

## ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:        ARMING AGENTS OR ASSAILANTS? A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO EXAMINING U.S. MILITARY AID AND REPRESSION

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The United States provides billions of dollars each year in military assistance to foreign nations, yet we know very little about how aid affects recipients. This dissertation considers the impact of military aid on repression. I use a principal-agent framework to examine the strategic interaction between the United States and recipient country and evaluate the conditions under which an agent “works” or “shirks” on human rights policy. The principal-agent theory of military assistance reveals that the extent of U.S. oversight of aid, preference similarities between the principal and agent, the expected costs of being caught and punished for shirking, and the potential payoff to shirking affect the likelihood of repression. I argue that critical explanatory power comes from disaggregating U.S. military aid programs: material aid increases the power of the recipient armed forces and is subject to less U.S. oversight compared to education and

targeted funding programs. I test my theory using a quantitative analysis of U.S. military aid to 180 foreign countries from 1991–2011 and two outcome variables, government one-sided violence and scaled physical integrity rights. The results indicate that education and targeted funding reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence. On average, I find that material aid is associated with an increased likelihood of physical integrity abuse in recipient countries. In addition, material aid to full democracies is associated with a lower likelihood of repression, while countries with oil exports are more likely to repress. This study improves upon previous research by theoretically and empirically disaggregating military aid from foreign aid writ large as well as augmenting our understanding of state repression. The project reveals that material aid may undermine other U.S. efforts to promote stability and democratization and that there are opportunities for policy changes to improve U.S. oversight of material assistance.

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EXAMINING U.S. MILITARY AID AND REPRESSION

by

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# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Motivation and Puzzle

Consider a country with a yearly per capita GDP around \$4,000, a semi-democratic government, a low level of civil unrest from minority groups, and armed forces that are not equally representative of the population. The military's equipment is outdated and it lacks modern air and ground transport vehicles. Now imagine that this country receives an influx of cash to buy advanced weaponry and arms. Soldiers are now carrying 21<sup>st</sup> century assault rifles, and the air force ordered a new helicopter. The military also sends some of its best officers to military higher education schools in the United States.

The United States provided almost \$6 billion in military aid to foreign countries in 2011.<sup>1</sup> The most surprising fact about this number is that it excludes aid to Afghanistan and Iraq. The policy focus in recent years has been on the ability of U.S. troops and dollars on the ground in these two countries to help build their armed forces, but large sums of money have also been transferred all over the world for this same purpose, without full-scale intervention.

U.S. military assistance largely takes the form of grants to fund the purchase of U.S. military equipment and training, yet we know very little about what effects military assistance has in recipient countries. In the above scenario, does the military use its new

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<sup>1</sup> In this study, I look exclusively at military assistance from the United States. This decision is largely based on data availability. While data on economic aid from foreign countries, especially OECD countries, is readily available, data on military assistance is less published. Moreover, at least among Western countries post-1991, the United States is the largest military aid donor.

arms and equipment to secure its border and fight terrorism? Do the officers help transition the country toward democracy through increased professionalism? Or does the government decide to consolidate its power and attack its political rivals? Do the armed forces become more violent toward protesters and demonstrators, perhaps firing on crowds? Further investigation into real world events reveals that all of the above scenarios occur. Understanding why provides the empirical motivation for this dissertation.

For example, Wikileaks documents from December 2010 revealed that Yemen used a U.S. funded counterterrorism unit to fight anti-government rebels in 2009. “Critics of the Saleh government have long claimed that the fight against Al Qaeda has been beneficial to Yemen’s government so it can garner financial and military aid for its own domestic agenda” (Kasinof 2010).

In 2008, Kenyan human rights leaders urged the United States to suspend military assistance following post-election violence because, “Some of the security forces benefiting from this aid and equipment have been killing Kenyan civilians with impunity” (*BBC Monitoring Africa* 2008). Elsewhere in Africa, Ethiopian forces were accused of a violent crackdown on civilian protestors in 2005. Ethiopian military aid skyrocketed from less than \$500,000 in 2001 to more than \$17 million at its height in 2008. The increased aid helped Ethiopian forces fight militants in its neighbor, Somalia (Guevara 2007).

In 1999, the United States placed an embargo on U.S. military aid to Indonesia after the Indonesian Army killed 1,500 people in East Timor. In 2005, the United States removed these restrictions out of the “national security interests of the United States.”

Human rights critics, however, argued that little had changed within the Indonesian Army (Parry 2005).

Human Rights Watch reported that troops in Uzbekistan—where U.S. anti-terror aid also increased dramatically after 9/11—fired on civilians in 2005 (Finn 2005). Similar criticisms are leveled at U.S. military aid to Azerbaijan, which the United States sanctioned before 9/11 for a poor human rights record; human rights groups state that the situation has not improved (Walsh 2004).

Colombia is one of the largest recipients of U.S. military assistance and faces multiple human rights abuse allegations. In 2008, Amnesty International stated that “Conflict-related killings, extrajudicial executions, killings of civilians by paramilitaries and by guerillas, enforced disappearances, abductions by guerillas, forced displacement, killings of women, enforced disappearance of women and killings of trade unionists have all gone up” (*Morning Star* 2008). In 2009, Colombia acknowledged that army officers had killed civilians to inflate the army’s success rate against leftist guerrillas (Reuters 2009).

The recent political events in Egypt also provided an empirical puzzle for further investigation. Egypt has long been one of the largest recipients of U.S. military assistance in all forms, a result in part of the Camp David Accords. Hosni Mubarak led Egypt through much of the history of U.S. military aid. The past several years of political upheaval beginning with the Arab Spring, however, brought a wave a political uncertainty and domestic unrest to Egypt. It also tested the U.S. military aid relationship with Egypt. The U.S. maintained military aid funding through the ouster of Mubarak, the election of Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi, and Morsi’s eventual

overthrow by members of the Egyptian armed forces (“US Unlocks Military Aid to Egypt” 2014). Importantly, the United States did not declare Morsi’s ouster a coup, which would have mandated the cessation of military aid. In the wake of Morsi’s removal, the Egyptian security forces have been accused of repression (Gordon and Landler 2013; “US-Egypt Fighter Jet Deal ‘on Track’” 2014). In a May 2014 election, former Army Chief and leader of Morsi’s ouster, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, was sworn in as President. In June, the United States agreed to provide ten Apache helicopters in future military aid (“US Unlocks Military Aid to Egypt” 2014).

Yet in some cases, the United States acts in the opposite direction. In 2009, the United States imposed conditions on Foreign Military Financing to Nepal’s Army. The bill stated that funds would be available for Nepal if the Army demonstrated that it was cooperating with human rights investigations based on 2004 actions against Maoist rebels as well as redefining the NAF mission, instituting a civilian ministry of defense, and assimilating former rebels (*BBC Monitoring South Asia* 2009). In 2005, the United States renewed military aid to Guatemala after a 15-year hiatus due to reforms in the armed forces (Thompson 2005).

U.S. defense officials also argue that military aid plays a vital role in cooperation with partner nations on key issues, and that U.S. equipment and training improves interoperability for future joint operations.<sup>2</sup> It’s not clear, however, that the United States has adequately researched the potential deleterious effects of military aid or thought about the long-term consequences.

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with U.S. defense official, June 2013.

These scenarios raise the question: does military aid foster democratization and stability by improving human rights practices in recipient countries? Or does it sometimes have the opposite effect of empowering the security forces to commit human rights abuses, and under what conditions? This empirical puzzle led to an interesting investigation into the types of military aid, the data available, and ultimately, the conditions under which military aid has positive and negative effects on repression of physical integrity rights.<sup>3</sup>

In the following section, I describe the history of U.S. military assistance to partner countries. I then discuss the gaps that this study seeks to fill in the scholarly literature on both foreign aid and repression. I also provide a brief overview of the principal-agent theoretical approach that generated my hypotheses on how I expect military aid to affect human rights practices. Subsequently, I describe the methodology used and discuss the main findings of the quantitative analysis. I conclude with a roadmap of the dissertation.

## **1.2 A History of U.S. Military Aid**

The United States has a long history of providing military aid to other countries. During World War II, the United States provided military aid in the form of equipment to Great Britain and the Soviet Union through the lend-lease program (US House of Representatives 2014).

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<sup>3</sup> From this point forward, when I refer to repression, I am discussing physical integrity violations. I use this term interchangeably with human right abuses. Repression can take a range of forms, from restrictions of political liberties to killing civilians. I choose to examine physical integrity repression because I am directly interested in understanding how military assistance affects the recipient armed forces' use of force. I do recognize that physical integrity repression may accompany other forms of government coercion, and additional research is needed to understand how various forms of foreign assistance affect the recipient's choice to repress in different ways.

During the Cold War, the United States provided military aid to key allies as well as countries it wished to influence. By providing military equipment, training, and cash for future arms purchases, the United States hoped to trade military aid for loyalty, a degree of policy influence, and deter or defeat Communist insurgencies. The effectiveness of this transaction is debated, but it was a strategy pursued by both sides during the Cold War (Sislin 1994). The strategic goal of both the United States and Soviet Union was to prevent the influence of the other in their block by increasing the strength of partner nations. The institutional development of partners was, arguably, secondary.

With the end of the Cold War and later, the events of September 11, 2001, the strategic goals of U.S. military aid shifted. No longer did the United States need to accumulate allies for a potential conflict against the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, U.S. foreign policy shifted toward humanitarian goals, and economic and development aid moved into the limelight. Military aid as a percentage of total aid fell.<sup>4</sup> Full-scale intervention—which falls outside of the aid definition—in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia also overshadowed the relatively small amounts of aid given in the form of training and cash for arms purchases.

As the awareness of civil conflict increased in the 1990s, however, U.S. policy began to reflect the notion of improving stability and conditions for democracy in the developing world. U.S. military aid focused on the former Soviet republics, with democratization and demobilization initiatives (O’Hanlon 1994).

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<sup>4</sup> For example, military aid composed 41% of total aid (military aid + economic aid) in 1988, but 25% in 2008 (USAID 2013).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks coupled with continued civil conflicts and instability around the world intensified U.S. awareness of and reaction to state failure and opportunities for terrorist safe havens. The ability of terrorist groups to operate and plan large-scale operations against U.S. interests in weak states such as Afghanistan now required a proactive response from the United States. The United States invaded Afghanistan, and in subsequent years faced the reality that preventing al Qaeda from operating in the country in the future would require significant state-building efforts. The United States could not afford to invest similar resources and troops in other weak states and thus shifted the focus of military aid, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, toward building the capacity of state forces through equipment and training. The strategic goal of military aid in the post-9/11 decade has thus been building military capacity in line with protecting U.S. interests. In many countries, the United States has invested a combination of military and economic aid to build institutional capacity and reduce state fragility. In an article in *Foreign Policy* in 2010, then–Defense Secretary Robert Gates laid out the U.S. strategy of military assistance in the years to come (R. M. Gates 2010):


“In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States' safety and security—a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time... This strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called “building partner capacity”: helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance. ... The U.S. military, although resilient in spirit and magnificent in performance, is under stress and strain fighting two wars and confronting diffuse challenges around the globe. More broadly, there continues to be a struggle for legitimacy, loyalty, and power across the Islamic world between modernizing, moderate forces and the violent, extremist organizations epitomized by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other such groups. In these situations, building the governance and



security capacity of other countries must be a critical element of U.S. national security strategy.”

Figure 1 below shows that military assistance decreased at the end of the Cold War and slowly increased again through 2012. The large spike in 2003 is a surge in funding for partner nations that participated in the initial invasion of Iraq.

**Figure 1: Total U.S. Military Aid, 1991–2011**



By far the largest U.S. military aid program is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which provides loans to purchase U.S. equipment and training. The United States defined the goals of FMF as follows (Department Of State 2006a):

- Improve the military capabilities of key friendly countries to contribute to international crisis response operations, including peacekeeping and humanitarian crises.
- Promote bilateral, regional and multilateral coalition efforts, notably in the global war on terrorism.
- Maintain support for democratically-elected governments that share values similar to the United States for democracy, human rights, and regional stability.

- Enhance rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of military forces of friendly countries and allies.
- Assist the militaries of friendly countries and allies to procure U.S. defense articles and services that strengthen legitimate self-defense capabilities and security needs.
- Enhance rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of military forces of friendly countries and allies.
- Support the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and services.

Another program that provides funding to the majority of countries in this study is International Military Education and Training (IMET), though the funding amount is far less than FMF. IMET is an educational program, largely for foreign officers, and does not have a material component. Rather, IMET has the explicit objective of imparting human rights knowledge. The United States defines the goals of IMET as follows (Department Of State 2006b):

- Impart skills and knowledge that help participating countries develop new capabilities and better utilize their existing resources.
- Provide training and education that augments the capabilities of participant nations' military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S., NATO and regional coalition forces.
- Expose foreign military and civilian personnel to the important roles democratic values and internationally recognized human rights can play in governance and military operations.

I argue that differentiating between the programs is critical to understanding how military assistance affects repression. For the statistical analysis, I group these eight programs into four categories: material aid (FMF, MAP, Excess Stock), education (IMET), counternarcotics (Andean Counter-drug Initiative, Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement), and anti-terrorism/nonproliferation (Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related).

In the following section, I describe the gap in the academic literature that this dissertation seeks to fill. In addition, this project contributes to an ongoing policy discussion about the effectiveness of U.S. involvement abroad. More than a decade of combat warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has lessened U.S. appetite for another prolonged “boots on the ground” conflict. Rather, as Secretary Gates described, the United States will continue to grow its foreign aid, training, partnership, and advisement programs. Military assistance could be at the forefront of U.S. engagement in friendly countries. While the overall consensus among security cooperation officials in the Defense Department seems to be that military assistance helps build stronger relationships with allies and helps achieve U.S. goals, it’s not clear that the policy community has investigated all the possible effects of U.S. arms, training, and education. Understanding how military aid affects human rights practices in recipient countries is critical to evaluating the “success” of U.S. aid. While military aid may achieve its short term strategic goal in a partner nation, it could be undermining movement toward democratization and fueling arms races around the world (Collier and Hoeffler 2007; De Ree and Nillesen 2009).

### **1.3 Gaps in the Literature**

This dissertation contributes to the literature on both foreign aid effectiveness and repression. Studying the effects of international influence on within country dynamics situates this study between the international relations and comparative fields. I follow a recent trend in the comparative literature, particularly the conflict literature, which recognizes that international and transnational actors—such as foreign governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and state-less

rebel groups—have an important and growing role in affecting the cause and consequences of internal unrest (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hafner-Burton 2005; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). I believe that studying how international actors and institutions affect internal dynamics is interesting from both an international and comparative perspective, and this dissertation has insights for U.S. foreign policy as well as for the sources of repression. Below, I reveal the gap that this dissertation fills by briefly reviewing the literature on foreign aid effectiveness and repression.

Overall, there is relatively little scholarly work that examines the effects of military assistance, as distinct from economic aid. During the Cold War, scholarship on U.S. military aid focused on where and how much the United States provided (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1990; Poe and Meernik 1995; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Shannon Lindsey Blanton 2000; Neumayer 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). Scholars do find that military assistance during the Cold War increased the likelihood of coups (Rowe 1974; Maniruzzaman 1992) and human rights abuses in some countries (Fitch 1979; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; McCoy 2005). There is also evidence that arms transfers are linked to human rights abuses (Blanton 1999). In the post-9/11 period, scholars began theorizing about the effectiveness of counterterrorism assistance (Azam and Delacroix 2006; Bapat 2011; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011). There is not, however, a cross-national study that examines the effects of U.S. military aid on human rights in the post–Cold War era.

The literature on foreign aid writ large is far more extensive, but there is not a consensus on the effects of aid on human rights (Hafner-Burton 2014). The broad lessons

from foreign aid studies are far from decisive, and the effects of foreign aid on outcomes such as economic growth, governance, and civil conflict are clearly dependent on a wide array of time and country-specific factors (Boone 1996; Tavares 2003; Knack 2004; Wright 2008; De Ree and Nillesen 2009; Busse and Gröning 2009; Wright 2009; Sullivan, Tessman, and Li 2011; Savun and Tirone 2011; Clemens et al. 2012).

I contribute to the literature on foreign aid effectiveness by examining the effects of aid on human rights from 1991–2011 across 180 countries. In addition, I argue that to gain a better grasp on how foreign aid works in recipient countries, we need to disaggregate both the independent and dependent variables. By looking exclusively at military assistance, I can draw out the theoretical and empirical casual mechanisms linking military aid and repression.

This study also contributes to our understanding of state repression and human rights practices. There are three important findings to highlight. Firstly, previous research found that repression is more common during periods of dissent and civil unrest (Hibbs 1973; Shin 1983; Davis and Ward 1990; Ziegenhagen 1986; Poe et al. 1994; Davenport 1995a; Davenport 1995b; Davenport 1996a; Davenport 1996b; Gartner and Regan 1996; Franklin 1997; Krain 1997; Goldhagen 1997; J. C. King 1998; Moore 1998; Davenport 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2000; Apodaca 2001; Regan and Henderson 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Davenport 2007a; Cohen and Green 2012). In addition, weak and failing states are also associated with human rights abuses (Englehart 2009). Secondly, previous repression increases the likelihood of future repression (Walter 1969; Dallin 1970; Davis and Ward 1990; Poe and Tate 1994;

Davenport 1995b; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Finally, scholars find evidence of a domestic democratic peace (Poe et al. 1994; Davenport 1996a; Zanger 2000; Harff 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

I build off of these findings and examine the effects of military aid on repression. As I discuss in the following section, I argue that military aid increases the resources of the armed forces, which increases the likelihood of repression under certain conditions. This dissertation provides an important contribution to our understanding of repression by bringing in U.S. military assistance as an international actor.

#### **1.4 Summary of Argument**

This dissertation seeks to fill the gaps in the above literature by thinking more clearly about how military assistance affects the prospects for state repression. I found my argument on principal-agent theory. The United States, the principal, provides military aid to the recipient government, the agent, and has certain expectations about how the recipient government uses that aid. The principal-agent relationship, however, is imperfect in that the United States has little direct control over its agent, and the agent has a significant information advantage. The principal-agent game generates several expectations about whether the recipient country chooses to “work” or “shirk”. These expectations are based on the extent of U.S. oversight, preference (dis)similarities between the principal and agent, payoff for shirking, and the chances that the recipient will get caught and then punished by the United States for shirking. In this study, I define shirking as repression and punishment as aid sanctions.

U.S. military assistance comes in the form of several different funding programs. I group these into material, education, counternarcotics, and anti-

terrorism/nonproliferation aid. I argue that military aid increases the power of recipient armed forces largely through material resources, which is provided via the Foreign Military Financing Program and Excess Stock Program. This material, arms and equipment, augments the power of the armed forces by providing increased capacity to engage in lethal action and increasing the psychological power by engendered greater “us versus them” feelings against the civilian population. Material aid is also subject to low levels of principal oversight; the United States provides cash for equipment purchases and largely does not control these purchases. On the other hand, the United States oversees education aid and targeting programs (counternarcotics and anti-terrorism/nonproliferation aid) to a greater degree. These programs require interactions with U.S. forces through training and have a smaller material component. Education aid (IMET) also includes human rights training. I thus expect that material aid increases the likelihood of repression in recipient countries while education and targeted programs may decrease human rights abuses.

I continue to use the principal-agent framework and argue that countries are more likely to use material aid to engage in repression when certain underlying incentives to repress exist. The first distinction is based on expectations of being punished by the United States for human rights abuses. I argue that recipient countries are less likely to be punished for abuses that don't “make the news”. Egregious human rights abuses, defined here as one-sided violence by the government, are more likely to be reported in the United States, and the United States faces domestic and international audience costs for providing aid to countries where such actions occur, increasing the likelihood of aid sanctions. I expect that on average, recipients of military aid desire to keep that aid, and

thus I argue that material aid is more likely to increase the likelihood of abuses that fall short of one-sided violence.

Secondly, when the United States provides military assistance out of its own strategic self-interest, the recipient country understands that the United States can't credibly commit to removing foreign aid, and therefore the recipient lowers its expectations of getting punished for shirking on human rights. In several of the anecdotes presented at the beginning of this chapter, the United States provides anti-terror assistance to strategically important countries. I argue that material aid may increase the likelihood of repression in these countries because they do not expect the United States to reduce aid when it sees the recipient as a strategically critical partner.

Thirdly, I argue that some countries have a status quo incentive to repress, and material aid may further enable abuses. In this dissertation, I examine the interactive effect of oil exports and material aid. Countries that receive resource rents may be more likely to engage in repression and witness civil conflict because they do not want to share profits with the population (M. Ross 2001; M. Ross 2004; Smith 2008). In such cases, material aid may enable recipient armed forces to engage in physical integrity abuses. Following the principal-agent framework, I argue that countries see the potential payoff to securing resources through repression as greater than the costs of aid sanctions.

Finally, I argue that when the principal and agent's preferences on the "work" are aligned, the aid recipient is less likely to shirk. In this study, I define preference similarity as regime type. I expect that democratic recipients are less likely to use military assistance for repression while autocratic governments and "partial" regimes are more likely to use aid for repression. These countries do not share the same definition of



human rights as the United States and thus lack the incentive to “work” on human rights policy in the way that the United States desires.

## **1.5 Summary of Findings**

In Chapter Four, I provide the methodological background for the empirical investigation. This study is a cross-sectional time series of 180 country years, from 1991–2011. Chapter Four also introduces the military aid data in detail as well as my dependent variables, government one-sided violence and repression as measured by the Political Terror Scale. I describe my methodological approach and address challenges of reverse causality, timing, and measurement.

Chapter Five discusses the results of the quantitative analysis. In sum, I find that education aid and targeted funding programs reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence. Material aid did not significantly reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence, but material funding increased the likelihood of repression as measured by the Political Terror Scale. I find little evidence that countries receiving material aid out of U.S. strategic goals are associated with repression. When material aid goes to an oil exporter, there is an increased risk of repression. Finally, the effect of military aid conditional on regime type ran parallel to my expectations. When military aid is provided to full democracies (defined as scoring 16–20 on the Polity IV additive scale), repression is less likely. I find little evidence that other regime types have a significant effect on repression. This finding is partly supported by research that suggests that only the highest levels of democracy insulate against human rights, and that certain dimensions of democracy are critical to reaching that threshold (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; De Mesquita et al. 2005). Future research projects will seek to discover the specific dimensions of these

democratic countries that make them more or less likely to utilize material assistance for repression.

These findings point to the need to think clearly about the role that military assistance plays in recipient countries. Under some conditions, it appears that military assistance has an adverse effect and may actually be associated with decreasing human rights standards. In particular, simply providing cash for material purchases is the most harmful for human rights. I argued that this is due to the lack of oversight of material aid; recipient countries can make purchasing decisions largely free from U.S. control, and they can use the equipment in many ways, which the U.S. may or may not know about. Material aid to some countries may be working against other U.S. initiatives, such as economic and democracy assistance.

## **1.6 Plan of the Dissertation**

This dissertation proceeds in five additional chapters. In Chapter Two, I discuss the relevant literature in more detail and show that the research contributes to two bodies of work: foreign aid effectiveness and repression. I argue that I gain theoretical and empirical traction by disaggregating military aid from foreign aid and physical integrity rights from repression writ large. Chapter Three describes my argument and delineates the hypotheses. I begin the chapter by describing why current theoretical approaches to foreign aid effectiveness are insufficient to understand the relationship between military assistance and repression. I then provide a background on principal-agent theory, and discuss the advantages of looking at military assistance through this framework. I offer a simple game tree to describe the strategic relationship between the U.S. principal and foreign agent. The principal-agent framework elucidates several interesting expectations

about when we may expect the agent to shirk versus work. I apply these to the military aid–repression relationship to generate my hypotheses.

Chapter Four reviews the data and methods used to evaluate my hypotheses. In addition to describing the source and coding of the independent and dependent variables, I discuss in detail several methodological challenges in cross-sectional time-series data and how I choose to address them. Chapter Five provides the results of the quantitative analysis. The first half of the chapter discusses the results for one-sided violence and the second half discusses the results for the Political Terror Scale. Each section includes a discussion of the results in terms of statistical and substantive significance.

Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a review of the main findings and discussion of my contribution and implications for future research. An Appendix follows, which includes alternative specifications and robustness checks for the results presented in Chapter Five.

## **Chapter 2. Foreign Aid Effectiveness and Sources of Government Repression**

This dissertation is situated between two distinct literatures, that on the effectiveness of foreign aid and that on sources of government repression. This chapter will review the important lessons from both bodies of work and reveal the gap that I seek to fill. My goal is to contribute to our understanding of foreign aid effectiveness as well as how international actors affect human rights practices by foreign governments.

Examining the literature on foreign aid reveals that the past decade has seen an uptick in studies of effectiveness, and a wide range of outcome variables. Few scholars have examined the effects of foreign aid on repression, but there are several insights to draw from studies of arms transfers, aid and civil conflict, and aid and governance. The clearest lesson is that foreign aid is very context dependent; it matters who gives the aid, what the aid can be used for, and what type of country is getting the aid. Scholars have begun to disaggregate aid to learn more about the conditions under which it is most and least effective. I continue in this vein by utilizing data on military aid, which has traditionally been lumped into overall aid or left out of foreign aid analyses. Examining disaggregated military aid allows me to more fully theorize about the causal mechanisms linking military assistance and government coercion.

The second body of literature reviewed in this chapter addresses major developments in our understanding of physical integrity rights repression. This is another body of work that has seen many advances in recent years. One key finding is that repression begets repression. Another is that repression is more common during periods

of domestic contention and dissent. A number of scholars examine the effects of regime characteristics on repression. Full democracies are, on average, less repressive while full autocracies are more repressive, but it's not clear how partially democratic and autocratic regimes affect repression. In addition, the data on one-sided violence and regime type, the most extreme form of repression, is somewhat surprising. Full democracies are more repressive than partial democracies during periods of civil conflict (Eck and Hultman 2007). Repression has largely been examined from a comparative standpoint, but in recent years, scholars have begun to think about what effect international actors can have on repression. While there are few studies on foreign aid and repression, scholars have studied the role of international treaties, organizations, and laws in improving human rights practices. This chapter will draw out these findings and reveal the contribution that this dissertation makes to our understanding of repression.

I begin this chapter with a review of the limited number of studies that do examine military aid. I then expand my review to foreign aid writ large, which provides some insight into how foreign aid works in recipient countries. In the subsequent sections, I look at notable findings on sources of repression, both from a comparative and international perspective. I conclude with a summary of the contributions that this dissertation will make to the foreign aid and repression literatures.

## **2.1 Military Aid and Arms Transfers**

Relatively little research examines the effects of military aid, and there are no longitudinal studies on the effects of military aid on repression that I am aware of, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Military aid is included in a selection of analysis of the effects of foreign aid writ large, but it is not disaggregated into the eight programs

examined here or theorized about separately from economic assistance. Most previous work on military aid, especially during the Cold War, focused on the allocation of aid rather than its effectiveness (Schoultz 1981; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Poe 1990; Poe et al. 1994; Neumayer 2003; Blanton 2005; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Boutton and Carter 2013). This line of inquiry has become somewhat less vibrant now that the United States provides at least some aid to the vast majority of foreign countries.

This section highlights some recent empirical articles that have started to address the military aid effectiveness gap in the literature as well as lessons learned about military aid during the Cold War. I begin with case studies that do investigate the effects of military assistance on human rights. I then move to the effects of military aid on policy congruence with the United States and a recent trend that looks specifically at counterterror assistance. Finally, I highlight research on the effects of arms transfers, again largely during the Cold War, and discuss why the effects of military assistance may not be identical. Overall, the story paints a rather grim picture of U.S. military assistance and arms sales in their effects on human rights, conflict, and policy convergence. This dissertation discovers that while material aid is associated with an increased likelihood of repression, educated and targeted training programs might have the opposite effect.

Most studies that directly address military aid and human rights come from the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America. Historically, military professionalization programs led by the United States in Latin America during the Cold War have a record for failing to improve human rights, and in some cases, increasing the likelihood that officers would commit human rights abuses. Military professionalization programs led by the United States at the School of the Americas during the Cold War tended to produce officers who

were *more* likely to commit human rights abuses (Schoultz 1981; McCoy 2005). Scholars also find that professionalization programs were less likely to be successful when recipient countries were not economically developed (Fitch 1979). One recent quantitative analysis finds that the number of U.S.-trained officers (largely through the IMET program) is negatively associated with coup attempts (Ruby and Gibler 2010). However, a case study indicates that international military education in practice is difficult to translate into gains for the home countries due to differences in the organizational and bureaucratic structures of the donor and recipient countries (Soeters and Ouytsel 2013). The record of U.S. military aid and human rights during the Cold War is thus rather bleak, but there is evidence that in the past two decades, education programs can have a positive effect on trainees. This dissertation examines education assistance as well as material aid and targeted programs to gain a better understanding of how U.S. military aid in all its forms affects the likelihood of repression.

The effects of military aid may also depend on where troops are located on the ground. One study on Colombia found that because military aid (arms) is distributed to military bases, attacks by Colombian paramilitary forces on civilians in election years increased in areas with bases but not those without (Dube and Naidu 2010). While specific to the conflict in Colombia, this study provides evidence that material aid does increase the likelihood of the use of force by recipient forces, though the effect was limited to politically relevant years.

Another segment of relevant research examines the effectiveness of military assistance at achieving policy congruence with the United States. In the post-Cold War period, the evidence points to the limited effectiveness of aid and policy congruence;

states that receive the most aid are least likely to comply with U.S. policy (Sullivan, Tessman, and Li 2011).<sup>5</sup> The authors also find that the United States appears to increase aid when a recipient country's behavior is less cooperative and that military aid to countries that are part of a defensive alliance with the United States are less likely to be cooperative. I posit a similar argument in Chapter Three: material aid to countries that are strategically important to the United States are more likely to engage in repression because they do not fear punishment in the form of aid sanctions. Military aid also only increases the likelihood of a country voting with the United States in the UN when that country is not a democracy (Lai and Morey 2006). These studies made important contributions to our understanding of military assistance, and provide reason to be cautious on the effectiveness of military assistance in generating policy congruence.

A third body of literature on military assistance that informs this dissertation is that on the effectiveness of counterterrorism aid. Counterterrorism aid has come into the limelight following the 9/11 attacks; the amount of military aid allocated to counterterrorism programs has increased, and the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism programs from the 1990s has been called into question. Empirically, terrorist activity in a state that threatens the United States is a good predictor of allocation of counterterror aid (Boutton and Carter 2013). However, using a formal model, Bapat (2011) argues that counterterror aid creates a moral hazard problem: host states only receive the aid if they have terrorists, creating an incentive to do enough to show progress but not enough to lose the aid. There is limited empirical work on the effectiveness of post-9/11

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<sup>5</sup> The dependent variable in this study is event data on policy cooperation on a wide range of issues with the United States.



counterterror aid, although formal models indicate that aid tied specifically to counterterrorism will be the most effective, but may be linked to overall regime instability (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011). This literature on the effects of counterterror aid is only likely to grow in coming years as more data becomes available. I include available data on counterterror aid through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) in the empirical analysis in this dissertation. In Chapter Three, I argue that under certain conditions, military aid may be linked to regime instability, in the form of repression, due to the incentives facing both the donor and recipient state.

A number of studies also look at the effectiveness of arms exports/imports rather than military aid during and after the Cold War. Arms exports include foreign sales and direct commercial sales. In the following chapter, I argue that it is necessary to examine military aid apart from sales because aid is a form of “payment” for services rendered, whereas arms sales decisions are made largely by the purchasing government. Countries that can afford to purchase equipment may also look quite different from those that receive U.S. military aid. In Chapter Four, descriptive statistics on Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales reveal that this intuition is correct. I do include models with Foreign Military Sales in my empirical results in Chapter Five, and the results differ from that of military aid.

The most relevant previous research reveals that arms imports during the Cold War were associated with a greater likelihood of human rights abuses in developing countries (Blanton 1999). Arms transfers were also related to an increased incidence of coups during the Cold War (Maniruzzaman 1992; Rowe 1974), indicating that

empowering the military through augmented arms may shift internal government power dynamics and provide the military with the capacity to seek additional influence. In addition, the literature indicates that arms transfers can positively affect the chances for armed conflict (Craft and Smaldone 2002; Krause 2004). There is also evidence that exports from the United States and Soviet Union led to recipient countries enacting more aggressive foreign policies toward neighboring states (Kinsella 1994; Kinsella and Tillema 1995) and to destabilizing effects on regional rivalries (Sanjian 1999). Finally, scholars evaluated the ability of arms exports to influence recipient policy, and they find that policy convergence with the United States was more likely when the United States promised rewards, focused on foreign policy, and when a civilian led the recipient regime (Sislin 1994).

These studies on arms transfers provide insight into what foreign militaries and governments may do with increased arms, but there is reason to believe that arms imports and military aid have different effects in recipient countries. Arms imports are largely the strategic choice of the ruling government, while military aid is plausibly given more out of the strategic interest of the donor government. Additionally, aid comes in the form of education and targeted programming as well as equipment, while Foreign Military Sales take the latter form. The theory and results presented in this dissertation, however, build on these studies. By adding military aid to the equation, we enhance our understanding of how international actors can affect the prospects for violence in foreign countries.

Overall, the extant literature on military aid is relatively minimal, but the available evidence points to a negative effect on human rights. Research on professionalization education programs during and after the Cold War reveals that the

effectiveness of such programs is context dependent. Quantitative research also indicates that recipient states do not adhere to policy congruence with the United States as a result of aid. In addition, previous research indicates that arms exports may increase the likelihood of human rights abuses and conflict. I argue, however, that we may not expect the same results on the effects of military aid, and that thinking about the aid relationship from a principal-agent perspective provides unique insights. This dissertation seeks to evaluate empirically the effect of U.S. military assistance on human rights in the post-Cold War period. In addition, I bring in a novel theoretical approach, principal-agent theory, which allows me to think through the costs and benefits for both the donor and recipient country of using military aid for difference purposes. Previous literature on military aid largely lacks a clear theoretical framework that allows for incentives facing both countries.

While the literature on military aid is limited, scholarly analysis of foreign aid writ large is far more robust. The following section delves into the foreign aid literature with a focus on how foreign aid affects human rights and civil violence.

## **2.2 Foreign Aid**

The literature on foreign aid is far more extensive than that on exclusively military aid, but the findings are not conclusive. Rather, the evidence thus far suggests that the effects of foreign aid depend on a wide range of factors including the time frame, conditionality of aid, regime type, and measurement of dependent variables. Again, there is not a cohesive body of work that looks at repression as the key dependent variable. As Hafner-Burton writes (2014):

A coherent message has not yet emerged on the precise effects of foreign aid or its conditionality on human rights. That may reflect the fact that most research has

explored the effects of aid on development or, more broadly, good governance.... There simply is not enough published research to adjudicate between these views, and the lessons that emerge from the small number of studies that exist are not easily comparable because they are drawn from different time periods, actors, and rights.

This dissertation thus seeks to fill a gap in the aid literature on the effects of foreign aid on human rights. However, I argue that more is gained as a starting point from theoretically and empirically disaggregating military aid from foreign aid and examining physical integrity abuses. Future research will need to carefully parse out the interactive effects of economic and military aid as well as how aid affects movement between different forms and degrees of repression. The following section reviews the extant literature on foreign aid and highlights the key points that help educate this dissertation, beginning with the limited research on human rights and moving toward key findings on foreign aid's effects on conflict and governance.

### **2.2.1 Foreign Aid and Human Rights**

Researchers began investigating a relationship between economic aid and human rights toward the end of the Cold War (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Poe 1990). Regan (1995) found that increases in U.S. economic aid during the 1980s had no impact on changes in recipient human rights practices. Future work uncovered more nuanced findings. Recent studies examining the effects of foreign aid on repression have built on selectorate models of political survival, which argue that foreign aid increases citizen's incentives to overthrow autocratic leaders (Smith 2008; de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Indeed, scholars find that autocratic governments that receive foreign aid need to restrict civil liberties, which requires them to invest more heavily in

repressive capacity (Kono and Montinola 2012; Kono, Montinola, and Verbon 2013).<sup>6</sup> European foreign aid appears to have a positive association with some human rights, bolstering the right to domestic movement, workers' rights, and freedom of religion (Carnegie, Aronow, and Marinov 2012).

Another recent vein of work examines how repression affects the promise of future aid from the United States. There is evidence that donors are selective about how they sanction repression in aid-receiving countries, and aid sanctions are more likely to occur when repressive states aren't closely connected to the donor, when violations have negative consequences for the donor, or when the repression is publicized (Nielsen 2013; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). These findings play into my theory; I argue that whether recipient states can expect to be sanctioned for repression affects the likelihood that they engage in coercion.<sup>7</sup>

These studies have made some headway in understanding how foreign aid affects repression, but clearly additional research is needed. I argue that examining military aid and thinking theoretically about the incentives that military aid creates for recipient governments will make strides toward filling this gap in the literature. Looking at the diversity of programs that compose U.S. foreign aid—such as democracy promotion, economic growth, judicial reform, and security assistance—reveals that the effects of these programs in the aggregate may be difficult to determine. Indeed, military aid in some countries may be undermining the efforts of democratization funding programs. I

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<sup>6</sup> Repressive capacity is measured by government military spending.

<sup>7</sup> I discuss empirical problems surrounding reverse causality in Chapter Four, and include results of a reverse causality model in the Appendix.

pull out military aid from foreign aid to gain insight into the role that this important component of aid plays in recipient countries.

### **2.2.2 Foreign Aid and Civil Conflict**

Although the research on foreign and human rights is limited, there is more work examining the relationship between foreign aid and civil conflict. An early argument was that aid increases the government's access to resources, which may induce rent-seeking behavior in rebel groups (Grossman 1992). In contrast, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that aid would be difficult for rebel groups to capture, and they find that neither aid nor policy change directly affect conflict, but may indirectly reduce conflict by improving incomes. Subsequently, Collier and Hoeffler (2007) proposed the theory that aid might lead to regional arms races when recipient's use aid to augment military expenditures. Recent empirical evidence reveals that aid flows across regime types are negatively associated with civil conflict duration in sub-Saharan Africa (but not conflict onset) (De Ree and Nillesen 2009).

A divergent theory proposes that aid affects conflict through aid shocks—severe decreases in aid revenues—which shifts the balance of power in recipient countries and fuels violence as rebels gain some bargaining power against the government. The empirical results reveal that aid shocks do increase the probability of conflict onset (Nielsen et al. 2011).

Recent research finds that democracy aid during the potentially volatile democratization process reduces the risk of civil conflict (Savun and Tirone 2011). Aid also appears to foster development following civil conflict when the aid recipient lacks natural resources and when the country is not receiving aid in support of the donor's

strategic goals (Girod 2012). In addition, a combination of military and economic aid during conflict increases economic growth, but significantly decreases growth after conflict (Creasey, Rahman, and Smith 2012). This study points to the need to more fully examine the specific effects of military aid.

These findings on aid and conflict provide valuable insight for this dissertation. Based on the available evidence, aid appears to have an effect on civil violence in recipient countries because it shifts power toward the government when aid is flowing, and toward the rebels when aid flows fall. In this dissertation, I build on the power theory and argue that material military aid augments the power of recipient armed forces. Unlike foreign aid, however, military aid comes directly in the form of potentially lethal equipment.<sup>8</sup> Under certain conditions, I expect that material aid will affect government use of repression.

Another line of inquiry examines foreign aid and the specific tactic of terror. Foreign aid reduces terrorism when targeted toward sectors, such as education, health, civil society, and conflict prevention (Young and Findley 2011; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011). Scholars also find that official development assistance reduces the likelihood of terror attacks from recipient countries while U.S. military interventions increase that likelihood (Azam and Thelen 2008; Azam and Thelen 2010). I argue that examining military aid apart from economic aid through the lens of principal-agent theory helps expand our knowledge of how foreign aid works in recipient countries, as most countries receive both economic and military assistance.

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<sup>8</sup> As shown by Collier and Hoeffler (2007), recipient governments may use economic foreign aid to build their armed forces as well, yet it is not often clear how much of foreign aid is transferred to military expenditures.

A related research trajectory investigates how military assistance influences rebel groups. This is particularly interesting, in part, because the research on military aid to government forces is not as well founded. The leading scholars utilize a similar argument as this dissertation: foreign governments “contract” with rebel groups to fight proxy wars against enemy government forces. The arms and funding that third parties provide to the rebels increase their resources and alter the dynamics of the conflict. In addition, scholars find that the nature of the third party sponsor—how much they care about human rights—affects whether or not rebels attack civilians. The logic posited here is that with outside support secure, rebels do not need to solicit support from the civilian population and may be more willing to attack the population. Overall, foreign support increases the likelihood of attacks against civilians, while third party support from democracies decreases attacks (Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014).

This dissertation follows a similar logic; I argue that similarity in human rights preferences between the United States and the recipient is an important interactive variable. In other words, the regime type of the recipient country matters just as much as the donor country. Despite the differences, comparing the effects on civilians of foreign support for rebel groups versus the government is an interesting exercise. I find that material military support from the United States to another democracy decreases the likelihood of human rights abuses.

The extant literature on the effects of foreign aid on conflict suggests that the relationship is dependent on several factors, including the timing of aid, the strategic



interests of the donor, and the funding program. These findings all provide important insights for this project.

### **2.2.3 Foreign Aid and Governance**

The findings on foreign aid and governance are also somewhat contradictory. Most studies find that foreign aid seems to have either a negative or null effect on quality of democratic governance and democracy (Knack 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Busse and Gröning 2009; Bosin 2012). However, other authors find that aid does effectively promote democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007) and reduce corruption (Tavares 2003; Okada and Samreth 2012). In addition, democracy aid that is tied to progress only works when the authoritarian leader has an incentive to democratize, that is, if he expects to get elected when reforms take place (Wright 2009). These studies largely measure democracy in the aggregate, using scales such as Polity IV, which is used in this study. It is clear that the effects of foreign aid on governance depend on the countries, time period, methods, and measures of variables. A concise causal story has not emerged from the research, and I argue that further disaggregation of the aid and outcome variables will help to clarify our understanding of how foreign aid works in recipient countries.

The research on foreign aid and economic growth are similarly inconclusive. Recent studies suggest that aid does seem to promote growth over a long time horizon, up to ten years (Minoiu and Reddy 2010; Clemens et al. 2012) or when the strategic benefits of providing aid are small for the donor government (Bearce and Tirone 2010).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The authors measure large strategic benefits as aid supplied during the Cold War. I argue that the United States also supplies military aid in the post-Cold War period for strategic purposes, particularly as part of the War on Terror.

By looking exclusively at military aid, I hope to gain better traction in interpreting how one type of aid affects the decision-making calculus of the recipient government. Future research will need to draw out the interactive effects of military and economic aid. Military aid directly impacts the armed forces, but aid tied to democracy or economic development affects other government institutions. The complete aid picture may thus be quite difficult to generalize across countries. In this study, my goal is to think more clearly theoretically about the strategic choices facing donors and recipients in the military aid process. The empirical results reveal again that there is not a one-size-fits-all model for how foreign aid works; rather, this dissertation enhances our understanding of one piece of the foreign aid puzzle and tells us how military aid works in the aggregate. In the following section, I discuss the literature surrounding the dependent variable in this study, physical integrity rights.

### **2.3 Human Rights Research**

Scholars have long sought to understand why governments repress, how often they engage in repression, and what drives the magnitude and scope of repressive actions. The comparative literature on human rights traditionally follows a choice theoretic-based model in which leaders engage in repression based on a calculus involving the benefits, costs, probability of success, and feasible alternatives (Lichbach 1987; Moore 2000; Davenport 2007b; Pierskalla 2010). These studies yielded important insights about how leaders, institutions, and dissent affect the likelihood and strength of repression.

More recently, scholars have begun to investigate international effects on human rights, such as globalization, trade dependence, and international agreements. This dissertation adds to this literature by introducing military aid as a key explanatory

variable in the repression equation. Below, I review insights from the comparative and international relations literatures on the causes of physical integrity rights repression.<sup>10</sup>

There are three key findings from the comparative literature on repression that illuminate this dissertation.

### **2.3.1 Repression and Dissent**

Firstly, dissent increases the likelihood of repression. Dissident activity such as protests, riots, strikes, guerilla insurgency, terrorism, and civil war all have a positive relationship with repression (Hibbs 1973; Shin 1983; Davis and Ward 1990; Ziegenhagen 1986; Poe et al. 1994; Davenport 1995a; Davenport 1995b; Davenport 1996; Davenport 1996; Gartner and Regan 1996; Franklin 1997; Krain 1997; Goldhagen 1997; J. C. King 1998; Moore 1998; Davenport 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2000; Apodaca 2001; Regan and Henderson 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Davenport 2007a; Cohen and Green 2012). Weak and failing states are also associated with human rights abuses (Englehart 2009). This line of research argues that threats to the state's legitimacy provide incentive for the government to engage in repression to maintain the status quo. The greater the perceived threat, the more likely it is that governments will respond with more severe forms of repression. In addition, governments estimate that more organized dissent requires a higher-level response (Davenport 2000). Studies in this line of research

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<sup>10</sup> I choose to focus exclusively on physical integrity rights repression in this study. I believe that military aid augments the power of the security forces, but not necessarily other areas of government, and may increase the likelihood that the armed forces utilize military aid to repress the civilian population. The security forces have control over the use of force, but not other types of repression such as limiting freedom of speech, restricting fair trials, or rigging elections. In other words, I disaggregate my explanatory and dependent variables to more clearly understand the causal process. I recognize, however, that physical integrity repression is only one coercive tactic available to governments and may occur alongside or in place of other forms of repression.

focus on the dissent side of the equation and provide clear evidence that greater threats to the state increase the likelihood of repression. In this study, I shift the focus away from the internal incentives for repression and think about how increasing the resources of the security forces alters their incentives to repress. To account for the lessons learned from the above literature, I control for internal conflict, and conduct analysis limited to country years in which conflict is present.

There is also a significant thread of research on targeting civilians during war and civil conflict, which is relevant for this study as I test the effect of military aid on one-sided violence. For example, scholars find that international law—whether or not a country signs The Hague or Geneva Conventions—does not affect the likelihood of a state targeting civilians during civil conflict. Rather, strategic incentives to winning a war trump the reputational costs of committing human rights abuses, and states are more likely to target civilians during wars in which civilians play a large role (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006). In fact, there is evidence that democracies may be more likely to target civilians in wars of attrition to reduce costs (Downes 2008). Another argument posits that attacks on civilians are the result of territorial control and information: if an actor doesn't control the territory, he doesn't have information about who to selectively target, increasing the likelihood of indiscriminate targeting of civilians (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009). This research centers on civilian targeting during conflict, and I do include models of military aid during solely conflict years. I build off of this line of inquiry by asking how military aid affects the likelihood of civilian targeting. The above literature also reveals that in some cases, democracies might be willing to target civilians. In Chapter Five, I find that democracies

that receive material military assistance are less likely to engage in repression, suggesting that democracies may weigh the costs of repression as more than the costs of continued conflict.

### **2.3.2 Repression Begets Repression**

A second critical finding is that past repression is almost universally associated with ongoing and future repression (Walter 1969; Dallin 1970; Hoefnagels and De Swann 1977; Davis and Ward 1990; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995b; Davenport 1995a; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). The logic here is that prior repression decreases the uncertainty about the effects of repression, and the government is likely to continue using repression if they find it effective. This is an important finding to take into account when examining the effects of military aid on repression, and I control for prior repression in the models presented in Chapter Five of this study. In addition, I use error correction models in my examination of the Political Terror Scale, which allows me to evaluate the effect of military aid on a change in the PTS.

There is also some evidence that the military by nature is prone to repression. One study asks whether military influence increases the likelihood of repression and is only tempered by the military's resources and political institutions. The evidence reveals that increasing the military's resources relative to the rest of government does increase the likelihood of repression, and political institutions do not temper the effect (Davenport 1995a).<sup>11</sup> I build off of this research by asking whether increasing the resources of the armed forces through military aid also increases the risk of repression.

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<sup>11</sup> The study did not include physical integrity rights as part of the dependent variable; rather it examines censorship and political restrictions.

### **2.3.3 Repression and Regime Type**

Finally, there are important insights from the literature on repression and regime type. Scholars have largely found evidence supporting a “domestic democratic peace”. Repression occurs less frequently in full democracies and more frequently in full autocracies (Poe et al. 1994; Davenport 1996; Zanger 2000; Harff 2003; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). The logic is that democracies enshrine peaceful resolution of disputes and contain institutional elements that allow for conflict resolution.

The domestic democratic peace effect, however, is not verified at all levels of democracy. Scholars have found that there may be a “threshold effect” in terms of the degree of democracy necessary to reduce repression, and that executive constraints might be a critical dimension that improves the prospects for human rights (De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007a). In addition, scholars find that the democratization process can be harmful to human rights in the short run (Regan and Henderson 2002). Regarding autocratic regimes, while autocracies are more likely to repress, they also do not all repress equally; dictators tend to be the most repressive while single-party systems are the least (Davenport 2007c; Davenport 2007a). Other research suggests that civilian autocratic regimes face higher audience costs than military juntas or strongmen, suggesting that these leadership styles might be more prone to repression (Weeks 2012)

When it comes to government sponsored one-sided violence against civilians, the most extreme form of repression and one of the dependent variables examined in this study, Eck and Hultman (2007) find that during civil conflict, “there are higher levels of one-sided violence in more autocratic and democratic countries, while semi-democracies experience the lowest levels of one-sided violence”, and “conflict actors in autocracies

are comparatively more violent than those in democracies.” This runs contrary to previous research that found that large-scale violence against civilians was more likely to occur in semi-democracies (Fein 1995) and that civil conflict is more likely in semi-democracies (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

These findings indicate that partial autocracies and democracies may be more likely to engage in low to medium levels of repression on a regular basis, while full democracies and autocracies are more inclined to respect physical integrity rights the majority of the time, but are more likely to rationalize extreme violence against a minority. This difference may be due to the fact that, on average, full autocracies and democracies have more consolidated power and stronger state reach. Democracies might also have an incentive to end the conflict quickly to reduce costs.

This dissertation contributes to the above research on domestic uses of repression by underscoring the role of international actors in affecting repression. Military aid provides a significant source of funding and material for recipient security forces, which may alter the status quo likelihood of repression. I build off of the evidence that augmenting the military’s resources increases the likelihood of repression under certain conditions. One such condition is the recipient’s regime type, and the theory presented in Chapter Three describes the expected interactive effect between regime type and military aid. Additional research will certainly be needed to more fully understand how foreign aid affects repression, but my goal in this dissertation is to begin this important discussion. In today’s globalized world, few state actions exist that are not affected in some way by outside forces. In the final section of this survey, I briefly highlight recent research that examines other international influences on state repression.

## 2.4 International Influences on State Repression

Recently, scholars have studied a range of international influences on human rights, with varying findings on effectiveness. This increased interest in how outside forces shape internal decision-making represents the reality of an interconnected world. This line of inquiry on human rights is relatively new, and additional research and data will continue to add to the discussion. The research has not produced findings that support resounding success of international efforts to reduce human rights. In sum,

The second generation of statistical cross-national research began focusing in the late 1990s on the effects of international human rights policies. Cumulatively, it suggests that more human rights policies and pressures do not reduce violations in and of themselves. Indeed, it seems that they can only affect state behavior indirectly and in conjunction with many other conditions. Different states also respond to human rights pressures in different ways, and it is often the case that more international pressure leads to contradictory policy reactions (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009).

Firstly, there is no consensus on whether military interventions improve human rights, but it is clear that impartiality of the intervention is crucial (Kathman and Wood 2011; Wood, Kathman, and Gent 2012). This finding plays into the theory presented in the following chapter, where I argue that the strategic incentive behind the U.S. decision to provide military aid is critical to understanding its effect on human rights. The authors also argue that shifts in violence against combatants and civilians in civil conflict is the result of the shifting resources gained from international intervention. Similarly, I argue that military aid may increase repression because it increases the resources available to the government forces. It should be noted, however, that I exclude cases in which the United States was an “occupying” force or served in a peacekeeping role. Comparing the results, however, will be a fruitful exercise.



Another strand of research examines the effects of international law on human rights. International agreements and foreign direct investment have a positive effect on human rights under certain conditions. For example, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that tie material benefits to compliance with human rights principles reduce repression while PTAs not tied to market benefits and state commitments to human rights agreements do not reduce repression (Apodaca 2001; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; Hafner-Burton 2005). This finding matches closely with the findings on foreign aid discussed earlier in this chapter, which indicate that aid conditional on improvements in human rights is most effective at achieving a positive result. The effect of international law on human rights is also still open to discussion, and there is some evidence that human rights treaties and World Bank Structural Adjustment Agreements do little to reform repressive states (Keith 1999; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007).

The U.S. military aid examined in this study is not explicitly tied to human rights, although the United States does reserve the right to cease or reduce aid should such violations occur.<sup>12</sup> While the above international efforts are directly aimed at reducing human rights abuses, it is only one of several stated goals of U.S. military assistance. In fact, as I argue in the proceeding chapter, U.S. military assistance may, in some countries,

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<sup>12</sup> The “Leahy Laws” of 1998 and 1999 amended U.S. law and prohibited the United States from providing security assistance through the Department of State and Department of Defense to foreign security forces if there was “credible” evidence of gross human rights violations. Interestingly, the original amendment to the DoD funding pertains only to actual training of foreign security forces and does not restrict the flow of materials or cash transfers, which compose the majority of U.S. military aid. In January 2014, a provision was added that extended the prohibition from just training to equipping and “other” assistance “for the members of a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights” (Serafino et al. 2014). This provision occurred after the scope of this study.

undermine the above agreements and treaties. International actors, organizations, and laws have unique and sometimes contradictory effects on human rights. Rather than searching for a universal effect, this dissertation continues along the vein of the above studies by looking at a specific type of international influence, military aid. I contribute to the discussion on repression by asking if international military equipment, cash for purchases, training, and education alter the status quo likelihood of repression in recipient states. Material military aid increases the resources available to the government, which has the very real possibility of increasing their use of force in society. As I discuss in the following chapter, however, recipient states have an incentive to retain military aid in the future, and my argument centers around a decision calculus of the costs and benefits to practicing “good” human rights versus achieving goals through the use of repression. By examining how military aid affects repression, I begin to fill a gap in the literature on the international influences on repression and begin a more cohesive discussion on the effect of foreign aid on repression.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter reviewed two distinct bodies of literature that this dissertation seeks to unite, foreign aid effectiveness and human rights. In the first section, I reveal that there is relatively little academic literature on the effects of military assistance. Research was more robust during the Cold War, but much of the empirical work focused on arms sales rather than aid. The research that does exist indicates that using military aid to influence policy convergence is not always a successful enterprise for the donor country, and arms imports may increase the risk of human rights abuses.

While the literature on military aid exclusively is limited, scholars have produced a wide range of works on the effectiveness of foreign aid writ large, examining outcomes such as economic growth, civil conflict, and democracy. The findings on the effects of foreign aid are somewhat inconclusive, and it is clear that a variety of factors, such as time, the form of aid, regime characteristics, and measurement of the dependent variable, are important in explaining different outcomes. A gap exists in the foreign aid literature, however, on the effect of aid on human rights and state repression. This may be, in part, because variables such as development and democracy are more logical and direct outcomes of foreign aid. In addition, the repression literature itself has largely focused on internal dynamics of the state, and scholars have only recently begun to theorize about international influences on repression. To gain a more nuanced understanding why and how foreign aid works in recipient countries, I believe that further disaggregation of both the independent and dependent variables is necessary. I argue that by disaggregating military assistance from foreign aid, we gain more leverage in understanding the causal processes at work. Economic aid augments GDP, and recipient countries have traditionally used aid to grow institutions (including the military), pay off debt, and spur growth. U.S. military aid, however, is somewhat unique in that it largely takes the form of equipment or cash for material purchases from the United States. This aid directly affects the armed forces, and the extant literature has not fully theorized about the effects of military assistance or investigated them empirically.

In the second portion of this review, I discussed the second body of literature to which this dissertation contributes, human rights and state repression. For much of the past 40 years, the repression literature focused on internal state dynamics affecting the

likelihood of state coercion. Scholars followed a choice-theoretic model to explain repression, in which leaders calculated the expected costs and benefits to their actions. I discussed three key avenues of research on the likelihood of repression. First, dissent and civil violence increases the likelihood of state repression. Second, previous repression increases the likelihood that the state will use coercion again. Finally, full democracies are, on average, less likely to engage in repression. In the second section, I highlighted recent studies on international influences on human rights, such as international law and treaties.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on human rights by examining a previously understudied international influence, military aid. Military aid provides equipment, training, and education to recipient armed forces, and a stated goal of the United States in providing that assistance is *improving* human rights. This statement, however, has not been fully tested empirically. Moreover, I argue that under certain conditions, military assistance may actually have the opposite effect and increase the likelihood of state repression.

Through this project, I draw attention to military aid as a critical portion of foreign aid that should be examined independently. By thinking about military aid and its causal effects, we may gain a better understanding of some of the inconsistent findings on the effectiveness of aid. Furthermore, this research contributes to the literature on repression by continuing in the vein of recent scholarship and focusing on international influences on state repression and human rights. While conflict research has long understood that shifting resources affect the dynamics of conflict and bargaining, it has not fully examined how influxes of resources affects state repression. By examining

several different military aid programs, including material aid, targeted programs, and education, I gain leverage in evaluating military aid's effect on state repression.

In the following chapter, I build off of this literature review and delve into the theoretical foundation of my analysis. I argue that the military aid–repression relationship is best understood by using a principal-agent framework. I first provide the conceptual background to the principal-agent relationship. I then use this theoretical construct to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which I expect military aid to affect repression.

## **Chapter 3: Military Aid as a Principal-Agent Relationship**

This chapter provides my argument for understanding how military aid affects repression in recipient states. Since there has been little direct work on foreign aid and repression, I provide a baseline for understanding the effects of military aid, which I ground in principal-agent theory. The following pages will discuss why principal-agent theory provides a strong theoretical backdrop for military aid and detail this logic in a simple game tree. The applied principal-agent theory generates a number of questions about the conditions under which military aid affects human rights. In the subsequent section, I use the principal-agent theory to derive hypotheses that detail my expectations about the testable conditions under which I expect military aid to positively or negatively affect repression. The chapter begins with a review of the current theoretical underpinnings of foreign aid effectiveness, and reveals why looking at military aid through the lens of principal-agent theory provides a more satisfactory explanation of the relationship between military aid and its effects in recipient countries.

### **3.1 Present Explanations of Foreign Aid Effectiveness**

As I discussed in the previous chapter, there is a gap in the literature on the effects of foreign aid on human rights. This dissertation seeks to begin to fill that gap by disaggregating military aid from foreign aid and thinking more directly about how military aid affects the recipient armed forces. In this section, I briefly review three of the contemporary and predominant theories on aid effectiveness—donor goals, recipient regime characteristics, and shifting resources—and explain how they have advanced our

understanding of aid effectiveness but are ultimately insufficient to tackle to the question of how military aid affects repression.

Firstly, a subset of aid studies, particularly those examining the Cold War period, focuses on the goals of the donor state in seeking to influence the recipient's policy (e.g., Sislin 1994; Sullivan, Tessman, and Li 2011). The dependent variable in these studies is policy convergence, and the theory draws on why the donor country—usually the United States—is providing the money, rather than conditions in the recipient country. The larger country can influence the smaller country to act in a certain way on foreign policy issues by providing aid that the recipient needs to develop. Understanding why the donor provides the amount of aid that it does is crucial for assessing the ultimately effectiveness in the recipient nation. I incorporate donor foreign policy goals as one of my key hypotheses, but I argue that by itself, the theory is insufficient to explain how aid affects human rights abuses. To understand how aid affects repression, we need to consider the conditions and goals of the recipient country.

Secondly, a well-developed portion of the foreign aid literature utilizes regime characteristics of the recipient country to examine how foreign aid affects development, policy convergence, and conflict. In contrast to the donor goals arguments, these studies focus on how different regimes make use of aid. Foreign aid writ large has traditionally been distributed to foreign governments as “free money”, although conditionality of foreign aid is becoming more common. Scholars have used selectorate theory to argue that autocratic governments are more likely to use foreign aid to channel money to their smaller group of supporters than democratic governments, while repressing popular demands. The argument is best summarized as follows (Kono and Montinola 2012):

Because foreign aid increases government revenue, it also boosts societal demands for a revenue share. Different governments respond to these demands in different ways. Autocratic governments maintain power by channeling resources to a small group of supporters while repressing popular demands. Because repression requires costly coercive forces, this strategy requires autocrats to spend foreign aid on the military. In contrast, democratic governments stay in power by accommodating popular demands. This requires them to spend aid, not on the military, but on programs that benefit mass publics.

In addition, scholars in this theoretical track argue that a leader's time horizon affects how they utilize aid; the longer the leader's time horizon, the greater their incentive to invest in public goods, and thus the effectiveness of aid on development increases (Wright 2008). Similarly, conditional democracy aid is more effective when a leader has a large coalition and can thus expect to win a free and fair election (Wright 2009). The nature of the recipient regime is an important component of understanding the effectiveness of foreign aid, but a theory that centers solely on the nature of the recipient forgoes the important insights gained from examining the policy incentives of the donor government.

Finally, the literature studying how aid affects civil conflict tends to focus on a shifting resources argument: foreign aid increases the resources of the government, which may induce rent-seeking behavior in rebels (Grossman 1992), deter rebels from fighting the empowered government (Collier and Hoeffler 2002), or encourage regional arms races (Collier and Hoeffler 2007; De Ree and Nillesen 2009). Shocks in aid resources can also empower the rebels in bargaining with the government (Nielsen et al. 2011). Thinking about foreign aid as increasing the resources of the government helps gain more traction in understanding the bargaining between the government and rebels groups and how it affects the ebb and flow of civil conflict. It is also a central part of the principal-agent theory of military aid effectiveness that I detail below. Again, however, the



resource argument tends to negate the donor policy goals and the nature of recipient country regime arguments that clearly also augment our understanding of how aid works. I argue that principal-agent theory allows me to incorporate the most important aspects of the above perspectives, and it offers the best theoretical explanation for examining the effects of military assistance.

In providing military assistance to countries in varying types and amounts, the United States is clearly making a strategic decision to support and build recipient armed forces. No two countries receive the same amount of military aid, so the strategic calculus behind the U.S. decision is an important factor to consider. It is also crucial to think about the internal characteristics of recipient countries. Countries with a tradition of repression will surely be more likely to continue in that vein. Coalition size may also impact how military aid gets used; does a leader need to secure his hold on power, or does he need to ensure the support of many? Military aid also increases the resources of the government, but in a unique way relative to economic aid. Military assistance increases the potential lethality of the armed forces by providing advanced equipment and training. It also provides education for young officers. It is thus important to think about how increasing the military's resources affects their use of force.

### **3.2 A Principal-Agent Theory of Military Aid**

Principal-agent theory allows me to combine all three of the above theoretical perspectives. The United States, the principal, “contracts” with the recipient country’s armed forces, the agent, to provide security in that country in a way acceptable to the United States. The “payment” for these services is military assistance. The United States makes a strategic decision to provide military aid; the recipient country receives that aid

and now has augmented resources; and the internal characteristics of the recipient affect how the aid is used. The following section provides the details of a principal-agent theory of military aid.

### **3.2.1 The Utility of Principal-Agent Theory**

Principal-agent theory was originally developed by economists to analyze problems of agency, in which the principal delegates authority to the agent to act on her behalf (S. A. Ross 1973). International Relations scholars have recently used principal-agent theory to understand the relationship between a constituency and executive in the decision to support an executive's choice to go to war (Downs and Rocke 1994), the relationship between civilians and the military in democratic societies (Feaver 2009), foreign funding of rebel groups and civilian abuse (Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014), delegation of fighting to rebel groups (Salehyan 2010), state-sponsored terrorism (Byman and Kreps 2010), and the organizations of rebel groups and violence during civil conflict (S. Gates 2002; Mitchell 2009).

Generally, scholars examine the problems associated with principal-agent theory rather than the successes. The concept of delegation is central to principal-agent theory.

Delegation...entails side effects that are known, in the parlance of economic theory, as agency losses. There is almost always some conflict between the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) and agents to whom they delegate it. Agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject only to the constraints imposed by their relationship with the principal (Kiewiet 1991).

In the principal's ideal world, the agent acts on behalf of the principal, making the same decisions and producing the same outcomes that the principal prefers. This ideal world, however, rarely exists.

There are two primary principal-agent problems that scholars discuss, the adverse selection problem and the moral hazard problem. The adverse selection problem occurs when the principal doesn't know the true preferences and capabilities of the agent upon the initial "hiring" decision (Feaver 2009; Rauchhaus 2009). For example, an employee at an interview claims to be the hardest worker, but the employer does not know if this statement is true until after the employment decision is made.

Moral hazard refers to a problem after the principal-agent contract has started. At its base, moral hazard is an information problem: the agent has more information about what risks she is taking than the principal. The classic example used to describe moral hazard is car insurance. An individual with car insurance may be more likely to engage in risk because she knows that her insurance will cover the costs should an accident occur. In essence, protection against risk promotes risk taking (Rauchhaus 2009).

The adverse selection problem and the moral hazard problem both occur in part because they are difficult for the principal to overcome. In the adverse selection problem, there are few ways for the principal to know prior to the contract how "good" an agent will be without previous information about her. In some cases, it may be possible to overcome the moral hazard problem through extensive principal oversight of the agent and punishment/praise for bad/good behavior. Both of these actions, however, are costly to the principal. In the following section, I describe the military aid relationship using principal-agent theory.

### **3.2.2 Military Aid through a Principal-Agent Lens**

Principal-agent theory, and the "problems" associated with contracts, is a beneficial framework for examining the effectiveness of U.S. military aid. In this case,

the United States, the principal, supplies military aid in various forms to recipient countries around the world, the agents. The United States wishes to protect its and its allies' interests around the world. If it were a viable option, the United States might prefer to deploy its own military to put out fires and protect its strategic interests in other countries. Forward deployment of U.S. forces to some 200 countries is unsuitable for both the United States—the costs would be enormous—and for the sovereignty of foreign nations. In some cases, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan, the United States does decide to deploy its own forces to counter instability and, in theory, protect U.S. interests. When deployment of U.S. troops is not an option, however, the United States instead chooses to delegate the role of securing its interests abroad to foreign militaries.

Delegation represents several advantages to both the principal and agent. For the United States, the costs should be lower than deploying its own troops. In addition, the United States benefits from the concept of “plausible deniability”; without its own troops under its direct control, the United States can more easily deny that it had a role in an action that runs counter to U.S. preferences (Byman and Kreps 2010). The recipient benefits from an influx in equipment and training, which it otherwise may not be able to afford. It may also benefit from a closer relationship with the United States and international community on a range of other policy issues.

The United States provides military aid to recipient armed forces with the expectation, albeit largely informal, that foreign militaries will act in accordance with U.S. military interests. As the local agent, the aid-receiving military has a significant information advantage. The recipient military knows how closely its preferences align with the United States as well as all the military actions it undertakes—known or

unknown to the United States. In the terms of principal-agent theory, the recipient military knows exactly how much it is “working” versus “shirking”. The shirking action that I examine in this dissertation is human rights abuses.<sup>13</sup> The reverse, improvement in human rights, is therefore “working.”

The principal, the United States, wants to avoid shirking, which can be embarrassing to the United States if discovered, and represents a poor investment of U.S. dollars. As discussed above, it is costly in terms of time and money for the principal to monitor whether the agent is shirking or working. The United States may choose to “punish” shirking agents by temporarily withdrawing military aid from the country. Of course, because it is at an information disadvantage, the United States might not find out about the shirking of the recipient military, or perhaps choose not to punish if the shirking action was not severe enough. The assumption remains that the United States prefers that the recipient not engage in human rights abuses. Later in this chapter, I discuss in more detail how U.S. knowledge of shirking and the subsequent decision to punish the recipient affect the likelihood of physical integrity repression.

The adverse selection problem in the military aid context arises before the United States decides to provide foreign aid to a specific country. The United States does not have complete information about how committed the recipient country is to producing the

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<sup>13</sup> I make the assumption that the United States prefers that the recipient military improve its human rights. There may be instances where this is not the case—i.e., the United States provides aid to a paramilitary group that knowingly engages in human rights abuses. This type of action was more common during the Cold War, but I cannot fully distinguish this type of aid because the military aid data used here does not specify what type of security force it goes to in the recipient country. I do, however, argue that the United States may “turn a blind eye” to repression when the country is strategically important to the United States.

outcomes that the United States prefers.<sup>14</sup> Since no formal “employment” contract is signed in the case of military aid, the terms of principal-agent contract are less clear, only amplifying the potential moral hazard problem. In this study, the vast majority of countries receive military aid (only 16 do not receive any aid in any year), thus the focus is on the moral hazard problem.<sup>15</sup>

The moral hazard problem occurs in the military aid relationship when a recipient country is more inclined to take a risk of engaging in behavior that the United States disapproves of—repression—because it expects the United States to continue aid. The moral hazard situation occurs when a recipient country believes that the risks of the United States removing aid are very low. This is not the case for all countries, as some aid recipients may be wary that the United States will sanction them for engaging in repression. In addition, some countries may have a low level of intrinsic appetite for committing human rights abuses. I argue that countries that are strategically important to the United States are subject to the moral hazard problem, as they are less likely to fear punishment for repression. I discuss this scenario and hypothesis in greater detail in section 3.4.3.

The above discussion yields the following insights about working versus shirking: the agent is more likely to work when its preferences are aligned with the principal, when the principal closely monitors it, and when the expectations of being caught and punished by the principal are low. In addition, as the capabilities of the recipient nation increase

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<sup>14</sup> Several studies do examine the factors that go into the U.S. aid allocation equation (e.g., Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe et al. 1994; Blanton 2005).

<sup>15</sup> Approximately 30% of all country years are coded as receiving no military assistance.

due to prolonged military aid, its need for the United States may decrease. In other words, the principal has decreasing control over time.

The United States delegates to an agent with significant autonomy, and its power to enforce the “contract” will vary across time and space. For its part, the recipient country has an incentive to get the most aid while doing the least work and pursuing its own interests. In this way, the effects of military aid are thus the result of a strategic interaction between the United States and the recipient country. Both the principal and the agent want to maximize their gains, but the agent has the information advantage. The recipient knows how closely its preferences align with the United States and how it is using the military aid. In addition, the policy outcome that the United States seeks in the case examined here—improvement in human rights—is often quite difficult to discern.<sup>16</sup> Human rights tend to be slow moving, and the United States may be relying on intermediary reporting for its information. Finally, a variety of internal factors and institutions affect the action of recipient country militaries, which largely fall outside the control of the United States. This backdrop sets the stage for an interesting game. The following explanation and game tree presents the actions and reactions of the principal and the agent more formally.<sup>17</sup>


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<sup>16</sup> While I examine human rights in this study, the United States has a variety of other goals in providing U.S. military aid—such as technological similarities with partner nations, advancing partner effectiveness on the battlefield, supporting the U.S. defense-industrial base, or policy convergence in other issue areas.

<sup>17</sup> Figure 2 is drawn from the work of Feaver (2009), in which he uses the game to describe the principal-agent relationship between the U.S. military and public.

1. The United States decides to provide military assistance through a variety of different funding programs, which affects the extent of oversight<sup>18</sup>
2. Recipient security forces decide to use aid to modernize, improve capabilities, and align policy with the United States (working for the United States) or to use aid to achieve their own political goals (that may differ from the United States—shirking) based on:
  - a. The expectation that they will be caught for pursuing their own goals
  - b. The costs of punishment for pursuing their own goals

**Figure 2: Principal-Agent Game Tree**




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<sup>18</sup> I examine eight programs in this study. These discussed in detail in Chapter Four. These programs compose the majority of U.S. military assistance, but they are not exhaustive.



In summary, the United States provides military aid in the form of several material, training, and education programs (discussed in more detail in the following chapter). The United States decides how much oversight or monitoring that it wishes to invest in. The recipient then decides to work or shirk based on its preferences and expected costs of punishment, which results in a certain payoff to the United States and recipient country. Based in part on the degree of oversight, nature decides whether or not the agent is caught for shirking. Finally, the United States decides to punish the agent.

This model is a simplistic way of outlining the strategic interaction between the United States, the principal, and aid-receiving militaries, the agents. It also raises several questions about what affects certain payoffs. For example, why are U.S. costs of oversight low or high? When might recipient preferences fail to align with U.S. preferences? What determines whether the United States will choose to punish a recipient country for repression? The principal-agent framework does not answer these questions but rather provides a previously under-developed theoretical backdrop for empirical investigations.

In this study, I am most interested in understanding why a recipient country decides to work or shirk on implementing human rights improvements. To answer this question, the principal agent framework implies that I need to understand the following:

- 1) Are U.S.-recipient preferences aligned?
- 2) Does the United States monitor the recipient?
- 3) Did the recipient work (improving human rights) or shirk (deteriorating human rights)?
- 4) Did the United States catch the recipient if it shirked?

5) Will the United States punish the recipient?

These are the questions that my empirical analysis attempts to undertake. Before I list my hypotheses in more detail, I briefly discuss the decision to examine human rights as the outcome of interest in this dissertation.

### **3.3 Outcome of Interest: Why Look at Human Rights?<sup>19</sup>**

The above game raises numerous questions about what paths the United States and recipient country may pursue. In the United States' ideal scenario, the recipient country's preferences are perfectly aligned with those of the United States, and military aid is used solely to improve the professionalization and capability of the recipient armed forces in countering security threats, i.e., doing the job that U.S. forces would seek to accomplish on the ground. In reality, however, this lofty U.S. goal often cited by policy officials is difficult to accomplish.

Traditionally, military aid is either left out of foreign aid analysis or included in total aid. Scholars have recently begun to investigate the effectiveness of military aid in deterring terror attacks, for example (Azam and Thelen 2010; Bapat 2011; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011). These studies are crucial to understanding the effectiveness of military aid. This dissertation seeks to build on recent scholarly analysis of military aid and address a gap in the literature: does military aid have adverse consequences and affect government violence and repression? Disaggregating military aid from foreign aid may shed more empirical light on this question than previous studies of economic aid permitted (Regan 1995; Kono, Montinola, and Verbon 2013). Military

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<sup>19</sup> In this study, when I refer to human rights or repression, I am referring to physical integrity rights.

aid is a significant subset of overall foreign aid and is unique in that it can only be used by a subset of the recipient government, the armed forces. Military aid, unlike cash transfers or even democracy funding, is not fungible across government institutions. The largest portion of military aid in most recipient countries is also unique in that it is potentially lethal equipment. Military aid conceivably augments the power of the receiving forces relative to the status quo without aid. Previous studies have shown that enhancing the power of the military is associated with a degradation in repression and human rights (Davenport 1995a; Blanton 1999).

U.S. military aid is different than a foreign country buying more arms, however, due to the nature of the principal-agent relationship. The United States has expectations about how that military aid should be used, and has the ability to sanction the recipient for using the aid “incorrectly”. In summary, military aid increases the capacity of the security forces, but its actions are constrained by the principal-agent strategic interaction. Examining human rights thus seemed like the logical and most interesting choice of outcome for this study, with implications for the academic literature as well as U.S. foreign policy. The type of repression examined here is physical human rights abuses, and in the following chapter I provide more detail on my two dependent variables, one-sided violence against civilians by the aid-receiving government and the Political Terror Scale.

Does military aid improve or harm human rights in recipient countries? I argue that the best way to answer this question is to examine the principal-agent relationship between the United States and recipient countries and draw insight from informational

asymmetries and the strategic decisions that go into the recipient working versus shirking on human rights. The following section lays out my hypotheses to answer this question.

### **3.4 How Does Military Aid Affect Recipient Armed Forces?**

My theory rests of the assumption that both the United States and the recipient country armed forces are rational actors pursuing their self-interest.<sup>20</sup> How military aid affects human rights is the result of a strategic decision-making process on the part of the United States and the receiving armed forces based on the above tree diagram. The hypotheses address my expectation that military aid does not universally reduce repression; under certain conditions, recipient armed forces may choose to engage in human rights abuses against the wishes of the United States. And vice versa, some conditions increase the likelihood that a recipient country will act as an agent of the United States and be less likely to engage in physical integrity repression.

In this section, I suggest that disaggregating military assistance yields insight into how aid affects the likelihood of repression. I argue that not all military aid is alike, and we need to think clearly about the different forms and goals of U.S.-provided assistance. I first contend that material assistance is the most likely to negatively affect human rights. In short, material assistance increases the lethal power of the armed forces by providing

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<sup>20</sup> This study makes two assumptions about the nature of the armed forces in the recipient country. Firstly, that the armed forces themselves are unitary actors, and secondly, that the armed forces are acting in accordance with the executive. These are strict assumptions and do not hold in all cases. For example, there are deep divides between the army and the internal security forces in Egypt. While I don't draw out the theoretical and empirical implications of internal divides in this study, examining whether military aid affects infighting among the armed forces represents an interesting future study. The second assumption is even more stringent. The relationship between the armed forces and the executive varies across countries in the dataset. While I do differentiate theoretically between autocratic and democratic regimes, the extent of power that the armed forces have within these types vary. Militaries with a larger role in executive decision-making may be able to utilize military aid to pursue their own preferences more easily than in countries with strict civilian control. Again, breaking down these differences is a good next step for future research on military assistance.

them with improved military capacity, which in turn has the psychological effect of making the armed forces feel more powerful. In contrast, education and targeted programming have larger training components and fewer arms.

The principal-agent approach also indicated that recipient countries might be more likely to shirk when their ex ante preferences on the work differed from the principal, when expectations of being caught and punished are low, and when there is a large payoff to shirking. I thus apply several conditional hypotheses to the expectation that material aid is linked to a higher probability of repression. Firstly, I expect that aid recipients are more likely to be caught for shirking on egregious human rights abuses. Secondly, I argue that when the United States provides material assistance largely out of strategic self-interest, the recipient's expectation of being punished falls. Thirdly, material aid to recipient governments that have alternative forms of national wealth that they wish to protect—natural resources—are more likely to repress. Finally, the effect of material aid is conditional on the ex ante preferences of recipients and the extent to which they match those of the principal, which I measure using regime type. The remainder of this chapter discusses each hypothesis in more detail.

### **3.4.1 Why Funding Program Matters**

The central variable for understanding how military aid affects physical human rights abuses is the type of aid that the United States provides. Certain types of aid are more easily converted into augmented resources for the recipient armed forces to use for physical repression. Specifically, material aid—U.S. military equipment and financing to purchase equipment—is a source of power for the recipient military and can be used to repress.

I argue that augmenting military equipment increases the risk that the armed forces engage in repression. By providing weapons, tanks, and other material aid, the armed forces have the capacity to escalate the use of force.<sup>21</sup> Military aid recipients take a variety of shapes and forms, including militaries with a history of very little repression, such as Poland, to security forces engaged in or emerging from civil conflict, such as Colombia, Nepal, and Guatemala. Providing more and advanced equipment to security forces that have an underlying incentive to repress increases their ability to engage in repression and the likelihood that they use lethal force.

In addition to augmented capabilities, military aid may have a psychological impact on the armed forces. There is evidence that weapons, and even the sight of weapons, increase aggressive behavior (e.g., Berkowitz and LePage 1967; Anderson, Benjamin, and Bartholow 1998). For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that security forces are more prone to using brutal force and firing weapons when they had more modern equipment. Equipped with U.S. weapons and tanks, the security forces acted aggressively while patrolling a protest march. Discussions with civilians also suggested that their image of the security forces had shifted over several years to one in which the police patrolled the streets in armored trucks and rarely interacted in a positive way with civilians, engendered distrust and potentially dissent.<sup>22</sup> Studies of police use of force in

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<sup>21</sup> The military aid data does not include a description of what equipment a recipient country receives or purchases with the grant. Military news sources often report on large-scale purchases, such as helicopters, but such expensive purchases apply to a minority of countries. Discussions with U.S. security assistance officials revealed that firearms and motorized vehicles are more common purchases for most countries.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with U.S. official, July 2013. The individual stressed that this was his observation on the ground at several different times from 2004 through 2010 and did not reflect official views of the U.S. Government.

the United States also suggest that less lethal weapons reduce the number of casualties (Meyer 1992; MacDonald, Kaminski, and Smith 2009; Bulman 2011). This increased power through material aid could be used to fight external enemies, internal insurgencies or terror threats, or to intimidate the civilian population.

In addition, using the principal-agent logic, the United States does not strictly oversee material aid. Most material aid comes in the form of grants to purchase U.S. equipment, and thus material aid allows the recipient country a relatively free rein for how to use that aid. The country may choose to purchase large numbers of automatic weapons, or even attack helicopters. For example, criticism surrounds the effectiveness of U.S. military assistance in helping the Pakistani military's efforts to combat Islamic extremists. Officials announced in 2007 that they believed that much of the money channeled through the Foreign Military Financing program intended to boost the fight against militants was diverted to help finance advanced weapons systems to counter India (Rohde et al. 2007). The United States is largely out of the picture once equipment arrives in recipient countries, offering few opportunities for oversight of the use of the equipment. In addition, it is important to note that the life-span of most equipment purchased is at least several years, which reduces the costs of punishment for the recipient in future years.

Material aid composes roughly 84% of total aid across countries, but there are important other types of funding programs to consider, which I argue have the opposite effect of material assistance. These programs fall into two overall categories, education assistance and targeted programs. This latter category includes both counternarcotics funding and anti-terrorism/nonproliferation funding. I examine them separately in the

quantitative analysis. Both education funding and targeted programs are subject to higher U.S. oversight than material assistance. In addition, they do not provide as much lethal equipment.

U.S. Military aid provides foreign officers with education through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The goal of IMET is to improve working relationships between the United States and its foreign partners as well as provide training on human rights, military strategy, and modern tactics. Officers involved in IMET rise through the ranks of foreign militaries and, ideally, have a positive effect on human rights and military professionalization in their respective countries. Some officers stay in the United States for programs lasting one or two months, while others remain for four years.<sup>23</sup>

Targeted military aid programs, such as International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Andean Counter-drug Initiative, and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-Mining, and Related (NADR) all provide money for equipment and training. The goal of these programs is to strengthen host country law enforcement and security forces to fight narcotics (INCLE), drug trafficking (Andean), and weapons trafficking (NADR).

Targeted programs are subject to higher levels of oversight because they usually require U.S. troops. These targeting funding programs do include equipment, but unlike straight material aid, the United States oversees the decision to buy a certain piece of equipment and provides training for that equipment. In addition, these programs are also used to fund training of foreign forces by U.S. troops. The United States is more directly

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<sup>23</sup> IMET provides funding for foreign students to attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.



involved in these programs, and thus it doesn't have as much leeway to claim plausible deniability should human rights abuses occur, providing incentive for greater oversight. Finally, programs such as NADR and DICDA involve both military and law enforcement components, which allows U.S. advisors and trainers to reach a greater portion of the security forces.<sup>24</sup>

When U.S. oversight is low, the chances for being caught and punished for human rights abuses decrease. Education and targeting training programs require much more interaction with U.S. forces. IMET funding also includes civil-military and human rights education, and even provides funding for foreign officers to live and study in the United States. These types of programs involve increased oversight by the United States, which increases the likelihood of getting caught and punished for shirking. More simply, education aid does not increase the firepower of the recipient armed forces in the way that material aid does. Targeted programs all involve aid that is tied to certain activities. These programs do provide equipment, but the United States oversees the purchases more closely and they are directly related to the program's goals.<sup>25</sup> The above discussion on the types of funding program and their effects on the likelihood of repression generate the following hypotheses:

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<sup>24</sup> FMF can be used to purchase equipment used by law enforcement personnel, but it is generally geared toward the military.

<sup>25</sup> Of course, the training aspect of these programs is finite, while the equipment is not, so it could be used for repressive purposes after training is completed. Overall, however, the amount of equipment provided through these targeted programs is far less than for FMF.

*Hypothesis 1: Material aid is more likely to be associated with physical integrity rights abuses*

*Hypothesis 2: Education and targeted funding aid are less likely to be associated with physical integrity rights abuses*

In sum, material aid increases the lethal capabilities and psychological power of the armed forces and is subject to low levels of U.S. oversight. Education and targeted funding programs do not increase the lethal capabilities of the armed forces, include elements of human rights training, and are subject to higher levels of U.S. oversight. The remaining hypotheses continue to use principal-agent theory to evaluate conditional effects of material aid.

### **3.4.2 How the Form of Physical Integrity Rights Repression Matters**

The above two hypotheses do not differentiate between forms of physical integrity rights violations. I simply argued that material aid is more likely to be associated with all physical integrity abuses, compared to education and targeting program funding. Physical integrity repression, however, can take on a wide range of forms, from rare threatening of a minority of the population to government killing of civilians. The principal-agent framework provides some insight into how material aid will affect different levels of repression.

I argued that the United States and recipient government engage in a strategic game in which the United States decides to provide aid through one or several funding programs and the recipient chooses to work or shirk on human rights policy. I showed that the recipient's decision to shirk is based on the extent of U.S. oversight, the

expectation of being caught and punished by the United States, the expected payoff to shirking, and preference (dis)similarity with the United States on human rights policy. On average, more egregious human rights abuses are more likely to be caught and punished by the United States. The recipient has an information advantage on its human rights practices, and the United States may be getting information through intermediary sources, such as the press and human rights organizations. The press and watchdog groups accessible to the United States are more likely to report on such extreme repression. Reporting may not pick up levels of physical integrity repression below killing civilians. In countries where government repression of minority groups is long running, lower levels of abuses will not hit mainstream media. The United States is more likely to face domestic backlash for providing military aid to countries that commit horrific abuses, and is thus more likely to punish these countries with aid sanctions. In contrast, there is less likely to be domestic pressure to end aid to countries where lower levels of repression are more common, and the United States will not punish them with aid sanctions.

In line with the military aid game discussed above, I argue that recipient countries recognize the higher likelihood of punishment from egregious repressive actions. I thus qualify hypotheses one, and argue that material aid increases the likelihood of physical integrity repression that falls short of killing civilians. Material aid in fact reduces the likelihood of civilian deaths in countries that do not have a large payoff to engaging in such abuses because the expectation of being punished is too high. To test this hypothesis, I utilize two dependent variables, government one-sided violence and the Political Terror Scale, with scores country-years on a five-point scale from less

repression to widespread repression. These dependent variables are discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

*Hypothesis 1.1: Material aid reduces the likelihood of government one-sided violence*

*Hypothesis 1.2: Material aid increases the likelihood of physical integrity rights repression short of killing civilians*

I expect education and targeted funding to have the same effect on both measures of repression; these programs do not increase the power of the armed forces and include elements of human rights training. In the following sections, I build on the above hypotheses and argue that material assistance is more likely to increase the likelihood of human rights abuses in countries that have underlying incentives to repress, which can overcome the disincentives to engage in one-sided violence that the expectation of being punished induces. The remaining hypotheses thus apply to both dependent variables, and I test the effects of all interactions on one-sided violence and the Political Terror Scale separately.

### **3.4.3 Strategic Value**

The principal-agent framework revealed that a moral hazard problem may arise when aid recipients take risks based on the expectation that the United States will continue aid and not punish them for this risky behavior. Hypothesis 1 and 2 address how the level of U.S. oversight affects the likelihood of repression. In this section, I discuss the likelihood of the United States punishing the recipient country for human rights

abuses. I argue that the likelihood of U.S. punishment for human rights abuses is lower when the United States provides aid to meet strategic goals. Strategic goals as used here imply that the United States is acting out of self-interest to protect and defend itself and its allies. I measure strategic priority as the presence of U.S. troops. Deploying and stationing U.S. troops to a country is costly for the United States and is more likely when the United States is acting in self-interest.<sup>26</sup> It also implies lasting relations with the recipient country. Several examples help demonstrate the role of U.S. strategic goals.

The United States gives military aid to Yemen in order to build up the ability of Yemen's forces to fight the Al Qaida terrorist threat inside the country, despite concerns over how the aid is being used (Kasinof 2010; Bapat 2011). Similarly, the United States began providing military assistance to Indonesia in 2005 as part of the War on Terror, ending an embargo on aid following the killing of 1,500 people in East Timor by the Indonesian security forces in 1999.

The decision will allow the US Government to provide financial assistance for Indonesia to buy American weapons and to train its officers in American military colleges. It is also intended as a reward for Jakarta's co-operation in pursuing Islamic militants. "Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said that the lifting of sanctions was "in the national security interests of the United States". He said: "Indonesia is a voice of moderation in the Islamic world. The Administration considers the relationship between the United States and Indonesia, the world's third largest democracy, to be of the utmost importance. But the move was bitterly criticised yesterday by human rights groups who contend that the Indonesian military is corrupt, brutal and unaccountable." (Parry 2005)

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<sup>26</sup> Alternatively, the presence of U.S. troops could increase the monitoring capabilities of the United States. According to the principal-agent framework, increased monitoring would actually lead to a greater expectation of the recipient nation getting caught and punished for physical integrity rights repression. In the post-Cold War period, I would argue that the United States deploys troops largely out of strategic self-interest in a country and region, rather than to serve as a monitoring force. Thus, while the presence of U.S. troops may be an imperfect proxy for U.S. strategic interest, I argue that it outweighs any monitoring role that the troops may play.

Aid to Azerbaijan also increased dramatically after 2003, from almost \$2 million in 2000 to a high of \$48 million in 2008.

President Aliyev launched a brutal crackdown on the political opposition immediately after his election, arresting hundreds and torturing many, according to human rights activists. Yet this month, with pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq undermining Washington's ability to criticise similar practices elsewhere, the Pentagon forged ahead with plans to increase its presence in the Caspian state. US officials cite the important strategic and logistical role that the key state in the Caucasus, on the border with Iran, can play in the "war on terror". They are also open about the need to protect the £2bn oil pipeline set to carry a million barrels of Caspian oil daily to Turkey and the American market by late next year. Washington is increasing to 50 the number of military advisers who are training Azerbaijani troops, while doubling its annual military aid package next year to nearly £13m. One European diplomat said the US was developing a "permanent military presence by stealth" (Walsh 2004).

In Pakistan, the United States has acknowledged potential misuse of foreign aid funds, but has vowed to continue military aid in an effort to counter terrorism. In 2011, the U.S. Congress threatened to delay military aid to Pakistan for failing to act against militant groups. Pakistani officials publically declared their commitment to the joint effort to fight al Qaida, and military assistance was not curtailed (Reuters 2011). If Pakistan weren't strategically important to U.S. efforts against Al Qaida, the story might have a different ending. More recently, the United States has further increased Pakistan's military assistance:

Arguing that Pakistan will remain a key player in counter terrorism post-2014, the US has proposed USD 280 million in military assistance to the country, although it wants to cut civilian aid in an effort to acknowledge India's concerns about misuse of the funds.... "FY 2015 funding for Pakistan is crucial to meeting key US strategic priorities of combating terrorism, strengthening security in both Pakistan and the region, and maintaining stability in Afghanistan post-transition," the Department said (*The Patriot* 2014).

A similar debate took place surrounding military assistance to Egypt—traditionally the second-largest recipient of U.S. aid—following the political upheaval of 2010–2012. In 2011, a Senate bill sought to tie military assistance to improvements

toward democracy. As one Egyptian official summarized the strategic nature of the aid, “If you insert new conditions, hinting at the fact the military aid might be touched in the future, this signals to the Egyptian military [that] the United States is not as solidly behind us as we think.” The U.S. administration publically opposed any reduction in military aid (Sheridan 2011).

In Colombia, where the United States has a significant number of troops (114 in 2008) and provides large sums of aid to help counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts, Amnesty International in 2008 urged the United States to halt military aid due the kidnapping and murder of civilians by the security forces, and human rights concerns in Colombia certainly pre-date 9/11 (Campbell 2000; *Morning Star* 2008). Controlling the narcotics trade, however, is an important strategic initiative for the United States, and military aid continues.

Another example is military aid in return for the ability to establish a U.S. military base in the recipient country. A U.S. base in a recipient country is also a good indicator of U.S. strategic importance; a base is difficult to move and indicates that a country and its region are of lasting importance to the United States. A base is also associated with a large and sustained number of U.S. troops.<sup>27</sup> Expected future military aid to Kyrgyzstan, for example, decreased when the U.S. base was closed in 2014.<sup>28</sup> A similar drop in aid occurred after the United States departed the Karshi-Khanabad air base in Uzbekistan in 2005, which had been the primary base for access to Afghanistan.

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<sup>27</sup> Statistically, the presence of a base and troops are highly correlated. I chose to use U.S. troops as it covers a wider range of strategic priorities. For example, USAFRICOM is based in Europe but sends troops throughout the year to Africa.

<sup>28</sup> Future aid projections are available in the FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification.

In sum, the United States cannot credibly commit to withdrawing military aid to countries that are its strategic priority, and the recipient country can make its own judgment about the likelihood of aid sanctions. In contrast, military aid to countries with a lower strategic value to the United States can expect aid to be decreased following human rights abuses or have aid tied to good human rights practices. In Nepal, for example, the United States has no troops in most years, and in 2009, the U.S. Congress conditioned Foreign Military Financing funding on the Nepali Army's cooperation with civilian human rights investigations from 2004 (*BBC Monitoring South Asia* 2009).

I argue that when U.S. strategic interest is the primary reason for giving material aid to a country, the likelihood of repression increases. The receiving country understands that the United States needs it for strategic or geopolitical reasons. The United States is not likely to immediately withdraw military aid because it requires the country's continued cooperation on U.S. security interests. In the terms of the principal-agent framework, the recipient country perceives the expected costs of punishment for repression to be low. This opens the door for the country to engage in repression without the fear of punishment.

In this study, I measure U.S. strategic interest using the presence of U.S. troops in the recipient country.<sup>29</sup> U.S. troops are a good proxy for strategic importance because when the primary goal of military aid in a recipient country is not strategic—

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<sup>29</sup> Another important measure of strategic importance of a recipient country to the United States is whether the former supported the latter in a coalition operation. These countries have strategic value to the United States by providing troops as well as displaying international support for U.S. military operations. Some 30 countries, for example, joined the “coalition of the willing” in the Iraq invasion of 2003. The United States provided large sums of FMF to Poland in 2003 for its large-scale participation in the effort. Future iterations of this research will investigate whether being a member of a military coalition increases the likelihood that military aid is used for repression.



democratization, institution building, technological compatibility, or support of U.S. defense industries—the need for U.S. troops in the recipient country is low.

*Hypothesis 3: Material aid is more likely to increase physical integrity rights abuses in countries with U.S. troops*

#### **3.4.4 Payoff for Shirking**

The first three hypotheses addressed the United States' decision-making. I argued that the United States provides aid from several funding programs based in part on strategic necessity. These programs have different effects in recipient countries. Material aid, on average, is more likely to lead to repression than education funding. In countries where the United States provides material aid for strategic reasons, the effects of material aid may be especially deleterious. The next two hypotheses consider internal characteristics of the recipient regime.

In this section, I argue that an expected payoff for engaging in repression provides incentive for the recipient country to weigh the benefits of repression as greater than the costs of U.S. punishment. One scenario in which the payoff to engaging in repression is likely to be high is when the government wants to protect its revenue stream. I argue that governments that have natural resource revenue are more likely to use material aid to repress. Countries with natural resource rents are more likely to experience civil conflict, and are more likely to engage in repression (M. Ross 2001; M. Ross 2004; M. Ross 2006; Smith 2008). Previous research has also shown that foreign aid post-conflict is more effective when a country lacks natural resource revenue (Girod 2012). Oil exports, the

measure I utilize in this study, provide significant revenue for some governments, and leaders may be more willing to use repression to sustain that windfall rather than share the profit with a larger portion of the population. Material aid potentially augments the ability of these governments to commit abuses.<sup>30</sup>

In addition, both aid and natural resources are associated with consequences due to their nature as “free resources”. Smith (2008) argues that leaders facing popular demands and dissent have two options for dissipating threats: increase the supply of public goods or decrease the supply such that citizens can no longer mobilize. Smaller coalitions governments and those with free resources (aid and natural resources) are more likely to suppress public goods:

When a large proportion of government income is derived from aid or natural resources, the proportionate effect of public goods suppression on government revenues is smaller, which makes such an approach to dealing with revolutionary threats more attractive from the leader's perspective. In this context, free resources are doubly divisive. They simultaneously increase revolutionary threats and make public goods suppression the more attractive policy response.

Since natural resource profits already increase the likelihood that countries will suppress public goods, countries that receive both foreign aid and natural resource rents are doubly at risk. I extend the above argument to the likelihood of repression. Countries with oil rents may be ex ante more likely to restrict the liberties of the population. Providing such countries with material aid again decreases the amount of public money that a government needs to spend to finance repression, putting more money in the government's pocket. This problem will be particularly acute in countries with a small coalition (De Mesquita and Smith 2010).

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<sup>30</sup> Again, this point assumes that the executive and armed forces in the aid-receiving country are acting cohesively and with the same preferences; this may not always be the case.

Governments with resource rents may be more likely to use material aid for repressive purposes, and they do not fear punishment because they have a significant revenue stream. This discussion therefore generates hypothesis four:

*Hypothesis 4: Material aid increases the likelihood of repression in recipient countries that export oil*

### **3.4.5 Preference Similarity: The Role of Regime Type**

Finally, underlying preference similarities between the recipient country and the United States affect the likelihood of policy convergence on human rights. The United States provides military aid to recipient security forces to work to improve military capabilities, enhance international military cooperation, and professionalize recipient forces. The United States has an invested interest in the recipient country not abusing human rights. The United States may face domestic and international backlash for providing aid to repressive regimes. In addition, regimes that repress are more likely to be unstable overall, and experience civil conflict. As the agent in this “contract”, however, the recipient country has its own inherent preferences for pursuing the principal’s goals. I argue that not all recipient governments have the same preferences for human rights practices. Governments and leaders have their own incentives to repress, and when the internal preferences of the agent vary from that of the principal, we can expect the principal to shirk rather than work. Specifically, when the aid-receiving military and the United States share a self-interested policy desire to respect and improve human rights in

the recipient country, there is a lower likelihood that the recipient country would choose to abuse physical integrity rights.

I argue that the best proxy for policy convergence on human rights is regime type, although there are several shades of grey.<sup>31</sup> The repression literature demonstrates that full autocracies are more likely to engage in human rights abuses and full democracies are less likely to repress. The expectations for repression in regimes that fall in between full democracy and full autocracy are less clear. In addition, there is evidence that not all autocratic leader types have the same domestic audience costs, which may effect the likelihood of repression (Poe et al. 1994; Davenport 1996; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Zanger 2000; Regan and Henderson 2002; Harff 2003; Weeks 2012; Kono, Montinola, and Verbon 2013).

The critical factor in this study is whether the recipient regime's preferences match those of the principal, the United States. I argued that the United States on average desires that the recipient armed forces do not engage in repression. The United States' policy preference is based on its own status as a full democracy with low levels of domestic repression, where domestic and international audience costs play a role in determining policy. Full democracies, on average, face higher domestic audience costs, and also hold norms against domestic violence.<sup>32</sup> Recipient countries that are full democracies also face similar pressures to abide by national human rights laws and

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<sup>31</sup> The following discussion uses the terminology of full and partial regimes types, which is based on my use of the Polity IV scale for measurement of these variables. There are a variety of other ways to examine regime type, particularly different leader types among autocratic regimes as well as democratizing states. Future research will examine additional measurement of regimes in more detail. Also see footnote 35.

<sup>32</sup> The United States, of course, has its own history of repression of minorities by security forces.

international norms. I thus expect that the preferences on human rights policy between the United States and full democratic recipients are aligned.

On the contrary, the human rights preferences between the United States and full autocracies may be at odds. Full autocracies are overall more likely to engage in repression, face less domestic audience costs,<sup>33</sup> and do not suffer as significant reputational costs for not following international human rights norms and treaties (Davenport 2007b; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Weeks 2012). I thus argue that full autocracies are most likely to have divergent policy preferences on human rights from the United States, and material aid is likely to increase the chances for repression.<sup>34</sup>

Regarding “partial” regimes, I argue that material aid to these countries is likely to have a harmful effect on human rights.<sup>35</sup> Research has demonstrated that partial and transitioning regimes can be dangerous and repressive in the short term (Regan and Henderson 2002). These countries are more likely to be emerging from civil conflict and have underdeveloped militaries. Governments are more likely to be facing opposition

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<sup>33</sup> See Weeks (2012) for an alternative argument on autocratic audience costs, also discussed in more detail in the following paragraph.

<sup>34</sup> As we would expect, full autocracies are the smallest recipient of military aid, and tend to purchase U.S. arms through the Foreign Military Sales program, which is discussed in Chapter 4.

<sup>35</sup> Again, the use of “partial democracy” and “partial autocracy” used here is reflective of the data used to generate these variables, the Polity IV scale. I define partial democracies as scoring from 11 to 15 on the additive Polity IV scale and partial autocracies as scoring from 5 to 10 on the partial autocracy scale. These measures, while useful, mask a variety of qualities about “partial” regimes. For example, autocracies, or anocracies as they are sometimes called, have a wide range of leader types. Military juntas and personalist dictators have been shown to be more aggressive than regimes governed by dominant civilian elites (Weeks 2012). Scholars using selectorate theory also argue that autocracies with a smaller selectorate are more likely to repress than those with a larger selectorate (Davenport 2007c; Davenport 2007a). Democratic regimes are equally diverse. The measurement used here also does not allow me to differentiate between regimes that are democratizing and regimes that are taking steps away from democracy, nor does it articulate the dimensions of democracy that are more important in predicting human rights abuses (De Mesquita et al. 2005). The results presented here provide a baseline, but future research will be necessary to more fully investigate how different regimes and leaders use military aid.

from internal parties, and jockeying for power creates an atmosphere of political uncertainty. Because executives may not have consolidated power in partial democracies and autocracies, they make imperfect agents for the United States. I argue that these governments have a short time horizon and are more likely to weigh the benefits of consolidating their power structure through the use of repression over acting as a good agent of the United States and professionalizing their armed forces. Moreover, the security forces in countries emerging from conflict may themselves have internal divisions and a diversity of goals that make repression more likely.

The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses on material aid and regimes type, and Table 1 summarizes all of the expectations listed in this chapter:

*Hypothesis 5: Material aid reduces the likelihood of human rights abuses in full democracies and increases the likelihood of human rights abuses in full autocracies*

*Hypothesis 6: Material aid increases the likelihood of human rights abuses in partial autocracies and partial democracies*

**Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses**

<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Direction of effect on physical integrity rights abuses</b>
<b>Material aid</b>	One-sided violence: - Political Terror Scale: +
<b>Education aid and targeted training</b>	One-sided violence & Political Terror Scale: -
<b>Material aid*U.S. troops</b>	One-sided violence & Political Terror Scale: +
<b>Material aid*oil exports</b>	One-sided violence & Political Terror Scale: +
<b>Material aid*full democracy</b>	One-sided violence & Political Terror Scale: -
<b>Material aid*full autocracy</b>	One-sided violence & Political Terror Scale: +
<b>Material aid*partial democracy/autocracy</b>	One-sided violence & Political Terror Scale: +

### **3.5 Conclusion**

This chapter presented my argument for analyzing the effectiveness of military aid. I draw from previous foreign aid research in pointing to three critical theoretical lines of inquiry in addressing this research question: donor policy goals, recipient country regime characteristics, and shifting resources. I argued that all three of the ways of thinking about the effects of aid are crucial. I then argue that thinking of the relationship between the military aid donor country and the recipient as a principal-agent relationship provides the most fruitful theoretical leverage. The principal, the United States, is strategic in providing aid to the recipient, the agent. The amount and type of funding resources provided as well as internal regime characteristics shape the choices available to the recipient country.

Through the delivery of military aid, the United States has expectations about how the recipient country will act. One of the primary goals is respect for human rights.

Indeed, it is the stated goal of U.S. military aid programs to improve professionalism within the armed forces. On the other hand, material forms of funding provide the resources for the recipient country to increase its lethality. Many of the recipient countries have experienced recent civil conflict, are not full democracies, and have significant oppressed populations. An important question to ask both theoretically and politically, then, is how does military assistance affect human rights in recipient countries? What conditions impact how the recipient military chooses to use security assistance? Resting on the foundation of principal-agent theory, my hypotheses begin to address this interesting question. The important questions to answer are, when is U.S. oversight likely to be high? What are the benefits to the recipient for shirking versus working? What is the likelihood that the recipient would get caught and then punished for shirking?

I argued that the most important first step is determining what funding program the United States uses to provide aid. Material aid, which comes largely in the form of cash for equipment purchases, is most likely to increase the likelihood of repression by augmenting the power of the recipient armed forces. Material aid is also subject to low levels of U.S. oversight. In contrast, the United States oversees education aid and targeting programs because they include training aspects, rather than simply arms. Education aid also provides training on human rights. I thus expect that material aid, on average, increases the likelihood of human rights abuses while education and targeted aid reduce repression.

The remainder of my hypotheses address several qualifications of this argument. I used principal-agent theory to show that countries with an underlying incentive to repress



are more likely to use material aid for that purpose, based on a cost-benefit analysis of the expected likelihood of being caught and punished for “shirking” by the United States.

Firstly, I argued that not all repression is alike: the United States is more likely to punish recipients for egregious abuses—killing civilians—than less “visible” forms of repression. Recipients that wish to keep military aid are thus more likely to refrain from one-sided violence but more likely to commit lower levels of abuses.

I also argued that when the United States provides material aid out of its own strategic self-interest, the recipient country lowers its expectation of punishment for repression because it knows the United States can’t credibly commit to withdrawing aid. Countries that are more likely to repress in the absence of material aid may also see an increase in repression as a result of augmented power. I argued that recipient countries with resource rents are more likely to repress with material aid because they have incentives to maintain their profit for the minority of the powerful, rather than the citizenry. Finally, when the policy preferences of the principal and agent align, repression is less likely. The United States is a full democracy with low levels of domestic repression, and recipient countries with similar regime characteristics are more likely to abide by human rights practices that match U.S. goals. Regimes with fewer elements of democracy, however, may have less institutionalized “good” human rights practices and are more likely to use material aid to meet their own goals. The following chapter provides the methodological background for investigating these hypotheses.

## Chapter 4. Methodology

In the previous chapter, I argued that principal-agent theory provided the best theoretical approach to analyzing the effects of military aid on human rights, and I presented seven testable hypotheses. Using a principal-agent framework provides insight into the choices facing both the principal, the United States, and the agent, the aid-receiving country. Based on this logic, I showed that the funding programs used, the degree of U.S. oversight of the aid, the preferences of the recipient country, the expected payoff to shirking, and the expectation of being caught and punished for shirking versus working were key to understanding the effects of U.S. aid. I chose to examine physical integrity rights as the outcome variable due to the potential lethal nature of military aid. This study seeks to fill a gap in the extant foreign aid literature by demonstrating theoretically and empirically how military assistance affects repression.

In this chapter, I introduce the data and methodology used to conduct my analysis. The first section provides details on the scope of the project and the independent and dependent variables utilized. I then highlight a number of methodological concerns and how I chose to address them. Finally, I briefly summarize the models that appear in the results in Chapter Five.

### 4.1 Scope

This study covers 180 countries from 1991 through 2011.<sup>36</sup> I chose to examine the post–Cold War era because the nature and strategic goals of U.S. military aid changed after the Cold War, and U.S. military aid programs expanded to a wider range of

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<sup>36</sup> A list of countries can be found in the Appendix.

countries. In addition, there has been little empirical analysis of the military aid programs that began and expanded during this time period. The dataset is thus a cross-sectional time-series with a country-year unit of analysis.

There are 15 countries that receive no military aid, and a number of countries that receive aid in only one or two years, as well as countries that receive large amounts of aid every year. Only two countries that received aid during this period were completely excluded from the analysis, Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>37</sup> In the post-9/11 period, the United States provided large sums of military aid to both countries for the purpose of training and equipping the security forces and establishing rule of law. Particularly in Iraq, the sums provided through the Foreign Military Financing program dwarf all other countries. I chose to exclude these countries from the analysis, however, because both countries fall into the category of foreign intervention, and the United States had significant numbers of ground forces engaged in stability and conflict operations for a decade. It would be difficult to empirically break apart the role that military aid played versus troops on the ground. Both countries were also arguably in a state of civil war for the entire period of military aid, without a fully functioning government. Because I am interested in understanding how military aid affects the recipient government, I felt that Iraq and Afghanistan fell outside the purview of this study. I do believe, however, that examining the effects of military aid in these countries in the future, once U.S. troops have pulled out, would make interesting case studies.

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<sup>37</sup> Countries of the former Yugoslavia enter the dataset only after the exit of U.S. and NATO forces and the establishment of sovereign governments, for the same reasons discussed below for Iraq and Afghanistan. Somalia also exists the dataset for the period in which U.S. troops play a combat role (1993, 1994).

## 4.2 Military Aid Data

Military aid in this study is defined as concessionary aid given by the United States to partner nations that directly affects the military or law enforcement agencies. It is funneled through the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State and is subject to congressional approval. Table 2 below displays the programs included in my definition. This aid can be in the form of weapons, training and education, and cash transfers that are used to purchase military equipment. This selection of aid programs offers an improvement over previous studies that lump military aid together, and it's not clear that any quantitative studies include funding for law enforcement (INCLE and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative). In many countries, interior police are responsible for responding to low-level civil unrest, and understanding how aid targeted toward training these forces affects repression is crucial.

The military aid data comes from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (“Greenbook”). The data includes all amounts that pertain to security funding, including law enforcement. A detailed description of the included line items is as follows<sup>38</sup>:

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<sup>38</sup> The Greenbook does not provide program descriptions; the descriptions are taken from the relevant U.S. program authority's official Web sites.

It should be noted that these programs do not encompass all of U.S. military assistance, rather only those that have congressional line budgets and for which there is publically available data. This data does not include Section 1206 and Section 1207 funding, which does provide anti-terrorism military aid funding, due to the inconsistency of the data available across time and countries. I also exclude U.S. peacekeeping funding, which is largely utilized for U.S. forces on the ground in conflict zones. The data also does not include any discretionary funds used for military assistance or task force training activities, which may be funded through the U.S. services.

**Table 2: U.S. Military Aid Funding Programs**

<b>Program</b>	<b>Description</b>
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF) & Military Assistance Program (MAP) <sup>39</sup>	“The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorizes the President to finance procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and international organizations. FMF enables eligible partner nations to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or, for a limited number of countries, through Direct Commercial Contracts (DCC) channels. FMF is a source of financing and may be provided to a partner nation on either a grant (non-repayable) or direct loan basis.” (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2014a) <sup>40</sup>
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR)	“The NADR account supports U.S. efforts in four areas: nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, regional stability, and humanitarian assistance... The NADR account also supports a comprehensive approach to preventing and countering terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens and interests and to minimize the impact of any attacks that may occur, whether at home or abroad. NADR funds the Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies, and Counterterrorism Financing. ATA provides technical training and equipment to assist foreign countries in protecting facilities, individuals, and infrastructure. The TIP improves countries’ capabilities to prevent the transit of terrorists and their materials between borders. CT Engagement programs build international political will leading to concrete steps in the war on terrorism and enable senior level foreign officials to develop plans in the event of an actual incident. Counterterrorism Financing assists foreign countries’ efforts to identify, freeze, and prevent the use of financial institutions, businesses, and

<sup>39</sup> FMF and MAP merged in the early 1990s; MAP funding thus falls out of the data in 1994 and is consumed by the FMF program.

<sup>40</sup> The funding numbers used in this study apply only to the non-repayable amounts and do not include Direct Commercial Contracts.

	charitable organizations as conduits for money to terrorist organizations.” (Department Of State 2014)
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	“The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) ...will continue to support country and global programs critical to combating transnational crime and illicit threats, including efforts against terrorist networks in the illegal drug trade and illicit enterprises. INCLE programs seek to close the gaps between law enforcement jurisdictions and to strengthen law enforcement institutions that are weak or corrupt.” (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State 2014)
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA)	Introduced in Section 1004 National Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 P.L. 101-510, DICDA authorizes counternarcotics support to U.S. and foreign counterdrug agencies, including providing defense services and training in support of U.S.-loaned equipment
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)	“Transfers excess defense equipment to foreign governments or international organizations. Typically used for modernization of partner forces. Excess defense articles provided to partner nation at a reduced price (based on the condition of the equipment) or as a grant. Partner nations pay for packing, crating, handling, and transportation (PCH&T), as well as refurbishment if applicable – EDA is “as is, where is” (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2014b). <sup>41</sup>
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	“The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy and a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships, which have proven to provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a

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<sup>41</sup> I include Excess Defense Articles supplied as a grant.

	<p>pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments. IMET's traditional purpose of promoting more professional militaries around the world through training has taken on greater importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against terrorism.”(Department of State 2014)</p>
<p>Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)</p>	<p>ACI provides counterdrug funding to Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. “ACI funds are divided between programs that support eradication and interdiction efforts, as well as those focused on alternative crop development and democratic institution building. On the interdiction side, programs train and support national police and military forces, provide communications and intelligence systems, support the maintenance and operations of host country aerial eradication aircraft, and improve infrastructure related to counternarcotics activities. On the alternative development side, funds support development programs in coca growing areas, including infrastructure development, and marketing and technical support for alternative crops. It also includes assisting internally displaced persons, promoting the rule of law, and expanding judicial capabilities.” (Veillette 2006)</p>

In Chapter Three, I argued that the type of funding program affected how military aid impacts human rights in recipient countries. Specifically, I expected material aid to have a harmful effect on repression and education and targeting training programs to have a positive effect on repression. Material aid is lethal in nature and subject to less U.S. oversight than education and targeted programs. To assess my hypotheses, I group these programs into the following four categories:

- 1) **Material Aid:** FMF, MAP, and Excess Stock

2) **Education Aid:**<sup>42</sup> IMET

3) **Counternarcotics:** INCLE, Andean Counterdrug Initiative, DICDA

4) **Antiterrorism/Nonproliferation:** NADR

In addition to the military aid data from the Greenbook, I also compiled U.S. economic aid data. The economic data includes all development and democracy aid funded through U.S. congressional line budgets. Both the military and economic aid data is collected in constant 2011 U.S. dollars.

Finally, I compiled Foreign Military Sales (FMS) data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2014a).<sup>43</sup> FMS refers to “defense articles and services” purchased by a foreign government in a year, in contrast to military aid, which is given in the form of a grant. Many countries get military aid as well as purchasing U.S. arms and equipment through FMS. On average, more wealthy, developed countries purchase goods through FMS and less wealthy, less developed countries receive military aid and purchase fewer arms through FMS.<sup>44</sup> Although DSCA does not provide the breakdown, FMS is largely utilized to purchase equipment rather than training. In Chapter Three, I theorized that material aid was associated with an increased risk of repression because augmenting the weapons supply provides the

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<sup>42</sup> All of the funding programs include an aspect of education, but it is IMET’s exclusive goal, and the focus of the education is military professional development. The focus of education as part of the other programs, such as NADR or INCLE, is directly related to that program’s overall goal, anti-terrorism or counter-narcotics, respectively. (Interview with U.S. Defense Department Official, Washington, D.C., July 2013.)

<sup>43</sup> The data was transformed to reflect constant US\$(2011). The data used for Foreign Military Sales is “delivered sales” and excludes Direct Commercial Sales. DSCA does collect information on commercial sales, but officials involved are skeptical of the accuracy of that data.

<sup>44</sup> 57% of country years are coded as getting FMS and military aid.



capability and psychological power to repress. In countries that receive FMS as well as material aid, the extra weapons may only exacerbate the problem. I chose to break apart military aid and sales data because I believe that a different causal process is at work with military aid. Under a sales agreement, the United States does not “contract” the recipient country to act as its agent, with a monetary sum as its incentive. The goal of foreign military sales is more economic for the United States, while the goal of aid is to influence and assist. Looking at the countries with the highest sales purchases supports this logic; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Israel, and Western European countries compose the majority of arms sales.

One problem with aid data is that it contains a large number of country years in which no aid was received as well as years in which large amounts of aid were received.<sup>45</sup> One tool often used to “minimize” the effect of very large numbers is to take the log of the data. The log of 0, however, is undefined, which would leave me with vast amounts of missing data. I thus use a modified log transformation, the inverse hypobolic sine transformation, which acts similarly to a log but is defined at 0 (Burbidge, Magee, and Robb 1988).<sup>46</sup> It takes the following functional form:

$$\log(y_i + (y_i^2 + 1)^{1/2})$$

Figure 3 below shows total U.S. military and economic aid from 1991–2011. Economic aid has steadily increased since 2001, with a dip in 2011 funding. Interestingly, military aid is consistent across the time period studied, except for a large increase in 2003. This sharp increase in Foreign Military Financing funding is actually the result of a


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<sup>45</sup> 22% of country years have no military aid.

<sup>46</sup> The inverse sine transformation is also used for economic aid and Foreign Military Sales data.


large sum provided to Poland for that country’s military support at the start of the Iraq War.<sup>47</sup> Figure 4 shows Foreign Military Financing alongside Foreign Military Sales. FMS amounts are greater than FMF for every year except 2003.

**Figure 3: Total U.S. Military and Economic Aid, 1991–2011**




<sup>47</sup> While I don’t expect military aid to have an effect on Poland’s human rights record, it is important to include aid given to countries with good physical integrity protections, as it only strengthens my results. In addition, the provision of military aid to Poland in exchange for military support in Iraq highlights the utility of thinking about military aid through a principal-agent framework. In accepting U.S. military aid in return for joining the U.S. in Iraq, Poland chose to act as an agent of the United States and carried out its contract in return for payment that it desired, despite competing internal preferences in the European Union.

**Figure 4: Total Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales, 1991–2011**



Figures 5 and 6 show U.S. military aid funding by the eight programs discussed above. The material-heavy FMF program is by far the largest. In the second figure, we can also see that DICDA, NADR, and INCLE funding has increased in the past decade, while Excess Stock Funding declined. IMET funding has increased slightly over time. On the following page, Figure 7 displays total military aid by country from 1991–2011, divided into five categories (increments of 20% of total aid).

**Figure 5: Total U.S. Military Aid by Funding Program, 1991–2011**



**Figure 6: Total U.S. Military Aid by Funding Program (Excluding FMF), 1991–2011**





Figure 7: Total U.S. Military Aid by Country, 1991–2011



The map reveals that the countries receiving the most aid during in the past two decades are spread around the world.<sup>48</sup> In addition, the majority of countries have received military aid at some point in the time period. Obvious exceptions are Iran, North Korea, and some Western countries.

### **4.3 Conditional Variables**


In addition to the data on military and economic aid, I include variables that are critical to understanding how military assistance affects repression. I argued in Chapter Three that material aid was more likely to affect repression when recipient countries had an underlying incentive to repress. I argued that U.S. strategic interest in providing aid affects how material aid impacts repression in recipient countries. When U.S. strategic interest is high, the recipient nation has a lower expectation that it will be punished for shirking its duties, in this case, committing human rights abuses. Governments may choose to use material aid to consolidate power without the fear of losing that aid, because the United States needs the agent's cooperation on a key strategic issue, such as fighting terrorism. I measure U.S. strategic interest as the presence of U.S. troops in the recipient country. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this proxy for U.S. strategic interest is imperfect in that it clearly does not capture every scenario, and includes Western countries, such as Germany and Italy, that have large U.S. bases. On average, however, I believe that sending U.S. troops to a country signals a degree of strategic

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<sup>48</sup> Although difficult to see on this map, Israel is the largest recipient. The top-five recipients include Colombia, Jordan, Poland (although it received this money in a two-year window), Egypt, and Israel. Military aid to Israel composes 42% of total military aid and Egypt 25%. For this reason, I conducted the analysis in Chapter 5 with and without both Israel and Egypt. I find that the results were largely the same and report the results with these countries included, noting any important differences.

commitment and interest.<sup>49</sup> Troop data comes from the U.S. Department of Defense, which produces yearly reports of U.S. military personnel in all applicable countries (Department of Defense 2014). The report is produced twice a year, and I used the data given for September 30 of each year to maintain consistency. Figure 8 shows the data on U.S. troops levels from 1991–2011. There is a sharp decline as the Cold War ends, and a more gradual decline since 1995. I use a binary measure of U.S. troop presence (coded one if the country had 100 or more troops per year) to examine the conditional effect of material aid. Within the data, 14% of countries have had at least 100 U.S. troops in one or more years.

**Figure 8: Total U.S. Troops across all Countries, 1991–2011**




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<sup>49</sup> As discussed above, country years in which the U.S. military played a combat role are excluded from the analysis.

The data for Hypothesis 4 on the interactive effect of oil exports and material aid comes from Michael Ross' Oil and Gas Data (M. Ross 2013). The principal-agent framework applied to U.S. military assistance revealed that recipient countries might choose to shirk on human rights policy rather than work when the benefits to pursuing this strategy outweigh the expected costs of U.S. punishment. Founded on previous research on natural resources and repression, I argued that one scenario in which the aid-receiving government may be more likely to utilize material aid to secure their power through repression is when the government possesses revenue from oil exports. Roughly 38% of the countries in my dataset export oil, and I use this binary measure for the interaction variable. Figure 9 below shows the oil export data graphically.

**Figure 9: Total Oil Exports across all Countries, 1991–2010**






My final hypotheses addressed the role of recipient regime type on the effectiveness of material aid. Previous research using foreign aid data is not conclusive on the role of regime characteristics in affecting outcome variables ranging from economic development to democratization to civil conflict. On average, foreign aid appears to be more effective in democracies and less so in autocracies. My expectations regarding how military aid will affect repression are again drawn from the principal-agent framework. I argued that when preferences on the area of “work” in the principal-agent contract are similar, the agent is more likely to fulfill her duties and not shirk. In this case, since the United States is a full democracy, I expect that recipient countries that are also full democracies will be most likely to use material aid to practice good human rights law. In contrast, full autocracies may be more likely to shirk and use material aid for repressive purposes. Partial autocracies and partial democracies represent a grey area for the theory. I argued that these countries are, on average, more likely to shirk than work on human rights practices. Partial regime types have lower GDPs on average and are more likely to experience internal unrest. In addition, their armed forces may be young, undertrained, and internally divided. Political leaders jockeying for power may not be fully constrained by the legislature and choose to use repression to deter political adversaries.

The regime data comes from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Gurr 2013). I use the Democracy and Autocracy variables in two ways. Firstly, I use the continuous variables, which are additive measures of characteristics of democratic and autocratic regimes on an 11-point scale. I also utilize four dichotomous variables for the interactions with material aid, strongly autocratic (0–4 on the additive Polity scale), partially

autocratic (5–10), strongly democratic (16–20), and partially democratic (11–15). Figure 10 below shows the distribution of total military from 1991–2011 by the four regime types. We see that full democracies do receive the most aid, while partial democracies receive the least.<sup>50</sup>

**Figure 10: Total U.S. Military Aid by Regime Type, 1991–2011**




#### 4.4 Control Variables

I also include several control variables that previous research shows affect violence and repression. GDP has been shown to be negatively associated with conflict onset while population is positively associated with conflict onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003; De Ree and Nillesen 2009; Savun and Tirone 2011). The GDP and population measures come from the World Banks' World Development Indicators (World Bank 2013). I take the log of both of these variables to account for very large and very small numbers. Figure 11 shows the amount of total military aid by GDP per capita; the blue

<sup>50</sup> Israel and Poland (in 2003) are the full democracies that receive the most aid.

bars include Israel and the red bars exclude Israel. Including Israel, the chart shows that the most aid goes to countries in the highest percentile of GDP per capita. Without Israel, we see that the United States provides the most military aid to countries in the 40-60<sup>th</sup> percentile of GDP per capita. This chart reveals that significant amounts of military aid are provided to countries in the mid-GDP per capita range (US\$(2011)3000–6,600).

**Figure 11: Total U.S. Military Aid by GDP per capita**




Five regional controls are also used (South and Latin America, the West and Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and Asia).<sup>51</sup> Figure 12 below shows the distribution of military aid by region. We can see that the MENA region,

<sup>51</sup> I include models with country fixed effects in the Appendix. North America is the excluded category.

which includes Israel and Egypt, the two largest recipients, gets the most aid overall. Aid to Asia and Africa has also notably increased in the past decade.

**Figure 12: U.S. Military Aid by Region, 1991–2011**



I also include a control variable for whether or not a country has experienced internal conflict in the current year. This data comes from the UCDP Intrastate Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Approximately 25% of country-years in the data are coded for having armed conflict in the current year. Table 3 below shows that government violence is more likely to occur in periods of civil conflict. Countries in internal conflict are already predisposed to engage in repression (Davenport 2007b), and I therefore include a model that estimates the effects of military aid on repression in countries currently involved in civil conflict.

**Table 3: Cross-tab of Government Violence and Internal Conflict**

	Government Violence=0	Government Violence=1
Conflict=0	98.8%	1.2%
Conflict=1	81.3%	18.7%

#### **4.5 Dependent Variables**


The outcome examined in this dissertation is physical integrity rights repression. Examining repression allows me to make a contribution in two areas: 1) understanding how international actors influence internal government repression, and 2) analyzing the effectiveness of an important subset of foreign aid, military assistance. I focus on physical integrity rights repression, attacks on personal security, ranging from government killing of citizens to kidnapping and torture to imprisonment. I choose to examine this definition of repression because it is most directly affected by military aid. In Chapter Three, I argued that military assistance, particularly equipment and arms, increases the potential lethality of the armed forces. Understanding how they use that increased power is the central goal of this dissertation. Under what conditions does augmented military power improve the human rights conditions in a recipient country, and what conditions affect the use of the aid for repression?

This study uses two dependent variables in order to more fully understand the conditions under which military aid affects physical integrity abuses. The two variables are one-sided violence by an aid-receiving government and physical integrity rights government repression using a five-point scale from good to bad. One-sided government violence represents the most extreme form of government repression, while the scaled

variable allows for degrees of repressive action. Using these two dependent variables allows me to consider the different expected costs of punishment for the recipient country shirking on human rights. I argue that the recipient country has a higher expectation of being caught and punished by the United States for engaging in one-sided violence than it does for engaging in torture or kidnappings.

The data on one-sided violence comes from the UCDP One-Sided Violence dataset and is coded as a binary variable for whether or not the aid-receiving government perpetrated one-sided violence (25 deaths) in that country year (Eck and Hultman 2007).<sup>52</sup> In the full dataset, there are 216 government violence country years, as shown in Figure 13 below. The number of countries with one-sided violence hovered around nine from 1993–2007, and has markedly dropped since that year.


**Figure 13: Number of Government One-Sided Violence Incidents, 1991–2010**



<sup>52</sup> See the Appendix for a negative binomial model that uses the total number of deaths per year as well as a rare events logistic model. The results are similar to those presented using the binary variable.

Figure 14 shows the percentage of FMF, FMS, and IMET funding going to recipient countries during a year with or without one-sided violence. Compared to FMS and IMET, a larger percentage of FMF goes to countries experiencing one-sided violence. One important consideration is that the United States provides military aid to countries engaged in internal conflicts—such as insurgencies—for the purpose of assisting those countries in defeating the anti-government forces. Previous research already shows that repression is more likely during conflict. Therefore, part of the spike in FMF during conflict years may be a result of U.S. strategic goals. I argue, however, that even in these cases the United States would prefer that the recipient country not use material assistance to engage in repression against the civilian population. For example, there is evidence that Ethiopian forces used U.S. military assistance targeted for counterterrorism operations to attack minority groups (Human Rights Watch 2005; Human Rights Watch 2007). The below chart indicates that the United States provides larger proportions of material assistance to conflict countries, rather than education funding. The results in Chapter Five reveal that material aid is significantly associated with a degradation of human rights, and the United States needs to think clearly about the effects of material assistance provided to countries fighting insurgencies and rebel groups.

**Figure 14: Percent of Aid during Government Violence Years, 1991–2011**



To study physical integrity rights repression, I use the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibley et al. 2013). The PTS uses data from two sources, Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. I utilize the latter for all country years. PTS measures violations of physical integrity by a state. In the Appendix, I provide results from sensitivity analysis using the Cingranelli-Richards CIRI Human Rights Project (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). CIRI’s physical integrity index is calculated on a nine-point scale in which higher scores reflect better human rights practices (the opposite of PTS). I use the PTS as the primary dependent variable because data is available for more country years than is CIRI.<sup>53</sup>

Scholars express several concerns with these measures of repression. The PTS uses a five-point scale, which has the effect of lumping countries together, particularly at

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<sup>53</sup> PTS data, however, is missing for several small countries that do receive U.S. military aid. These countries include Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts & Nevis, Tonga, and the Marshall Islands.



the top of the scale, that are highly heterogeneous. In addition, there is a lot going on “between the lines” of each point on the PTS, which quantitative research cannot draw out (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). For example, Clark and Sikkink (2013) make the point that,

Like other quantitative data, such as GDP variables commonly used in economics, human rights data are not conducive to identifying nuances or sources of behavior, and researchers cannot with much confidence use these data alone to assign causality to the trends being uncovered...Patterns related to information availability and how the scales deal with variation in the substantive nature of human rights violations can be embedded in the coding and therefore difficult to separate from patterns related to actual changes in violations.

Clark and Sikkink find that there are information effects in both PTS and CIRI; there is a correlation between human rights scores and the amount of information available in reports used for coding. Specifically, there is on average more information available for degradation of human rights than improvement. While these concerns should be taken into consideration when using the PTS and CIRI scales and interpreting results, they remain the best available cross-sectional data on physical integrity repression. The PTS levels are as follows (Gibley et al. 2013):


**Table 4: Political Terror Scale Levels**

<b>Level</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>5</b>	Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.
<b>4</b>	Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
<b>3</b>	There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
<b>2</b>	There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
<b>1</b>	Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

Figure 15 below shows the country-year frequency of PTS scores in the data.

Scores of 2 and 3 are the most common, and there are slightly less than 500 country years with a score of 4 and roughly 150 country years with a score of 5.


**Figure 15: Frequency of PTS Scores, 1991–2011**




In addition, Figure 16 shows the average PTS score by region. Not surprisingly, countries in the West and Eastern Europe have the lowest average scores, and the Americas hovers below 2.5. The other three regions do slightly worse, with scores creeping toward 3. Figure 17 displays the sums of FMS and FMF by PTS level, and Figure 18 shows FMS and FMF by PTS level for countries undergoing civil conflict. We see that FMS is more dominant in countries with lower PTS scores. FMS requires the country to have cash available to purchase equipment, which is more common for wealthy countries, which are also associated with lower PTS scores. In contrast, FMF is most common in countries scoring a 4. Removing Egypt and Israel shifts this balance to 3, though there remain few countries scoring a 1 or 2. This descriptive chart thus indicates that countries scoring a 3, 4, and 5 on the PTS receive large sums of material

aid. Figure 18 supports previous research that the likelihood of repression increases during conflict. Again, the United States may provide military assistance to help partner nations combat internal threats such as insurgencies and terrorism. Even if military assistance helps achieve this strategic goal, it is important to understand if military aid affects how the recipient military uses force: to attack rebels or to attack rebels and repress the civilian population.


**Figure 16: Average PTS Score by Region, 1991–2011**



**Figure 17: Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing by PTS Level**



**Figure 18: Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing by PTS Level during Civil Conflict**



Using two outcome variables, government one-sided violence and the Political Terror Scale, allows me to more fully examine how military aid affects physical integrity repression. The one-sided violence data falls on the extreme end of the repression scale, and my expectation is that few recipient country agents would choose to defy the U.S. principal due to the high probability of being caught and punished. Government killings of 25 or greater civilians a year is highly likely to be reported, and the United States would need to take action to distance itself from that country. In fact, I expect that military aid is likely to reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence in recipient nations. One-sided violence is very rare because the potential costs for leaders are high, and far more likely to occur during conflict. The Political Terror Scale dependent variable allows me to examine a wider range of repressive action, and provide perhaps a better test of my conditional hypotheses. Because the abuses measured by the PTS are more nuanced and less severe, I expect that there is a lower likelihood of being caught and punished by the United States. Therefore, I argued that we are likely to see material aid being used by recipient countries for mid-range repression, on average.

The following section addresses the major methodological concerns when using cross-sectional time-series data, and the chapter concludes with a summary of the models used to obtain the empirical results presented in Chapter Five.

#### **4.6 Methodological Challenges**

There are several methodological concerns with cross-sectional time-series data. Chief among these is the issue of endogeneity. In short, the concern in this study is that while military aid may affect repression, repression may in turn affect the amount of

military aid. Below, I summarize how I address endogeneity in this dissertation, followed by a discussion of other common approaches.

There are a number of tactics scholars adopt in addressing endogeneity. I choose to tackle endogeneity concerns by lagging my independent variables and by including a one-year lag of repression for the PTS models and time between government violence incidents for the one-sided violence models. In the one-sided violence models and the ordered probit PTS model, the military aid variables are averaged over a five-year period, with a one-year lag. In other words, when examining the effect of military aid on government violence in 2002, I am using the average of military aid from 1997–2001. In the Error Correction Models, I use a three-year lag of military aid.<sup>54</sup> This approach, however, does not completely eliminate concerns about endogeneity, and the results should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.<sup>55</sup>

Previous studies of foreign aid have used up to ten-year time-frame to examine the effects of aid (e.g., Clemens et al. 2012), while other studies also examined the average effect over five years (Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Bearce and Tirone 2010). I adopt this latter approach because it best accounts for the nature of military aid. Certain military aid programs fluctuate year-to-year, such as the Foreign Military Financing program and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. Since FMF allows recipient countries to

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<sup>54</sup> Detail on the primary models used is provided in the following section. I also used a two-year and five-year lag as a robustness checks. The results were similar with the two-year lag, but less strong with a five-year lag (based on predicted probabilities).

<sup>55</sup> The results of a reverse causality model are provided in the Appendix. I do not find that repression in the previous year measured by the Political Terror Scale significantly affects military aid, but one-sided violence in the previous year is negatively associated with U.S. military assistance. After three or more years, however, one-sided violence does not significantly affect military aid.

purchase equipment, we need to take into account that the equipment likely has a life extending beyond the donor year. For example, if the United States provided a country with \$500,000 in financing and the recipient country chose to purchase new automatic weapons for their security forces, those guns will probably last for several years. The United States may not provide as much money the following year, but the guns are still as plentiful and effective. The only program that doesn't vary very much in spending year-to-year is IMET. Taking the five-year average for IMET still makes sense theoretically, however, because IMET is an education program that provides training on advanced military strategy, tactics, and professionalism. This education will have an effect on the trainees for more than the donor year. I chose five years as the best number of years to take the average of because it allows the training and equipment to take effect and be in circulation for some time, but also recognizes that military technology changes rapidly and requires service, and after five years, certain equipment may become less useful or less plentiful. In addition, five years allows for officers receiving training to be in their current positions for some time, and accepts the fact that conscription in some countries lasts two to three years (Israel, for example). I begin using data in 1991, so the first country year in the analysis using the five-year average is 1996. The first country year in the three-year lagged analysis is 1994.

There is significant debate surrounding the best way to address endogeneity in time-series panel data. One of the most common ways to address the concern is using instrumental variables (e.g., De Ree and Nillesen 2009; Savun and Tirone 2011). While the instrumental variable approach is a viable option in many works, I argue that it is very difficult to find a valid instrument for military aid in the models utilized in this study.



Instrumental variables must be both exogenous and exclusionary, which are strict conditions to meet. As Rodrik wrote about this problem: “it is genuinely hard to find credible instruments which satisfy both the exogeneity and exclusion requirements” because “it is always possible to find a story about why an exogenous variable belongs as a regressor in the second-stage of the estimation (therefore making it invalid as an instrument)” (Rodrik 2005).

Scholars using the instrumental variable approach often use a combination of political, military, and strategic variables. The challenge in this study, however, is that the principal-agent theory built in Chapter Three argues that it is precisely these political-strategic factors that affect how recipient countries use the military aid. Lagged aid, on the other hand, satisfies the exogeneity and exclusion requirements (Bearce and Tirone 2010). By taking the five-year moving average of aid, lagged one year, it is causally prior to repression in the current period. If the United States gave more aid as a reward for past performance on human rights, the aid coefficient would be biased positively. I do control, however, for the previous year’s human rights score. In addition, if the United States is providing aid for the purpose of inducing reform on human rights, the coefficient could be biased in the negative direction. In addition to the models presented in the next chapter, I also provide results from a “system” generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator in the Appendix, using Roodman’s package (Roodman 2006).

In addition, I account for temporal effects in my government violence models by controlling for the time since the last year of government violence as well as a control for internal conflict. In the Political Terror Scale models, I “de-trend” the data by including the previous year’s PTS score in the model.

## 4.7 Summary of Models

In this section, I describe the models used in my analysis, the results of which appear in the following chapter. I utilize two dependent variables, one-sided government violence and the Political Terror Scale. These two variables require different methodological approaches.

The analyses of the effects of military aid on one-sided violence are conducted using a probit model.<sup>56</sup> The military aid data and economic aid data is a moving average over the five previous years. As discussed in the previous section, this approach addresses some, but not all, of the concerns about endogeneity in the model. I also include the number of years since the last incidence of government one-sided violence and three cubic splines. All models include robust standard errors. The Appendix includes additional specifications, including the negative binomial model using total fatalities to account for overdispersion, a rare events logistic model, and lagged aid data rather than the moving average. The base model appears below:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Government Violence} = & b1(\text{Material Aid 5yrAvg}) + b2(\text{Counternarcotics 5yrAvg}) \\ & + b3(\text{IMET 5yrAvg}) + b4(\text{NADR 5yrAvg}) + b5(\text{Economic Aid 5yrAvg}) + b6(\log \\ & \text{Population}) + b7(\log \text{ GDP}) + b8(\text{Democracy}) + b9(\text{Autocracy}) + b10(\text{oil exports}) \\ & + b11(\text{U.S. troops}) + b12(\text{conflict}) + b13(\text{peaceyears}) + b14(\text{West}) + b15(\text{Africa}) \\ & + b16(\text{MENA}) + b17(\text{Asia}) + b18(\text{Americas}) + \_cons \end{aligned}$$

The second dependent variable utilized in this study is the Political Terror Scale. The PTS is measured on a scale ranging from one to five, and I therefore utilize an ordered probit model. The ordered probit specification allows me to examine how military aid affects the likelihood of engaging in a certain level of repression in a given

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<sup>56</sup> I use a probit model rather than survival analysis, which is frequently used in conflict data, because I am interested in how military aid affects the onset of government violence, rather than the amount of time to conflict.


year. It does not, however, allow me to assess if military aid was in part responsible for a change in the PTS. To answer this question, I also use an error correction model, which uses the change in the PTS score year-over-year as the dependent variable. The ECM poses a difficult test for the theory, however, due to the “stickiness” of human rights scores, particularly after periods of abuse (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009; Clark and Sikkink 2013). Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) describe the challenge:

Inside the CIRI data set a country has about a one in three chance of getting better, getting worse, or staying the same from one year to the next; the improvements that do take place, however, are relatively small steps. This stickiness is even more pronounced in the PTS data set, which is less fine grained: most countries never change their practices from year to year, and when they do, the shift is usually quite small. Quite often, moreover, repression gets worse, rather than better. Such change as does occur is often small scale; few countries undergo the monumental reforms required to make citizens truly safer.

In the ECM, the lagged coefficients represent the long-term effect of military aid.

Figure 19 shows the year-over-year change in PTS scores. The vast majority of country years showed no change, but roughly 450 country years saw a one-point increase and decrease in PTS score.

**Figure 19: Year-over-Year PTS Score Change, 1991–2011**



I thus utilize the ordered probit and ECM models to paint as full a picture as possible, given the limitations of my data and analysis. Both models use robust standard errors. In the Appendix, I provide additional models using the CIRI human rights data as the dependent variable, a linear regression, an autoregressive model (Prais-Winsten), a GMM estimation (Arellano-Bond), and fixed effects. The base equations are as follows.

Ordered Probit Model:

$$\text{PTS} = b_1(\text{PTS}_{t-1}) + b_2(\text{Material Aid 5yrAvg}) + b_3(\text{IMET 5yrAvg}) + b_4(\text{NADR 5yrAvg}) + b_5(\text{Counternarcotics 5yrAvg}) + b_6(\text{Economic Aid 5yrAvg}) + b_7(\log \text{Pop}) + b_8(\log \text{GDP}) + b_9(\text{Democracy}) + b_{10}(\text{Autocracy}) + b_{11}(\text{oil exports}) + b_{12}(\text{U.S. troops}) + b_{13}(\text{conflict}) + b_{12}(\text{West}) + b_{13}(\text{Africa}) + b_{14}(\text{MENA}) + b_{15}(\text{Asia}) + b_{16}(\text{Americas}) + \text{constant}$$

Error Correction Model:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta PTS = & b1(PTS_{t-1}) + b2(2\Delta \text{Material Aid}) + b3(\text{Material Aid}_{t-3}) + b4(2\Delta \text{IMET}) \\ & + b5(\text{IMET}_{t-3}) + b6(2\Delta \text{NADR}) + b7(\text{NADR}_{t-3}) + b8(2\Delta \text{Counternarcotics}) + \\ & b9(\text{Counternarcotics}_{t-3}) + b10(2\Delta \text{Economic Aid}) + b11(\text{Economic Aid}_{t-3}) + \\ & b12(\Delta \log \text{pop}) + b13(\log \text{pop}_{t-1}) + b14(\Delta \log \text{GDP}) + b15(\log \text{GDP}_{t-1}) + b16(\text{Oil} \\ & \text{Exports}) + b17(\text{U.S. troops}) + b18(\text{Democracy}) + b19(\text{Autocracy}) + b20(\text{conflict}) \\ & + b21(\text{West}) + b22(\text{Africa}) + b23(\text{MENA}) + b24(\text{Asia}) + b25(\text{Americas}) + \\ & \text{constant} \end{aligned}$$

## 4.8 Conclusion

This chapter presented the dataset and methodological approach used to evaluate the hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. The military aid data was collected for eight security assistance programs funded by the United States, which were then grouped into four categories: material aid, education aid, counternarcotics aid, and anti-terrorism/nonproliferation aid. I also reviewed the data sources for my key conditional variables: U.S. troops, oil exports, and recipient regime type. I then presented my two dependent variables measuring physical integrity repression, government one-sided violence and the Political Terror Scale. Finally, I reviewed the endogeneity challenge that faces time-series panel data, and argued that using a lag of the aid variable—specifically, a five-year moving average with a one-year lag—is the best approach for addressing the endogeneity concern in this study. The following chapter reveals the empirical results for the models presented above.

## Chapter 5. Quantitative Results

Does international military assistance impact the use of repression by recipient armed forces? Previous research has not fully explored this question. Specifically, most existing studies do not disaggregate military assistance from foreign aid, and further, they do not account for the different types of military aid provided: material, education, and targeted programs. In addition, research on foreign aid is inconclusive on how aid affects repression in recipient countries (Hafner-Burton 2014). I argue that this gap exists in part due to the failure to fully theorize and empirically investigate the role of military assistance. This dissertation enhances the current literature on foreign aid and repression by clarifying a theoretical approach to understanding the strategic interaction between the donor of military aid and the recipient, and it introduces the use of disaggregated military aid data.

In Chapter Three, I used principal-agent theory to guide my expectations about how military aid affects repression. I argued that the United States provides military aid to the recipient country to act as an agent of the United States in reducing instability and providing security within their sovereign territory. The U.S. goal is that the recipient country uses the military aid to professionalize its forces and improve military effectiveness to counter threats such as insurgencies, terrorist safe havens, weapons trafficking, and illegal drug trade. Improved military capacity, however, also increases the potential for repression. The hypotheses discussed in Chapter Three describe the conditions under which I expect military aid to affect physical repression. I made the case that the most critical variable is the type of funding program through which the United States provides aid, and I argued that material aid was more likely to increase the risk of

human rights abuses. In this chapter, I test my hypotheses, providing empirical results and discussing substantive significance.

The first section provides results using government one-sided violence as the dependent variable. I argued that recipient countries view the expected costs of punishment for engaging in one-sided violence—defined as killing 25 or more civilians in a year—as high. I thus expected that all military aid programs would reduce the likelihood of one-sided violence. In short, I find that education assistance and the NADR program reduce the likelihood that a recipient government will engage in one-sided violence. The coefficient on material aid is insignificant. One-sided violence is such an overall rare event that these results are not surprising. These results on one-sided violence indicate that the recipient government sees the expected costs of punishment by the United States for killing civilians as very high, and military education and NADR aid, among other factors, may help deter the armed forces from committing egregious human rights abuses. However, we need to be circumspect in attributing much causal value to the results, as the reverse causality test indicated that one-sided violence in the previous year is negatively associated with military aid.<sup>57</sup>

The subsequent section in this chapter uses the Political Terror Scale as the dependent variable, allowing me to investigate a wider range of repressive tactics. As discussed in the previous chapter, I provide results for both an ordered probit model and an error correction model. In support of Hypothesis 1.2, I find that when I expand the types of human rights abuses examined, U.S. material assistance is associated with higher levels of physical integrity repression. I also find support for hypotheses 4 and 6: material

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<sup>57</sup> One-sided violence three or more years in the past does not significantly affect military aid.

aid to countries with oil exports is associated with an increased risk of repression while material aid to democratic countries is less likely to lead to repression. While these results indicate the need for additional research on how certain government characteristics influence the use of military aid, they provide some interesting insight on the real (in)ability of military assistance to improve human rights records. The following sections discuss these results in greater detail.

### **5.1 Military Aid and One-Sided Government Violence**

As discussed in the previous chapter, the one-sided violence data comes from the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset, and I use a probit model with aid averaged over the past five years.<sup>58</sup> I argued that recipient countries have a greater expectation for being caught and punished by the United States for one-sided violence, making the costs outweigh the benefits for this type of extreme human rights abuse. One-sided violence incidents are rare, 216 country years, indicating that few governments see a benefit in engaging in this type of repression. Table 5 provides the results for four models: disaggregated aid, disaggregated aid during conflict, Foreign Military Sales added to material aid, and Foreign Military Sales as a control variable.

The results of the base model in column one reveal that on average, education aid and the NADR program significantly reduce the likelihood of a recipient government engaging in one-sided violence, supporting Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 1.1 is not supported: material aid does not affect one-sided violence. It is not clear from this model, however, whether education and NADR assistance helps generate real institutional

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<sup>58</sup> Additional models are provided in the Appendix, including a rare events logistic model, negative binomial model, and a probit model using lagged military aid.



change or whether the effect is solely based on fear of future aid sanctions, or other omitted variables. We also cannot rule out the possibility that the results are driven by U.S. response to government violence in previous years.

Control variables for GDP, regime type, oil exports, and U.S. troops are not statistically significant. As expected, internal conflict in the repression year significantly increases the prospects for government violence. The time since the last year of government one-sided violence is also negative and significant.

The second column includes only those country years in which conflict occurred. In this model, there are 310 observations and 73 years of government violence.<sup>59</sup> We see that NADR and counternarcotics aid are negative and significant, but the coefficient on IMET is no longer significant. Given the limited data, however, we need to be cautious in interpreting these results. One important consideration is that the United States may be providing military assistance—and economic assistance—to countries involved in civil conflicts to help fight insurgencies and rebel groups. This is certainly the case in Mali and Colombia, for example. The goal of aid to these countries is thus to eliminate the threat of insurgency to the government.<sup>60</sup> Despite a largely strategic goal in providing aid to conflict countries, it is important to consider how the military assistance is used. In Colombia, for example, there are concerns that paramilitary forces killed civilians to boost the count of guerrillas killed (*Morning Star* 2008). The statistics in column two indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that material aid has no effect on one-

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<sup>59</sup> Israel accounts for eight years of government violence in this model. Most other countries are in Africa, as well as Colombia, Guatemala, Nepal, and India.

<sup>60</sup> In most cases, I would argue that the U.S. is acting out of strategic interest: aid to Colombia to combat FARC was aimed at reducing the drug trade, and many insurgent groups in Africa pose a terrorist threat.

sided violence during conflict years.<sup>61</sup> The good news for the United States is that countries receiving military aid through programs with higher levels of oversight and less arms—IMET, NADR, and counternarcotics—are less likely to commit one-sided violence.

Economic aid is associated with an increase in the likelihood of government violence in the conflict model. This result for economic assistance falls in line with research on the effectiveness of aid that finds a relationship between aid and conflict and aid and military spending (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Nielsen et al. 2011; Kono and Montinola 2012). However, other analyses indicate that economic assistance takes up to ten years to be effective (Clemens et al. 2012). Finally, I note that in a model that drops Israel, economic aid remains significant, but the effect of an increase in assistance is smaller. The economic aid variable I use here is not disaggregated, and future research will be necessary to evaluate the interactive effects of economic and military assistance.

The final two columns provide the results for the effect of Foreign Military Sales on repression. Interestingly, neither FMS by itself nor material aid added to FMS is significant. This runs contrary to results from the Cold War (Blanton 1999). However, looking closely at the countries making large purchases indicates that these countries are relatively stable and do not have the predisposition to engage in one-sided violence, with the notable exceptions of Israel and Egypt. Other large purchasers include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Great Britain, Australia, Germany, Canada, and Turkey.

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<sup>61</sup> An interesting future analysis will be to consider the effects of material aid several years after the conclusion of civil conflicts.

**Table 5: One-Sided Government Violence and Disaggregated Military Aid**

	Disaggregated Aid	Disaggregated Aid, conflict years	Material Aid+FMS	FMS
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
Material Aid 5yrAvg	0.014 (0.013)	-0.0027 (0.021)		0.017 (0.014)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.061* (0.034)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.037*** (0.014)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.014)
NADR 5yrAvg	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.059** (0.029)	-0.041** (0.019)	-0.042** (0.019)
Material Aid+FMS 5yrAvg			0.0047 (0.013)	
FMS 5yrAvg				-0.0053 (0.014)
Economic Aid 5yrAvg	0.032 (0.030)	0.063* (0.034)	0.040 (0.030)	0.030 (0.030)
Log population	0.30*** (0.094)	0.15 (0.16)	0.27*** (0.091)	0.30*** (0.094)
Log GDP	-0.12 (0.079)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.079)	-0.12 (0.081)
Autocracy	-0.0022 (0.051)	0.055 (0.097)	0.0053 (0.049)	-0.0029 (0.051)
Democracy	-0.011 (0.042)	0.077 (0.082)	-0.0058 (0.042)	-0.011 (0.042)
Oil Exports	0.13 (0.16)	0.41 (0.25)	0.11 (0.17)	0.11 (0.17)
US Troops	-0.32 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.56)	-0.28 (0.33)	-0.30 (0.33)
Conflict	0.79*** (0.15)		0.80*** (0.15)	0.79*** (0.15)
Time since last one-sided violence	-0.99*** (0.20)	-1.18*** (0.28)	-1.01*** (0.20)	-0.98*** (0.20)
West	2.99*** (0.35)	3.31*** (0.65)	3.32*** (0.35)	3.22*** (0.36)
Africa	3.30*** (0.35)	2.63*** (0.65)	3.66*** (0.33)	3.56*** (0.35)
MENA	3.17*** (0.33)	2.74*** (0.62)	3.53*** (0.31)	3.44*** (0.33)
Asia	3.08*** (0.33)	2.77*** (0.62)	3.41*** (0.32)	3.34*** (0.34)
Americas	2.79*** (0.48)	2.89*** (0.53)	3.11*** (0.47)	3.05*** (0.50)
Constant	-6.16*** (1.35)	-1.76 (2.07)	-6.65*** (1.33)	-6.50*** (1.35)
Observations	2,232	310	2,232	2,232


Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1


Because this is a probit model, the coefficients tell us the direction of the relationship, but not the strength of that relationship. I therefore show the predicted probabilities for a marginal change in key independent variables while holding the other variables at their means with 95% confidence intervals.

Examining the substantive significance of the effects of IMET funding on government one-sided violence reveals that a change in IMET funding from 0 to 12 (converted from the inverse hyperbolic sine, \$0 to \$100,000 per year) decreases the likelihood of one-sided government violence by 1.2 percentage points. While this is not a large number, I would argue that it is substantively significant, considering the small amounts of IMET funding relative to other types of military aid and economic aid. Increasing NADR funding from the 0 to 12 (\$0 to \$100,000 per year) reduces the risk of one-sided violence by half a percentage point. Figures 20 and 21 show this effect graphically.

**Figure 20: Effect of IMET on Government Violence**




**Figure 21: Effect of NADR on Government Violence**




The following two figures show the effect of NADR and counternarcotics aid on the predicted probability of government violence during conflict years. Again, these results should be interpreted with caution, given the limited number of conflict years in the data. Increasing NADR aid to 12 (\$100,000) reduced the predicted probability of one-sided violence by 10 percentage points. Finally, a similar increase in counternarcotics funding reduced the predicted probability of one-sided violence by 12 percentage points.

**Figure 22: Effect of NADR on Government Violence during Conflict**



**Figure 23: Effect of Counternarcotics on Government Violence during Conflict**



The next set of models investigates Hypothesis 3 and 4. I argued that the effect of material aid on recipient countries is conditional on the strategic interest of the United States in providing the aid. If the United States provides aid for the purpose of protecting its strategic interests, it most likely has long-term interests in the recipient country and

region and is less likely to punish the recipient country for human rights abuses and withdraw aid. I measure U.S. strategic interest as the presence of U.S. troops on the ground.

I also argued that the effects of military aid might be conditional on what the recipient country has to gain from “shirking”. If the potential gains from engaging in human rights abuses outweigh the expected punishment from the United States, the recipient country is more likely to utilize repressive measures. One reason that the recipient country may choose to engage in repression is to protect its revenue stream. Previous research found that countries with oil exports are more likely to utilize violence to protect that windfall (M. Ross 2001; M. Ross 2004). In addition, profits from oil lessen the recipient country’s dependence on foreign aid, potentially weakening the principal-agent relationship.

Using the one-sided violence dependent variable, Table 6 shows that the effect of military aid is not conditional on oil exports or the number of U.S. troops in the recipient country. It therefore appears that recipient countries predict that the expected costs of punishment from the United States for engaging in the highest level of repression are very high, and that there are few conditions that would provide sufficient benefits that outweigh the expected costs. Again, one-sided violence is a very rare event, and few governments choose this tactic of repression. A government engaging in one-sided violence might face sanctions, reputational costs, and increased dissent at home.

**Table 6: Effect of U.S. Troops and Oil Exports on Government Violence**

	Payoff Hypothesis: Oil Exports	Strategic Hypothesis: U.S. Troops
	Coefficient	Coefficient
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Oil Exports	-0.0039 (0.018)	
Material Aid 5yrAvg*US Troops		0.017 (0.032)
Material Aid 5yrAvg	0.015 (0.014)	0.013 (0.012)
Oil Exports	0.15 (0.21)	0.12 (0.16)
US Troops	-0.30 (0.31)	-0.53 (0.51)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.038*** (0.014)
NADR 5yrAvg	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.042** (0.019)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.017 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.022)
Economic Aid 5yrAvg	0.032 (0.030)	0.030 (0.030)
Democracy	-0.011 (0.042)	-0.0099 (0.042)
Autocracy	-0.0027 (0.050)	-0.0023 (0.051)
Log population	0.30*** (0.093)	0.29*** (0.093)
Log GDP	-0.13 (0.079)	-0.12 (0.078)
Conflict	0.79*** (0.15)	0.80*** (0.15)
Time since last One-sided Violence	-0.99*** (0.20)	-0.99*** (0.20)
West	2.99*** (0.35)	3.26*** (0.36)
Africa	3.30*** (0.35)	3.56*** (0.36)
MENA	3.17*** (0.32)	3.40*** (0.34)
Asia	3.07*** (0.34)	3.33*** (0.34)
Americas	2.78*** (0.48)	3.06*** (0.48)
Constant	-6.13*** (1.35)	-6.39*** (1.35)
Observations	2,232	2,232


Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1




In order to fully examine the interactive effects of material aid and oil exports and U.S. troops, I provide the predicted probability of one-sided violence following a discrete change in oil exports and troops while holding all other variables at their means, as shown in Figures 24 and 25. The figures reveal that that the effect of a discrete change in oil exports and U.S. troops does not have a significant effect on the probability of government violence.

**Figure 24: Effect of a Discrete Change in Oil Exports on Government Violence**



**Figure 25: Effect of a Discrete Change in U.S. Troops on Government Violence**



Finally, Table 8 shows the results for Hypotheses 5 and 6 on the interactive effects of regime type and material aid on government one-sided violence. I expected that preference similarity on human rights between the United States and the recipient country—proxied by regime type—would affect how material aid impacted repression.<sup>62</sup> I argued that because the United States is a full democracy that does not engage in domestic human rights abuses due to accountability and norms, recipient countries were more likely to have similar ex ante preferences on human rights, and were unlikely to use material aid for this purpose. The results indicate that the effect of material aid is conditional on regime type. Again, it is necessary to examine predicted probabilities to

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<sup>62</sup> Full democracy is measured as 16 or better on the additive Polity IV scale, and partial democracy and autocracy are measured as 11–15 and 5–10, respectively. The dropped variable in this model is Full Autocracy, because this represents the least number of country years in the data (18%). When the dropped variable is full democracy or partial democracy, the interaction with full autocracy is not significant.

understand the effects of a discrete change in the regime type variables on one-sided violence. Due to the limited number of years of one-sided violence in the data and the vast amounts of aid provided to Israel, these results on regime type need to be interpreted with some caution.<sup>63</sup>

**Table 7: Effect of Regime Type on Government Violence**

	Regime Type
	Coefficient
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Full Democracy	0.082*** (0.025)
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Partial Democracy	0.041 (0.033)
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Partial Autocracy	0.054* (0.031)
Material Aid 5yrAvg	-0.037 (0.023)
Full Democracy	-0.74*** (0.26)
Partial Democracy	-0.28 (0.28)
Partial Autocracy	-0.22 (0.23)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.021 (0.016)
NADR 5yrAvg	-0.043** (0.019)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.012 (0.021)
Economic Aid 5yrAvg	0.036 (0.031)
Log Population	0.35*** (0.091)
Log GDP	-0.16** (0.075)
Oil Exports	0.083 (0.16)
US Troops	-0.28 (0.31)
Conflict	0.79*** (0.15)


<sup>63</sup> The results were the same when I dropped Israel, which is coded as a full democracy and has 8 years of government violence. Full democracies with one-sided violence years include Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Dropping Colombia and Israel renders the coefficient insignificant.

Time since last One-sided Violence	-0.91*** (0.19)
West	3.27*** (0.37)
Africa	3.47*** (0.35)
MENA	3.39*** (0.33)
Asia	3.30*** (0.33)
Americas	3.25*** (0.41)
Constant	-6.42*** (1.33)
Observations	2,284


Robust standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Again, the coefficients on the interaction terms in the table tell us little about the true statistical and substantive effect of regime type. Figures 26, 27, and 28 provide the predicted probabilities for the effect of material aid on one-sided violence when the recipient is a full democracy, partial democracy, and partial autocracy. We see that the predicted probability of violence is roughly half a percentage point higher when the recipient country is not a full democracy, supporting Hypothesis 5. Neither the effect of a discrete change in partial democracy nor partial autocracy is significant.


**Figure 26: Effect of Full Democracy on Government Violence**



**Figure 27: Effect of Partial Democracy on Government Violence**



**Figure 28: Effect of Partial Autocracy on Government Violence**



The results displayed in this section reveal that certain military aid programs do have a negative and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of recipient countries engaging in one-sided violence. Looking in more detail at the disaggregated aid programs, I find support for Hypothesis 2: both IMET and NADR funding are associated with a reduced likelihood of government violence. I also find that material aid to full democracies reduces the likelihood of one-sided violence. All of these results, however, must be interpreted with caution due to the nature of the one-sided violence data and the results of the reverse causality analysis. This data measures only government killing of 25 or more civilians each year, and there are only 216 country years of government violence in the dataset. Outright killing of civilians falls at the extreme end of physical integrity rights repression, and I would surmise that most countries that receive U.S. military aid

would expect punishment in terms of aid sanctions for engaging in such extreme repression. Alternatively, the likelihood of one-sided violence in individual countries may also be the results of omitted cultural and historical variables. That being said, it is clear that military aid continues to countries with one-sided violence years, including Israel, Colombia, and Ethiopia.

Keeping in mind that the United States sanctions countries for previous one-sided violence, the policy upside for the United States is that the IMET and NADR programs may help improve human rights in recipient countries, although this model cannot evaluate whether that improvement is due to the education and training offered through these programs, the fear of sanctions should the recipient engage in repression, or intervening factors. U.S. program officers for IMET express optimism that the training improves interoperability with the U.S. Army as well as increases the professionalism of the foreign officers. Regional military exercises offer the opportunity for renewing training and relationships.<sup>64</sup> At the least, the results of the disaggregated aid models validate examining each program separately, while controlling for the others. The following section continues my analysis of the effects of military aid on repression by using a new dependent variable, the Political Terror Scale. The results are different from those of the one-sided violence model, pointing to the necessity of measuring physical integrity rights in different ways.

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<sup>64</sup> Interview with U.S. Army Officer, July 2013.

## 5.2 Military Aid and Political Terror

The next set of results utilizes the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as the dependent variable of human rights. The PTS measures physical integrity rights on a scale from one to five, with one being low levels of political terror and five high. The PTS allows me to examine the effects of military aid on slightly more nuanced levels of physical integrity rights abuses.

I examine the effects of military aid on the PTS through the lens of two models: an ordered probit model and an error correction model. The former allows me to understand how military aid affects the likelihood of a country falling into any one of the five PTS levels while the latter model studies how military aid affects a *change* in the PTS level. Because the PTS is only a five-point scale and because previous research has found that PTS scores tend to be “sticky” over time (Clark and Sikkink 2013), the ECM is a “tough” model for my theory. The ordered probit results are generated using military aid as a five-year average and the ECM results utilize military aid lagged three years.<sup>65</sup>

Table 9 shows the results for the base ordered probit model. Disaggregating military aid again provides insight into how security assistance affects recipient country repression. The first column provides the results of the base model with disaggregated aid programs and the control variables. In this case, material aid and economic aid are positively associated with higher scores on the PTS. This supports Hypothesis 1.2, which stated that material aid is more likely to be associated with physical integrity repression than education funding. As I argued in Chapter Three, material aid advances the lethality

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<sup>65</sup> Additional models in the Appendix include results using lagged aid, CIRI data, autoregressive model, GMM model, and fixed effects.



of recipient armed forces and is subject to less oversight than education and targeting funding programs program. IMET funding is the expected direction, negative, but is not statistically significant. Previous repression, economic aid, population, and conflict are also positively associated with the PTS, while democracy and GDP are negatively associated with repression.

The second column shows the effects of disaggregate aid on the PTS during conflict years. None of the explanatory variables are significant in the model, but again we need to note the small number of conflict years in the sample, 265. As I discussed in the previous section on one-sided violence, the United States may be providing military aid to countries in internal conflicts to aid in the fight against insurgencies or terrorist groups. I argued that the goal of this aid is largely strategic, but the United States still prefers that the recipient armed forces not engage in repression against civilians.<sup>66</sup> The results indicate that U.S. military aid to countries during conflict years does not significantly affect the likelihood of repression.

The final columns show the results of adding Foreign Military Sales to the equation. We see that FMS is actually negatively associated with Political Terror, while adding material aid to FMS renders the variable insignificant. Material aid is still positive and significant controlling for FMS. This finding on FMS runs contrary to previous research that has related arms sales to human rights abuses, though the time frame studied was the Cold War (Blanton 1999). As was the case with one-sided violence, it appears that equipment acquired through FMS does not have the same effect as FMF. I expect

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<sup>66</sup> In future research, I plan to collect more data on the U.S. policy rational for providing aid to individual countries, specifically looking for evidence that the United States is supporting government forces in an internal conflict.

that this is due in large part to the fact that FMS, on average, is purchased by developed countries with higher GDPs and lower levels of domestic instability.<sup>67</sup> The results support my decision to investigate the affects of military aid separately from sales, as it appears that a different causal process is at work.

**Table 8: Effect of Disaggregated Aid on the PTS, Ordered Probit**

	Disaggregated Aid	Disaggregated Aid, Conflict Years	Material Aid+FMS	FMS
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	1.29*** (0.052)	1.34*** (0.12)	1.30*** (0.052)	1.29*** (0.052)
Material Aid 5yrAvg	0.0090* (0.0056)	-0.0035 (0.014)		0.014** (0.0062)
Material Aid+FMS 5yrAvg			-0.0063 (0.0053)	
FMS 5yrAvg				-0.012** (0.0056)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	0.011 (0.0064)	-0.012 (0.019)	0.013** (0.0064)	0.012* (0.0064)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.0013 (0.0067)	-0.029 (0.020)	0.0079 (0.0060)	0.00058 (0.0067)
NADR 5yrAvg	0.0073 (0.0057)	0.011 (0.014)	0.0091 (0.0057)	0.0082 (0.0057)
Economic Aid 5yrAvg	0.025*** (0.0062)	-0.023 (0.022)	0.026*** (0.0062)	0.022*** (0.0064)
Log Population	0.26*** (0.035)	-0.046 (0.13)	0.24*** (0.035)	0.25*** (0.035)
Log GDP	-0.061** (0.029)	0.017 (0.100)	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.038 (0.031)
Democracy	-0.066*** (0.017)	0.0075 (0.053)	-0.062*** (0.017)	-0.068*** (0.017)
Autocracy	-0.0062 (0.020)	0.039 (0.067)	-0.0025 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.020)
Oil Exports	0.036 (0.062)	-0.049 (0.19)	0.013 (0.062)	0.0089 (0.062)
US Troops	-0.072 (0.084)	0.12 (0.27)	-0.029 (0.089)	-0.017 (0.089)
West	0.10 (0.21)	1.72*** (0.31)	0.15 (0.21)	0.062 (0.21)
Africa	0.49** (0.22)	1.55*** (0.43)	0.52** (0.22)	0.49** (0.22)

<sup>67</sup> Again, Israel and Egypt are important exceptions.

MENA	0.44** (0.22)	1.39*** (0.37)	0.50** (0.22)	0.43* (0.22)
Asia	0.29 (0.21)	1.68*** (0.32)	0.32 (0.21)	0.27 (0.21)
Americas	0.53** (0.21)	1.51*** (0.40)	0.55*** (0.21)	0.51** (0.21)
Conflict	0.50*** (0.083)		0.50*** (0.083)	0.50*** (0.083)
cut1 Constant	4.35*** (0.52)	3.21** (1.49)	4.59*** (0.53)	4.65*** (0.53)
cut2 Constant	6.48*** (0.53)	4.64*** (1.54)	6.72*** (0.54)	6.78*** (0.55)
cut3 Constant	8.59*** (0.55)	6.98*** (1.56)	8.83*** (0.57)	8.90*** (0.57)
cut4 Constant	10.6*** (0.58)		10.8*** (0.59)	10.9*** (0.60)
Observations	2,281	265	2,281	2,281

Robust standard errors in parentheses


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figure 29 below shows the probability of scoring each level of the PTS while holding the variables at their averages. The predicted probabilities were calculated using the model that included Israel, and we see that scoring a 2 or 3 on the PTS is the most likely outcome.


The substantive effects of material aid are small, as show in Figure 30. The graph displays the effect of a marginal change in material aid on the probability of scoring each level on the PTS, while holding the other variables at their mean values. We see that as material aid increases, the likelihood of scoring a 2 decreases and the likelihood of scoring a 3 and 4 increases. From a U.S. policy perspective, however, these effects are still worthy of consideration. For example, material aid may be undermining the effects of other types of military and economic assistance. Moreover, the United States needs to be cautious about whose hands the arms and equipment end up in. From the recipient country’s perspective, material aid provides a “free” source of revenue for the leadership,

which in some countries may provide sufficient revenue to reduce the costs of public goods suppression (Smith 2008).

**Figure 29: Effect of Means on the PTS**



**Figure 30: Effect of Material Aid on the PTS**



The above models, however, do not elucidate whether material aid is affecting a year-over-year change in repression, an issue that an error correction model seeks to address. In the previous ordered probit model, I used a five-year average of military aid and a lagged dependent variable. Alternatively, the following ECM uses the change in the PTS as the dependent variable and includes a lag of PTS, a three-year lag of the military aid variables, and change of the military aid variable two years prior on the right-hand side of the equation. Neither model, however, completely assuages the reverse causality concern.

The ECM using disaggregated aid, shown in column 1, reveals that material aid has a very small, significant positive effect on change in the PTS, again providing evidence for Hypothesis 1.2 that material aid may have the effect of empowering the recipient armed forces to increase repression.<sup>68</sup> None of the other types of military aid were significant. Economic aid and population also had a small, statistically significant effect, while democracy had a negative effect. The second model included only conflict years, and in this model, material aid did not have a significant effect, but IMET had a significant and negative effect. During conflict years, providing education funding might limit the likelihood that the armed forces engage in repression. The final two models show the results for Foreign Military Financing. FMS on its own has a negative effect on the PTS, again revealing that sales and aid have different effects. When I include sales, the coefficient on counternarcotics is also significant and positive, running contrary to my expectations.

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<sup>68</sup> The size of the coefficient on material aid is very small; converting it from its inverse hyperbolic sine forms gives a value of slightly less than .1.

**Table 9: Effect of Disaggregated Aid on Year-over-Year Change in the PTS**

	Disaggregated Aid	Disaggregated Aid, Conflict Years	Material Aid+FMS	FMS
	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.37*** (0.017)	-0.46*** (0.061)	-0.37*** (0.017)	-0.37*** (0.017)
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0016* (0.0013)	0.0078 (0.0055)		0.0033* (0.0019)
Material Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0016 (0.0013)	0.0033 (0.0038)		-0.0016 (0.0013)
Material Aid+FMS <sub>t-3</sub>			-0.0014 (0.0020)	
Material Aid+FMS <sub>Δ2</sub>			-0.0023 (0.0017)	
FMS <sub>t-3</sub>				-0.0042** (0.0021)
FMS <sub>Δ2</sub>				0.0024 (0.0020)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0036 (0.0023)	-0.0048 (0.0066)	0.0039* (0.0023)	0.0039* (0.0023)
Counternarcotics <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00046 (0.0014)	-0.0040 (0.0045)	-0.00021 (0.0014)	-0.00031 (0.0014)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.00062 (0.0024)	-0.024*** (0.0073)	0.0019 (0.0022)	0.00076 (0.0024)
IMET <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0017 (0.0022)	0.0012 (0.0048)	-0.0016 (0.0023)	-0.0014 (0.0022)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>		0.0078* (0.0046)	0.0021 (0.0020)	0.0020 (0.0020)
NADR <sub>Δ2</sub>		-0.0018 (0.0030)	-0.00040 (0.0015)	-0.00045 (0.0015)
Economic Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0068** (0.0031)	-0.020** (0.0084)	0.010*** (0.0023)	0.0095*** (0.0023)
Economic Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.0024 (0.0023)	0.014*** (0.0041)	0.00069 (0.0019)	0.00076 (0.0019)
Democracy	-0.039*** (0.0077)	0.015 (0.027)	-0.037*** (0.0077)	-0.038*** (0.0077)
Autocracy	-0.012 (0.0090)	0.022 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.0090)	-0.015 (0.0091)
Log Population <sub>t-1</sub>	0.041*** (0.0079)	0.11** (0.053)	0.042*** (0.0081)	0.041*** (0.0081)
Log Population <sub>Δ</sub>	-1.26 (0.96)	-4.18 (5.68)	-1.13 (0.96)	-1.01 (0.96)
Log GDP <sub>t-1</sub>	0.030*** (0.0097)	-0.11** (0.052)	0.030*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.011)
Log GDP <sub>Δ</sub>	0.027 (0.096)	0.076 (0.30)	0.037 (0.096)	0.032 (0.096)
Oil Exports	-0.0027 (0.027)	-0.050 (0.099)	-0.0063 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.027)
US Troops	-0.058 (0.036)	-0.066 (0.12)	-0.060 (0.037)	-0.052 (0.037)
West	0.043 (0.078)	0.18 (0.24)	0.045 (0.079)	0.029 (0.080)

Africa	0.25*** (0.088)	-0.26 (0.25)	0.26*** (0.089)	0.26*** (0.089)
MENA	0.18** (0.087)	-0.022 (0.20)	0.20** (0.087)	0.19** (0.088)
Asia	0.18** (0.082)	0.035 (0.20)	0.18** (0.083)	0.17** (0.084)
Americas	0.22*** (0.086)		0.23*** (0.086)	0.23*** (0.087)
Conflict	0.28*** (0.038)		0.28*** (0.038)	0.28*** (0.038)
Constant	-0.59*** (0.22)	3.36*** (0.99)	-0.60*** (0.23)	-0.67*** (0.23)
Observations	2,257	265	2,262	2,262
R-squared	0.201	0.310	0.197	0.200

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The next set of results address my hypotheses that the effect of military aid on repression is conditional on the U.S. reason for providing aid and the payoff to the recipient country for “shirking”. Table 10 displays the results for the interaction between material aid and the presence of U.S. troops as well as material aid and whether or not the country exports oil. The interaction with U.S. troops is significant, and an F-test shows that I can’t reject the null hypothesis that U.S. troop presence has no effect on repression. Predicted probabilities of a discrete change in the presence of U.S. troops reveal that the results run contrary to my expectations, as shown in Figures 31 and 32. U.S. Troops increase the likelihood of scoring a 2 on the PTS. Alternatively, U.S. troop presence may not be a good proxy for strategic priority.<sup>69</sup> The strategic hypothesis is one that is often mentioned by U.S. officials on the ground, and is born out by formal theory (Bapat 2011).

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<sup>69</sup> Interaction terms using a U.S. base and a defensive alliance as the strategic variable were also not significant.

Future research will seek to find an accurate measurement for strategic priority, and further investigate this hypothesis quantitatively and qualitatively.<sup>70</sup>

The predicted probabilities for the oil exports and material aid interaction reveal that countries with oil exports are slightly less likely to score a 2 on the PTS and more likely to score a 4, providing support for Hypothesis 4. This result indicates, perhaps, that oil exporters do not fear punishment from the United States and therefore use material aid to repress.

**Table 10: Effect of U.S. Troops and Oil Exports on the PTS, Ordered Probit**

	Strategic Hypothesis, US Troops	Strategic Hypothesis, Oil Exports
	Coefficient	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	1.29*** (0.052)	1.28*** (0.052)
Material Aid 5yrAvg*US Troops	0.024** (0.011)	
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Oil Exports		-0.021*** (0.0079)
Material Aid 5yrAvg	0.0054 (0.0058)	0.018*** (0.0065)
US Troops	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.070 (0.084)
Oil Exports	0.035 (0.062)	0.18** (0.082)
NADR 5yrAvg	0.0086 (0.0057)	0.0078 (0.0057)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	0.0089 (0.0065)	0.012* (0.0064)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.0030 (0.0067)	-0.00031 (0.0067)
Economic Aid 5yrAvg	0.025*** (0.0062)	0.024*** (0.0062)
Democracy	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.065*** (0.017)
Autocracy	-0.0062 (0.020)	-0.0069 (0.020)

<sup>70</sup> For example, other proxies for strategic importance are whether the recipient country pledged troops for a coalition operation, or whether the United States provided military aid in support of the War on Terror.




Log Population	0.25*** (0.035)	0.27*** (0.035)
Log GDP	-0.052* (0.029)	-0.074** (0.029)
West	0.064 (0.21)	0.16 (0.21)
Africa	0.46** (0.22)	0.56** (0.22)
MENA	0.37* (0.22)	0.49** (0.22)
Asia	0.26 (0.21)	0.33 (0.21)
Americas	0.50** (0.21)	0.57*** (0.21)
Conflict	0.49*** (0.083)	0.50*** (0.083)
cut1 Constant	4.38*** (0.52)	4.34*** (0.51)
cut2 Constant	6.51*** (0.53)	6.48*** (0.53)
cut3 Constant	8.65*** (0.55)	8.60*** (0.55)
cut4 Constant	10.6*** (0.58)	10.6*** (0.58)
Observations	2,281	2,281


Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


**Figure 31: Effect of U.S. Troops on Scoring a 2 on the PTS**




**Figure 32: Effect of U.S. Troops on Scoring a 4 on the PTS**



**Figure 33: Effect of Oil Exports on Scoring a 2 on the PTS**



**Figure 34: Effect of Oil Exports on Scoring a 4 on the PTS**



The ECM for the interactions between military aid and U.S. troops and oil exports is shown in Table 11. The results are slightly different from the ordered probit model: the interaction between military and troops is not significant. The result for the oil exports interaction, however, is similar.

**Table 11: Effect of U.S. Troops and Oil Exports on Year-over-Year Change in the PTS**

	Strategic Hypothesis, US Troops	Payoff Hypothesis, Oil Exports
	Coefficient	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.37*** (0.017)	-0.37*** (0.017)
Material Aid*Troops <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0050 (0.0038)	
Material Aid*Troops <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.0025 (0.0027)	
Material Aid*Oil Exports <sub>t-3</sub>		-0.0054** (0.0027)
Material Aid*Oil Exports <sub>Δ2</sub>		-0.00095 (0.0022)
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0015 (0.0019)	0.0042* (0.0021)
Material Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0020 (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.0015)
US Troops	-0.098** (0.039)	-0.070* (0.036)
Oil Exports	-0.000043 (0.027)	0.027 (0.030)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0019 (0.0020)	0.0018 (0.0020)
NADR <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00038 (0.0014)	-0.00047 (0.0015)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0035 (0.0023)	0.0039* (0.0023)
Counternarcotics <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00024 (0.0014)	-0.00022 (0.0014)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.00020 (0.0023)	0.00040 (0.0023)
IMET <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0014 (0.0022)	-0.0013 (0.0022)
Economic Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.010*** (0.0023)	0.0098*** (0.0023)
Economic Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.00063 (0.0019)	0.00070 (0.0019)
Democracy	-0.037*** (0.0077)	-0.038*** (0.0077)
Autocracy	-0.013 (0.0090)	-0.014 (0.0090)
Log Population <sub>t-1</sub>	0.044*** (0.0081)	0.045*** (0.0082)
Log Population <sub>Δ</sub>	-1.15 (0.96)	-1.33 (0.96)
Log GDP <sub>t-1</sub>	0.028*** (0.0097)	0.026*** (0.0097)
Log GDP <sub>Δ</sub>	0.030 (0.096)	0.029 (0.095)
West	0.028	0.046

	(0.080)	(0.080)
Africa	0.25***	0.27***
	(0.088)	(0.089)
MENA	0.17**	0.20**
	(0.088)	(0.088)
Asia	0.17**	0.19**
	(0.083)	(0.084)
Americas	0.22**	0.24***
	(0.086)	(0.087)
Conflict	0.27***	0.28***
	(0.038)	(0.038)
Constant	-0.56**	-0.56**
	(0.22)	(0.22)
Observations	2,262	2,262
R-squared	0.199	0.199

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Finally, Table 12 evaluates Hypothesis 5 and 6 on the way that regime type conditions material aid's effects on the PTS. In sum, I find that material aid to full democracies is associated with a lower score on the PTS while the results for partial regimes are not significant.

The lack of an effect of material aid in partial democracies again exposes the need to look closely at the dimensions of democracy that are critical to reducing repression; an aggregate measure of "partial" democracy using the Polity IV scale masks the dimensions that are driving the results. Previous research indicates that multiparty competition is a critical threshold for reducing human rights abuses, and accountability is the dimension that makes full democracies respect human rights (De Mesquita et al. 2005). Though additional research is needed to uncover how material aid affects repression in democratic regimes, the findings indicate the United States needs to think carefully about providing material aid to democracies.

For example, Colombia scores a 17 out of 20 on the additive Polity IV scale for the majority of years in this study. Colombia holds elections, improving its executive

competition score, but it loses points for the competitiveness of political participation. Colombia is also coded for being in civil conflict for the duration of the study. U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications routinely cite goals in Colombia as counternarcotics, regional stability, supporting democracy, protecting human rights, and providing humanitarian assistance. The United States provided Colombia with equipment to both counter the FARC insurgency as well as interdiction of drug trafficking. Colombian armed forces officially comprise the regular army, but are also supplemented by a paramilitary unit called the United Self Defense Forces (AUC), which fought the FARC and ELN from the late 1990s to 2006. The AUC was linked to the Colombian military and police during this time, and was accused of committing human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 2001; *Morning Star* 2008; Dube and Naidu 2010). Colombia did receive significant IMET and counternarcotics funding, which largely supported U.S. training efforts, and it also received large sums of material aid. As I argued in Chapter Three, the United States does not provide high levels of oversight for material assistance. Human Rights Watch links army units that received U.S. material assistance in the mid-1990s to cooperation with paramilitary groups and human rights abuses. Due to national security interests, U.S. presidents have waived human rights-based restrictions on security assistance (Human Rights Watch 2001). The Colombia example, while not meant to test my theory, provides anecdotal evidence that democracy does not insulate countries from human rights abuses. The United States provided significant arms and equipment to Colombia, and it's not clear that the United States has control over how those weapons are used.

**Table 12: Effect of Regime Type on the PTS, Ordered Probit**

	Regime Type
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	1.28*** (0.052)
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Full Democracy	0.050*** (0.010)
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Partial Democracy	0.025 (0.016)
Material Aid 5yrAvg*Partial Autocracy	0.0059 (0.013)
Material Aid 5yrAvg	-0.025** (0.010)
Full Democracy	-0.71*** (0.11)
Partial Democracy	-0.36*** (0.14)
Partial Autocracy	0.079 (0.12)
NADR 5yrAvg	0.0071 (0.0056)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	0.013** (0.0064)
IMET 5yrAvg	0.0036 (0.0066)
Economic Aid 5yrAvg	0.022*** (0.0063)
Log Population	0.28*** (0.034)
Log GDP	-0.089*** (0.028)
Oil Exports	0.015 (0.061)
US Troops	-0.029 (0.084)
West	-0.037 (0.21)
Africa	0.40* (0.22)
MENA	0.41* (0.22)
Asia	0.25 (0.21)
Americas	0.41* (0.21)
Conflict	0.48*** (0.080)
cut1 Constant	3.96*** (0.52)
cut2 Constant	6.07*** (0.54)

cut3 Constant	8.16*** (0.57)
cut4 Constant	10.1*** (0.60)
Observations	2,334

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
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figures 35 and 36 show the predicted probabilities for a discrete change in full democracy from 0 to 1, holding all other variables at their means. Again, the substantive effects are quite small. When the average amount of material aid (8, or converted from the inverse hyperbolic sine, \$5,000) goes to a full democracy, the predicted probability of scoring a 2 on the PTS increases from .25 to .5. The probability of scoring a 4 on the PTS decreases from .073 to .016, when material aid is 8.


Figures 37 and 38 show the effect of partial democracy. Partial democracies are more likely to score a 2 on the PTS, but the effect is not significant at higher levels of the PTS. The effect of partial autocracy is also not significant, as shown in Figures 39 and 40.




**Figure 35: Effect of Full Democracy on Scoring a 2 on the PTS**




**Figure 36: Effect of Full Democracy on Scoring a 4 on the PTS**




**Figure 37: Effect of Partial Democracy on Scoring a 2 on the PTS**




**Figure 38: Effect of Partial Democracy on Scoring a 4 on the PTS**



**Figure 39: Effect of Partial Autocracy on Scoring a 2 on the PTS**



**Figure 40: Effect of Partial Autocracy on Scoring a 4 on the PTS**



The Error Correction Model shows similar results: full democracies that receive more material aid are more likely to see a decrease in PTS score. In this model, the effect of partial democracy is also negative, running contrary to my expectations. F-tests reveal that I can reject the hypothesis that partial democracy and full democracy have no effect on repression. I argued that partial democracies are more likely to experience internal power struggles and weak institutions, which increases the incentive for the government to use material assistance to consolidate its power through repression. Movement on the PTS is rare, and I would argue that these effects are still worthy of consideration. Moreover, the effect of economic assistance is equally small.

Another example helps underline the country-specific effects of military aid. Ethiopia is a “partial” democracy—scoring an 11 out of 20 on the additive Polity IV scale—to which the United States provided military aid beginning in 1992, totaling \$50 million by the end of 2011. The 2007 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification describes the purpose of U.S. military aid to Ethiopia as follows (U.S. Department of State 2007, 278):

Ethiopia has a large and professional military that has provided support for the war on terrorism (including an offer of troops for the US-led effort in Afghanistan). It is the fifth largest contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. FY 2007 International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds will be used for training that will further increase the professionalism of the Ethiopian military, focusing on senior level professional military education courses (War College and Command and General Staff level schools) and instructor training to assist in the development of Ethiopia’s own military training institutions. FY 2007 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will be used to provide Ethiopia with additional equipment and spare parts to increase its counter-terrorism and peacekeeping abilities, including enhancing Ethiopia’s own training capabilities, and to finance the existing vehicle and C-130 aircraft maintenance contracts. Ethiopia is eligible in FY 2007 to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. EDA will be used to enhance Ethiopia’s ability to control its borders with Sudan

and Somalia, execute humanitarian mine action operations and participate in regional peacekeeping missions.

Foreign Military Financing composed the bulk of the funding, though Ethiopia also received small IMET funding each year. Ethiopia also experiences civil conflict for all but one year. Ethiopia scores a 2 on the PTS in 1996, but the majority of years are coded as a 4. Human Rights Watch reports that Ethiopian forces are accused of physical integrity violations, particularly in minority Anuak ethnic group areas along the borders with now–South Sudan in 2003 and 2004 (Human Rights Watch 2005). The sources of this conflict and repression, as well as the low-level civil conflict in the Ogaden and Oromia, are clearly based on long-standing ethnic tensions (Human Rights Watch 2007). The United States provides military aid to Ethiopia largely for the purpose of building the military’s capacity to counter insurgent and terrorist threats within Ethiopia, and neighboring Somalia. However, there is evidence that U.S.-equipped Ethiopian forces are engaging in physical integrity rights repression—including rape, torture, imprisonment—as part of counterinsurgency operations in ethnic minority areas in Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch 2007). The “partial” democratic regime offers little opportunity for minority group representation in government, and the security forces, particularly at a local level, are not ethnically representative (Human Rights Watch 2005). Again, this example is not meant to act as a case study, but rather highlight the diversity of regimes to which the United States provides military aid. It also underlines the need for additional research on military assistance to conflict zones; without oversight of material aid, it’s not clear that the United States can track and prevent military aid from being used by recipient governments to achieve personal gain against minority groups, for example.

**Table 13: Effect of Regime Type on Year-over-Year Change in the PTS**

	Regime Type
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.35*** (0.017)
Material Aid*Full Democracy <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0099** (0.0043)
Material Aid*Full Democracy <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.00094 (0.0041)
Material Aid*Partial Democracy <sub>t-3</sub>	0.011** (0.0055)
Material Aid*Partial Democracy <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.0024 (0.0045)
Material Aid*Partial Autocracy <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0031 (0.0052)
Material Aid*Partial Autocracy <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00085 (0.0049)
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0047 (0.0041)
Material Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0027 (0.0038)
Full Democracy	-0.23*** (0.046)
Partial Democracy	-0.14** (0.054)
Partial Autocracy	0.063 (0.050)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0017 (0.0020)
NADR <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00020 (0.0014)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0044* (0.0023)
Counternarcotics <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00030 (0.0014)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	0.00072 (0.0023)
IMET <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00054 (0.0023)
Economic Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0098*** (0.0023)
Economic Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.00050 (0.0019)
Log Population <sub>t-1</sub>	0.048*** (0.0088)
Log Population <sub>Δ</sub>	-0.83 (0.96)
Log GDP <sub>t-1</sub>	0.014 (0.0097)
Log GDP <sub>Δ</sub>	-0.022 (0.094)
Oil Exports	0.0025 (0.027)

US Troops	-0.066*
	(0.036)
West	-0.0030
	(0.081)
Africa	0.23**
	(0.090)
MENA	0.17*
	(0.089)
Asia	0.17**
	(0.085)
Americas	0.18**
	(0.088)
Conflict	0.27***
	(0.037)
Constant	-0.42*
	(0.22)
Observations	2,307
R-squared	0.194

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### 5.3 Summary of Results

Overall, the results for the Political Terror Scale models provide support for disaggregating military assistance to understand how it affects human rights in recipient nations. The first section of this chapter revealed that recipient countries see the costs associated with committing one-sided violence as high: education and targeted programs were associated with a lower likelihood of one-sided violence, although material aid was insignificant. In contrast, it appears that recipient nations that receive material aid “shirk” on human rights policy when repression is measured on a scale from one to five, accounting for a wider range of repressive actions. I argued that recipient countries are less confident that the United States will catch and punish them for repression that falls short of killing. Human rights abuses such as kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment are less likely to be reported in the United States, which puts less pressure on the United

States to sanction recipient countries for these abuses. These abuses are also far more common than one-sided violence.

In this section, I used both an ordered probit and error correction model to best capture the explanatory power of my variables. For the most part, the ECM corroborated the results of the ordered probit. The results of the base model revealed that the above intuition holds: on average, material aid increases the chances that a country will score higher on the PTS, and is associated with positive year-over-year change on the PTS. Foreign Military Sales as a control variable is associated with a lower level of physical integrity rights, which supports the decision to examine military assistance separately.

Material aid misses statistical significance in the conflict model. Future research will examine the intersection of military assistance and conflict in more detail. The United States provides assistance to countries engaged in conflicts against insurgencies (e.g., Colombia) and terrorist groups (e.g., Yemen, Pakistan, and Ethiopia). The goal of this type of military assistance is building the capabilities of partner nation armed forces to combat threats (to the home country, but more importantly, the United States) and influencing policy. Repression is more likely during periods of civil unrest. Based on the research and results of this dissertation, it appears that military assistance to countries in conflict does not help improve human rights, and may contribute to deteriorating conditions for some.

I did not find support for Hypotheses 3. Material aid to countries with U.S. troops does not significantly increase the likelihood of repression. I argued throughout this chapter, however, that additional measurement of U.S. strategic intent is necessary to more fully evaluate this hypothesis. Collecting information on the recipient country



contributions to international peacekeeping missions and U.S. coalition missions as well as involvement in the U.S. War on Terror may be especially fruitful. In contrast, I find support for Hypothesis 4: material aid to countries that export oil is associated with a higher PTS score, though the substantive effects were small. This result does provide some support for the principal-agent understanding of material aid. Countries that export oil may not fear reprisal from the United States for repression, and may therefore be more likely to engage in human rights abuses.

The results of the regime type interactions using the Political Terror Scale as the dependent variable also largely performed as expected. The strongest finding is that fully democratic countries that receive material aid are less likely to engage in higher levels of physical integrity rights repression. Additional explanatory leverage could also be gained by studying the relationship between the government and the armed forces as well as the different types of forces and their composition. Ethnically homogenous forces may be more likely to repress than those that are representative of the population. Military juntas and strongmen have lower audience costs and also may be more likely to repress (Weeks 2012).

#### **5.4 Discussion and Implications**

The results presented in this chapter have several interesting implications for U.S. policy. Firstly, the results on the disaggregated military aid programs reveal that it is important to think about and examine the effects of the programs by themselves. The one-sided violence model showed that education aid might be associated with a reduced likelihood of government violence. Additional case study research is needed to evaluate whether this result is driven solely by the fact that the United States provides less aid to

countries previously responsible for one-sided violence.<sup>71</sup> However, this result implies that interactions with U.S. military men and women and higher education for officers may have a positive impact on extreme human rights abuses.

In addition, the PTS model demonstrated that material aid has a positive and significant effect on higher levels of physical integrity rights repression. I argued that this is due to the fact that material aid comprises lethal weapons, and the United States has less oversight of the aid. Based on these results, the United States needs to think critically about its strategic priorities balanced against the possibility that aid increases the likelihood of human rights abuses in that country. Moreover, this study indicates that funding programs with a higher degree of oversight and that including training and education aspects are less harmful to human rights. The United States should consider additional oversight of material aid, whether that includes tying aid more closely to human rights practices, better complementing material aid with training and education assistance, or tracking and monitoring the distribution and use of equipment.

Secondly, the results on regime type add to existing evidence that full democracies are less likely to engage in repression. I found that, on average, full democracies receiving material aid were less likely to repress. Partial democracies and anocracies that receive material aid, however, may not be immune from repression. This finding relates to research that shows that aggregate measures of democracy mask the critical characteristics of democracy related to preventing human rights abuses. As Bueno de Mesquita (2005) explains:

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<sup>71</sup> Research on officers from Benin who trained and received education in Belgium indicates that the officers learned valuable lessons on military professionalism and effectiveness, but had trouble translating that education upon returning to Benin (Soeters and Ouytsel 2013).

Rather, crossing critical thresholds on individual dimensions is essential to achieving significant gains in a country's human rights record. The statistical evidence supports the idea that dramatic improvement is unlikely before a government adopts a high degree of competitiveness in all aspects of political life, that is, executives are constrained and party competition is entrenched.

This research implies that understanding how democracy affects material aid is more complex than simply applying the binary measures of “full” and “partial” democracy. Future quantitative and qualitative research is necessary to uncover the dimensions and timing of democracy that impact how material aid affects repression.

I cannot provide a full understanding of the interaction of material aid and democracy; however, the results do have some early implications for the United States. The United States provides material aid to a wide range of countries with various dimensions of democracy, GDP, and history of conflict. Previous research shows that GDP, population, and previous conflict all affect the likelihood of repression. Material aid provides a source for arms and equipment financing that the recipient country would otherwise need to allocate from its gross domestic product, which often requires checks and balances from the legislative and/or judicial branch. Empowering the armed forces relative to other aspects of government and civil society could engender government infighting and adverse reactions from civilians. If the security forces have their own source of income, they become less beholden to the legislature and executive. In democracies that suffer from lower GDP per capita, this change in internal government power structure could affect civil-military relationships, giving the armed forces more control over their actions, resulting in less punishment for repression. In countries that do not have a history of entrenched democracy or where violence against minorities is a concern, material aid may push the country “backwards” on human rights practices. This dissertation did not fully examine all of the potential hypotheses on material assistance,

but it serves as a starting point for understanding how U.S. military aid impacts recipient countries. It is clear that simply because a country is considered a democracy that holds elections, it is not insulated against the risk of human rights abuses, and material aid could be fueling these practices.

## **Chapter 6: Conclusion**

### **6.1 Summary of the Question and Argument**

This dissertation began by asking a broad question: does U.S. military aid affect human rights? In Chapter One, I demonstrated that military assistance is an important but little understood component of foreign aid writ large. Military aid is also a potential substitute for military intervention. The United States has withdrawn the majority of its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, and defense officials have stressed the importance of building the capacity of foreign armed forces to act as partners for the United States in countering internal and transnational threats (R. M. Gates 2010). The United States provides billions of dollars a year in military aid to more than 160 countries, yet we know little about the effect this aid has on its recipients. Aid recipients take all shapes and forms, from Western Democracies to developing African countries, which reflects the diversity of U.S. goals in providing military aid. For example, the United States provided a large sum of aid to Poland before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Military aid to Yemen also spiked following the 9/11 attacks as the United States sought to build the capability of the Yemeni forces to fight terrorism within their borders. Despite the mounting importance that the United States puts on military aid, little policy research has evaluated its effects.

Chapter Two revealed that there is also a gap to fill within the academic literature on the effects of foreign aid. Scholars investigated the effects of military assistance and arms sales during the Cold War, but there are few if any cross-national studies on the effectiveness of military aid on repression after 1991 (Maniruzzaman 1992; Sislin 1994; Sanjian 1999; Blanton 1999; Blanton 2005). The foreign aid literature writ large is vast,

but most studies only examine economic aid, or lump military aid into the total. These studies have revealed that foreign aid can foster regional arms races and civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2007; De Ree and Nillesen 2009; Nielsen et al. 2011), but may be effective at reducing terrorist attacks (Azam and Thelen 2008; Azam and Thelen 2010; Young and Findley 2011). The evidence linking foreign aid to democratization is not conclusive (Knack 2004; Wright 2009). Based on this literature, it's not immediately clear how foreign aid affects repression.

The comparative literature on sources of repression recently began to look outside the state at international influences, but has not fully examined the role of aid (Hafner-Burton 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hafner-Burton 2014). Traditional explanations teach us that repression is more likely during periods of dissent and civil conflict, when the state previously used repression, and when the country is not a full democracy.

This dissertation therefore sought to make a contribution to both the foreign aid literature and the repression literature. I argue that divorcing military assistance from foreign aid writ large lends theoretical and empirical traction. In addition, the world is increasingly globalized, and it is important to think about the role that international actors play in incentivizing or improving human rights abuses. From a U.S. policy perspective, the role of military assistance is likely to increase as an alternative to U.S. troops on the ground. The United States provides military assistance for a variety of reasons, including policy influence, helping partners fight terror and insurgent groups, improving international military cooperation, fostering democratization, and supporting the U.S. defense industrial base. From an official standpoint, one can imagine that the short-term

benefits that U.S. leaders expect to gain from military assistance—attacking terror groups, gaining support for international military operations, or other issues of policy convergence—provide incentive for offering aid. Yet the longer-term consequences of military assistance deserve serious consideration, as repression can destabilize the home country as well as incentivize additional U.S. enemies. To tackle the question of how military assistance might affect repression, I first articulated a theory that allowed me to consider the strategic incentives facing both the United States and the recipient country.

In Chapter Three, I argued that viewing the military aid relationship through the lens of principal-agent theory lent the most explanatory power. Principal-agent theory is based in the economic literature, and scholars engaged the theory to describe employer-employee relationships. More recently, political scientists adopted the theory to describe relationships between the President and public, the military and public, foreign funders and rebel groups, states and terrorist groups, and members of rebel groups in civil conflict (Downs and Rocke 1994; S. Gates 2002; Mitchell 2009; Feaver 2009; Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014). Applying the theory to military aid provides interesting insight into why recipient governments may choose to engage in human rights abuses.

The United States—the principal—enters into a “contract” with a recipient country—the agent—by providing military aid in return for certain “work”, such as policy convergence on a key international issue, access for U.S. troops in the recipient’s territory, countering terrorism or drug trafficking, or democratization. In this dissertation, I labeled the “work” that the United States expects out its military aid contract as respect for physical integrity rights. Human rights may be a secondary or tertiary goal in some

aid relationships, but I argue that the United States prefers in all cases that the recipient country not use military assistance to repress the civilian population.

I used a game tree to demonstrate the sequence of decision-making events by the United States and recipient. First, the United States decides to provide aid through one or several different funding programs. The recipient country then decides to “work” or “shirk” on human rights policy, which is based on the level of U.S. oversight, the payoff to shirking, internal preferences on human rights, and expectations of being caught or punished by the United States. Thinking about the military aid relationship in this way allowed me to draw out the costs and benefits of the recipient country’s actions. The principal-agent framework revealed that repression is more likely when the United States has little oversight, when the recipient’s payoff to shirking is high, when the recipient’s policy preferences diverge from the United States, and when the expectations of being caught and punished by the United States are low.

I then used these generalized expectations to generate my hypotheses. The major theoretical and empirical contribution of this dissertation is that the type of funding program plays a large role in determining the likelihood of repression. I argued that material aid, funded through the Foreign Military Financing and Excess Defense Articles Programs, had the least amount of U.S. oversight. These programs comprise arms and equipment, either provided directly or through grants to purchase U.S. products. This lethal weaponry coupled with low oversight means that material aid is most likely to increase the power of the armed forces. In contrast, education and targeted funding programs, such as counternarcotics programs and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,



Demining and Related (NADR), are subject to greater U.S. oversight and do not increase the lethal power of the armed forces to the extent that material aid does.

The remainder of my hypotheses qualified the above argument and addressed my belief that material assistance was especially likely to increase the severity of repression when recipient countries had an underlying incentive to repress. The first incentive to repress came from the principal. I argued that the United States was more likely to punish recipients when the latter committed egregious human rights abuses, because the United States would face domestic and international accountability and reputation costs. I defined egregious abuses as government one-sided violence, or killing more than 25 civilians in a year. On the other hand, I expected that the United States was less likely to catch and punish recipients for abuses that fall short of one-sided violence.

I also stated that the reason for the principal entering into the contract was important because it affected the likelihood of punishment for shirking. When the United States provides material aid largely for strategic self-interest, the recipient lowers its expectation of punishment for shirking because it knows it is strategically important to the United States. In other words, the United States can't credibly commit to removing aid when the recipient is a strategic partner.

The final two hypotheses addressed internal incentives for the recipient to repress. The principal-agent framework revealed that a high potential payoff to shirking might raise the benefits of breaking the contract with the United States above the costs. One scenario in which this may occur is when the recipient receives large rents for natural resources and chooses to engage in repression rather than share resource rents with a larger segment of the population.

Finally, I took into consideration the status quo preferences of the principal and the agent on working versus shirking. In the workplace, an employee may decide to work as hard as her boss wants her to on a project because she feels passionately about the subject and thinks it will advance her career. In the aid relationship, a recipient country may be predisposed to improving its human rights record, and material aid will not affect that goal. In contrast, a recipient might have an internal preference to engage in repression because the government seeks to retain power, and material aid could exacerbate human rights abuses. I chose to measure preferences as regime type, and I argued that full democracies are least likely to use material aid to abuse human rights, while full autocracies and partial regime types were more likely to use material aid to repress.

## **6.2 Summary of Results**

Chapter Four presented the data and methodology that I used to test my hypotheses. My cross-sectional time series dataset included eight military aid funding programs as well as foreign military sales and economic aid data for 180 countries from 1991–2011. I categorized the military aid data into four groups: material, education, counternarcotics, and anti-terrorism/nonproliferation, and took the moving average of each over a five-year period. I thus assessed the effect of the average of military aid from 1991–1995 on repression in 1996. I also introduced my control, conditional, and dependent variables. I measured repression using UCDP’s One-sided Violence data as well as the Political Terror Scale. I test the one-sided violence hypotheses using a probit estimation, and the PTS models using both an ordered probit and error correction model. The control variables included population, GDP, civil conflict, and five regions. I

measured U.S. strategic interest as the presence of 100 or more U.S. troops in the recipient country, resource rents as oil exports, and regime type using the Polity IV scale.

Chapter Five presented the empirical results. The first section of the chapter analyzed the effects of military aid on one-sided violence, and the second section the effects on the Political Terror Scale. I expected that recipient countries would be less likely to use material aid to engage in one-sided violence because the chances of the United States catching and punishing the recipient are high. I also expected that education and targeting funding programs would decrease the chances of one-sided violence. These programs do not increase the power of the armed forces in the same way as material aid, and the United States maintains greater oversight. I found support for this latter hypothesis: increasing IMET funding and NADR funding decreased the risk of one-sided violence in recipient countries. However, previous one-sided violence is associated with decreased military assistance, so the results must be interpreted with caution given the endogeneity concern.

My third and fourth hypotheses were not supported in this model: neither material aid provided to countries with U.S. troops nor countries with oil exports significantly increase the likelihood of one-sided violence. My final hypotheses argued that the effects of material aid are dependent on the institutional similarities between the principal and the agent. I expected that full democratic recipients of material aid were more likely to share preferences about “working” on human rights policy, and were therefore less likely to use material aid for repression. Conversely, full autocracies and “partial” regimes may have internal incentives to use material aid for repression. These results supported Hypothesis 5: full democracies receiving material aid were less likely to engage in

government violence. I did not find a conditional effect for partial democracy or partial autocracy.

There is clearly room to think and test more accurately the specific dimensions of democracy and autocracy that inclines governments to engage in repression. On the democratic side, there is evidence that achieving executive competition and accountability are critical to reducing human rights abuses (De Mesquita et al. 2005). On the autocratic side, military juntas and strongmen face lower domestic audience costs than civilian elite regimes and thus may be more likely to repress (Weeks 2012). In addition to parsing out these regime effects, future research on the effects of military aid should examine the diverse relationship between the armed forces and executive. In military juntas, for example, the leader of the military is the leader of the country, offering few checks on military power. In some democracies, civilian control over the military is strong; there are significant legislative checks on military power, the defense minister is civilian, and the culture favors a norm of military restraint. In other democracies, military officers play a much larger role in high-level decision-making; for example, the defense minister is a military officer, a large portion of the legislator has military experience, and the civilian culture supports a strong military role in foreign policy.

I also presented the results of a model that examined the effects of aid on countries experiencing civil conflict. These countries are particularly predisposed to use repression (e.g., Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2007b). I found that NADR and counternarcotics funding reduced the likelihood of one-sided violence during conflict

years. The coefficient on material aid was not significant. These results should be interpreted with caution, as there were only 310 conflict years in the sample data.

The remainder of Chapter Five provided results from the Political Terror Scale Models. Using principal-agent theory, I argued that recipient countries might be more willing to use military aid to engage in repression that falls short of one-sided violence. Unlike outright killing of 25 or more civilians, other forms of physical integrity are less likely to be widely reported in the mainstream media, which puts less domestic and international pressure on the United States to punish recipients for human rights abuses. I used two models in this section, an ordered probit and an error correction model. The ordered probit model told me how military aid affected the likelihood of a recipient country scoring one of the five levels on the PTS. The error correction models complemented these results by testing if the long-run effect of aid was associated with a year-over-year change in the PTS.

The results on disaggregated aid provided support for my theory. I found that material aid did increase the likelihood of scoring higher on the PTS, and I used predicted probabilities to demonstrate that more material aid increased the risk of scoring a 4 and reduced the probability of scoring a 2. These results provided evidence that material aid is associated with a greater risk of repression. On average, recipients appear to estimate a low probability of punishment by the United States for repression that falls short of one-sided violence. However, education aid and targeted programs did not significantly increase the likelihood of scoring lower on the PTS. The error correction model also supported these results. While the substantive effect of material aid is small, it is important to note that movement on the PTS is minimal. The coefficient on material aid

during periods of civil conflict was not significant, indicating that more research is needed to fully comprehend how military aid affects the use of government repression during conflicts.

The remaining models tested my intuition that material aid would have deleterious effects in countries with an underlying incentive to repress. Again, I found no evidence that U.S. strategic intent—proxied by U.S. troops—increased the risk that countries used material aid to repress; rather, U.S. troops were associated with a greater likelihood of a low score on the PTS. This may indicate that troops are a poor proxy for strategic goals, or that recipient governments do not alter their expected likelihood of punishment based on U.S. strategy. This hypothesis, however, is one that is repeated often by officials involved with U.S. military aid, and Bapat (2012) formally argues that this is the case in Yemen. Additional research is necessary to further investigate the strategic hypothesis.

I did find support for my hypothesis that material aid may be linked to repression in countries that export oil. Natural resource rents have previously been associated with an increased risk for conflict and repression. Leaders with resource rents may want to limit the redistribution of resource wealth to a minority, and they may repress elements of the population that demand more equitable terms. In this case, material aid provides the fuel to enable such physical integrity abuses. In principal-agent terms, I showed that recipient countries are willing to shirk on human rights when the payoff to repression is large and outweighs the costs of punishment. The evidence for this hypothesis indicates that perhaps recipients do make such a cost-benefit calculus, and the payoffs to repression usurp the costs of punishment.

Finally, I tested my hypotheses about regime type, material aid, and political terror. As with the one-sided violence models, I expected that countries with similar ex ante preferences to the United States on human rights would be less likely to repress, while countries with internal incentives to maintain power would be more likely to repress. Again, the results for full democracy were in the expected direction. Material aid to full democracies was associated with a lower score on the PTS, as well as negative year-over-year change. The predicted probabilities showed that material aid to full democracies was associated with a higher probability of scoring a 2 on the PTS at all levels of material aid. The interactions between partial democracies and autocracies and material aid were not significant in the ordered probit model, but partial democracy was associated with negative year-over-year change. These results support previous research that finds that on average, full democracies are less likely to repress, but demonstrates the need to further investigate the dimensions of democracy that are the most critical and the “threshold” at which democracy has an effect on repression.

### **6.3 Contribution and Future Research**

This dissertation sought to fill a gap in the literatures on foreign aid and repression. I argued that the extant literature on foreign aid effectiveness does not provide a sufficient theoretical explanation for how aid could affect repression. I introduced principal-agent theory to fill that gap, arguing that it allowed me to infer critical decision-making nodes for both the United States and recipient country. In addition, the literature has thus far largely failed to consider the effects of military aid apart from economic aid. Disaggregating military assistance from foreign aid is critical because it primarily affects the armed forces, rather than the country’s leadership, and it cannot be redistributed

across government. I showed that examining military aid on its own reveals that incentives may exist for recipient countries to use aid for repression. I also showed that disaggregating military aid into its component funding programs is crucial to understanding its effect. While education funding and some targeted programs can help reduce the risk of human rights abuses, material aid may undermine these advances. Material aid may also be working against other Department of State aid initiatives, such as development and democracy assistance. This dissertation revealed that we need to examine individual types of foreign aid to truly understand its effect. The combined impact of foreign aid will differ across countries, as most countries receive a unique combination of aid dollars. Adding military aid to the equation sheds light on the contradictory findings of other foreign aid effectiveness studies. Future research should take military aid into consideration when measuring foreign aid and also investigate the timing and combined effects of military and economic assistance.

I also showed that international actors affect the likelihood of state repression, joining other scholars who recognize that the causes of repression no longer occur within a state's own borders (Keith 1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; Hafner-Burton 2005; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). The principal-agent framework used here builds off of previous scholars who viewed repression as a result of a cost-benefit analysis. Scholars found that repression is more likely during period of contention, when the government previously repressed, and in regimes that fall short of full democracy. Research also shows that repression is more likely when the resources available to the military are increased (Davenport 1995a; Blanton 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2007). This dissertation confirmed these studies and showed that some types of



military aid are associated with a greater likelihood of repression. I also showed that material aid is more likely to affect human rights when certain internal incentives exist. Material aid provides a source of funding for the armed forces outside of their own country, and the influx in arms may augment the ability of the government to repress if it chooses to. In certain countries, U.S. education funding and targeted programs can have a positive effect and reduce the chances of human rights abuse by the military. The repression literature has long looked inside the state for explanations, but like the literature on foreign support for rebel groups (Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014), I show that it is important to consider the effects of outside influence.

In addition, the results of this dissertation have implications for U.S. foreign policy. As mentioned above, the United States may be undermining its own efforts at development and democratization by providing material military aid without sufficient oversight. This study reveals that the United States should think carefully about the long-term consequences of providing military assistance. The United States has provided material aid in the past decade to many countries out of short-term strategic necessity. For example, the United States augmented military aid to Middle East and North African countries to counter terrorism. The aid may have been in exchange for access for U.S. troops to Iraq and Afghanistan as well as strengthening the capacity of foreign forces to fight terrorism on their own in their home countries. Whatever the short-term intentions, the research presented here reveals that material aid may enhance the capabilities of the recipient armed forces, but that new power can be used to repress. Repression causes harm to civilian populations, but it can also lead to domestic unrest and instability, particularly if the repression-dissent-repression cycle continues. The United States thus

faces a normative concern: material military assistance in some countries increases the chances of physical integrity abuses. Further down the road, domestic unrest is associated with civil conflict and overall state fragility, which may increase the chances of a country becoming a safe-haven for terrorist and insurgent groups—the very outcome the United States sought to deter.

There are policy opportunities for the United States to reduce the deleterious effects of material assistance. Firstly, this project has revealed that the United States needs to evaluate the individual country conditions before providing aid, as civil conflict and prior repression make future human rights abuses more likely. In addition, democracies that hold elections cannot be assumed to practice “good” human rights. My research also revealed that the United States takes a very “hands off” approach to material aid, and a better system for tracking and monitoring material aid after the initial delivery might improve the prospects for its proper use.

This dissertation shows that full democracies are less likely to repress. It’s not clear how regimes labeled as “partial” democracies or autocracies condition the effect of material aid on repression. Additional research is clearly necessary to deduce what dimensions of democracy are the most critical in understanding the likelihood of repression, although previous research indicated that accountability may be the most important factor (De Mesquita et al. 2005). The main takeaway is that the United States cannot apply a one-size-fits-all approach to military assistance. Democracies that score between an 11 and 15 on the Polity IV scale cannot be assumed to have the checks and balances that inherently limit repression. The United States should carefully consider how empowering the armed forces in each country will affect intra-governmental relationships

as well as relationships with the population, especially minority groups or government rivals.

As I discussed in Chapter Five, additional research is also needed to more fully test the strategic hypothesis. The effect of material aid to countries with and without U.S. troops was not significantly different at all levels of the PTS. However, it is clear that strategic priority plays a role in the amount of aid and the likelihood of aid sanctions. Other options for measuring strategic intent include whether or not the recipient joined a military coalition operation or if it cooperates with the United States on the War on Terror.

In addition to understanding the interactive effects of democratic dimensions on repression, future research will consider the relationship among the armed forces, government, and civilian population. Military aid is somewhat unique within foreign aid writ large in that only one government institution can use it. Material aid in the form of cash grants goes to the central government, but the money can only be used to purchase U.S. materials and services. Education and training aid affects the military even more directly, and in most countries, the armed forces are responsible for choosing officers to complete the IMET program.<sup>72</sup> In some recipient countries, the armed forces have significant decision-making power over what equipment to purchase and how the military aid is used. For example, the military leadership decides which units receive the material aid, and certain units may be more likely to repress than others. In addition, the ethnic composition of the armed forces and police might affect the chances for repression. Uncovering these relationships is an important next step for understanding how military

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<sup>72</sup> Interview with U.S. defense official, June 2013.

aid affects repression. I hope to explore these questions in future research using both additional quantitative analysis and case studies.

## **Appendix**

In this appendix, I provide results of the reverse causality regression as well as sensitivity analysis for the models discussed in Chapter Five. Temporal dependence is a concern, and error correction, autoregressive, and generalized method-of-moment models attempt to control for this. The models reported in the main text are probit and ordered probit estimations with lagged aid and a lagged dependent variable (for the PTS models). I also include models that measure the dependent variables differently. The results of the sensitivity analysis largely support those reported in the main text. Firstly, Table 14 lists the countries included in the analysis.

**Table 14: Countries Included in the Analysis**

Albania	Georgia	Panama
Algeria	Germany	Papua New Guinea
Angola	Ghana	Paraguay
Antigua and Barbuda	Greece	Peru
Argentina	Grenada	Philippines
Armenia	Guatemala	Poland
Australia	Guinea	Portugal
Austria	Guinea-Bissau	Qatar
Azerbaijan	Guyana	Romania
Bahamas, The	Haiti	Russia
Bahrain	Honduras	Rwanda
Bangladesh	Hungary	Sao Tome & Principe
Barbados	Iceland	Saudi Arabia
Belarus	India	Senegal
Belgium	Indonesia	Serbia
Belize	Iran	Seychelles
Benin	Ireland	Sierra Leone
Bhutan	Israel	Singapore
Bolivia	Italy	Slovakia
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Jamaica	Slovenia
Botswana	Japan	Solomon Islands
Brazil	Jordan	Somalia
Brunei	Kazakhstan	Samoa
Bulgaria	Kenya	South Africa
Burkina Faso	Kuwait	South Korea
Burma	Kyrgyzstan	Spain
Burundi	Laos	Sri Lanka
Cambodia	Latvia	St. Kitts and Nevis
Cameroon	Lebanon	St. Lucia
Canada	Lesotho	St. Vincent and Grenadines
Cape Verde	Liberia	Sudan
Central African Republic	Libya	Suriname
Chad	Lithuania	Swaziland
Chile	Macedonia	Sweden
China	Madagascar	Switzerland
Colombia	Malawi	Syria
Comoros	Malaysia	Tajikistan
Congo	Maldives	Tanzania
Costa Rica	Mali	Thailand
Cote d'Ivoire	Malta	Timor-Leste

Croatia	Marshall Islands	Togo
Cuba	Mauritania	Tonga
Cyprus	Mauritius	Trinidad & Tobago
Czech Republic	Mexico	Tunisia
Denmark	Micronesia	Turkey
Djibouti	Moldova	Turkmenistan
Dominica	Mongolia	Uganda
Dominican Republic	Montenegro	Ukraine
DRC	Morocco	United Arab Emirates
Ecuador	Mozambique	United Kingdom
Egypt	Namibia	Uruguay
El Salvador	Nepal	Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea	Netherlands	Vanuatu
Eritrea	New Zealand	Venezuela
Estonia	Nicaragua	Vietnam
Ethiopia	Niger	Yemen
Fiji	Nigeria	Zambia
Finland	North Korea	Zimbabwe
France	Norway	
Gabon	Oman	
Gambia	Pakistan	

## A.1 Reverse Causality

In Chapter Four, I discussed concerns about endogeneity. I chose to address reverse causality by using a five-year moving average of military aid and controlling for the previous year's Political Terror Scale score. This method, however, does not assuage all concerns that human rights abuses are affecting the U.S. decision to provide a certain amount of military aid. Below, I show the results of the reverse causality analysis. They show that we do need to interpret the results of the government violence models with extreme caution, as government violence in the previous year affects the amount of military aid provided in the current year. However, government violence three or more years in the past did not affect the amount of military aid. Fortunately, the results for the Political Terror Scale indicated that PTS scores do not significantly affect military aid

down the road. I used total military aid for the dependent variable below. PTS scores one, three, and five years ago were also not significant using total aid, material aid, IMET, NADR, and counternarcotics as the dependent variable. These results do not suggest that the United States does not provide military aid amounts based in part on human rights practices, but it appears that strategic considerations come to the forefront.



**Table 15: Regression Analysis of the Effect of Physical Integrity Rights on Military Aid**

	One-sided Violence	Political Terror Scale
	Coefficient	Coefficient
Military Aid <sub>t-1</sub>	0.79*** (0.013)	0.79*** (0.013)
One-sided Violence <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.59* (0.36)	
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>		0.14 (0.098)
Economic Aid <sub>t-1</sub>	0.12*** (0.017)	0.11*** (0.018)
Democracy	0.039 (0.048)	0.055 (0.049)
Autocracy	-0.075 (0.058)	-0.069 (0.059)
Log Population	-0.055 (0.095)	-0.12 (0.099)
Log GDP	-0.076 (0.079)	-0.044 (0.080)
Conflict <sub>t-1</sub>	0.065 (0.24)	-0.22 (0.24)
Oil Exports	0.19 (0.17)	0.18 (0.17)
Troops	0.31 (0.22)	0.32 (0.22)
West	-0.026 (0.40)	-0.076 (0.41)
MENA	0.21 (0.40)	0.21 (0.41)
Asia	0.21 (0.31)	0.23 (0.32)
Americas	0.34 (0.40)	0.27 (0.41)
Africa	-0.38 (0.32)	-0.40 (0.33)
Constant	3.20*** (1.19)	3.06** (1.20)
Observations	2,195	2,174
R-squared	0.759	0.759

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## A.2 Alternative Government One-Sided Violence Models

The following tables provide alternative specifications using one-sided violence by the government as the dependent variable. I provide the results for the base disaggregated aid models. The first model addresses temporal dependence. The second two models provide alternative specifications of the dependent variable.

Table 16 displays the results of a probit model with aid lagged three years.<sup>73</sup> The models in the main text used a moving average of military aid. Given that military aid amounts fluctuate year to year and have enduring effects, I argued that an average of the previous five years of assistance was the best theoretical approach. The results show that the NADR variable retains its statistical significance, and the coefficient on IMET just misses conventional standards of significance.

Table 17 provides results for a rare events logistic model. This model recognizes that there are only 128 years of government violence in the sample. Regular logistic regression may under-predict the probability of rare events. The rare events model uses the procedure generated by scholars to improve the estimation power of a model with limited number of positive instances of government violence, for example (G. King and Zeng 2001; Tomz, King, and Zeng 2003). The results are similar to those presented in the main text, with IMET funding negatively associated with violence, providing additional support for Hypothesis 2. In this model, the coefficients on NADR and counternarcotics funding are also negative and significant. It should again be noted that these results should be interpreted with caution, given the findings of the reverse causality analysis.

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<sup>73</sup> Results using two and four years were similar. Aid was no longer significant using a lag of five years.

The final table of this section provides the results of a negative binomial count model. I also adapt the dependent variable in this model and use the number of government violence fatalities in a country-year rather than the binary coding for the presence of government violence used in the main text. I use the UCDP “best” estimate of fatalities for a given country-year (Eck and Hultman 2007).<sup>74</sup> The negative binomial model accounts for overdispersion of the dependent variable. The variance of the fatalities data is 263,244 and the skewness is 54, as shown below in Figure 41, and Table 18 provides the results for the base disaggregated model. However, in this model, IMET is not significant, throwing into question Hypothesis 2. I do find that NADR and counternarcotics are negatively associated with fatalities.

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<sup>74</sup> I run this model without Rwanda, which is an extreme outlier (500,000 fatalities in one year).

**Table 16: Government Violence, Lagged Aid**

	Disaggregated Aid
	Coefficient
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.005 (0.0092)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.029** (0.014)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.014 (0.011)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0024 (0.015)
Economic Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.025 (0.026)
Log Population	0.25** (0.088)
Log GDP	-0.086 (0.077)
Autocracy	0.024 (0.047)
Democracy	0.0034 (0.040)
Oil Exports	0.055 (0.16)
U.S. Troops	-.326 (0.304)
West	3.14*** (0.32)
Africa	3.57*** (0.31)
MENA	3.49*** (0.29)
Asia	3.25*** (0.29)
Americas	2.85*** (0.44)
Gov't Violence peaceys	-1.03*** (0.20)
Conflict	0.77*** (0.15)
Constant	-6.60*** (1.25)
Observations	2,220

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


**Table 17: Government One-Sided Fatalities, Rare Event Logistic**

Disaggregated Aid	
	Coefficient
Material 5yrAvg	-0.0155 (0.025)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.081*** (0.025)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.095** (0.039)
NADR 5yrAvg	-0.089*** (0.033)
Economic 5yrAvg	0.18*** (0.092)
Democracy	0.062 (0.080)
Autocracy	0.098 (0.10)
Log Population	0.63*** (0.18)
Log GDP	-0.225* (0.12)
Oil Exports	0.433 (0.30)
U.S. Troops	-1.15 (0.84)
West	-0.27 (0.65)
MENA	-0.33 (0.59)
Asia	-0.65 (0.48)
Americas	-0.34 (0.99)
Africa	0.20 (0.54)
Conflict	2.45*** (0.35)
Constant	-13.5*** (2.32)
Observations	2,232

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Figure 41: Frequency of Government One-Sided Violence Fatality Events**



**Table 18: Government One-Sided Fatalities, Negative Binomial**

	Disaggregated Aid
	Coefficient
Material 5yrAvg	-0.028 (0.031)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.13*** (0.047)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.044 (0.033)
NADR 5yrAvg	-0.20*** (0.041)
Economic 5yrAvg	-0.00089 (0.043)
Democracy	-0.62*** (0.11)
Autocracy	-0.47*** (0.12)
Log Population	1.03*** (0.22)
Log GDP	-.0218 (0.20)
Oil Exports	-2.12*** (0.52)
Troops	1.62*** (0.40)
West	-2.59** (1.22)
MENA	-0.096 (1.40)
Asia	-1.99* (1.18)
Americas	0.882 (1.13)
Africa	0.486 (1.34)
Conflict	4.42*** (0.33)
Constant	-20.3*** (2.80)
lnalpha	3.34*** (0.088)
Observations	2,096

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

### **A.3 Alternative Models for the Political Terror Scale**

This section provides the sensitivity analysis for the Political Terror Scale models. Again, the first set of models addresses concerns about temporal dependence. These models supplement the error correction models in the main text, which use the year-over-year change in the Political Terror Scale as the dependent variable and separates out the short- and long-run effects of the independent variables. Subsequently, I include a fixed effects model, a linear regression, and results using the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Rights Dataset (CIRI) (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).

Table 19 displays the results for the Political Terror Scale ordered probit model using a three-year lag of aid, as opposed to the five-year average used in the main text.<sup>75</sup> The results are similar to the model using the five-year average, with material aid increasing the likelihood of scoring higher on the PTS.

In Table 20, I display the results for an autoregressive model (Prais-Winsten). Autoregressive models use a two-stage process in which the temporal dependence of the overall model is estimated in the first stage and controlled for in the second. Again, material aid is associated with a higher PTS score.

A final model that speaks to concerns about temporal dependence is the generalized method-of-moment model (Arellano-Bond). GMM models use temporal lags as instrumental variables to account for serial correlation. Aid is lagged three years. In this model, the coefficients on military aid are not statistically significant, shown in Table 21.

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<sup>75</sup> Results using lags of 2 and 4 years were similar. As with the government violence model, results using a 5-year lag were not significant, indicating that after 4 years the effect of material aid diminishes.



Table 22 provides the results for a linear model using the Political Terror Scale. The PTS ranges from one to five, with each level represented a category of human rights practices. Though an ordered model is the best theoretical fit for the data, the results of the linear model show that material aid has a positive and significant effect on repression, again supporting Hypothesis 1.2.

The next models provide the result for an ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. In the main text, I use regional controls rather than country controls due to that lack of variation over time of several of the independent variables as well as the dependent variable, the Political Terror Scale. In the fixed effects model, I lose 70 countries due this lack of movement. In support of the disaggregated aid hypotheses, material aid is positive and significant. I also conducted fixed effects analysis for the PTS Error Correction Model. This model reveals the same results as the ordered probit model. Tables 23 and 24 display these results.

The final specification checks are shown in Tables 25 and 26, which display the results of the regression using the CIRI physical integrity rights data. The first results are based on a linear regression and the second use an error correction model. It is important to note that CIRI's scale runs in the opposite direction than PTS and comprises eight levels; a low score on the CIRI scale implies worse human rights practices. Several of the smaller countries in my dataset are missing CIRI physical integrity rights data. Using the CIRI data, the coefficient on material aid is negative and just misses statistical significant ( $p=.11$ ). Material aid is negative and significant in the error correction model.

These alternative specifications largely support the findings supplied in the main text. IMET, NADR, and counternarcotics funding programs are associated with a reduced

likelihood of government one-sided violence, providing support for hypothesis 2. I also find that material aid is associated with an increased likelihood of repression using both the PTS and CIRI physical integrity rights scale.

**Table 19: Political Terror Scale, Lagged Aid Ordered Probit**

Disaggregated Aid	
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	1.28*** (0.052)
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0079** (0.0041)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0076 (0.0051)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0068 (0.0044)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	0.00088 (0.0051)
Economic Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.020*** (0.0054)
Log Population	0.27*** (0.035)
Log GDP	-0.051* (0.035)
Autocracy	-0.012 (0.020)
Democracy	-0.068*** (0.017)
Oil Exports	-0.035 (0.062)
U.S. Troops	-0.088 (0.084)
West	0.090 (0.21)
Africa	0.496 (0.224)
MENA	0.446 (0.222)
Asia	.334 (0.216)
Americas	0.556 (0.218)
Conflict	0.50*** (0.083)
cut1 Constant	4.46*** (0.52)
cut2 Constant	6.58*** (0.54)
cut3 Constant	8.71*** (0.56)
cut4 Constant	10.7*** (0.59)
Observations	2,267

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 20: Political Terror Scale, Autoregressive Model (Prais-Winsten)**

	Disaggregated Aid
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	0.71*** (0.014)
Material 5yrAvg	0.0040* (0.0022)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	0.0042 (0.0030)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.0016 (0.0025)
NADR 5yrAvg	0.0010 (0.0028)
Economic 5yrAvg	0.0098*** (0.0026)
Log Population	0.032*** (0.008)
Log GDP	-0.019* (0.008)
Autocracy	0.00041 (0.0083)
Democracy	-0.021*** (0.0069)
Oil Exports	-0.015 (0.025)
U.S. Troops	-0.056* (0.032)
West	0.042 (0.087)
Africa	0.182 (0.092)
MENA	0.131 (0.092)
Asia	0.128 (0.089)
Americas	0.154 (0.089)
Conflict	0.20*** (0.029)
Constant	-0.44** (0.17)
Observations	2,289
R-squared	0.797

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 21: Political Terror Scale, GMM (Arellano-Bond)**

	(1)
	gd_ptss
L.gd_ptss	0.48*** (0.070)
L3.material_IHS2	0.0062 (0.0045)
L3.cn_IHS2	0.0020 (0.0063)
L3.nadr_IHS2	0.0073* (0.0038)
L3.imet_IHS2	0.00034 (0.0072)
L3.economic_IHS2	0.0072 (0.010)
Log population	0.18*** (0.067)
Log GDP	-0.056 (0.049)
Autocracy	-0.039 (0.063)
Democracy	-0.039 (0.050)
Oil Exports	-0.022 (0.13)
US Troops	0.095 (0.19)
West	-0.15 (0.98)
Africa	0.054 (0.87)
MENA	0.044 (1.03)
Asia	-0.074 (0.86)
Americas	0.014 (0.89)
Conflict	-0.025 (0.20)
Constant	-0.10 (1.12)
Observations	2,267

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 22: Political Terror Scale, Linear Regression**

	Disaggregated Aid
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	0.60*** (0.018)
Material 5yrAvg	0.0050* (0.0026)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	0.0058** (0.0029)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.00068 (0.0030)
NADR 5yrAvg	0.0014 (0.0026)
Economic 5yrAvg	0.013*** (0.0031)
Log Population	0.12*** (0.017)
Log GDP	-0.016 (0.014)
Democracy	-0.037*** (0.0077)
Autocracy	-0.011 (0.0090)
Oil Exports	0.0095 (0.027)
U.S. Troops	-0.067* (0.035)
West	0.056 (0.077)
MENA	0.17** (0.084)
Asia	0.17** (0.080)
Americas	0.20** (0.083)
Africa	0.24*** (0.084)
Conflict	0.28*** (0.038)
Constant	-0.52** (0.20)
Observations	2,281
R-squared	0.736

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 23: Political Terror Scale, Ordered Probit with Fixed Effects**

Disaggregated Aid	
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	0.79*** (0.059)
Material 5yrAvg	0.020** (0.0094)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.0041 (0.012)
IMET 5yrAvg	-0.0096 (0.011)
NADR 5yrAvg	0.0041 (0.0098)
Economic 5yrAvg	0.011 (0.016)
Log Population	1.21*** (0.45)
Log GDP	0.014 (0.094)
Autocracy	0.15*** (0.051)
Democracy	-0.0018 (0.039)
Oil Exports	-0.079 (0.13)
U.S. Troops	-0.036 (0.14)
Conflict	0.53*** (0.13)
cut1 Constant	18.1*** (5.23)
cut2 Constant	20.8*** (5.24)
cut3 Constant	23.2*** (5.24)
cut4 Constant	25.4*** (5.25)
Observations	2,281

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 24: Effect of Military Aid on Year-over-Year Change in the PTS with Fixed Effects**

	Disaggregated Aid
	Coefficient
PTS <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.67*** (0.024)
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0038* (0.0022)
Material Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0014 (0.0012)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0016 (0.0028)
Counternarcotics <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00021 (0.0013)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.00089 (0.0030)
IMET <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.0011 (0.0021)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>	0.00066 (0.0025)
NADR <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00057 (0.0013)
Economic Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	0.00010 (0.0039)
Economic Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.00018 (0.0022)
Log Population <sub>t-1</sub>	0.50*** (0.17)
Log Population <sub>Δ</sub>	-2.16 (1.51)
Log GDP <sub>t-1</sub>	0.012 (0.035)
Log GDP <sub>Δ</sub>	0.042 (0.10)
Democracy	-0.0025 (0.016)
Autocracy	0.057*** (0.021)
Oil Exports	-0.026 (0.049)
U.S. Troops	-0.033 (0.058)
Conflict	0.21*** (0.056)
Constant	-6.68*** (1.98)
Observations	2,281
R-squared	0.367

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table 25: CIRI Physical Integrity Rights, Linear Regression**

	Disaggregated Aid
	Coefficient
CIRI <sub>t-1</sub>	0.63*** (0.019)
Material 5yrAvg	-0.0048 (0.0049)
Counternarcotics 5yrAvg	-0.0165** (0.0006)
IMET 5yrAvg	0.0019 (0.0063)
NADR 5yrAvg	-0.0015 (0.0052)
Economic 5yrAvg	-0.020*** (0.0049)
Log Population	-0.25*** (0.035)
Log GDP	-0.08*** (0.0049)
Democracy	0.079*** (0.016)
Autocracy	-0.006 (0.019)
Oil Exports	0.074 (0.016)
U.S. Troops	0.24** (0.078)
West	0.158 (0.158)
Africa	-0.178 (0.168)
MENA	-0.090 (0.17)
Asia	-0.174 (0.161)
Americas	-0.047 (0.16)
Conflict	-0.55*** (0.076)
Constant	5.14*** (0.49)
Observations	2,173
R-squared	0.760

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 26: Effect of Military Aid on Year-over-Year Change in CIRI**

Disaggregated Aid	
	Coefficient
CIRI <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.40*** (0.019)
Material Aid <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0062* (0.0038)
Material Aid <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.0028 (0.0027)
Counternarcotics <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0017 (0.0051)
Counternarcotics <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.00092 (0.0029)
IMET <sub>t-3</sub>	0.0037 (0.0049)
IMET <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.0008 (0.0029)
NADR <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.0037 (0.0041)
NADR <sub>Δ2</sub>	-0.00097 (0.0029)
Economic <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.011** (0.0050)
Economic <sub>Δ2</sub>	0.000070 (0.0040)
Log Population <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.27*** (0.034)
Log Population <sub>Δ</sub>	4.50** (2.04)
Log GDP <sub>t-1</sub>	0.013 (0.027)
Log GDP <sub>Δ</sub>	-0.15 (0.16)
Democracy	0.062*** (0.016)
Autocracy	-0.013 (0.020)
Oil Exports	0.10* (0.055)
U.S. Troops	0.050 (0.076)
West	0.47*** (0.14)
Africa	-0.00039 (0.12)
MENA	0.066 (0.15)
Asia	0.062 (0.12)
Americas	-0.048 (0.15)
Conflict	-0.51*** (0.080)

Constant	5.62*** (0.49)
Observations	2,156
R-squared	0.193

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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