 (sections 2.2 – 2.4), I had articulated a theory to explain the level of political instability in countries that have recently fought wars. The goal of this theory was to justify why the costliness of war can be a useful barometer to explain postwar domestic politics. The fundamental assertion I made was that costlier wars incentivize domestic contenders for power and other regime opponents to undertake anti-government activities. Costlier wars create an independent dynamic of mass discontent which encourages counter-elites, political groups and organizations as well as defectors from the existing winning coalition to think that their attempt to topple the incumbent can be successful (See Figure 2.2).

The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 3 was an attempt to test this theory. I used a different dependent variable (i.e. level of instability and postwar threats against the

government) than has traditionally been used in leader-based studies. I argued that using the removal of wartime leaders and their post-exit fate as indicators of postwar political punishment may be too reductive. The outcome variable must capture the overall level of postwar societal and political discontent irrespective of whether the wartime leader was still in power or not. The effect of war cost – measured in terms battle deaths – on postwar threats was not supported by the statistical models while civilian fatalities was found to be positively associated with such events.

While statistical analysis is helpful in detecting broad patterns across a variety of diverse cases, it has its limitations. In order to complement the empirical results from the previous chapter, I have done an in-depth analysis of two cases. These can be invaluable in uncovering how the hypothesized variables influence the outcomes of interest. Case studies also help to isolate the intervening causal processes that are difficult to capture in large-n studies (Bennett & Elman, 2007, pp. 174-175). This chapter will examine how far the theory articulated in sections 2.2 – 2.4 "fits" the cases that were selected of intensive examination: (1) Paraguay's victory in the Chaco War (1932-35) and (2) Egypt's defeat in the Six Day War (1967).

4.1.1   Case Selection

While selecting these two cases I kept three things in mind: (i) battle deaths (ii) outcome (iii) the fate of wartime leaders and their government. While the Chaco War lasted almost three years at the end of which Paraguay emerged victorious, the Six Day War was a very brief, albeit costly engagement forcing Egypt to immediately concede defeat. Battle deaths are frequently used as a proxy for war costs and it was a great surprise when the variable performed so poorly in the large-n empirical tests presented in the

previous chapter. Given their size and population, the battle deaths suffered by both countries in these wars were quite significant although the raw count of Paraguayan deaths (36,000) was three times higher than that of Egypt (10,000). While it suffered fewer battle deaths, Egypt's military capabilities were seriously degraded by the Israeli attack forcing it to accept defeat almost as soon as the war began. This may point to a problem with relying too heavily on battle deaths as an explanatory variable. I saw these case studies as another opportunity to analyze the political effects of higher battle deaths. Hence, I deliberately chose these two wars where there were no recorded instances of civilians being killed or targeted (Downes, 2006, 2008). Given the empirical support for the theory that countries that suffer civilian casualties are much more prone to face postwar instability, I thought it would be more useful to choose cases where only combatants were harmed.

While Paraguay was a weak and unstable democracy in 1932, Egypt under Nasser would be classified as a long standing autocracy in 1967. However, according to the *Logic of Political Survival Data Source* developed by Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators, at the time they waged their respective wars, the size of their respective winning coalitions was the same : 0.25 (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The other motivation in choosing these two cases is to illustrate that comparing the survival rates of wartime leaders may not be sufficient to illustrate the domestic political consequences of war involvement. This may help uncover some of the complexities behind postwar turnover (or lack thereof) in political leadership that have already been discussed elsewhere (Colaresi, 2004).

The two cases represent two "ideal types" of wartime governments – (i) Those that were deposed after being victorious (ii) those that survived after being defeated. Variation in war outcomes had to be a consideration in case selection because my data analysis had

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shown robust support for the association between defeat in war and heightened levels of anti-government activity in the postwar period. This bolstered the findings of previous studies in which defeat in war was found to be a consistently significant factor in predicting the rates survival and severity of post-exit fate of wartime leaders. These two wartime governments took different and counterintuitive political trajectories in the postwar period: While the government of President Eusebio Ayala of Paraguay was deposed in a coup within eight months; President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt survived in office – till his death from natural causes three years after the war ended. In the traditional binary models, Ayala would be coded as a wartime leader who had been "punished" while Nasser would not. Analyzing these two cases should illuminate why the events unfolded the way they did in these two countries after they fought a war.

4.2   Case I: Postwar Regime Change

Wartime leadership is perhaps the toughest test of political management and a victory in war is a policy success like no other. A political leader that has successfully accomplished such a difficult assignment can reasonably expect to be feted by his fellow citizens. It follows that such a leader would be insulated from significant threats from domestic opponents in the aftermath of the war. Yet, there have been several instances in history when victorious leaders have been unceremoniously forced to demit office after the war ended. Why would a leader of a country be removed from power even after winning a war? The answer may lie in the costliness of the war. Higher cost wars can generate domestic effects that produce sub-optimal political outcomes for wartime leaders. The unfortunate fate of President Ayala of Paraguay after the victorious campaign in the Chaco seems to fit this theory and merits further investigation. The analysis below will primarily

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focus on the human and material costs suffered by Paraguay in the Chaco War and its

impact on the contemporaneous domestic political situation of the country. In order to

contextualize this narrative, I will incorporate relevant aspects of the broader strategic

setting in which the Chaco War was fought and the diplomatic negotiations that were

involved in ensuring its termination and postwar settlement. Prior to delving into them in

greater detail, it will useful to summarize the key events pertaining to the Chaco War and

its aftermath.

4.2.1 Chaco War and Paraguay: An overview

It has never been disputed as to which side initiated the Chaco War. Bolivia started

the aggression to achieve its war aim of acquiring territory in the arid Chaco region on its

boundary with Paraguay. While Paraguay was the first to officially declare war, Bolivian

troops were the ones to commit the first aggressive act (Farcau, 1996, p. 113). Bolivia

wanted to gain direct access of a trade route to the Atlantic that was lost after its defeat in

the War of Triple Alliance (1865-70). The incentives to fight over the Chaco were also

heightened by the widespread belief on both sides that the region contained reservoirs of oil

(Clodfelter, 2002, p. 412). After three years of intense fighting that cost tens of thousands

of lives on both sides, the Ayala government of Paraguay agreed to an armistice offer from

Bolivia in June 1935 (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, p. 193).

Although Bolivia's offer of an armistice was a *de facto* admission of defeat,

Paraguay had not completely annihilated its military capabilities. The answer to the

question "Who won?" may not have been conclusively answered when fighting ceased in

1935 (Rout, 1970, p. 45). Tortuous diplomatic negotiations were conducted for almost

three years with arbitration by several countries including the US. Paraguay, as the

smaller, weaker power, emerged with the more favorable terms of the peace signed in Buenos Aires in 1938 (Hughes, 2005, p. 412). Although most of the disputed territory was eventually awarded to Paraguay(Clodfelter, 2008, p. 414), Rout succinctly summarizes the net result of the Chaco War for the two belligerents: "Bolivia lost the Chaco but retained its petroleum treasure. Paraguay won the Chaco but did not reach the oil fields (Rout, 1970, p. 45)." Although one can quibble about the scale of the victory, Paraguay had wildly exceeded its prewar expectations and was the victor by any objective measure. Both sides engaged in total mobilization of their economies for war, French and German military advisors were used in massive battles with modern, lethal weaponry. In many ways, this was a preview of the casualty levels that were reported few years later in the Second World War (Hughes, 2005, p. 412).

The government of Paraguay was led by a civilian president Eusebio Ayala who ruled the country throughout the entire duration of the war. The military operations were primarily handled by General Jose Felix Estigarribia. Both men played their respective roles in wartime leadership providing a great example of civil-military collaboration under trying conditions (Gleditsch, Chiozza, & Goemans, 2009). Despite achieving a victory against a stronger opponent, Ayala's government could not survive even a year after the cessation of hostilities. Both Ayala and Estigarribia were forcibly removed in a military coup in February 17, 1936, eight months after accepting the armistice offer. They were initially jailed and then sent into exile. The coup marked the fall of Liberal Party from power, which it had held since 1904. The new regime headed by Colonel Rafael Franco was short-lived and in 1937, General Estigarribia returned from exile and was elected

president. He lasted three years. Thus, Ayala's removal was followed two more illegal

changes in regime in Paraguay in quick succession.

This indicates that the policy success in thwarting Bolivian aggression and

acquiring the disputed territory did not yield any political dividends for the Paraguayan

leadership that was at the helm during wartime. In fact, they suffered the severest form of

political punishment, short of execution. Their successor also could not stay long and the

overall nature of postwar politics can be fairly described as extremely turbulent. In the

next section, I detail the human and financial toll of the war for Paraguay.

Table 4.1 Paraguay and the Chaco War: Basic Facts

Variable	Observation
Battle Deaths	36,000
Civilians threatened	**No**
Outcome	Victory
Role in War	Target
War Stakes	High
Number of Leadership Changes during War	0
Postwar tenure of Wartime Leader	Deposed in a coup after 8 Months
Number of Postwar Leadership Changes in 5 year period	3

4.2.2   Paraguay's Costs in the Chaco War

There is general consensus that the Chaco War was one of the most lethal interstate

wars in Latin American history. The Correlates of War (COW) database records the

number of battle deaths for Paraguay to be 36,000 which is the consensus in the standard

historical accounts of the war (Farcau, 1996; Hughes, 2005; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010;

Zook, 1961). This represent almost 3.5% of its total population (Zook, 1961, p. 241). As

mentioned in Chapter 2, an analysis of all wars (interstate and civil) between 1618-1918

has shown that populations losses up to 6 percent is the maximum that even the most determined belligerent has been able to bear (Klingberg, 1966). This gives us a sense of the historical significance of the scale of Paraguay's losses in this war.

Clodfelter has reported that of these, approximately 12,000 soldiers were killed in action while the rest had fallen victim to war-related diseases and the inhospitable terrain and weather they encountered in the Chaco. In addition, 26,000 are estimated to have been wounded. Table 4.2 lists the six major battles in the war (Clodfelter, 2008, p. 414).   In his account of the war, Farcau asserts that 40,000 Paraguayan died from all causes while the number of wounded to be approximately double that number. This does not include those that contracted serious illnesses during the war. The percentage of casualties as proportion of the total force mobilized for the war is truly mindboggling. The estimated number of troops mobilized was between 100,000 and 140,000 which was approximately 11 –15% of Paraguay's total population (Brilev, 2013, p. 252; Farcau, 1996, p. 237).   Almost fifty percent of all men that were mobilized for the war were either killed or injured.

While the lethality of firepower was the primary cause of casualties, scarcity of drinking water on the battlefront increased the likelihood that a huge number of combatants would not survive the war. The logistics had great difficulty managing the long supply lines that were required to wage war in an arid region where each soldier needed a minimum of ten liters to stave off dehydration. Water tankers had to bring fresh supplies from Isla Poi, which was almost sixty kilometers away from the Chaco (Farcau, 1996, p. 53).   The diseases associated with lack of access to drinking water took many lives on both sides (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, p. 211). The contagion of epidemic diseases was made worse by the mass contact between the armed forces of the two belligerents and Chaco's

indigenous people. Malaria was pervasive on the Chaco front forcing Field commanders to send frantic requests to headquarters for medical staff to deal with infectious diseases amongst the troops (Horst, 2010, p. 297).

Since the war lasted for almost three years, it is instructive to note the temporal breakdown of these casualties over this period. Given what was to come, Paraguay enjoyed a string of early successes with relatively few fatalities till the end of 1932: 700 soldiers had been killed, 1,400 wounded, 65 captured (Clodfelter, 2008, p. 414). However, this casualty count does not present the full picture of the severity of the war for the Paraguayan forces. Although battlefield losses were low, by November 1932 almost 50% of the Paraguayan troops that were deployed on the front were suffering from influenza or dysentery. They were severely afflicted with malnutrition and paucity of medical supplies (Farcau, 1996, p. 98). In 1933, Paraguayans suffered approximately 9,000 casualties including killed and wounded. Of these, 8000 casualties were expended on a single battle: the Paraguayan victory at Campo Via between October 23 to December 13, 1933. Although fighting continued for another year and a half, in retrospect, Bolivia never recovered from its loss at Campo Via. In the first seven months of 1934 Paraguayans had lost another 5,000 soldiers as Bolivia mounted a counteroffensive. Paraguayans suffered their biggest defeat of the war on May 25, 1934 at Canada Strongest. This single engagement resulted in 1,556 soldiers being taken prisoner and 400 killed or wounded. Between May to December 1934, Paraguayans had lost an additional 17,000 men, wounded or missing. In their failed attempt to occupy the Bolivian oil fields in Santa Cruz Province in the final six months of the war (i.e. the period from January from June in 1935), the Paraguayans lost an additional 15,000 casualties to warfighting and diseases (Clodfelter,

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2008, p. 414).   Thus, it seems like the biggest wave of casualties for Paraguay came

between May 1934 and the armistice of June 1935.

Table 4.2 Major Battles of the Chaco War: Paraguayan Deployments

Location	Date	Year	Troops Deployed
Boqueron	September 9 – 30	1932	7,565
Nanawa – First Assault	January 19	1933	2,500
Nanawa – Second Assault	January 24 – 28	1933	5,000
Nanawa – Third Assault	July 4 – 8	1933	6,000
Campo Via	October 23 – December 13	1933	26,500
Canada El Carmen	November 11-16	1934	11,000

Source: Clodfelter, 2008

Logistical problems made it impossible to commit tanks and airplanes and artillery

in the Chaco region. The terrain, climate and distances in the various theaters of this war

had made it imperative that the bulk of fighting be done by infantrymen, most of whom

were illiterate peasants, who had never been outside their village communities (Clodfelter,

2008, p. 414; Farcau, 1996, p. ix).

Recollections and contemporaneous accounts of combat by Paraguayan infantry

officers convey how the "…the horrors of modern warfare carved its mark deep into their

beings (Farcau, 1996, p. ix)." For example, one officer that was part of the first battle of

the war with mass casualties – the offensive to recapture the Boqueron Fort[21] − described it

thus: "The vile war; the hell, the desert, the agonizing thirst, the infernal heat that envelops

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[21] The Battle of Boqueron was one of the first major battles that the Paraguayan's won, albeit at the cost of heavy casualties. It was a counteroffensive launched to retake a fort that had been occupied by Bolivian forces. Hundreds of Paraguayan troops feel to gunfire as the Bolivian Lieutenant Colonel Marzana held out for almost twenty three days. This kind of lethal engagements between the two sides would be the pattern of fighting in numerous battles throughout the war (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, p. 198)

you, the stench of rotting bodies left for days on end…this kind of war is a terrible

crime(quoted in Seiferheld, 2013, p. 200)." Carlos Maria Sienra Bonzi's recollections are

typical of many Paraguayan recruits who were traumatized by the searing levels of violence

that they would encounter in the Chaco. He was recruited as part of the massive

mobilization of armed forces at the outbreak of the Chaco War and rose to the rank of

lieutenant. Later events would show that their combat experience also radicalized and

politicized many members of the armed forces. It was the Chaco War veterans like Carlos

who formed the core base of support for the plotters of the coup of 1936 against Ayala.

Carlos took the political path favored by many of his fellow combat veterans in the

tumultuous postwar period: He joined the *Partido Revolucionario Febrerista* (The

February Party) that came to power after deposing the Ayala government in 1936 (Lambert

& Nickson, 2013, p. 203). His moving description of military combat gives us a sense of

how a politically aware Paraguayan soldier in the Chaco War evaluated its costs and

benefits (Bonzi, 2013, pp. 204-205):

> War scars a man forever, and it is not easy to get over the images left by so
> much death, with the knowledge that you were part of that mad war machine. All of us
> went to the Chaco as youngsters…We thought war would be an adventure, but we were
> confronted with a brutal reality. It would have been much more constructive for
> everyone to have had friendly trade relations with Bolivia rather than killing each other
> like we did in those three terrible years of war.

While these sentiments were common among young Paraguayan men that saw the

consequences of serious combat, the dominant prewar public opinion had been one of war

hysteria.

Besides the truly staggering human costs, the financial impact of the war on an

impoverished country like Paraguay was no less significant. The Paraguayan leaders were

very cognizant of its lack of military preparedness and the years leading up to the Chaco

War. A secret Executive Order 21.211 of 29 July 1925 by President Jorge Antezana

Villagran authorized the expenditure of 1,810,000 gold pesos, equivalent to £ 348,715, on

arms acquisition in Europe (Hughes, 2005, p. 430). Between 1925 and 1932 Paraguay had

spent almost £ 1,250,000 on arms (Hughes, 2005, p. 430).   According to another estimate,

over a six years period prior to the outbreak of the war, successive governments spent

$4,730,733 on a buying spree of a wide variety of military hardware (Zook, 1961, p. 63).

The two Presidents during this period – Eligio Ayala (no relation to the wartime President

Ayala) and Jose P. Guggiari – secretly allocated 60 percent of the total revenues to prepare

for the impending war, meeting the debt obligations for the War of Triple Alliance (1864-

70) and creation of a reserve of foreign currency and gold. In 1929, the government was

forced to take an internal loan of £ 470,000 (100 million Paraguayan pesos) in order to

keep up with these purchases (Hughes, 2005, p. 432). One thing to note is that all the

spending and military modernization prior to the war was done in secret. This secrecy

would have political consequences which shall be discussed in section 4.2.2.

The Paraguayans paid for most of these purchases in hard currency. In order to

raise this money, it relied on its income from exports, issues of paper, loans sourced from

Argentina totaling 16,626072 Ps. ($5,542,026).   In addition, it used up the 3,000,000 Ps.

gold surplus ($4,900,500) built up by former President Eligio Ayala.   After the war began,

the huge booty captured – 28,000 rifles, 2,300 automatic weapons, 96 mortars, large

ammunition stores – valued at over $10,000,000 helped to defray some these costs (Zook,

1961, p. 241).

While Paraguay was carrying out its program of rearmament, the global economy

was hit with the Great Depression in 1929. Fortunately for Paraguay, it was still a largely

autarkic economy whose dependence on foreign exchange from exports was limited. This contained the damage that the global economic crisis could inflict on it. While it was not ravaged by the depression, it was saddled with a total foreign debt of 830,000 pounds sterling by 1930. This forced the government to drastically cut domestic expenditure to keep the arms purchases going (Farcau, 1996, p. 24). Fortunately for Paraguay, foreign investors that were connected to the Liberal Party elite were able to ensure a steady supply of credit to finance the war and keep the economy stable (Shea, 2014). All the same, by August 1934, the financial strain of the war was coming to a head for Paraguay. The economic effects of maintaining such a large military and paying for the costs of 14,000 Bolivian prisoners were beginning to be felt on the economy (Zook, 1961, p. 202).

At this crucial point in the war, the Argentinian government came to the rescue. Over the months of October-November 1934, Argentina secretly deposited 4,000,000 Pesos (Argentinian) in two installments in Paraguay's account in Paris. The transfer of this interest free loan with an open-ended repayment schedule was done in total secrecy with the help of middlemen. This was a lifeline that revived the Paraguayan war machine in the final stage of the war enabling it to invest in vehicles and transportation equipment. Given that logistical issues were especially crucial in this war, this Argentinian assistance at a crucial stage was a decisive factor in achieving victory(p. 205).

Besides helping pay for the war, access to inexpensive credit helped Paraguay to avoid visible economic dislocation over the duration of the war. This could be one of the reasons why the Ayala regime did not face political problems at home while the war was in progress (Shea, 2014). No attempt was made to remove Ayala nor was there any significant anti-government activities observed during wartime Paraguay. The same forces

that deposed the Ayala regime within months after the war ended may have acted sooner if the country was undergoing an economic crisis during the war years. In the next section, I review the historical background and the nature of the Paraguayan political system before, during and after the Chaco War.

4.2.3   Paraguay before the Chaco War

The nature of the Paraguayan political system in the period corresponding to the Chaco War and its aftermath was the product of the developments in decades following its defeat in the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870). The constitution that was created following Paraguay's defeat sought to excise the legacy of the tyrannical rule of Francisco Solano Lopez (1862-1870) (Hicks, 1971, p. 90)[22]. The period between the War of Triple Alliance and the Chaco War were characterized by anarchy, frequent turnover of leaders, corruption and financial machination that drove the country into debt and considerable penetration by foreign commercial enterprises (Hicks, 1971, p. 91).[23]

The two main political parties that emerged under the constitutional system of 1870 – Colorados and Liberals – owed their genesis to two rival clubs that were formed after the War of Triple Alliance when the Brazilian occupation was still in effect (Lewis, 1982).[24]

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[22] The new constitution stated purpose was to create a liberal, democratic government. The president was supposed to be elected with a bicameral legislature. The other key principles it sought to uphold were the freedom of press, universal suffrage, and the protection of private property (Hicks, 1971, pp. 90-91). This constitutional scheme may have been inspired by the principles of the Enlightenment but the reality of Paraguayan politics did not match its lofty ideals.

[23] A majority of the country's land passed into the hands of foreign companies over this period facilitated by successive governments (Lewis, 1968, p. 23) Paraguay had as many as forty-one presidents from 1872 to 1932 when the Chaco War broke out. Governments were always under threat of armed military uprisings and street battles among political factions were quite common (Farcau, 1996, p. 24).

[24] The postwar winning coalition congealed that under the banner of the Colorado Party also known as the National Republican Party with the counter elites organized under the banner of the Liberal Party.   Apart from the two main parties, a Communist Party was active as well although it was not a serious contender for power. The Liberal Party was initially organized by businessmen and professionals who felt cheated by the

The Liberal party wrested power away from the Colorados with the aid of the Argentinian government in 1904 (Lewis, 1968, p. xxi). Under different leaders, Liberals held power till the coup of 1936 brought a new coalition to power after the Chaco War. However, it is misleading to divide Paraguayan history according to the party in power as neither of these two major parties were cohesive entities (Hicks, 1971, pp. 92-93). The internal violence in Paraguay during the decades leading up to the Chaco War was rooted as much in intra-party factional splits as the rivalry between the two parties. During the Liberal era, various groups of the Liberal party were not averse to using violent means against each other (Lewis, 1968, p. xxi).[25] The general level of instability in Paraguay over this period is illustrated by the scatterplot in Figure 4.1 that displays annual count of four types of anti-government threat events in that country between 1919 and 1939.[26]

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vested interests that sought to monopolize economic opportunities with the collusion of the government that was formed in Paraguay after the end of foreign occupation in 1876 (Hicks, 1971, p. 92).

[25] There was a rapid turnover of leaders even though the Liberal Party held power in the period spanning 1904 to 1936.[25] The first reasonably free and fair election of Paraguay was held in 1928 in which Jose P. Guggiari won. Despite the election, Guggiari administration's credibility remained suspect due to the low participation in the elections of 1928 that helped regime opponents to label it as a minority government. This weakened Guggiari's capacity to cope with the crises that were emerging (Lewis, 1968, p. 29). Liberal party was divided into hostile factions: (i) Guggiari loyalists, (ii) a group that favored a rival Liberal politician named Eduardo Schaerer and (iii) dissident Liberals that represented the radical wing of the party. The third group of young radicals would later join the coup against Ayala in 1936.

[26] The graph in Figure 4.1 plots the four classes of events that were used to construct the dependent variable in the statistical models in Chapter 3.

Figure 4.1 Annual Count of Anti-Government Activities in Paraguay, 1919-1939

Source: Banks Cross-National Time Series Archive

The decade prior to the Chaco War also saw a rapid professionalization of its armed

forces. Following the government's victory in the civil war of 1923, a concerted effort was

made by the Liberal government to improve the management and training of the Armed

Forces which went a long way in ensuring victory in the Chaco War. The political

establishment became more accommodative of officers of competing political loyalties.[27]

From the 1920s onwards, the sociological profile of the military also changed: a career in

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[27] Officers that showed sympathies to opposition parties and movements were not automatically terminated but transferred to less prestigious positions (Abente, 1989).

the military became sought after, as can be gauged from the number of recruits from a middle class or upper class background (Abente, 1989, p. 543).

The 1920s also witnessed the birth of a key social organization called the *Liga Nacional Independiente* headed Adriano Irala and Juan Stefanich.[28] It be a key voice of nationalist opposition against the Liberal government in the months leading up to the outbreak of the Chaco War. Its publication *La Nacion* were filled with detailed accounts of the government's lack of preparation for the impending war (Warren, 1950, p. 6). After the war began, this became the main platform for the critics of the strategic and tactical decisions of the Ayala regime.   Members of this organization eventually joined the coalition that carried out the coup against Ayala.

Prewar Paraguayan society was also suffering from socio-economic tensions that were simmering under the surface. Unbeknownst to the squabbling members of the Liberal party elite and their respective supporters, the economic impact of the party's laissez faire doctrines was also creating a pool of discontent in the society.[29]

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[28] The Liga began in 1928 as a political club formed by university intellectuals who advocated broad social and economic reforms, without regard to party politics. Although small in numbers, the *Liga* exercised considerably influence on public opinion through the newspaper *La Nacion* (Lewis, 1968, p. 28).   Irala and Stefanich were prominent intellectuals and held professorships at the prestigious National University (Lewis, 1968, pp. 28-29).

[29] The domination of foreigners in the Paraguayan economic life was visible to all. Most peasants were landless, forcing them to work in exploitative conditions for large landowners of foreign origin (Lewis, 1982, p. 35). The working conditions in the privately-owned agricultural estates (*latifundios*) resembled feudal domains. On the eve of the Chaco War only five percent of the Paraguayan population possessed their own land. In a country whose chief means of production was agriculture, such a lopsided ownership structure gave a vast section of the citizenry a very good reason to be discontented with the existing political establishment (Lewis, 1968, pp. 24-25).

4.2.4 Eve of the Chaco War

In late 1927 and into 1928 incidents between the patrols of the two countries became more frequent on the disputed border with Bolivia. In the Buenos Aires conference of 1928, Bolivia set aside all previous boundary treaties. Its strict negotiating stance at the conference made no secret of its goal of the "complete rejection of all possessory actions of Paraguay since 1536 (Zook, 1961, p. 46)." More seriously, Bolivia also began blatant encroachments into the disputed territory. Paraguay's leaders were cognizant of the threat but could do little more than protest as they knew that their country was totally unprepared to wage a full-scale war. The failure of the Buenos Aires conference signaled to both sides that they would have to speed up their mobilization for war. As the relatively weaker side, the threat for Paraguay was very stark.

When Bolivians erected Fort Vangaurdia on the upper Paraguay River in 1928, the crisis came to a head. Members of the Paraguayan opposition and Liberal dissenters came down hard on the government for its failure to respond to the Bolivian incursions. Colorados, the *Schareristas* (supporters of Liberal politician named Scharer) and *Liga Nacional Independente* did everything in their power to expose the woeful state of Paraguay's armed forces in order to embarrass the government. As news of the construction of Fort Vangaurdia reached the capital Asuncion, demonstrators gathered and there were loud demands for a robust military response to Bolivian aggression. While these sentiments were duly reflected in the Paraguayan legislature, the political leadership could not do much as they knew that the country was in position to wage a war (Farcau, 1996, p. 13).

As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the truth was that a considerable amount of resources were being allocated to rapidly modernize the military. The political problem for the Liberal politicians in the government was that this was all being in secrecy. This severely damaged the Liberal Party's reputation as a protector of national security.[30] With the political debate over the government's response becoming more rancorous, a Paraguayan officer Major Rafael Franco launched an attack on Fort Vanguardia without the consent of his political or military leadership. This made the war all but inevitable (Farcau, 1996, p. 12; Lewis, 1982, p. 36). As later events would prove, there is a strong possibility that Franco's actions were driven as much by patriotism as the calculation that the outbreak of war would be politically beneficial for a capable army officer like him. Although Franco's troops succeeded in retaking the fort of the Bolivians, this action proved to be a strategic disaster for Paraguay and political problem for the Liberal regime. When Bolivia occupied two Paraguayan forts in retaliation, the outbreak of war seemed imminent. To buy more time, the Liberal government thought it wise to agree to arbitration through a multilateral peace conference at Bouenos Aires. Give the state of preparedness of their armed forces, this action is understandable. When the government agreed to rebuild Fort Vangaurdia and return it to the Bolivians as part of a deal brokered at this conference, it further weakened its credibility of Liberal Party at home and dented its popularity (Lewis, 1982, p. 36).

There were anti-government demonstrations in the capital Asuncion in October 1928 to protest against this move. These could only be suppressed by the lethal use of

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[30] There was a valid strategic reason why successive Liberal Party governments were trying to hide their arms acquisition as much as possible. As the storms of war with Bolivia gathered, the Paraguayan government wanted to avoid provoking Bolivia into launching a full-scale preemptive strike. However, the concealment of the arms purchasing process from the public reinforced the popular impression – shared by a section of the military – that Liberals were not serious about meeting the Bolivian threat (Zook, 1961, p. 67).

force by the government of Guggiari. Sensing an opportunity, Franco began plotting a coup

with a number of the junior army officers to remove the Liberal government which at that

time was headed by Guggiari. However, he found no support from senior officers who

were convinced by Guggiari to stay loyal to the existing government. Guggiari then

discreetly had Franco removed from active duty and sent abroad (Farcau, 1996, p. 26).

The Liberal government's reputation was further sullied by another eruption of

violence on October 23, 1931 which was basically an attempted coup d'etat by the *Liga*

Nacional. When a crowd of anti-government student demonstrators tried to break into the

Presidential Palace, troops opened fire killing and injuring several of them. This event had

tremendous long-range repercussions (Lewis, 1982, p. 37). On 26 October 1931, all

members of the opposition Colorado Party resigned *en masse* from the legislature forcing

Guggiari to demit office. The Vice President, Eusebio Ayala replaced him (Farcau, 1996,

p. 26; Zook, 1961, pp. 55-56). Many of the students who survived the "*23 octubre*"

incident were reservists that later served in the Chaco War as officers. On the front, they

found common cause with regular army officers that had long been disgruntled with the

Liberal government. The battle fields of Chaco would serve as the venue for the formation

of many of the networks of combat veterans that would be critical in the postwar attempt to

create a new order (Lewis, 1982, p. 37).

As domestic public opinion turned rabidly in favor of waging war, senior Liberal

politicians were struggling to come to a consensus on the Bolivian threat. Ayala had

publicly suggested in 1931 that Paraguay should be open to considering Bolivia's demands

as it could actually work in its favor: "I suggest that the Foreign Ministry's proposal be

sent (to Bolivia) along with other suggestions…to show our desire to satisfy Bolivia to the

point of giving her access (to the Rio Paraguay)." He further commented that a Bolivian port would improve trade and possibly give Paraguay preferential access to Bolivian oil. On the other hand, hawks within the government like Foreign Minister Jose Zubizaretta demanded a complete Bolivian withdrawal from the Chaco (Farcau, 1996, p. 26). Eventually, people like Ayala were isolated and the country moved inexorably towards war.[31]

Ayala was formally elected President in the election of 1932. Like his predecessor whose election was undermined by low voter turnout, the legitimacy of Ayala's election was severely undercut by the boycott of Colorado party, the dissidents Liberals, and the *Liga Nacional Independiente* (Lewis, 1968, pp. 35-36). President Ayala's election provided a semblance of unity for the Liberal Party as both the "officialist" wing and the followers of Eduardo Shaerer (*shaererista*) supported him. Moreover, with his long standing ally, Estigarriia, ensconced in the post of commander-in-chief of the army, Ayala's winning coalition appeared stable as the country prepared for war (Lewis, 1968, p. 36).

4.2.5   Wartime developments and postwar period

The war formally began in July 1932 after Bolivia seized Fort Pitiantuta. The start of the war seemed to paper over the pre-war domestic dissension in Paraguay. Military reservists were called up and there was total mobilization of the society for war. Even a known anti-establishment figure like Franco was called back and assigned to active duty in

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[31] It is also important to recognize Eusebio Ayala's involvement in negotiations of a 1913 treaty for the competing boundary claims of Paraguay and Bolivia (Lewis, 1968, p. 29). Ayala had given a concession to Bolivia that had built some forts within the arbitral zone (Lewis, 1968, p. 30). This had already made many nationalist Paraguayans, who advocated a hawkish stance vis-à-vis Bolivia, suspicious of Ayala. His public stance in 1931 calling for negotiations to avoid war would have further cemented these suspicions.

a command position. However, this surge of nationalistic sentiment did not mean that the danger for Ayala from his domestic opponents had dissipated. Even while officers and soldiers were fighting on the front under the leadership of Ayala and his allies, they were preparing for a postwar revolution to replace them (Lewis, 1968, p. 36). The costliness of the war provided these anti-Ayala forces a readymade excuse to carry out their designs after the war ended. It is quite possible that these counter-elites would have attempted a regime change even if the war had not occurred. However, the costliness of the war ensured that any credit for the military victory could not be claimed by the Ayala regime.

Despite being the weaker power on paper, the Paraguayan forces, especially the peasants, generally exhibited better warfighting skills than their Bolivian counterparts. Within a few weeks, they succeeded in checking the Bolivian advance. Overcoming tremendous challenges, the Paraguayans were occupying most of the Chaco by December 1933(Lewis, 1982, p. 37). It is at this point that President Ayala took a decision that would make his domestic political position very precarious. Hearing reports of a string defeats and worsening political crisis in Bolivia had convinced a large number of Paraguayans – including those on the front – that the Bolivians could be forced to surrended in a matter of days. At this stage, when Paraguay's president, Eusebio Ayala proposed a truce, it invited universal opprobrium. This decision was castigated by regime opponents as another example of the mismanagement of the war (Lewis, 1982, p. 37) .

In their eyes, the truce the government had let the Bolivian Army off the hook when it was on knees. Instead of pushing for victory, they had given it time to recoup its battlefield losses and reorganize to carry on the war (Farcau, 1996, pp. 161-162). The case made by regime opponents was strengthened when Bolivia took advantage of the truce to

recover and launch a counteroffensive. The intense fighting continued for another year and a half.   Ayala loyalists claimed, perhaps truthfully, that the army was in no position to press home the advantage in December 1933 and needed the truce to regroup. It was Estigarribia who had conveyed to Ayala that Paraguayan troops were facing supply shortages. Ayala concurred with his trusted commander. However, both came under vicious attack by the political opponents for this decision (Farcau, 1996, p. 161). The most vocal of these was Juan Stefanich of the *Liga Nacional* who rhetorically accused Ayala and Estigarribia "of betraying Paraguayan interests (Warren, 1950, p. 8)."

Although Paraguay did win in the end, its casualties had multiplied manifold by then (Lewis, 1982, pp. 37-38). Although it is a matter of conjecture, if Paraguay had succeeded in making Bolivia surrender in 1933 Ayala could have played on the euphoria of victory to deter potential challengers and survive in office. As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the last phase of the war (January 1934 – June 1935) was also the most lethal in terms of fatalities for Paraguay. Estigarribia confirmed in his memoirs that there was no way his forces could have pressed on at that stage given the logistical problems he was facing. In fact, he believed that if he carried on the campaign in December 1933 it would have certainly ensured Paraguay's defeat (Farcau, 1996, p. 162).

By the time victory came, eighteen months and thousands of additional casualties later, a vast section of the soldiers were terribly disaffected with the Liberal government. It is not surprising that these soldiers saw their contribution and sacrifices as far more consequential in making this victory possible than the strategic competence of President Ayala and senior Paraguayan military commanders like Estigarribia. In their view, the war had been won "in spite of – not because of – government's leadership (Lewis, 1982, p.

38)." While the loss of lives in battle undoubtedly caused widespread grief among the Paraguayan people, the victory in the Chaco War bolstered the military *espirit de corps* and helped to mobilize it as a political force to bring down the Liberal government (Abente, 1989, pp. 543-544). The Chaco War had the unintended consequence of undermining the basis of the system of elite consensus among civilian politicians by legitimizing the political role of the military (Abente, 1989, p. 544) Victory in the military campaign raised the social profile and prestige of the armed forces to unprecedented levels. Many veterans were imbued with a strong sense of mission that translated into a socialization against the existing ruling Liberal elite that was currently represented by Ayala.

Ayala may have hoped that the celebratory victory parades in the Paraguayan capital of Asuncion would translate into political capital for him. Unfortunately for him, these were more an expression of mass relief rather than a reflection of the popularity of the government. There was widespread sorrow at the heavy death toll rather than jubilation at the military victory (Farcau, 1996, p. 230). It was in this environment that vast numbers of demobilized and unemployed veterans of the Chaco War congregated in Asunción in late 1935 and early 1936. The divide between the ruling elite Liberals and the Chaco War veterans had become irreconcilable and it was a matter of time before an open struggle for power would erupt (Chesterton, 2013, p. 124).

In their desire to bring down the Liberal regime, the disgruntled members of the armed forces found allies in the emerging and vociferous middle class of white collar workers, professionals, and intellectuals. Some of them were represented in the reserve corps composed of university students that had been given basic military training. This group served as a bridge between the regular officers and the soldiers.   Some of these

university students had earlier participated in the bloody protests in October 1931 expressing the demand that the Liberal government give a robust response to Bolivian aggression (Lewis, 1968, p. 36). Although they fought under the leadership of the Liberal government, they were bitterly opposed to the existing order dominated by its oligarchy. The comradeship that these Paraguayans from different backgrounds experienced in the battlefield of Chaco broke down the ideological foundations on which old political parties and rivalries were based (Pendle, 1967, p. 32). These university educated men imbued with radical ideas also helped to foment discontent among workers and peasants towards the country's general socio-economic structure that was high unequal and exploitative (Lewis, 1968, p. 36). To add to all this, the effects of the global depression was still reverberating across the world. Although Paraguay had escaped being directly impacted, its effects eventually added to the woes of the Paraguayan economy.

Therefore, the aftermath of the Chaco War brought together a broad coalition against the Ayala regime: besides the military and the existing opposition that had abstained from the 1932 election, it also brought together members of two classes – the peasants and workers. Throughout history, such a coalition has often proved to be a sufficient precondition for a social revolution. The radicalization of the middle class and a small but active proletariat also created a fertile ground for the spread of both neo-fascist as well as leftist ideologies. Prior to the war, these newly politicized social groups fed the popular perception created by anti-Liberal forces that the politicians in power were too weak to protect Paraguay's interests vis-a-vis Bolivia. After the war, Paraguay's failure to occupy the Bolivian oil fields after a string of early military successes solidified this perception (Abente, 1989, p. 544).

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Plotting and conspiracies among officers and soldiers against the Ayala government that were afoot during the war gathered steam after it ended. The conspirators settled on Colonel Rafael Franco as their leader. He was the military officer who had attacked Fort Vangaurdia in 1928 without authorization of the Liberal Party government. His anti-establishment credentials vis-à-vis the Liberal elite were very sound: He had been relieved of active duty for his role in the Fort Vangaurdia incident. He was even exposed as a plotter of a coup against the Guggiari government and sent into exile. Three years later, in October 1931, the pro-war demonstrators hailed him as their hero even as they castigated the Liberal government for its failure to meet the Bolivian threat. When the war began, the Ayala government brought him back from exile. He performed heroically in the war further bolstering his standing with the would-be revolutionaries as well as in the general public as a national hero. Franco enjoyed fanatical loyalty of the soldiers under his command because he was successful in manipulating the military bureaucracy to ensure preferential treatment for them (Lewis, 1982, p. 38). Apart from his troops, there was a considerable section of the regular army officers that were very impressed with Franco's open defiance of the government's prewar diplomacy, which they regarded as spineless. They also regarded the diplomatic solution to the Vangaurdia incident of 1928 as a national disgrace. Franco's popularity among the rank and file of the armed forces can be gauged from the fact that he had also become the head of the 10,000 member war veterans' association, the *Asociacion Nacional de Ex-Combatientes* (Lewis, 1968, p. 36). This body was formed in 1935 "as a protest against the inefficiency of traditional parties(Warren, 1950, p. 9)."

In many ways, Franco was the ideal candidate to lead the coup. His natural proclivity for self-aggrandizement had been in evidence throughout his military career. The other factor was his bitter, long-standing rivalry with General Estigarribia who had become closely associated with the Ayala regime as a result of their wartime collaboration (Farcau, 1996, p. 238). It was in Franco's personal interest to prevent the Ayala regime from consolidating its power after the war because this would have also elevated Estigarribia's claim as the military mastermind of the victory in the Chaco War.

The Liberal government did not help its cause with a series of steps in the immediate aftermath of the war which were bound to make it even more unpopular. Citing deteriorating economic conditions, the Liberal-dominated Paraguayan Congress voted to withdraw pensions due to disabled war veterans. On the other hand, it promoted Estigarribia to the highest rank of field marshal along with an annual pension of 1,500 gold pesos for life. This move created an irreconcilable gulf between Ayala's favorite Army commander and the common soldiers and diminished Estigarribia's prestige (Lewis, 1968, p. 38, 1982, p. 38). Rumors began to circulate that Ayala was looking to get a law passed through Congress that would remove the term limit that barred anyone from holding the office of office of President for two consecutive terms (Chesterton, 2013). The conspirators did everything in their power to spread this message that along with Estigarribia, Ayala was scheming to exploit the war victory to establish a dictatorship.

The other pitfall for the Ayala regime was its handling of the postwar negotiations that were held under the auspices of a Pan-American forum of neutral nations. The importance of postwar negotiations can hardly be understated in the political events that unfolded in Paraguay in the aftermath of the Chaco War. There were a variety of factors

that would go into the deal that would eventually be struck. The protocol enshrining the cease-fire began at noon on June 14, 1935 (Farcau, 1996, p. 236). On November 1, 1935 the representatives to the peace conference attended by six neutral countries and the belligerents declared the war over. The problematic nature of the peace conference is illustrated by the remark made by the Chairman Hugh Gibson, who represented the US. He bluntly told the Paraguayan delegation that it could not get everything it wanted because unlike "a war ended by the imposition of terms by the victor…in the present case, the cessation of hostilities was negotiated, not imposed… (Rout, 1970, p. 128). This left Ayala in a conundrum: at home there was little doubt in anyone's mind that Paraguay had comprehensively defeated their enemy and only a maximalist postwar agreement in its favor would be politically viable for his domestic audience. The Paraguayan victory on the battlefield made it so that any settlement with even a hint of compromise could be portrayed as treason by Ayala's political opponents.

After a period of negotiation, the Chaco Peace Conference secured a protocolized act 21 January 1936 which released all prisoners of war and renewed diplomatic relations between the two belligerents. According to its terms, Paraguay traded its prisoners of war with Bolivia for a fresh guarantee of the status quo in terms of the territory it had acquired. It was also concluded that the costs of maintaining prisoners would be that of the host country, which was also in Paraguay's favor. The postwar agreement to which the Ayala government gave its assent cannot be called a weak compromise. Any objective assessment of the terms of the armistice would lead anyone to conclude that Paraguay had achieved a diplomatic victory. Zook concludes that "... the state (Paraguay) whose arms had beaten the aggressor preserved the military triumph at the peace table (Zook, 1961, p.

24)." Yet, the opponents of the Liberal regime in Paraguay were successful in capitalizing on the popular impression that their country had failed to capitalize on its military success.

The main reason for this was that while these negotiations were going on, the domestic situation facing Ayala was getting worse by the day. Military leaders who had policy differences with the high command during the war, and were consequently sidelined, were unhappy. The sudden and rapid demobilization was an economic and social setback for many members of the military, especially for reserve officers. This pool of embittered, discontented veterans of the Chaco War were ready to believe the opposition propaganda that the Ayala government was throwing away the hard fought victory at the peace table (Farcau, 1996, p. 238; Zook, 1961, p. 248). It was clear by now that the prospective revolutionaries wanted to base their campaign on the propaganda that Ayala was not bargaining hard to protect Paraguayan interests at the peace conference (Farcau, 1996, p. 238).

After the war ended in July 1935, Colonel Franco had been assigned to head the Military College by the Ayala government. It was on Estigarribia's recommendation that Ayala had appointed Franco to this post. Estigarribia mistakenly thought that this move would pacify the radical segments of the military officer corps (Chesterton, 2013). The Ayala government was aware of the aforementioned conspiracy and the prospective role of Franco. However, he let the situation fester. Later, Ayala explained the reason why he failed to respond promptly and vigorously to the gathering threat to his survival in the immediate aftermath of the war. According to him, he was waiting for the peace settlement at the Chaco Peace Conference with Bolivia to be signed before acting. He thought that openly cracking down on regime opponents at that stage would have worsened domestic

dissension, embarrassed Paraguay before the international community and weakened its negotiating position. Ayala's patience finally ran out when Franco started using his post at the Military College as a platform to give anti-government speeches. Estigarribia ordered his arrest on February 4, 1936 and he was deported to Argentina two days later (Chesterton, 2013; Warren, 1950, p. 10). *The New York Times* reported the events unfolding in Asuncion in the following manner (Gleditsch et al., 2009):

> The Paraguayan Government has formally charged Colonel Rafael Franco, its most prominent Chaco war hero, with being a Communist and has ordered him deported to Argentina. A communiqué from the Ministry of War charges that Colonel Franco plotted the overthrow of the government, instigated and supported by Soviet organizations. ...For more than a year there has been strong resentment in the Paraguayan Army against the professional politicians who control the government. Now that these politicians are squabbling among themselves for the Presidency, there is a strong sentiment both in and outside the army in favor of establishing a military government and ousting all professional politicians. Colonel Franco, as the idol of the soldiers, would be the natural candidate for the Presidency if this movement should be successful."

This was followed by another Franco collaborator, Colonel Camilo Recalde being arrested. Ayala confined him to the military hospital rather than making a public spectacle of his arrest. Unfortunately for Ayala and the Liberal regime, this move was not enough to deter the plotters which included several mid-ranking military officers. While some leading civilian politicians were also part of this conspiracy, it was the military leaders that were the major protagonists that shaped the events that were about to unfold (Lewis, 1968, pp. 38-39). After the sudden removal of Franco and Recalde, the plotters led by Facundo Recalde (Colonel Recalde's brother)[32] convinced another military leader with sufficient seniority and prestige – Colonel Fedrico Wedell Smith, the commander of Campo Grande garrison – to join them(Lewis, 1968, p. 39).

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[32] Unlike his brother, Facundo Recalde was a journalist by profession

On February 17, 1936, the conspirators struck in the shape of a trainload of troops who had been stationed at the Campo Grande cavalry garrison. After disembarking at the Asuncion station in the early morning hours, they proceeded to the president's palace. Ayala was drive to take refuge on a gunboat on the river. When no help came to rescue him, he resigned. Thus ended thirty-two years of Liberal rule. Estigarribia, who was in the Chaco, learned of the coup, but was in position to offer any resistance. He was arrested upon his return to Asuncion on 21 February, and both he and Ayala were sent into exile (Farcau, 1996, p. 40; Lewis, 1968). Colonel Franco was now summoned back from Argentina to head the new government under the banner of the *Febrerista* Party (Lewis, 1982, p. 38). Domestically, Franco imposed a strict press censorship. Tribunals were created to prosecute politicians who were suspected of treason during the war. Franco promised that land would be expropriated from their owners and redistributed to the landless poor (Pendle, 1967, p. 33).

Unfortunately for the new regime, the soldiers and intellectuals who came together on an anti-Liberal platform had little else to hold them together. The people who held portfolios in the Febrerista regime held such disparate ideological beliefs that it was a matter of time before the government would run into trouble. This is clear from the allegiances of Franco's key ministers: While the ministers of justice and education were socialists; those holding the treasury and the interior portfolios were neo-fascists who wanted an authoritarian state; a Colorado party man was in charge of agriculture; and the minister of foreign affairs Stefanich was a liberal democrat from the *Liga Nacional Independiente*. When each of these constituent factions made demands on Franco to implement their disparate policy agendas, he found it impossible to reconcile the

contradictions (Lewis, 1982, p. 39). Franco's solution was to impose restrictions on political activity: Under Decree Law 152 passed on March 10, 1936 all labor unions, parties, business organizations were abolished (Lewis, 1968, p. 53).   This caused a sharp reaction from a variety of groups and associations which included ex-combatants and labor. In the face of such widespread resentment, several key members of the cabinet resigned destabilizing the government. It was only members of the Liga Nacional were left to support the regime (Lewis, 1982, p. 39).

On the diplomatic front, Franco failed to push the core agenda of the revolution: to renegotiate the "shameful" peace treaty with Bolivia at the Chaco Peace Conference that the Ayala government had signed on January 21, 1936.   Stefanich of the Liga Nacional who was now Rafael Franco's foreign minister had previously attacked the January 21, 1936, agreement and denied that the Liberal Party diplomats had ever won any diplomatic victories over Bolivia. The new regime promptly repudiated the peace treaty as one of its first official acts (Farcau, 1996, p. 239).   However, after months of negotiations Franco's government had to agree the withdrawal of the Paraguayan forces from the advanced positions that they had held since the end of the Chaco War. While there is no doubt that Franco and his supporters genuinely believed that they would defend Paraguay's interests much better than the ousted government, their ambitious goals were stymied by the realities on the ground in Chaco.

A Neutral Military Commission had been set up to negotiate the postwar boundaries between the two countries. The Franco government tried to bargain hard to retain the territories it had acquired during the war, based on the widespread belief that they

were sitting on unexplored oil deposits. [33] However, they were told by the commission that

these expectations were highly exaggerated.[34] The Franco government initially refused to

believe these reports as it had come to power precisely to ensure that Paraguay maximize

its gains from the Chaco War. Once they were convinced that the prospective oil windfall

was a mirage, Foreign Minister Juan Stefanich indicate a possible reorientation of his

nation's position on December 25, 1936 (Rout, 1970, p. 144).[35] This reorientation meant

that Franco and the Febreristas would have to drop a major part of their anti-Liberal plank.

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[33] Even before the hostilities ended when the Liberal government was in power, Paraguayan forces had begun to drill in the Chaco. Prior to June 1935, the Paraguayans had drilled some ninety-five wells searching for petroleum. On the Bolivian side of the line, in what had been part pf the neutral zone, troops guarded three capped wells. Dry well had been found by the Paraguayans near Machareti. Hence, the belief that Paraguayans held territory rich in petroleum was not totally absurd.

[34] One of the members of the commission, Major John Weeks, a United States military attache, wrote back to the State Department on June 23, 1936: "from conversation with Paraguayan officers, it is evident that they believe that they occupy territory containing oil, and they expect to retain this occupied territory (Rout, 1970, p. 143-144)." In June 1936, Spruille Braden, the US mediator at the Peace Conference, informed the State Department that both Standard Oil and *Argnetine Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales* (YPF) had come to the same conclusion: "…based upon their respective geological and engineering studies, and even a certain amount of drilling…oil does not exist in the area to the east of the line of *hitos*. Authorities further state that were it to be found, it (oil) would be at such great depth as to make it entirely uneconomical for exploitation. In so far as possible, this information will be conveyed to Paraguayan officials in an attempt to lessen their desire to retain this western section of the Chaco (Rout, 1970, p. 145)."

[35] The foreign minister's stand did not indicate that all Paraguayan diplomats were preparing to renounce posthaste their quest for petroleum. Juna Isidro Ramirez, conference delegation head under Rafael Franco, continued to believe in the possibility of a Chaco bonanza. On January 18, 1937, he urged Stefanich to undertake an extensive subsoil study in the Machareti-Nancorainza-Tiguipa area. In May 1937 Emiliano Rebuelto, Argentine government engineer, informed Ramirez that extremely deep wells would have to be drilled to obtain petroleum in the western Chaco. In August Ramirez recommended that Carlos Emilio Cremiex, a Swiss-born Argentine national, be allowed to explore for petroleum near Machareti. The final Paraguayan effort to locate petroleum came in November and December 1937 (Rout, 1970, p. 145) On January 4, 1938, however, Paraguayan delegates were at last were prepared to admit that if petroleum reserves existed to the east of the line of *hitos* they were "commercially unimportant."(Rout, 1970, p. 146).

As it turned out, when Franco eventually ordered his commanders in the Chaco to withdraw from the positions that were being held since the end of the war it precipitated a rebellion in the army that brought down the Franco government. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Paredes the garrison at Concepcion and Campo Grande joined forces and launched an attack on the capital. On August 15, 1937 Dr. Felix Paiva replaced Franco as provisional president (Warren 1950, p. 16). The Liberals were back in power, but this time it was with the explicit backing of the army. This change of government had little effect on the Chaco negotiations: the peace treaty fixed the final boundary in the Chaco behind the Paraguayan battle lines. The Liberals were aware that the danger to their survival had not ceased and in 1939, they went looking for a popular military officer to replace Paiva. Marshall Estigarribia, the "General of Victory," was the natural choice. Once in office, however, Estigarribia found the going very tough. The social reforms introduced by the Franco government had raised expectations regarding the scope of welfare functions of the state. The old Liberal politicians in Congress wanted to junk those measures while Estigarribia concluded that doing so would be politically disastrous. This led to a constitutional crisis: Estigarribia dissolved the Congress and assumed dictatorial powers. He asked his cabinet, who called themselves "New Liberals" to write a new constitution whose provision would contain many of the social welfare principles embodied in Franco's "February Revolution" and was a huge departure from the laissez-faire doctrines of 1870 constitution.[36]

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[36] Estigarriia commented on the reasons for the ideological shift represented by the new constitution: "As a result of the War of the Chaco and other political circumstances, there had occurred an anarchy dangerous to the national existence…Paraguay needed a constitution more genuinely its own, without detriment to the cardinal principles of American democracy states in the Constitution of Philadelphia and the Argentine Constitution of 1853, and adopted by our country in the Constitution of 1870, which arose out of a great

Although the new constitution was to remain in force for another quarter of a century, a series of events pushed the "New Liberals" out of power and brought the old Liberals back. However, this was to be a pyrrhic victory and Liberals of all stripes were soon banished from Paraguayan political life. After Estigarriia's sudden death in an airplane accident in 1940 his war minister, General Higinio Morinigo became president as a caretaker president. Once in power, Morinigo manipulated the military appointment system to build his support to turn on the old Liberals who had put him in power. The ghost of the Chaco War came back to haunt the Liberals years after it had ended: Citing a document recently published by the Argentine Foreign Ministry regarding its activities in the Chaco Peace Conference, Morinigo made the case that Liberals had tried to solicit Bolivian support to overthrow the Franco government. The Liberal party was banned and their leaders exiled. Henceforth, Morinigo used the constitution of 1940, with its expanded presidential powers, for legitimizing a dictatorship whole sole constituency of support was the military (Lewis, 1982, p. 42).

4.2.6 Political impact of war costs

It is clear from the account presented above that Paraguay was not unfamiliar to dramatic and visible political instability prior to the Chaco War. Although it was nominally a constitutional democracy the rules and norms of political competition were not settled. However, the heavy costs that the Chaco war imposed on its people made it

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disaster. "it sought…to defend more ably our society and to broaden the radius of action of the State in that which refers to its intervention in economic and social life, by which the discarded concept of a neutral and indifferent State is abandoned. The modern state cannot simply by a policeman (Lewis, 1982, p. 41)."

possible for new elites to bid for power and opened the space for a fresh set of political actors to pursue their policy agendas. Military success that was achieved at a heavy cost could not protect its wartime political leaders from removal. Interestingly, even the replacement of Ayala, whose culpability was clear and well-established, did not exhaust the potential for threats and unrest for his successor. The successor of the wartime government also failed to survive for too long as the new government struggled to negotiate the peace. The fate of this victorious wartime government and its successor calls for a reexamination of the concept of political punishment and leader culpability that has become so central to the literature of war and political survival (Croco, 2011; H. E. Goemans, 2000). The fate of successors of culpable wartime leaders may be an additional avenue of research that can be explored.

Various historical accounts clearly indicate that the coup against President Ayala was primarily organized by a faction within the military. In this enterprise, they were assisted by a conglomeration of political groups and factions who advocated contradictory policy programs. The coming together of this motley coalition under the umbrella of counter elites fits the theoretical argument that I had outlined in Chapter 2. My theory basically rests on how costlier wars change the incentives of key members of the selectorate. When war costs pile up, counter-elites sense an opportunity to exploit the general sense of public malaise in their favor. In a country like Paraguay that had its first nominally free and fair election in 1928, the formation of this kind of a conspiratorial coalition is not very surprising. However, it is definitely defensible to argue that the tremendous costs of the Chaco War on the country created a hospitable environment for such a coalition to carry out its conspiracy to bring down the existing government.

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The revolt against Ayala received support from a variety of civilian actors, mostly

unsuccessful anti-Liberal politicians and ideologues that had little hope of attaining power

through normal democratic processes in the existing system. This included Marxists,

reformist moderates, Fascists, Colorados and the *Liga Nacional*. The radical wing of the

Liberal Party that had opposed the Ayala faction also joined. However, it was the

disgruntled army officers like Franco that led the plot. After assuming power through

unconstitutional means, the new winning coalition felt an obligation to justify replacing

twenty-five years of civilian rule – however corrupt and inefficient it may have been

perceived to be – with that of the military. Among these rationalizations, the heavy

casualties suffered during the course of the war came in very handy. By pointing to the

heavy losses that were incurred, the *Febreristas* could cover their actions with the sheen of

credibility, patriotism and national interest. They launched a frontal attack on the Liberal

party personified in Ayala's government for failing to protect the national interest and

taking decisions that resulted in avoidable fatalities (Lewis, 1968, p. 41). The proclamation

put out on behalf of the new political formation when it assumed power ferociously

attacked the Liberal for failure to manage the war properly. The following passage in the

proclamation is particularly instructive as it underlines that the conduct of the Chaco War

by the Liberal government headed by President Eusebio Ayala was crucial in motivating

them (Smith & Recalde, 2013, pp. 218-219):

> "The savage war broke out over our people, who were manacled by the satrapy of Puerto
> Pinasco and its occult machinations. Through the irony of fate, he was the president and
> commander in chief of the nation's armies, whose men went off to leave their bones in the
> blood-stained fields of the Chaco, already the home of enemy machine guns. And then not
> a day passed when the compromised agent of foreign bosses did not try to diminish by
> every means in his power the miraculous victories of a Paraguay revived…the proof of
> treason carried to its maximum: the offering of an armistice to Bolivia after the victory of
> Campo Via, in order to prevent the capture of the remainder of the invading army…He
> (President Ayala) planned the destruction of the Liberating Army in order to replace it with

prison guard. We will not mention the people's anguish and desperation, which the
vampires dwelling in the presidential circle sharpen day by day in order to enslave them.
Hunger strikes every home. Thirty thousand Paraguayans died in the Chaco, thousands of
millions of pesos have been spent, yet in the postwar period they casually debate the most
urgent problems and ramifications brought upon the country by the regime…But all this
might have been sufferable had it not been for new plans by the people's unfaithful
president and his accomplices to pare down the Republic's territorial sovereignty and to
irredeemably frustrate all the victories of our armies in the Chaco War. "

My contention is that absent the incredible costliness of the war, such rhetoric would
not have carried much meaning. Once such heavy costs had been sunk, the wartime
government of Ayala found itself battling the odds of survival. Even if Ayala had survived,
he would have only done so by beating back a robust counter-coalition that was intent on
removing him. The heavy casualties and the public disaffection these created altered the
incentives of key members of the selectorate in postwar Paraguay and motivated them to
bid for power. They felt confident in plotting and carrying out a coup against a government
that – by any objective measure – had performed brilliantly in defending the nation in a
deadly and prolonged war. The plotters were convinced that despite the military victory, a
public case could plausibly be made against President Ayala and the Liberal Party that they
were unworthy of continuing in power. This helped motivate the pool of diverse political
actors that became united in their opposition against the Liberal government. The
exhaustion and disaffection in the Paraguayan with the long and grinding war was
exploited by a coalition of counter-elites that had been out of favor with the Ayala regime.

As with other wars, the soldiers and officers that experienced the brutal realities of
combat in the Chaco were traumatized by the experience. Some of them also became
radical opponents of the existing political order. A rapid postwar demobilization placed
46,515 members of the military back into civilian life after the armistice of June 1935
(Clodfelter, 2002, p. 414). A large proportion of these combat veterans would provide the

base of support for the counter-elites that deposed the wartime winning coalition of Ayala. It may be the case that some Paraguayans had wanted to avoid war at all costs and were unhappy that the Ayala government failed to keep the peace with Bolivia. The Paraguayan Communist Party is an example of such a group. However, this was decidedly a minority. The overwhelming mood within Paraguay in the years and months leading up to the initiation of hostilities was in favor of war. Given that Bolivia was the aggressor and had been encroaching on the Chaco for quite some time, the high stakes of an impending war were clear to all whether they were part of organized political formations or not. Paraguay had a predominantly agro-based economy. All its neighbors were larger and relatively more powerful (Farcau, 1996, p. 23). Its last major militarized dispute, the War of Triple Alliance (1865-1870) had been disastrous: it lost nearly half the territory that it possessed when it became independent from Spanish rule. The war had also annihilated most of its male population (Farcau, 1996, pp. 23-24). Given this legacy, the repeated encroachments by Bolivian forces in the Chaco were initially met with fatalism among ordinary Paraguayans. However, as the implications of the Bolivian actions on the border became known, this fatalism gave way to a wave of intense nationalistic sentiment. There was a popular mood that a war had become essential to defend their homeland against Bolivian aggression. It was widely believed that a failure to appropriately respond the Bolivian threat could spell the end of Paraguay as a nation. From the beginning, the majority opinion within Paraguay was that any war with Bolivia would be a fight for survival (Farcau, 1996, p. 24).

Given that the Paraguayan opinion was largely in favor of this war, what explains the formation of a diverse counter coalition to depose the wartime government of Ayala that

carried out the popular will? Once the war losses had been accumulated, these forces calculated that the visible costliness of the war had negated any political capital that the Ayala government would gain from achieving and exceeding its prewar aims. Ayala's opponents focused on the perceived failure of his regime to press home the strategic advantage in the final months of the war.   They also tried to exploit populist sentiment in Paraguay that a victory gave their country the right to inflict the most onerous terms on Bolivia in postwar negotiations. Hence, any concession, however minor, made by the Ayala regime at the Chaco Peace Conference was portrayed as a betrayal of Paraguay's national interest.

Despite emerging victorious, the Ayala government could not counteract popular opinion and propaganda of its opponents that it had mismanaged the war. After the heavy casualties that it suffered over the course of three long years, every move made by the Ayala government during the treaty negotiations at the multilateral Chaco peace conference[37] was viewed with deep skepticism. The news of minutest hint of possible concessions to Bolivia was immediately castigated as an example of Ayala's weakness. Eventually, the coalition of anti-Ayala forces settled on a popular war hero, Rafael Franco as their leader and proceeded to carry out the coup against him.

Franco regime was beset with several problems and it could have fallen under the weight of its own contradictions. However, it also found out that replacing a government that had fought an expensive war leaves behind a toxic legacy. When Franco's government had to admit that there was no oil bonanza in the offing from the territories Paragauy had

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[37] The Chaco peace conference was organized under the auspices of several countries including Argentina, Brazil, and the United States to help negotiate the termination of the war

acquired during the war at such a huge cost, it made its position untenable as well. Franco was also deposed by a rebellion from within the army. Just eighteen months ago, Franco was being universally hailed as a war hero who could lead the revolutionary charge against the weak and corrupt Liberal political establishment. Even Franco found it impossible to survive when he could not deliver the spoils of victory that would adequately compensate for the losses that had been incurred. Although Liberals succeeded in briefly returning to power, they soon found themselves being banished from Paraguayan politics as a military-backed dictatorship under General Morinigo assumed power in 1940. This set Paraguay on a trajectory of decades of authoritarian rule and derailed the prospects of a constitutional democracy for some time to come.

4.3   Case II: Postwar Regime Survival

To say that defeat in war is the worst outcome for a wartime government and its leader, is to state the obvious. It follows that the risk of terrible political consequences for the regime and its head should be extremely high after – or sometimes during – such a war. As the statistical results in Chapter 3 have shown, the likelihood of anti-government events tends to be much higher in countries that faced defeat. It is intuitive to think that states do not concede defeat unless the costs that they are incurring have become untenable. Given the overwhelming support for the defeat variable in explaining postwar threats to the government and survival of wartime leaders, I decided to choose a case where the wartime leader and government survived despite a defeat. The analysis focuses on the last years of Egypt's long-standing ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser following the Six Day War in June 1967.

This investigation of the costs of Egypt' defeat in the Six Day War and postwar domestic politics is driven by two objectives. First, the case allows us to make a judgment on the relative weight of outcome and cost as an explanatory factor of antigovernment hostility: What is the effect of the costliness of war in a country that had suffered an "extreme" defeat? Such a case should also help in judging whether a defeated wartime leader that survives paid any political price. If he does, how is this price extracted by his domestic constituency? As I mentioned in Chapter 2, most studies of postwar survival code all surviving leaders in the same category. I argued that since all wartime leaders that survive are not alike, the bluntness of this coding scheme may generate incomplete and/or erroneous conclusions regarding the effects of war on domestic politics. The variation in the incidence and intensity of domestic challenges faced by a surviving wartime leader can help us evaluate whether he was punished or not.

Any wartime leader that is still office three years after a war is usually classified as doing "OK". Even if some culpability had been assigned to the leader for waging the war, it is said that he avoided punishment (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Croco, 2011; Henk E. Goemans et al., 2009). By surviving a costly defeat, Nasser after 1967 defied the expectation of political accountability advanced in most theories of war and leader survival. He remained in office for three years after a comprehensive defeat which cost thousands of lives. The case addresses the question: Short of removal, what other negative consequences can a wartime leader face? Does Nasser's postwar survival mean that he paid no price for his war performance and the costs that were incurred? Did his regime

escape "second-order"[38] negative domestic consequences of war involvement? The

historical record suggests that Nasser did face serious domestic problems during the

postwar period. We need to pay close attention to manifestation of these anti-government

events that occurred in Egypt soon after the end of the 1967 war. The massive costs that

Egypt suffered in a short span of time and the loss of the Sinai had forced Nasser to accept

defeat in the Six Day War. This event created opportunities for new domestic actors to

enter the political process and challenge the norms and practices of the regime. Despite the

evidence of postwar anti-government events that I present, I only claim a partial "fit" of

this case with the argument that I made in Chapter 2. While both outcome – a

comprehensive defeat – and costliness were important contributors to the changes in

Egyptian domestic politics, the evidence suggests that the defeat was by far the most

palpable cause of postwar political destabilization. In the sections that follow, I will

illustrate how this happened.

4.3.1   Six Day War and Egypt: An Overview

The June 1967 crisis that eventually resulted in the war erupted in a matter of weeks

with the Egyptian government taking most of the initial escalatory steps (James, 2012, p.

58). It resulted in approximately ten thousand deaths and a crushing defeat at the hands of

Israel. As the name suggests, this happened in a matter of days. Egypt lost major portions

of its territory in the Sinai. Nasser resigned taking moral responsibility for the defeat.

However, there was an immediate upsurge of popular emotion against his decision among

the Egyptian people which was reflected in massive gatherings on the streets of Cairo on

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[38] As I explained in Chapter 2, these cover those events that make it difficult for a ruler to govern effectively
even if these do not result in his removal from office.

July 9 and 10. This sentiment allowed him to regain the reins of power which he held till his death in 1970 from natural causes. Although Nasser survived, he could only do so after purging several members of the pre-war winning coalition who were made the scapegoats for the debacle. There was a clear split in the prewar winning coalition as the true scale of fiasco became known. A significant section of the senior leadership of the armed forces began to actively plot a coup in the immediate aftermath of the war. They would have surely carried out the conspiracy, had they not been purged by Nasser and his supporters. It can be speculated that a different set of actors would have succeeded in deposing Nasser under such circumstances. It was Nasser's alacrity in taking preemptive action that saved him from removal and post-exit punishment at the hands of the coup plotters. A vast number of top generals and senior officers were put on trial and sentenced. Although Nasser avoided direct punishment by surviving, the postwar period was highly challenging for him and his regime which supports my argument that leaders can face punishment in a variety of ways while in office. In his last three years in power, Nasser had to manage "second-order" domestic political consequences that war involvement can generate.

My argument in Chapter 2 rested on the costliness of the war generating its own dynamic that encourages anti-government forces to mobilize and target the incumbent. Egypt after the 1967 war presents a challenge to that argument. When a defeat occurs so quickly and decisively, the disaggregation of the independent effects of costs and outcome on postwar political events can become difficult to establish. What is undeniable is that this war was followed unprecedented mass unrest: Within a few months of the end of the war, there were demonstrations and protests that were directly motivated by the public anger at Egypt's war performance. Social groups that had hitherto never dared to openly

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criticize and protest against the Nasser regime came out in full force to make their voice heard. These included students, workers and intellectuals which is a lethal cocktail that can destabilize any country, especially one emerging from a disastrous war. These unrest events compelled Nasser to promise several measures to reform the state apparatus, which he is unlikely to have considered otherwise. An interesting aspect of the postwar public reaction was the vocal demand for the resumption of hostilities so that the status quo ante could be restored. The mass public supported greater hawkishness rather than a fatalistic acceptance of the war outcome. With dominant public opinion behind him, Nasser launched his country into another full-fledged war with Israel called the War of Attrition on March 6, 1969 to "take back" the territories it had lost in 1967. Egypt again suffered significant casualties, including civilians, but its forces performed much better than in 1967. However, the War of Attrition ultimately ended in a stalemate in August 1970. Nasser died a few weeks later of a heart attack.

Table 4.3. Egypt in the Six Day War: Basic Facts

Variable	Observation
Battle Deaths	10,000
Civilians threatened	**No**
Outcome	Defeat
Role in War	Initiator
War Stakes	High
Number of Leadership Changes during War	0
Postwar tenure of Wartime Leader	Died of natural caused after 3 years
Number of Postwar Leadership Changes in 5 year period	1

4.3.2 Egypt's costs in the Six Day War

Egypt was the strongest of the Arab states that fought Israel in this war under the command of Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer. Within the first two days of the war, Egypt lost 309 planes to Israeli airstrikes. In the remaining days, it lost an additional 61 planes. In the Sinai, the Egyptians deployed 100,000 troops and 930 tanks under the command of Abdel Mohsen Mortaugi. Egypts' defeat in this theater was comprehensive: it lost 700 tanks, 500 artillery pieces, and 10,000 trucks. According to Clodfelter, the breakdown of losses in this war was as follows: 3,000 killed, 5,000 wounded, and 4,990 taken prisoner, for a total 12,990(Clodfelter, 2008). Another estimate puts the total casualties at 17,500 soldiers of which 11,500 were killed and the rest wounded or captured. Out of the prewar strength of 300,000 armed forces, only half of the troop units remained intact as cohesive formations when the war ended (Kandil, 2012, p. 79). The COW database estimates the battle deaths to be 10,000 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). This interstate war is considered to be the most severe in human history in terms of battle deaths per day (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010, p. 159). In addition, 700,000 Egyptian civilians had to be evacuated from the towns in the Suez Canal zone that had been shelled (Stephens, 1972, p. 510).

Under the barrage of preemptive Israeli air strikes, the Egyptian air force, in particular, was totally gutted making serious offensive operations on the ground impossible. It lost most of its MIG fighters, and all of its TU-16 medium bombers and IL-28 bombers, during the Six Day War (McLaurin, Mughisuddin, & Wagner, 1977, p. 83). The short duration of the war also meant that Egyptian ground troops and infantry were not deployed over long periods in a combat environment. As Muhammad Fawzi, the chief of

the Egyptian general staff in June 1967, pointed out: "A staggering 75 percent of Egypt's

ground forces did not even see the enemy, let alone engage in combat (McGregor, 2006, p.

272)." In any case, Egypt's troop strength of 180,000[39] would have meant little given the

overwhelming technical superiority of Israel's air force (Dekmejian, 1971). It would have

been politically foolhardy to have carried on fighting, continue to suffer more losses and

put its civilian population at risk and lose more territory.

One of the major reasons for the fatalities incurred by Egyptian forces was the

mishandling of the retreat from the Sinai battlefront by Field Marshall Amer. Within hours

after the land battle began on July 6, Amer decided to order a withdrawal. Fawzi, the Chief

of the General Staff at that time was stunned by this decision as he felt that the Egyptian

land forces were holding their ground. Instead of falling back and counterattacking Israeli

positions, Amer ordered a precipitous withdrawal to be completed within twenty-four

hours. However, given the number of troops this step proved disastrous (Kandil, 2012, pp.

81-82). Almost eighty percent of the Egyptian army's equipment had to be left behind on

the battlefront (Gawrych, 2000, p. 71). Only six percent of the soldiers sent to the Sinai

returned with their weapons intact (Kandil, 2012, p. 82). Thousands of the deployed

soldiers went back to their villages after crossing the Suez Canal rather than rejoin their

units (Gawrych, 2000, p. 71). Those who were less fortunate were stranded in the open

desert as targets of Israeli airpower. Not surprisingly, almost all the casualties suffered by

Egypt in this war occurred on July 6 (Kandil, 2012, p. 82). As the future war minister Abd

al-Ghany al-Gamasy later recalled (quoted in Kandil, 2012, p. 82):

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[39] Clodfelter (2008) estimates put the total number of armed personnel at approximately 240,000 while Kandil (2012) at 300,000.

> I watched a heavy flow of troops move westward (away from the Sinai). It was completely disorganized…Could a retreat take place in this manner, when it normally required extreme discipline and precision and according to the doctrine of war, should take place while the fighting still continued…The field command had given up control of its forces at the most critical time…the situation can neither be explained nor excused…troops withdraw(ing) in the most pathetic way…under continuous enemy air attacks…an enormous graveyard of scattered corpses, burning equipment, and exploding ammunition.

The immediate economic consequences of the war were no less significant. A total of $400-$500 million annually from the Suez Canal ($230-$250), Sinai Oil Fields ($100) and tourism ($100) were no longer available to Egypt (Barnett, 1992, pp. 110-111). These constituted nearly two-thirds of the balance of payments deficit incurred for 1966. The loss of this revenue, the fiscal crisis and immediate costs of defense impacted the government budget that was proposed in the aftermath of the war. Addressing the National Assembly, the Deputy President Zakaria Moheiddin reminded his fellow Egyptians regarding their obligations while introducing new budget and tax increases: "It is the duty of every citizen to keep the targets of struggle always in sight and adapt to life to new circumstances." Contrary to the public stance of the regime, government decided to protect the Egyptian people from the costs of the war. Thus, while direct taxes were increased by 25%, the lax and inefficient tax enforcement machinery of the Egyptian state ensured that such taxes would hardly have any impact. However, indirect taxes and the prices of government subsidized commodities increased to some extent. However, the majority of the revenue loss and war expenditure was met by skimming the profits and assets of the public sector enterprises.

The Six Day War shook the ideological foundations of the Nasser regime. Nasser had championed "Arab Socialism" since he emerged as the undisputed leader of Egypt thirteen year ago. Pre-war Egypt was already beset with fiscal, foreign currency and

balance of payments crisis which was accentuated by the loss of revenue due to the 1967

defeat (Barnett, 1992, p. 110). The economic crisis that followed the war forced Nasser to

adopt more market-oriented policies. For example, exchange controls were liberalized to

make it easier for Egyptian citizens working abroad and foreign residents to repatriate their

foreign exchange earnings (Barnett, 1992, p. 113). In addition, the economic costs of the

1967 war forced Nasser to look for international donors to resurrect the country's finances.

At a conference in Khartoum in 1967, Nasser also actively persuaded oil-rich states –

Kuwait, Libya and Saudia Arabia – to compensate Egypt to the tune of $266 million for the

loss in revenue due to the closure of the Suez Canal. Since this was not enough, he had to

approach the Soviet Union for assistance as well (Barnett, 1992, pp. 113-115).

4.3.3 Egypt before the Six Day War

Prior to proceeding further with the details of postwar Egyptian politics, it is

essential to provide a brief background. Although Egypt had achieved independence from

British rule in 1882, its political affairs remained under indirect British occupation till

1954. On July 23, 1952 a group of military officers that called themselves the "Free

Officers Movement" organized a coup against King Farouk who had ascended to the throne

in 1936.[40] Nasser was among them. Although they had a large military presence in the

country in 1952, the British did not intervene on behalf of the king. It could be that their

decision was influenced by the fact that the coup had the unofficial backing of the US.

After a period (1952-54) of intense struggle for power among different factions of the

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[40] These came from the first batches of Egyptian officers that had been trained in the Military academy
created by the British in the 1930s.

revolutionaries, Nasser emerged on top (Barnett, 1992; Kandil, 2012). When the Six Day

War began in June 1967, Nasser had already been in power for thirteen years.

Nasser had successfully deposed his main rival, Naquib who had become President

following the 1952 coup. After ascending to power, Nasser systematically eliminated all

the remnants of Naquib loyalists from the regime. He also cut off his ties with the Muslim

Brotherhood – an organization with whom he forged a temporary alliance to depose Naquib

and ordered a brutal crackdown on the organization. As with most autocratic leaders,

Nasser relied upon a coterie of trusted lieutenants. What is crucial to note is that over time,

a gulf developed between this group of Nasser loyalists and the military as an institution.

As Nasser wanted to portray himself as the head of a populist regime rather than a military

dictatorship, he went along with this arrangement. In the years that followed, the regime

became crystallized into two factions: the military headed by Amer[41] as the chief general

while the political and administrative institutions headed by Nasser as the chief politician.

(Kandil, 2012, pp. 41-42).

On the global stage, Nasser saw himself as a radical, anti-imperialist Third World

leader that resisted attempts by the US to break his relations with Russia. In the region, the

ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict defined his worldview. He became a leading

advocate of the solidarity expressed by various Arab states ("Pan-Arabism") with the cause

of the Palestinians who had lost a major part of their homeland. He viewed Israel as an

expansionist state that was a danger to all its Arab neighbors and part of the international

Zionist movement supported by Western imperialist powers led by the US (Stephens,

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[41] Amer was a longtime friend of Nasser and part of the Free Officers Movement. He was the Field Marshall of the Egyptian army when the 1967 war occurred. After the 1967 war, he briefly became the rallying point for anti-Nasser forces.

1972). However, the Soviet opposition to his efforts to bring the Arab states – Egypt,

Syria and Iraq – closer meant that Nasser also remained suspicious of them despite

receiving significant military and financial assistance (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 237). In the

first phase of his reign, Nasser's main resistance and opposition were directed against the

efforts to induce Arab states into a Western alliance system that had already been

established under the US leadership.[42]

At home, Nasser biggest challenge was to consolidate power while being mindful of

the growing influence of Amer who was gradually creating a constituency of supporters

loyal to him within the military. While Nasser was not in total control of the military, he

ensured that the internal security apparatus was populated by his loyalists. Over the thirteen

years between 1954 till 1967, Egypt under Nasser grew into a massive intelligence and

surveillance state with the senior officers of the internal security agencies as the most

powerful members of the ruling elite or a "security aristocracy." Nasser was heavily reliant

on them for keeping opponents in check. Therefore, the anti-Naquib coalition that had

captured power in 1954 gradually organized itself into two competing groups of security

institutions: (i) Political: Ministry of Interior and President Bureau of Information and (ii)

Military: Commander-in-Chief of Political Guidance, the Military Intelligence Department

(MID) and General Intelligence Service (Kandil, 2012, p. 43).

Nasser's domestic reputation as a leader was considerably enhanced by the Sinai

War of 1956 when Egypt faced the combined might of France, Israel and UK after he

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[42]In 1955, Nasser joined a group of "non-aligned" leaders from other Third World nations at Bandung,
Indonesia to signal his intent (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 111).

nationalized the Suez Canal. After early reversals, Nasser temporarily took over command of the armed forces from Amer, whose leadership skills had come under a cloud. Despite Amer's perceived failings as a military leader, he was allowed to return to his position after the war. It is generally believed that Nasser's close friendship with Amer precluded him from firing the latter, despite clear evidence of gross incompetence. Nasser's personal popularity grew because he had managed to keep most of the Egyptian armed forces and equipment intact despite facing a relatively more powerful coalition. His opponents were denied a total victory as both the superpowers – US and the USSR – made strenuous diplomatic interventions to ensure that the war was terminated (Kandil, 2012, p. 44).

In 1962 Egypt became military engaged in the Yemeni civil war on the side of its royal government. As this intervention lasted five years, it had a negative impact on Egypt's military readiness for the 1967 war. Egypt had invested an immense amount of expenditure and suffered considerable casualties in the Yemeni intervention: Its monetary investment was in the range of $60 to $ 120 million per year over this five year period while it lost 15,000 military personnel – including officers – between 1962 and June 1964 alone (Rogan & Aclimandos, 2012, pp. 154-155). In his memoirs a leading Egyptian army officer, Field Marshal El-Gamasy stated that the involvement in Yemen had serious debilitating effects on its armed forces: On the eve of the 1967 war, "nearly a third of our land forces, supported by our air force and navy, were engaged in an operation approximately two thousand kilometres away from Egypt, with no prospects of a political or a military settlement." As he recalled, Egypt's lack of military readiness prior to the 1967 war was astonishing (quoted in Rogan & Aclimandos, 2012, p. 163):

> We incurred heavy losses in manpower, our military budget was drained,
> discipline and training suffered, weapons and equipment deteriorated, and fighting

capability was seriously affected. Soldiers returning from Yemen were given furloughs during which weapons were overhauled, but levels of training consequently declined. Planes and technical equipment belonging to the air force were subjected to heavy wear and tear as a result of airborne operations and troop movements.

The conscription policy practiced by the Nasser government further compounded these problems. It continued to give exemptions for those that belonged to the more affluent sections of society. Even after the heavy casualties suffered in the Yemeni intervention, the government only recruited university graduates on a limited basis. The majority of the Egyptian army that fought in the Yemeni civil war and the 1967 Six Day War came from the lower income groups (Barnett, 1992, pp. 101-102). This meant that the most vocal and affluent groups of Egyptian society probably did not pay a personal cost in the Six Day War.

While the rational response to a costly military engagement in Yemen should have been to avoid brinkmanship and military hostilities with Israel, the Egyptian government ended up doing the opposite (Rogan & Aclimandos, 2012, pp. 148-151). One of the key domestic reasons why Egypt escalated tensions when it was not in its interest to do so can be found in the peculiar regime structure that had evolved under Nasser. As mentioned earlier, despite holding executive powers Nasser did not have complete control over the military which had developed into a semi-autonomous segment of the Egyptian state. There was deep mistrust between the factions loyal to Nasser and various loyalists of Field Marshall Amer that populated the armed forces in the period prior to the outbreak of the 1967 hostilities. The Amer faction was insecure because of the miserable performance of the military in the Yemeni intervention. Amer and his loyalists may have found it in their interest to precipitate a crisis with Israel to ensure that they could avoid their accountability for the Yemeni disaster. Accounts of the pre-war escalatory steps taken by Egypt place a

large proportion of the blame on Amer. Amer seems to have deliberately misrepresented facts in internal deliberations and taken unilateral decisions to mobilize troops on the Sinai border which ensured that a war could be precipitated. There is evidence that Amer and his faction only wanted to engage in some saber-rattling with Israel to restore the military's credibility and strengthen his position in the regime rather than wage war (Kandil, 2012, pp. 76-79). This was confirmed later by an important member of Amer's faction who was the then war minister, Shams Badran. During his postwar trial to hold him accountable for the 1967 debacle, he confessed: "We were 100 percent sure that Israel would not dare to attack (quoted in Kandil, 2012, p. 83)." However, once the initial escalatory steps were taken they created their own dynamic that resulted in the outbreak of war.

4.3.4 Eve of the Six Day War

Nasser's pre-war behavior seems to suggest considerable confusion on what he really wanted to do. He was confident of the capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces to engage in a prolonged defensive battle which would involve the bigger powers and provoke a global crisis – a situation that (he thought) could be manipulated to press Egypt's interests. On the other hand, if Israel blinked in the game of escalation and brinkmanship it would be a triumph for Arab nationalism and reestablishment of the Egypt's sovereignty over the Tiran straits (James, 2012). The war of 1967 appears to have been the result of a genuine miscalculation by Nasser about the willingness of Israel to strike first if the escalation proceeded forward. As mentioned in the previous section, he was badly served by the military top brass headed by Amer who had their own political motivations in precipitating a crisis. The Egyptian mobilization for the war had begun on 13 May in response to reports sourced from the Soviet government that the Israelis were massing their

forces on the Syrian border. The Egyptian government ordered full mobilization a day later and forces were concentrated in the Sinai desert. However, this decision was not unanimous. Nasser had serious misgivings about undertaking such a move while Field Marshall Amer was advocating it and eventually acted without Nasser's consent. Amer later justified his actions to Nasser that such a mobilization was mandated by the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact of 1962. The extent of mistrust between Amer and Nasser can be gauged by the fact that the latter sent the Army Chief of Staff and Nasser loyalist, Fawzi to Damuscus to confirm whether an Israeli attack was likely to occur soon. The Fawzi report contradicted the Soviet claims that were the basis of Egypt's troop mobilization. Despite this finding, the Egyptian government's posture did not soften (Kandil, 2012, p. 76).

The probability of open hostilities increased further when Egypt ordered the evacuation of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai. Here again, although Nasser seemed to recognize that doing so would hurtle Egypt into war, he was outmaneuvered by Amer. Nasser tried to modify the evacuation order to the head of the UNEF by saying that Egypt would be satisfied with a partial withdrawal. Amer manipulated the situation by ensuring that the English draft of the order sent to the UN headquarters retained the demand for full withdrawal. Nasser contacted UN undersecretary general Ralph Bunche to retract the order but he mysteriously refused to respond. The final step on the escalatory ladder taken by Amer was the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli access by controlling passage through the Tiran Straits which blockaded the port of Eilat on May 22. It was long known to Egypt that any Israeli government would treat this as *casus belli* which it did. When Nasser asked Amer and war minister Badran about Egypt's military readiness for war, both gave strong assurances. Badran told Nasser that he had

been assured by his counterparts on a recent visit to Moscow that Soviet Union would come to Egypt's rescue if war really broke out. This claim was denied later by the Soviet leaders at that time as well as Egypt's ambassador to Moscow. The fact was that the Amer faction had decided to close the Tiran Straits six days earlier. They had deliberately closed off any prospects of de-escalation. Nasser had his own rationalizations for favoring an escalation. Hence, he went along with Amer and his loyalists on the condition that Egypt would not strike first as this would turn the international community against it (James, 2012; Kandil, 2012, pp. 76-78).

4.3.5 Wartime developments and postwar period

On the morning of Monday, 5 June Egypt was attacked by Israel. This assault left most of the Egyptian air force in tatters and forced Field Marshall Amer to order a retreat from the Sinai Peninsula which was not enough to prevent a total collapse. By 8 June, the entire Sinai had been occupied(James, 2012, p. 74). The Egyptian government agreed to a cease-fire the same evening (James, 2012, pp. 74-75). The rapidity of the capitulation of the Egyptian armed forces sent Nasser into a state of shock. Later, he recalled that the immediate aftermath of the war as "one continuous nightmare…We were in a strange state of confusion, uncertainty and doubt…We did not know, but we feared what the Israeli were going to do."

Although Nasser resigned on June 9 taking moral responsibility for the defeat, he may not have totally come to terms with the scale of the defeat that his country had suffered. In the days following the ceasefire, he was still hoping for a 'post-withdrawal" situation where outstanding issues could be negotiated (James, 2012, p. 75). At that point in time, Nasser was very fearful of a public backlash to the outcome. He told his Minister

of Information Mohammaed Fayek prior to his resignation broadcast: "They'll put me on trial and hang me in the middle of Cairo (James, 2012)."

Nasser's fear proved to be unfounded. The public reaction to his broadcast taking full responsibility and decision to resign was very surprising. There was a popular demand that Nasser stay on and he did. Nasser's personal political stature remained inexplicably unaffected by the debacle. One possible theory for this is that the people of Egypt wanted to "salvage something from this bitter defeat" and blaming and degrading Nasser would have only added to their sense of collective shame. Moreover, in Egyptian society's popular consciousness Nasser embodied the spirit of defiant Arab nationalism. Driving him out of office following a defeat would further strengthen the hands of their enemy – Israel and its Western allies (Barnett, 1992; Gawrych, 2000). Faoud Ajami argues that there was a fervent desire to "believe in someone" who could maintain a sense of continuity in a difficult time. Hence, the public anger became directed towards the political and military apparatus rather than at Nasser. In a sense, the signal that Nasser was given by the public was to undertake a purge and fix accountability for this miserable failure while remaining in the saddle (Ajami, 1981).

The address to the nation that Nasser gave also helped in ensuring that the public opprobrium for the war outcome and its attendant costs would not be personally directed against him. The speech that he delivered had the right mix of humility and emotion that conveyed the significance of the disaster while explaining why Egypt had no choice but to militarily assist Syria against the possibility of Israeli incursion. As he pithily said: "Who starts with Syria will finish with Egypt (Gawrych, 2000, p. 72)." Even as Nasser was offering to resign, he was trying his best to absolve himself of his role in the escalation that

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led to the outbreak of hostilities. The dominant Egyptian public opinion seems to have sided with Nasser's view that the war could not have been avoided. The only question now was to fix blame for the defeat. In the senior officer corps of the armed forces, Nasser and the Egyptian people found plenty of convenient scapegoats for this purpose.

Unsurprisingly, a strong undercurrent of discontent emerged within the army for being blamed for the defeat. In Field Marshall Amer, these elements found a spokesperson who would articulate their grievances. As mentioned in the previous section, Egypt was ruled by a peculiarly structured authoritarian regime in which Nasser was not in total control of the armed forces. Amer had converted the army into his personal fiefdom. He had used his time as Army chief to cultivate an independent base of support within the military thanks to an efficient patronage network. This system was run through cliques (*shilla*) or power centers (*markaszat al-quwwat*) which owed their loyalty to Amer (Gawrych, 2000, p. 73; James, 2012, pp. 76-77). Amer had long been perceived as a possible threat by Nasser's backers. The 1967 disaster and the prospect of a coup organized by Amer and his supporters convinced Nasser to finally get rid of Amer and wrest control of the army.

When Nasser dismissed him as commander-in-chief after the war, Amer refused to exit graciously. Amer's personal defiance and general feeling of discontent among officers loyal to him raised the specter of a coup (Bowen, 2005, p. 321; Gawrych, 2000). Within a couple of days of the end of the war, some of Amer's loyalists within the army officer corps communicated their displeasure to Nasser, backed by a show of force. Nasser offered a compromise to this faction by offering Amer the post of Vice President and set up

a committee to address their grievances. At the same time, Nasser refused to reinstate Amer as military commander.

Nasser was acutely aware that his personal safety could be in jeopardy. However, the Amer loyalists did not carry out any visible action that could be construed as a direct and open challenge to Nasser's grip on power. Although it is reported that on June 11 a few armored vehicles were sent by Amer loyalists to Nasser's residence, this seems to have been more of a pressure tactic rather than an overt and serious attempt at deposing him (Stephens, 1972, p. 513). However, it is clear that the prewar winning coalition had frayed in the face of the 1967 debacle. The postwar contestation was over who will take the blame for the fiasco.

There was an open dispute between Nasser and Amer loyalists over the tactics that were chosen in the war. Amer loyalists felt that Nasser was evading responsibility for his no-first strike policy which gave an undue advantage to the Israelis. Nasser publicly rejected this view and criticized the state of confusion in the army command and their failure to adequately prepare for the scale and lethality of the Israeli attack. In his first public speech since rescinding his resignation, Nasser stated on 23 July that an Egyptian attack would have surely invited US intervention on Israel's behalf and the denunciation of the international community(Stephens, 1972, p. 513). The relative merits of these two arguments are not very important as the Egyptian public seem to clearly side with Nasser. The public directed all its anger for the defeat towards the army and respect for it declined considerably. This initially helped Nasser in consolidating his hold over the army and eliminate any threat of a coup by Amer loyalists.

The danger of a coup was very real especially in the weeks following Amer's

removal. It was the former war minister Badran – fired along with Amer – who took the

lead in conspiring with a number of active and retired military officers to reinstate Amer.

This plot had the tacit approval of Amer (Gawrych, 2000, p. 73). If this plot had

succeeded, there is little doubt that Nasser would have been deposed. Anticipating these

dangers, Nasser and his loyalists within the regime acted ruthlessly to eliminate them.

Nasser and his trusted advisors had decided that they would get rid of Amer and a plan

called "Operation Johnston" was hatched. On 25 August, Amer was placed under house

arrest and there was talk that he would be tried for conspiring against the government.

Three weeks later, on 14 September, he was found dead. Although the stated cause of

death was suicide, there is no firm evidence supporting that theory. He may well have been

murdered on Nasser's orders, as alleged by his family (Bowen, 2005, p. 321; Gawrych,

2000, p. 73).

Anyone within the pre-war winning coalition suspected of being close to former

Field Marshall Amer were either imprisoned or dismissed. The war minister Badran, Head

of General Intelligence Salah Nasr and Interior Minister Fathi Radwan were arrested

(James, 2012, p. 77). Virtually all the four-star generals were fired including the chiefs of

three branches of the military. This was followed by a purge of major generals and other

senior officers over the next few months. They were replaced by officers that he trusted

such as General Muhammad Fawzi as the new commander in chief. In all, fifty top

commanders and senior civilian officials were sacked and arrested in one fell swoop

(Gawrych, 2000, p. 73). Nasser also mandated that all promotions for the rank of colonel

and above would require his assent. He moved the military out of internal security function

and strengthened the role of the police for these purposes. Nasser was now clearly in command of the armed forces. This was the first major consequence of the war. In addition, Nasser moved to reorganize the way the government was structured so that he could have control over the state apparatus. He now held the post of president, prime minister and chief of his party, the Arab Socialist Union. Nasser also tried to further shore up his credentials with Islamist organizations which was reflected in the greater use of religious phrases in his public speeches (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 252). By the time Nasser left for the Arab summit in Khartoum at the end of August 1967, Nasser "was more secure that he had been in years (Bowen, 2005, p. 322)."

There were other changes in the regime as ideological divisions among senior officials between the pro-Western and pro-Soviet factions became more pronounced. The pro-Soviet faction grew in power as Egypt became more reliant on Soviet assistance to rebuild its military (James, 2012, p. 77). On the eve of the war, it had an unserviceable debt of $2 billion which it would have great difficulty repaying as it had lost valuable sources of revenue due to the defeat. The reliance on foreign assistance to tide over these economic problems also locked Egypt into renewed confrontation and possible war with Israel as many of its regional donors – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya – made their assistance conditional on such a policy (James, 2012, p. 78).

In the immediate aftermath of the war it appeared that Nasser had not only escaped personal punishment for the 1967 debacle but had actually strengthened his domestic position. However, the public anger with the conduct of the war would continue to reverberate and influence Egyptian domestic politics in unprecedented ways. Unlike most totalitarian regimes, the Egyptian society and polity underwent an extremely public self-

examination to try to understand why their armed forced performed so poorly. Nasser soon

realized that the purge of the open and suspected defectors from his winning coalition was

not sufficient to protect his position. The public clamor for accountability for the disaster

had not been satisfied yet. Something had to done to restore the military's credibility in the

eyes of the public.

Within two weeks of Amer's apparent suicide, the government announced the

setting up of military courts and tribunals to probe officers accused of incompetence in the

war. The depth of the public anger against the armed forces was truly revealed in February

1968 when the sentences for some of the senior military officials were handed down.

Among the senior most officers on trial included: General Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud, the

commander of the air force and air defense; General Gamal Afifi, his chief of staff and

deputy commander; Major General Abd al-Hamid Daghdidi, the commanding general of

the Eastern Military District in which the Sinai was located; and Major General Ismail

Labib, the chief of the antiair defenses. Of these, Afifi and Daghdidi were found innocent

while Sidqi received fifteen years and Labib was given ten years for dereliction of duty.

These sentences were universally criticized as being too lenient and were to become a

rallying point for the demonstrations that followed (Gawrych, 2000, p. 88).

The trials and the subsequent sentences provided the trigger for the public

antigovernment mobilization to demand accountability for its poor war performance. The

legitimacy of the regime was also severely dented by the exposure of the army's internal

workings and procedures during the trial of the officers accused of dereliction of duty.

These trials brought to light the systemic inefficiency, cronyism and corruption among the

highest echelons of the military high command adding further fuel to the public anger. In

1968, Egypt witnessed riots, demonstrations and unrest led by students, workers and supported by ordinary citizens. Since Nasser came to power in the early 1950s, Egypt had not seen such an open defiance of the state by members of public. Besides vocal complaints against the military, questions began to be raised about the lack of access of democratic participation and questioning the credibility of state institutions (Barnett, 1992, p. 103). Agitations and student clashes with police occurred in Cairo, Alexandria and Asyut. While there were sporadic cases where protestors criticized Nasser personally, the dominant demands of the protestors centered on holding the military leadership accountable for the humiliation of 1967 (Gawrych, 2000, p. 88). The other slogans that were heard at these protests were "Down with the Military State" and "Down with the Police State" (Kandil, 2012, p. 96). These expressions of dissent against powerful state institutions and public debate over fixing accountability of senior officials were nothing short of extraordinary for a regime like Egypt. The protests seem to convey a deep sense of disgust with the inefficiency and lack of transparency of important organs of the state as well as the harassment and arbitrariness of the repressive domestic security apparatus.

The first visible coalescing of these sentiments came in February 1968, at the Helwan Steel plant (Barnett, 1992, pp. 103-104). A pro-regime gathering at the plant had been organized by Ali Sabri of the Arab Socialist Union, which was Egypt's only political party owing allegiance to Nasser. Ironically, a show of support for the Nasser regime ended up triggering public anger against the state. Official miscommunication played no mean part in escalating an event that would have gone unnoticed otherwise. The police had not been told that it was the ASU that was behind this gathering. When they tried to forcibly break up the meeting, it led to a confrontation. When the news reached Cairo that

a workers in Helwan had been forcibly suppressed, it triggered a spontaneous mobilization

by the students of Cairo University. The protestors were joined by ordinary people who

wanted to express their unhappiness with the military's conduct of the war. Soon the

protests turned violent that resulted in injuries to 20 civilians and 60 policemen(Stephens,

1972, p. 533).

As these persisted, the student demonstrations also became directed against

cronyism that denied economic opportunities to those who did not belong to the military

nor had some association with that institution (Barnett, 1992, p. 104). The significance for

these protests in Egypt can be gauged from the fact that, in scale and scope, they were the

first such event since 1952(Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 185). The general sentiment of the students'

movement was very hawkish as they were disgruntled with the military's failure give a

befitting reply to the Israeli attack in the 1967 war (Barnett, 1992, p. 104). This

hawkishness is understandable because the danger of Israeli attacks did not cease after the

war of 1967 ended.   For example, the November 1968 protests in Assiut University in

Upper Egypt were mainly triggered in response to the unchallenged entry of Israeli jets into

Egyptian airspace over Nag Hammdi which succeeded in bombing an electrical facility

(Gordon, 2006, pp. 105-106).

The war also had an effect on intra-regime dynamics: there was a bureaucratic

tussle between the civilian technocratic elite and the military brass. The technocrats

exploited the opprobrium being heaped on the military to further their own ends. They

accused the military of being more interested in political affairs instead of defending the

country. For his own political reasons, Nasser sided with the civilian bureaucracy and

started to reduce the involvement of the military in issues that were unrelated to defense.

This had an effect on the overall ideological orientation of the government. Most of the

Western-educated civilian bureaucrats were suspicious of the radicalization of Egyptian

society. Moreover, they were more sympathetic to the role of the private sector in the

economy than the vision of Arab socialism that Nasser had championed for years. The fact

that Nasser went along with this shift in policy is another indication that his core

ideological beliefs had been shaken by the 1967 defeat (Barnett, 1992, p. 104). However,

he was sure that if he had to survive he would have to undertake measures to confront the

Israelis pretty soon in a full-fledged war.

As a shrewd politician, Nasser recognized that although the retrials had temporarily

pacified the demonstrators, he had to be seen as doing something to improve the existing

order. These protests represented a fervent dissatisfaction among a significant segment of

Egyptian society with the status quo. While he had managed to ride out the immediate

manifestation of the sourness of the public mood, his domestic problems were far from

over. Members of the Nasser government during the post-protest phase period recall that

Nasser began obsessively tracking any fluctuation in food and commodity prices for fear

these might further worsen public sentiment and prompt a popular revolutionary upsurge in

Egypt. Nasser recognized that these protests reflected an open expression of total distrust

in the existing order (Gawrych, 2000, p. 89). As an autocratic ruler in a personalist regime

that presided over a powerful and loyal state machinery, it would have been remarkable if

he had accepted the demands for greater political liberalization. However, he showed a

keen astuteness of the seriousness of this challenge and responded as well as could be

expected from an autocratic leader. He knew that he must be seen undertaking some

tangible reforms to address the concerns of the Egyptian people with the functioning of the military and the police.

Nasser announced a slew of reforms under the banner of the "March 30 Program" in 1968 to address the deficiencies in both these organizations as well as welfare-statist measures, protection of basic freedoms and rule of law.[43] A senior Egyptian journalist, Haykal and his newspaper *Al-Ahram* emerged as a champion of personal liberties vis-à-vis the security agencies. Haykal also drew his influence from the fact that he was considered close to Nasser. It was frequently rumored that his weekly columns were actually Nasser's ideas and he used this platform to gauge the public reaction to new ideas. However, such a major reorientation of an authoritarian state was easier said than done, especially given the emergency situation that the country was facing (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 261). The major obstacle to these measures came from the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)[44] who felt that expanding political liberties to elements outside their party would bring chaos. Their real reason for opposing Haykal's ideas may have been the fear that political liberalization would result in the loss of their privileged position that came from being the member of the sole political party in Egypt. Again, Nasser avoided taking a visible stand in this dispute as the opponents of reform directed their attacks at Haykal (Dekmejian, 1971, pp. 263-264).[45]

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[43] In October of 1968 the new reformist order was put to the test. A government statistician dissented against the head of his organization, who was s senior military officer. The latter had him arrested. Haykal directly attacked the military security agencies for this and carried on with his criticism even after the statistician was released which was an unprecedented challenge to the security apparatus on behalf of an ordinary citizen. In August 1969 another major development occurred when the Minister of Justice, Abu Nusayr was forced to resign when it was revealed that it had facilitated the arrest and illegal detention of a number of citizens (Dekmejian, 1971, pp. 261-262).

[44] ASU was formed in 1962 to promote the principles of Nasserism. It was the sole political party permitted to function in Egypt.

[45] However, Nasser did give minor concessions to the reformists when his regime permitted some candidates to run in the National Assembly elections of 1969 who did not have the backing of the ASU (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 285).

Nasser gave priority to changing the functioning of the military. He knew that if he pushed the military too hard to change the way it had been functioning, it may turn against him. The best evidence for this is the way Nasser seems to have resisted demands from ASU to make the military ideologically in sync with the revolutionary principles of the party and to induct party cadres in large numbers into leadership positions within the organization to ensure that this was done. However, Nasser drastically changed the conscription policies to include more educated men and tried to professionalize its internal management. Nasser had a bigger problem in reforming the police because the reasons that it was a hated institution by the Egyptian public – accusations of brutality, lack of transparency and accountability – were essential to combat attempts by domestic opponents to unseat him. However, Nasser made a public show of demanding that the police show restraint with the people and act as "servants of the people and the revolution (Dekmejian, 1971, pp. 255-257)." In reality, police reforms were hardly implemented on the ground. However, for Nasser's mass constituency a declaration of his intentions may have been enough to satisfy them in the short term.

Nasser dealt with the strikers and demonstrators by a combination of repression to restore order followed by a series of steps to meet some of their demands. The most strident student and workers demonstrations were concentrated over two spells during 1968: once in February and then again in November. Each time the most severe manifestations of unrest lasted for almost a week. Ultimately, it was the police crackdown under the guidance of the Interior Ministry that ended these demonstrations. One estimate of the total human toll in these two episodes was 21 dead, 772 injured and the detention of 1,100 (Kandil, 2012, p. 96).

Although the police action stamped down these eruptions of popular anger and seemingly restored stability, Nasser knew very well that the discontent articulated by the demonstrators had popular resonance in Egyptian society. Nasser initially went against the counsel of his advisors who suggested that any compromise with the demonstrators would weaken his position. Nasser realized that if he mishandled this popular upsurge it could pose a serious danger to his survival. Sacrificing commanders at the altar of public outrage, some of whose loyalties he suspected, was a relatively easier choice for Nasser. On 25 February, less than a week after the verdicts had been handed down, a retrial of the four defendants mentioned earlier. In August 1968, the judges handed out revised sentences imposing stiffer penalties on Sidqi Mahmud and Labib while keeping the prior acquittal of Afifi and Daghdidi unchanged (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 258; Gawrych, 2000, pp. 88-89).

Nasser also asked members of the National Assembly to open up talks with student leaders. Nasser also addressed a workers rally at the Helwan plant on 3 March where he skillfully sided with the protestors and openly castigated the police for its use of force. Instead of attacking the entire body of demonstrators for the disturbances, he blamed a few "reactionary agitators" among them. Finally, he gave a rhetorical riposte to the main reason many Egyptians, including the demonstrators were agitated. He promised them that he will take back every inch of the territory that had been lost in the 1967 war (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 258). Nasser also signaled that he shared the public's low esteem of the military leadership by dramatically reducing their representation in his cabinet (See Table 4.4). The civilians that were included in the cabinet included seven university professors that had some credibility with the student protestors (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 261). However, this did

not mean that these civilians were granted significant powers as policy makers but were used to signal that Nasser was sympathetic to the demands that the protestors had made (Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 186).   He also had a sort of temporary rapprochement with the Muslim Brothers: several of the Brothers were released from prison as a gesture of goodwill.

Things got trickier for Nasser when the second round of the 1968 protests occurred in November. Impatience with the lack of real changes in the functioning of the state as well as periodic Israeli shelling triggered a more violent explosion of mass sentiment. In Alexandria, when protestors mobilized with an explicit demand for more civil liberties, it degenerated in mass rioting. 491 people were arrested, 91 were detained. Of these 46 were tried. The Alexandria riots were significant because ordinary people joined the students. In Mansoura, when Islamic divinity students demanded a change in the examination system four of them were killed in ensuing clashes. These protests attracted a wide spectrum of political groups – Muslim Brothers, Communists – as well as adherents to liberal and radical ideologies. These protests seems to lack a focused ideological program but encompassed a broad coalition of Egyptians who wanted greater political freedom (Stephens, 1972, pp. 536-537).

While Nasser publicly dismissed these eruptions of anti-government and pro-freedom sentiment as "counter-revolutionary tendencies" incited by an "irresponsible minority"(Gordon, 2006, p. 106), he was astute enough to quickly recognize the seriousness of the challenge facing him. He realized that the growing ferment in Egyptian society that had found its most visible expression in the student-worker protests in 1968 had to have a political response. He may have hung on to office after the 1967 debacle but

these protests were a stark reminder that all was not well. In the ultimate analysis, Nasser

sided with those within his coterie that did not want to open up the political system (Kandil,

2012, pp. 96-97). However, for a brief period the opportunity for transforming the

authoritarian polity of Egypt seemed real. My contention is that absent the war such an

opening is unlikely to have occurred. Despite the popular anti-government protests and

unprecedentedly public expressions of anger at state institutions that extended from street

protests, the press, academic institutions and the arts, these were not sufficient to produce

tangible liberal democratic reforms in Egypt (Gordon, 2006, p. 107). By mid-1969 the

upheaval had fizzled out as Egypt made preparations for another war with Israel. Nasser's

response to November 1968 riots was to tighten his internal security apparatus even further

and organize spy and conspiracy trials in which seven Egyptians were tried for planning to

assassinate Nasser and overthrowing the regime (Stephens, 1972, p. 537).

In the aftermath of the war, Nasser had been under constant pressure to resume the

Arab-Israeli conflict and avenge the loss of 1967. The capture of the Sinai by Israel was

something that had transformed the stakes in the conflict for Egypt. Nasser's launching of

the War of Attrition in 1969 was driven by the logic that he could not afford to let the status

quo stand From being a dispute that was propelled by Pan-Arabism and standing with the

Palestinian cause, the conflict had been transformed into one where Egypt had lost a vital

piece of territory which it could not let go (Barnett, 1992, p. 105). This was one of main

issues agitating a majority of the demonstrators in 1968 as well.   Nasser realized that

another full-scale war would mean imposing economic privations on the Egyptian people.

Fawzi later recalled that one of the main reasons why Nasser proceeded to implement his

policy of "what was taken by force can only be recovered by force" was the incredible

public pressure to do so (Gordon, 2006, p. 109). Nasser was aware that it would not take long for the hawkish public opinion to turn into anti-government opposition that could topple him (Barnett, 1992, p. 106).

In order to fulfil the public clamor for a response while avoiding a full-fledged war, Nasser tried to pressurize Israel by shelling its positions on the East Bank. This move backfired as well as Israel responded by bombing the Suez cities and engaging in deep penetration strikes. The destruction of the Canal cities created a massive population exodus to Cairo where many became homeless, destitute and unemployed. This furthered the societal pressures on the regime and increased its financial straits (Barnett, 1992, p. 105). The period from December 1967 to March 1968 the main preoccupation of the Nasser Cabinet was to decide whether to prioritize the rebuilding of the military for another war with Israel or to focus on the economic difficulties that the country was undergoing. Eventually, although the public stance was that both had to be done together, the reality is that the Nasser regime was totally focused on rearmament to recover the territory it had lost in 1967. As the preparations for another war with Israel were going on, small-scale fighting continued along the Suez Canal (Gordon, 2006, pp. 109-110).

Following the 1967 war, conscription was expanded to cover the entire male population of draft age. There was a deliberate class bias that existed prior to 1967 that allowed men with higher education or those from wealthier families to avoid service. The medical standards were lowered and women were recruited to serve in support roles (Barnett, 1992, p. 104). Although there was some murmurings from student groups that the state grant greater political rights, the dominance of a hawkish sentiment in Egyptian

society helped Nasser to implement his policy of total conscription with little resistance (Ajami, 1981).

Egypts' War of Attrition with Israel formally began on March 6, 1969. The period between the ceasefire of 10 June that ended the 1967 war and the start of the War of Attrition of 1969 witnessed several episodes of low-intensity fighting. There was consistent sniper fire and small engagements along the new Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and the Sinai (McGregor, 2006, p. 273). Israel responded to Egyptian artillery barrage across the Suez Canal with massive air strikes and artillery shelling of its own. Both sides targeted civilians in the War of Attrition although Egypts' noncombatant losses were far greater (Downes, 2008). Israel also targeted Egyptian civilians in the war through bombing raids hoping that this would help topple Nasser from power. With neither side able to make much headway, a ceasefire was arranged in August 1970 (Downes, 2006). On September 28, Nasser died after suffering a heart attack.

Table 4.4 Postwar Changes in Nasser's Cabinet (Source: Dekmejian, 1971)

CABINET	TOTAL	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
		N	%	N	%
June 1967	29	19	65.4	10	34.4
March 1968	33	13	39.4	20	60.6

4.3.6   Political impact of the war costs

While there is little doubt that the human costs of the Six Day War were significant, the main reason why the Nasser regime was forced to concede defeat within days was the degradation of its military capabilities and total collapse of its military command. The peculiar nature of this war requires that we reexamine what we mean by the "costs" of war. While battle deaths and civilian casualties serve as useful proxies for operationalizing this concept, how these "costs" are perceived by the mass public following a massive defeat may be different. Although the Egyptian casualty count was reasonably high for an interstate war, the hostilities neither involved most of the Egyptian armed forces nor did they directly threaten the well-being of the civilian population.

This may explain why the prevailing postwar political sentiment among Egyptians was to reject the war's outcome and desire to fight again to regain the territory that was lost. While they might have been demoralized by the battle deaths that had been incurred, this does not appear to have been the primary motivator of the anti-regime sentiment that manifested after the war. In the immediate aftermath of the war, members of the Egyptian public were so shocked by the outcome that many refused to believe that they had been comprehensively defeated: As the Egyptian Chief of Staff in 1967, Fawzi observed: "Egyptians did not considered themselves to have fought a war and lost it; the term defeat did not seem to apply…The June experience was therefore referred to as the 'setback' (quoted in McGregor, 2006, p. 272)."

As the true scale of the defeat sank in, public resentment with the architects of war policy became more pronounced. In this war, the technological superiority of Israeli airpower had degraded Egypt's warfighting capabilities with amazing speed. Therefore,

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the tolerance of the Egyptian people to war casualties or their "willingness to be harmed" was not truly tested: In other words, how many Egyptian lives were they willing to lose to defend the Sinai? (Rosen, 1972, p. 169). Since Egypt's technical capacities to carry on fighting were stymied by its rival very quickly, the tolerance level of the Egyptian society did not become an issue in the war. Under such circumstances, the level of casualties may not adequately explain why the war was terminated or what happened in its aftermath. Egypt's fighting capabilities was decimated and rearmament was impossible in the short-term. Further resistance would have only added to the body count without changing the eventual result. The degradation of military hardware convinced Nasser and his advisors that there was absolutely no chance of resurrection.

As described in the previous section, the demonstrations in 1968 were the first visible expressions of postwar public opinion after the massive gathering in July 1967 asking Nasser to rescind his resignation. While the demands made by the protestors became more expansive as the demonstrations gathered steam, the proximate cause of these popular outbursts was the 1967 war. The key question for this study is whether these protestors were angered by the costliness of the war measured in terms of war-related casualties or the national humiliation of a military defeat that had tangible consequences in terms of loss of territory. The war-related themes that were highlighted during these protests focused primarily on the bad war performance of the military leadership which gradually transformed into expressions of long-held grievances against the repressive nature of the Egyptian state. In a way, the unambiguous nature of the defeat opened the door for other complaints to be aired which sought a renegotiation of the scope of political and civil rights of the Egyptian citizen vis-à-vis the state. I am not convinced that if Egypt

had lost fewer soldiers in the 1967 war then these demonstrations were less likely to occur, holding the war outcome constant. Given the enormity of the interests at stake in the war, it can be speculated that the Egyptian mass public would have tolerated even higher casualties if there was a prospect of a victory or even a stalemate. It was the sudden and total capitulation by the armed forces that seemed to be at the heart of the postwar anger of the Egyptian mass public.

Therefore, I have to conclude that the postwar domestic political consequences seem to be more a function of the outcome of the war, specifically the loss of the Sinai. The enormity of outcome is likely to have overwhelmed the marginal effect of the losses that were suffered in the war. There was almost complete unanimity among Egyptians that everything should be done to recover the territory occupied by Israel. There was a popular demand that Egypt wage another war to retake the territory that had been lost. When Nasser's regime widened the net of conscription following the 1967 defeat, to include new social groups (university graduates, upper classes and women), there was hardly any resistance. This clearly shows that there was an appetite for further war involvement among the Egyptian people when the Six Day War ended. The costliness of the Six Day War was not enough of to deter the Egyptian public from wholeheartedly supporting a resumption of hostilities with Israel which would bring more casualties in its wake.

In these circumstances, Nasser recognized the primary danger to his survival would come from the army which bore the brunt of the public anger at the result of the Six Day War. After his offer to resign and the subsequent public reaction assured him that his personal popularity had not suffered to the extent that he had feared, he maneuvered the public's anger against the military to strengthen his own position. In Field Marshall Amer

and his loyalists, Nasser found an ideal set of scapegoats to pin the blame for the war. Amer was eliminated in a very public way from his inner circle and all his loyalists found themselves purged as well.

Given that Egypt was an authoritarian regime, it is justified to be skeptical of the popular upsurge to request Nasser to rescind his resignation. The fact is that there is little doubt the expressions of popular will that led to the reinstatement of Nasser on 9 June was genuine and widespread. One of the explanations for Nasser's survival after the 1967 defeat may lie with the reservoir of goodwill that he had generated. Through his rule, Nasser had successfully cultivated a personal reputation for incorruptibility among a large proportion of Egyptians. Even when people were extremely unhappy with various institutions of his regime – the cabinet, military and internal security apparatus – Nasser was rarely blamed directly for the shortcomings of his government. A "setback" in 1967 was not enough to wipe this out the legitimacy of a charismatic, nationalist leader that was admired by most Egyptians. The other factor that may have helped Nasser survive was the unambiguous desire by the Israeli government and its allies to see Nasser go. Conversely, this made the Egyptian public support Nasser as a collective gesture of defiance.

In addition, there might have been some that wanted Nasser to stay in power because they may have instinctively feared that if he was removed the country would descend into chaos (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 245). However, the public discrediting of the military did give an opportunity to students, workers and artistes to express their discontent and criticize the state in unprecedented ways. It is true that the workers would have been motivated primarily by the deteriorating economic conditions rather than fixing accountability on military officials. However, absent the war, it is hard to imagine such

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open expression of anti-regime sentiment being expressed. My theory articulated in Chapter 2, focused on the changes in the incentives of key members of the selectorate. In this case, Nasser successfully liquidated the quasi-challenge from defectors from his winning coalition. Once that happened, his position was more or less secure. He faced a second wave of challenges from the members of the mass public. With them, he initially offered some concessions and began a process of political and administrative reforms. He may have realized that a transition to a more open government may endanger his own survival. Thus, he went back to his security apparatus to prevent the activists and protestors from organizing a full-scale rebellion.

Although Nasser survived the 1967 debacle, his postwar reign cannot be classified as stable. The attempts by Amer and his loyalists to defect from the winning coalition in the immediate aftermath of the war were a genuine threat to his survival. Nasser handled these defections with alacrity and extreme ruthlessness. A more competent set of rivals could have deposed Nasser in the immediate aftermath of the war when he was truly vulnerable. Although he survived that phase, he had to sacrifice an extraordinary proportion of his colleagues within the regime and the military establishment to convince a restive public that someone was being held accountable for the debacle. Despite being a uniquely popular figure among Egyptians, his regime had to face manifestation of public anger as well. The very fact that these challenges occurred, is a sign that despite surviving the 1967 war, the debacle had shaken his grip on power. Just because he managed to surmount postwar challenges should not detract from the fact that the war generated negative domestic consequences for him.

The case of Nasser after 1967 helps to illustrate two critical questions that are at the heart of this dissertation: (1) Does costliness of war help to explain postwar domestic discontent against governments? (2) Do we need to differentiate among surviving wartime leaders? The peculiar nature of the 1967 war meant that the postwar behavior of the defectors from winning coalition and the mass public seem to be overwhelmingly driven by the outcome – a total defeat. These defectors wanted to pin the blame on Nasser and use the opportunity to depose him. The mass public was also motivated to renew the war to regain the territory that had been lost. It is clear that they were willing to pay more costs to achieve this goal. Hence, the costliness of the 1967 war does not appear to be the primary motivating factor in generating their disquiet with the regime. It was their military's inability to take on the Israelis that seem to be driving the initial wave of protests in 1968. Of course, once the political space was opened for anti-regime sentiment other claims relating to police suppression and civil rights were added to the list of demands that were articulated. The postwar domestic problems that Nasser had to face bring into question the crude indicators of leader fate that only code survival, removal or post-exit punishment. These are not the only possible domestic political consequences that a wartime leader can face. He may survive but also be forced to undertake a series of unanticipated actions to counteract domestic challenges.

5   Conclusion

5.1   Purpose of Study and Findings

      This dissertation grew out of my general interest in questions that lie at the intersection of international relations and domestic politics. I do not agree with those that argue that domestic politics of states is a "black box" that can be left unopened by students of international relations. The research that straddles the artificial international-domestic divide has tended to explore the connections between various foreign policy choices by leaders and domestic political processes and events. The causal chain linking variables in these two domains has been tested in both directions to pursue a variety of interesting research agendas. A subset of this literature examines the domestic political accountability of leaders for their performance in interstate war. I set out to reexamine the assumptions that motivate this body of scholarship. I was especially interested in the literature that compared the fate of wartime leaders using explanatory variables like war outcome, culpability and regime type. Victorious wartime leaders that faced severe domestic problems – or were deposed – in the postwar period motivated me to delve into the general question of war and political punishment.

      I took the view that such cases complicate the neat association that previous studies have established between war performance and political punishment – operationalized as removal from office or post-removal retribution such as exile, arrest or execution. Hence, these merit scholarly attention. In trying to find a war-related variable that could fill this gap in the literature, I settled on costliness. I argued that besides outcome, the costliness of war is likely to generate discontent in the mass public and thereby change the incentives

motivating members of the groups that constitute any selectorate: the counter-elites, smaller groups capable of causing problems for the incumbent and the existing winning coalition. Therefore, I argued in Chapter 2 that the literature on war and leader survival would be enriched if we examine the effect of costliness of war on domestic politics in greater depth.

Secondly, I sought to establish that the binary coding scheme that distinguishes among wartime leaders based on whether they survived or not is insufficient to understand the range of domestic political consequences of interstate wars. Besides examining the survival of leaders, it is equally important to observe the variation in the level of hostility faced by governments from domestic actors in the postwar period. This is why I chose anti-government actions and events as my dependent variable. The core hypotheses that I tested was that costlier wars are likely to be associated with higher incidence of anti-government activities in countries that wage them. In order to test my hypotheses, I conducted a variety of large-n empirical tests and analyzed two cases in detail. In the remaining parts of this section, I will review the main findings of this dissertation. Following this, Section 5.2 will make suggestions on how my work can contribute to the wider discipline. I will also offer some suggestions on how this research can be extended.

5.1.1 Empirical Findings

In Chapter 3, I explored whether the number of postwar anti-government actions is associated with the costliness of war. Costliness was operationalized with two indicators: battle deaths and civilian casualties. In addition, I tested three hypotheses to test whether the relationship of a war's costliness with manifestation of anti-government antagonism

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was influenced by three variables – role of the state in the war, its regime type and the stakes involved.

The evidence of the independent effect of costliness on anti-government sentiment is decidedly mixed. The battle deaths measure – normalized using a variety of commonly used techniques – had been found to be a valid indicator of survival rate of war leaders (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). Therefore, it was very surprising when this variable failed to work as a predictor of events that indicate anti-government hostility in the aftermath of war. There could be several plausible explanations for this finding. The first possibility is that there are limitations with the Banks time series dataset that I used to construct the combined event count of postwar anti-government sentiment. It can be subject to "reporting biases" as it relied on country-specific media coverage to count the incidence of different events. As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith observe, "Differing levels of press penetration mean it is possible that events are more likely to be recorded in, for example, the United States than in Ghana (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010, p. 941)." It is quite possible that the Banks data has under reported postwar antigovernment activity for several crucial cases thereby impacting the results. At the same time, I must mention that these manifestations of anti-government hostility in the Banks archive are strongly associated with postwar leader turnover, when I tested this relationship as a robustness check. Hence, while underreporting might be an issue this events data seems to capture the general level of unrest or instability within a country during the period of observation.

The second possibility is that there is actually no association between battle deaths and expressions of anti-government sentiment because states have tried to build a mechanism to shield the mass public from directly suffering physical harm due to war

involvement.   It is a matter of record that several countries that are part of my analysis waged wars without enforcing conscription or a draft. This meant that the risk of battle deaths was borne by professional armed forces in combat. Thus, the societal link between the armed forces and the rest of society may not be very strong. It is possible that in several cases, the professionalization of the combat forces could have precluded the first step in the causal chain that I describe in Chapter 2: the rise of discontent in the mass public corresponding to higher battle deaths. As I argued in that chapter, it's the perceived unhappiness of the mass public with the costs incurred that would motivate influential and noninfluential members of the selectorate to act against the incumbent. If battle deaths do not generate a negative reaction in the mass public because these do not impact them directly, then the rest of the theoretical mechanism may not follow. The mass public may genuinely believe that battle deaths are justified given the interests at stake. The strong positive effect of the war outcome that I found in my analysis seems to indicate that defeat is more likely to motivate the mass public to express their discontent.

The other indicator of costliness that I used was the incidence of civilian targeting. This variable related to the outcome of interest as expected by my theory. Countries that saw civilian deaths during war were at much higher risk of witnessing expressions of anti-government hostility after the war concluded. This relates to the point made earlier in this section that my theory relies very heavily on the reaction of the mass public to the costliness of the war. From what I have found, it appears that it is only when population centers are targeted that the causal mechanism that links costliness to public discontent comes into effect. When civilians face a proximate danger of violence the costliness of

warfighting becomes a domestic political issue on which they are forced to take a clear stand.   Hence, the tolerance of the mass public to paying the costs of war is directly tested.

Among the three contingent variables, the most reliable result that I can report is that the levels of discontent among the mass publics tend to be associated with marginal increases in indicators of costliness for countries that started wars. This provides support for the basic argument outlined in Chapter 2: Initiators have to make the case and build support among the mass public that waging war is preferable to the status quo. In trying to build support and boost national morale on the eve of war, a leader is likely to signal to the mass public that the war aims can be achieved at reasonable cost. Conversely, initiators are more likely to signal that the prospective gains from a military victory would outweigh the sacrifices.   So when these prewar estimates of the likely costs turn out to be wrong, this is more likely to trigger a negative reaction of the mass publics and other members of the selectorate.

5.1.2   Case Study Findings

Chapter 4 presented two case studies that were chosen to study the mechanisms underlying two kinds of situations that can arise in a country after it has waged a war: (1) removal of a leader after presiding over a victory – President Ayala of Paraguay after the Chaco War and (2) survival of a leader following a defeat – President Nasser of Egypt after the Six Day War. Despite the strides that the discipline has made in using statistical methods to test hypotheses, case studies serve a useful methodological tool for international relations research.

T In Chapter 4, I tried to undertake "the investigation of a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical

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happening itself (Bennett, 2004, p. 21)." The primary goal of these two case studies was to analyze the exact scale of costs that were incurred by Paraguay and Egypt in fighting these wars. The second objective was to study whether these costs were related to any observable antigovernment sentiment after the war had concluded. Given the powerful effect of outcome on the dependent variable that had been detected through the statistical results, this variable was a major criterion for case selection. I wanted to explore the relative effects of outcome and costliness on postwar manifestations of threats to the government.

The events in Paraguay fit some elements of the causal mechanism that I discussed in Chapter 2. The absolute numbers of battle deaths were quite high for a small country like Paraguay. The war dragged on for over three years with reports of massive casualties from the Chaco front. This clearly created discernible disquiet across Paraguayan society with the management of the war under President Ayala's leadership. This discontent was exacerbated by claims made by the opponents of the Ayala regime that the President and his leading commander Estigarriabia had failed to press home the advantage when the Bolivian forces had been weakened by a string of early reversals. They claimed that this allowed Bolivia to regroup and extended the war. It did not help that most of the casualties were incurred by Paraguay during the last phase of the war. These accumulated casualties also put immense pressure on the political-military leadership of Paraguay to signal to the weary public that their country had extracted some tangible gains from their adversary by waging this war at such a huge cost.

The rapid demobilization of the armed forces and the immediate dislocation in the economy signaled to the counter-elites that this was an opportune time to mobilize against

President Ayala under the leadership of a charismatic and controversial military officer, Rafael Franco. While the Paraguayan political system was prone to leadership turnover prior to the war, the February revolution of 1936 that brought down the wartime President Ayala was no ordinary factional struggle. It brought together a diverse counter-coalition that ended the Liberal Party's hold on power and irrevocably changed the course of Paraguayan politics. There is a clearly a link between the costliness of the Chaco War with the postwar removal of the wartime leader President Ayala in a coup. The counter-elites and smaller anti-government groups that backed this coup exploited the discontent among the mass public in general, and the armed forces in particular, that the costs of the Chaco War had generated.

Since Paraguay had succeeded in decisively beating back Bolivian aggression and emerged victorious, war outcome can be ruled out as an explanation for Ayala's fall. The case illustrates that the negative fallout of the costliness of the war had made Ayala and his allies politically vulnerable by the time the war ended in 1935. The costliness of the Chaco War continued to impact Paraguayan politics after Ayala was deposed by the February revolution. One of the key planks on which the new government sought to distinguish itself from Ayala was that it will protect the national interest in the postwar peace negotiations. This can explain the decision of the Franco regime to refuse the recommendations of the Neutral Military Commission to vacate occupied territories in the Chaco region where they expected to find oil deposits. This intractability of the Franco regime delayed a postwar settlement. It was only after international experts presented incontrovertible evidence that Paraguayan hopes of an oil bonanza were misplaced, did the Franco government agree to a withdrawal (Rout, 1970). The collapse of the Franco regime

within a couple of years was not merely due to the internal contradictions of the new winning coalition. The costliness of the Chaco War meant that the Franco regime was under as much pressure as its predecessor to deliver tangible fruits of the military victory. This made its every move in the negotiations at the Chaco Peace Conference fraught with risk. Ultimately, Franco government's decision to withdraw from positions that had been occupied by Paraguayan forces triggered another revolt within the armed forces and ended the regime's tenure.

Egyptian domestic politics in the aftermath the Six Dar War presents some challenges to the argument that I have advanced while offering some support as well.   This case interested me because Nasser's survival after a defeat contests the intuitive expectation that a leader will be punished for a bad war outcome. The contribution of the Egyptian case to this dissertation is in illustrating how war can generate "second-order" negative consequences. This adds another dimension to traditional understandings of punishment.   I understand "second-order" negative consequences as those domestic events that create problems for a government or leader but do not result in regime change.

The narrative of the situation in Egypt after the Six Day War shows that this event had an immediate impact on the state-society relationship. The sweeping expressions of dissent against the established order and demands for political liberalization were unprecedented for Egypt since the Nasser regime had consolidated power in the early 1950s. The open criticism of the armed forces bordering on ridicule was also a remarkable development for this country. The success or failure of groups that mobilized against the state may be moot. The very fact that these events occurred is significant in a country where the state has been described as an "overwhelming structure" which gives the person

"who controls it…immense power over society (Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 316)." This is why the manifestation of anti-regime sentiment against powerful state institutions after the 1967 war was a serious challenge to Nasser. Although he successfully countered these challenges, there is little doubt that 1967 war disturbed the equilibrium of the Egyptian polity. The fact that the protestors, activists and sundry groups that rose up against the state failed to successfully mount a full-scale revolution should not detract from the significance of the events that they engineered.

The other noticeable disruption brought about by the 1967 war was the change in the composition of the winning coalition that ruled over the country. The enormity of the defeat would have consumed most leaders. The primary reason for the survival of Nasser after such a major defeat was that the he enjoyed an exalted status within his country. His role in ending the British occupation, building infrastructure and starting a variety of social welfare programs had given him a measure of goodwill that would not be dented by a defeat. At a time of national crisis, casting him aside would have eliminated a symbol of national resistance (Stephens, 1972, pp. 507-508). The overwhelming mood within Egypt was not to surrender but to fight again to retake the territories that had been lost. Forcibly removing Nasser from the helm would have only made this harder. However, this may not have been sufficient to protect him had he not sacrificed a major section of his winning coalition at the altar of political accountability and reconstituted it with new members. The purges of his rivals and trials of senior members of his regime from the armed forces not only consolidated Nasser's position abut also went a long way in defusing the discontent that had erupted in Egypt following the war.

The Egyptian case gives support for the domestic effect of war outcome and illustrates why the defeat dummy performed so strongly in the quantitative analysis as a predictor of antigovernment events. The battle deaths count for Egypt in this war would place it quite high on the costliness scale. However, it is clear that it was the humiliation of the defeat that was the overwhelming reason for the anti-regime sentiment that was manifested in a variety of events in the aftermath of the war. The other wrinkle in this case is that the dominant public mood was to wage another war with Israel to avenge the defeat. This clearly means that although the costs of the Six Day War were quite severe, these had not exhausted the limits of tolerance of the Egyptian people. It would seem that the demand to restore Egypt's pride through another full-scale war and a demand for political liberalization and civil rights were being made simultaneously by groups arrayed against the regime.

5.2   Relevance for the Discipline and Future Directions

The findings from this dissertation build upon the insights gained by various studies of domestic politics of belligerent states. The dissertation highlights the value of opening the "black box" of internal politics of countries involved in interstate war. I have tried to make a case why we cannot limit ourselves to leader survival in discerning the domestic consequences of war involvement. A bare bones approach to coding the fate of leaders may be parsimonious but it overlooks important postwar political events inside countries that can be associated with key variables of war participation – costs, outcome, role in war, stakes etc.

Relaxing this dichotomous dependent variable and analyzing antigovernment actions can convey a richer picture of the real political effects of war involvement. The

dissertation makes a beginning in this endeavor. As a next step, elaborate case analysis of the wartime and postwar periods of warring states can tell us which of the manifestations of postwar antigovernment discontent can be reasonably related to the war. There are a host of factors unrelated to the war that can explain why a government or leader loses popularity or sees a spike in threat events. Just because these occur in the aftermath of war does not necessarily mean they are connected with one another. This can also help to isolate cases of leader removal that may have been misspecified under the "punished" category in previous studies. The exact circumstances surrounding the removal of a leader can illuminate whether the punishment was due to some war-related factor or not. In my view, I can use this dissertation as a stepping stone to reexamine the postwar tenure of all leaders that survived defeats or were deposed following a victory. Using these two ideal types as a baseline, an interesting cross-national events database for wartime leaders can be developed which can further advance leader-based studies of war. There is also scope to examine whether there are other leaders like Ayala that were victorious is costlier wars but found it harder to agree to a postwar peace settlement because of domestic pressure.

This dissertation has highlighted issues and shortcomings relating to the operationalization of the costliness of war as an independent variable. This can be useful for anyone that uses this data. The certainty with which the number of battle deaths is used as a proxy for costliness of war may have to be reassessed for large-n studies. More complex ways of evaluating the costliness factor need to be developed that can truly capture its impact on the mass public. In a recent piece, Fazal has advocated that advances in modern medicine and improvements in transporting the wounded has raised the survival rate of combatants (Fazal, 2014). This problematizes the counting of battle deaths in

existing datasets and its use as an explanatory variable. Greater attention to the number of the injured as well as questioning the current threshold for classification for interstate war may be the direction in which the operationalization of war cost may have to head.

One of the key aspects of the costs incurred by Paraguay in the Chaco War was that the war was preceded by a process of coercive mass mobilization by the state. It could be that the negative fallout that I was expecting for higher battle deaths only occurs when war causes societal dislocation that forced conscription may generate. The cumulative unhappiness with battle deaths may be a function of whether it is a professional army that is incurring these casualties or fresh recruits that have been mobilized for the war. The Egyptian case study can also motivate questions that pertain to the relative effect of outcome and cost on domestic politics: Are the domestic political consequences of an unambiguous defeat fundamentally different from costliness? Does the mass public make a distinction between the costliness of the war and its outcome under conditions of total defeat? It will be interesting to explore whether the marginal effect of costliness on domestic public opinion hold any relevance when countries suffer total defeat in war.

One of the results of the large-n analysis that support my core argument is that countries that suffered civilian fatalities also experienced higher incidence of antigovernment events in the postwar period. This supports the basic logic of my argument that costliness is a very important variable for explaining political developments inside a warring country. When noncombatants are targeted, they face a proximate effect of the political decision of their government to take part in war. In such cases, there is tremendous scope for research on the spatial and temporal domains of civilian casualties. Hypotheses can be developed that tests the link between the location and duration of

civilian targeting with manifestations of postwar antigovernment discontent. Is it that once

civilians come under attack in any part of a warring country, it fundamentally alters the

domestic political situation for any postwar (or wartime) government? It will be interesting

to study the mechanism by which governments that are subject to civilian targeting are

"punished", as indicated by my quantitative analysis.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

		Battle	Civilian	
Country	War Name	Deaths	Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
Italy	War for Kosovo	0	0	2
Netherlands	War for Kosovo	0	0	2
Turkey	War for Kosovo	0	0	2
France	War for Kosovo	0	0	1
United Kingdom	War for Kosovo	0	0	0
Germany	War for Kosovo	0	0	0
Australia	World War II	23265	0	0
New Zealand	World War II	10033	0	0
El Salvador	Football	107	1201	2
Japan	Second Sino-Japanese	10000	0	8
Israel	Six Day War 1967	1839	20	7
Israel	Lebanon War	368	0	4
Chad	War over the Aouzou Strip	1000	0	10
United States of America	Gulf War of 1990-91	146	0	0
Italy	Gulf War of 1990-91	0	0	16
United Kingdom	World War II	264443	65000	3
United States of America	Kosovo War	2	0	0
Canada	World War II	45631	0	0
Turkey	Turco-Cypriot War	300	500	16
Canada	Gulf War of 1990-91	0	0	1
France	Gulf War of 1990-91	2	0	1
Brazil	World War II	943	0	7
Italy	Italo-Ethiopian War	2313	0	0
Russia	Sino-Soviet War	143	0	4
Egypt	Gulf War of 1990-91	12	0	18
China	Off-shore Islands	1003	0	5
Uganda	Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79	1500	500	8
USSR	World War II	6329600	17055700	2
Saudi Arabia	Gulf War of 1990-91	29	0	0
Morocco	Gulf War of 1990-91	0	0	4
Somalia	Second Ogaden War Phase 2	8000	1251	3
India	Bangladesh	3241	178	8
China (PRC)	Sino-Indian War	722	0	3
Israel	Sinai War	189	0	6
Armenia	Azeri-Armenian War 1993-94	5500	7500	5
USSR	Soviet Invasion of Hungary	669	0	0

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Country	War Name	Battle Deaths	Civilian Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
Cuba	Second Ogaden War Phase 2	700	0	0
Syria	Gulf War of 1990-91	0	0	0
United Kingdom	Gulf War of 1990-91	16	0	9
Kuwait	Gulf War of 1990-91	1000	1000	0
Libya	Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79	500	0	1
Greece	Second Greco-Turkish War	30000	25000	7
Italy	World War II	200700	80000	29
Saudi Arabia	Yom Kippur War	100	0	1
Hungary	World War II	200000	0	3
Argentina	Falklands War	746	3	3
Lebanon	Arab-Israeli War	500	0	10
Egypt	War of Attrition	5000	1000	4
Jordan	Six Day War 1967	696	125	37
Iraq	Yom Kippur War	278	0	7
Syria	Arab-Israeli War	1000	0	9
Iraq	Arab-Israeli War	500	0	7
Egypt	Yom Kippur War	7700	0	4
Jordan	Arab-Israeli War	1000	0	5
Jordan	Yom Kippur War	23	0	1
Pakistan	Kargil War	745	0	10
South Africa	War over Angola 1975-76	28	0	11
Syria	Yom Kippur War	3100	101	2
Czechoslovakia	Hungarian Adversaries War	2000	0	1
France	Korean War	271	0	14
United States of America	Korean War	33667	0	7
Australia	Vietnam War	425	0	4
Pakistan	Second Kashmir War	1500	500	6
United Kingdom	Korean War	1078	0	4
China	Sin-Vietnamese Punitive War	10000	2200	0
United States of America	Vietnam War	47000	0	4
Canada	Korean War	516	0	1
Philippines	Korean War	128	0	5
United Kingdom	Sinai War	22	0	1
Belgium	Korean War	104	0	1
Thailand	Korean War	136	0	4
France	Franco-Turkish War 1919-20	5000	27600	17
Greece	Korean War	194	0	17

Country	War Name	Battle Deaths	Civilian Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
France	Sinai War	10	0	21
Vietnam	Sino-Vietnamese Border of 1987	2200	0	0
Netherlands	Korean War	120	0	2
Thailand	Vietnam War	351	0	14
China	Sino-Vietnamese Border of 1987	1800	0	2
Australia	Korean War	306	0	0
Iraq	Iran-Iraq War	105000	1000	13
Turkey	Korean War	889	0	2
Philippines	Vietnam War	1000	0	14
South Korea	Vietnam War	4687	0	4
China (PRC)	Taiwan Straits	239	0	5
China	Korean War	401401	0	5
India	Sino-Indian War	1423	0	12
Hungary	Soviet Invasion of Hungary	926	3000	1
Syria	Six Day War 1967	4296	0	8
Finland	World War II	79047	650	2
China	Second Sino-Japanese	50000	10000	22
Pakistan	Bangladesh	7982	305	5
Egypt	Six Day War 1967	3000	125	3
Ethiopia	Second Ogaden War Phase 2	1800	550	8
Azerbaijan	Azeri-Armenian War 1993-94	8500	7500	5
Libya	War over the Aouzou Strip	7500	0	0
Egypt	Sinai War	1000	1000	0
Tanzania	Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79	1000	1500	1
China	Sino-Soviet War	1035	2000	22
Iraq	Gulf War of 1990-91	400000	3250	14
Honduras	Football	1200	401	3
Israel*	War of Attrition	641	152	6
Vietnam(PRV)	Vietnam War	1000000	300000	3
Hungary	Hungarian Adversaries War	6000	1000	5
Israel	Yom Kippur War	2838	0	6
United States of America	World War II	292131	0	1
United Kingdom	Falklands War	277	0	4
India	Kargil War	474	0	10
Cuba	War over Angola 1975-76	500	0	0
Ethiopia	Badme Border War of 1998-2000	70000	250	0
Iran	Iran-Iraq War	262000	12420	0
India	Second Kashmir War	3712	500	20
South Korea	Korean War	184573	675000	4

Country	War Name	Battle Deaths	Civilian Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
France	Ifni War	0	0	23
Spain	Ifni War	113	0	8

Appendix B

Country	War Name	Battle Deaths	Civilian Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
Colombia	Korean	210	0	10
Ecuador	Cenepa Valley	550	-	8
Peru	Cenepa Valley	950	-	17
Bolivia	Chaco	5661	0	11
Paraguay	Chaco	12000	0	7
Poland	Russo-Polish	4512	0	8
Poland	Lithuanian-Polish	500	0	8
Croatia	Bosnian Independence	409	-	1
Yugoslavia	Bosnian Independence	1890	-	2
Yugoslavia	War for Kosovo	5000	-	9
Bosnia	Bosnian Independence	3060	-	5
Bulgaria1	World War II	6671	2000	3
Bulgaria2	World War II	7671	2000	3
Romania	Hungarian Adversaries	30000	0	2
Romania1	World War II	169882	465000	4
Romania2	World War II	290000	465000	4
USSR	Russo-Polish	100000	0	20
Lithuania	Lithuaninan-Polsh	500	0	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	War over Angola	100	-	5
Ethiopia	Korean	120	0	4
Eritrea	Badme Border	50000	250	0
Angola	War over Angola	1000	-	8
South Africa	World War II	6840	0	0
Morocco	Ifni War	241	-	5
Turkey	Second Greco-Turkish	13000	15000	4
Turkey	Franco-Turkish	35000	1000	6

Country	War Name	Battle Deaths	Civilian Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
Syria	War over Lebanon	1350	10000	1
Saudia Arabia	Saudi-Yemeni	100	0	3
Yemen	Saudi-Yemeni	2000	0	0
Qatar	Gulf War	0	0	1
United Arab Emirates	Gulf War	6	0	0
Oman	Gulf War	0	0	0
China	World War II	1350000	10000000	16
Mongolia	World War II	3000	0	0
North Korea	Korean	214899	750000	0
Cambodia/KhmerRep/Kampuchea	Vietnam War Phase 2	2500	-	10
Cambodia	Communist Coalition	5000	-	16
Cambodia	Vietnamese Cambodian	32500	-	10
Laos	Second Laotian, Phase 2	11250	-	7
Vietnam	Vietnamese-Cambodian	4063	-	0
Vietnam	Sino-Vietnamese Punitive	10000	4600	0
South Vietnam	Vietnam War	254257	42000	3
Germany	World War II	350000	121200	-
Japan	World War II	174000	658595	-
India	First Kashmir War	2500	0	-
Pakistan	First Kashmir War	1000	0	-
China	Third Sino-Japanese	75000	-	-
Japan	Third Sino-Japanese	25000	-	-
USSR	Changkufeng	1200	-	-
Japan	Changkufeng	526	-	-
USSR	Nomonhan	5000	-	-
Mongolia	Nomonhan	3000	-	-
Japan	Nomonhan	20000	-	-
Belgium	World War II	9600	76000	-
France[†]	World War II	213224	350000	-
Yugoslavia	World War II	305000	-	-

Country	War Name	Battle Deaths	Civilian Casualties	Anti-Government Threats
Netherlands[†]	World War II	7900	500000	-
Greece	World War II	18300	325000	-
Poland[†]	World War II	320000	56750000	-
Ethiopia	World War II	5000	-	-
Finland	Russo-Finnish	24923	-	-
USSR	Russo-Finnish	126875	-	-
France	Franco-Thai	700	-	-
Thailand	Franco-Thai	700	-	-
Israel	Arab-Israeli	3000	-	-
Egypt	Arab-Israeli	2000	-	-
Taiwan	Off-Shore Islands	1367	-	-
Taiwan	Taiwan Straits	1500	-	-
Ethiopia	Conquest of Ethiopia	16000	-	-
Norway	World War II	3000	-	-
Country cases where COW counts "phases" as different observations that I treat as one				
Australia	Vietnam War Phase 2		-	-
France	World War II			
Italy	World War II			
South Korea	Vietnam War Phase 2			
South Vietnam	Communist Coalition			
United States	Second Laotian Phase 2			
United States	Communist Coalition Phase 2			
Vietnam	Communist Coalition			

*Those cases which had data on all the three variables shown here had other information missing
†The casualty figures for France, Poland and Netherlands in World War II include the period of the German occupation as well.

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