Cooperative Security in Europe: New Wine, New Bottles

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Contents

I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 4
II. Cooperative Security ........................................................................................................... 6
   1. The Origins of Cooperative Security
   2. Definitional Debates in the Evolving Literature
   3. Cooperative Threat Reduction as the New Model for Cooperative Security
   4. Reasons for the Apparent Decline of Cooperative Security
   5. The Continued Relevance of Cooperative Security
III. Core Factors in Cooperative Security ............................................................................. 20
   1. The Indispensable Nation: The US and Cooperative Security
      1. American Perspectives
   2. Institutionalization and Interaction in the Transatlantic Space
      1. The Atlantic Bond – NATO and the EU
      2. European Perspectives: No Single Voice
   3. The Problem with, of, and for Russia
      1. Russian Strategic Concerns and Agenda for Reassurance under Cooperative Security
IV. The Tests of Relevance: Current Cases ........................................................................... 35
   1. Arms Control
   2. Institution Building
   3. Missile Defense
   4. Terrorism and Proliferation
   5. Energy Security
V. Future Prospects and Recommendations ......................................................................... 75
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 80
Appendix 1: International Organization Membership in the Euro-Atlantic Space…………..89
Appendix 2: Cooperative Security Treaties and Other Arrangements…………………….…94
Appendix 3: Missions Conducted by the European Union ESDP 109 ...............................98
I. Introduction

This is a report on the life, and reported near-death, of one of the most powerful concepts in recent European political history: cooperative security. Europe is where the concept originated, blossomed, and has experienced its greatest tests and successes. However, neither its intellectual parents nor the practitioners who found it so useful in their efforts to shape a new post-Cold War international order would concede that cooperative security is a concept restricted by geographic limits. As they see it, Europe is the first, but not the only, region where the principles of cooperative security can be applied. They would also reject the cultural bounds suggested by critics— that it is a concept reserved only for advanced/democratic societies, with enough prosperity and social harmony to allow for consensus and confidence.

There are many different explanations and claims about how the Cold War ended and why Europe, long the cockpit of war and violence, has now been transformed into a harmonious political landscape. Realists and Reaganites find the major cause of the change in the collapse of the Soviet state, unable ultimately to reform its sinking economic system or to answer the great challenge of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Supporters of inevitable American primacy see the triumph of irresistible American values, of democracy and its commitment to cooperation and problem solving. Others, followers of integration theory, affirm Jean Monnet’s basic principles: that routine, continuous interaction, even amongst enemies, brings about the building of trust and the search for converging, if not common, interests. Most ardent perhaps are the advocates of civil society practices and human rights: they argue that change came slowly but surely from below, and in spite of, the state level, as populations in Eastern Europe sought and reacted to cross-border initiatives and ultimately designed their own revolutions.

Whatever the claims, Europe is now almost completely whole and free. Armies no longer face off across the Central European plain. Few border disputes remain and few populations are now subject to repression, fear, hostility, or systematic mistreatment. It is the application of the principles of cooperative security that has led to a far different Europe than one could have dreamed about in 1989. There is more than enough praise and credit for this to go around— for personalities from Gorbachev and Yeltsin to Reagan and Bush and groups such as the opposition East Germans, the determined Hungarians under Gyula Horn, and even the ever-ambiguous Czechs. There are hot spots still on the periphery, but Europe is a zone of peace. This is not the result of striking a new balance of power; it is even less related to dreams of a European supranational entity based on integration or world government.

Europe is a space inhabited by sovereign states with varying levels of trust in one another, which have chosen and continue to choose a different way of co-existence and mutual reassurance.

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1 This essay was prepared in response to an invitation by the Center for International Security Studies – Maryland under the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security program funded by the MacArthur Foundation, to review and expand on my work at the Brookings Institution in the mid-1990s. It benefited greatly from the comments of John Steinbruner, Nancy Gallagher and Jonas Siegel, colleagues at Maryland; and talented critics Judith Reppy, Janne Nolan, and Peter Dombrowski. I am appreciative, too, to Simon Moore, MPP, Maryland and Eric Auner for research and editing help. My appreciation also to Scott L Warren, Roland Jacob, and Marylanders: Philip Maxon, Benjamin Loehrke, Anya Loukianova, Wes Neuman, and Gavin Way for research input and careful commentary.
within a region that was so often the site of great violence and cruelty. The national actors in this space have done so – not always elegantly or proficiently but generally with non-violent resolution – in the face of continuing crisis flares on the periphery – in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in the Baltic region, in Georgia, and in Ukraine.

The argument here is that these European states have been able to coexist peacefully precisely because Europe and its transatlantic/Eurasian frameworks have developed new habits of transparency, mutual confidence, and a regard of violence as a last resort, undergirded by a persistent trend toward institutionalization and constant communication at all societal levels. This is not the result of the West’s victory. Europe has often been the site for experiments in cooperative security structures; when successful it has been a beacon for others to follow, though when results have been less impressive, others have also taken note. Two decades of experimentation and debate have produced few close parallels to any of the specific structures in Europe. But the technologies of transparency and verification are being honed there for all to see, with lessons to be drawn as others choose.

But there is still more to do in Europe:

- to help develop effective forums for another attempt at cooperation with a transformed Russia, even as it experiences internal political turmoil and doubts about the future course of the European experiment;
- to smooth and offset recent US-EU turbulence as post-Lisbon Europe becomes a global foreign policy player and faces new fiscal and geopolitical challenges, including a debt crisis that threatens the future of European institutions;
- to provide new tools for managing Europe's unstable periphery;
- to overcome the long-neglected gaps in Eurasian resource tussles, in energy demand and supply, and in the inequitable balance of access and assured supply; and
- to modernize, if not overhaul, arms control and confidence-building measures in Europe, to reduce the risks of conflict, military accident, and repression given the threats of the 21st century.

This essay attempts a second interim assessment of the concept of cooperative security, its impact on the future of European security, and its potential generalization to issues beyond arms control and to other non-European areas, revisiting themes developed in my 1994-1995 work for the Brookings Institution.² It will look first at the concept and how it has been critically assessed over the last twenty years. It will ask whether the model can be replicated, and demonstrate that there is much to suggest that such replication should be attempted. It will then examine three of the core elements in its development and in its evolution. There will also be a review of test cases in the present, particularly the challenges faced in a future wave of arms control negotiations, and in the construction of a missile defense system against rogue or terrorist attack on Europe. Moreover, there are new and difficult areas for global applications and for further broadening and deepening the reach and grasp within Europe, such as the battles against

proliferation risks and against homegrown and external bases of terrorist activity. Finally, there are the new economic threats, exemplified by Europe’s search for energy security.

II. Cooperative Security

The Origins of Cooperative Security

Cooperative security originated during what we now know was the final decade of Cold War. Its roots stretch back to 1970s and early-1980s thinking about the intractable Cold War stalemate in Europe, particularly between the United States and Russia, but also between what was then defined as Western and Eastern Europe. The root concept – and still our core definition throughout this essay – was to find a long-term, persistent political basis for cooperative action on issues and events seen as likely causes of great risk while simultaneously finding and creating new barriers to future armed conflict and nuclear war.

These sources of risk might manifest themselves as political turbulence both within and across borders, and could become triggers to conflict and military escalation in an arena of high armament and political stalemate. The key policy prescriptions included commitments to stable engagement and the search for full transparency of action and intention, even if achievement of those levels have to be aspirational goals, not expected operational realities. The scope of cooperation and agreement might be limited at first, but over time, a widening pool of converging interests and cooperative practices would emerge, as cooperation and particularly persistent communication and interaction proved a welcome way to lower tension and costs. The mutual interest would be served by lowering risk, and by containing or even preventing sources of tension and strife without a demand that any party had to capitulate or sacrifice its long-term visions. As one of the principal intellectual architects of the idea, John Steinbruner, described it: the hope was that on a progression of issues, “a political deal could be struck in which each side improved its security and relieved its long-term investment burden at the cost of adjusting long-established planning assumptions and habits of unilateral decision-making on matters of mutual security.”

The result in Europe was a series of open procedures, routine dialogues, and multilateral institutions of cooperation, which included all of the states of Europe and committed each, at least rhetorically, to the search for cooperation and transparency in security decision-making.

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3 Some of the earliest thinking was European and focused on the concept of common or non-zero security, particularly highlighted in the works of the Palme Commission and its publications in the 1980s. The Carnegie Corporation of New York and especially its then president, Dr. David Hamburg, were keenly interested in the concept and supported conceptual and policy development at several key institutions: at Brookings under John Steinbruner, head of Foreign Policy Studies and Janne Nolan; at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) and the work of William J. Perry; and at Harvard’s Belfer Center, especially the efforts of Ashton Carter.


The first and most expansive organization became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It emerged from the Helsinki process in the 1970s as an entity that stressed the importance of economic and human rights issues for security, as well as military security requirements. It also affirmed the principle of peaceful alterations to borders that nurtured German reunification and the “Velvet Divide” of Czechoslovakia (see the list of OSCE members in Appendix 1). Others ranged from the German-East European dialogues initiated by Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the early 1970s to the arms control negotiations that resulted in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which constrained the forces and the deadliest arms deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. Analysts and politicians alike spoke of an emerging European security architecture, in which transparency and communication would mitigate and perhaps eventually supplant the human and material costs of Europe’s division.

In these dying days of the Cold War, few scholars, analysts, or participants foresaw the momentous events that were about to reshape the world. It was at this time that Gorbachev’s Soviet Union was exploring a new approach to security strategy, based not on unilateral policy making responding to and anticipating American actions, but rather on forming, in negotiations with the United States, a new security entente. Many now see that the 1986 meeting in Reykjavik between Gorbachev and Reagan was the turning point. The most formal hallmarks of the new cooperative security efforts were the interlinked complex of declarations and practices. These included treaty agreements on mutual strategic arms reductions and intermediate nuclear forces (START and INF), and the formal, tactical nuclear unilateral initiatives we now refer to as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). A core step for Europe was the negotiation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which formalized the military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. It set upper limits on the size and regional constraints on the deployment and movement for the critical military forces (5 specific weapons categories termed TLEs), both of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and provided for a groundbreaking system of annual data reporting from a declared baseline and for what is now approaching 6,000 inspections. Around this core flowed secondary “deepening” agreements (e.g. the Open Skies Convention for aerial inspections).

Changes within OSCE came to constitute what Rüdiger Hartmann, a longtime German diplomat and OSCE representative, calls the second circle of cooperative security in Europe: the confidence and security building measures (CSBM), which encompass formal as well as

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7 TLE—Treaty Limited Equipment, the unit measurement agreed to under CFE which denotes “one” of the weapons to be subject to maximum holding level and geographic deployment patterns specified in the treaty. The five types of TLE are tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Arms Control Asssociation, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.

8 Inspections were both on-site with regular notice and the most extensive ever provisions for no-notice challenge inspections – both involving teams of mixed nationality, all formally trained to the same standards. See Kelleher, Catherine, Jane Sharp and Lawrence Freedman (eds.), The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control Editors (Noms: Baden-Baden, Germany, 1996).
informal elements of transparency and joint action. The first move was the creation of the Forum on Security Cooperation (FSC) within the OSCE in 1992. The final piece was the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures, formally agreed to in 1999, but worked on continuously before then and frequently amended since. It encompasses formal agreements on information exchanges on force strengths, and procedures for consultations in the case of unusual military activity, and prior notification of large-scale military activity, especially large-scale exercises.

Far more consequential in the longer-term, though, were the political changes occurring throughout the continent. The opening of borders in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to allow for the free flow of information and persons and the increasing attraction of cross-border democratic opposition groups were almost miraculous in their positive security effects. That growing dynamic rolled on to what seemed ever new heights, with no violence across borders and minimal amounts internally, usually directed against the forces of oppression under the previous Communist states who would not believe their time had gone. The end of the first phase was the medley of peaceful revolutions of 1989-1990 in CEE, the de facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the transformation in 1991 of the Soviet Union into Russia and a series of new independent states, most of which at least initially rejected close alliance with Russia and turned westward.

These events provided the framework of the concepts invoked for cooperative security in Europe. The goals in the second phase (1992-present) include securing the peace – ensuring that the promises of cooperation and transparency would not be undermined in the re-nationalization of defense and security that might follow, or in the mistaken belief that all of Europe’s security challenges had been resolved. The near-term challenge has largely become that of finding a role for Russia: its changed status, and the likelihood that it would become a full participant in the cooperative security process and not return to the brutal practices of the Stalinist era, or the traditional power diplomacy of administrations from Khrushchev through Brezhnev. The longer-term view also folds in the challenges that may eventually spark and sustain conflict: resurgent nationalism and exclusionism throughout Europe, pockets of conflict on the periphery, the growing disparities in income and prosperity within the region, or the continuing riddles of ethnicity and immigration.

What does cooperative engagement now require? How far is transparency and communication assured given centuries of Russian tendencies towards secrecy and the defense of ultimate sovereignty, and four decades of East-West hostility and ideological battle? Few in the West were able to conceive of Russian membership in a European framework, let alone a security alliance like NATO. Why would it want to join the network? How would it be balanced? Or would it be given a special status by its former allies and enemies, with special interests to be protected in its claimed “near abroad” in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries? These questions are still relevant and important in the larger geopolitical framework.

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10 The 2010-2011 actions of the increasingly anti-democratic government of Viktor Orbán in Hungary exemplify these trends.
Definitional Debates in the Evolving Literature

Much of the substantive refinement of the intellectual concepts involved in this paper’s definition of cooperative security was developed in a series of Brookings Institution research efforts throughout the 1990s, which gained considerable attention in Washington during the Clinton Administration. In one of the earliest papers, William Kaufmann and John Steinbruner described cooperative security as “inherently more efficient than unregulated national competition... [T]he key to that efficiency is reduced uncertainty.”11 Two years later, Steinbruner, writing with two who became key figures in the Clinton Defense Department, William Perry and Ashton Carter, observed:

The central purpose of cooperative security arrangements is to prevent war and to do so primarily by preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled, thus also obviating the need for states so threatened to make their own counterpreparations...Cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security as preventive medicine differs from acute care.12

The ambiguities in cooperative arrangements also shifted the emphasis of international relations from a military/security dimension to a political/legal calculus. In a conventional alliance, an aggressor is easily identified as an entity outside the alliance transgressing the alliance’s borders. In a cooperative arrangement, the potential aggressor is not specified at the organizing point or for all time; it is behavior that defines an aggressor within the arrangement—much as it is within a state. Determining whether an act of aggression has occurred is a quasi-legal step, often with the alleged aggressor and alleged victims among the adjudicators. The judgment on the penalty to be imposed and paid is frequently left until the occasion of an alleged attack arises.13

It was precisely on this point that perhaps the most skepticism and indeed hostility to the cooperative security concept was expressed in Washington and occasionally in Europe as well. Henry Kissinger and those in and out of government who saw themselves as “realists” argued that at its core, aggression flowed from relative power: Russia whatever its present labels or weaknesses would re-emerge and continue as the principal challenge to be faced over the coming decades in Europe.14 Others such as Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that a sufficient basis of trust with the Russians did not and would not exist given their history, their authoritarian political culture, and their essential non-European/non-Western character. Without a common fundament of values and ideals, cooperative security would not be possible. Neither Russia nor perhaps eventually a resurgent Germany would ever accept being a “larger Switzerland,” willing over the

14 Robert Gates gave a number of telling speeches in the late Bush years, including one where I was present at the National Defense University, in which he argued Russia under Gorbachev was constructing Potemkin villages of peaceful cooperation and purported transparency in order to hide its capacities as the resurgent power in Europe.
long-term to limit its choices for political and eventual military dominance in its traditional sphere. With the vigilance of a well-armed and present United States in Europe, Russia might for a time adhere to certain standards or be deterred. But this could not be the basis for prudent policy planning for the future nor a reason for the United States to forego critical assets for its own defense or that of its allies. Only idealists or the gullible would make such an argument.

A third strand of argument was more existential. It stressed rather that cooperative security would ultimately undermine the deterrence mechanism and allow states to lose their caution in interstate relations. Converging values and a willingness to sacrifice present advantage in weaponry for long-term stability might work in the European region, with the legacy of World War II and shared postwar values. But war and attack were still possibilities to be prepared for, and Europeans would be more and more affected by an integrating global system. The use of force, and especially the use of nuclear force, might always be *ultima ratio*, but deterrence would also always depend on credibility, and therefore outward reliance on force and military preparations to be used if aggressors did not halt.

Supporters of the concept however took heart at the initial efforts of the Clinton Administration to translate the concept to policy prescriptions, particularly for Europe. Policy attention in Washington and in Europe in the 90s was largely devoted to assessing the organizational framework in Europe that would now be the most appropriate for the day-to-day practice of cooperative security. A UN framework was briefly favored, but quickly seemed too tradition-bound, too slow, and too cumbersome for effective action. There were extensive debates about which security architecture was best; would NATO or the evolving EU represent the better alternative? Furthermore, where would the neutrals and non-EU, non-NATO members fit in? The Bosnian conflict and the failures of the OSCE and the EU to end the bloodshed on Europe's threshold or even to mount conflict management operations led to disappointment and disillusionment about independent European decision making. Only NATO was able to act to create a kind of peace, and then only slowly and with considerable difficulty and hesitation. This was compounded by a reluctant Clinton Administration and major loss of life among civilians and combatants – a pattern repeated in Kosovo a few years later.

The search to find a more satisfactory conceptual basis continued apace. The Yugoslav wars of the 90s shook the most optimistic. Both the EU and NATO apparently underestimated the political and diplomatic burden imposed by the decisions to expand their memberships, and the adjustments within each organization to the new patterns of obligation and reassurance, let alone decision making, often proved taxing. Hostility was often barely disguised between CEE states and Russia, and between Russia and the United States within military and bureaucratic interactions. All these developments countered the earlier assumptions of an inevitable cooperative trend and the relatively quick transformation of cooperative security into something akin to Karl Deutsch’s security community.¹⁵

Two 2001 studies conducted at the NATO-affiliated Marshall Center illustrated the theoretical directions explored. Richard Cohen noted that in some critical circles, cooperative security had acquired a reputation for idealism, perhaps to the detriment of practicality.\textsuperscript{16} He attempted to reformulate notions of what cooperative security entails, giving four criteria that a system must meet to fit the term – his method of “operationalizing” the term. For him, an organization needs to have two conventional roles – (1) collective security, attempting to provide security from within for members of the organization and (2) collective defense, protecting members from external aggression – as well as two less common roles – (3) individual or “human” security, and (4) stability promotion.\textsuperscript{17} After defining the issue and criteria, not surprisingly, he determined NATO to be the only cooperative security organization presently operational.\textsuperscript{18} In contrast, Michael Mihalka gave a more open definition, describing cooperative security as “sustained efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directed against a specific state or coalition of states” (emphasis mine). This is distinct from simple cooperation or alliance, which is traditionally conceived as a common response against an external threat or threats. He phrased it as a means of mitigating the “security dilemma” by short-circuiting the action-reaction cycle inherent to unilateral security decision making.\textsuperscript{19} As I do, he found no necessary organizational or legal format, and supported cooperative efforts through a variety of risk reduction strategies.

Lionel Ponsard, writing in 2007, capped the argument by asserting, “Cooperative security does not mean that participants are treaty-bound to offer assistance. If that were the case, we would speak about collective, not cooperative security.”\textsuperscript{20} Ponsard also stressed the relatively limited aims of cooperative security:

\begin{quote}
[C]ooperative security does not aim at establishing global governance through the resolution of all conflicts. The attention is on preventing the accumulation of the means for mass, deliberate and organized aggression, such as seizure of territory by force or the destruction of vital assets by remote bombardments for unilateral gain.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Ponsard also observed that a cooperative security framework was particularly good for dealing with the challenges that Europe faces: transnational issues that require cooperation beyond the traditional state-to-state interaction, issues that at a minimum include nuclear proliferation, organized crime, terrorism, epidemics, and environmental disasters.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 5-9.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid}, p. 16. This is a judgment that few cooperative security first-phase supporters, myself included, would find satisfactory, because of Cohen’s disregard of looser multilateral methods (as in OSCE) or the interlocking networks of bilateral arrangements led by the United States.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid}, p. 127.
Later discussion about cooperative security too often simply equated the concept with cooperation in security of any kind. It was invoked to substitute another term for positive diplomatic relations, or to suggest a choice other than peace or war. In retrospect, it may also have been a case of the literature mirroring policy, since, as I argue below, the Bush Administration’s disdain for cooperation served at many levels to downgrade the concept itself (and arms control) and to ignore any new opportunities for which this policy approach might have been appropriate.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction as the New Model for Cooperative Security**

Several influential commentators, however, remained focused on the principles involved and have proposed an even broader definition of cooperative security. Their summary judgment is that cooperative security as a concept has been transformed in policy experiences since the fall of the Berlin Wall. First Michael Krepon and then Jeffrey Larsen and Lewis Dunn have suggested that cooperative security principles are really now those that are at the core of the Nunn-Lugar programs of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR).22 Established first under the Clinton Administration, these programs were originally devised to reduce the risks inherent in the dissolution of the Soviet nuclear establishment. Efforts were initially confined only to the reduction and destruction of Soviet-era capabilities and facilities and the protection of human and material assets from diversion, re-use, or theft. But almost from the outset, CTR enveloped a far wider agenda: re-education and re-training of personnel, frequent consultations about daily operations and constraints, the economic and scientific rehabilitation of closed cities, the joint securing of nuclear material stocks, large and small, and the enforcement of safety and security codes, to mention only the most prominent. Inspection and operational teams of American, Russian, and European scientists and officials worked on all aspects of the program and developed not only catalogs of best practices but also personal rapport and consistent experience of the benefits gained and the difficulties involved.

Krepon and Dunn argue persuasively that CTR programs have taken transparency, verification, and information sharing to new levels and evolved not only broad principles but practical tool kits that go far beyond traditional negotiated arms control measures and provisions. These are far richer, more suited to 21st century classes of threats, primarily terrorism and proliferation. CTR does demonstrate the fullest extent of cooperation, even though that level is not achievable or even politically feasible in all risk domains. The inherent flexibility and capacity for “growth” of this conception of cooperative security goes far beyond the legalistic/diplomatic structures of its first phase. Then the focus was on formal state-to-state interaction and primarily the U.S.-Russian strategic competition. The result was too-often rigid categories and tight monitoring and domestic demands for reassurance and compensation in other domains.

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For example, Dunn points to 5 classes of measures which function both to increase trust and confidence and to reinforce habits of cooperation, culminating in greater joint activity and engagement:

1. Strategic dialogues, information exchanges;
2. Visits, personal exchanges, liaison arrangements (military and civilian);
3. Unilateral declarations, initiatives (PNIs);
4. Joint programs and centers of long duration (Risk Reduction Centers, proposed data-exchange centers); and,
5. Joint studies, experiments, and initiatives (PSI).23

Although activities of these sorts have most often been funded and carried out in the United States by the Department of Defense and the Energy Department, Dunn, Krepon, and Larsen all argue that these are far broader classes of activities even though they don’t include every form of state-to-state cooperation. These five are more quickly and easily coordinated with standard diplomatic moves than are treaty provisions, and may well become part of Track II approaches when formal political obstacles impede negotiation or agreement.24 They further develop parties’ understanding of each other’s interests and the need to avoid miscalculation, without assuming an instant or comprehensive convergence of interests. Moreover, these measures have not taken as long to negotiate nor prompted the same level of confrontational Congressional review as, for example, the agreement on INF or on the multilateral chemical or biological weapons conventions did. And while funding has not always been easy, these programs have survived and in some cases even flourished without high-level attention or fear of constant political damage.

A 2008 study, “Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,” carried out by the nonpartisan National Academies of Sciences’s Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at the behest of Congress takes this analysis several steps further.25 CISAC takes as its starting point the ways in which these programs transcended their DOD-DOE base to become more effective and coordinated cross-governmental measures. Moreover, through frameworks such as the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, these programs can be generalized and regularized to enhance international partnerships.

**Reasons for the Apparent Decline of Cooperative Security**

The evolution noted above represents the views of a small, articulate, but still minority group. A reading of most recent policy literature suggests at the very least that the concept of cooperative

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23 See Dunn in Larsen and Wirtz, op. cit.; p.177-183.

24 Track II—non-official and non-binding negotiations or discussions, most often with retired officials or individuals of political note, who can explore and propose solutions or compromises not permissible at the official level.

security has entered a period of semi-dormancy. The concept seems only to be noticed by the decision-making classes when its everyday practice in Europe is challenged or undermined. Many attempts to apply the “European cure” to other regions have slowed, though not stopped – most notably, in the search for a framework within which to achieve greater transparency and cooperation in Asia without overarching rules and institutions, arguments to which we will return at the end of this essay.

Why has this been so? The list of factors is long, but four are paramount. The first is an overwhelming sense of complacency in Europe itself, but especially in Western Europe, about the achievements that cooperative security has made possible. It was never a concept that attracted vast public attention, and it is still in the hands of a very small and increasingly aged set of national experts in almost every country in Europe. For most European populations, the problem of security centers on domestic security – against terrorists, disgruntled minorities, or disturbed citizens. In all but a very small number of cases, popular fear of cross-border military attack in Europe is gone; the fear, if it exists at all, is at Europe’s periphery. The number of overt security challenges – either domestic or interstate – in the traditional European space approaches zero. War for almost all is unimaginable; arms on every side have been severely reduced and are, for the first time in at least two centuries, viewed as “unpopular” and “expensive.” People, goods, and ideas flow freely and almost without restraint in the European space; only the exceptions – the persistent dictatorship in Belarus or Berlusconi’s flagrant Italian media monopoly – attract attention.

The consequences of this complacency varied across Europe. In Western Europe, it resulted in a domestic peace dividend and spurred a major push to transform the European Union politically to reflect the new nature and scope of Europe. The idealistic ambitions and sometime hubris of the early-90s EU was quickly dampened by the violence of the Yugoslav wars, including the turbulent conflict over Kosovo that lingers to the present. The lessons that European states, especially France and Germany, drew about European weakness and disorganization vis-à-vis a dominant United States in Bosnia and Kosovo led to a push for a more serious role for Brussels in foreign and defense policy. Despite a number of objections from national governments and many disagreements, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) ultimately provided for a common European foreign policy process, though an admittedly watered-down version.

Germany has posed an especially complex case given both the priority of reunification and its oft-exhausting claims on German financial and political means for the last decade. Germany's stalwart sponsorship of cooperative security tools and principles has continued unabated; German politicians (particularly Foreign Ministers Joshua Fischer, Frank-Walther Steinmeier, and Guido Westerwelle) have regularly praised the contribution cooperative security trends and transparency made to their unification. They called for making these advantages known and available to others inside and outside Europe.

The situation in what we now call Central Europe was, and is, somewhat less complacent and certain, given lingering fears and fresh doubts at the beginning of this century about Russia’s intentions and its continuing ambitions to act as suzerain CEE states (that is, controlling their foreign policy while granting them some range of domestic autonomy). But while wary, CEE
still see cooperative security as a useful framework, particularly in tandem with the Western collective defense guarantees inherent in EU and NATO membership.

Russia is the clearest exception to particular aspects, but not all, of this pattern of regional order. As is discussed in more detail below, Russia under Putin was seen in Western Europe (and in Russia) as more predictable and effective than the corrupt and chaotic Yeltsin era. Medvedev’s Russia has seemed in much the same pattern but also somewhat softer in outline, more moderate in tone, and perhaps more committed to compromise. The short 2008 Russia-Georgia war raised evocative specters of the past with innovative techniques of deception and cyber-attack added to old-fashioned guerrilla and conventional force attacks. For most of Western Europe, at least, the conflict, however regrettable, was not cause for concerted disavowal of Russia as a diplomatic partner or its exclusion from functional cooperation. To them, Russia is far away, energy rich, and no longer expansionist in the sense of practicing major overt cross-border aggression. Putin’s election to another possible 12-year term in 2012 seemed at least for four or five weeks to stir concern only at home and in Russia’s immediate neighborhood.

The second factor is the occasional failure of institutions and the foregoing of regular injections of cooperation and transparency to change new nationalist behavior or “personalist” or “authoritarian-ist” political strategies. The rapid emergence of new problems on the international stage, from the ethno-nationalist disintegration of the former Yugoslavia through the emergence of rogue states and non-state terrorism as major global issues, has created an uncertain environment and delayed or deadened the development of new institutions. The NATO-Russia Council has faltered in several incarnations. NATO’s Partnership for Peace program has succeeded almost too well in preparing new candidacies for membership and implementing meaningful security associations for countries that will never be members. But this is largely because of constant American interest throughout the 1990s and strong bilateral underpinnings from several other countries/regions, including Britain, Scandinavia, Poland, and the Baltics. Russia has never really formally participated.

Instead, cooperation- and confidence-building measures and transparency promotion have been left to multilateral institutions already in place – the UN, NATO, OSCE, the EU, and perhaps the worst performer of all, the Council of Europe. Almost all of these institutions failed in one or another crucial arena in the late 20th and early 21st centuries; certainly none lived up to the easy dreams of a thickening safety net of international and regional security institutions that

26 See for examples two strong documents from the summer of 2009 in the wake of the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict, protesting Obama’s policy as too Russia-centric and expressing directly the fear that their interests would be sacrificed to the good of better US-Russian relations. The first is a Policy Brief of the German Marshall Fund entitled ‘Why the Obama Administration should not Take Central and Eastern Europe for Granted’ signed by Pavol Demes, Istvan Gyarmati, Ivan Krastev, Kadir Liik, Adam Rotfeld, and Alexandr Vondars, of July 13, 2009; the second, an Open Letter issued on 16 July 2009 by the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament.

27 The 2008 experience in Georgia is seen by many – more in the US than in Europe – as an exception to this judgment. But the legal confusion and mutual provocation that is documented in the 2009 EU report allows most to declare guilt on all sides and the exception that will never occur again. Its ways at home, while not welcomed, are accepted and not the subject of challenge or demands for exclusion as, for example, over Russian action in South Ossetia. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Brussels; 2009; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc_report.pdf.
were talked about after 1989. Transparency alone did not guarantee follow-up; information about risks did not bring automatic actions or responses. Success came, if it came at all, through unilateral actions or ad-hoc arrangements – “coalitions of the willing” – rather than united alliance action in Bosnia and Kosovo. For example, the United States brokered the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), without institutionalization and only bilateral agreements on political and military assistance. The problems of establishing and ensuring accountability that cooperative security principles require were too often left unresolved as a crisis closed. Transparency promotion policies also floundered, on a scarcity of applicable technology throughout CEE or the lack of financial resources nationally and locally to analyze and distribute information captured in a timely and effective manner.

A third factor is what seems to be a new pattern of conflict. Emerging global threats appeared to some (especially in the early Bush years) to be less amenable to attempts at cooperative engagement. Terrorism, jihad, and insurgent warfare proved hard to frame, let alone resolve, in terms of cooperative security principles. Attacks were localized; Iraq and Afghanistan both suggested that deterrence in terms of existing theater capabilities was inadequate at best and mostly irrelevant unless applied in a specific location or region within a definite time period. Moreover, both problems involved a step-change in focus. While during the Cold War, and for a brief period thereafter, the important players were clearly defined and, on issues such as arms control, had similar policy objectives, in the early 2000s, it was harder to conceive of a pattern in which new threats could and would be managed on a consistent basis. During the Cold War, even conflicts in remote parts of the world were influenced by the actions of one or both of the superpowers, and negotiation between the two had the possibility to calm the situation (though, obviously, this possibility was not always acted upon).

The fourth factor, and probably the most critical, was the precipitous change in American policy. The Clinton administration embraced the theme of cooperative security, and pursued it officially for much of its time in office. Its successes, though, came mainly in the security and arms control area, and in nuclear threat reduction ventures. Successes did not come from the broader efforts of, for instance, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission efforts to engage economic and technical elites, or the efforts to engage Russia in global trade agreements or financial institutions. Moreover, the Clinton administration’s inability to act cooperatively with its European allies in at least the first years of the Bosnian War marked a true failure in its approach to post-Cold War security creation, and helped prolong both the war’s duration and the eventual sacrifice of more than 100,000 citizens of the former Yugoslavia.28, 29

Much of the blame lies with the Bush administration and its revisionist approach to most aspects of foreign policy (in the phrase of the times, ABC – “Anything But Clinton”). It favored unilateral action or “coalitions of the willing” over cooperative engagement for its response to

28 Kelleher, 1995; op. cit. pp 117-123. Originally assessed during the Bosnian conflict, at 200,000 plus, postwar evaluation suggests a lower number – still horrific for many in a state acknowledged to be part of postwar Europe – of 100,000+ for the dead and disappeared. Woodward, Susan, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Brookings; Washington, D.C., 1995); and Andreas, Peter and Kelly Greenhill (eds.), Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict (Cornell, 2010).

9/11 and its most critical military challenges, in Iraq and Afghanistan. A wide-ranging cooperative framework, particularly one anchored in multilateral treaties and agreements, was incompatible with the administration’s preferences and prejudices. The administration’s rejection of the traditional arms control agenda – its withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, its unwillingness to proceed with ratification of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), and its unwillingness to address troubles with either the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime in North Korea and Iran or with the CFE treaty in Europe – identified it as anti-cooperation in the area with the greatest previous track record in cooperative security policy making.

Bush’s rhetoric, however, still embraced cooperation and strategic partnership, which included the close personal presidential ties and the convergence of Russian and American interests in issues that ranged from how to deal with the “Axis of Evil” to how to stabilize terms of investment and energy supplies. These factors alone, in Bush’s public argument, reflected the end of Cold War hostility and drastically reduced the need for treaties and formal agreements, for extensive strategic reduction trade-off formulas, or elaborate protocols for inspections and verification. Cooperation was established and natural; Reagan’s “trust but verify” became “trust and ignore”: negotiate and ally only if you cannot proceed single-handed. Beyond its nuclear weapons, Russia, in the view of some neo-conservative members of the Bush administration, was simply no longer relevant to the new American strategic and political preeminence. Just like traditional European allies, Russia in the end had no other choice but to deal with the United States on its own terms and within the framework of the American global agenda.

Bush’s approach to Europe in particular was characterized by inattention and indifference, overlaid by insistence on short-term political concerns. The OSCE was perhaps subject to the greatest indifference; the Bush team shared and intensified the general disdain of the Clinton era (and perhaps before) for this “talking shop,” while Russia’s willingness to manipulate its consensus-driven protocols seemingly confirmed their prejudices. Perhaps the administration’s only interest in the OSCE was its election supervision activities, which supported the administration’s enthusiasm for democracy promotion. A number of the bigger European states, however, gladly stepped into Bush’s shadow, happy to blame him for what was really their own growing indifference and inattention. It was thus left to the smaller states and the neutrals to carry the OSCE ball forward where and when they could.

In terms of treaties, Bush’s ideological repudiation of formal agreements and multilateralism meant CFE and other formal treaties fared only slightly better. Cooperative security on a day-to-day level was left to a small but interconnected group of specialists and experts in the foreign and defense bureaucracies of each member state. And its very “usualness” and “standard operating procedure” character led both to wide-ranging acceptance and a significant measure of protection for the relatively unique transparency and rigor involved.

The new institutionalization that did receive the Bush imprimatur was almost without exception organized efforts that involved Europe as part of a global effort (e.g. against terrorists or further proliferation) and as a regional grouping or pole attached to an American central focus. These usually operated in parallel with strong bilateral pressures, rather than through a multilateral framework as NATO, which risked greater resistance or opposition. A number of Bush
initiatives were launched without much consultation in Europe or notice to the cooperative security organizations that had been central in the 1990s. For example, the United States began developing a missile defense scheme in CEE, first launched as the “third-site project” in 2001-2002 (discussed further below). Even more notable were post-9/11 activities that invoked cooperative security principles to move American security borders as far offshore as possible, including the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 2002 Container Security Initiative, and the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Bush’s approach left no shortage of problems for President Obama to confront. The present administration’s “reset” with Russia has received the greatest public emphasis in the security field, and Obama has crafted policies specific to Europe like the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense plan. Until his 2011 demand that Europeans shoulder the major roles in the Libyan war, though, his principal hallmarks had been a commitment to listen and to abandon “megaphone diplomacy.” Terrorism and instability that may lead to war remain the primary security concerns for publics and politicians throughout Eurasia.\footnote{See, for example, the discussion in Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist,” The New Yorker, May 2, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa_fact_lizza#ixzz1SarFs3Rj.} Iran’s nuclear program remains unresolved. North Korea’s status veers between obstinacy and engagement, and an opaque leadership transition in the wake of Kim Jong Il’s death further heightens uncertainty on the Korean peninsula. Stability levels in Afghanistan remain uncertain in the face of the withdrawal deadline, Iraq is ended for the West, but turbulence and intra-societal conflict remain. European states have largely gained a greater interest and stake in trying to work with the United States, to contain and correct it but also to support its goals and its leadership. For much of the Medvedev period, Russia’s propensity to continuous confrontation and only transactional foreign policy abated, and its rhetoric about cooperation increased. Tensions persist, however, and Russia continues to publicly criticize American missile defense plans. Furthermore, Russian state television recently accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and American Ambassador Michael McFaul of fomenting anti-government sentiments. The future of a new Putin Administration is far from certain. As will be shown below, each of the challenges outlined in this section opens the potential to be addressed using cooperative security approaches and techniques.

The Continued Relevance of Cooperative Security

The rediscovery of cooperative security in Europe has come and will continue to come from achieving demonstrable progress on the issues and situations of risk to which it is applied. Positive gains are perhaps most easily demonstrated in the areas of security and arms control; the risks involved are still more clear-cut than in other areas, even though the threat of nuclear war now seems unthinkable in Europe, and plausible scenarios have to be handcrafted for many of the other areas of the world. The fundamental intellectual roots, particularly of arms control, are similar; the stress is on creating stability and dialogue and achieving progressive limitation and the openness needed to sustain it.
As will be discussed at the end of this essay, far-reaching cooperative security arrangements outside of Europe may indeed have to await more aligned fundamental values. Indeed, cooperative security has attracted interest from many regions – most notably from those seeking to design a strategy in the Pacific or for the two Koreas. Those most attached to a “pure” form of cooperative security organization (=collective security) would argue that the experiences of both the United Nations and the League of Nations, and maybe even the present OSCE, suggest that success requires fundamental political consensus on values. Most critics ascribe this to the overhang effects of expectations and experiences of democratic practice on the national level. Some non-democracies can and do provide fringe functionalities, but if its core membership has values at odds with each other, an over-arching system that relies on extensive regulation, case-by-case negotiation about state interests, and collective punishment will almost certainly fail to take consistent action or to develop, precedent by precedent, to a new level of habit and expectations.

But again, such thinking veers toward the ideal of an overarching supranational or regional structure that is far beyond what European cooperative security has reached for or ever tried to achieve. So long as the arrangements are built on the cornerstone of national interest and sovereignty, there are limits at every stage, no matter what the level of mutual risk or action.

One further question should be asked as a limit: Are the principal questions about cooperative security in Europe really questions that turn on the role of Russia and its engagement in the cooperative consensus? Is it the case that the relative balance of power is the bounding case? Moreover, is this a question of selective Russian engagement or the selective application of the cooperative security approach in arms control but not on questions of out-of-area proliferation? And is this only a question of time and practice, rather than inherent structural negatives? Is it a close parallel to the Monnet thesis of peaceful integration in Europe with progressively widening circles of cooperation and transparency based on habits and a pattern of success?

To take the extreme view: If one accepts Richard Cohen’s formula, the answers to these questions are fairly simple. NATO is the only operational cooperative security organization and Russia, obviously, is not a member. Nor, if present evidence is correct, will it ever be. The same is true for a Russian membership in the European Union. Cohen’s requirement of shared values makes total Russian involvement in a Western/Atlantic cooperative security arrangement doubtful. It is easier, although only marginally so, to imagine some day that Ukraine or Georgia might come to be accepted as members. It is also far from clear why and at what cost Russia would want to join such an organization, particularly one with broad objectives.

But the definition of cooperative security that we have developed here suggests Cohen has missed the essential element. Russia does have risk-reduction interests in common with the West in core policy areas. It can be a productive and helpful partner on many issues and can move from being a target to a co-decider of many policies of the Western cooperative security apparatus. Ukraine and Georgia in the end present many risks but fewer fundamental challenges,

31 Dunn, Lewis in Larsen and Wirtz; op. cit., p 175-194.

32 Kelleher, 1995, op. cit.
and have thus far less to contribute to the mutual goal of regional and global security. Cooperation with Russia may well cost far more, but the ultimate gains and therefore the ultimate cost/benefit calculation over the long haul for both sides is significantly different than with lesser states. Both Russia and the United States need a core of mutual political will that can generate the confidence and commitment to transparency that is required; that can assess the benefit/cost ratio in respecting the red-line security concerns of the other and that impels domestic political leaderships to make all this a critical national priority.

This essay argues that in Europe and elsewhere there is still much to which the concept and expanded tool kit of cooperative security can be applied. The concept and practice arose in times when risk of war was low but calculable and when Russia’s cooperation was not assured but deemed possible. The situation at present suggests a far lower risk of direct military threat but many other risks confronting individual and state security in the long run. There is a need for new initiatives and for defending and expanding the practices of the past and the present against today’s challenges and future threats. Without this type of commitment, the level of transparency, trust, and engagement that have sustained peace and its credibility within the European space will fade. This paper will return to these conundrums, with recommendations for future cooperative solutions, in each of the below test cases.

III. Core Factors in Cooperative Security

As was outlined in my 1995 analysis, and has been reprised above, the implementation of the concept of cooperative security essentially turns on states’ persistent willingness to use means short of violence to achieve stable and peaceful arrangements that prevent surprise attack and may allow dispute resolution with other states deemed hostile or core competitors. It does not guarantee that war will not occur, but it provides for a dampening of risk, a lowering of constant tension, and means to signal defensive, not offensive intent. In John Steinbruner’s words about cooperative security in the strategic nuclear realm: “Each side would cede the legitimacy of territorial defense and would cooperate to impose restraint on offensive operations.”

As I have detailed above, the European model of cooperative security entails a broad range of variables. It implies that success depends on a variety of external factors: economic prosperity, the availability of leadership talent, and, probably, the diminution and ultimately the lowering of the possibility of overwhelming threat. But its manifestations in Europe are also conditioned by three important core variables:


1. The role of the United States as both promoter and anchor, with a domestic consensus that has allowed for the recognition of both European and Russian security concerns and for a commitment to defend against attack but not to take aggressive action;

2. The pattern of institutional relations, especially in and for Europe itself, that gave multilateral institutions the capability to clarify security concerns, to legitimize a search for resolutions short of war, and to foster cooperative processes and tools; and

3. The role of Russia as actively engaged in European security, in terms of what it demands as reassurance of its own perception of threat and risk, and its willingness to understand and acknowledge European and American perceptions.

The “Indispensable Nation”: The United States and Cooperative Security

A core element in all cooperative security efforts of the 20th and 21st century has been American support and leadership under successive Democratic and Republican administrations. The cooperative path from 1991 to 2010 of the European zone of peace, however, has not always been smooth or assessed in the same way by all participants. It is important to sketch the present state of the relationship and the expectations on all sides about the sources of agreement and disagreement in the future.

1. American Perspectives

At the highest levels, official American attitudes toward transatlantic cooperation and cooperation with Russia shifted to a narrow focus directly after the emotional debates that led up to the Iraq War in 2002-2003. President Bush cast the world as “either with us or against us.” This proved to be a considerable test for the “oldest allies” in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the elites and publics viewing Bush as a rogue warrior determined to implement his own strategy, preferably unilaterally, and only making a sop to the international community as a disingenuous act of legitimacy seeking. Most leaders, but tellingly, not the publics, of newly admitted NATO members in CEE sided with the Bush administration. They found themselves being treated on a par with their Western European neighbors, and still in thrall to the United States, which had helped liberate them at the end of the Cold War. This was NATO’s collective defense as they understood it, the reason why NATO membership whatever its costs was to be prized, and the American guarantee of their integrity and security was to be their principal bulwark against renewed Russian pressure or aggression.

35 The phrase is Madeline Albright’s on The Today Show, February 19, 1998: “Let me say that we are doing everything possible so that American men and women in uniform do not have to go out there again. It is the threat of the use of force and our line-up there that is going to put force behind the diplomacy. But if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us. I know that the American men and women in uniform are always prepared to sacrifice for freedom, democracy and the American way of life.”

36 For an earlier analysis of this see Kelleher, Catherine, “The United States and Europe: Waiting to Exhale” in Tardy, Thierry (ed.), European Security in a Global Context (Routledge, 2008).
Russia was among the major states, along with Germany and France, which rejected the Bush lead on Iraq, both publicly and privately. The Bush administration’s rhetoric toward Russia remained that of strategic partnership, with the noted decline of a need for agreements, verification, or even explanations for actions among two states that were as committed to cooperation and the same basic values. But within the U.S. bureaucracy and within some sectors of the American public, Russia somewhat resumed the status it had had during the latter stages of the Cold War—a state of potential, if not actual, hostility to the United States, concerned only with its imperialist dreams and its nationalist ambitions.

During his second term, President Bush pursued a more conciliatory tone. The administration gave more rhetorical emphasis to European concerns about preserving stability, to diplomatic solutions, and to encouraging wide-ranging definitions of cooperative security—still concentrating on the global war on terror, but taking a more international approach to energy security and seeking a multi-partner “Road Map” in the Middle East. As time passed, Western European allies who had opposed U.S. action in Iraq rediscovered the commercial and political common ground they had previously shared. The first European Security Strategy of 2003 perhaps represented the most dramatic turning point: the deliberate crafting (through the blessings of Javier Solana and the major European powers) of a document designed to come as close to the Bush doctrine and concepts of security requirements as Europe could. Furthermore, the election of center-right leaders in Germany and France, Angela Merkel in 2005 and Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, while still not traditional pro-American leaders, marked a clear transition from the stridently anti-American rhetoric of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac.

Russia represented a different case. As is discussed below, President Putin reportedly determined that Bush’s rhetoric would never result in a true strategic partnership, and that Bush would never grant legitimacy to Russian fears of exclusion from decisions—such as those regarding missile defense—made unilaterally or within NATO. Instead, he turned at least some of his focus toward cooperation with the major European states, especially with Germany and France. Interviews done in Moscow and Washington between 2004 and 2005 revealed enormous frustration and wells of hostility on both sides. The culminating event for Bush was the extremely pointed February 2007 speech that Putin gave at the Munich Security Conference (aka Wehrkunde), in which he accused the United States essentially of imperial ambition and only aggressive intent in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush officials saw the Putin strategy as combative on the critical basics of nonproliferation and arms control, and raising persistent resistance and sometimes-organized opposition to major U.S. diplomatic moves across spheres and regions. The ultimate denouement came with the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war, where Russia acted militarily against a Partnership-for-Peace state that Bush had declared was destined shortly for NATO membership. It also was what a number in Moscow saw as a “tit for tat” retribution for the West’s unwillingness to consider Russian opposition to NATO actions against Kosovo.

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result was a suspension of all but the most needed exchanges, and a shutdown of all on-going negotiations.

But poll data discussed below also suggests that, for most Americans, the calculus that has sustained a relatively unique transatlantic framework still holds. Americans still tend – albeit in somewhat smaller numbers now – to see Europeans as “like us.” They expect Europeans, regardless of whether there is any confirming evidence, to have the same values, to see and assess the emerging threats the same way, and to be spurred by the same convictions to promote democracy and a just international order. Europeans are the most intertwined and trusted allies, even the often-maligned French, and Americans expect them to cooperate and to “be there with us.”39 Elite opinion has less sentimental parallels. Particularly after the last decade, American elites are far from confident that the United States alone can or should bear the burdens of global leadership. Europeans have assumed significant political responsibilities, some of which are not easily accessible to Washington – such as the European Three’s early negotiations with Iran over Iranian enrichment facilities and the coordinated, multi-year drive to persuade Libya to give up its long-hidden nuclear capabilities. Under the 1992 Petersberg agreements and the security-task definitions set forth in the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, Europe has codified, and increasingly acted upon, specific security and foreign policy priorities.40

The most recent test was European action in Libya, an action that was stimulated by French and British calls for NATO action in support of the opposition to the Gaddafi regime. Obama stepped back from the lead in this conflict on the grounds that the United States was not prepared to engage in another prolonged conflict (the U.S. military’s greatest fear) and because the conflict was in Europe’s neighborhood and therefore Europe’s responsibility. In many respects, Obama’s initial assertions did not match later operational reality. Europe’s performance was somewhat ragged; Europe repeatedly confronted its lack of basic investment in munitions and equipment for more than a decade.41 American support for surveillance, logistics, and communications was key, and provided not simply through formal NATO channels.

EU forces have also assumed a number of low-end political-military tasks, notably in Africa (see Appendix 3 for a list of EU security missions), which Americans have tended to see as far less extraordinary than have Europeans. Americans generally accept this type of engagement as the responsibility of “those that can” to do the “right” thing. U.S. officials also suggested that the

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39 Perhaps the only other country to enjoy this level of popular identification is Israel.

40 The Petersberg tasks were originally agreed to in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) and later taken over by the EU when it assumed security responsibilities in 1997. They are defined as:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

EU tasks were neither terribly difficult nor the types of missions in which the United States would have participated.

The election of Barack Obama proved to be a critical change. Although the positive effects of the Obama factor have diminished over the months, there is no doubting Europe’s basic trust and admiration for the president. The decision to award the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize to Obama shortly into his first term partially reflected these sentiments. Indeed, the administration’s approval ratings were higher in France, Germany, and the UK than they were in the more divided United States. A June 2010 poll conducted by The German Marshall Fund of the United States found that 71 percent of respondents in the European Union and Turkey supported President Obama’s handing of international affairs, a drastic increase over the 19 percent that supported Bush’s international policies in 2008. This was even higher than Obama’s 57 percent domestic approval rating. Obama’s popularity transcended his personal actions and personality; a majority of EU citizens and Turks (66 percent) had a favorable opinion of the United States overall (a significant increase from the Bush years). The number of Europeans that believed “it is desirable that the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs” also increased from 33 percent in 2008 to 50 percent in 2009.

The picture of Obama’s irreproachability is not universal, however, even among the nations surveyed; changed political circumstances explain some of this variation. For instance, many new East European NATO members saw Obama’s actions vis-à-vis Russia – forgiving the disproportionate Russian counterattack in Georgia in 2008, containing critiques of the alleged Russian cyber attacks on Lithuania and Estonia, and tolerating Russia’s reported fomenting of ethnic violence in Estonia in 2007-2008 – as disappointing and weak. Obama’s restructuring of Bush plans to deploy missile defense interceptors to Poland and radars to the Czech Republic, only exacerbated CEE worries about Obama’s naïveté regarding Russian policies. But some CEE politicians argue that the United States cares more about agreement on stability and arms control with Russia than it does about the rights of its allies. Obama’s resolute support for EPAA, with the expansion to Romanian, Spanish, and Turkish bases in the face of growing Russian disapproval has softened many of these criticisms. Turkey’s public is also divided over Obama, with increasing skepticism or outright disapproval.

Russia’s situation is once again divergent. Initially, Obama invested heavily in a “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations in a number of areas, and has concluded critical agreements that undergird strategic stability, spelling out mutual dependence on efforts in Afghanistan and pursuing strategic arms control. Negotiations continued to move forward in a number of critical areas – including missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons reductions, the conclusion of a CTBT, Iran’s nuclear program, and the entry of Russia into the WTO. The number of high-level visits and meetings increased manifold; the number of conversations with both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin more than doubled the later Bush years. But major areas of

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disagreement remain and an atmosphere of almost-stalemate is emerging – over NATO’s action in Libya, diplomacy in response to the Arab Spring and Syria in particular, and the question of the U.S. precise conventional strike capability, to name only the most painful. Putin’s return looms large among the future uncertainties being assessed in Washington and in allied capitals. Russian opposition to EPAA and continuing resentment over NATO expansion, Kosovo, and Libya seem implacable.

The Russian public is far more positive about America than it was in the Bush years. Obama’s presidency is a factor; so too is the greater governmental openness that is reflected in Russia’s state-controlled television, the principal source of news for 80 percent of the population. In general, the population is more confident and more willing to consider cooperation with the U.S. and by extension NATO. The only negative trends relate to economic policy and economic performance, and the perception that Russia is weak and being taken advantage of by the West. These trends are particularly strong among older generations and Putin supporters, and among those who support the old Communist party. Urban and rural populations contrast strongly in their perceptions and expectations of the West with younger urbanites and those middle-class professionals who benefited most from Putin’s strong hand and flexible economic policies.

Institutionalization in the Transatlantic Space

1. The Atlantic Bond – NATO and the EU

NATO is without question now the preeminent security organization in the West, and it has been adapting to the new 21st century circumstances. NATO’s engagements in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and most recently Libya have brought new insights into the nature of the alliance, while also being predominantly American-derived creations. These first ventures into “the alliance at war” have also demonstrated a strong sense of the alliance’s limitations. As then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pungently observed in his farewell speech to the alliance, NATO now appears too often to be a divided organization, with partners unwilling or unable to meet their commitments, with deeply held differences about the role and scope of NATO’s agenda for the 21st century. Some Europeans have echoed these fears. UK Defense Minister Philip Hammond warned that Europe needs to prove that it is “serious about defense” during a 2012 speech. NATO’s expansion to 28 members, to include former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet Republics of the Baltic area, has ultimately led to questions about the composition of the ideal membership as well as about the alliance’s appropriate activities. Ultimately, NATO


45 Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’s Speech on NATO’s Future, Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2011, http://www.blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-future/. It should be noted that this is really not a new phenomenon in NATO’s history and that differences between the larger and smaller states, the old members and those who have joined in the past two decades only parallel earlier splits and debates.
must deal with its relationship to Russia, which is never to be a member but always an irritant, if not more, to some CEE states.

Most models of NATO’s future stress continued transatlantic consensus on the basis of transparency and stability, values and goals that have served the West well, and the habit of continuing cooperation to mutual benefit. The uncertainty has been about what would be the appropriate framework for such an alliance and what form of political and military commitments would be required. If one of these alternatives is sufficiently attractive, it might be able to replace or enhance the scenarios of NATO or NATO/EU evolution that have characterized transatlantic debate since the end of the Cold War.

Obama, perceived both as a liberal democrat with rhetoric that has promised more multilateralism and as a politician with an unprecedented international background, had caused Europeans, at least initially, to reassess their opinions of the United States. As will be discussed later, Obama had at a minimum changed the direction of missile defense planning and tailored both the system’s concept and its technical descriptions closer to Russian preferences such that it was possible to contemplate Russian involvement and cooperation. His move thus pleased Western European missile defense opponents and soothed CEE opponents.

But Obama’s specific agenda for NATO, beyond the broad goals of anti-terrorism and solidarity in Afghanistan, is at this point in his administration far from universally acclaimed. The administration’s view of Europe may be less sentimental than any previous administration. European leaders have rarely been as closely aligned with the U.S. president on matters of social policy, but in foreign policy, Europe lags in importance compared to its paramount position for most predecessors. Analysts have argued that both the president’s personal heritage and his assessment of likely important international issues mean that often-parochial European concerns rank behind other problems. China is now seen as America’s most significant strategic competitor and partner. Europe has led the campaign for a stronger response to climate change, but it is the likes of China and India that are crucial to the development of a solution. First Iraq and now Afghanistan are winding down as the central conflicts; European countries are withdrawing their troops at an even faster pace than the United States. Libya, both for critics and supporters, seemed to herald a different sharing of NATO’s burdens as did the President’s designation of Europe as having become a “net exporter of security.”

Obama’s 2012 announcement of a new defense strategy and of the withdrawal of approximately 50% of the U.S. troops in Europe met with little surprise or resistance on either side of the

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48 Garton-Ash; op. cit.

Atlantic, somewhat disappointing Atlanticists. Europe is now designated an “economy of force area.”\textsuperscript{50} Asia and the Middle East are to be the United States’s main focus. Allied partnerships are therefore deemed increasingly important. Nuclear worries in North Korea and Iran, and the endless Israel-Palestine problem also offer supporting roles for European involvement. This relegation may in part reflect a complacency on the part of the administration — that Europe is stable, on “our side,” and unlikely to vanish any time soon. But it does reflect a shift in U.S. priorities from a Cold War-centric view of the world, to an attempt to seriously explore what the increasingly Asia-centric economic as well as military future will look like and shaping its thinking accordingly.

Viewed in the context of the shooting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the midst of squabbles over rights and obligations, all but a linear extension of the present NATO format seems somewhat academic or farfetched. However, it is instructive to look at how different yet convergent American and European discussions of possible alternatives to NATO have been.

An ever-larger group of Americans also questions whether formal multilateral frameworks based on consensus pose particular problems for a dominant political and military power that believes in its global reach and its own exceptionalism.\textsuperscript{51} Organizational procedures are slow, consensus building is often hard and imperfect, and political constraints lead at best to lowest-common denominator decisions when the asymmetries of power and interest are not taken into account. This was a favorite theme of some in the Bush Administration (particularly regarding formal treaties and the divisive debate over Iraq), but it is hardly a new theme in American foreign policy, especially in the twentieth century (e.g., see the Senate debate about the League of Nations in 1918-1919).

For Americans and many Europeans, the operational significance of asymmetries in power registered forcefully first in Kosovo and then in the Second Gulf War. Before the decisions to invade Iraq in 2003, some conservative American critics went a step further and argued that the United States would be better off fighting alone given the “unbridgeable” gap in transatlantic military capabilities.\textsuperscript{52} Europeans, with the possible exception of the British, the French, and maybe the Germans, were simply too far behind to catch up. They could at best attain “niche” capabilities, with traditional ideas of transatlantic burden sharing having not survived even a neighborhood test in the Balkans. Many Europeans read Kosovo differently (i.e. as an inability

\textsuperscript{50} This term was used initially in the later years of the George W Bush Administration to characterize areas where the US would attempt to deal with areas of lower risk but of critical value with much lighter forces (“footprint”), nimble and flexible enough to deal with day to day operations, especially when joined with the other US resources and agencies deployed in the area (State, AID, Justice, Agriculture et al) that would be reinforced quickly in time of higher risk and threat. Forward basing (“lily pads”) and special operations forces would be key and allies would be expected to share a far greater burden in cost and in assets. See Thom Shanker’s discussion of this in its applications under Obama and the new national strategy in his “Djibouti Outpost Behind Somalia Rescue Is Part of New Defense Strategy” \textit{New York Times}, January 25, 2012.


to affect the outcome or even the course of action given their weakness and lack of national or European capability). Some vowed privately never to let that happen again, whether through the development of a European autonomous capability or through exploring options for a “soft balancing” of the United States and its tendency toward unilateral decisions. The Libyan operations and continued reductions in European forces and stocks suggest that determination was short-lived.

In the American image of the preferred international order, Europe will continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity and a net exporter of security. Yet Europe is presently challenged by several internal security issues, beyond its involvement in North Africa, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. As will be discussed in section IV, Europe’s energy vulnerability looms ever larger; the need, especially for the smaller and CEE states, for guaranteed supplies and relatively equitable access to resources remains a pressure point for Russia’s oil diplomacy. Beyond the unpredictable terrorist or jihadist threats linger potential hot spots, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, the Caucasus, and the several “frozen conflicts” along Russia’s southern periphery. The Hungarian experience in 2012 suggests that authoritarianism still exists and may descend into anti-democratic governance in the face of economic downturn.\footnote{See, for example, the discussion of Orban’s restriction of civil liberties and centralization of power in his hands in Karasz, Palko, “Leader of Hungary Defends New Constitution,” \textit{New York Times}, 7 February 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/europe/viktor-orban-defends-hungarys-new-constitution.html?_r=1&ref=viktororban.} Europe also has to deal with the complex security status of Turkey and its potential ambitions for dominance vis-à-vis the northern Middle East in general and the Iraqi Kurds in particular. Europe, Americans conclude, must come to understand Europe’s new security needs and its obligations to the global order, but more importantly its obligations to the maintenance of the present democratic systems and peaceful borders.

\section*{2. European Perspectives: No Single Voice}

Few of the smaller or emerging democracies in “New Europe” are interested in, or willing to support, a global framework for cooperative security or partnership; their sights are set at most at the European regional level. Even North Africa or the Middle East seem to pose only far away threats, of little relevance to them. The dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces is debatable and must include provisions for their speedy withdrawal if conflict or acute threat looms. Military deaths for those who contributed to the U.S. coalition in Iraq or are now represented in ISAF in Afghanistan have been a new experience for the CEE domestic political scene, which was shielded from such tragedies during the Soviet era and the initial post-Cold War decade. Few CEE leaders are ready to contemplate another contribution, even on a small scale, in the foreseeable future. Opposition critics indeed now challenge the price/benefit ratio involved: Was the cost of this out-of-region support for the United States actually appreciated or compensated? How have alliance membership and the resulting obligations actually benefited national security in recent years? And reflecting the lower popularity ratings described earlier, did not the United States now have more interest in carving out a new cooperative agenda with Russia than in
honoring the debts and promises of the Bush Administration on, for instance, missile defense or investment plans or defense against Russian energy pressures?

In this broad context, Britain, France, and increasingly Italy and Germany, present a more engaged security agenda, up to and including the use of military force as a last resort. These states have a broader, more global scope, and have been engaged in, and have often lead, phases of the fight against terrorism and efforts to limit proliferation. Yet, even for these states, states with major international economic and energy stakes, priority goes to the domestic economy and national security interests, and to European regional interests, expressed within future EU security competencies. The institutional battles between NATO and the EU seem largely over, and cooperative arrangements are firmly in place, even if in specific cases, such as the competition over the Darfur support force aimed at assisting the beleaguered African Union forces, the hand-over protocols or the specific divisions of labor are not to everyone’s liking. In contrast, the concept of linked cooperative security partnerships or a coalition of democracies with commitments to humanitarian intervention that is outside of the UN framework has limited attraction and generated outright opposition at the NATO Riga Summit in 2006 and the NATO debates before the Bucharest summit in 2008. These doubts have delayed the development of earlier concepts, and the Obama team is now not interested enough to spend the political capital necessary to resurrect them.

Two contrasting fears plague most centrist European elites, the leaders of both new and old Europe. First, the experience of the post-Cold War era suggests that it is difficult to avoid sharing the risk of American use of military power, even at a geographical and psychological distance. Despite recent cuts, American forces are still deployed and launched from Europe, and American tactical nuclear weapons are still in Europe, albeit in very small numbers. (The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 and the subsequent 2011-2012 Defense and Disarmament Review – see discussion below – may once again leave them in doctrinal limbo despite popular and elite opposition to what seems an obsolete force.) European sites under broad, bilateral agreements with the United States are still used for intelligence, for planning, and, as the worst of the Iraq practices showed, for extraordinary rendition and secret detention.

Short of a politically costly show of opposition, as undertaken by Germany, France, and Turkey over Iraq in 2003, most European members of NATO retain their guaranteed right of consultation and voice in decision-making. And as an organizational framework, NATO has been a major instrument for establishing and maintaining a relatively unique degree of transparency about military forces, military plans, and military deficiencies among its 28 members (e.g. through the annual national NATO reviews). The United States regularly participates and can be collectively, if not always successfully, addressed and held to account in a continuing political forum.

Paradoxically, as the recent debate on European missile defense has proven once again, being left out of a decision critical to the security of their populations raises other fears among NATO members: that the “rampant unilateralism” of the United States will drag them into a conflict, a confrontation, or an intervention that does not match their priorities.
The sum of these fears is that the search for a new framework or a way to restructure the existing framework remains unresolved. The global networking of NATO or the linking of other democracies in the Middle East and Asia to NATO, first espoused by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and initially favored by Secretary Hilary Clinton’s team, now seems remote in any practical political terms or useful only in low-profile specific security tasks (as in the anti-piracy efforts off Africa’s east coast).54

Yet, simply clinging to structures and patterns of the past seems equally unlikely. There is an appetite among NATO leaders for cooperation with non-NATO partners like India. U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo Daalder highlighted the role of NATO in encouraging such cooperation during a 2012 presentation.55 The extent to which these non-NATO countries are able or willing to participate in European cooperative security arrangements is unclear. There is also an interest in building on extra-NATO mechanisms like the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The Problem with, of, and for Russia

Almost every discussion on how to structure cooperative security in Europe has started and ended in debate over the proper role of Russia in the evolution of European security. This was true even in the annali miracoli at the beginning of the 1990s, when the Soviet threat to Europe formally ended and Russia actively pursued a new partnership with the West under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The strategy of engagement seemed destined to be successful, but habits and prejudices on all sides died hard, and policy chasms seemed at every step to cast doubt on the ability to reach a lasting level of stability and mutual understanding.

Is it not the case, Western skeptics about cooperative security have argued, that the principal questions about cooperative security in Europe are really questions that turn on the role of Russia and its engagement in the cooperative consensus? Should it not commit to changing its international behavior and abandoning its claim to superpower/imperial privilege? Is it the case that the relative balance of power is the true boundary to its conduct? So long as Russia was anxious to be considered as an equal by the United States, it regarded American preferences for the cooperative solutions in Europe as at least a primary condition. The 1990s saw grave disappointments and disjunctures; the George W. Bush years, despite the rhetoric of partnership, even more. Once Putin shifted strategy in 2004-2005, to one that built a Russian identity defined as non-American or as not dependent on American “approval” or sometimes even in total distinction to the United States, Russia had no longer any need to accept “American conditions.” The limitations of Russia’s ability to be truly self-sufficient were swiftly found. But the Putin

54 Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), for example, is an informal cooperative network based on ad hoc but persisting agreements to preserve maritime security for shipping in the Indian Ocean and off the west coast of Africa. Somewhat analogous in structure to PSI, its coordinating council which meets regularly includes China, India, Pakistan, and Russia as well as NATO and EU members, all of which contribute forces to a cooperative command and share in the adoption of compatible ROEs. See, for example, Combined Maritime Forces; ‘CMF Hosts 22nd SHADE Meeting’ 23 December 2011; http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2011/12/23/cmf-host-22nd-shade-meeting/

55 Daalder, Ivo, Remarks at George Washington University, 26 January 2012.
strategy asserts that there are only limited reasons to define interests cooperatively – and only then at times and in places of Russia’s choosing.

In the United States, criticism of cooperation with Russia has become especially pronounced in recent years. Many high-profile right-wing politicians and commentators have attacked the “reset” policy, alleging that the Obama administration has sold out Eastern European allies and American interests in order to meet Russian demands. This criticism has extended to plans for missile defense cooperation, as well as the New START treaty. GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney used high profile op-eds attacking the treaty to establish his foreign policy expertise in 2010 ahead of the 2012 presidential election.56 These right-wing voices often stress the need for “equal security” for the CEE states.

In general, existing institutional frameworks continue to struggle to work with Russia in a cooperative security arrangement. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither the West nor Russia has identified an appropriate institutional framework that assures regular negotiations, bargaining, and the exchange of information beyond bilateral channels. Russia expected to be treated well because of its former superpower status and the way it surrendered its identity, territory, and nuclear weapons after 1991. It was not. NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the CFE regime all placed Russia in the unenviable position of being the one against all the rest, the focus or the target of action of the others. Furthermore, while many states have been willing to cooperate with Russia, to trade with it and buy its energy, few have been willing to stand by Russia in times of crisis, even given its new wealth and energy resources. Sometimes this has been a self-inflicted wound – as in the case of the war in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, when members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) remained silent about Moscow’s actions or where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)’s final communiqué didn’t mention it.

Obama’s first three years have seen a definite lightening of the political mood and a retreat from Russia’s constant sniping about the United States. In part this reflected the positive turn of the arms control negotiations, with President Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov asserting that this dialogue was entering a productive phase. The Russian leadership were clearly more surprised by Obama’s election and his avowed willingness to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations than were most other European elites; they welcomed his changes to U.S. missile defense plans, even while publicly declaring that they would remain a problem in the future. Russian hardliners, particularly in the military, still see a looming follow-on threat in U.S. conventional strategic superiority and the Obama plan for a series of linked regional missile defense schemes, but there was a better fundamental state of relations on which to build and a level of cooperation on Afghanistan that can be expanded to support American interests.57

Russia’s political future is uncertain, especially after Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party tampered with the results of the December 2011 parliamentary elections and called forth


57 See also section IV.ii
unexpected country-wide demonstrations, most visibly in Moscow and St Petersburg. It remains to be seen whether the newly reelected Putin will respond to emerging largely middle-class demands for a more open society. Some suspect that he will crack down on ongoing protests and seek to maintain current authoritarian political structures, and that his use of the “anti-American, strong-defense” card in the electoral campaign will in itself create barriers he cannot jump over easily. Others argue that the presidential campaign forced Putin to adopt more overtly nationalistic rhetoric and to dismiss continuing U.S.-Russia negotiations on missile defense and other issues unless they are on Russian terms. Now secure, they argue, he will have more leeway and given Russia’s financial difficulties, will have reason to realign in part with the United States and Europe.

1. Russian Strategic Concerns and the Agenda for Reassurance under Cooperative Security

In the last 20 years, four broad strategic concerns have emerged as accepted “truths” in Russia, all with critical bearing on the prospects for cooperative security arrangements with the United States and Europe. What Russia fears is often hidden in a cloud of nationalist rhetoric of political opportunism, and a cacophony of voices vying in stridency. The Soviet tradition of hard bargaining to the last deal sets the standard in formal negotiation; the fracture and opacity of Moscow political debate means public statements are rare and often-unreliable guides. But these trends have become less common, particularly under Medvedev’s “reset,” and presumably will continue declining as “normalization” and “reconciliation” with Russia’s neighbors, especially Poland, proceeds.58

i. Strategic Uncertainty

Russia is only slowly emerging from two decades of strategic uncertainty—about its own identity and its 21st century political and security requirements. The past two decades have mostly been about what Russian leaders have perceived as weakness and retreat—the loss of superpower status, the uncertainty of economic adjustment, and the palpable discrepancies of wealth distribution. Measurable increases in Russian quality of life are offset by criticism on the left about Putin authoritarianism and on the right about Russia’s unrequited sacrifices to the West after 1991. Naïve or hopeful attitudes that Russia would become a “normal” European country were quickly replaced in many circles by a political discourse that, particularly in hard times, stresses renewed distrust of the West, and emphasizes the glories of the national past. The future is generally viewed gloomily: What will be the affect of Putin’s return to the presidency? Will energy continue to pay the national way for at least another decade? Will threats from Russia’s South and eventually Russia’s East pose overwhelming challenges to Russia’s largely unprepared military forces?

ii. Nuclear Weapons as Strikers of the Balance

58 My interviews with Polish leaders in 20010 and 2011 stressed the achievements reached in this dialogue, especially in joint “historical truth” commission, and the setbacks, now largely overcome, caused by the Polish president’s untimely death in an airplane crash. See also the ground breaking historical work of Rotfeld, Adam Daniel and Anatoly Turkonov eds. White Spots – Black Spots. Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations 1918-2008, Warsaw-Moscow 2010 Russian (Moscow and Warsaw, 2010) resulting from their co-chairmanship of Polish-Russian “Group for Difficult Matters.”
Russian nuclear weapons, like their U.S. counterparts, are now at their lowest levels since the late 1950s given both unilateral reductions and arms control agreements with the United States. The New START agreement will reduce the active stockpiles to a little over 1,500, and perhaps less given the retirement of specific weapons systems. Yet in political and, especially, military circles, nuclear weapons’ value to Russia has increased, in both doctrine and operations. Strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons alike are the makeweight to what Russians see as their conventional inferiority to NATO in the West and potential challengers, including China, in the East. Russia has maintained their weapons’ technical capacity on a more or less equal footing with those in the West, and in some cases, the Russian military has argued that without political or arms control restraint, their capability could have been superior (particularly regarding short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the associated sensors, and present radars). But Russian conventional weapons are not equal in numbers, readiness, or precision to American offensive and defensive capabilities. And shrinking Russian conventional forces are likely to continue to lag in mobility, readiness, and command reform, despite major new investments.

This is particularly true in the domain of air/missile defense and enhances the complexity of NSNW reduction bargains. Russia still maintains the Galosh missile defense system around Moscow, and it is adding conventional weapons to the older nuclear warheads originally developed for the system. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia lost most of its front-line air-defense network including forward stations in the Baltic and the Caucasus military districts. Many military leaders still view tactical air strikes as part of disarming/decapitating strategies as the most likely military threat, nuclear or conventional, from the West. Replacing this network has been expensive, time-consuming, and it is not yet complete. In the 1990s, Russia chose not to participate in NATO’s Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) to monitor conventional aircraft, although it now participates in civil air traffic monitoring through a special arrangement with NATO facilitated by EUROCONTROL.

iii. The Search for “Equal Sacrifice”

A persistent theme in popular discourse is Russia’s proclaimed right to “equal sacrifice” in any bargains with the United States and the states of “old NATO.” Russia, the argument goes, willingly gave up its empire and withdrew without violence from the CEE states, and in return it expected (and, some add, was promised) acceptance and concessions from the West. The inequality of sacrifice is particularly clear in Putin’s 2002 acceptance of Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty without a specific offset and despite the weakness of Russian air defenses. But there are other grievances as well. Russia’s sense of outrage also focuses often on the “near abroad,” where some believe Russia should or must have special droit de regard or decisive influence. Those who make this argument assert, for example, that the now independent FSU states – such as the Baltics – have proven “ungrateful” for the sacrifices Russia undertook and the economic investment and support Russia made to their present status. In the 1990s, the

59 See, for example, the statements stressing also the threat of the increased numbers of Western cruise missiles by Major General Igor Sheremet, Deputy Head of the General Staff, on 31 May 2011 to Ekho Moskvy radio accessed at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-sees-growing-cruise-missile-threat-from-west/

unequal treatment of Russian citizens in these states became a nationalist rallying cry; for the Russian Right, it continues to be a potent symbol, even after fundamental changes under European auspices have been made in status and political participation.

This demand for equal sacrifice has surfaced repeatedly in arms control negotiations. Of particular importance for any future NSNW reduction agreement are the Russian charges of inequity regarding the implementation of the CFE agreement and its protocol. Here Russian diplomats and military officials have complained that the agreement requires sacrifices to be made almost exclusively on Russian territory, with unequal coverage of weapons systems, and with rights of inspection targeted at the oversight of Russian capabilities and bases, whatever the formal practice.

iv. The Need for a New Organizational Framework to Guarantee a Russian Role in Decisions on European Security

A related theme has been Russian insistence on a new organizational framework—beyond NATO, OSCE, and any pre-1991 organization—that will secure Russia an appropriate voice in European security policy councils. Russia’s preferred format has varied over time, and there have been few specific details beyond a decisive Russian influence. In the argument of a Russian interviewee, Russia is “not Estonia” and therefore not just one more “equal” member. Most recently, in 2008 Medvedev called for an overarching new European security framework, a call that remained relatively vague and attracted little external interest or support before being essentially disowned in 2010 by its creator.61

Moscow’s ambivalence about its own strategic identity is here most telling. In many issue areas and in many discussion circles, Russia’s standard of comparison is always the United States, and the strength/outcome of the bilateral relationship and reciprocal exchanges. For the foreseeable future, this will remain the case. But it also has more than occasionally flirted with its role in the European space and its long-term association with the major regional players – Germany above all, but also England and France. It has had an off-and-on relationship with the European Union per se, but knows its exclusion from that body is most probably permanent. And neither the OSCE nor the Council of Europe as currently organized carries sufficient weight or influence to attract most Russians.

Russian interest on this issue is now focused on a network of three institutions: the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) made up of FSU republics that are still closely allied with Russia; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Russia hopes - against Chinese resistance – will still develop a stronger security or regional stability focus; and most importantly for European security discussions, the revived and reformatted NATO-Russia Council (NRC). NATO’s Lisbon Summit agreement gave new functions and responsibilities to the NRC, particularly in forging a cooperative European missile defense scheme, as we will discuss below.

also the most promising of the three organizations to assuage Russian concerns.

IV. Tests of Relevance: Current Cases

To reiterate this paper’s basic argument: The concepts of cooperative security are still relevant to the security challenges of the 21st century. This is particularly true for the U.S.-Russia-Europe triangle, but it also has the potential to be applied elsewhere, in policy areas characterized by levels of hostility, enmity, and even of limited direct violence. Success parallel to that of the 1980s and the 1990s is not assured. Obstacles need to be overcome: the habits of neglect of the last decade and the assumption that the organizational and operational frameworks on which present stability and public confidence rest are somehow irreversible or on auto-pilot. Rediscovering cooperative security’s precepts and utility for new challenges as well as ensuring regular attention and watchfulness to its achievements will take political leadership – in Washington, Europe, and Moscow. This will also require the education and mobilization of domestic constituencies, both elite and popular.

The following section outlines five areas of challenge, all of great importance to the security agenda of the transatlantic/Eurasian area. None are easily resolved; each involves elements of short- and long-term risk that could raise the prospect of significant discord or the escalation of irritation to conflict. Each has a different policy profile and utility to the interests of the United States, Russia, and Europe, and none promises permanent success or short- or medium-term stability.

Meeting these challenges will require political will and a mixture of traditional and/or innovative approaches in a cooperative security framework. The traditional approach would most often be an adaptation of ideas and tools from the first and second phases of cooperative security such as:

- Demonstration by example;
- Bilateral and multilateral agreements;
- Unilateral declarations;
- Evolutionary long-term design;
- Available technology; and,
- Committed funding.

The more innovative approaches reflect an opportunity to think anew or adapt earlier approaches to political changes, new technologies, or different popular expectations that have emerged in the past decade. The challenges may pose unequal risks to each pole of the U.S.-Europe-Russia triangle, but each would seem to require new efforts to re-balance relations, as well as a new willingness to recognize and adapt policy planning and military preparations to avoid, to the highest degree possible, the legitimate security concerns of the others.

Two political estimates seem key to this assessment:
The general political acceptability of each challenge to critical Eurasian political constituencies – elites and attentive policy publics – at least in the United States, Europe, and Russia.

The political priority that the Obama administration places on each of them.

The following table reflects my assessment of the political environment. The cases developed below are meant to provoke debate as much as to evaluate an arbitrarily fixed set of options. In that spirit, I also then offer an estimate of how probable it appears that, in each issue area, some kind of cooperative security arrangement will be in place by 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Challenge</th>
<th>Basic Approach</th>
<th>Tools/Instruments Needed</th>
<th>Political Acceptability</th>
<th>Political Priority for Obama Administration</th>
<th>Probable by 2020?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Formal/informal agreements, bi/multilateral; examples; unilateral declarations.</td>
<td>Low/medium for US; High for Europe; High/medium for Russia</td>
<td>Medium-high</td>
<td>Medium??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution Building</td>
<td>Mixture of traditional and innovative</td>
<td>Formal/ informal agreements, bi/multilateral; examples; unilateral declarations.</td>
<td>High for Europe; Medium for US and Russia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium to low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td>Innovative</td>
<td>Formal agreements, bi and multilateral</td>
<td>Medium/high for US; Medium/low for Europe and low/high for Russia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation/counter terrorism</td>
<td>Innovative, traditional</td>
<td>Agreements, short and long term, bi and multilateral; funding</td>
<td>High in US and Russia; Medium for Europe</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy security</td>
<td>Innovative</td>
<td>Trades; agreements; institutions; funding</td>
<td>High for Europe; Medium for Russia and US</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium/ low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Arms Control

Arms control in the broadest sense is where cooperative security began and where there has been the most systematic thinking about its future. The prospects are at best mixed. Every one of the arms control treaties and initiatives that were the hallmarks of the initial cooperative security approach had by 2011 suffered disappointment or disaffection, particularly during the Bush era. Analyst after analyst now concludes that these treaty arrangements are not suited to the present political realities or the threats a Europe at peace now faces – internal threats, terrorism, drugs, illegal immigration, etc. Overwhelming Western conventional superiority even at lower levels of both strategic and tactical forces and biting fiscal constraints have changed the nature of threat and risk, therefore, there is less and less cause, for example, to monitor maximum numbers of delimited military equipment or even specific equipment categories or TLEs.62

Perhaps most under attack has been the OSCE. Its failure in times of trouble has been clear. It approached the conflict of Bosnia in a timely, determined manner only to find that its most fervent supporters in general – Germany and the neutrals – did not want it deeply involved. On later incidents, it issued statements of regret but didn’t take specific actions. In the run-up to the 2008 Georgia war, it was not able to use its consultation procedures or even to extend the term of its own peacekeeping mission.63 Much of the blame in that instance must be given to the opposition of the two protagonists – Russia and Georgia, both members. Russia was able to use its experience and influence within international organizations, particularly the OSCE, to ensure that it had the space to act free of constraints. But neither Europe nor the United States expressed enthusiasm about cooperative actions to restore the status quo ante. The stakes, the arms, the depth of the conflict – all meant that most preferred the OSCE to retreat from involvement.

The CFE presents a different failure in the face of challenge. There have been numerous attempts to update CFE and its original Cold War-derived formulas and balance. Most extensive, and subsequently most controversial, was the Adapted CFE Treaty (ACFE), which was signed in May 1997 at Paris. Among many other balances it struck a number of detailed compromises:

- It lifted the flank limits on Russia that restricted Russian troop movement on its own soil in the South (as proved a problem in the Chechen wars)
- It established NATO-as-a-whole ceilings for TLE
- It allowed for the eventual accession of the Baltics and Slovenia
- It enshrined NATO’s promise not to have permanent stationing of significant combat forces in the former Warsaw Pact space, and

62 To get a sense of the magnitude of reductions/withdrawals that have taken place since CFE was signed: Jeffrey McCausland, a long-time CFE expert recently remarked that under CFE the US is authorized to hold 4,006 tanks in Europe and in June 2008 had 91. And it is not at all accountable for the most potent new weapons: UCAVs (unmanned combat air vehicles) or RPV’s (remote piloted vehicles). See his essay in Zellner, Schmidt and Neuneck; op. cit.; p. 230.

63 OSCE procedures demanded unanimity to extend its peacekeeping mission, which Russia was not prepared to countenance without constraints that would have emasculated the mission.
Intense bargaining over the next two years led to compromise at the November 1999 OSCE meeting in Istanbul designed to “modernize” the OSCE. Russia promised to withdraw its leftover military deployments in Georgia and Moldova by a certain date, and conditions were set for the accession of new members, including the new NATO members admitted eventually in 2004, four former Warsaw Pact states and the three former Baltic republics.

Political winds and the Putin team decided otherwise; and thus began a 10-year stalemate, with the United States urging its allies not to ratify the adapted CFE until Russia made good on its commitment to withdraw its military contingents from the Abkhazia/South Ossetia encampments, and those in Transnistria. Russia tried internal pressure and discussion within OSCE to dissuade this campaign and then changed tactics after the failure of the 2006 spring review conference. It then warned all the states that this discrimination against Russia led by the Bush Administration (criticizing Russia’s human rights record while overlooking similar problems in NATO-aspirant countries including Georgia and Ukraine) would have major strategic consequences, especially for the Europeans. In December 2007, Russia suspended its observance of CFE requirements, leading to the present stalemate, and by 2012 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov argued that the CFE was dead.

What are important here are perhaps not the specifics but the combination of causal factors. Camille Grand argues that it reflects what is wrong with all the present cross-Europe arrangements:

- Too much “benign neglect” on all sides;
- Russian assertiveness;
- NATO short-sightedness; and
- The disappearance of the traditional European “honest brokers” – neutrals and others whose major stake is not in a specific political outcome but in the continuation and accumulation of the process as a whole.

Grand’s judgments are a telling assessment of what must be changed in the future if the CFE/OSCE framework on which so much day-to-day confidence and certainty are based is to continue or even morph into a new, more satisfactory arrangement. In some ways, he argues, we are back to the beginning—the first steps in the mid-1980s. What is to be done?

There is widespread agreement at the expert and policy level that CFE and indeed all of the linked institutions and procedures must be brought into accord with present strategic realities: the question is how? The debate surrounding Medvedev’s proposal may be the perfect vehicle for

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64 Although the step of “suspension” has no legal grounding within the treaty, Russia did at least stop short of full withdrawal.


66 Grand, Camille in Zellner, Schmidt and Neuneck, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
advancing these arguments. If not, other ways can and should be found. The formal renegotiation of the treaties is probably neither desirable nor necessary given how long the process took and the recent experience of the EU with a pattern of recalcitrant (or is it ambivalent) countries and leaders. A post-Lisbon EU with more experience, revived after the financial crises and increasingly articulate, can perhaps be entrusted to represent European interests now; perhaps a three way U.S.-Russia-EU conversation would be the best thing. There are also short-fuse negotiation tactics and tricks that can be explored if the political will is there. It may even be possible to do this given the financial pressures faced now by all defense budgets and the consequent need to have more stability and reliability in planning for long lead-time purchase. The acquisition cycle alone means countries will be looking to reduce major expenditures and to persuade populations not to forget the more sophisticated technological investment for the next two decades or more.

What is to be involved? The experience of the last decades suggests devoting far more attention to information technologies, to ways of diffusing alarms and information, to allowing quick convening and a known response catalogue. Modern technologies and social networking experience, for example, could be harnessed to achieve CBMs almost at the individual level. At lower force levels, too, there should be more concern about covering or at least linking-in observation and measurement of paramilitary and homeland defense forces, which are now sufficiently powerful in comparison to the shrinking traditional armies to disturb the peace, as in Georgia and throughout the Southern Caucasus and the Balkans. Perhaps most importantly of all for the future, there should be more attention to the unconventional forces (e.g. unmanned vehicles for surveillance and reporting) and new technologies (e.g. robotics) that seem critical for particular outcomes. The ideas of systematic review and evaluation on a regular transparent basis need also to be strengthened. The comprehensive EU review of Georgia mentioned earlier is one good example, embodying the idea of “community accountability” and the possibility of a nonpartisan attribution of blame and perhaps recommendations for national trials, investigations, and enforcement. It would certainly help in the terrorist cases now facing the EU; it could provide a vehicle for a different Russian response in the South Caucasus cauldron.

Several years ago, Gregory Govan, a distinguished U.S. military leader and long-time CFE-OSCE negotiator, argued the case for “wing walking,” that is, for drawing on the old lessons of the carnival aerial barnstormers, of holding on to what we have now in good order before moving on to a new phase. In his view, a clear-eyed perspective on where CFE has foundered is needed to determine what legacy can and should be preserved, and what should be slowly but surely dismantled. It is important to remember that CFE was never about resolving every outstanding conflict in Europe (see, for example, the frozen conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh or even the Georgian cases) but about changing the odds for risk reduction, crisis prevention, and rapid responses to dampen most, or at least some of the riskiest conflict, civilian and military.


68 Govan, Gregory in Zellner et al; op. cit., p. 167 ff.
Jeffrey McCausland’s list of potential improvements includes two other interesting elements. The first is to strengthen and renew the Military Doctrinal Forums under the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). This is important to do: as NATO renews its own Strategic Concept, Russia has just completed parts of its own strategic review, and the United States too. The goal would be to increase military-to-military dialogue that in its regularity and transparency is somewhat more sheltered from bilateral political pressures or overall diplomatic atmospheres. The most important achievement might simply be the extension of the “no surprises” rule beloved by military elites; but certainly critical is a basic understanding of decisions taken, even if there is not agreement, in order to avoid miscalculation or escalating irritations. A second goal might be to accelerate the collection and emulation of best practices. One clear area would be to expand the lessons learned and the procedures under the Wassenaar Agreements, the accords now signed by 40 countries, to promote transparency about cross-border transfers of equipment and technology. This would supplement similar initiatives in the nuclear field and allow greater reassurance especially of Russian fears about American transfers and conventional superiority.

Finally, there are the questions studiously avoided twenty years ago but perhaps more accessible now: the linking together of requirements and procedures of the various substantive regimes in an overarching framework to achieve greater predictability and stability. The arguments twenty years ago as to why this might put too much pressure on accords or focus political pressure too narrowly on informal accords may still be sound, but they seem vaguely outdated in a time of a Lisbon Europe and instant Internet communication. The prominent unease about future nuclear weapons deployments – even what to do with the complex of nuclear arrangements, especially the status of NSNW in NATO, the INF Treaty, the PNIs, and the hosting/storage infrastructure – might all be folded in to ensure at least greater transparency.

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept took direct aim at the issues of Russian deployments and doctrine regarding the NSNW it holds on its territory west of the Urals. It is hard to envision further unilateral NATO nuclear reductions without parallel Russian reductions and direct cooperation with Moscow over the coming years on a host of broad security issues.

From the vantage point of early 2012, the prospects for a follow-on arms control treaty to New START appear dim. Most experts interviewed believe that it will take considerable time to negotiate such an agreement, and that significant verification issues remain to be resolved.

69 McCausland, Jeffrey in Zellner et al; op. cit., p. 231-233.
70 Kelleher, Catherine and Scott Warren in Zellner et al; op cit, p. 547.

“In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO’s members.” Accessed at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm.
Nevertheless, some proposals have been put forth and discussed. A future treaty could be a bilateral negotiation on global ceilings for U.S. and Russian deployed and nondeployed strategic and nonstrategic warheads, possibly with a common number governing all categories and involving the choice and the freedom to mix. Some argue that such an accord might still not adequately address NSNW limits if there is freedom to mix warheads under a common ceiling.

A polarized U.S. domestic political environment makes treaties difficult to ratify and further complicates negotiations on an agreement to limit NSNW or other nuclear weapons. The relatively modest New START treaty was only ratified after a drawn out political battle between the White House and parts of the Republican leadership in the Senate, even though the treaty was supported by virtually the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment. Russian domestic bargains, especially politico-military are no less complicated.

Interim NSNW measures are needed, though there is no significant progress on the horizon. U.S. officials have called for increased NSNW transparency on a reciprocal and parallel basis through data exchanges and verification. Most European allies appear to support the concept of parallel transparency as a step towards further arms control as indicated in a spring 2011 “food for thought” or “non-paper” signed by ten allies, including Germany and Poland. There have also been a number of unofficial discussions, notably among think tanks working with or close to governments, on possible verification measures, adapting process elements both from strategic nuclear monitoring and from earlier conventional inspection/verification schemes. The data exchange could include the numbers, locations, and types of weapons within agreed categories and be accompanied by the specification and adoption of appropriate verification measures.

Agreements, either bilateral U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia, could include issues such as the relocation of warheads to specified geographic limits (say, a non-deployments zone on either side of the NATO-Russia border or further restrictions on exercises), mutual or reciprocal reductions, and/or the consolidation of deployment or storage sites. Each approach would have advantages and disadvantages. The relocation of Russia NSNWs to the east would comfort NATO allies but would create concerns for Japan and China, as well as undercut Moscow’s hopes for a global INF ban to parallel its agreement with the United States. Reciprocal reductions (e.g., 30 percent each, rather than a specific number) would lead to larger numerical cuts for Russia, but would leave NATO with very few remaining U.S. weapons on European soil. A consolidation of NATO sites may allow the United States to have greater opportunities

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74 Background for Foreign Affairs Council, Defense Ministers and Development Ministers, 9 December 2010, Brussels 8 December 2010, p.3. The paper advocated “enhanced cooperation, with a view to spending resources in Europe more efficiently and to maintain a broad array of military capabilities to ensure national objectives as well as Europe’s ability act credibly in crises.”

beyond “nuclear presence” to affect “nuclear sharing.”\textsuperscript{76} Russian leaders also stress the need for more comprehensive negotiations that include conventional weapons, missile defense, and space – all of which would clearly extend and complicate NSNW talks. The success of an interim arms control step designed to enhance transparency and potentially achieve proportional reductions, while consolidating and relocating NSNW sites, would require close consultation with allies and careful negotiations with Russia. But it presents by far the best path to “create the conditions” for further NSNW reductions.

A somewhat different but not mutually exclusive approach would begin with a renewal of existing CBMs and the initiation of new cooperation, exchange, and transparency measures. NATO and Russia, or, initially the United States and Russia, might exchange information on the safety and security of their weapons and storage sites. New officer exchange programs involving specialists as well as promising officers could explore common understandings about these weapons and their possible effects. Indeed this has been done under the auspices of cooperative threat reduction on a range of nuclear issues. Seminars, such as the OSCE doctrine seminars held in Vienna in the 1990s and those occasionally held under the NRC, could restart regular exchanges on nuclear doctrine and strategy, even at the unclassified level. NATO and Russia could hold joint exercises to practice responses to nuclear accidents and develop standards for nuclear forensics. Lessons can also be learned from the NATO-Russia discussions on the critical assumptions that supported planning for the eight European missile defense exercises/simulations that began in 2002 and were halted after the Georgia War. These might well be introduced at the next missile defense exercises scheduled for 2012 in Germany.

Other forms of cooperation could also increase confidence and transparency, and diminish Russian and CEE security concerns that might otherwise prompt resistance to NSNW reductions. Many involve refreshing or refashioning areas of cooperation from the past (e.g., the treaty-based data exchanges under the continuing Open Skies agreements) or refashioning new cooperation initiatives (e.g., the logistics pact on supply transit of Russian territory in support of Afghanistan) into new instruments or organizations against terrorist threats or major disasters. Similarly, the record and experience of ~6,000 CFE inspections, which have proceeded without incident and with great success, could be added to the experiences gained under other regimes. The development of a corps of inspectors and the creation of an EU or regional inspectorate with specific mandates and that is trained to common or cooperative professional standards would reduce the usual \textit{ad hoc} improvisation that characterizes crisis responses. To cite Vice President Biden’s May 2010 op-ed, this would allow for more effective conflict-prevention, conflict-management, and crisis-resolutions mechanisms that would increase regional stability and security.\textsuperscript{77}

Another very accessible mechanism that could be relatively quickly expanded is the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), a project begun in 2002 under the NRC along the NATO-Russia


border as a mutual counter-terrorism effort and has also increased transparency and predictability within the regional airspace domain. In several respects, this initiative suggests a model for missile-defense data exchange and demonstrates how relatively inexpensive such initiatives can be given their potential use of off-the-shelf hardware and software. Russia and 11 NATO states have invested significantly in the network, establishing eight communications nodes (four in Russia, two in Poland, and one each in Norway and Turkey) to transmit ground sensor data that tracks civil aircraft activity 150 kilometers on either side of the border to either a NATO or Russian coordination center (CC). The CCs then inform their counterparts in real time. The system reached international operational status after “end of concept” proofing in June 2011, and experts have declared that the system’s remaining technical issues are “easily resolvable.”

CAI’s expansion into the monitoring of military aircraft activity could follow upon agreement on operational rules and procedures. This was foreseen in 2002, has been tried in Scandinavian exercises on “rogue aircraft” under the Baltic Council, and has attracted measurable support and little outright opposition within Russia as within the Alliance. It could also usefully be expanded geographically in Europe to cover a wide swath of NATO and Russian territory or as the NRC has suggested, to allow the participation of other states, NATO members including the United States, and members of the Partnership for Peace program, and neutrals. Beginning in 2006, officials have even moved to expand the initiative or parallel it in other non-European areas: a proposed expansion of counter-terrorism cooperation under the U.S.-Russia Presidential Working Group; and the NORAD move in 2006 to examine possible CAP links across the Bering Straits. In the view of several American proponents, CAI might also be used as a base for a NATO-Russia cruise missile defense concept that could affect or employ Russian S-family interceptors.

A similar, functionally driven form of cooperation might also flow from the 2011 Arctic pact on search and research cooperation. This would fit with the NRC’s functional charter, and respond to the likelihood that increased maritime traffic, anticipated as a result of global warming, will strain existing national capabilities to deal with disaster or crisis. The activities under this pact would involve not only dialogue and planning but would naturally flow into cooperative training regimes, the exchange of “best practice” materials and procedures, and allow the building of new predictable consultations, despite the continuing national disagreements on specific sovereign limits.

There is, in short, more than enough to be done. Greater transparency and accountability, whether unilaterally declared or multilaterally agreed, would represent significant gains in almost every category of arms reduction and monitoring. What is needed on all sides is a greater sense of urgency, political will, and the recruitment of an expanded talent pool to execute the resulting plan.

78 See Loukianova, op.cit.,May 2011. Details on the most recent NATO-Russia air exercise “Vigilant Skies” that took place June 6-10,2011, see NATO, “NATO and Russia to Exercise Together Against Air Terrorism,” 1 June 2011.

Institution Building

A second test focuses on the area of great success in 1989-1991: the institutionalization and “routinization” of contacts and practices through the establishment of a spider web of organizations that were mutually reinforcing and all essentially oriented toward risk reduction through transparency and verification.

The two most important Western multilateral organizations (NATO and the EU) have, diplomatically phrased, an imperfect record of coordination and cooperation. This record has been exaggerated by political rhetoric, especially during the last eight years, where both Europe and the United States gained from emphasizing divisions. In particular, France has at times gloriied in stressing the ties that divide, both as a tribute to a Gaullist vision still worth political capital in France, and as a crucial bargaining chip against Germany and its balanced ties with Washington. Other divisions stretch back into fundamental differences about process and perceptions, discussed elsewhere in greater detail. 80 Indeed, while the objectives of the EU’s foreign policy and defense apparatus (such as it is) and NATO are largely similar, their political methods and organizational capabilities vary in important ways that have serious implications for the future of cooperative security.

In the last several years, though, much has changed. France, in a reversal of 40 years of policy, rejoined the integrated military structures of NATO and took over two commands, the Transformation Command (ACT) in Norfolk and the Joint Forces Command in Lisbon. The French public’s silence at this move was remarkable, a tribute perhaps to the power of the French presidency and of Sarkozy himself over the traditional critics on the left (stirred by often-visceral anti-Americanism) and on the right (children of de Gaulle with a potent fear of German preeminence in NATO). 81 Nuclear forces were explicitly excluded from the agreement, leaving French claims of total independence for the force de frappe still questionable but legally intact. 82 A major factor in this turn was that under Sarkozy, the search for a French-led independent EU foreign policy and an organized EU military component larger than that dictated by Petersberg appears to have been shelved for the near term, if not for the indefinite future. The French military in particular is enthusiastic about the ACT assignment and the new opportunities it presents for both influence and resources. 83

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80 Kelleher in Biscop et al; op cit


83 A close observer of the French military noted at a late June 2009 meeting of the Washington Atlantic Council on French normalization in NATO that the French military were largely disappointed with the EU defense force because France had to pull too much of the weight. Moreover, it was proving more costly and more complex a challenge than they had originally thought and as a result, EU enthusiasm waned. Atlantic Council of the US; Panel discussion; June 2009 (Chatham House rules in effect so speaker unnamed).
Europe’s evolution toward an independent European foreign policy and a European foreign service, meanwhile, remains somewhat of a mystery both to insiders and U.S. officials. The Lisbon process had been virtually stagnant for the better part of eight years, and almost no one in Washington not directly responsible for European policy understood it or paid close attention to it. What post-Lisbon Europe will look like – and be capable of – is less clear-cut. Ambassador Daalder has described post-Lisbon NATO as NATO 3.0, and emphasized NATO’s role in enabling cooperative action. In terms of the European leadership there have been few indicators – say, in the Libya campaign or in the broad reactions to the Arab Spring –that the EU president, Belgian Herman van Rompuy, and the foreign minister, Britain’s Catherine Ashton, have been influential enough to promote substantial agreement, let alone a united European foreign policy both within and beyond the Union. They seem to have ended up in the tradition of pre-Lisbon EU leaders – bureaucrats-in-chief without the power to override disparate national interests or present a serious and viable face to outsiders. On immediate appraisal, neither appears the kind of figure to “stop the traffic” in Beijing or Washington, a trait British foreign secretary David Miliband had suggested should be a prime qualification for the job. Neither seems likely to make the world see Europe anew nor to project a vigorous European unity on the world stage. Instead, Europe chose a pair of unprepossessing, unremarkable, inoffensive politician-technocrats. Both could still do a capable job. But the chances of major developments in EU foreign policy seem as distant now as at any point in the pre-Lisbon years. The lack of consensus on how and within which institutional framework to deal with Russia alone is stunning.

Other controversies also remain. The “neutral” countries have been mollified with several concessions in the wording of the Lisbon Treaty to calm their concerns – what practical impact this will have on the foreign policy process or on these countries’ neutrality remains to be proven. Likewise, only experience will show whether the new structures help overcome divisions on some issues or whether they simply reinforce a continuation of past practice – with unanimity exceedingly scarce as always on major policies, such as the unified EU approach to Russia or Iran or even Libya.

The other major barrier to cooperation between the two institutions is their differing capabilities, and the different methods of problem solving they drive. NATO is a military alliance and can call on the immense power-projecting potential of the U.S. armed forces. The EU has not come close to being able to project military power in the same way, nor does it wish to do so. However, there is plenty of overlap in their activities and their membership, which ensures continuous collaboration. The 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) outlines the political underpinnings of the relationship – mutual respect, consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency, and the rest. After months of heated discussion, the Berlin-Plus arrangements of 2002 allow NATO to offer the EU nearly its entire

84 What began as the drive European Constitution at the start of the process following the Nice Treaty became, following numerous objections, referendum failures and ministerial summits, the Lisbon Treaty. Since that document was first published, two years passed before all countries ratified it in a watered down form (a process completed by the Czech Republic in November 2009).

too kit (with the notable exception of nuclear weapons) for EU missions. According to coordinated EU and NATO decision making, there is to be a range of support for EU Defense Forces, making available assets and capabilities that are to a major degree American assets assigned to NATO, including equipment and transport, command arrangements, and operational planning assistance. NATO can still play a role in EU-led missions even when it is not itself engaged – and has done so in the cases of Operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003 and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2004 (see Appendix 2).

Moreover, with the exception of Chirac’s France (and on occasion Spain and Belgium), most national and EU leaders have always argued that the EU has a comparative advantage in focusing on non-military solutions – the use of economic aid, trade, sanctions, and political pressure to pursue its intentions. These differences ought not necessarily to prompt tension between the EU and NATO – indeed, the two should form a neat synergy. However, the division of labor rather than how to cooperate and strengthen the synergy has been the subject of endless wrangling almost since the wall fell in 1989. After Bosnia, some European states – particularly France and Germany but also some of the small states – have complained that this means the EU gets to clean up the messes the United States has unilaterally decided to make and over which they have little control. The dramatic refusal of Germany, France, and Turkey to cooperate with the invasion of Iraq did not fully reveal the widespread dissatisfaction of European elites over American unilateralism, because most leaders carefully stood in the shadow of these countries and unofficially supported their opposition.

The tools available shape (and are shaped by) the political preferences of the membership, and historically European countries have tended to rate threats differently and to prefer non-military solutions.

Dangers to World Peace86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% saying ‘great danger’</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>Israeli-Palestinian Conflict</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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India | 8 | 15 | 6 | 13
---|---|---|---|---
China | 22 | 31 | 11 | 27

The table of views on threats to world peace (regrettably not replicated since 2006 in Pew public opinion studies) also reveals the difference in perspectives Americans and Europeans have about what matters most in global relations, especially when confronting threats of violence or illegal actions. Many of the rankings may have changed in the last several years, and the gap between U.S. and European attitudes may now be considerably smaller, but the effect of the “near enemy” is likely to remain pronounced for Europeans.

In general, the United States has a wider lens and a penchant for pre-emptive or preventative action as a threat builds. A good example is the continued enthusiasm for an Iran strike and the “bomb Iran” rhetoric from some U.S. commentators, while Europeans tend to favor a status quo or go-slow approach, or simply to consign problems to the United States and its far greater capabilities.\(^87\) This gap in attitudes cannot be underestimated. True to its foreign policy tradition and “pioneer spirit,” the U.S. public and leadership have proven notably more willing to resort to the use of force – a dispute being replayed in the continuing debate over burden sharing and ROEs (rules of engagement) in Afghanistan.\(^88\)

1. Russia and the New Institutionalization: After the Medvedev Plan

Sometimes it is useful to review the evolution of a policy failure to assess underlying causes and unresolvable paradoxes. The failed Medvedev plan for a cooperative international security system outlined in a series of speeches given through 2008 and 2009, was to allow Russia a full, integrated and equal share in choices about European and Eurasian security.

The draft European Security Treaty was released in November 2009, giving a first formal indication of Russian intent and solidifying the rather vague outline that had previously been described.\(^89\) In a speech Medvedev gave in Berlin in 2008, he envisaged a “genuinely equal cooperation between Russia, the European Union and North America as three branches of European civilization.” “Atlanticism has had its day,” meaning NATO cannot go on making decisions without wider consultation. However, other organizations with potential, such as the OSCE, are held back by “the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics.” At a joint 2009 press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Medvedev stated that NATO and the EU should be involved in the creation of the new organization, alongside the OSCE, the CIS, and the CSTO, and could become institutional

\(^87\) A November 2011 poll found that 75% of Americans agreed that “it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world.” In France the figure was 62% and in Germany it was 50%. Pew Global Attitudes Project

\(^88\) Table reference to GMF, TA Trends 2010. This is a consistent trend over virtually all postwar surveys of European and American attitudes on foreign policy that ask this or similar questions.

parties to the treaty. He also remarked that national interest should not be the focus, but that all countries should be looking for common cooperative solutions.  

But the hooks were in the details. Existing NATO members were unlikely to accede to the formulation in the draft, including Article 9.2 (“The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in the area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty, are not incompatible with the Treaty”), which appeared to give the new document primacy over any and all past or future international security agreements – including NATO. The future role and relevance of the OSCE was even more complicated. The Medvedev plan foresaw an organization with no ideals beyond the combined national interests of members – objectives, such as democracy promotion, development, and human rights, which have been at the core of OSCE’s original purpose. As Dmitri Trenin pointed out in October 2009, Medvedev’s plan distinctly identified problems with the current set-up; countries beyond the NATO space, such as the Caucasus and the Crimea, have no stable security arrangement, falling through gaps in the present architecture. The OSCE had proven incapable of shoring up their situation, thus it was a positive step that the Russian leadership wanted to tackle that problem, even though the method of achieving that was neither clear nor proven.

The biggest question of all, though, is why the West should voluntarily reconsider existing organizations. Another unresolved issue is the role of the Russia-led or Russia-preferred treaty organizations (see Appendix 1 for memberships and overlaps). So far, the West has avoided formal institutional relationships with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), just as it has also done from the beginning with the predecessor CIS. It has deemed it undesirable to confer such credibility to groups driven by, and almost entirely comprised of, non-democracies with blemished human rights records and unrealistic in its implication of “political-military symmetry” between, for example, CSTO and NATO, or even on occasion, CSTO and the EU. The member states – Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan – have until recently had little more than virtual ties to one another, and most have operated principally through bilateral relations or a “hub and spoke” system with Russia. Threats surrounding the fighting in Afghanistan have given more reasons to confer, and to create a rapid deployment force, roughly parallel to the U.S. force that is so vital for logistics in Afghanistan, and to build a Russian base in Kyrgyzstan to organize and support it. In 2009, there were also well-publicized efforts to secure full recognition of the CSTO as a supplier of crisis support and peacekeeping forces to the UN and to secure recognition from NATO itself.

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90 Medvedev, Dmitry, Press Conference with Chancellor Merkel of Germany; Munich, 16 July 2009. See also Speech at Helsinki University; 20 April 2009.

91 An internal review process (The Corfu Process) was begun by the Greek presidency in the hopes of identifying opportunities for reform and revitalization of the OSCE.


93 See the counter argument to this in Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “An Agenda for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2009.

Another organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), has attracted greater interest from the West. The SCO offers a formal linkage between China and Russia in the critical policy areas of energy, security, and trade, and it has at least the potential to play a critical role in Central Asia and redefine many geopolitical relationships within the post-Cold War/post-Afghanistan regional shakeups that are certain to occur. The SCO is now composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – with Pakistan, India, Iran, and Mongolia as observers. The United States early on flirted with asking for a form of limited observer status, especially given its interests in Afghanistan and the energy resources in the region. But after a 2005 SCO call for a timetable for American withdrawal of its anti-terror forces in Afghanistan and subsequent pressure about U.S. forces leaving the base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, its interest has drawn back. Under Bush at least, American policy leaders viewed the institution as of little consequence or a mere bullhorn for anti-American criticism. Russia itself has been somewhat ambivalent, trying regularly and without much success to go beyond joint exercises and strategy discussions to recast the SCO as a political-military pact with potential force mobilization capabilities. Its preferred model is again suzerainty, with even greater emphasis in its eastern “near abroad” as exercising selective intervention into domestic policy and patterns of governance as well. But China has been adamant that the CSO should primarily be used to develop regional economic capabilities and exchanges and to remain at a traditional inter-governmental level to deal only with issues of mutual concern.

Medvedev ultimately admitted that his plan had no future and had garnered almost no support from other countries. Yet, there was some momentum around the idea of treating both NATO and the CSTO more seriously, or at least legitimizing repeated Russian calls for new institutional linkages for the 21st century. In a pioneering 2009 Foreign Affairs piece, former National Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski proposed an advantageous institutional option for NATO vis-à-vis Russia but also other CEE states. He suggested setting aside reservations “in the event that a joint agreement for security cooperation in Eurasia and beyond were to contain a provision respecting the right of current nonmembers to eventually seek membership in either NATO or the CSTO – and perhaps, at a still more distant point, even in both... A NATO-CSTO treaty containing such a proviso would constitute an indirect commitment by Russia not to obstruct the eventual adhesion to NATO of either Ukraine or Georgia in return for the de facto affirmation by NATO that in neither case is membership imminent.” The Medvedev draft included hints in this direction, but provided no clear route to its achievement. In this instance, however, the West’s position is also hard to judge - such a step would certainly be a significant shift in attitude for a number of big participants, most obviously the United States, but as part of a second phase of the “reset” program, it may well not be off the table.


It is also striking how similar many of the remarks coming from Western statesmen about the Medvedev Plan echo the terms used to describe the Helsinki process in the 1970s. Then, too, the Russian side insisted on American non-participation, and then relented. That program was accused in many quarters of being intended to weaken the Atlantic Alliance, of having no obvious advantages over existing arrangements, and of being wholly favorable to the Kremlin. Yet the outcome of that process – the OSCE – is now the status quo being defended, and the Helsinki Final Treaty is seen as one of the diplomatic pinnacles of the Cold War era. As Henry Kissinger observed, “[rarely] has a diplomatic process so illuminated the limitations of human foresight.”\footnote{Kissinger; op. cit.; p. 635.} Dismissing the Medvedev Plan out of hand risked curtailing a negotiation that could have yielded an agreement that would have defined the post-Cold War age in much the same way as the Helsinki Final Treaty set out the path of the latter stages of the Cold War.

Much of this paper’s analysis suggests the need to address in an assured manner the lack of a continuing forum for NATO-Russia interchange and consultation. Initial NATO-Russia agreements envisaged that the NRC would fulfill such a function.\footnote{See James Goldgeier, op.cit., for further details of the initial NRC charter and agenda, Chapter 5.} Instead, in the almost two decades of its existence, both NATO and Russia have neglected the NRC, excluded it from significant discussions held elsewhere in NATO, and expressed disappointment at its failure to serve as a consultation or planning body worthy of high level or even consistent participation.

The Lisbon Summit’s reemphasis on the NRC paralleled the lines of reset between Moscow and Washington, and filled in the space left by the consistently disappointing EU-Russia consultations and in the often-dysfunctional OSCE debates. Some Russian leaders interviewed for this paper suggested that while Russia is still not granted proportionate influence, the NRC under Secretary-General Rasmussen’s leadership is now far more of a meeting of 29 rather than the 28 versus 1 confrontation that many Russians condemned in the Bush era. Its working groups have attracted far more skilled participants and observers than in the past; its meetings serve in several important new projects, including the missile defense cooperation and counter-terrorism efforts.

The question is whether it is possible or desirable to transform the NRC into an even more effective body, with a deeper staff and more call on NATO decision-making authorities. A regular meeting calendar would require all participants to at least show up and be accessible, even if it also allows for public stonewalling. At this point, both the United States and Russia prefer bilateral deals in the strategic area; NSNW is surely one of the designated areas for such an agreement. Yet, the NRC might prove a good stage for trial balloons and for a safety fuse for both sides. It could also be a center for oversight – of new or old inspection regimes, of training cooperation, and of expanding work on definitions and the adoption of new technologies.

One further organizational change, perhaps now a goal rather than a realistic possibility, is an expansion of the NRC’s earlier efforts at unclassified discussions of broad nuclear doctrine issues and exchanges of strategic views. This was part of the NRC initial mandate, but faded in importance in the late 1990s as action moved into bilateral U.S.-Russia channels. NRC exchanges in this area might parallel exchanges in the U.S.-Russia channels, e.g., those at
STRATCOM in the 1990s or the earlier CHOD (Chief of Defense Staff) exchanges. A major stumbling block would be the encrusted bureaucracy and procedures of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which, with the support of strong national constituencies, has successfully resisted reform or major adaptation to the post-1991 character of the European security landscape. Yet, transparency about future actions is a critical component of reassurance, both for allies and the NATO-Russia domains.

A strengthened NRC might also be a mechanism for expanding transparency mechanisms on a multilateral basis to other NATO nations beyond the United States (including perhaps the remaining near PFP members) in order to prepare for new roles in the next round of arms reductions. Present plans foresee that the next round of negotiations will include nuclear powers beyond the United States and Russia; this might well be a good proving ground and one that will allow other NATO states some insight into their decision making.

Around the fixed point of the NRC, there could eventually be supplemental arrangements with the CSTO and perhaps the SCO. These would be enhanced by stronger commitments to transparency. Crisis management between Russia and NATO has proven hopelessly weak under the strain of major events (Georgia especially), so the inclusion of improved communication and data-exchange systems could have practical benefits.

This tack would parallel and hold out merits similar to the 2009 plan outlined by Brzezinski. By engaging Russia on terms that give it a valuable stake in not just the outcome but the process, it would harness Russian pride and prestige to identify mutually acceptable settlements. By encouraging Russia to operate in multilateral processes, it would give the West the opportunity to monitor its conduct at closer hand than has occurred in the more standoffish arrangements currently witnessed, and to nurture learning on both sides from each others’ actions. By recognizing the CSTO and establishing the accompanying institutional requirements, the West gives up little while getting the benefits of regularized interaction with Russia and the CSTO, as well as the SCO. Brzezinski, at least, thinks there is value in allowing Russia to save face in exchange for ensuring communication. As cooperative security advocates have argued from the beginning, the development of means of cooperation beyond slow-moving and confrontational treaty negotiations (joint military training exercises, cultural, scientific and educational exchanges) can enable cooperation to progress between the headlines. If an NRC arrangement can incorporate these positives while searching (admittedly with little chance of immediate success) for a major paradigm shift in the East-West institutional relationship, it would be a valuable contribution to cooperative security.

**Missile Defense**

One of the near-term testing grounds for a new vision of cooperative security that would demonstrate concrete results quickly is the plan for a missile defense system in Europe. Championed by President George W. Bush throughout his administration, missile defense (MD) plans became the symbol of an American unilateralism that alienated allies, and enraged Russia. It was cited in Europe and in the United States as a stark and dramatic example of a
cooperative security system gone seriously awry and approaching the point of no return. While it entailed more informal consultation than was usually publicly acknowledged, the Bush plan essentially bypassed both NATO allies and the Russians, refusing to acknowledge the potential qualms of other states in favor of bilateral deals and a strategy vis-à-vis Iran that appeared, and was, almost exclusively American in interest. Obama has revised these decisions in alternative plans for an MD system that, as now outlined, lacks a cooperative security core. There is evidence, though, to suggest that the United States is now searching for a cooperative solution, with more serious consideration of involving Russia as a partner, inviting interested allies to join, and extending its benefits beyond the borders of Europe itself into the Middle East, East Asia, and other regional areas of tension.

Judging by 2010 data on CEE opinion, the United States would have been better off had it never begun with the Bush initiatives, as both CEE and Baltic countries felt the disappointment of Obama’s reorientation keenly and saw it as a pro-Russian. In 2011, the Czech Republic withdrew from the cooperation once it was clear that it would not have an important, exclusive role as the principal radar base. In Poland and Romania, relations were reparable, in light of new American promises of air defense equipment and training, but recent interviews suggest that the policy shift left the Poles wondering about Obama’s basic attention to their security concerns.

In order to understand the status of the missile defense plans for Europe, and how it relates to the larger concept of cooperative security, it is necessary to understand the history of the Bush missile defense plans. The ultimate failure of those plans, and the Obama administration’s attempts to reorient them, are classic cases demonstrating the failures and promises of a cooperative security strategy.

1. The Past

The Bush administration first aggressively pushed for the deployment of MD in Europe beginning in 2006, but the campaign was the culmination of a fundamental shift in the direction that the Bush administration took in the field of arms control and defense. Establishing missile defense systems as part of a larger strategy to shift to a proactive military defense approach against weapons of mass destruction was in Bush’s plans even before he took office, evidenced when he announced in a 1999 campaign speech at The Citadel military college that his administration would “deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, both theater and national, to guard against attack and blackmail.”


102 Author interviews conducted through DARE program organized by the Carnegie Corporation 2002-2010. These have been supplemented by interviews in Europe and the United States carried out from January to June 2011 for a Nuclear Threat Initiative project.

103 Kelleher and Warren in Zellner et al; op cit.

The rough plans date back to before the Bush took office. Setting the tone for Bush’s fervent support of a missile defense system was the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, an independent commission convened by the U.S. Congress in 1998 to assess the potential threat of ballistic missiles to the security of the United States (and key allies such as Japan and NATO members). The commission was led by Donald Rumsfeld, George H. W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, and largely focused on new, post-Cold War military threats.105

Despite the commission’s findings, the Clinton Administration announced in its last days that it would not move ahead with plans for the deployment of a National Missile Defense program (NMD). Clinton argued that MD technologies were still largely unproven, that a system would entail a breach in the core ABM Treaty limits, and that deployment would likely meet opposition from NATO allies. Ever protective of the ABM treaty, European states feared that an MD program could negatively provoke Russia into another arms race, as well as leave the continent more susceptible to retaliatory attacks. Significantly, Russia acknowledged Clinton’s refusal to commit to an extensive MD program, and pledged to work with the United States on a more limited multilateral system in the future.106

Early in his first term, Bush signaled a major policy shift on missile defense: High-level officials immediately began emphatically making the case for the deployment of a system in Europe as well as in Asia, arguing that NATO had become more susceptible to political coercion and blackmail. In 2002, the United States, withdrew from the ABM treaty citing the need to undertake new tests against the new threats. It began to explore in earnest the possibility of establishing in Europe an effective multilayered defense system involving air, sea, and land assets, including a series of exercises with interested allies and Russia.107 Bush officials also began unofficial probes and preliminary talks as early as 2001 in several CEE states (including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) over the possibility of U.S. missile defense bases on their soil. In 2006, as the Bush team pursued a more aggressive program to blunt Iran’s increasing nuclear ambitions, it began to press hard on Poland and the Czech Republic. The NATO Council was informally briefed about the program outside of formal sessions but was not consulted, which led to conflict down the line.

In February of 2007, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek announced that the Czech Republic and Poland were prepared to station 10 missile interceptors on Polish soil, and locate a site for a

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105 In its report to Congress, the Commission powerfully, and controversially, asserted that rogue nations like North Korea or Iran could soon have the capability to strike against the United States with “little or no warning.” At the same time, the Commission asserted that no country, besides Russia and China (which already possessed ballistic missiles) would be able to obtain the capabilities of such an attack before 2010, with the possible exception of North Korea. Because of disagreement within the Commission, it did not itself explicitly endorse any specific defense system. In its aftermath, however, Republican politicians, along with a few Democrats, used the Commission’s findings to amplify the debate on a national missile debate system, and attempted, with little obvious success, to make it an election issue in 2000. See Rumsfeld, Donald, “Executive Summary, Final Report to Congress, The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” Washington, D.C., 1998.


107 NATO approved several broad gauge missile defense concepts, and although the pace of implementation and funding was glacial, there were 8 relevant planning exercises, including some related data-exchange trials involving Russia under NRC auspices from 2002 onward. These were halted after the conflict in Georgia in 2008.
radar detection system in the Czech Republic. The announcement caused great consternation, with major European allies claiming that they neither had been consulted nor were convinced, especially after Iraq, about American claims of urgency regarding an Iranian missile threat.\textsuperscript{108} Russian outrage stressed that the plan threatened their security, despite repeated American efforts to demonstrate technically that these limited forces would have no utility against existing Russian missile capability. Russian military figures, past and present, thundered at the breaking of the Gorbachev-Bush agreements of 1990 on NATO deployments in Eastern Europe (reaffirmed at the time of the 1997 NRC Founding Agreement), and hinted at the immediate suspension of existing East-West arms control agreements such as CFE and the INF agreements while prompting a return to Cold War rhetoric.\textsuperscript{109}

At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, the U.S. delegation attempted to pressure allies to find an agreement on missile defense. In the final communiqué, all allies appeared to endorse the concept of a missile defense system on their own territory, acknowledging “the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defense assets.” The United States made this a high priority “legacy” objective, utilizing senior officials, including Vice President Cheney, to negotiate with the Poles in the hopes of guaranteeing a deal before the end of Bush’s term.

After the August 2008 war in Georgia, the shift in transatlantic debate allowed the United States to proceed rapidly with efforts to deploy an MD system. Poland was clearly concerned about resurgent Russian power and wanted a guarantee of American backing and a “special relationship.” The former top Polish missile defense negotiator, Witold Waszczykowski, suggested some months later that the delay in reaching an agreement was entirely political, and that Prime Minister Donald Tusk wanted to prevent President Lech Kaczynski from receiving any credit for the deal. Waszczykowski forcefully declared, “I got the impression that political interests were more important than the safety of the nation.” He was promptly fired.\textsuperscript{110} Key European allies had begun to warm to the idea of a system as long as it remained clearly limited in capability and non-nuclear in its makeup. In part, this also reflected growing European exasperation with Iran and their inability to slow the emerging Iranian nuclear program.

Some European states, and many American strategic analysts, charged that the system presented a regional bias, leaving some NATO states and associates – Turkey, Greece, and the Balkans in particular – unprotected against Iran because of their proximity to the rogue state.\textsuperscript{111} In several


\textsuperscript{110} Cf Deutsche Welle, “Polish Leader Fires Missile-Shield Negotiator With US,” 11 August 2008, \url{http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3555878,00.html}.

\textsuperscript{111} In 2007, Lt. General Henry Obering, head of the US Missile Defense Agency, officially confirmed the findings of a previous NATO report: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey would be among countries in Southeast Europe that would not be protected by the current plan.
respects, this provided a realistic view of risks; inequitable coverage would prove costly, not only for the NATO guarantee system, but also the delicate politics of integration within the European Union. Many officials, including the previous NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, found this distinction problematic, as it would de-facto separate NATO countries into “A-grade and B-grade” allies. The U.S. promised to provide closer-in theater missile defense systems, such as Patriot and potentially sea-based Aegis missiles, but by spring 2008, these plans had yet to be fleshed out, let alone implemented. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was among the most vocal actors, asserting that any missile defense system in Europe should be “seen as a task for the alliance collectively,” rather than strictly an American endeavor.

Echoing the divisive alliance debate over Iraq in 2002-2003, albeit at a lower level, the administration continued to define the system as a national project, relying on bilateral agreements with the Czech and Polish governments that would then be “presented” to NATO.

2. U.S.-Russia Relations

U.S.-Russian tensions are a core issue of missile defense discussions. A cooperative Russian-U.S. strategic partnership has remained in question throughout. Is it possible? Is it even desirable?

U.S.-Russian antagonism was present from the beginning, when Russia extended olive branches that would have provided Russian cooperation or involvement in a MD system in Europe from the first stages. In late spring 2007, in a meeting with Bush, Putin seemingly unexpectedly offered the use of the Russian-operated Gabala radar system, based in Azerbaijan, as a substitute for the Czech site. He also suggested the sustained deployment of Russian observers at the potential interceptor base in Poland. While the Pentagon tried to cast these moves as theater, Putin quickly followed up with a second offer, a more advanced radar site in Armavir, which would provide an unrivalled view of Iranian airspace from Russian territory. Meetings between secretaries Rice and Gates and their Russian counterparts in the fall of 2007 failed, however, to reach an agreement, with Rice insisting that the Russian bases serve as add-ons, not substitutes, to the Czech and Polish sites. Neither Poland nor the Czech Republic for their part welcomed the idea of having Russian military officials permanently stationed on their bases.

 bibliography

112 NATO; Bucharest Summit Declaration (3 April 2008); http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html.


115 A June 2008 CRS report notes that: “On June 7, 2007, in a surprise move during the G-8 meeting in Germany, Putin offered to partner with the United States on missile defense, and suggested that a Soviet era radar facility in Azerbaijan be used to help track and target hostile missiles that might be launched from the Middle East. President Bush responded by calling the proposal an “interesting suggestion,” and welcomed the apparent policy shift. The following day, Putin suggested that GMD interceptors be “placed in the south, in U.S. NATO allies such as Turkey, or even Iraq ... [or] on sea platforms.” Hildreth, Steven, “Long Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.

In informal interviews in 2008 and 2009, a number of Russians argued that the unilateral nature of U.S. decision-making about MD worried them most. The American potential for upgrading and re-orienting the system without Russian agreement, they asserted, poses the most direct threat to their national security, if now, then under future leadership. Some in Moscow expressed specific alarm at missile systems being placed close enough to the Russian border to permit the monitoring of Russian air space and to potentially target Russian missile silos, capabilities that were presumed to be achievable by Phase IV of the revised Obama plan. Russia also fears that the MD system will lead to American control over key defense capabilities (including Pershing anti-missile defenses, in addition to the interceptors) in areas it believes belong in its particular sphere of influence.

The actual extent of the future U.S. threat to Russian strategic missile bases was debatable; most American critics suggested that while the Bush proposed system could be expanded, it was not highly probable. Moscow’s continued, and increased, opposition to the potential MD system in Europe may also have backfired. A Russia that appears implacably opposed to a U.S. presence near its border, and that insists on maintaining its own sphere of influence, was not to be defined as a partner, but rather as a hostile factor at least in geopolitical terms. Russia’s military campaign in Georgia alarmed a number of former Soviet states and allies, who worried that recent Russian rhetoric may not be as hollow as the United States suggested. Of even greater concern was Russia’s demonstrated contempt for the West, as it ignored criticism and linked the “climbdown” from the U.S. “virtual project” in Georgia with Washington’s need for Russian agreement in its more ambitious global projects.

2. The Present

What took eight years of haggling, consternation, and acrimony to establish took just a few months to be scrapped. The Obama administration provided a mostly technical rationale for changes to the MD plan, asserting that the system as previously constituted was too expensive and largely unproven. In its place, Obama approved a new system that promised to be “smarter, stronger, and swifter,” and involved many more countries in its coverage and potentially more interceptors (100+). Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the new plan also relied more on existing technology. “We can now field initial elements of the system to protect our forces in Europe and our allies roughly six to seven years earlier than the original plan.”

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117 Povdig, Pavel, “Russia and Missile Defense in Eastern Europe,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2009. Also, author interviews for DARE project, Carnegie Corporation, that were affirmed in interviews in 2011 for the NTI project.

118 Seemingly responding to this alleged responsibility, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued its sternest warning days after the announcement of the Czech agreement, stating that if an MDE agreement was ratified, Russia would “be forced to react not with diplomatic, but with military-technical methods.” RIA Novosti, “Russia says U.S. Missile Shield in Europe Prompts Arms Race,” 20 August 2008.


plan that began in spring 2011, sea- and land-based versions of the Standard Missile-3 system were placed across Europe (mainly in the Mediterranean near Israel and Cyprus), “primarily as a precaution against possible short- and medium-range missiles launched from Iran,” now considered more likely than longer-ranger missiles. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense report raised the significance of the “regionally based systems” to a status almost co-equal to that of homeland defense and provided a fairly clear, technical perspective on the systems proposed and those under eventual consideration.

Discussions on MD cooperation have grown significantly over the past 18 months in depth and complexity. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO committed to seeking a cooperative solution to European missile defense (EMD), engaging NATO states and Russia in programs linked to the Obama Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which relies on land- and sea-based deployment of Aegis missiles and the Standard Missiles (SM1Block 1A) in the period up to 2015 (Phases 1 and 2), on the upgraded land-based Standard Missiles (SM3 Block 1B) after 2015 (Phase 3), and on the SM3 Block 2 from 2018-2020 (Phase 4). The United States is planning to finance the development of the SM3 interceptors and key radars; other nations will finance their own interceptors, and NATO will fund the common command and control system. An Aegis platform is already deployed in the Mediterranean, providing some reassurance for the states of southern Europe as well as Poland and Romania, which will host interceptors and radars. The EMD decision was negotiated carefully with Turkey, given some concerns in Ankara and elsewhere that Turkey might pursue nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear Iran, but also with an eye to potential deployments of radars and interceptors in Turkey as well.

At the outset, prospects for cooperation remained cloudy. Medvedev and the Russian military sought to posit a single integrated system with full-scale interoperability and constant oversight. Russia then suggested a somewhat murky “sectoral approach” that to critics and some in the Baltics seemed to accord Russia responsibilities for the defense of some NATO territory. Moscow appears to have almost abandoned this concept, given American opposition, but there are still occasional calls for this as a goal.

The United States and NATO have proposed two separate MD systems in Europe – one for NATO territory, the other for Russia – which will operate under national/alliance rules, but exchange crucial early warning data and signals. The linked radars and sensors would fuse data on threats as well as launches from rogue states, most especially, Iran. In bilateral negotiations and those in the NRC, NATO and the United States have suggested a range of other measures that would function as gradually intensifying confidence building measures. There could be an operational cooperation center or centers (not yet clearly financed or sited, although Moscow and Brussels have been mentioned) to fuse data for a common operating picture, to provide training, and to allow the alliance and Russian military officials to develop and practice cooperative procedures. The alliance’s goals are transparency and basic interoperability. This, it is argued,

123 Ibid.
125 See Collina, Arms Control Today, cited in fn. 101 above.
will give Russia both a greater sense of strategic “comfort” and insight into NATO plans and procedures without allowing it to limit the development of the NATO system or indeed the EPAA overall.

For Moscow, the goal still appears to involve the development of maximum inclusion and interoperability. But it also seeks formal guarantees – initially a presidential statement, later legally binding formulations – that the United States will in the future not use this program or develop expanded capabilities against Russia’s strategic capabilities.¹²⁶ There are also clear differences of opinion among three key Russian constituencies: the military, the non-military political bodies, and the Track-II semi-official players and think tanks. At the moment, the military seems to be playing the critical role; it is clearly focused on the potential negative impact for the global strategic balance of a successful American move to Phase 4, when the American interceptors stationed in Europe or deployed in the United States or perhaps Asia are designed to have intercontinental range. It is also still worried about the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike systems, particularly in a worst-case analysis focused on the stipulated need for larger numbers to support “major regional campaigns.”¹²⁷ In the military’s view, the EPAA deployments are just the opening stage in a campaign that future U.S. presidents may decide to change.

As of February 2012, the outcome of the negotiations is not yet clear. Regular consultations in Geneva, Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and elsewhere have continued but seem to be approaching total deadlock. Progress has been made on the science and technology sharing agreements that the United States argues must precede any data or technology sharing. The NRC is still planning to conduct a MD exercise in Germany in spring 2012 to which Russia is invited. But the domestic politics of preambles and statements on missile defense are in full bloom in both Washington and Moscow. The 2012 electoral campaigns in both Russia and the United States take precedence.

In my judgment and the judgment of those I’ve interviewed, progress in missile defense cooperation along parallel tracks between the US/NATO and Russia is a major determining factor in Russia’s willingness to consider further cooperative security arrangements.¹²⁸ It has become an essential litmus test and a practical indicator of whether missile defense cooperation might be an alternative to complex long-duration negotiations on strategic arms control. Stabilized by transparency and a comprehensive membership, missile defense need not be the provocative technology it is sometimes characterized as, especially if full transparency and rapid data exchange on a credible basis are emphasized from the first stages.

¹²⁶ This presumably would expand the 1994 Russian and American statements that they would not target one another’s strategic offensive forces and be in tune with the NATO promises in 1997 not to deploy significant combat capability or nuclear weapons on the territory of former Warsaw Pact states, the CEE.

¹²⁷ Interviews with Russian military officials and policy officials, April and May 2011.

¹²⁸ This argument is more fully developed in the missile defense portion of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative’s February 2012 report, which was presented to the 2012 Munich Security Conference. EASI; ‘Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
This level of cooperation will not occur overnight, however, or without significant political persuasion or leadership. Some American and European conservatives still fear that the Russians are not collaborators, and that the system should not involve their support. This was evident as many Republicans, with Senator Jon Kyl in the lead and with senator and former presidential candidate John McCain right behind him, expressing open dismay at the Obama administration’s insistence on changing the former Bush plans for the system.\(^{129}\) In April 2011, 39 Republican Senators sent a letter to the White House warning against giving the Russians a “veto” over American missile defense plans and expressing the opinion that sensitive data should not be shared with the Russians.\(^{130}\) Similar concerns over cooperation and data and technology continue be expressed by right-wing critics of the administration. To address this opposition, the president needs to articulate why an approach steeped in cooperative security principles will benefit American security interests.

The Russians, for their part, need to meet persistent domestic criticism of the Obama missile defense approach. Leading Russian politicians, Russian hardliners, and military officials all assert with dismaying regularity that by phase IV (2020) or even phase III (2018) of EPAA, the United States will have new capability close to Russian borders that can target Russian missiles before their launch. European deployments of a linked network of regional MD systems simply magnify the impact that American conventional superiority already provides. They argue that this will be true whatever new missile technologies Russia might employ.

### Terrorism and Proliferation

The loosely related policy objectives of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation demonstrate the strengths of cooperation in the transatlantic community and with Russia. Both policies are core foreign policy objectives for these governments, with considerable popular understanding and support. They also exemplify the evolution of cooperation, typifying a low-key, behind-the-scenes approach. The bulk of activity on these issues takes place at the bureaucratic, rather than the political, level. The only time that these programs get public attention is in the event of major successes, such as with the August 2006 arrests of individuals planning to blow up transatlantic airliners, or serious failures, such as the case of Umar Abdulmutallab, who smuggled concealed explosives aboard a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day of 2009. Little activity takes place in highly visible military arenas, and indeed military action is far behind options emphasizing agreements to cooperate among well-trained intelligence, police, gendarmerie, and coastguard units.\(^{131}\)

1. **Counter-terrorism**

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\(^{130}\) Letter to President Barack Obama, 14 April 2011.

\(^{131}\) The exceptions are in policy areas where Washington has viewed allied agreement as unachievable, as in its turning a blind eye to an Israeli military strike in 2007 against a supposed reactor built in Syria with North Korean help.
With more diffuse targets and more wide-ranging methods, counter-terrorism operations pose a greater challenge than nonproliferation practices. Though there is broad political agreement on the need for a coherent and effective counter-terrorism policy and on some of the methods to be used, there is a variation in its strategic prioritization – even among countries as closely aligned as EU member states – which can lead to systemic shortcomings and present unique policy problems. Establishing an effective cooperative security arrangement around counter-terrorism is likely to be difficult, but it is essential for tackling such a transnational security challenge.

After September 11, 2001, international counter-terrorist activity was been transformed in many ways. The Bush administration made the “War on Terror” the centerpiece of its foreign policy, tying many objectives to defeating terrorists. The public face of the “war” was the invasion first of Afghanistan and then of Iraq, but the more mundane worlds of intelligence gathering and analysis, police work, and data sharing were also given major overhauls. The United States pushed for, and obtained, agreements from a wide range of countries on defining terrorism and inaugurating specific cooperative actions to oppose it, including UN Security Council resolution 1373, which became the cornerstone of the international community’s concept of terrorism and modernized its anti-terrorist actions. Most states that supported the global anti-terrorism agenda were U.S. friends or allies but not all, as states suspicious of the United States also saw the reduction of risks to state and international stability as of primary priority.

In the years since the immediate responses to 9/11, counter-terrorism has evolved, as have terrorist threats. Additional attacks in the West – in Madrid and London, as well as the July 2011 massacre in Norway – and in Islamic nations – a long list that includes Indonesia, Turkey, Tunisia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia amongst many others – have revealed new terrorist strategies and brought home the importance of stopping them. The successes of the pervasive anti-terrorism strategy are harder to quantify – activities that have been prevented cannot be quantified. High-profile cases, such as the trial and conviction of a British gang that plotted to destroy transatlantic flights using liquid bombs, have given occasional insights into the nature of the battle being fought.

The first aspect that distinguishes counter-terrorism from other forms of international cooperation is the sheer range of countries involved. Individual mobility means a person raised in the UK can become radicalized in Pakistan before attempting an attack in the United States. Compounding this problem is the shortage of resources in some of the countries most troubled by terrorist activity. Governments in Somalia or Yemen have scant authority to act against groups operating within their borders even if they are inclined to do so or amenable to consistent U.S. pressure to police themselves. The United States recognizes the harmful potential of failed states and has proclaimed that rebuilding and developing states is vital to the national interest, preventing them from becoming safe harbors or recruitment spurs for terrorist organizations.

Even in the West, multiple policies and a diversity of strategies leads to coordination problems. Disputes over Afghanistan troop commitments or the future of Guantanamo inmates have made

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headlines, but other, subtler issues also cause concern, showing divides within Europe. As terrorism expert Dan Byman argued, “It is far easier for a terrorist to be European than for government to be European.”\textsuperscript{133} Individuals can move freely across borders, as can finance for terrorist activity. Until recently, police forces stop too often at national boundaries, and while information sharing in Europe is much improved, it is unlikely to have one responsible body at the EU level even under Lisbon. Groups can also distribute their networks to complement the variation in policy – propaganda websites will be based in countries with liberal free-speech laws, while bank accounts will be held, if at all, where privacy laws are tougher and financial oversight is looser. Increasingly, terrorist groups have turned to informal banking networks, precious goods exchanges, or even smuggling as ways to transfer funds undetected.

As nations struggle to balance civil liberties with increased security, terrorist groups will seek to take advantage of the discrepancies. Policy variation manifests in other ways – the levels of integration and wealth of Islamic communities varies widely between the United States and Europe, with European Muslims on average poorer, less trustful of their government, and more concentrated in ethnic communities that have not integrated within the wider state. Assimilation is for many not a desired option. The majority population is similarly uninterested or even actively hostile.

Though such variation in policy may cause anguish for anti-terrorism experts, it is impossible to agree on who has it right. After all, there is more under consideration than simply stopping these attacks, and the tensions between personal freedom and national security have been cast in sharp relief following some of the actions taken by governments as part of the War on Terror. Since determining a perfect and universal policy is impractical, policymakers must instead focus their attention on ensuring compatibility with other states’ systems, and ensuring that they interoperate to the greatest possible degree. Such was the emphasis on terrorism in foreign policy over the past decade that a multitude of different international institutional arrangements have proliferated.

Within Europe, this has meant a greater role for the EU, through the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Office of the CTC has been strengthened as the “pillars” system that characterized post-Maastricht Europe is eliminated, in the process ending the “policy silos” it created between foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs policy. The “Stockholm Program” is the EU initiative for developing an area of “freedom, security, and justice,” addressing collective challenges including terrorism at a Europe-wide level. However, the Lisbon era is still taking shape, and it is yet to be determined how the institutional roles will shake out. The EU has broken its strategy down to four principal components:\textsuperscript{134}

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1. **Prevent** – The first part of the strategy aims at preventing radicalization and recruitment. Different member states have led different components; Spain for example, is leading an imam-outreach activity while Denmark heads de-radicalization efforts.

2. **Protect** – This part focuses more on conventional security concerns. Improving the security of external borders was a major feature of the plan, since the Schengen Agreement allows for free movement between member states. Attention is also being paid to cyber-security, securing transport networks, and ensuring explosives stocks are adequately protected.

3. **Pursue** – The third part focuses on traditional police functions. Data sharing is re-emphasized, while Europol is given a boosted institutional identity by being incorporated into EU structures. Efforts are also underway to find accommodations for the different criminal codes across the continent.

4. **Response** – The final part attends to managing and minimizing the consequences of an attack. Crisis response exercises promote best practice. The EU has channeled funding to victim support organizations throughout its member states.

The EU has used its foreign affairs apparatus to widen bilateral and multilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism with the United States, the countries of South Asia, the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa, India, Turkey, and Russia. Emphasizing the role of foreign policy, development, and security undoubtedly has merit as a preventative counter-terrorism strategy. However, cooperating on foreign policy has proven problematic in the past; national voices remain loud, and frequently out of harmony. The broader and still unresolved challenge of creating a European foreign policy has direct implications for the counter-terrorism aspects of that program.

The G8, with strong Russian support, also has new prominence in this area, establishing the Counter-terrorism Action Group (CTAG) at the 2003 summit in Evian, France. It aimed to enhance global counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance and coordination activities and to reduce duplication of effort. It invited non-G8 regulars Spain, Australia, and Switzerland to cooperate in its mechanisms. CTAG was particularly successful in measures to counter the financing of terrorism, but stalled when attempting to broaden its involvement beyond that aspect. A lack of consistency due to rotating leadership and no permanent secretariat has combined with U.S. and British reticence to rely on using G8 capabilities. Ultimately this has reduced the appeal of the organization for other members as a focus for their CT efforts.

The Center on Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation was more upbeat in its assessment of Japan’s 2009 CTAG presidency, but still found much room for improvement, advocating a more holistic response than focusing on law enforcement and security measures. The G8 also set up the “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,”

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channeling $10 billion-$20 billion from 2002-2012 to stop the spread of WMD. However, it too struggled to overcome constrained funding and a narrow focus.\textsuperscript{136}

Unfortunately, the G8 grouping suffers because of its limited membership, as well as some of the troubles inherent in expanding other loose cooperative security arrangements. It is still possible to gather resources at that level, although many wealthy counter-terrorism donor countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are excluded. Target countries, however, are also not involved in the decision making process, and their perspectives are rarely taken into account. By expanding its membership, the CTAG could address some of these problems, but at the same time would lose the cohesion and standing it gets from being a G8 body; in a G8+ form, it would become just another coalition of concerned nations.

The CTAG was formed in part in response to dissatisfaction with the far broader UN Counter Terrorism Committee (also usually abbreviated CTC – for clarity hereafter UNCTC). That committee was established to aid implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373 took the unprecedented step of mandating counter-terrorism action by all UN countries, “such as the criminalization of both terrorism and its financing…[It] recommends a wide series of measures in terms of international co-operation against terrorism, ranging from collaboration between police and intelligence services to that between judiciaries, while at the same time asking for the signing and ratification of the international instruments against terrorism that have been approved by the General Assembly.”\textsuperscript{137}

A subsequent resolution, Security Council Resolution 1540, obliged states to refrain from “supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems” and established the “1540 Committee” as a standing body to oversee it.\textsuperscript{138} The list of terrorism-related resolutions is lengthy (see Rupérez for a complete roster), but the impact of this abundance of legislating has been mixed.

Attempts to agree on a universal definition of terrorism or to organize the oft-delayed Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism have foundered; too many states are still willing to encourage and finance terrorist activity and do not wish to see this curtailed. Other nations simply do not have the resources to commit to an energetic anti-terror campaign, needing to focus on more basic functions to improve living standards for their people. Given the scope of cultural, political and economic differences that exist between UN members, more so than any other, less comprehensive, international body, it is perhaps unsurprising that some leading countries in the counter-terrorism sphere have chosen to focus their attention on more tightly knit, smaller membership bodies and bilateral agreements. UN operations, though marked with strident rhetoric in the aftermath of a major attack, can descend into repetitive bureaucratization

\textsuperscript{136} Its work has largely been conducted in avoiding proliferation in the former Soviet Union, with other recipient nations being neglected.

\textsuperscript{137} Rupérez, Javier, “The UN’s Fight Against Terrorism: Five Years After 9/11,” Real Instituto Alcano, Madrid, Spain, 6 September 2006, \url{http://www.un.org/terrorismruperez-article.html}.

\textsuperscript{138} United Nations, “1540 Committee,” \url{http://www.un.org/sc/1540/}. 
and lose the content and impact they intend. The creation of standing committees to oversee implementation has not solved this tendency.\textsuperscript{139}

Another challenge to counter-terrorism cooperation is what the EU CTC calls “CT fatigue”: with several years having passed since the most severe attacks on the West, in New York and Washington, London and Madrid, and with other events having threatened people’s livelihoods in other ways – the financial crisis, for instance – publics and politicians alike have less time for counter-terrorism work. The CTC’s advice for dealing with this is to avoid overly repressive policy options, and to avoid spurts of activity in response to major attacks, and instead establish a realistic pace for strategies to unfold.\textsuperscript{140} The challenge with this approach is prevention: Can the CTC effectively prevent future terrorist attacks if it is not making counter-terrorism a constant priority?

Cooperation on stopping the financing of terror groups (anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism finance or AML/CTF) has consistently shown better results. Key institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, and the Financial Action Task Force – have demonstrated a “high level of informal cooperation,” according to the Center on Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation.\textsuperscript{141} Those organizations’ work on “setting standards, conducting needs assessments, and helping build the capacity of countries through technical assistance and training programs” garnered particular praise.\textsuperscript{142} Nevertheless, on-going turf battles between U.S. agencies and overlapping work on the international stage mean more can still be achieved.

Beyond the institutional programs, bilateral counter-terrorism agreements exist between the United States and many other countries. Few countries other than the United States have sought out such agreements, so the bilateral model more closely resembles a hub-and-spoke arrangement with the United States at its center, than a network with multiple links.

U.S.-Russian collaboration was among the strongest and certainly the most public of bilateral links during the Bush era. Over the course of the subsequent decade, though, that united front dissipated amid other disputes between the countries, many of which are discussed elsewhere in this paper.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President Putin was the first foreign leader to speak to President Bush. In the week that followed, Putin pledged Russian resources and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. As attention turned to Afghanistan, Russia saw the advantages of cooperation. After all, it had been supporting Northern Alliance fighters against the Taliban since the mid-90s,

\textsuperscript{139} Rupérez; op cit.
fearful that after the debacle of its own occupation of the country, the Taliban would nurture and train Islamist insurgencies in Central Asia, including Chechnya and some of the newly independent “stans.” An intergovernmental working group, the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan, which had been established at a 2000 Clinton-Putin, quickly found the scope and importance of its activities expanded as war with Afghanistan became inevitable. The group was rebranded as the Working Group on Counter-terrorism in 2002 and directed cooperation focusing on regions, such as the Caucasus, and issues, such as WMD terrorism. The forum provided another channel for communication between the two countries, although Beene et al. find that it had a limited impact, mainly serving “to cushion the blow from U.S. initiatives that might otherwise engender a more vitriolic response from Russia.”

Russia saw other advantages in a closer alliance with the West on terrorism. Its ongoing war in Chechnya was recast as a battle against Islamist extremism, lending it a veneer of international acceptability that had previous been lacking. The Bush administration was willing to turn a blind eye to the re-escalation of that conflict, which had previously generated considerable international criticism, including from the U.S. government. That was one of several incidents (the bungled Russian police raid on a hostage-taking incident at a Moscow theater in October 2002, and the spate of assassinations throughout Russia’s want-away southern provinces being others) that highlighted one of the major concerns with the brand of cooperation Bush and Putin had chosen to operate. When used as cover for government crackdowns, no matter how tangentially related to the counter-terrorism objective, the entire counter-terrorism strategy could be delegitimized. The United States faced its own loss of core legitimacy with later acts, including the invasion of Iraq, the torture scenarios from Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo, the agreements on extraordinary rendition, and the often-sloppy watch lists of “terrorist” individuals and organizations. But it also suffered a diplomatic backlash against the acts committed by other countries in the name of its strategy.

Bilateral arrangements also are seen to have more direct, immediate operational benefits. Cooperation between France and the United States has reached new heights since 9/11, with intelligence sharing being the leading operational benefit. France’s elite counter-terrorism forces (heralded as “the most effective in the world” by as unlikely a source as the conservative American Enterprise Institute) have been able to give U.S. analysts a better insight into Islamist threats emanating from the Maghreb and the Middle East. Despite the bitter acrimony over the Iraq war, lower-level interactions between intelligence officials proceeded apace – it was not by chance that the CIA and FBI headquartered their European counterterrorist liaison in Paris. French investigators – under fewer legal constraints than their U.S. counterparts even after the enactment of the Patriot Act – have greater capacity for sweeping and intrusive surveillance. In the form of the juges d’instruction system, powers are also combined, assigned to powerful

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individuals given abilities of prevention, deterrence, and punishment. Cooperating in this way allows countries to make the best of other nations’ laws, taking advantage of the differences between jurisdictions to get the best out of all systems.

2. Nonproliferation

Nuclear nonproliferation, originally a more expansive strategic priority, has become emblematic of counter-terrorism. The largest fear for global security is not that a rogue state will possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but rather that a terrorist organization will. Thus, cultivating a responsible, cooperative approach to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and keeping them out of terrorist hands has become a central priority.

The Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) may be the most expansive implementation of this approach. Coordination and a diffuse cooperative system of intelligence sharing and action were primary features of PSI. It is not a formal system, but rather, a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Obama team seems willing, at least for now, to continue this “coalition of the willing” approach and to give precedence to intra-team transparency and progressive ad hoc agreements on case-specific actions over formal institutionalization and bureaucratic rule-making. This approach gives credence and credibility to Obama’s overall approach of cooperative security in counter-terrorism: cooperation is needed, but on a case-by-case basis, rather than in broad strokes.

PSI reflects a broad transatlantic consensus on both principle and operations. Its goal is to stop the transport, at sea, of materials and components that facilitate WMD proliferation. Even though PSI has no formal treaty, the majority of the NATO allies and littoral Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries are public adherents or unannounced supporters. A number have taken leadership roles in some of the more public exercises or actual incidences – Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Poland, and the UK, in addition to the United States. The United States has been most active in pushing this non-institutionalized, non-treaty based activity to its limits. It has signed agreements with all of the flagging (registry) states to ease boarding inspections on the high seas, away from territorial waters. It has pushed new technologies and techniques, often in conjunction with domestic Department of Homeland Security programs. It has pushed for increasing transparency and common operational pictures, to ensure timely interdiction and the “creative” use of national regulations to ensnare cargoes and ships (the “broken headlight” scenario, where lesser violations are used to justify searches that may turn up evidence of serious proliferation activity). In the Bush doctrine, the need for continuous real-time surveillance

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146 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Launched by President Bush on May 31, 2003, U.S. involvement in the PSI stems from the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. That strategy recognizes the need for more robust tools to stop proliferation of WMD around the world, and specifically identifies interdiction as an area where greater focus will be placed. Today, more than 90 countries around the world support the PSI. Cf State Department; ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’; Washington DC; 2009; http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.
trumped many established rights including the right of privacy of communication and the usual evidentiary requirements. Where this national security need collided with the U.S. constitution, the tasks were simply outsourced to willing partners in position to act.

As Andrew Winner explains, “At its core, the PSI is a coalition of the willing with the potential for participants to vary the degrees of their commitment and participation.” At the deep end of commitment, countries have signed up to the terms of a brief “Statement of Interdiction Principles,” with other countries agreeing to decreasing circles of commitment. Russia, but not China, have publicly agreed to support the PSI.

Yet, the initiative has its problems. The Congressional Research Service found the levels of involvement of most of the 70 countries that “support” the PSI to be “unclear.” There is no “organization,” in any conventional sense. It has no secretariat, no headquarters, and no annual dedicated budget. The Statement of Principles lacks the enforcement rules, or indeed any specified obligations, that are characteristic of “normal” treaties. Still, it is more developed than being a set of bilateral agreements between the United States and partners. Without these formalities, and with the secretive nature of the work carried out under PSI, it is also hard to assess the success of the program.

With continued support from the Obama administration, PSI seems to be succeeding. The use of bilateral agreements allows American partners to act in circumstances where the United States cannot, such as boarding ships in international waters and searching for weapons. It also provides a certain level of cohesion; the PSI is a network of bilateral agreements, providing the interdependence necessary for an effective cooperative security arrangement. There are hubs and spokes, but the spokes connect. In essence, it is effective because each participating state recognizes that it is in its interest to act cooperatively.

The main lesson to be drawn from counter-terrorism cooperation is to “look at the work, not at the headlines.” States are engaged in extensive cooperation at multiple levels, and through different institutional frameworks. At times, this abundance of work leads to overlap, redundancy, or waste. At others, it most closely resembles a “coalition of the willing,” when the participation of the unwilling is most critical. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Iraq have all claimed more capabilities than are easily at hand and have produced a series of dramatic failures resulting in lost lives and status. And the 2011 capture of Osama bin Laden, only miles from an elite Pakistani military school speaks for itself.

Yet considering that many of the processes for conducting counter-terrorism cooperation have been around for less than a decade, the overall performance must be considered reasonably


positive. The final judgment will still be whether cooperation prevents more attacks than would be expected through national efforts alone. Some hair’s-breadth escapes in 2009 (the attack on the Milanese barracks, the arrest of a scientist at CERN, the failure of the Christmas Day bomb plot) make it clear that there is no room for complacency.\textsuperscript{150} The investigations into the latter attempt have uncovered failures in information-sharing, but as always, vague connections appear much clearer in hindsight than before an event.

Traditional elements of cooperative security are increasingly part of the international counter-terrorism strategy. Indiana Senator Richard Lugar, as well as a number of administration figures, have repeatedly proposed extending and expanding the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative (CTR, or as more popularly named, the Nunn-Lugar Program) to encompass new geographical areas, as well as new types of activities.\textsuperscript{151} As part of this shift, Russia and Europe would need to adopt a more active and expanded role as participants, monitors, funders, regulators, and governors. This expanded initiative’s goal would be to build on Nunn-Lugar programs and create a worldwide monitoring and oversight capability that is perhaps governed by a coalition of the willing, but ultimately anchored by these three poles.

This proposal has many backers and a number of true admirers. CTR is viewed as one of the major successes of the post-Cold War era, and has been an interesting and rich source of cooperative work, continuing complex interactions at the individual level, and occasionally a test-bed for policy ideas and experiments. The initiative has bloomed and expanded, and has created several political and diplomatic, if not military and scientific breakthroughs. As with the CFE Treaty, the inspection and verification experience has led to unexpected insights and generated substantial data about the effects and consequences of the verification choices that have increasingly replaced the ideologies of the past. Some in Congress view the program as too favorable to the Russians; the CTR program twice almost did not receive congressional approval or funding. Indeed, there are a number of striking examples of how bureaucracies, when determined, can and did thwart implementation of programs (e.g. the long U.S.-EU stalemate over funding the Science Centers, the “surplus” facilities that were constructed and never used, and questions of espionage and inadequate political oversight).

Yet, the program is relatively inexpensive given its results, which can be generalized on several different levels. It is an instrument in hand, waiting for resources and leadership. As it moves forward, its principal emphasis should be on the cooperative activities themselves and the demonstration – regular, public, and well organized – of what its results mean for domestic constituencies.

**Energy Security**


\textsuperscript{151} Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Program; op. cit. See earlier discussion of origins of Nunn-Lugar in cooperative security concepts, p.xxx.
All of the recent controversies surrounding energy issues, especially natural gas distribution in Europe, suggest that ensuring energy security should be a natural venue for cooperative solutions. Europe’s balance of power, however, has made it difficult to identify widely accepted solutions or even to find suitable methods of working together. The impulse to securitize energy supply in politics, east to west, is strong given the persistence of distribution networks largely built first during the Cold War. The absence of short-term, market-driven solutions makes a cooperative intergovernmental arrangement the next best option to achieve a more stable outcome with serious concern for the differing equities of consumers, suppliers, and transit countries. Such a set up could regularize contacts and information exchanges on energy concerns, lead to the establishment of a mutually acceptable and impartial dispute-settlement mechanism, and help pave the way for the modernization of both infrastructure and market structures.

The likelihood of this outcome appears slim, however. While there have been some improvement after the energy supply shocks of the decade of the 21st century, the energy relationships between Europe and Russia still show strain and short-term turbulence. Russia’s energy wealth has been key to its economic revitalization and its ability to reassert power in the region. Indeed, Russia supplies 31 percent of the natural gas consumed in the EU, and this figure is projected to rise to 50-60 percent within the next two decades. EU countries also meet a quarter of their oil needs and a third of their uranium needs with Russian imports, although these markets are characterized by greater international competition than the natural gas sector. Rising European demand for gas, driven by both economic growth and a desire to switch away from more carbon-intensive sources of electricity generation (predominantly coal), put ever-greater pressures on these energy relationships. This level of dependency gives Russia substantial leverage and has led to considerable unease among European policymakers. Several developments – the most problematic being the gas-supply shutoffs that have become a staple of European winters over the last decade, Russia’s hostility toward Western companies operating “its” resources, and Russia’s ravenous accumulation of downstream assets across the continent – have led to calls for a less confrontational way of doing business.

1. **The Energy Charter Treaty: Demise by Negotiation**

It is not for lack of cooperative designs in this area. As far back as 1991, Europeans attempted to tighten cooperation in this area. The Energy Charter (which led, in 1994, to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)) laid out principles that were intended to guide countries’ policies and establish a code of conduct. The ECT’s initial intent was the integration of former Soviet and Eastern European countries’ energy sectors into the broader European market following the end of the Cold War. Its objectives fall into four areas: protecting foreign investments; establishing non-discriminatory conditions for trading energy products; environmental and energy efficiency

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measures; and a dispute resolution system. These amount to an approximate trade of Western finance and technology for eastern oil and gas.

Its early days were marked by positive rhetoric – of “a new paradigm for trade in energy.”\textsuperscript{153} With the former Soviet republics collapsed and desperate, and with Russia at its lowest historical ebb, the desire to incentivize investment in the lucrative but run-down energy resource sectors was abundant. Western Europe, meanwhile, was eager to diversify its oil supply base away from the Middle East, and to begin the process of stabilizing and acculturating its eastern neighbors to the post-Cold War world. These reciprocal interests provided a strong basis for energy cooperation within the region.

The role of Russia – the biggest energy supplier in the region and the catalyst for any truly effective energy cooperation – has so far been the biggest obstacle facing the ECT. Although President Yeltsin supported the treaty and its objectives, many nationalist hardliners in the Russian parliament objected to it, decrying it as “a ploy of the West...to exploit and control Russia.”\textsuperscript{154} Ratification was delayed for several years before Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency, at which point support for ratification from the Kremlin was withdrawn.

The period of Yeltsin’s leadership saw the Russian economy suffer a series of travails, with its currency devalued, its people impoverished and starving, and its industries in severe decline. When Putin became president, revitalizing the economy and the nation was his primary objective. Energy presented the means by which that would be accomplished. Utilizing the monopoly power inherent in the gas pipeline networks, consolidating that power in Gazprom, and firmly tying Kremlin policy to Gazprom action, Putin rejected the “quid pro quo” implicit in the ECT structure. Western investment would bring nothing Russia could not provide for herself, and would take the proceeds of Russia’s resource bounty away from her people. Putin’s nationalistic alternative would use oil and gas money to pay for public services, modernization and investment. Gazprom was the revenue stream that made this possible.

In 2000, work began on an addition to the ECT, known as the Transit Protocol. The objective of the Protocol was to make access to transit pipelines non-discriminatory – accessible equally by all firms, foreign and domestic, at fair prices. Though appealing in an EU context, where unbundling and market liberalization were still a key focus of policymaking, to Russia the Transit Protocol was a disaster. In a stroke, it would obliterate Gazprom’s monopoly, its rent source, and with it, the source of so much of the government’s income. If Putin disliked the ECT before, now it became untenable. Russia has since shown no indication of an interest in the ECT. There is no reason to assume the ECT or anything close to it will be brought back to life in Putin’s second period as Russian president.\textsuperscript{155}


\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155} See Martin Wulf’s column in the February 21, 2012 Financial Times “Prepare for the Golden Age of Gas.” Wulf cites these tensions for the primary reason that European supplies will not benefit proportionately from the new gas economy allowed by shale gas. Accessed at www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7d298f50-5e85-11e1-8ff1-00144. There is also at least a short-term loss of
The controversy surrounding the Protocol made it clear that decisions within the signatory nations were no longer being made cooperatively, with agreement from all involved parties (if indeed they ever were). In other words, the cooperative movement that existed in 2000 was smaller than its 1991 version, with arguably more closely aligned values, but without the breadth of membership to be useful to resolve conflict and confrontation in the energy sector.

- Signatories to the Energy Charter Treaty (green) and observers (blue). Russia and Norway signed but did not ratify.

- Source: Energy Charter Secretariat

The international energy community features other international organizations, though neither of the most prominent could reasonably be described as cooperative in constitution or intent. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) looks out for the interests of oil producers. The International Energy Agency (IEA) was established in an attempt to counter OPEC’s influence by coordinating the policies of the “consumers” – the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In the 1970s – a decade of oil shocks, embargoes, and hours-long gas lines – the relationship between the two bodies was entirely and deliberately confrontational. OPEC – in part trying to maximize the economic returns on its resources, and in part trying to punish the West for broader foreign policy reasons, especially Western support for Israel – had little interest in compromise. The relationship between the organizations has fortunately avoided returning to this type of competition, as

confidence in the easy access to Polish shale gas, given the number of “empites” that drilling in the fall of 2011 and winter 2012 have produced. Interview comments, January 2012.
OPEC’s influence has been steadily diminished by infighting and changed market conditions. NATO has dallied with the idea of encouraging energy cooperation but been hampered by the view of many, especially in Europe, that this would only lead to greater “securitization.”

In the commercial world, these changed market conditions mean more for cooperation than any number of institutional contrivances. As oil moved from being mainly traded on long-term fixed contracts to a spot market, the politicization of the business decreased. The continuing difficulties in Europe’s gas market derive, at least in part, from the inability of the gas industry, dependent as it is on pipelines and long-term contracts, to move to a more flexible structure. Increasing their reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) is one longer-term method that European consumers could employ to reduce their dependence on the political whims of a handful of critical suppliers. The shale gas alternative (the “tsunami” in the word of Daniel Yergin) that has significantly expanded the global market and lowered unit prices faces major barriers because of its damage to the environment and uncertain production potential in the two major locations, Poland and France.

2. **Where next for energy cooperation?**

Cooperative approaches are only likely to yield successful outcomes if there is some compatible interest that joins the parties involved. The Eurasian energy sector, of late, has not shown much in the way of mutual understanding, and has at times appeared riven with competition even among members of the EU. However, a few basic interests underlie the actions of supplier, transit, and consumer countries alike, around which a cooperative arrangement could coalesce.

Energy (predominantly gas) supply cutoffs have become a staple of European winters. Gas supplies to Ukraine were cut in January 2006, March 2008, and January 2009, while oil supplies to Belarus were stopped in January 2007. Repeat closures of Belarusian supply lines in summer 2010 were resolved more rapidly and caused little disruption downstream at a time of low consumption.

Shutoffs and short-time disruption of east-to-west supply of gas have a widespread and painful impact, as recently as in the winter of 2012. When supplies to Ukraine are cut, gas ostensibly intended for EU customers is still put into Ukrainian pipeline systems for transit. However, facing domestic shortfalls, the Ukrainian gas supply company has on numerous occasions topped up its own supplies from the volumes intended for more Westerly customers, shrinking the amounts sent on. This practice reduces the volumes of fuel that reach CEE nations, such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Short on fuel, high-consuming industrial users have been forced to close, shutting thousands out of work, while citizens face winter conditions in their homes. Ukraine has suffered tremendously from these cutoffs, both in terms of the damage to its domestic customers, and the damage done to its reputation as a reliable transit source. Recent Ukrainian political leaders are more attuned to making Russia-friendly deals and to implementing stricter measures against theft and diversion. But this has also meant higher fuel

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prices at a time of fiscal shortfalls and lower prospects for the prosperity that independence seemed to offer. And because there is no available mechanism to resolve or even illuminate the cause for this turbulence, suspicions of manipulation and malfeasance abound.\footnote{See Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, “Ukraine and Russia: Another Gas War?” Q&A, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 21, 2012. This is despite the successful EU-Russian agreement on, and use of, an early warning alert system devised in 2008 and 2009.}

Europe is looking closely at alternative supply routes, with Nordstream, a pipeline through the Baltic already under joint Russian-German patronage now open, and a pair of proposals for routes through Turkey on the drawing board (Nabucco and Sudstream) that would reduce the leverage Poland and Ukraine have sometimes exercised, and the transit fees they can charge. The northern route also reduces the transit fees that have sustained Baltic energy purchases and Polish influence over the trade volume.

Though Russia is usually portrayed as a calculating, Machiavellian schemer, who uses shutoffs to pressure neighbors like Ukraine and Belarus and to gouge higher prices out of Western consumers, it has much to lose from the repeated use of these tactics. It faces the prospect of future competition. If it can resolve its funding difficulties, the Nabucco pipeline (officially favored by the EU and informally by the US) may in time offer not only a new transit route, but also potentially new supply sources for fuel, hooking Europe up to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and undermining Russia’s monopoly position. Russia is also not paid when gas is not sold. For a country as dependent on energy sales as Russia, low sales or increasing domestic demand for a week as was true in the January 2012 cold snap can be troubling for major state budgetary items. Finally, Russian usual domestic demand for energy has increased exponentially, along with a popular unwillingness to sacrifice personal prosperity and comfort for state purposes.\footnote{This in itself is perhaps even stronger element in recent political unrest than the unwillingness demonstrated by the reaction of the Russian middle class to election fraud engineered by United Russia in early 2012.}

Europe’s energy interests are converging on other fronts as well. The Energy Charter Treaty and the many Russian alternatives suggested are all dead, held up at their core by questions about the strategic role of Gazprom in the Russian state. But the financial crisis has focused minds enormously and until recently, much of the explosive rhetoric has been underplayed or replaced with new talk of cooperation and “communities of fate.” With Russian firms (Gazprom, in particular) looking to make investments in downstream assets in the EU, the potential for a symmetric exchange of strategic interests may be viable. Such a plan would require a level of unity not previously displayed by EU members, as they would need to avoid undercutting each other in exchange for supply contracts and stand firm for a more equitable deal.

This point gets to the heart of the difficulty in arranging a wide-reaching, cooperative energy security system among suppliers, transit countries, and customers in Europe and Eurasia. Attempts to assemble a coordinated policy between members of the European Union – a group of countries with ostensibly compatible values and interests – have been underwhelming. EU nations have only formed a semblance of a common energy policy, one that is riddled with inconsistencies. Internal market liberalization – long the sole focus of the European
Commission’s efforts at consolidation – remains largely unfulfilled, despite a gamut of directives and outright threats from the competition commissioner. Agreement was finally reached in early 2009 on the need for a joint external policy, with the Parliament passing the recommendations of the 2008 Second Strategic Review (SSR) on energy policy. It is too early, even in 2012, to tell what, if any, impact this new policy will have, as much of its focus is long-term, and implementation moves slowly. On paper, it addresses the concerns about Europe’s previous failure to “speak with one voice” on energy matters. However, different member states have different approaches to and different demands of the relationship with Moscow, and the policy does not clarify with whose voice Europe speaks. If and when the EU countries decide what it is they agree on, they can work with Russia with a clear sense of what their objectives and priorities are, and what they cannot tolerate.

This paper does not attempt to determine the precise outline or outcome of a cooperative arrangement. Russian and European parties must determine their shared interests, especially those that are not immediately apparent in the absence of talks and transparent motives. Given the dismal state of energy diplomacy and its failures in winters past, any outcome will be better than the ad hoc firefighting currently being attempted. However, to be successful, a cooperative energy regime should have certain characteristics. Given the emphasis on improving the information available to both parties, transparency should be the focal point. Transparency in action is critical for mutual reassurance – to let both parties know that their counterparts are negotiating honestly and delivering on their promises. Transparency of motives is also important, as it will help diplomats on both sides figure out what policies the traffic will bear.

There have been some cooperative start-ups across the energy sector already; these need to be expanded and deepened to allow the building of mutual trust, and confidence against sudden change or political mandates. As recently catalogued, there is a wide range of opportunities:

- Exploration of steps needed to permit synchronous interconnections for electricity trades,
- Nuclear power safety projects and “energy bridges” to compare best practices,
- Renewed, self-correcting infrastructure cooperation, across pipelines, high-voltage lines, underground gas storage, LNG terminals, and liquefaction plants,
- Cooperation and transparency in methods and models to improve simulation, prediction and control of supply and demand.

Other mechanisms can provide similar reassurance to members of a cooperative forum – including stand-alone forums; those subsumed under a broader Eurasian forum; or even groupings pursued in public pronouncements and interlocking bilateral arrangements. For

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instance, veto provisions will keep the pace of negotiations from exceeding what any participant is willing to stomach, and avoid the “railroading” of the preferred policies of big players against the wishes of smaller nations.

It is clear that there may soon be another test of the ability of Europe, Russia, and the United States to design cooperative, persistent, and peaceful sharing solutions. In the view of several observers, the Arctic under climate change could become the next tempting location for energy exploration. It could be both a challenge and an opportunity simultaneously. And there are in place weak but reinforceable institutions to foster and develop cooperative solutions. There must be attention to the competing market structures involved, and the need to find ways not just to harmonize but to foster the identification of converging national interests, toward sharing both risk and benefit in the energy area as in other domains.

The discourse surrounding energy policy, particularly in Europe, increasingly resembles that of arms control. Talk of the use of “the energy weapon,” of MAD (in this instance “mutually assured dependence”), and of the balance of power exemplifies the trend. Energy cutoffs are the big threat, the surprise attack, in this way of thinking. And the methods that were brought to bear to reduce tensions in the nuclear weapons sphere are appropriate for Europe’s increasingly fractious energy relations. Cooperative methods, reasonably applied to willing participants, could yield positive results. Even if the outcomes are not optimal, the process of dialogue can help ease tensions and increase mutual understanding. Both Europe and Russia should make a commitment to keep talking, with the United States taking a far more active supporting role than simply holding everyone’s coat. After all, that is better than the alternative.

V. Future Prospects and Recommendations

Reviewing the excitable tone of some of the early cooperative security literature, it is understandable why some have become disenchanted with the concept. Sold, in some quarters, as the definitive and relatively easy post-Cold War security structure, as the ideal way to manage relations between a multitude of nations and regional groupings of varying size and power, it could never have lived up to expectations. Neither it, nor anything else, could solve all the world’s problems by itself. However, just because it may have been advertised overeagerly does not mean that its applications to date have failed, nor does it leave CS absent a role to play in the future.

This paper has looked at five different security challenges and the role CS can play in managing them. CS cannot solve them all, but it arguably has a significant part to play in helping manage

161 Ibid, pp 4-5, and 11-12 for specific recommendations for immediate actions.

162 These would include at a minimum the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Development framework, and the support organizations for UNCLOS.

the risks inherent to them all, in allocating tasks among nations committed to tackling the problems, and in coordinating activity throughout the international community.

At its core, the idea of CS is to create stakeholders who despite differences and perhaps reasons for suspicion recognize common or convergent interest in behaving differently toward each other to achieve a share-able gain. Broadening the range of countries who are both concerned about a particular issue and prepared to engage in some action to prevent, mitigate, or resolve it, increases the likelihood of a successful outcome. By linking intentions, countries tend toward closer collaboration on actions. By acting jointly, countries align their objectives. By acting transparently, states set the conditions for both stability (back to “no surprises”) and set precedents for similar acts in other areas.

This paper has shown that the merits of cooperative security can be applied to a wide range of problems. It has made recommendations specific to each of these problems in the relevant sections. These recommendations fall into several themes, which are recounted here:

- **Information sharing** – Across the board, increasing information sharing and overall transparency are the simplest means of achieving an improved cooperative security environment. In some cases, such as counter-terrorism, it is the only way that the widespread and varied efforts to tackle the problem can gain any sense of coherence. It avoids unnecessary duplication of efforts, while at the same time allowing international partnerships to identify unfilled gaps. In some areas, particularly those accustomed to operating at the highest levels of official secrecy (parts of the military and the nuclear complex are two examples that spring to mind), a cultural resistance to information sharing can be expected. It is in these areas that high-level leadership ought to apply pressure to the bureaucracies, proving the importance of information sharing at the strategic level.

  Proposed applications include, for instance, arrangements to rapidly share intelligence on “homeland defense” paramilitaries in disputed territories in Eastern Europe, or on terrorist activity in Europe and the Middle East. Information sharing is one of the routes to resolving the dispute over missile defense, ensuring that Russian- and American-gathered data and resources from radar installations allows for the greatest protection against nuclear attack from any rogue states. Implementing the data-exchange mechanisms between Moscow, Brussels, and Washington is an obvious first step.

  NATO’s “Smart Defense” initiative, announced by Secretary General Rasmussen in February 2012, could spur cooperative efforts. The concept seeks to allow NATO partners to “do more with less” by encouraging the “pooling and sharing of resources,” setting shared priorities, and coordinating efforts. Transparency and accountability are obviously key. Defense Ministers from several NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Czech Republic, have spoken positively about the idea.

- **Development of institutions** – At the opposite end of the scale, few methods are more demanding than institutionalization. Even when it was in vogue – and no international conference could end without the establishment of a permanent committee
or organization to advance the final communiqué – locating niches, maintaining momentum, and finding resources have always posed obstacles. Nevertheless, when done right, for reasons of genuine cooperative interest and not just to be seen to be doing something rather than actually doing it, developing well-organized international bodies can be critical for achieving a given policy objective. Examples are varied, from the breadth (both of membership and of focus) of the OSCE to highly specialized bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Such institutions could be implemented, for example, in the sphere of arms control, by linking together requirements and procedures from the various substantive regimes in and around Europe in an overarching framework with the goal of achieving greater predictability and stability. This would not prohibit links and unstructured interactions with other more global arrangements (e.g. the work of the IAEA), but it would give priority to “actionability” and to familiarity within existing expert communities and the politically responsible. A greater degree of interaction between existing institutions could also be beneficial. The West loses little by recognizing the reality of the CSTO and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, loose as they are, and the value of ensuring that communication occurs far exceeds the cost.

- **Sharing of best practices** – The range of experiences that different bodies have had with the challenges highlighted in this paper means that there is a wealth of knowledge on which methods work and which do not. Unfortunately, there has been little emphasis on disseminating this knowledge, so as to avoid replicating the failures and learning from the achievements.

Examples of such activities might be launching joint training exercises and exchanges; establishing a greater understanding of IT use in achieving confidence building measures for arms control purposes; and establishing a catalog of responses for given contingencies and crises, allowing observers and colleagues to avoid misunderstandings about actions being undertaken.

- **Openness to broad participation** – Among the biggest obstacle to greater cooperation is ingrained and outdated thinking at all levels about who can be cooperated with. This thinking comes from a variety of sources, including the demands of domestic politics. In principle, this obstacle is easy to resolve and demands no official resources or particular actions. Yet, in practice, it is harder to engender than policy change.

Several issues and regions clearly require greater openness to broader cooperation, including cooperating with Russia on energy or working with Mideast countries on counter-terrorism where international relations are already frosty or antagonistic. It is only by setting aside or working through such differences that mutually acceptable solutions that reduce hostility can be found.

- **Rethinking strategic interest** – This paper’s final recommendation is somewhat counterintuitive. After all, many of the most successful applications of cooperative security occur at lower levels, in the interactions between troops on joint-training
exercise, between civil servants sharing data, or even politicians gaining trust in and respect for their opposite numbers. Yet, the uppermost echelons of leadership need to have a sense of the strategic imperatives of cooperative security to ensure that cooperation is something more than a temporary, pragmatic option.

For the United States and Russia, a renewal will require a new political calculus about status and advantage, about trade-offs between short-term hype and long-term advantage. Action-reaction sequences extract heavy costs and often exacerbate problems in ways that sometimes are irreversible. What is at stake, once again, is a new understanding of international relations, doing away with much of the traditional distinctions of allies and enemies.

It is also true that style often confirms substance and can advance it, particularly in a globe grown smaller and more interconnected than before. New threats, such as cyber-security for the public and private sectors, call out for new solutions based on new technologies but existing principles. New emergencies beyond the capabilities of any single state—failed states, cross-border terror networks, climate change, to name just three—suggest that without cooperation, even partial solutions will be less than what is needed.

Cooperative security is an ongoing process, not a point solution or a unidirectional, omniscient strategy. Monnet’s philosophy of narrowing gaps by doing, of creating overlaps and overloads that drive toward cooperative solutions, remains as illuminating about how to proceed as it was in the creation of a cooperative, stable, and eventually peaceful Western Europe. There are often reversals or partial victories – view the trash heaps of failed European institutions of the 1950s and the 1960s and even a few from the 1990s. But there are always other ways, and other paths that lead in essence to the same results. Time and persistent engagement are required to take up the challenges and try again.

About the Author

Catherine McArdle Kelleher has had a distinguished career both in academia and in government. She is a College Park Professor, University of Maryland at College Park, and also holds a research appointment as Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute, Brown University, and the honorary title of Research Professor Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College. She is a member of the Naval Studies Board of the National Academies of Sciences. She was also named an honorary professor at the Free University of Berlin, and was a Senior Faculty Associate for 2004-2009 at the Geneva Center for Security Policy in Geneva, Switzerland. She serves as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analysis in Washington.

Her areas of policy analysis have included the development of cooperative European security, American-Russian relations, the evolution of NATO, the acquisition of theater nuclear forces, the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and European defense and security policies, both at the level of the Union and Paris, Berlin, and London. In the Clinton Administration, she was the Personal Representative of the Secretary of Defense in Europe and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. Professor Kelleher's other governmental experience includes a position on the National Security Council staff during the Carter Administration and a series of consulting assignments under Republican and Democratic administrations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of the Army. She was Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College.

Professor Kelleher has had a wide range of academic involvement in the field of national security studies. She has taught at Columbia, Illinois-Chicago, Michigan, the Graduate School of International Studies at Denver and was founding Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), as well as a Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. She has been a research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, a Kistiakowsky fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has received individual research grants from NATO, the Council on Foreign Relations, the German Marshall Fund, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Ford Foundation. She is the author of more than seventy books, monographs and articles.

Professor Kelleher has also been active in the design and implementation of programs to broaden education in security studies, both nationally and internationally, in universities and think tanks, and within the military. She is the founder of Women in International Security program (wiis.org), dedicated to developing career opportunities for women in this field. She has served on many international research boards, including those of SIPRI and the IISS, as well as the Carnegie Commision for a European Security Initiative (EASI). Professor Kelleher holds degrees from Mt. Holyoke College (A.B. and D.Litt) and from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D.). She is the recipient of the Medal for Distinguished Public Service of the Department of Defense, the Director’s Medal from the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Cross of Honor in Gold of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany. In 2004, she was awarded the Manfred Woerner Medal by the German Ministry of Defense for her contributions to peace and security in Europe.
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## Appendix 1: International Organization Membership in the Euro-Atlantic Space

Membership by organization

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Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
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Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan

CIS CSTO SCO
Armenia Albania China
Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan
Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia
Kyrgyzstan Russia Tajikistan
Moldova Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Russia Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan

Membership by country

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## Appendix 2: Cooperative Security Treaties and Other Arrangements

### European Cooperation

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<tr>
<td>Maastricht Treaty</td>
<td>November 1, 1993</td>
<td>12 Established the European Union strengthened the democratic legitimacy of the institutions; improved the effectiveness of the institutions; established economic and monetary union; developed the Community social dimension; established a common foreign security policy</td>
<td>Replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lisbon Treaty</td>
<td>December 1, 2009</td>
<td>27 Provides a more transparent and democratic EU. Establishes a President of the European Council and makes binding the Charter of Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>Active</td>
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<td><strong>OSCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Helsinki Final Act</td>
<td>August 1, 1975</td>
<td>35 Continued the dialogue from CSCE. Focused on establishing norms for settling territory disputes, human rights and conflict prevention.</td>
<td>Replaced by Charter of Paris</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1 Effort by the U.S. to monitor and work in coordination for policy with the OSCE. Commission is made up of 9 Senators, 9 Representatives and 1 rep. each from Defense, State and Commerce.</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter of Paris</td>
<td>November 1990</td>
<td>34 Established guidelines and procedures that helped establish a stronger OSCE. Stressed Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Document</td>
<td>November 16, 1999</td>
<td>56 Reinforced conflict prevention. Allowed for the exchange and verification of military information between participating states.</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>May 5, 1949</td>
<td>47 Emphasis on legal standards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of law and cultural co-operation. Council includes Committees of Minister, a Parliament, Secretary General, and a Court on Human Rights</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Energy Charter</td>
<td>April, 1998</td>
<td>53 Strengthens the rule of law on energy issues, by</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investment and trade. Russia has failed to ratify

## Arms Control in Europe

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<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnership for Peace[^11]</td>
<td>October 11, 1994</td>
<td>Is a partnership formed individually between each Partner country and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government. It allows further cooperation between NATO and non-NATO states. It also is a requirement for states seeking to join NATO.</td>
<td>Active, with 22 current members and 12 previous members</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty[^12]</td>
<td>July 17, 1992</td>
<td>Limited the conventional armaments of Russian and NATO forces. States were limited to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters.</td>
<td>Suspended by NATO and Russia in December, 2007. Suspended by United States in 2011</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe II[^14]</td>
<td>November, 1999</td>
<td>Focused on states instead of blocs for reductions. Called for Russian withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia.</td>
<td>NATO and Russia refused to sign</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty on Open Skies[^15]</td>
<td>January 1, 2002</td>
<td>Permits each state-party to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the others' entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities.</td>
<td>Active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction[^17]</td>
<td>November 27, 1991</td>
<td>Provides monetary and technical assistance from the U.S. to Russia and former Soviet states to secure, protect, and eliminate WMD facilities and delivery systems.</td>
<td>Active, renewed every year by Congress</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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**Selected Global Arms Control Treaties**

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<th>Parties</th>
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<td>Missile Control Technology Regime[^20]</td>
<td>April, 1987</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Urges its voluntary aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks.</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wassenaar Arrangement[^22]</td>
<td>July, 1996</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Information exchange export control regime where members exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies.</td>
<td>Active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottawa Convention[^25]</td>
<td>March 1, 1999</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>Commits parties to not use, develop, produce, acquire, retain, stockpile, or transfer anti-personnel landmines. The U.S. is not a member.</td>
<td>Active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative[^27]</td>
<td>May 31, 2003</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Aims to interdict shipments of WMD and missiles that could be used to deliver or produce such weapons, to terrorists and countries suspected of trying to acquire WMD</td>
<td>Active</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>Duration</td>
<td>Note</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8 Declaration on Addressing the Nuclear Threat 28</td>
<td>July 8, 2009</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Endorsement by the G8 on moving toward a nuclear free world, strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and securing nuclear weapons and material from terrorists. Declaration of a nuclear summit in 2010.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement</td>
<td>April 13, 2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attempts to prevent reuse of plutonium materials by having parties dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of plutonium each, or the total equivalent material from 17,000 weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
<td>August 1, 2010</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>An international ban of unlimited duration on the use, acquisition, transfer or development of cluster munitions.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
<td>February 5, 2011</td>
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<td>Limited states to 1,550 deployed, 800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to nor more than 700.</td>
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## Appendix 3: Missions Conducted by the European Union ESDP

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<td>EUPM (EU Police Mission)</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2003- present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea (Military operation, taking over from NATO’s SFOR)</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2004- present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission)</td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine (Transnistria region)</td>
<td>2005- present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo (Police and civilian rule of law enhancement mission)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2008- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2008- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo (Security Sector reform mission)</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2005- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL RD Congo (Policing assistance mission, succeeds EUPOL Kinshasa)</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2007- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Security sector reform mission)</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR (anti-piracy mission)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2008- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX (Judicial training mission)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2005- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah (Border assistance mission)</td>
<td>Israel (Gaza)/Egypt</td>
<td>2005- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS (Criminal justice and policing trainingPalestinian Territories mission)</td>
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<td>2006- present</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan (Police mission)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Concordia</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>EUPOL Proxima</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUJUST Themis (criminal justice reform mission)</td>
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<td>EUPAT (police advisory mission)</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
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<td>Operation Artemis</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa (police training mission)</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo (Support for United Nations’ MONUC electoral support mission)</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA (as part of joint EU-UN Mission)</td>
<td>Chad/Central African Republic</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>2008- present</td>
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</table>
NATO Missions Since 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Troop numbers (approx)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF (UN mandated)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001-present (NATO leadership 2003-present)</td>
<td>42,457</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
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<td>NTM-I (Training mission)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Operation Active Endeavor</td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>2001-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM (supporting African Union)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS (supporting African Union)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Ocean Shield</td>
<td>Offshore Horn of Africa</td>
<td>2009-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Ocean Provider</td>
<td>Offshore Horn of Africa</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Ocean Protector</td>
<td>Offshore Horn of Africa</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Earthquake relief mission)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
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<td>IFOR, SFOR</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Essential Harvest</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav</td>
<td>2001-2003</td>
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<td>Operation Amber Fox, Operation</td>
<td>Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Allied Harmony</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Unified Protector</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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