NEWS RELEASE

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Maryland/Tsukuba Paper examines
Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations

College Park, MD—Japan's gradual and limited engagement in U.N. peacekeeping operations is the subject of a comprehensive review by Milton Leitenberg. *The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations*, the third in the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland's (CISSM's) *Maryland/Tsukuba Papers on U.S.-Japan Relations*, traces the details of this engagement, both the specific military steps and the Japanese political debate which has accompanied them. Leitenberg notes that Japanese participation has been constrained by the enduring Japanese reluctance to engage militarily—the legacy of World War II. He notes further that the acceptance by Asian nations of Japanese military participation has been adversely affected by Japan's failure to come to terms with its World War II atrocities, and by the lack of an integrated Asian military organization like NATO, which has facilitated German participation in Europe's defenses. Leitenberg concludes that encouraging Japan's integration in U.N. peacekeeping is more likely to lead to further peaceful evolution of Japan's role in the world than having Japan remain outside that structure.

Leitenberg, a senior fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland at the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, is the author of a wide range of works on defense and international security issues covering the period since World War II. According to series editor (and CISSM Director) I.M. Destler, "Leitenberg's paper underscores, like others in our Maryland/Tsukuba series, how national political processes and the character of internal debates affect nations' foreign policy actions." Professor Hideo Sato of the University of Tsukuba is codirector and coeditor with Destler. The primary sources of funding of CISSM's *Maryland/Tsukuba Papers on U.S.-Japan Relations* are the Center for Global Partnership (CGP) of the Japan Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Japan-United States Friendship Commission.

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The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

by Milton Leitenberg

Maryland/Tsukuba Papers on U.S.-Japan Relations

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DIRECTOR'S PREFACE

In his detailed, fully-documented analysis, Milton Leitenberg tracks the long, and often slow-moving debate in Tokyo over whether engagement in U.N.-sponsored military action outside Japan's borders is consistent with Japan's anti-war constitution, and desirable as international policy. By the early 1990s, the Japanese position on these issues had changed to a cautious affirmative. But specific engagements were limited in number and constrained in the type of activities undertaken by the Self-Defense Forces. A primary reason has been the strong and continuing national consensus against military assertiveness in any form. Hence the Leitenberg paper supports the central premise of the Maryland/Tsukuba Project: that the foreign actions of Japan (and the United States) are determined, in important part, by domestic attitudes and political processes.

The Maryland/Tsukuba Project on U.S.-Japan Relations was inaugurated in 1993 by our two institutions—the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and the Graduate School of International Political Economy at the University of Tsukuba. Our aim has been to explore the connections between the political and other forces within each nation and the evolving relationship between them. Unlike the other papers in this series, The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations has its origins outside the core Maryland/Tsukuba Project, in an independent analysis initiated by the author under a John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation grant. It is the third in a series of Maryland/Tsukuba Papers we are publishing this year. It will be followed shortly by Ivo Daalder's essay on the security dimension of U.S.-Japan leadership sharing. As always, the views expressed in the paper are those of the author.

CISSM wishes to thank a range of professional colleagues for the help and advice they have provided throughout the project. In particular, we would like to acknowledge the support we have received: from the leadership of our two universities; from many in both nations who helped us with our
research; from our graduate assistants, Ning Shao, Ray Greene, and Misa Kemmiya; from Jean Block Bessmer for editing assistance and printing management; and above all, from our primary sources of funding: the Center for Global Partnership (CGP) of the Japan Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Japan-United States Friendship Commission.

— I.M. Destler  
Codirector, Maryland/Tsukuba Project  
Director, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
INTRODUCTION

In September 1992, the first Japanese military forces were committed to participation in a U.N. peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This occurred under new Japanese legislation enacted in June 1992. It was followed by other short-term deployments with U.N. contingents in Mozambique in May 1993, in Zaire in 1994, and most recently with U.N. peacekeeping forces on the Golan Heights in 1996. In September 1994, the Japanese Socialists reversed their policies of decades, accepting all that they had opposed before in regard to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), including its basic constitutionality and legitimacy. However, the constitutional question has always been a proxy for a less symbolic and more basic issue: How can the Japanese public and political leadership guard against a resurgence of "militarism," the accretion of both forces and political power that would permit the use of Japanese military forces for aggressive purposes?

Has the discussion of this question been realistic? Could such a process any longer take place without the approval and direction of the government? Is any incremental step toward the involvement and integration of the Japanese military in international collaborative activities, such as U.N. peacekeeping, the initiation of unavoidable and inevitable military independence, and the loss of control over the military by Japanese civil society and government? What would be the most desirable policies to follow so that the Japanese military behaved in accordance with international norms for the indefinite future? Is the most likely inhibitor of its misbehaving in the long term its integration with the military forces of other Asian and worldwide militaries, after 50 years of isolation, or attempting to maintain that total isolation indefinitely? And what does the question of a thoroughgoing and heretofore essentially absent Japanese national understanding of the practices of its armies in Asia between 1931 and 1945 have to do with these questions?

This paper reviews the record of the proposals over many decades for Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, its evolution under the pressure of the Gulf War in 1990-1991, and from then to the present. Japanese legislation presently permits SDF forces to participate in U.N.
missions authorized by the U.N. Security Council under the provisions of Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter. The paper then examines whether that should be extended to U.N. or other international coalition operations authorized or delegated under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, that is, permitting Japanese forces to engage in combat. If so, why; and if not, why not? It also raises the question of the nature of the positions that Japanese policymakers might take in the U.N. Security Council in the circumstances that Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 authorization was being debated, if Japan acceded to a permanent seat on the Council.
HISTORY

The first discussion of Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces apparently took place as early as 1946, when the Imperial Diet debated what came to be called "the pacifist clauses" of the draft Constitution.1 With the military occupation just having begun and Japan not yet a member of the United Nations, the issue was considered much too abstract and irrelevant to the current circumstances. When the Constitution, drafted by American officials in the Occupation Forces, was ratified in 1947, Article 9, the basis of so much contention for the next 47 years, stated

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

The Japanese public was strongly opposed to any significant rearmament, and it was an extremely popular initiative. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, however, the U.S. government's idealism vanished and its position changed. A large portion of the U.S. ground forces in Japan moved to Korea, and a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men was established in the summer of 1950 under a directive of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. In August 1952, shortly after the 1951 peace treaty went into effect, the Reserve was upgraded to the National Safety Force, and in February 1954, the Japanese

"Self-Defense Forces" (SDF) were established. Since that time, Japan has had an Army, Navy, and Air Force, whatever they may be called. Japanese governments have successively reinterpreted Article 9, first to permit the establishment of the SDF, and in successive decades to sanction defense cooperation with the United States under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, as well as in other ways. In fact during the Korean War, Japan—still under U.S. military occupation at the war’s outset—sent minesweepers to operate off the Korean coast in assistance to the U.N. forces in response to a request from the United States. The ships were technically part of the Japanese coast guard, the deployment was made secretly, and even incurred casualties. At present, Japan’s military


expenditure is the fourth highest in the world,\(^4\) and the three branches of the SDF—ground, sea, and air—are among the world’s best trained and equipped military forces.

The 1954 SDF legislation was accompanied, however, by a resolution in the House of Councilors—Japan’s upper legislative house—stipulating that the SDF could not be sent overseas to any other country. The major motive behind this resolution was reportedly not to counter the possibility of sending troops abroad for U.N. missions, but to prohibit any attempt to send troops outside the country for collective self-defense purposes under U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Although the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty became the basic construct of Japanese military security policy, Japan was forbidden to participate in other international military collective security arrangements; defense cooperation was limited to that with the United States. The SDF could be used only for the defense of Japan against an armed attack on Japanese territory.

The basic contradictions inherent in the combination of the existence of Japanese military forces, the country’s nominal obligation to U.N. peacekeeping as a U.N. member, Japan’s national legislation, and the direct utilization of Japanese military forces in U.N. peacekeeping were all explicitly joined in the mid- and late-1950s. They would not be resolved, however, until the early 1990s. The first statement of “Basic Policies for National Defense” adopted by the Japanese National Defense Council and the Cabinet on May 20, 1957, stated as the very first of its principles, “To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace,” and in the fourth and last principle, “To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such

\(^4\) Annual figures for global military expenditures, in current dollars, appear each year in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The most current volume, for 1993-1994, provides data only through 1993. A more current estimate was provided by the compilers of the volume. (Personal communication.) Nations with higher military expenditures than Japan are the United States, Russia, and China. The relative positions of China and Japan depend on highly variable estimates of the level of China’s actual military expenditure, as opposed to its officially released figure. Acceptance of China’s official—but highly dubious—figure for its military expenditure would result in Japan ranking as third highest.
aggression. The conundrum was thus established immediately: How could Japan cooperate with the United Nations to maintain international peace and security if it did not participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations?

Before Japan was accepted as a member of the United Nations in 1956, debates took place in the Diet regarding the constitutionality of Japan’s possible participation in a U.N. force when Japan did become a U.N. member.

"The government answered that Article 43 of the Charter could be interpreted to suggest various possible ways of contributing to U.N. activities, the exact nature of which would be determined by 'a special agreement or agreements' to be concluded between the member state and the Security Council. Thus, Japan's Constitution would not necessarily be an obstacle to Japanese membership in the United Nations. Japan's application for U.N. membership accordingly included a statement that Japan would fulfill all obligations of a U.N. member 'by all means at its disposal.' Since no such 'special agreements' have been made in the entire history of the United Nations, this question was a highly hypothetical and theoretical one."

All the abstract discussion was tested almost immediately, however, and continued to be tested for the 20 years that followed the first instance. In July 1958, then U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold asked the Japanese government to send officers of the SDF to participate in the U.N. Observer Group in Lebanon. The Japanese government rejected his request on the argument that the mission might violate existing laws, if not the Constitution. Hammarskjold didn’t wait long to repeat his request for Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, which he did in February 1961, during the Congo crisis. The Japanese ambassador to the United Nations at the time supported his request. Notably, the U.N. operation in the Congo was authorized under Chapter 7 of the Charter, and

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involved combat.

In early 1961, the statement by Japan's then ambassador to the United Nations aroused a controversy; Ambassador Koto Matsudaira was reported to have stated that he was in trouble when Japan refused Mr. Hammarskjold's request and that 'it is not consistent for Japan to adhere to U.N. cooperation on the one hand and to refuse all participation in the U.N. armies.' The opposition parties demanded Ambassador Matsudaira's resignation. In the end, Mr. Matsudaira withdrew his statement.

In response to criticisms by the opposition parties, the Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Shuzo Hayashi, summarized the position of the government in the Diet in 1961. He said:

"If the U.N. police activities are conducted in an ideal form, in other words, when a country that disrupted order within the U.N. system is to be punished, or in the case of establishing a police corps to maintain order, and if a unitary force under the United Nations is created with the participation of personnel dispatched by member states, then [Japan's participation in such a force] would not be an act of a sovereign nation. Also there is the possibility of a peaceful police force which does not conduct military activities. These possibilities would not pose problems relating to the First Clause of Article 9."

This was meant to establish the framework of government policy.

In 1968, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations George Ball raised the issue again in Tokyo, remarking that "...the U.N.'s ability to send observers and armed contingents on peacekeeping missions to the world's danger spots would be vital to future peace." Chief Cabinet Secretary Toshio Kimura responded by ruling out the possibility of contributing Japanese SDF forces to U.N. peacekeeping missions, stating that "Our Constitution does not allow it, but Japan might consider sending civilian personnel should a request for such a contribution be made." (The Japanese government also rejected a U.S. request to send minesweepers to Southeast Asian waters during the Vietnam War, but that bore no relation whatsoever to U.N. peacekeeping operations.) Nevertheless the idea of SDF peacekeeping participation apparently percolated at some level inside the Japanese Foreign

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1 Ibid., pp. 90-91.

Ministry bureaucracy in the mid-1960s. In June 1992, during the debate on the U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) bill, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed that the initiative "...has been a long-standing age-old proposal, particularly on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been put forward on the table of national discussions since some 20 to 30 years ago."9

In 1977 the Nomura Research Institute prepared a study on the future of Japanese national security policies, under a commission from the Japanese government and with the participation of senior Japanese government officials, including Takuya Kubo, then Director General of Japan's National Defense Council. One of its recommendations was that Japan should consider sending its troops abroad for the first time since World War II in the context of U.N. peacekeeping efforts.10 In 1980 the official government position of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's cabinet nevertheless continued to hold the issue at arm's length, and was stated as the following:

"It is impossible to discuss the right or wrong of Japan's participation in a U.N. force in general because the so-called U.N. forces have different objectives and missions. If the objectives and missions of the U.N. force in question include the use of force, we believe that the Constitution does not allow the participation of the SDF in it. On the other hand, if their objectives and missions do not include the use of force, the Constitution does not prohibit the participation of the SDF. But because the current SDF law does not give such a mission to the SDF, the SDF is not allowed to participate in it."11

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In 1983 a second group of Japanese specialists in international law and international politics urged the Japanese government to consider the possibility of participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations that did not involve the use of force.¹² Neither of these recommendations had any discernable effects on policy. When Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone suggested in 1987 that Japan should send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf during the naval operations carried out by a Western coalition to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers, the suggestion was opposed both by the opposition parties and by Nakasone's own chief cabinet secretary, and no action was taken.

However the 1980s did begin to see changes of several sorts. In 1981 the government established a sea-lane defense perimeter 1,000 miles out from the Japanese coastline. The concept had been developed years earlier in the Maritime SDF and accepted by the Defense Agency by the late 1970s. The SDF's battle plans were shifted from repelling an invasion at the beachhead to meeting it out at sea. This greatly expanded the Japanese Navy's area of operations. In September 1987, Japanese legislation authorizing the overseas dispatch of Japanese Disaster Relief Teams entered into force. (In 1992, simultaneous with the passage of the PKO bill, amendments to it and to legislation governing the SDF resulted in the authority for SDF personnel or units to participate in international disaster relief activities.) In May 1988, the government of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita proposed the concept of "three pillars of international cooperation," consisting of (1) cooperation for peace, (2) promotion of international cultural exchange, and (3) increase in official development assistance (ODA). According to Takeshita, "Cooperation for peace" included "positive participation in diplomatic efforts, the dispatch of necessary personnel and the provision of financial cooperation, aiming at the resolution of regional conflicts."¹³

In 1988 Japan sent one civilian to the U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan and another civilian to the U.N. monitoring


¹³ A. Tanaka, op. cit., p. 91.
operations on the Iran-Iraq truce (the U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group). In February 1990, Japan assigned 31 civilian observers to join in monitoring the Nicaraguan elections. In 1989 exchanges of military students between Japan and several Asian states also began. But most indicative was a statement to the Diet in November 1989 by Juro Matsumoto, the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (the equivalent of Minister of Defense) that he was "considering authorizing the use of troops for anti-terrorist operations, protecting Japanese nationals overseas and in international peacekeeping activities."\(^{14}\) Prime Minister Toshiko Kaifu had made a speech to the Diet in October 1989 hinting at similar interests, saying that the government wanted "to begin studying" such a step, which the *Far Eastern Economic Review* commented, was "the standard Japanese approach towards implementing a sensitive policy."

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1990: The Gulf War and Its Effects

After 1990 a combination of pressures brought about by the Gulf War, the upsurge in U.N. peacekeeping, and the total reversals in the positions that the Japanese Socialist Party had maintained for decades until it acceded to the Prime Minister's position, altered everything in a period of four years.

"Throughout the seven months bounded by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the U.S.-led defeat of Iraq in February 1991, Japanese political and intellectual life was convulsed by an intense debate over the nation’s appropriate role in the crisis . . . . Japan entered a seven-month ordeal of tepid measures, false starts, and arcane debate that did little to enhance its image as a major power."15

That debate centered entirely on the constitutionality of various proposals, in relation to Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. Externally, Japan was severely criticized for the fact that its contribution to the allied effort was only in terms of financial support and was not very forthcoming. Seventy percent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East, and in 1980, at the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, a Japanese minister had called on the United States Navy to maintain the freedom of oil supplies to Japan from the Gulf. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. government called on its allies to contribute to the multinational effort in any possible form. Prime Minister Kaifu's government first pledged $100 million, and in a few days raised that to $4 billion. A U.N. Peace Cooperation Bill was first drafted,

largely by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in August and September 1990. It proposed sending a 1,000-member "peace cooperation team" to the Gulf, composed of a mix of civilians and unarmed SDF personnel, to perform non-combat support roles. Public opinion on the subject was closely monitored by the Japanese press for the subsequent two years. At the time of submission of the bill in October 1990, it was about evenly split; by November, polls indicated that 78.7 percent of the public opposed the bill's passage. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, composed of legal experts, expressed doubt in October 1990 whether the inclusion of SDF personnel in the bill's provisions was constitutional. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was split on the issue, with important factions opposing the bill's passage, and Prime Minister Kaifu himself continually hesitant and not himself in favor of SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping. Despite the lobbying of U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost for a Japanese contribution of personnel, the government decided to let the bill die without coming to a vote.

Following the attack on Iraq in January 1991 and the continuation of U.S. criticism, the Ministry of Finance responded with a suggestion of increasing Japan's financial pledge to $9 billion, which the government announced, and the Defense Agency prepared a new version of the proposed legislation. Japan's financial contribution eventually totaled $13 billion. Several delegations of LDP Diet members, together with those from the two minority opposition parties, also visited U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. By the spring of 1991 the LDP and the two minority parties had come around to the position that contributing Japanese civilian personnel to a multinational force, or SDF personnel for non-military activities, would not violate Article 9 of the Constitution. There were also various innovative proposals made by political scientists outside the government. One of these

suggested the formation of collaborative units combining Japanese forces with those from other Asian countries that already had experience participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Nepal. Prime Minister Kaifu also announced that he would dispatch SDF transport aircraft to help in returning Asian refugee workers from Iraq to their home countries, but when opposition to this suggestion also developed, he never issued the authorization.

In April 1991, however, following the German government's decision to participate in minesweeping operations in the Gulf following the war's end, and additional urging by the United States and some Arab coalition partners, Prime Minister Kaifu utilized a paragraph in the SDF legislation which permitted him to interpret Iraq's placement of mines in the Persian Gulf as a hazard to Japanese shipping, enabling him to send Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers and support vessels to the Gulf on April 24, 1991. The minesweeping capability of the Maritime SDF is one of the strongest in the world, and the Japanese flotilla joined ships of the United States, England, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Saudi Arabia in the minesweeping operation, which lasted five months. By this time public opinion had already begun to shift on the issues, and the deployment was received favorably both domestically and externally. Seventy-five percent of the Japanese population supported the decision to deploy the ships on the day that the minesweepers sailed, an extraordinary shift of 50 percent of the polling population between November 1990 and April 1991. One observer also noted the route that the ships took, and found this as significant as the deployment decision: the Japanese flotilla made its way slowly, taking a month to reach the Gulf, and making stops on the way in the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia, just as Prime Minister Kaifu was touring the


These reports referred to a Japanese deployment of four minesweepers and two support ships. However, another report described the Japanese flotilla as consisting of five minesweepers, one mother ship, four backup ships, and one escort ship: *The United States and Japan in 1992: A Quest For New Roles*, 1992, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., pp. 35-37.
ASEAN capitals. The ships received a warmer welcome than Tokyo had anticipated. The South Korean foreign minister, however, expressed dissatisfaction with these developments, and several months later, in July 1991, the Malaysian prime minister expressed apprehension regarding any Japanese presence in the Southeast Asia region.

On June 6, 1991, the LDP convened a "Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community." It was chaired by LDP General Secretary Ozawa, and referred to as the "Ozawa Commission." Ozawa was the strongest supporter of the LDP wing that supported Japanese SDF participation in the Gulf War operations. The Commission's report was not released until February 20, 1992, but its conclusions were publicly known by November 1991. It recommended Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. However, well before this, on September 19, 1991, the Kaifu government had submitted a new "Peacekeeping Battalion" bill to the Japanese parliament. The proposed legislation superseded a formal agreement that the LDP party had signed with Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party in November 1990, which had called for the creation of a separate organization composed of civilian volunteers and distinct from the SDF to be used for Japanese peacekeeping participation. By September 1991, however, all three of these parties supported the new legislative proposal, and the LDP cabinet was also now united in its support. Aside from the Socialist and Communist parties, public and party opinions had shifted sharply as a consequence of the Gulf War. In the words of a

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Komeito party spokesman,

"There has been a national change of mind in this country. The Gulf War had a strong impact. We watched the war on TV, with newscasters and scholars and pundits talking about what Japan's role in the world ought to be. And the new consensus that emerged is that our strong anti-war pacifism is still there. But, beyond that, shouldn't Japan have some role in helping the United Nations preserve peace? . . . How can our country lock itself out of the world and sit here behind the closed door of anti-war pacifism?"  

The new legislation authorized the deployment of up to 2,000 SDF personnel to carry out non-combat tasks such as refugee relief, construction, transport, medical care and clearing ocean mines—only as part of authorized U.N. peacekeeping missions and only after a cease-fire is in place. Government legal advisors now found that the legislation did not violate Article 9 of the Constitution. The Socialist and Communist parties nevertheless remained adamantly opposed to any overseas deployment of Japanese forces under any circumstances, whether linked to U.N. peacekeeping or any other. These parties also argued that Japan's financial contributions to the costs of the war against Iraq violated the Japanese Constitution as well.

It is clear from the foregoing narrative that there had been requests to the Japanese government before 1990 by U.N. Secretaries-General, and by U.S. government officials, to contribute personnel to U.N. peacekeeping. Aurelia George has described the factors which led to the passage of the PKO legislation.

The actual sequence of events that culminated in the successful launching of the PKO proposal exemplified the classic "pressure-response" pattern exhibited by so much of Japan's international behavior. The decision to send troops overseas for peacekeeping purposes did not represent a unilateral spontaneous, unprompted gesture to the international community; the Gulf War dictated its

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timing, while external pressure also largely shaped its content. Expectations from the United States for Japan to commit itself to an actual physical presence in the Gulf in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait precipitated the long, tortuous policy process . . . . [this] external pressure was . . . also harnessed by internal forces eager to achieve the same objective. The domestic push not only came from the small group of defense nationalists centering on the LDP's so-called "defense tribe" (kokubo zoku) but extended to a broad cross section of policy elites within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the LDP executive leadership, and to opinion leaders outside government, all of whom had their own reasons for wishing to dispatch the SDF abroad on peacekeeping missions. Although placating the United States was high on the list of Foreign Ministry objectives, the ministry pursued its own separate agenda relating to the advancement of Japan's national interests. This included the elevation of Japan's international standing, raising its political profile in international affairs, winning greater international respect for Japan as a nation that pulls its weight in international affairs, and possibly earning Japan a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. For certain elements within the LDP leadership on the other hand, the desire was for Japan to gain international acceptance as a "normal state" or "regular player" in international affairs.23

There are several important points to add. All of the three largest political parties—the LDP, the Socialist, and Komeito—contained factions that favored Japanese, and then SDF, participation in U.N. peacekeeping, and factions that opposed it. In addition, during the Gulf War deliberations, the Kaifu government is reported to have deliberately excluded the SDF "... from crisis management deliberations—intended to minimize internal and regional concerns over emerging militarism," while during the deployment to Cambodia, government concern to control all aspects of SDF activity "... meant that every task, request, or other order had to be sent to Japan for clearance by government bodies."24 At least for the present time, the major issue is not the long range intentions of the senior military leadership in the SDF, but of the Foreign Ministry or other political groupings, such as Ichiro


Ozawa's new party. George emphasizes that

The path-breaking nature of the PKO initiative was central to another of the real, as opposed to the stated, purposes of elements within the government in pushing relentlessly toward the goal of dispatching the SDF overseas: namely, to legitimize the presence of SDF troops on foreign soil. According to one assessment, 'making contributions to the international community is not the government's first priority. Its goal is nothing less that to effect the mobilization of the Self-Defense Forces on the international stage. Because of domestic political sensitivities, however, the idea of sending the SDF abroad had to be 'gift-wrapped' in the guise of a greater international contribution... It is important, however, to maintain the distinction between military realism and militarism. Realists are not necessarily militarists and the sort of realist beliefs articulated by the Ozawa Committee do not disguise ultranationalist military ambitions or territorial, neocolonialist goals aiming at Japanese expansion. It is true that the Ozawa vision is a nationalist vision and that he and other nationalists like him wear the cloak of internationalism, but ultimately what Ozawa and others in the LDP want is for Japan to be able to 'step up to the broad array of global responsibilities ordinarily borne by major nations.' For them, U.N. peacekeeping is the vehicle on which Japan will ride to international rehabilitation and restoration...

Whatever form it ultimately takes, Japanese involvement in international peacekeeping will complement a more proactive diplomacy and higher profile in international affairs, particularly in Asia. The locations of Japan's initial forays into international security operations was highly significant in this respect. Japan sees Asia as a natural arena in which to exercise international leadership beyond the narrow confines of its economic and trade relations. At the same time, the Asian region presents Japan with the hardest and yet most vital test of its international acceptance.25

A Japanese observer essentially agreed:

But the true intention of the government that I sensed through contacts with government leaders in charge of the drafting of the bill was different. What really motivated the government to enact the

law was a desire to become a political power. Government leaders thought that unless Japan could dispatch troops abroad (for peacekeeping operations), it would not be taken seriously by the international community, nor would its desire to become a permanent member on the U.N. Security Council be given any credence.26

One can say, perhaps, that the "wrong" people supported Japanese U.N. peacekeeping participation, and for the wrong reasons—that is, not for the intrinsic utilities of peacekeeping for the international community—and that the "right" people opposed it. The Japanese "internationalists" are not, unfortunately, internationalists. The Socialists, who one might for abstract ideological reasons have assumed to fit the role of internationalists, were opposed due to their opposition to the domestic military, both in Japan and in Germany.


Without the passage of legislation that permitted Japanese citizens to participate in U.N. international forces, it was difficult to see how Japanese diplomats could sit on the U.N. Security Council making decisions that involved military action by other nations.
NEW PRESSURES:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA

The lower house of the Diet approved the peacekeeping bill on December 3, 1991. It then went to the upper house in which the opposition parties controlled a majority. During this period Japanese diplomats carried messages to China, South Korea, and ASEAN states to say that a Japanese role in peacekeeping operations would not lead to a rearmed Japan. Discussions between Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and his Chinese and South Korean counterparts at the U.N. Security Council's meeting in September drew apprehensive responses, but exceedingly mild ones. In January 1992, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urged Japan to join in peacekeeping operations, asking for "even a small number" of personnel. In return the Japanese Foreign Minister asked for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and the deletion of two clauses in the U.N. Charter that list Japan and Germany as "enemy nations." In September, Nakayama had asked the same at the United Nations, and strenuously and successfully lobbied for Japan to obtain an unprecedented seventh two-year term on the U.N. Security Council for the rotating seat representing Asia. Japan also successfully campaigned for the appointment of Yasushi Akashi, the most senior Japanese serving in the U.N. Secretariat, to become the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cambodia and to head UNTAC. Once appointed, Akashi urged Tokyo to support UNTAC both financially and with personnel, specifically mentioning police forces. In January, Cambodia's Norodom Sihanouk also asked the chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party who was visiting Cambodia "to


send Japanese troops to help clear mines and restore peace.  

Of greater significance was a trip by Cambodian Premier Hun Sen to Tokyo on March 21-23, 1992, arranged by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. He urged the passage of the peacekeeping legislation in a series of meetings with the prime minister, foreign minister, chief cabinet secretary, and the heads of the SDP and Komeito parties, and specifically asked that Japanese SDF forces participate in the UNTAC peacekeeping force for Cambodia. He is reported to have said the following:

"The purpose of my visit is to call on Japan to dispatch Self-Defense Forces troops, police and administrative officers to work with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). More than 20 nations have already decided to dispatch their troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Why doesn't Japan decide to dispatch its troops? We hope that the political parties will coordinate their views in order to make it possible to dispatch Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia. Japan should play a political role commensurate with its economic status. It is known that Japan hesitates to dispatch Self-Defense Forces troops abroad because of its remorse over the nation's acts in the past. But such an attitude is behind the times. The Cold War is over and so are ideological conflicts. The confrontation between the West and the East no longer exists. Even if Japan dispatches its troops to the UNTAC, no country would associate it with Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept which prevailed before and during the war. The lives of some troops of the UNTAC may be claimed, but it is similar to the possibility of being killed in traffic accidents. The warring factions of Cambodia will soon start disarming themselves. But the Pol Pot faction may refuse to do so. The U.N. peacekeeping force has not yet received enough troops from different nations as was originally planned. If things go as they are now, it will be impossible to have the Pol Pot faction disarm itself, which would get the country mired in confusion."

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31 Yoshitaka Sasaki, "Japan's Postwar Non-military Diplomatic Policy at Crossroads," manuscript, pp. 7-8.
His visit was considered an important stimulus to the ultimate passage of the legislation.

In April, at a press conference in Beijing, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said that "the U.N. contingent for Cambodia is already filled, and that Japanese are not needed."32 The following day a Japanese Foreign Ministry official responded that what Boutros-Ghali meant was that "the forces in Cambodia are sufficient, not that the Japanese aren't needed." The issue of the participation of Japanese military forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations continued as one of the major political issues in Japan in 1992 and through the summer of 1993, even after the bill was finally passed on June 15, 1992. The bill contained additional constraints that had been required to gain the approval of the Komeito and Democratic Socialist parties, without whose votes the bill could not be passed. All missions involving direct peacekeeping duties such as monitoring a cease-fire or collecting weapons would be postponed—"frozen"—for an indefinite period, but for at least three years. (See pages 24-25.) An additional act of Parliament would be necessary to end the freeze, and each subsequent deployment would have to be approved by Parliament. That last requirement, insisted upon by the Democratic Socialists, assured the Japanese public, as well as other Asian countries, that elected representatives would make each deployment decision, and not the bureaucracy. Participation in "peacemaking" operations or any direct military action under U.N. Security Council resolution, such as the war against Iraq, was still out of the question. Prime Minister Miyazawa stated that such activities clearly violated the Japanese constitutional provisions

32 Chalmers Johnson, op. cit.
Japanese Cooperation with U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
Main Features of the PKO Legislation

The PKO law authorized the SDF participation in two broad categories of U.N. operations:

(1) potentially dangerous peacekeeping duties; and (2) supposedly less risky roles in logistical support and humanitarian assistance. For up to three years, the SDF contingents are allowed to engage only in activities in the second category, including the following:

- Election monitoring
- Advisory functions involving civil administration
- Medical care
- Logistical support
- Bridge repairs and road maintenance
- Assistance in environmental restoration

This “freeze” restriction is aimed at alleviating widely shared apprehensions in Japan about possible Japanese involvements in overseas military conflicts. In order to avoid such involvement, the legislation also requires that the following safeguards be in place before and during actual deployment:

- A cease-fire among warring parties
- The consent of those parties to Japanese deployment
- A prior U.N. request for Japanese deployment
- The impartiality of U.N. peacekeeping operations
- The right of Japan to “suspend” its PKO role
- The permission to use “light arms” (pistols and rifles) in self-defense

In addition, to assure military accountability to civilian authority, the law requires prior Diet approval for each instance of SDF dispatch. A deployment lasting more than two years is subject to new Diet approval; if rejected, the operations must cease.
The provisions designed to assure safe PKO operations are to remain in effect for three years and can be lifted only through new legislation following parliamentary review of PKO performance during that period. Even if the "freeze" is lifted, prior Diet approval will be needed to permit an SDF dispatch on risky PKO missions. The operations put on hold include the following:

- Cease-fire monitoring
- Patrol in buffer zones
- Monitoring of arms traffic
- Collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons
- Relocation and disarmament of warring factional forces
- Assistance in creating cease-fire lines
- Assistance in the exchange of prisoners of war

[Adapted from Rinn-Sup Shinn, Congressional Research Service, 92-665F, August 24, 1992]

The Japanese Defense Agency presented a briefer but more formal list of Japanese PKO guidelines:

**Basic Guidelines for Japan's Participation in Peacekeeping Forces**
(The so-called Five Principles)

I. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict.
II. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), shall have given participation in the force.
III. The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
IV. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent.
V. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel's lives, etc.

[Defense of Japan, 1992, Defense Agency]
against "using military force overseas." Japanese public opinion was almost divided just prior to the bill's passage, although the numbers had been significantly inverted: 42 percent favored SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping, and 37 percent opposed it. China and South Korea expressed public displeasure. Opposition both at home and abroad arose out of the fear of a "toe in the door." In the words of a Chinese official at a symposium in Tokyo, "What we are worried about is not the present but the future. The fear is that the [peacekeeping troop dispatch] law is a start in a bad direction."

In the judgment of Philip Trezise, however, the two years of debate indicated the opposite:

"... the process by which Japan made its decision confirmed that its acquired aversion to militarism continues to be, after nearly fifty years, a domestic political force... Realistically, what the affair tells us is that Japan remains addicted to the view that a military renascence would be a bad idea. If the step toward participation in


34 Extensive polling by the Japanese press is summarized in Inoguchi, 1993, p. 112, fn. 9.


international peacekeeping has been tentative, that is what the political situation allowed.\textsuperscript{37}

The government had also submitted an amendment to the International Relief Force Bill at the same time as the PKO legislation was submitted to the Diet. It provided for the inclusion of SDF forces as participants in any Japanese relief force to be dispatched overseas at the request of another state, and it encountered little objection and was passed.\textsuperscript{38} Six weeks later the LDP won a large majority in the parliamentary elections for the upper house of the Diet, and the Socialists, who had opposed the PKO bill, suffered the greatest losses.\textsuperscript{39}

As for South Korea, it had not obtained full U.N. membership until 1991, and for itself, it announced in mid-1992 that it would provide military forces for U.N. peacekeeping under a somewhat ambiguous public formulation. It would offer combat troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as military observers and medical staff, but "only for defense and peacekeeping missions. Combat troops are to be fielded but not to take part in real battles, but . . . to prevent the outbreak of war and for disarmament."\textsuperscript{40} This seemed to emphasize Chapter 6 circumstances, rather than those of Chapter 7, but the permitted categories could easily involve some degree of combat.

Only two days after the passage of the PKO bill, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's report, An Agenda for Peace, was published. It had been

\textsuperscript{37} P. Trezise, 1992, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{38} Takao Takahara, op. cit., p. 10.


Writing in 1995, a South Korean analyst noted that, "The South Korean government, while having no such legal obstacles, [as Japan], is similarly cautious about committing its troops to U.N. peacekeeping efforts with the recognition that South Korea's primary 'peacekeeping' mission is the deterrence of North Korean aggression." That is probably correct, but given the size of South Korean military forces, several thousand troops could be assigned to U.N. peacekeeping duty without running excessive risks. South Korean military units at divisional strength had of course been heavily involved in combat in South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
nearly a year in preparation, and was produced in response to a request from the heads of state of the "Group of Seven," which includes the Japanese prime minister. It appeared at the height of the post-1990 expansion of U.N. peacekeeping missions, and most crucially, it suggested the expanded application of peace enforcement operations under Chapter 7 sanction. In effect, it returned to the full scope of options available to the original U.N. Charter. Coming precisely days after the climax of the two years of Japanese domestic political struggles—which resulted in freezing Japanese participation in Chapter 7 operations—not surprisingly, it was reported that Prime Minister Miyazawa was not excited about the idea of "peace enforcement units." When Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe addressed the full U.N. General Assembly session in September 1992, he said,

"Japan believes that the principles and practices of peacekeeping operations upheld by the United Nations for more than 40 years are still both appropriate and valid today and will continue to be so in the future. The idea of 'peace-enforcement units,' proposed by the Secretary-General's report, offers an interesting approach to future peacemaking efforts of the United Nations, but requires further study because it is rooted in a mode of thinking completely different from past peacekeeping forces."  

Nevertheless, the next development was swift, following only two or three weeks after the Diet's passage of the PKO bill. On July 1, the first Japanese "fact-finding mission for international peace cooperation in Cambodia" left for that country. On August 11, the government announced that it was officially beginning preparations for an SDF deployment, and a second fact-finding mission left on the same day. The United Nations made an official request to Japan on September 3 for a Japanese contribution of personnel to serve in UNTAC, and in the last days of September and early October the first Japanese military engineering units arrived in Cambodia.  

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41 Quoted in Akihiko Tanaka, op. cit., 1995, p. 99. Presumably intended to indicate hesitancy, the statement can also be seen as contradictory; the original "principle" of U.N. peacekeeping unquestionably included enforcement.


In September-October 1992, under the provisions of the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Japanese government also sent three civilian election observers.
Three-hundred Japanese journalists were on hand when the first 200 SDF personnel landed.\(^{43}\)

Six months after the passage of the peacekeeping legislation, Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party leaders decided to initiate a process that at the time might have been expected to take years to complete, but may now be bypassed entirely due to subsequent changes in the position of the Japanese Socialist Party on the constitutionality of the SDF. They suggested amending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to permit participation of Japanese forces in U.N. peacekeeping, and they proposed establishing a commission to consider the question. They also called for the "unfreezing" of the restricted portions of the 1992 legislation, but also, and avoidably, the procurement of long-range transport aircraft and ships to move Japanese forces to peacekeeping missions.\(^{44}\)

In February 1993, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali unceremoniously jumped into the Japanese domestic debate, apparently with little care or preparation, although perhaps under pressure from the failure of other governments to assign additional troops to peacekeeping operations in Africa. In advance of a trip to Japan, he suggested that Japan should change its Constitution to permit it to join peacekeeping operations, adding that such an amendment would "facilitate" Japan’s "greater political role in the United Nations."\(^{45}\) He thus joined the peacekeeping deployment issue and Japan’s effort to obtain a permanent U.N. Security Council seat. Once in Japan, however, he felt compelled to withdraw the suggestion for

\[\text{to serve in UNAVEM II, The United Nations Angola Verification Mission II.}\]


constitutional change. He then requested Japanese troop participation in the U.N. forces serving in Somalia, withdrew that suggestion also, and replaced it with the suggestion that a Japanese deployment to Mozambique would be more suitable, since "There is a solid cease-fire agreement and operations are under way for rehabilitation of refugees." He also expressed the hope that Japanese forces could serve in U.N. missions in Latin America, as well as in Africa.**46** There had been reports that at least some of the SDF military leadership and LDP "hawks" were interested in deploying personnel to both Somalia and Mozambique, but that was ruled out by both Prime Minister Miyazawa and the Japanese defense minister even before Boutros-Ghali made the public request.**47**

The Japanese participation in Cambodia went well, closely monitored by numerous Diet members, and with "enormous effort to micromanage Japanese involvement." Despite some calls for the unit's withdrawal after several Japanese non-military personnel serving in UNTAC were killed by Khmer Rouge ambushes, the government did not withdraw the SDF.**48**

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total 1,200 SDF personnel were deployed to Cambodia. For a time the Japanese Foreign Ministry examined the question of cooperation with Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines in aiding the resettlement of Cambodian refugees, but such cooperation did not take place. The Philippine government, however, did ask the Japanese government to help transport the equipment for its forces in Cambodia from the Philippines, and Japan did provide such help.\footnote{Masashi Nishihara, "Trilateral Country Roles: Challenges and Opportunities," in John Roper, et al., (eds.), \textit{Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Cooperation}, New York: A Report to the Trilateral Commission, 1993, pp. 49-66.}
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS: IN JAPAN AND ABROAD

Between May 1993 and January 1995 Japan contributed 155 SDF personnel to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) for duty as staff officers and in logistics units. The decision to send an SDF contingent to Mozambique was made in March 1993, and occasioned little controversy. (Conflict had ended in Mozambique sometime before, the peace agreement was not being contested, Japanese assessment teams had visited the country in advance, and there was no fear for the safety of the Japanese contingent.) Nevertheless, in December 1993, the head of the Defense Agency, a member of the Japan Renewal Party which favored constitutional revision, was forced to resign for commenting to party colleagues that "Japan should change its Constitution to allow the Self-Defense Forces to join more global peacekeeping missions."

Another request came quickly: early in January 1994, Yasushi Akashi, now head of the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, asked the Japanese government to contribute a minimal contingent to his forces—four or five officers to join an unarmed observer team in Macedonia, or for similar duties in Croatia. The request was summarily rejected by Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tsutomo Hata, although there were indications that Foreign Ministry officials might have been sympathetic to the request. The report noted that "... the ministry has been forced to back down on several occasions by Prime Minister Morihito Hosokawa's dovish advisors who believe that Japan should keep a low profile on security issues."


In June 1994, Tomiichi Murayama, Chairman of the former Socialist party—now renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)—became prime minister in a coalition government. For decades the Socialists had denounced the Self-Defense Forces as unconstitutional, and called for the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. It had also consistently opposed the peacekeeping legislation and SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Even after becoming part of the ruling coalition under Prime Minister Hosokawa in August 1993, the Socialists had strongly objected to sending SDF troops overseas, even in a non-military capacity. However, within days of taking office, Mr. Murayama announced that his government would "firmly maintain" the U.S.-Japan Treaty. It was the precise phrase which the Socialist party had not permitted the preceding coalition government of Prime Minister Hata to use, in which it had also served.\textsuperscript{3} Furthermore, it accepted the constitutionality of the SDF. Just over 60 percent of the Socialist party membership approved of the new positions, and the party platform was reversed in an extraordinary convention early in September.\textsuperscript{4} In the same week a report of an SDPJ study group on future security policy was released. It stated that Japan needed a new basic law on national security to reconcile the Constitution and the existence of the SDF. Regarding Japan and peacekeeping participation, "The panel suggested that if the SDF is to participate, a special unit should be set aside for that purpose. If a non-SDF organization is to play this role, it should be allowed to take part in military activities allowed under the framework of Japan's U.N. peacekeeping cooperation law."\textsuperscript{5} In other words, there was no essential disagreement at all with the evolution of the previous several years, which had come to pass only over the fierce opposition of the SDPJ and a final dramatic filibuster that the party had


staged in June 1992 before the peacekeeping legislation came to a vote.

The first outcome of this reversal was the deployment of 401 SDF personnel between September and December 1994 to provide air transport and public health services in Zaire following the Rwandan genocide. This time it was Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the highest level Japanese international civil servant, who appealed directly to Prime Minister Murayama to specifically send a Japanese SDF contingent to Zaire. The PKO legislation allowed the SDF to perform humanitarian missions without Diet approval; peacekeeping missions required Diet approval. The SDF deployment to Zaire was the first under the humanitarian relief provisions of the PKO legislation. An SDPJ spokesman said "Although we don't like the [peacekeeping operation] law, we should not oppose it forever. It is our job to improve it or to check to make sure the law is not abused."

Toward the end of 1994, a major report was released which was produced by a national Advisory Group on Defense Issues established some 18 months before by Prime Minister Hosokawa. Its position on Japan, the SDF and participation in U.N. peacekeeping was unequivocally positive. "Japan enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, thus making its stand clear in favor of full-scale involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations, including participation of the SDF. The legislation actually qualified the "full scale involvement," however, in that Japanese participation in operations under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter were "frozen"—i.e. postponed—for a minimum of three years, as well as in other ways. (See pages 36-37.) But the report, which was

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Record of Implementation of International Peace Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Cooperation</th>
<th>Dispatch period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</td>
<td>Staff officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement control unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International relief cooperation assignments for Rwandan refugees</td>
<td>Refugee relief activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air transport (ASDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison and coordination personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Assignments under the International Peace Cooperation Law

(as of January 31, 1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Total no. of persons</th>
<th>Main Assignments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Observation of fair implementation of presidential and national assembly elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>• Observation of state of storage of collected weapons and state of observance of cease-fire • Monitoring of cease-fire along national borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of advice or guidance and observation of police administrative affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>• Restoration of roads and bridges • Oil and water supply to UNTAC • Provision of meals, lodging facilities and work facilities to UNTAC personnel and medical services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Observation and administration of fair execution of the election for the national assembly to enact the Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>• Formulation of medium–long term operation plan at the ONUMOZ Headquarters and planning and coordinating transport operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Observation of fair implementation of presidential and national assembly elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>• Allocation of transportation, support for customs clearance and other transport-related technical coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 (each)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Observation of fair implementation of presidential and national assembly and other elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Medical, sanitary and water supply operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Air transport of personnel of Rwandan refugee relief corps and supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (Zaire) • Air transport of personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations utilizing surplus capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca 10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>• Liaison and coordination operations between humanitarian organizations and SDF units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:

1. In addition to the foregoing, MSDF (Cambodia) and ASDF (Cambodia and Mozambique) units implemented transport and supply support operations.
2. Replacement personnel were dispatched in the cases of cease-fire observers and SDF engineering units in Cambodia, staff officers and movement control units in Mozambique and liaison and coordination personnel in the case of the international relief cooperation assignments for Rwandan refugees.
considered rather important since it was the first in two decades commissioned by the government as a whole on defense issues, continued as follows in regard to the SDF and U.N. peacekeeping, making its advocacy for full participation clear:

As noted in light of the issues raised in his "An Agenda for Peace" by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and a number of its cases now underway, the fact is that the content and concept of U.N. peacekeeping operations are being forced to adapt to the new environment and undergo repeated experiments. There is no doubt that the United Nations is finally beginning to move in the direction of a United Nations as it should be.

Seen in this light, it should be emphasized anew that one of the major pillars of Japan's security policy is to contribute positively to strengthening the U.N. functions for international peace, including further improvement of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, such contribution is important in the sense that Japan's firm committing to such an international trend regarding security problems will strengthen its role befitting its international position. The closer the world moves to the realization of the ideal held up in the U.N. Charter of a world without wars, the better place it will become for nations such as Japan, which aspires for a true peace in the original sense of the word; therefore it is extremely important to Japan's national interest to make utmost efforts toward this goal.

The SDF, whose most important mission is to ensure the security of Japan, cannot be exempt from this duty. From this viewpoint, a number of improvements are needed in such areas as statutes governing the operation of the SDF, SDF organization, equipment and training.

First, it is important to consider it a major duty of the SDF, along with the primary duty of national defense, to participate as positively as possible in various forms of multilateral cooperation that are conducted within the framework of the United Nations for purposes of international security, including peacekeeping operations.

In this sense, it is necessary to take such measures as improvement of the law system, including revision of the SDF Law to add participation in peacekeeping operations to the primary duties of the SDF, and organizational improvement of the SDF with a view to international cooperation. In addition, use of SDF facilities for such purposes as training centers and advance depots for materials and
equipment for peacekeeping operations, and supply by Japan of equipment necessary for peacekeeping operations conducted by other nations also merit positive consideration. Such measures mean providing international public goods for peace. Peacekeeping operations, which are currently attracting the particular attention as a role of the United Nations, require in some cases that weapons be used to a certain extent. In view of the purposes of the United Nations already described, however, it is natural that such use of arms should be permitted. From this viewpoint, we believe that government should make efforts to obtain public understanding at home and abroad with regard to the mode of SDF participation. As for the mode and limits of SDF in peacekeeping operations, it should be decided in a comprehensive manner taking into consideration a number of aspects including whatever means available for Japan to make meaningful contribution.

There is a view in some quarters that organizations other than the SDF should be dispatched to engage in peacekeeping operations. If this view is intended to evade constitutional questions, it is meaningless. Organizations that participate in the military sector of peacekeeping operations, regardless of their names, are internationally regarded as military organizations. Under status-of-forces agreements, for example, they are treated as "foreign military units"; in addition, when the United Nations requests nations to contribute personnel, branches of service, ranks, and so forth as mentioned. Thus even non-SDF organizations would be treated as military organizations.59

It would seem that the Advisory Group's report had undoubted influence on the content of the new defense policy promulgated by the Murayama administration, and announced a year later in November 1995, despite earlier reports that Prime Minister Murayama had "quietly shelved" the report. It was the first major revision of Japanese defense policy since the National Defense Program Outline of 1976. It had two striking and contrasting components:

(1) Japanese defense forces would be cut across the board—ground, naval, and air forces. The cuts were substantial, both in manpower and in ships, tanks, and aircraft. Cuts in defense expenditure had begun as early as 1990, and the rate of growth of military expenditure was further reduced in 1994 and 1995. Now it would be cut further to produce an actual decrease when inflation rates were accounted for.

(2) In contrast, missions of the SDF were increased, to include "duties beyond defense of the country, to allow them to deal with a wider range of situations, including disasters, terrorism, and peacekeeping operations." It was a combination, it was suggested, in which "... the cuts in the Japanese military may irritate the Americans; the changes are likely to reassure South and North Korea and other Asian countries that remain nervous about Japanese military intentions."

One of the more interesting developments at this point was a report that "Japan is consulting with China about cooperation in U.N. peacekeeping operations as part of confidence-building measures between the two countries." Japan had reportedly asked China to discuss "joint training and participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. The Chinese government had not yet responded..." It would be an extremely desirable socialization for both, and perhaps even more so for China than Japan. Writing in December 1995, the Director of Japanese Studies at the [South] Korean Institute for Defense Analysis published an article in a Japanese publication proposing South Korean-Japanese collaboration in U.N. peacekeeping operations. She envisaged broader forms of cooperation in such missions as theoretically possible in the future, but for the moment suggested collaboration in the kinds of operations that Japan performed for UNTAC in Cambodia. She also expressed support for the establishment, by Japan and in Japan, of a regional multinational peacekeeping training center. She also felt that it


would be most feasible for the two nations to collaborate in peacekeeping operations if other Asian nations participated in the same missions at the same time. To this end she suggested that these ideas be discussed in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).\textsuperscript{61} The membership of this group is perhaps too large to obtain a relatively quick response. ASEAN has so far not considered establishing a joint peacekeeping organization for itself, although five ASEAN members contributed personnel to the UNTAC Force in Cambodia.\textsuperscript{62}

There have also been suggestions by Japanese authors for SDF participation in an all-Asian force. In the spring of 1991, Koji Kakizawa, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, suggested in a lecture at Japan’s National Defense Academy that the SDF should participate in “...an Asian Peacekeeping Force under U.N. auspices.”\textsuperscript{63} Conceivably this could also include collaboration with Australia and New Zealand. At the time—before the Japanese SDF deployment to Cambodia—Malaysian reaction to any proposal approximating that, was decidedly negative. In July 1991, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad told an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur that “We do not want to see any Japanese expeditionary force in this region,” but at the time of Prime Minister Murayama’s visit to Malaysia in August 1994, Mahathir said that Japan should “...prepare to play all international roles, including a military

\textsuperscript{61} Young-sun Song, “The Prospect of Cooperation Between South Korea and Japan in Peacekeeping Operations,” manuscript; published as "Nikkan wa PKO de renkei wo" ("Japan and Korea should work together for PKO"), \textit{This is Yomiuri}, December 1995, pp. 80-85. The Asian Regional Forum includes 18 nations: the six members of ASEAN (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei), seven dialogue partners (Australia, the European Union, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States), three observers (Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea), as well as China and Russia.

\textsuperscript{62} Of a total of some 22,000 personnel, ASEAN contributed 4385: Indonesia 2034; Malaysia 1208; the Philippines 351; Singapore 75; and Thailand 714.


role in U.N. peacekeeping efforts.""64 In 1991 the ASEAN foreign ministers even rejected a suggestion by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama that the informal annual dialogue between ASEAN and most of the nations in the ARF (excluding Russia and China) be converted into a regular conference on regional political and security matters.65 Nevertheless, in the following year, the ASEAN Summit held in January 1992 endorsed a modified version of the suggestion. Most recently, in February 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry suggested that "Defense officials of China, Japan, the United States, and other Asia-Pacific nations should meet regularly to promote understanding and head off military crises."66 ARF members have also asked the Japanese to aid in piracy surveillance and emergency rescue and response programs in Southeast Asian waters. However, it is the Japanese Coast Guard, and not the Maritime SDF, that will collaborate in these programs.

Discussion in the summer of 1995 as to whether to send a Japanese SDF contingent to the Middle East to join the U.N. interposition and observer force on the Golan Heights resulted in the dispatch of a unit of 45 armed Japanese troops in February 1996—the first Japanese forces to serve in a full peacekeeping role, although they will serve in a logistics unit.67 Beyond these, Japan has not offered SDF personnel to the United Nations for any other peacekeeping operations.

Japan has provided financial aid for humanitarian programs in the former Yugoslavia since 1992 and contributes additional funds, just as many other nations do, through its assessed peacekeeping contributions.68

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Japan also suggested that "its support for Balkan peace efforts should be balanced
National financial contributions to the U.N. regular budget and to the special peacekeeping budget are reset every three years. The most recent such adjustment was made in January 1995. Japan's assessment for the regular U.N. budget was set at 13.95 percent, and for the peacekeeping budget at 14.01 percent. Recently another report cited Japan’s assessment for 1997 at 15.65 percent, for both the regular U.N. and the peacekeeping budget.\footnote{Barbara Wanner, “United Nations Reform Shines Spotlight on Japan’s Leadership Potential,” Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 15A, April 19, 1996, p. 4.}

However, since Japan's GNP is currently approximately 85 percent that of the United States, and the U.S. assessments for the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets are in the range of 25 percent and higher, it is not clear why the Japanese financial contribution should not be substantially higher.

So far there has been only one troubling note. That was the suggestion by Japanese government and military sources in January 1993 that new long-range transport aircraft and ships should be procured to move SDF forces to peacekeeping missions. This suggestion was patently unnecessary. Such systems could easily be seen as giving Japanese forces greater potential long-range offensive capability, and it is precisely the kind of indicator that opponents of extending the missions of the SDF beyond Japanese borders fear.\footnote{Yoshitaka Sasaki, “Japanese Politics: Sailing into Stormy Seas,” Asahi Shimbun, March 23, 1993; Yoshitaka Sasaki, “View From Nagatacho; Showdown Nears on Landing Craft Procurement,” Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 1993.} There are no apparent difficulties at present in moving Japanese
peacekeeping contributions via Japanese commercial carriers. The numbers of personnel and the size of the logistics train for the Japanese units have so far been quite limited. The Japanese sealift and airlift for its SDF deployment to Cambodia—the largest of the deployments to date—was carried out by a mix of commercial and military assets, without any significant problems. In addition, transport could be provided by other nations, in the same way that the peacekeeping contingents of many other nations whose military services do not own their own long-range transport are moved to the areas in which they are to serve. In short, there is no need to acquire longer-range hardware for Japan to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In making this suggestion in 1993, it was clear that the Cambodian deployment was being used opportunistically. After Japan has been contributing to the U.N. peacekeeping missions to everyone's satisfaction for a decade or two, and if there is then an apparent need for long-range transport, the issue can be considered at that time. Even then, aircraft could simply be purchased or leased from commercial airlines.

ANALYSIS:  
THE PROS AND CONS OF JAPANESE PARTICIPATION

Writing early in 1992, before legislative or judicial decisions in both countries altered the previous status quo on the degree of both nations' use of their military forces, Durch and Blechman commented on the post-World War II effort "... to demilitarize German and Japanese society:

"That effort has succeeded, perhaps beyond anyone's expectations at the time and, indeed, to such an extent that both countries' governments have a difficult time convincing legislators and publics that their military participation in even so clearly a multilateral, peace-oriented, and constructive endeavor as U.N. peacekeeping is a good idea. Evidently there are fears in those countries that sending military units to far away lands might reawaken some atavistic imperial urge or re-stimulate German or Japanese forces to dominate their societies."71

Put more crudely, in the remarks made by former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in May 1991, "... allowing the Japanese to participate in military operations was like giving an alcoholic liquor chocolates... the Japanese do not know when to stop,"72 and as the Chinese diplomat already quoted put it in 1992, "What we are worried about is not the present but the future." In a similar vein, an American military commentator wrote,

"The most extreme foreign critics suggest that a JSDF overseas peacekeeping deployment could be a precursor to Japanese forces marching abroad under the battle flag of the Rising Sun... Most important to all parties was the question of what JSDF deployments


abroad might indicate about future Japanese military intentions."\(^{73}\)

Also writing in 1992, Chalmers Johnson strongly emphasized that "the Japanese political system lacks a 'checking mechanism'. . . . It must be understood that most Japanese equate Article 9 of the Constitution with democracy itself; to alter one is to alter the other." And he quoted a Japanese academic to the effect that Japan had not arrived "at a compatibility between an army and democratic principles. In that sense, we must call modern-day Japanese democracy incomplete. . . . Of course, the Self-Defense Forces are going to be viewed by other countries as a threat if they are sent abroad with this present structure still intact."\(^{74}\)

On the other hand, international law specialists such as Richard Gardner and John Ruggie argued that,

"Japan has, like every other signatory of the U.N. Charter, a solemn obligation to negotiate an Article 43 agreement with the United Nations that puts fighting forces, not simply peacekeeping troops, at the disposal of the Security Council."\(^{75}\)

Both Japan and Germany are among the handful of wealthiest states in the world, and both have well-armed and well-trained military forces. On the other hand, both states invaded and conquered numerous neighboring states during World War II, and carried out military operations thousands of miles from their shores. There is no one, anywhere, who wants a repetition of that experience. In the case of Japan, many of their World War II and pre-World War II victims have in the past expressed varying degrees of apprehension or opposition to the participation of Japanese troops in peacekeeping operations. If one is interested in the greatest likelihood that the armed forces of Japan should never again manifest the behavior that they did during and before World War II, is that more likely to be achieved if they

\(^{73}\) Lt. Col. A. H. N. Kim, op. cit., p. 22.


participate in United Nations or other international coalitional peacekeeping or combat operations, or if they do not? Which carries the greatest risk of the resumption of undesired behavior 25, 50, or 100 years hence?

The resolution of the "compatibility between an army and democratic principles," and the "completion" of "Japanese democracy" would seem to have taken place in September 1994, with the reversal in positions of the Japanese Socialist Party. Since it was the Japanese Socialists who had insisted for the 40 years between 1954—the year of the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces—and 1994 that the SDF was inconsistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, and since their total reversal of position in 1994 and the additional approval of the 1992 PKO legislation by a Socialist prime minister, the reinterpretation of Article 9 is no longer "... alter[ing]... democracy itself." The Socialists renounced their decades-long position that Japan should pursue a permanent policy of "unarmed neutrality" exactly two years after they had fiercely fought any compromise and the enactment of the PKO legislation. One might conclude that the nature of the resolution of the compatibility between democracy and the existence of the SDF was more than a bit ironic—perhaps even cynical—and that the polarity of the previous positions was excessive, and overloaded with clichés on the part of the opposition.

In several discussions with highly informed Japanese specialists that both oppose and favor the expansion of Japanese peacekeeping operations, it was virtually impossible to obtain a description of the sort of circumstances that could once again lead, in contemporary Japan, to a rise of "militarism," leading either to the domestic consequences of the abrogation of civilian government as in the 1930s, or to its external aspect—the aggressive use of Japanese military forces for imperial conquest. When these fears are expressed they have a highly abstract quality, referring always to what was able to happen once before, rather than to present or future conditions. In 1990, Hanns Maull noted that, "Most fears about

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76 Writing in 1993, Frank McNeil could also only offer the "... worst-case scenario, the sum of all fears in Asia, sees the intimidating power of the far Right on the rise, pushing the clock back to an aggressive remilitarized Japan. The fears are understandable, and they have been heightened by the recent call of a Japanese military officer for a military coup to end corruption. That would require, inter alia, a radical change in the peaceful temper of the Japanese." See Frank McNeil, Japanese Politics: Decay or Reform. The Consequences of Political Stagnation and the Prospects for Major Change, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
Japanese and/or German revanchism turn less on perceived political strategies by today’s leaderships in Tokyo or Bonn than on the dynamics of ungovernable change."77

If one compares the international, as well as the regional, circumstances in Asia that existed in the 1920s and 1930s with those that obtain now, they all differ drastically, without exception:

■ A China that was not unified, dominated by civil war and regional warlords, versus the present military and economic power of China;
■ An independent and powerful South Korea, allied to the United States, as well as the military capabilities of North Korea;
■ The independence and governmental legitimacy (and armed forces) of the nations of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, etc. They are no longer colonies. The additional existence of ASEAN;
■ The total absence of legitimacy to any conception of imperial conquest, at present or in the future;
■ Japan’s own alliance with the United States;
■ The complete ineffectuality of the League of Nations versus the capacities of the United Nations;
■ Japan’s present economic status—the second largest economy in the


An example of the kind of analysis that attributes every change in the Japanese defense sector, be it military expenditure or weapons procurement, to “militarism,” although the same term would never be used for similar events in most other countries, is Glenn D. Hook, "Militarization in Contemporary Japan: The Erosion of Anti-Militaristic Principles," Australian National University, Peace Research Center, Working Paper No. 50, September 1988.

world—which includes its successful peacetime economic penetration of the economies of Southeast Asian states, versus that of the 1920s and 1930s.

All of these, individually and combined, make the plausibility of external Japanese military aggression extremely low. Japan’s existing territorial disputes with its immediate neighbors are close in and limited: with Russia regarding the northern islands, with China regarding the Senkaku (Diao-yutai) Islands, and with South Korea regarding Tok Do (Takeshima). The likelihood of Japan’s use of military force to resolve any of these disputes seems equally low.

There are most definitely, however, major and significant differences between Japan and Germany in assessing the desirability of the participation of their military forces in international peacekeeping, and one must consider to what degree those differences should determine the policies recommended for each of the countries.

There are two overriding reasons why Germany’s military forces—and government—have gained the confidence of its neighbors in a way that Japan has not, and why doubts or fears of a resurgence of German “militarism” has essentially been overcome. The first of these is that for the entire past 40 years, German military forces have existed integrated into an alliance—NATO—with those of its immediate neighbors that it invaded and occupied during World War II. German military forces have exercised in joint maneuvers for decades. Training is internationalized and integrated. Senior German staff officers serve in and are incorporated into an international command structure. German political and defense decision-makers have, and have had to, operate in an international pan-European and Atlantic setting. All of these processes, over an extended period of decades, have given the other European countries confidence in Germany’s evolution—even some degree of control over both its military and foreign policy framework—and a reasonable certainty that Germany will not again go off on its own in a rampage of aggression and murderous destruction.

Nothing of the sort has happened in Japan. As a 1993 Carnegie Endowment report noted, “Japan’s experience of constructive engagement with the rest of the world is limited.” Japanese military forces were not integrated into any larger international grouping precisely because everyone

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agreed that Japan could not join a common defense coalition. Although close, the bilateral Japanese-American security relationship bears no comparison whatsoever to the integrated operational functioning of NATO: there is no joint command structure, no integrated combat units, no membership by nations that Japan had invaded in World War II, no joint decision-making on the use of nuclear munitions, etc., etc. There is also no way to redo the past 40 years now. There is no "Asian NATO" on the horizon. ASEAN does not even function in that manner for its member nations in Southeast Asia. Participation by Japanese SDF forces in U.N. and international peacekeeping is the only mechanism at hand to initiate the processes—or some semblance of them—that German military forces have undergone, intensively, for the past decades. It is for this reason that suggestions for joint peacekeeping operations between the Japanese SDF forces and those of other Asian states seem particularly desirable, and of course, the suggestion has been made by others, by Japanese authors as well as in the South Korean example provided earlier. There had apparently been some possibility of joint operations with a Chinese engineering battalion assigned to UNTAC in 1992; however, the Chinese unit moved its location, and the opportunity was lost.\(^79\)

The Question of Japan’s Responsibility in World War II

The second aspect that differentiates Germany and Japan is that there has been no thoroughgoing national assumption of responsibility for Japan's aggression and extraordinarily vicious military behavior during World War II. This is something that Germany and the German body politic has essentially succeeded in doing. Japan has not, and 50 years have passed since 1945.\(^80\) The utterances of "regret" and "apologies" offered by senior

\(^79\) Lt. Col. A. H. N. Kim, op. cit., p. 29.

\(^80\) A more detailed examination of these aspects appears in the version of this study published in Asian Perspective.


Regarding Japan in particular, the following items are a small selection of relevant materials: Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the
political figures—isolated and symbolic—at times following months and even years of bureaucratic and interparty wrangling over the choice of a single word, only demonstrate this all the more. The specifics are well known: between 10 and 17 million persons killed in China alone; the notorious individual massacres, in Nanking, Singapore, and Manila; the "Three-All" campaign of "Loot All, Kill All, Burn All" carried out in North

China in areas in which Communist forces operated; as many as 250,000 Chinese killed in a single series of reprisals related to the inconsequential U.S. air raid on Tokyo in April 1942; the widespread rape by Japanese forces; and the use of 200,000 "comfort women" forced into prostitution to serve the military; severe mistreatment of prisoners of war; use of biological warfare in China, etc. But in contrast to the many explicit actions to atone for the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities by successive German governments over a period of decades, Japanese officialdom has essentially avoided the matter. Until the early 1970s, Ministry of Education-approved textbooks avoided even mentioning that Japan had invaded neighboring countries during World War II; thereafter the world has witnessed a peculiar struggle over textbook language between that Ministry seeking to employ words like Japan’s "advance" into China and "war of liberation" in Asia, which "caused inconvenience" to neighboring countries—and foreign (particularly Chinese and Korean) critics extracting marginal changes, attained through embarrassing publicity or the intervention of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bureaucratic evasion and equivocation has been replicated by senior political leaders. Several cabinet ministers have been forced to resign since 1985 after statements, such as, that accounts of the Japanese Army’s massacre in Nanking were "fiction," that Japan's invasion of China was not aggression, or that Japan’s World War II invasions actually benefited Asian countries. Additional cabinet members were spared resignation after similar remarks were "withdrawn" or retracted under pressure. Japan’s current Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said as recently as October 1994 that "it was a matter of delicate definition whether Japan had committed aggression against Asian neighbors during the war."

There has been, over the past decade, a series of carefully worded Prime Ministerial apologies and recognitions of "unbearable suffering" caused by Japan’s wartime occupation. But these have been compromised by prolonged disputes among the political parties in the Diet over their

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worrying: as recently as 1995, a watered-down Diet resolution on the occasion of Prime Minister Murayama’s visit to China was summarized in a Far Eastern Economic Review headline: “Japan, Sort of Sorry.” The 50th anniversary of the war’s end in 1995 would have been a long overdue—but opportune—time for a significant acknowledgement by Japan’s political elite; instead, the situation was compromised further. The only resolution that could be approved by the Diet was a decided step backward. The LDP would not agree to the use of the words “apology” or “regret,” only to the use of the word for “reflection.” A group of over 150 LDP politicians lobbied against any formal parliamentary apology for the war, half of the Diet boycotted the final vote, and the entire enterprise was reduced to an effort to maintain the coalition by a compromise of wording. In 1996, 116 Diet members again formed a group opposed to any official Japanese government apology for World War II.

Non-governmental institutions have behaved similarly. In contrast to Germany where the major national weekly magazine Der Spiegel has published lengthy series over a period of two decades on the Holocaust and World War II German extermination camps, a Japanese film distributor in 1988 removed from the film The Last Emperor—without the director’s permission—40 seconds of World War II documentary newsreel coverage of Japanese military operations in China.

What bearing has this second issue—the inability of a very significant portion of Japan’s political elite to acknowledge its World War II record—on the question of SDF involvement in U.N. peacekeeping? Here, too, there is no way to quickly compensate for the failure of Japan to have

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undergone a more satisfactory evolution during the past 50 years. This legacy is clearly relevant to the question of whether other nations, particularly Asian nations, should welcome Japanese military operations in the region today. There is power in the view, expressed recently by a Chinese citizen’s group (in reference to the Nanking massacre) that, “A country that does not recognize its wrongs cannot do right.” 84 It is not that in this continuing framework particular Japanese initiatives would be received with, or “provoke,” distrust, but that they would deserve distrust. It is perhaps the most problematic factor of all that stands in the way of developing confidence in the interest of future Japanese governments to maintain control of the SDF within international norms. But just as participation in NATO has rendered German military forces acceptable to their European neighbors, Japanese behavior and perceptions are likely to be beneficially modified by the degree of influence or control manifested by the rest of the international community, and most particularly by other Asian nations. U.N. peacekeeping, and joint Asian peacekeeping participation, could only serve to counteract the World War II residue problems. Even if the benefit were only marginal, which seems unlikely given the German example, it could no nothing to aggravate the situation.

Developments in April 1996 will apparently lead to further elaboration of the role of the SDF in the coming years, although in this case not in the area of U.N. peacekeeping. Rather these are likely to produce expanded interaction between the SDF and U.S. military forces, and an enlargement of Japan’s practices and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. During President Clinton’s meeting with Prime Minister Hashimoto on April 17, 1996, a “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security; Alliance For the 21st Century” was signed. 85

President Clinton noted that “...The security declaration... is a result of more than one year’s hard work and careful study.” 86 In June 1995, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye described these U.S.-Japanese


85 “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security; Alliance For the 21st Century,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, April 17, 1996.

86 “Press Conference by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto,” The White House; Office of the Press Secretary, Tokyo, April 17, 1996, p.2.
discussions:

"... what we have done is launch an intensive security dialog with the Japanese which will take a year or more to finish, which is aimed at reaffirming and enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance. The initiative looks at three areas. First of all, the bilateral relations and the frictions that inevitably arise in bilateral defense relationships. Second, the regional context, to try to get Japan and the United States to align their regional strategies with each other. And third, global issues—to find ways in which we can be supportive to the extent Japan chooses to become involved in global issues." 87

Clearly, therefore, the Joint Declaration was not simply a response to the most recent provocative events in the area: China's March 1996 testing of surface-to-surface missiles to impact close to Taiwan's two major harbors, or the April 14, 1996, announcement by North Korea that it would no longer respect the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, a cornerstone of the 1953 truce agreement that ended the Korean War. 88 These events certainly reconfirmed for Japanese and American officials the importance of the new security proposals, but they were apparently prompted by broader concern about China's military future, and by the


88 North Korea immediately followed this announcement with a series of brief demonstrative, but purposeful, military forays into the demilitarized zone, and typically accompanied its actions with a rash of pronouncements that the United States and South Korea were preparing an imminent invasion of North Korea and that war on the Korean Peninsula was drawing closer each day. See also, "North Korea Says It will Cease Respecting Demilitarized Zone," New York Times, April 5, 1996; Reid G. Miller, "North Korean Troops Violate DMZ Again; U.S., U.N. Officials Say Actions Pose Little Risk of Imminent Threat to South," Washington Post, April 7, 1996; Kevin Sullivan, "N. Koreans Enter DMZ A Third Time; Tensions Rise in Area, U.S. Officials Minimize Threat of Confrontation," Washington Post, April 8, 1996; Andrew Pollack, "Armed North Korea Troops Again Violate the DMZ," New York Times, April 8, 1996.
volatile mix on the Korean peninsula: the North Korean nuclear program, and the possibility that that nation's political instability could trigger either an invasion of the South or a disintegration of the regime. Concern that the latter might, in turn, produce an outflow of refugees prompted Prime Minister Hashimoto to suggest a possible need to receive them or "to rescue Japanese in certain areas of emergency." Finally, the political need for reaffirmation of the alliance was made urgent by the public outcry in Japan which followed the September 1995 rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa by three American soldiers stationed there.

The specific obligations that Japan has assumed under the new joint declaration and in a logistical support agreement signed on April 15 are, on the surface, quite circumscribed: to supply the United States with weapons parts, airport access, and other logistical assistance in peacetime. More importantly, Japan pledged to study a more active role in the event of war, and toward this end the 1978 Guidance for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation would be reviewed, "...including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the security of Japan." The significance of these initiatives is that previously the SDF was permitted to collaborate in "collective defense" only with U.S. military operations that were being carried out exclusively in direct defense of Japanese territory. In the future, the presumption now is that the SDF could be involved in collaboration with U.S. forces in other regional contingencies short of full scale war. The review would be undertaken by the Security Consultative Committee, foreign and defense ministry officials of the United States and Japan who meet regularly. It would reportedly focus on several issues: (1) Japanese contributions to regional crises; (2) expanded base access and

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90 The 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation called for focusing bilateral defense cooperation on the deterrence of aggression; the actions in response to an armed attack against Japan; and Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of external crises affecting Japan's security.
facilities cooperation; material, logistical, infrastructure, and repair support; and some operational cooperation; (3) enhanced cooperation on international peace operations and humanitarian assistance; and (4) multilateral cooperation and confidence-building measures. The new defense guidelines that the Japanese government had adopted in November 1995 previewed these developments. Had President Clinton also attended the November 1995 APEC Summit in Japan, the joint U.S.-Japanese declaration would probably have been signed at that time. Clinton had to cancel that trip due to domestic budgetary problems in Washington. Finally, the joint declaration stated that the United States and Japan would "... continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia."

The Japanese government also used the occasion of the summit visit to announce a contribution of $500 million toward the U.N.'s Bosnia Reconstruction Fund.

One question remains: What positions might Japan take on peacekeeping—and in particular on peace enforcement questions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter—if it were to obtain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council? Peacekeeping operations have become increasingly important in the work of the U.N. Security Council since 1990, and there are reasons to suspect that the tendency of Japanese positions would be to temporize and to constantly urge caution. Although the comment was made before the major changes in Japanese policy in June of that year, Barbara Wanner noted early in 1992 that,

Some analysts... have expressed concern that Japan's deliberative, consensus-oriented policymaking style may inhibit the country's ability to act decisively within the United Nations, particularly in the event of another crisis comparable to the one created by Iraq's

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aggression against Kuwait.\footnote{Barbara Wanner, "Japan Views Leadership Opportunities Through the United Nations," Japan Economic Institute, Report No. 10A, March 13, 1992.}

In an interview in March 1994, Yoshio Hatana, then Japan's Ambassador to the United Nations, responding to a question on the lessons that could be applied from UNTAC's experience in Cambodia, commented that

The first 'lesson' UNTAC provided the world was the importance of restraint. UNTAC refrained from retaliating against repeated attacks and provocations from the Khmer Rouge, the rebel forces in Cambodia. Although the Khmer Rouge engaged in minor-scale military attacks in many places, U.N. peacekeepers kept these skirmishes from escalating into a large-scale military involvement. This certainly was commendable.\footnote{Barbara Wanner, "Japan Pursues Leadership Role in the United Nations: An Interview with Yoshio Hatano, Japan's Ambassador to the United Nations," Japan Economic Institute, Report No. 12A, March 1994, p. 3.}

Unfortunately, it was the wrong "lesson" that Mr. Akashi, head of UNTAC, took with him to Yugoslavia when he succeeded to the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General there. His decisions in the face of "repeated attacks and provocations" there continually shaven off portions of the Security Council's mandate to the point of appeasement of Serbian aggression. The tendency to temporize, to continually compromise and step back from confrontation always provides an advantage to the aggressor.

As regards Japan's attitude about its own participation in Chapter 7 operations that require the use of military force, these may yet change should the Parliament reconsider the question. However, in September 1994, Yohei Kono, President of the LDP and then Foreign Minister in the Murayama government, stated at the United Nations that Japan was prepared "to discharge its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council," but that "Japan does not, nor will it resort to the use of force prohibited by its Constitution."\footnote{"Statement by H. E. Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 49th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," September 27, 1994, Press Release, Permanent Mission of Japan to the
nations simply do not contribute personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions—or those that the Security Council sanctions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter—there is no inherent reason that they should not, and that pertains to Japan as well. Furthermore, Japanese military participation under Chapter 7, just as in the case of its participation under Chapter 6, should not be placed in the context of Japan's effort to obtain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. It is simply an obligation of all member states of the United Nations, whether or not they aspire to Security Council membership.

SUMMARY

It is clear that there had been a long history of pressure and requests, from U.N. Secretaries-General and senior U.S. government officials, for Japan to take on the task of military participation in U.N. peacekeeping. The issue was deferred for 40 years, from the time that Japan became a full member of the United Nations in 1954, until the major policy changes that first took place in 1992 and 1994.

The question of Japan’s World War II responsibility remains a problem. A single, euphemistic word or phrase, uttered once every few years by a Japanese official, does not substitute for a process of national assumption of responsibility. That national understanding seems absent to a significant degree in Japan, despite the continued desire of large portions of the Japanese population to maintain their “peace” Constitution. There are too many senior politicians in the LDP that appear so unconstructed that they see little or nothing wrong in Japan’s World War II activities.

Nevertheless, the basic question remains the same: For the long-term future, which process is more likely to lead to the peaceful evolution of Japan’s role in the world and its avoidance of any future aggressive use of its military forces—its present integration in U.N. peacekeeping operations, somewhat as a late analogue to Germany’s NATO alliance experience, or leaving it permanently outside that structure? Either choice might work out well, and either choice could lead to undesirable results. Once the precedent of overseas deployment has occurred and has been legitimized, it is obviously easier to envision the beginning of a process with untoward results, in contrast to an absolute firebreak of “no overseas activities,” if that could be maintained forever. Nevertheless, it would seem that integrating the Japanese government and its military into the framework of collaborative U.N. peacekeeping stands the better chance of producing the same long-term outcome as occurred in Germany via NATO. In addition, all the regional geopolitical developments of the past decades in Asia would appear to strongly circumscribe the possibilities for Japanese military aggression. Since 1992 Japanese forces have participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Zaire, and have recently joined a U.N. mission of the Golan Heights. Asian nations that had expressed
apprehensions before have found this development unobjectionable; some have even made public statements in its support. If a collaborative regional security regime which includes Japan begins to develop in Asia in the coming years, it would presumably aid in the same desirable evolution. The past and present role of the United States in the Pacific theatre is not likely to continue indefinitely, although ironically, it is desired by all the regional states—Japan, China, and Korea—as well as by Taiwan and the ASEAN nations.

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The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) works to enhance research, training, and policy-oriented scholarship across a wide range of international issues. CISSM is based at the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland at College Park in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The Center fosters research by students and visiting scholars in a wide variety of disciplines, including public policy, political science, sociology, economics, and history.

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**Women in International Security** – This program is an international, nonpartisan education program and network dedicated to increasing the effective professional involvement of women in the fields of foreign and defense policy.

**Program on International Policy Attitudes** – Cosponsored with the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes, this project uses nationwide polls and in-depth interviews to examine the attitudes of policymakers and citizens toward current international and foreign policy issues.

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**Jerusalem: Exploring the Limits of Negotiability** – This research project explores Israeli and Palestinian attitudes about the future of Jerusalem.

**Rethinking Arms Control** – This project sponsors discussion groups and publications intended to challenge the basic assumptions on which past arms control efforts and existing military arrangements are grounded.

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Managing Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: An Indian View by P.R. Chari, with A Commentary by John Hawes, CISSM Paper 4, April 1995.


