ABSTRACT

Title of Document:	The Role of Cultural Models of Self-Worth in Vicarious Experiences of Wrongdoing
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This research sought to understand why people from different cultures respond in fundamentally different ways to their own ingroup transgressions. We predicted that in face cultures, where self-worth is defined by one's reputation, ingroup transgressions would elicit vicarious shame and withdrawal tendencies, especially in public; in dignity cultures, however, where self-worth does not depend on reputation and justice is a focal concern, ingroup transgressions would elicit vicarious guilt and reparative behavior. In Study 1, participants responded to hypothetical ingroup transgressions. In Study 2, sorority and fraternity members recalled a time when a group member committed a wrongdoing. In Study 3, we simulated a real ingroup offense in the lab. We found partial support for our hypotheses in Study 1; face predicted distancing behavior, mediated by image-threat appraisals and shame, but only in public. The results in Studies 2 and 3 were less clear, and suggest evidence for motivated distortion.

THE ROLE OF CULTURAL MODELS OF SELF-WORTH IN VICARIOUS
EXPERIENCES OF WRONGDOING

By

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Theoretical and Practical Importance

In February of 2010, the world-renowned company Toyota was confronted with a failure of epic proportions. Due to widespread mechanical malfunctions that led to consumer injuries and deaths, the Japan-based automaker was forced to recall more than eight million vehicles. Americans were outraged when Toyota President Akio Toyoda failed to issue a public apology until more than two weeks after the original recall. Experts on Japanese culture speculated that the delay in apology was due to face concerns; that is, in Japanese culture, people do not wish to draw attention to failures in order to preserve the reputation of individuals or groups (Lim, 2010). Americans, accustomed to the United States' corporate culture of timely apologies and fair compensation for injustices (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005; Lee et al., 2011), did not know what to make of Mr. Toyoda's behavior. Did the absence of a prompt apology indicate that the automaker did not take responsibility for his company's actions? Was he not interested in the safety and well-being of his international customers? Did he feel no guilt, shame or remorse on behalf of his company's failures?

In a globalized world where people from different cultures must communicate, cooperate and solve problems on a daily basis, baffling situations like these are not all that uncommon. This example in particular illustrates the importance of understanding how people from different cultures respond to ingroup wrongdoings.

Even though Mr. Toyoda's behavior may have been considered appropriate in Japan, his delayed apology induced frustration among Americans. Discrepancies in cultural norms and expectancies can lead to misunderstandings such as the one experienced by Mr. Toyoda and his American consumer base. People from one culture may see apologizing or offering reparations as the best way to make amends, whereas people from a different culture may prefer not to address the transgression at all and see withdrawing from the conflict as more appropriate than provoking a confrontation. If the offending party uses withdrawal as a strategy when the victim is expecting an apology, misunderstandings can ensue and give rise to large-scale intergroup conflict. Thus, a better understanding of how people from different cultures react to the wrongdoings of their ingroup members may prevent such cases of intercultural misunderstanding from taking place.

With instances like Mr. Toyoda's controversial response to the Toyota failure, it is important to understand the process through which an event like an ingroup wrongdoing is translated into action through emotional affordances, and more generally, how a single event can lead to vastly different outcomes across cultures. Drawing on extant research, we argue that ingroup transgressions can evoke divergent *appraisals*, or judgments, about the situation due to different *focal concerns* in different cultures, or in other words, issues considered important by an individual or group (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Focal concerns about justice, which we argue below are predominant in dignity cultures (Kim & Cohen, 2010; Leung, Cohen & Au, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009), may lead to appraisals regarding concern about how the victim was treated, whereas focal concerns about

preserving a positive group image, which we argue are predominant in face cultures (Ho, 1976; Kim & Cohen, 2010; Leung, Cohen & Au, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011), might lead to appraisals about implications for the ingroup's reputation. These appraisals then lend themselves to certain emotional reactions like guilt and shame, respectively, which can be experienced *vicariously* on behalf of an ingroup member (Lickel et al., 2005). That is, a preoccupation with the injustice of the transgression leads to feelings of guilt, an emotion that has been associated with a focus on the wrongness of the behavior itself (i.e., "I did something bad"; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994). Alternatively, a feeling that the transgression has cast a negative light on the group's identity may induce shame, an emotion associated with a feeling of being inherently bad on account of the wrongdoing. (i.e., "I am a bad person"; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994). In turn, these guilt and shame experiences motivate divergent behavioral responses such as reparation-oriented apologies (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994) or reputation protecting strategies like withdrawal (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), respectively.

More generally, drawing on literature in cultural psychology, we expect that cultural models of self-worth influence how people react to ingroup wrongdoings and their subsequent appraisals, emotions and behavioral tendencies resulting in highly different reactions to the same ingroup transgression across cultures. There is already evidence to suggest that individuals from the United States define self-worth in terms of *dignity*, which is the notion that worth is created from within, should be afforded to everyone, and cannot be taken away by others (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Because self-worth is believed to be something that every person

deserves, justice is a focal concern in dignity cultures. Accordingly, we propose that the justice concerns that are focal in dignity cultures will lead individuals to appraise ingroup wrongdoings with respect to concerns about the injustices inflicted upon the victim. Subsequently, these transgression-focused appraisals will afford the emotional experience of guilt, and encourage behavioral responses that can mend injustices like apology and reparation.

In many East Asian cultures like Japan, however, worth is defined in terms of *face*, or how the self is seen through the eyes of others (Ho, 1976; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Because the perspective of others is so important in face cultures, image protection is a focal concern. As such, we predict that the image concerns that are focal in face cultures will lead these individuals to respond to ingroup transgressions with identity-focused shame reactions. In turn, shame will set in motion image-protecting behavioral strategies like withdrawal or derogation of ingroup offenders (i.e., black sheep effect; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Notably, as we will argue below, certain situational factors like the public or private nature of the transgression might moderate shame responses, given the extent to which public opinion defines self-worth in face cultures. The public or private nature of the situation, however, is not expected to be as relevant in dignity cultures (c.f. Kim & Cohen, 2012).

In sum, as in the Toyota example discussed above, we expect that even in identical situations, people from dignity and face cultures might appraise and react to events like ingroup transgressions quite differently. Due to such diametrically opposed viewpoints as to how to respond to an ingroup transgression (e.g., the

expectation of an apology when the other party engages in avoidance), intercultural misunderstanding is likely to surface when an ingroup's response is incongruent with an outgroup victim's expectations. Because intercultural misunderstanding can quickly spiral into intergroup conflict (Lickel et al., 2006; Stenstrom et al., 2008; Brown, Wohl & Exline, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2012), research on this topic is of central theoretical and also practical importance.

Overview of This Research

In what follows, we will first give a general overview of the appraisal and emotion literature to demonstrate that the sequence through which emotional reactions and behavior are produced is driven by what is focal in a particular culture. Next, we will integrate findings from the guilt and shame literatures to highlight certain appraisals and action tendencies that have been linked to emotions in response to an ingroup transgression. We will then discuss why cultural models of self-worth explain how the same transgression can lead to vastly different emotions and outcomes across cultures. Thereafter we will propose three studies to test the hypothesis that focal concerns of justice and image in dignity and face cultures will differentially predict vicarious guilt and shame responses to an ingroup transgression, respectively. Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the theory being presented.

Appraisal and Emotional Processes

In their seminal *Psychological Bulletin* paper, Mesquita and Frijda (1992) proposed a *process model of emotions* to illustrate the ways in which variation can be produced at each stage of emotion processing. The key stages in this model include

appraisals, emotional reactions, and *action tendencies*, and this whole process is driven by *focal concerns* within the context of the event. We will provide a brief overview of the process model and go on to discuss how vicarious responses to ingroup transgressions can be mapped onto this structure, drawing from findings on guilt and shame and highlighting the relevance of justice and image as focal concerns, respectively.

From Focal Concerns to Appraisals

In the process model of emotions, some antecedent event must occur, which then becomes subject to interpretation (Scherer et al., 1986; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). The *appraisal* of an event involves evaluative processes concerning the implications of the situation for oneself or others (Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Scherer, 2001), and different appraisals can arise across individuals and groups even following an identical event (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer, 1997; Zhang & Cross, 2011). For example, events leading to disgust tend to involve appraisals about immorality, and events leading to joy often result from appraisals about goal achievement (Wallbott & Scherer, 1988). This process is inherently linked to *focal concerns*, or in other words, issues that are considered salient or important within a particular sociocultural context (Lebra, 1983; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer, 1997). Attention to these concerns will influence what appraisals are made about an event. For example, Japanese society emphasizes the importance of *giri*, which is the duty to fulfill obligations and protect one's reputation. In contrast, a focal concern for American society is the protection of individual rights. Indeed, Japanese and Americans have been found to make different

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appraisals in response to identical conflict episodes. Using multidimensional scaling, Japanese categorized (i.e. appraised) conflicts in terms of the degree to which they reflected violations of duties and failure to maintain reputation whereas Americans categorized the identical conflicts in terms of how much they reflected violations to rights and infringements to autonomy (Gelfand et al., 2001).

From Appraisals to Emotional Reactions

According to the process model of emotions (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) appraisals afford the experience of specific emotions (Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Scherer, 2001; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004). Some emotions are associated with corresponding facial expressions or physiological responses, as well as direct subjective self-reports, and can be experienced at varying levels of intensity and duration (Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Russell, 1994; Eid & Diener, 2001; Kitayama, Mesquita & Karasawa, 2006; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011). For example, universally recognized facial expressions exist for happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust and contempt (Izard, 1971; Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972; Ekman et al., 1987), and some people report physiological sensations alongside emotions such as change in body temperature, arousal, feelings in the stomach, and increased or decreased heartbeat (Scherer et al., 1986; Wallbot & Scherer, 1988). However, the extent to which these reactions are manifested and reported depend on sociocultural constraints about their appropriateness and salience as indicators of emotional experience. For example, Japanese people produce fewer facial expressions than do Americans (Matsumoto &

Ekman, 1989), and also report fewer physiological symptoms of emotions (Scherer et al., 1988).

From Emotional Reactions to Action Tendencies

Emotions exhibit a strong influence on decision-making processes and behavior (Isen & Shalker, 1982; Lickel, Schmader & Spanovic, 2007). Appraisals of events and subsequent emotional experiences can drive behavior directed toward sustaining or shifting away from an emotional state; for example, prosocial behavior has been linked to both the desire to maintain positive emotions as well as to reduce the experience of negative emotions (Isen & Levin, 1972; Clark & Isen, 1982; Batson et al, 1988; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). Thus, the experience of emotions involves a complex process of antecedent appraisals and behavioral outcomes, and it is important to understand why a single event might result in fundamentally distinct emotional and behavioral responses depending on differences in focal concerns.

Although Mesquita and Frijda's process model (1992) outlines a clear relationship between appraisals, emotions and behavior, this mechanistic approach is subject to debate as other models have emerged to challenge the notion that emotional processing occurs in such a straightforward, linear fashion. For instance, the psychological constructionist perspective describes emotional experience as core affect combined with conceptual knowledge about emotion (Barrett, Lindquist et al., 2007; Barrett & Lindquist, 2008a; 2008b). In other words, an individual first has some discrete 'emotional experience,' which may be characterized by valenced and arousal-based properties (Barrett, 2004). This core affective state is interpreted as a

specific emotion, such as guilt or shame, as a result of preexisting knowledge or available information about what constitutes different categories of emotion. Categorization transforms the core affective state into an intentional state (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008a) and leads to appraisals about what caused the affective experience and what course of action to take next. This approach allows for cultural variation such that cultural differences in focal concerns could elicit qualitatively discrete conceptualizations of core affective states.

We acknowledge that there are multiple perspectives from which we can approach the study of vicarious emotions, and we do not take a strong stance on one in particular. We use the process model (Mesquita & Frijda, 1991) in the present research merely as a heuristic for distinguishing between the appraisal, emotional and behavioral components of reactions to ingroup transgressions. We do not measure or analyze reactions to ingroup wrongdoings in a way that temporally defines the onset of appraisals, emotions and behavioral responses, but we see each of these responses as theoretically relevant to the understanding of ingroup wrongdoings.

Responses to Ingroup Trangressions

In the present research, our interest is in understanding how witnessing an ingroup wrongdoing affords such a process of appraisals, emotions and action tendencies, and how the outcomes can vary drastically due to differences in focal concerns. Research surrounding the trajectory through which a transgression leads to appraisals, emotions and action tendencies has emerged in the *guilt* and *shame* literature (Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Both of these emotions arise from some antecedent event like a failure or violation of

an important norm that reflects poorly on the self (Lewis, 1971), but involve distinct appraisal processes and behavioral responses. However, little is known about what focal concerns give rise to these appraisal and emotional processes in the first place. Moreover, accumulating evidence points to the notion that guilt and shame can also be experienced *vicariously* on behalf of an ingroup transgression (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Johns, Schmader & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Although this link has yet to be explicitly drawn in the vicarious guilt and shame literature, we propose that in response to the same ingroup transgression, vicarious guilt is most likely to emerge in contexts where *justice* is a focal concern, whereas vicarious shame is more likely to be experienced when *image* is a focal concern. We will provide support for this argument in what follows.

As mentioned previously, guilt involves appraisals focused on the transgression itself (i.e., "I did something wrong"). People who feel guilt are specifically preoccupied with the harm incurred by their transgression when it occurs in an interpersonal context. Thus, it stands to reason that appraisals leading to guilt are drawn from focal concerns about *justice,* or in other words, distress about the inequity between the transgressor and the victim that has come from the wrongdoing. In turn, the experience of guilt affords behaviors that attenuate the emotional state through repairing the wrongdoing, thus alleviating justice concerns. For example, guilt has been found to predict behavior such as apologies and reparative actions that restores justice between the offender and the victim (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). This evidence provides support for the notion that guilt is an

approach-oriented emotion (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Shiekh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).

In contrast to guilt, shame involves appraisals about the implications a transgression has for beliefs about the self (i.e., "I am a bad person"; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994). Shame is associated with internal, stable and uncontrollable attributions for failure, as opposed to merely feeling bad about the transgression at hand (Tracy & Robins, 2006). Thus, it could be reasoned that shame emerges from focal concerns about one's general sense of self-worth. The experience of shame predicts a repertoire of behaviors quite distinct from those elicited by guilt. Shame is said to be an avoidance-based emotion (Shiekh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Because it is more difficult to "fix" the problem when the problem is the self as opposed to the specific wrongdoing, people who experience shame are more likely to demonstrate avoidance and withdrawal behaviors (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

Recent work has extended theories of guilt and shame to involve situations when people experience these emotions by proxy of another person or group's behavior. These third-party experiences of self-conscious emotions are called *collective* or *vicarious*[1] guilt and shame. For example, some white Americans feel guilt for the injustices that took place against African-Americans during the times of slavery despite having had no role in what happened (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). According to Social Identity Theory, individuals define themselves according to their

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[1] It is important to note that much of the present literature on the third-party experience of guilt and shame fails to distinguish between the terms "vicarious" and "collective." "Vicarious" implies that one person experiences an emotion on behalf of another, whereas "collective" suggests a group-level experience; that an entity consisting of multiple individuals shares a sense of guilt or shame. Much of the work on collective guilt and shame actually concerns situations that may be more appropriately labeled as vicarious. For the purpose of the present research, we will refer to the third-party experience of guilt or shame on behalf of an ingroup as vicarious guilt or shame.

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group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and a person may respond to the acts of other ingroup members as if it was their own individual experience. Indeed, a recent body of work has found evidence that individuals feel guilt or shame on behalf of the actions of other group members, ranging from close friends (Lickel et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006) to members of their nationality (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer & Pederson, 2006).

Research on vicarious guilt has revealed that individuals who feel guilt on behalf of an ingroup make appraisals similarly to those who experience guilt on a first-person level (Doosje et al., 1998). Vicariously guilty people are preoccupied with the transgression at hand as opposed to implications for their group's identity, and are motivated to help restore the balance between the offender and the disadvantaged victim (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Individuals who think about the offenses of their ingroup are likely to support reparatory actions toward the victim. For example, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found that guilt in Bosnian Serbs predicted attitudes in support of reparations for harm inflicted by their group in the 1992-1995 war. The effects of guilt were mediated by empathy toward the outgroup.

More recently, vicarious shame has emerged as a topic in emotion research. Much like the first-person shame literature, vicarious shame is associated with appraisals about the fundamental nature of the self, with respect to group membership. Lickel et al. (2005) found that vicarious shame could be predicted by the extent to which a transgression was relevant to the shared social identity between the individual and the wrongdoer. In particular, vicarious shame is mediated by the

degree to which an individual perceives a *threat* to his or her self-image (Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Such appraisals of threat to self-image predict motivation to distance oneself from the transgression, a reaction typically associated with shame on the first-person level (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). For example, when British participants were reminded about their country's involvement in Iraq, shame-based reactions were mediated by appraisals of image threat, and predicted action intentions to advocate withdrawal of troops (Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Vicarious shame can also lead to other distancing behaviors. Because of the threat an ingroup transgression can present to one's social image, vicarious shame can result in the *black sheep effect*, which is the tendency to derogate an ingroup member or distance oneself from the group as the consequence of the violation of a group norm (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988).

Although the literature has linked vicarious guilt and shame to appraisals of justice and image threats, respectively, little is known about why the same event might elicit distinctive types of appraisals and emotional experiences across different people and situations. For instance, why is it that Mr. Toyoda's response to the Toyota failure was more indicative of shame than guilt? We expect that culture plays an important role in the trajectory of vicarious emotions that arise from an ingroup transgression. However, because no work thus far has addressed the role of culture in vicarious guilt and shame[2], we have a limited understanding of how individuals from different cultures might react to a wrongdoing on behalf of a fellow ingroup member.

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[2] Virtually all of vicarious guilt and shame research has used the English lexical descriptors "guilt" and "shame," despite that some languages use many more (or fewer) words to describe these experiences (Bruegalmans & Poortinga, 2006; Li, Wang & Fischer, 2004). Furthermore, because this research has relied on North American samples, that which we know thus far about the appraisals associated with vicarious guilt and shame is limited to Western, English-speaking societies.

Given the special self-relevance of vicarious guilt and shame, we propose that cultural models of self-worth will have an important bearing on the focal concerns and appraisals associated with an ingroup transgression. Specifically, we look to *dignity* and *face* as cultural models of self-worth that are particularly relevant to the experience of vicarious guilt and shame.

Dignity and Face Cultures

Cultures have been known to vary in the way they define self-worth. In societies such as in the United States, there is a belief that self-worth is created from within, and that no one can take one's sense of worth, or *dignity*, away from a person. Conversely, in some East Asian cultures, self-worth is defined by the perception of others. In these cultures, this public reputation, or one's *face*, is the primary determinant of the worth one holds (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011).

Dignity and face cultures are characterized by beliefs about the self that are reinforced through social structures and internal or external systems of self-control. Dignity is rooted in the idea that individuals are born with equal worth and should live freely from the control of others (Ayers, 1984; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010). These ideals lead to strong norms for positive tit-for-tat reciprocity (Leung & Cohen, 2011), which are reflected in laws protecting individuals from harm or infringement of rights by others. Fairness is a particularly strong tenet of dignity societies like the United States (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). There is a common standard in dignity cultures that every individual should be afforded certain inalienable rights, no matter their social status. Individuals attain their worth on their own accord, irrespective of

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other people's opinions. Related to the idea that worth comes from within is the notion that internal standards should guide behavior, rather than concern for what others think. Although individuals are guided by internal standards, these standards arise from societally shared beliefs that all individuals deserve to be treated equally. Thus, the primary goal in response to a transgression should be to "do what's right" rather than "do what other people think I should do," and "what's right" usually constitutes making sure the cards are played fairly. In this sense, guilt is thought to be an effective internal self-control mechanism for guiding appropriate behavior and repairing wrongdoings (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010). People who deny others fair treatment should feel guilty for their behavior. When an individual commits a transgression, they have the opportunity to restore their own dignity and resolve justice concerns by expressing remorse and repairing the equity between themselves and the victim.

In contrast, focal points of concern for face cultures are maintaining harmony, reputation and hierarchy within society (Ho, 1976; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011). The emphasis on avoiding conflict as opposed to maintaining fairness is reinforced by the legal system. For example, when there is a car accident in Japan, responsibility is usually split at least 20/80, even if one driver was clearly at fault. This is thought to preserve harmony by not singling out one person to take the blame. Unlike dignity, the amount of face one has is relative to their position in the social hierarchy; higher status individuals have more face, and thus more face to lose. Face can be lost through overreaching on status claims or doing something that disrupts harmony (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Face loss extends to anyone associated with the

individual who has lost face. Therefore, maintaining a positive reputation among others is a key concern, perhaps more so than actually resolving the conflict at hand. Shame is thought to be a powerful regulator of behavior in face cultures (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010); fear of a tarnished reputation motivates behavior that adheres to social standards. If one has behaved in a way that is shame-worthy, it is considered better to accept the judgment of others than to defy it. Because face as a determinant of self-worth is something that is reached by social consensus, it is not within one's own control to regain face through good behavior after face loss. Instead, it is more socially adaptive to withdraw from embarrassing situations rather than make active attempts to "fix" the problem in a way that draws attention, thus potentially disrupting harmony and causing further loss of face (Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010). When an embarrassing failure affects the whole group, it could even be beneficial to pretend the event did not happen in order to prevent the onset of shame.

Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests that people from dignity and face cultures react differently to their own moral transgressions. In one study, Anglo-Americans and Asian Americans were made to believe that they had committed either many or few moral transgressions, and were asked to think of these transgressions either in their own perspective or in the perspective of significant others (Kim & Cohen, Study 1, 2010). After the experiment, participants were offered the choice of a handwipe or a pencil as gift. The handwipe choice has been used in past research as an implicit measure of moral cleansing after committing a transgression (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006). For Anglo-Americans, people who thought they had committed *many* transgressions chose the handwipe most often, suggesting that these individuals

believed that more transgressions required greater need for cleansing. However, for Asian-American participants, others' perceptions played a greater role in the handwipe choice than number of transgressions alone. When made to think the number of transgressions were few in the eyes of significant others, Asian-Americans rarely chose the handwipe; when the number was high, however, the handwipe was chosen much more often. Importantly, this effect did not hold when others' opinions were not invoked. These results suggest that people from face cultures, as opposed to dignity cultures, experience greater emotional upheaval when they believe that others think badly of them.

Drawing upon these findings, we might suppose that dignity and face as models of self-worth should make certain concerns become more or less salient when an ingroup member commits a wrongdoing, evoking corresponding appraisal, emotional and behavioral processes. Even though people from both dignity and face cultures might be affected by witnessing an ingroup wrongdoing, different appraisals may come out of the situation. People from dignity cultures may be more preoccupied with the distribution of fairness, whereas people from face cultures may be more concerned with how the event bears upon their reputation. These appraisal processes have downstream implications for emotions and action, such that when witnessing an identical transgression, dignity cultures may be motivated by guilt to enact reparative-oriented behavior, and face cultures driven by shame to display avoidance tendencies.

Moreover, given that the role of others' judgments in definitions of self-worth varies so significantly between face and dignity cultures (Kim & Cohen, 2010; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2011; Leung & Cohen, 2011), public or private context is a likely

moderator of how vicarious guilt and shame are experienced. Because dignity cultures should be theoretically most concerned with correcting injustices, it should not matter whether or not a transgression occurred in public or private. For face cultures, however, the public nature of the wrongdoing is more likely to impact appraisals of the situation. Face loss through a wrongdoing is contingent upon the assumption that others will be aware of your behavior. Therefore, appraisals of image threat should be particularly salient when it is apparent that public judgment is possible. Transgressions might be less of a concern when the situation is not made public, as reflected in the finding from the aforementioned study that Asian Americans chose the handwipe less frequently when not invoking the perspective of others (Kim & Cohen, 2010). However, most of the vicarious guilt and shame literature has involved situations that are inherently public, such as national transgressions (e.g., Brown & Cehajic, 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to tease apart reputational concerns from preoccupation with the ingroup violation. Thus, we seek to determine how public and private context moderates cultural influences on emotional reactions to vicarious transgressions.

Naturally, there is room for within-culture variation in responses to ingroup transgressions. Not all Asian Americans endorse face as a model of self-worth, particularly those who have spent their whole lives growing up in a dignity culture like the United States. Likewise, not all Americans endorse the tenets of dignity to the same extent. Accordingly, we measure face and dignity and examine endorsement of these concepts as our main predictors in the following studies. We also acknowledge that certain situational conditions might make justice- or image-based appraisals more

or less accessible, a point to which we return in the discussion. A transgression that is fundamentally about justice is likely to activate justice concerns across the board, whereas a transgression that is more relational will make image concerns more salient. We attempt to explore a range of situations and conditional factors in what follows.

Hypotheses

The present research adds to the emotional processing, vicarious guilt and shame and cultural models of self-worth literatures by providing a more nuanced understanding of the process through which ingroup transgressions translate to action through appraisals and emotional affordances, and how this process can vary due to culturally specific focal concerns. Based on the integration of these literatures, we arrive at the following hypotheses, which we empirically test with respect to hypothetical, past and laboratory-controlled transgressions:

> *Hypothesis 1.a. Appraisals*: In response to an ingroup transgression, endorsement of face as a model of self-worth will predict appraisals of threat to one's image, especially in public situations.
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> *Hypothesis 1.b. Appraisals*: In response to an ingroup transgression, endorsement of dignity as a model of self-worth will predict appraisals of threats to justice, and will not vary as a function of public or private context.
>
> *Hypothesis 2.a. Emotional Reactions:* In response to an ingroup transgression, endorsement of face as a model of self-worth will predict the emotional experience of vicarious shame, especially in public situations.

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Hypothesis 2.b. Emotional Reactions: In response to an ingroup transgression, endorsement of dignity as a model of self-worth will predict the emotional experience of vicarious guilt, and will not vary as a function of public or private context.

Hypothesis 3.a. Behavioral Responses: In response to an ingroup transgression, endorsement of face as a model of self-worth will predict withdrawal or distancing behavioral intentions, especially in public situations.

Hypothesis 3.b. Behavioral Responses: In response to an ingroup transgression, endorsement of dignity as a model of self-worth will predict reparation-oriented behavioral intentions, and will not vary as a function of public or private context. *Hypothesis 4. Moderated Mediation:* The trend for face to predict withdrawal and distancing will be mediated by appraisals of threats to one's image and the vicarious experience of shame, especially in public situations. The trend for dignity to predict reparation-oriented behavior will be mediated by appraisals of threats to justice and the vicarious experience of guilt.

General Overview

In three studies, we investigate the hypothesis that people from dignity and face cultures differentially experience guilt and shame on behalf of an ingroup member's transgression on account of focal concerns for justice and image, respectively. Specifically, we examine cultural differences in the appraisals, emotional reactions, and action tendencies in response to an ingroup transgression. Study 1 used pre-tested vignettes to assess cultural differences in appraisals, emotional reactions and behavioral intentions in response to identical transgressions.

Because hypothetical behavior is not a reliable approximation of actual behavior (Baumeister, Vohs & Funder, 2007), Study 2 used mindset priming to examine reactions to a real-life ingroup member's wrongdoing in dignity and face cultures. Although this method has high external validity, it is important to understand how a single event can lead to different outcomes across cultures (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Thus, Study 3 investigated real behavior in response to an ingroup member's transgression in a laboratory game.

We used a measure to directly assess endorsement of dignity and face as models of self-worth. Because participants from the United States might overwhelmingly endorse dignity as a model of self-worth, we decided to sample from cultural backgrounds known to endorse dignity or face in order to increase variability in responses. Previous work gives support to the notion that Americans subscribe to dignity as a model of self-worth, and East Asian countries are more concerned with face (Ho, 1976; Kim, Cohen & Au, 2010; Kim & Cohen, 2011). Based on research that East Asian Americans share many cultural similarities with East Asians (Kim & Cohen, 2010), we sampled from University of Maryland undergraduate students who come from European American and East Asian backgrounds to represent dignity and face cultures. Our criteria for what specific ethnicities constituted dignity and face cultures were derived from the literature (c.f. Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). China, Korea and Japan are countries that are thought to be high on face, so we included participants whose family originated from these countries or countries that share considerable elements of culture and history (i.e. Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia).

Participants who were born in the United States and had family of Western European

origins represented dignity cultures.

Chapter 2: Study 1

Participants, Design and Procedure

Participants were 106 students at the University of Maryland (70 female, 35 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 19.9). Seven participants were removed from analyses because they did not clearly belong to a dignity or face culture (e.g. Eastern European or mixed ethnicity), or they failed to follow instructions properly[3]. Therefore, our final sample consisted of 99 participants (67 female, 31 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 19.92). Fifty-one of these participants came from a European American background, and 48 came from an East Asian background. We allowed people to participate online or in the lab and all responded to an online survey. Seventy-three participants completed the study in the lab, and 26 participants completed the study online. All participants were offered $5 in compensation for the 30-minute study.

Lab participants read and signed a consent form detailing the purpose of the study prior to participation. For online participants, the consent was obtained electronically. Online participants also read a statement with tips to avoid becoming distracted while participating in the study. Because the survey platform was internet-based, the rest of the procedure was identical for both lab and online participants. First, participants completed the Dignity and Face Scale. Next, participants were asked to list the first name of a friend. Then, participants were presented with two

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[3] Participants were asked to provide a friend's first name, which was inserted into hypothetical ingroup wrongdoing scenarios. Participants who did not list a friend's name did not read the scenarios as intended and thus were removed from analyses.

pre-tested scenarios in which their friend performed a wrongdoing that affected

others. Scenarios were manipulated between-subjects to reflect that the wrongdoing

took place in public or private. Thus, participants either saw two public situations or

two private situations. Condition was randomly assigned by the survey platform, and

scenario order was counterbalanced for each participant. After reading each scenario,

participants were asked to respond to the transgression in terms of appraisals,

emotional reactions, and hypothetical behavioral intentions, as well as complete

additional control and demographic measures. Upon completing the study, all

participants were debriefed and thanked. Lab participants were paid immediately, and

online participants made an appointment to pick up their payment in person.

Stimuli

Hypothetical Scenarios

We developed hypothetical scenarios to tap into different types of

transgressions that occur in daily life, as per previous work on interpersonal offenses

(Gonzales, Manning & Haugen, 1992). We administered two hypothetical scenarios.

Scenario 1 was: "*Imagine that [friend's name] picked you up from your apartment

complex. When backing out of a parking space, [friend's name] hit a parked car in

your lot and left noticeable damage. [Friend's name] said "Oops!" and continued to

drive out of the parking lot without leaving a note on the car that was hit.*" Scenario 2

was: "*Imagine that you live in a dorm on campus with your friend [friend's name].

There is a student on another hall who is somewhat quiet and withdrawn. You

hear [friend's name] make some nasty, hurtful comments about this student that are

completely unfounded. Eventually, these rumors start to spread.*"

We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA in order to ascertain any potential differences in responding between the scenarios. They were not found to differ in perceived severity ($t(98) = .57$; n.s.).

Public/Private Manipulation

For half of the participants, it was made clear that other people were aware of the ingroup wrongdoing. For the other half of the participants, it was made clear that the wrongdoing was not known about publicly. The public and private versions of the scenarios were also subject to pilot testing with our focus group. The private version of the hit-and-run scenario ended with "*The parking lot was empty when this happened*," and the public version ended with "*There were several other people in the parking lot who saw this happen*." The private version of the gossiping scenario ended with "*When the student finally hears the rumors, most people don't remember who actually started them*," and the public version ended with "*When the student finally hears the rumors, most people in the dorm know that [friend's name] started them*." See Appendix A for the complete list of scenarios and manipulations.

Measures

Dignity and face. We used the newly developed 11-item Dignity and Face Scale, which assesses the extent to which individuals identify with these cultural models of self-worth on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much). Sample items for dignity include "All human beings should be treated with the same respect, regardless of their social status." Sample items for face include "What others think of you is more important than what you think of yourself." Although this scale

is sometimes framed at the descriptive norms level (i.e. "What do most Americans think?"), we framed the scale at the individual level because most of our East Asian sample was assumed to have grown up in the United States. We conducted Principal Axis Factor analysis on the scale with a direct oblimin rotation to allow for correlation between factors. Based on the factor loadings and substantive considerations about the relevance of certain items to the underlying constructs, we accepted a two-factor solution for the scale. Reliability was acceptable but not optimal, especially for the dignity subscale (dignity, $\alpha = .62$; face, $\alpha = .73$). See Table 1 for factor loadings and Appendix B for the complete scale.

Appraisals. We created a 12-item scale based on factors known to be relevant to the experience of self-conscious emotions, modifying items from Lickel and colleagues' (2005) previous vicarious emotion research and Gelfand and colleagues' (2001) work on conflict episodes. Our items specifically focused on image and justice based concerns. Image based concerns included items assessing the extent to which participants perceived a threat to their social identity or reputation as a consequence of their ingroup's behavior. A sample item for image appraisals is "What happened was a threat to my group's image/reputation." Justice based concerns included items about unequal distribution of fairness and sympathy toward the victim. A sample item for justice appraisals is "What happened was a violation of fairness." All items were pre-tested in advance with a group of East Asian and European American students. Items that were hard to understand or irrelevant were revised for the final version of the six-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree).

In order to explore the structure of the new scale, we conducted Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) analyses on the 12-items with a direct oblimin rotation for each of the scenarios. PAF is a technique that allows shared variance among items, and direct oblimin rotation is used when factors may be related. This was an appropriate technique for our scale, as image and justice concerns should not be mutually exclusive. Our Kaiser's criterion was set for Eigen-values over one.

Taking into account standards for factor correlation and cross-loadings, we deemed a two-factor solution acceptable, with the hypothesized Justice and Image dimensions. We decided to remove one Image item, "What happened would compromise harmony within my group," from the analyses because it was cross-loading on the justice dimension. Therefore, we were left with six items in the justice subscale (α = .83) and five items in the image subscale (α = .86). See Table 2 for factor loadings and Appendix C for the complete measure.

Emotional reactions. In line with past research (Leach et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007) we measured vicarious emotions using indices for guilt and shame. Guilt consisted of three items (guilty, remorseful, regretful; α = .85), and shame consisted of five items (ashamed, disgraced, humiliated, embarrassed, shamefaced; α = .93). Confirmatory factor analysis has demonstrated that these two factors are well defined by their items (Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007). Emotion items were evaluated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Very much). See Appendix D for the complete measure.

Behavioral intentions. Drawing from past research on behavioral intentions associated with vicarious transgressions (Lickel et al., 2005), participants answered

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questions regarding how they wanted to behave in response to the wrongdoing they reported. The 12-item scale consisted of two main factors, reparative-oriented and avoidance-oriented behavior. Individual items assessed how much the participant wanted to apologize to the victim (e.g., "I wanted to apologize for what happened"), offer reparations (e.g., "I wanted to reach out toward the victim(s)"), withdraw (e.g., "I wanted to disappear from the situation"), or distance himself or herself from the offender (e.g., "I wanted to distance myself from the group member who caused the event"). These items were pre-tested in advance with a group of East Asian and European American students. Items that were hard to understand or irrelevant were revised.

As with the appraisal measures, we conducted factor analyses to examine the structure of the behavioral intentions scale for the scenarios. Once again, we used Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with direct oblimin rotation and Eigen-values held to one. Based on the PAF solution, we arrived at three dimensions: the Reparative Behavior factor (e.g., "I would want my friend to apologize to the victim," $\alpha = .85$) consisted of six items, the Withdrawal Behavior factor (e.g., "I would want to hide," $\alpha = .83$) consisted of four items, and the Distancing Behavior factor (e.g., "I would want to distance myself from the group member who caused the event," $\alpha = .89$) consisted of two items. Items were evaluated on a six-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 6, = Strongly agree). Please see Table 3 for the factor loadings and Appendix E for the complete measure.

Additional measures. We included several potential control variables, such as the perceived severity of the offense (see Appendix F) and the Inclusion of Other in

Self Circle Task (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992; see Appendix G) as a measure of closeness with the friend whose name was used in the hypothetical scenario. Because these measures were not correlated with our predictors, they were not included in subsequent analyses. Finally, we asked participants some demographic questions about their age, gender and ethnicity (see Appendix H).

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables can be found in Table 4. First, we performed a manipulation check to ensure that participants had interpreted the public/private manipulation as intended. Next, we looked for differences in dignity and face in the East Asian and European American sample. We then conducted hierarchical regression analyses by regressing appraisals, emotions and behavioral intentions on dignity, face, condition and the two interaction terms.

Manipulation Check

After reading each scenario, participants were asked whether the event occurred in public or private. There was a tendency for many individuals in the private condition to categorize the situation as public (Scenario 1 *n* = 30, Scenario 2 *n* = 39), presumably because few situations involving another person can truly be considered private. However, participants were also asked how many people seemed to observe the incident and how easy it would be for other people to find out what happened. These items revealed that the public condition elicited greater perceptions of observation than the private condition. Collapsed across both scenarios, participants in the public condition thought that more people observed the situation

than participants in the private condition ($M = 3.71$ and $M = 2.62$, respectively; $t(97) = 7.43$, $p < .001$) and also thought that it would be easier for others to find out about the incident ($M = 3.02$ and $M = 2.35$, respectively; $t(97) = 5.57$, $p < .001$).

Dignity and Face

As expected, East Asians endorsed the concept of face more strongly than European Americans ($M = 3.51$, $SD = .69$ and $M = 3.27$, $SD = .53$, respectively; $t(97) = 2.00$, $p < .05$). However, the two samples did not differ on dignity scores ($t(97) = .835$, n.s.). This is to be somewhat expected as more than half of the participants in the East Asian sample were born in the United States, and only two had lived in the US for less than five years. Therefore, all participants were subject to some degree of American socialization and may have internalized dignity values.

Appraisals

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive effect of dignity and face on justice- and image-based appraisals, moderated by the public/private condition. In the first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and condition. Condition was effect-coded such that private = -1 and public = 1 to increase interpretability of the regression coefficients. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once with each the mean-centered dignity and face scores.

Hypothesis 1.a predicted that face would be related to appraisals of threat to one's image, especially in public situations. For image-threat appraisals, there were significant main effects for face and condition in the first step of the model (see Table

5). Higher face scores were associated with appraisals of a threat to one's image (β = .33, $p < .001$), and perception of image-threat was also greater in the public condition (β = .34, $p < .001$). These main effects were qualified by a Condition x Face interaction in the full model ($R^2\Delta$ = .033; β = .19, $p < .05$; see Figure 2), which revealed that face predicted image-threat appraisals in public (β = .83, $p < .001$) but not in private (β = .28, n.s.). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 1.a.

Hypothesis 1.b predicted that dignity would be related to appraisals of a justice infraction. There were not effects for dignity on appraisals, however. Moreover, unexpectedly, face marginally predicted justice appraisals in the first step of the model (β = .18, $p = .08$). This effect was qualified by a two-way Condition x Face interaction in the full model ($R^2\Delta$ = .074; β = .28, $p < .01$; see Table 6), which revealed that the relationship between face and justice appraisals was particularly strong in the public condition (β = .64, $p = .001$) but not in private (β = -.04, n.s.). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.b was not supported.

Emotions

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the effect of dignity and face on guilt and shame, moderated by the public/private condition. In the first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and condition. Condition was effect-coded such that private = -1 and public = 1 to increase interpretability of the regression coefficients. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once with both the mean-centered dignity and face scores.

Hypothesis 2.a predicted that face would be associated with feelings of shame, especially when the situation was public. Indeed, we found a main effect for face in the first step of the model, such that face was associated with greater appraisals of image threat ($\beta = .27$, $p < .001$). This main effect was qualified by a two-way interaction for Condition x Face in the full model ($\beta = .25$, $p < .05$; see Table 7 and Figure 3). Higher face scores were associated with increased shame, and were amplified in the public condition ($\beta = .87$, $p < .001$) as compared to the private condition ($\beta = .14$, n.s.). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 2.a.

Hypothesis 2.b predicted that dignity would be associated with feelings of guilt. Instead, only face was a significant predictor of guilt in the first step of the model, such that higher face scores were associated with increased feelings of guilt ($\beta = .24$, $p < .05$; see Table 8). Thus, Hypothesis 2.b was not supported.

Behavioral Intentions

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive effect of dignity and face on reparative, avoidant and distancing behavioral intentions, moderated by the public/private condition. In the first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and condition. Condition was effect-coded such that private = -1 and public = 1 to increase interpretability of the regression coefficients. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once with both the mean-centered dignity and face scores.

Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be associated with the desire to distance oneself from the wrongdoer after an ingroup transgression, particularly when

the situation was public. We found two main effects in the first step of the model. Overall, participants in the private condition actually wanted to distance themselves from their friend more than participants in the public condition ($\beta = -.24$, $p < .05$). There was also a marginal trend for dignity to predict the desire to distance oneself from the ingroup wrongdoer ($\beta = -.20$, $p = .053$). These main effects were qualified by a marginal two-way interaction for Condition x Face ($R^2\Delta = .06$; $\beta = .18$, $p = .075$; see Table 9 and Figure 4), such that face predicted intentions to distance in public ($\beta = .46$, $p = .09$), but not in private ($\beta = -.15$, n.s.). Thus, we found partial support for Hypothesis 3.a.

Hypothesis 3.a also predicted that face would be associated with the desire to withdraw after an ingroup wrongdoing, particularly when the situation was public. There was a significant two-way interaction for Condition x Face ($R^2\Delta = .07$; $\beta = .26$, $p < .05$; see Table 10 and Figure 5), such that face predicted intentions to withdraw, but only in public ($\beta = .65$, $p < .05$) as compared to in private ($\beta = -.34$, n.s.). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 3.a.

Hypothesis 3.b predicted that dignity would be associated with the desire to repair the situation after an ingroup wrongdoing. There was no main effect for dignity, but there was a two-way interaction for Condition x Dignity ($R^2\Delta = .05$; $\beta = .22$, $p < .05$; see Table 11) such that dignity actually slightly negatively predicted reparative intentions in private ($\beta = -.41$, $p = .09$) but not in public ($\beta = .27$, n.s.). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 3.b.

Moderated Mediation

Hypothesis 4 predicted that face would predict distancing tendencies, mediated by appraisals of image threat and shame, especially in public situations. We found partial to full support for Hypotheses 1.a, 2.a and 3.a through our hierarchical multiple regression analyses. We did not find support for Hypotheses 1.b, 2.b or 3.b. Thus, we set out to test our moderated mediation hypothesis only for the process model involving face. We conducted these analyses for both distancing and withdrawal appraisals.

Moderated mediation focuses on the degree to which an indirect effect of some independent variable X on Y through mediator M depends on some moderator M (Hayes, 2012). We followed path analytic procedures for moderated mediation (Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007; Hayes, 2012) with bootstrapping to test conditional indirect effects in the model. This is recommended over significance testing, as significance tests do not respect the non-normality of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect (Hayes, 2012). We entered face as the independent variable (X), condition as the moderator (W), and distancing/withdrawal as the dependent variables in each analysis (Y), with image-threat appraisals and shame as mediators (M1 and M2, respectively). Because appraisal and emotion measures were administered in such close temporal proximity, we entered these terms as mediators operating in parallel rather than serially (e.g. appraisals leading to emotions). Face, image-threat appraisals and shame were centered prior to analysis, and condition was entered at the values -1 = private and 1 = public.

Distancing. The analyses produced a 95% confidence interval based on 5000 bootstrap samples for the conditional indirect effect of face on distancing at both values of the moderator (-1 = private, 1 = public). When the confidence intervals do not contain zero, the effect is considered significant. We found a conditional indirect effect of face on distancing through image-threat appraisals (CI_{95} = .020, .53) and shame (CI_{95} = .11, .70) when the transgression occurred in public. Confidence intervals for the private condition contained zero for both image-threat appraisals and shame. We then looked for an indirect effect of the highest-order Condition x Face interaction (irrespective of values of the moderator) on distancing through image-threat appraisals and shame. We found indirect effects for both image-threat appraisals (CI_{95} = .00080, .24) and shame (CI_{95} = .028, .36). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 4. Please see Table 12 for the full moderated mediation results.

Withdrawal. We performed the analyses again for withdrawal behavior. The analyses produced a 95% confidence interval based on 5000 bootstrap samples for the conditional indirect effect of face on withdrawal at both values of the moderator (-1 = private, 1 = public). We found a conditional indirect effect of face on distancing through shame (CI_{95} = .23, .96) and but not image-threat appraisals (CI_{95} = -.031, .53) when the transgression occurred in public. Confidence intervals for the private condition contained zero for both image-threat appraisals and shame. We then looked for an indirect effect of the highest-order Condition x Face interaction (irrespective of values of the moderator) on withdrawal through image-threat appraisals and shame. We found indirect effects for shame (CI_{95} = .043, .47) but not image-threat appraisals

(CI_{95} = -.0070, .24). Thus, we found partial support for Hypothesis 4. Please see Table 13 for the full moderated mediation results.

Discussion

In Study 1, we found support for the hypothesis that face predicts appraisals of image threat, feelings of shame, and both intentions to withdraw from the situation and distance oneself from the offender in response to an ingroup transgression, especially in public. Moreover, our moderated mediation analyses provided partial support for the hypothesis that image-threat appraisals and shame mediate the relationship between face and behavioral outcomes in public situations. These findings provide insight as to why individuals who endorse face as a model of self-worth might see withdrawal and distancing as an appropriate image-maintenance strategy.

We found little support for the hypothesis that dignity predicts appraisals of justice threat, feelings of guilt, and reparative behavioral intentions. Dignity actually negatively predicted reparative intentions in private. However, we also found that dignity negatively predicted the tendency to distance oneself from an ingroup wrongdoer. It may be that because the norms to apologize are so strong in American culture, there was a ceiling effect such that dignity scores had no additional predictive power.

It is worth noting that face also predicted justice appraisals and guilt, including an interaction with the public condition for justice appraisals. It could be that people who are particularly concerned with reputation and preserving ingroup harmony are also sensitive to incidents that threaten justice in their social

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environment, especially when they occur in public. It is not particularly surprising that face also predicts guilt, since the literature reflects a historic struggle to disentangle these emotions.

Having found partial support for our theory in Study 1 using concrete hypothetical scenarios, we move on to test our hypotheses in a setting with higher external validity, drawing upon real-life past events.

Chapter 3: Study 2

Participants, Design, and Procedure

Participants were 130 undergraduate students (96 female, 35 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 20) at the University of Maryland who belonged to sororities and fraternities. We chose sororities and fraternities because many students belong to these organizations and thus we could have better control over the type of group referenced in response to the mindset prime. Participants were offered $5 each for participating in an online survey, and the Office of Fraternity and Sorority Life also offered campus service credits to organizations that participated in the study. Of the six organizations sampled, two sororities and one fraternity considered themselves Asian Interest Groups. Of the participants, 65 came from a European American background, 44 came from an East Asian background, and the rest belonged to a different ethnic background. Only European American and East Asian participants were included in the analyses. We had to remove an additional 30 participants from analyses because they did not complete the prime instructions as intended[4]. We were then left with 79 participants (57 female, 22 male; mean age = 20.1). Of these participants, 51 came from a European American background and 28 came from an East Asian background.

Study 2 used a mindset priming method (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen & Steller, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) to evoke memories of a time when a member of

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[4] This included many participants who wrote that they had not witnessed an ingroup transgression in their organization. Therefore, we were unable to analyze the rest of their data.

their sorority or fraternity committed a transgression that harmed someone outside of the group. All participants completed the survey online, and were given instructions to avoid distraction during the study. All participants provided consent before beginning the study. First, participants completed the Dignity and Face Scale. Then, they were asked to recall and write about a time when they witnessed a person they knew commit a wrongdoing that harmed someone else. Following the recall, participants answered questions about the transgression including the public/private nature of the event, appraisals associated with the transgression (e.g., image threat, justice threat), and emotional reactions (e.g., shame, guilt), and behavioral responses (e.g., apologizing, withdrawing). Finally, participants completed additional demographic questions. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed. Participants were paid later at a chapter meeting.

Stimuli

Recall Instrument

We presented participants with a prompt asking them to write about a time they witnessed a member of their group do something that harmed others. The exact wording of the prime was: "For the next 5 minutes, please write about a time when you witnessed (or heard about) a member of [organization name] do something that somehow harmed or negatively affected others who did **not** belong to your group. Describe what happened. Who did what? How did you feel? Did you do something, or want to do something?" The prompt was piloted in advance with East Asian and European American students, and modifications were made based on feedback that

would improve the comprehension of the prime. See Appendix I for the recall prompt instructions.

Measures

Dignity and face. We used the same 11-item Dignity and Face Scale as used in Study 1. This scale was also framed at the individual level, and we included the 5-item dignity ($\alpha = .50$) and 6-item face ($\alpha = .70$) subscales in our analyses.

Public/private context. In order to determine how often participants in dignity and face cultures reported ingroup transgressions that were public or private in nature, we asked participants to indicate whether the event occurred in public or in private. Participants were also asked how many people observed the incident, and how easily others could have found out about the event.

Appraisals. Participants were asked to complete the same appraisal measures as in Study 1 about image and justice based concerns, modified to reflect a past event rather than a hypothetical scenario. Based on our analyses of the scale in Study 1, we broke down the items into the justice- and image-based appraisal subscales for analyses ($\alpha = .86$ and $\alpha = .82$, respectively).

Emotional reactions. Participants completed the same guilt and shame indices as used in Study 1, broken down into guilt and shame subscales ($\alpha = .79$ and $\alpha = .92$, respectively).

Behavioral intentions. Participants completed the same behavioral intention items as in Study 1, including the approach, withdrawal, and distancing subscales ($\alpha = .85$, $\alpha = .76$, and $\alpha = .92$, respectively).

Additional measures. We included several potential control variables, such as perceived severity of the transgression, participants' status in the group (i.e., pledge or brother/sister) and how many semesters they belonged to the group. Because these variables were not found to correlate with our predictors, they were not included in primary analyses. However, severity will be discussed later as a moderator in exploratory analyses.

We also included a 4-item measure of identification with the participant's sorority or fraternity (Doosje et al., 1995) and the Inclusion of Other in Self Circle Task (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992), but because some of participants' responses referenced individual wrongdoings and others referenced group-based wrongdoings, we did not find either of these measures suitable to include in subsequent analyses. Finally, we collected demographic information about participants' age, gender and ethnicity.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables can be found in Table 14. Many participants had a difficult time recalling a specific instance of a member of a sorority or fraternity member committing a wrongdoing. Because including only participants who wrote about a specific incident drastically reduced our power, we included participants who wrote about general wrongdoings (e.g., "Very often within my sorority I hear girls in my chapter putting down other houses and girls in other chapters").

First we looked at dignity and face scores in order to ascertain differences between our East Asian and European American sample. We then used hierarchical

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multiple regression analyses to regress appraisals, emotions and behavior on dignity and face scores in the same manner that we did in Study 1.

Dignity and Face

We conducted t-tests to determine whether there was a mean difference in dignity and face scores between the European American and East Asian sample. East Asians endorsed face more strongly than European Americans, although this difference was only marginally significant ($M = 3.51$, $SD = .55$ and $M = 3.27$, $SD = .56$, respectively; $t(77) = 1.86$, $p = .066$). As in Study 1, dignity scores did not differ between East Asians and European Americans ($M = 4.04$, $SD = .43$ and $M = 3.98$, $SD = .49$ respectively; $t(77) = .49$, n.s.). The marginal difference in face scores, as compared to Study 1, might be accounted for by the distinctive Greek culture in which our subjects were immersed. Sororities and fraternities are unique organizations that have strong cultures, and so might not be too surprising that East Asians resembled European American students more than in Study 1.

Appraisals

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive effect of dignity and face on justice- and image-based appraisals, moderated by whether the situation occurred in public or private. We ran separate equations for justice and image appraisals. In the first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and an effect-coded term representing whether the situation was public or private. This term was coded such that -1 = private and 1 = public to increase interpretability of the regression coefficient. In the second step we entered two

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interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded public/private

term with the mean-centered dignity and face scores.

Hypothesis 1.a predicted that face would be positively associated with

appraisals of image threat, but only in public situations. In the first step of the model,

public/private context was a significant predictor such that public situations resulted

in higher appraisals of image-threat (β = .36, p < .001; see Table 15). Although face

was not a significant predictor (β = -.031), there was a nonsignificant trend for dignity

to negatively predict image threat appraisals, such that higher dignity scores were

related to lower appraisals of image threat (β = -.16, p = .13). Neither of the

interactions involving dignity or face with public/private were significant. Therefore,

we found no support for Hypothesis 1.a.

Hypothesis 1.b predicted that dignity would be positively associated with

appraisals of justice threat. There were no significant predictors in the full model (see

Table 16). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 1.b.

Emotions

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive

effect of dignity and face on guilt and shame, moderated by whether the situation

occurred in public or private. We ran separate equations for guilt and shame. In the

first step we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and an effect-coded term

representing whether the situation was public or private. This term was coded such

that -1 = private and 1 = public to increase interpretability of the regression

coefficient. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by

multiplying the effect-coded public/private term with the mean-centered dignity and face scores.

Hypothesis 2.a predicted that face would be positively associated with shame, especially in public situations. The public/private context variable was a significant predictor of shame in the first step of the model (see Table 17), such that public situations induced greater shame ($\beta = .34$, $p < .005$), but none of the other predictors were significant. Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 2.a.

Hypothesis 2.b predicted that dignity would be positively associated with guilt. None of the variables in any of the models were significant predictors of guilt (see Table 18). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 2.b.

Behavior

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine the predictive effect of dignity and face on approach, distancing and avoidance-oriented behavioral intentions, moderated by whether the situation occurred in public or private. We ran separate equations for approach, distancing and withdrawal. In the first step of each equation we entered mean-centered dignity and face scores and an effect-coded term representing whether the situation was public or private. This term was coded such that -1 = private and 1 = public to increase interpretability of the regression coefficient. In the second step we entered two interaction terms that were created by multiplying the effect-coded public/private term with the mean-centered dignity and face scores.

Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be positively associated with the tendency to distance oneself from the wrongdoer, but only in public. None of the

variables in any of the models were significant predictors of distancing behavior (see Table 19). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 3.a.

Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be positively associated with the tendency to withdraw from the situation. Although we did not find support for this hypothesis, there was a marginal effect for dignity in the first step of the model such that dignity negatively predicted the tendency to withdraw ($\beta = -.21$, $p = .073$; see Table 20).

Hypothesis 3.b predicted that dignity would be positively associated with reparative behavior. None of the variables in any of the models were significant predictors of reparative behavior (see Table 21). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 3.b.

Exploratory Analyses

Because face did not predict any of our expected appraisal, emotion or behavioral outcomes, we explored potential moderators. Given the wide range of situations recalled, we suspected that some of the situations reported were not severe enough to elicit face-relevant appraisals. Thus, we conducted further hierarchical regression analyses to test the moderating effect of severity on the Public/Private x Face interaction. We entered centered severity and face scores in the first step of the model, along with the effect-coded term for public/private context (-1 = private, 1 = public). We entered interaction terms for Public/Private x Face, Face x Severity and Public/Private x Severity in the second step of the model. Finally, we entered a three-way interaction term for Face x Public/Private x Severity by multiplying the two

centered severity and face variables with the effect-coded term for public/private context.

Along with a main effect for public/private context, as we had found in our original analyses, we found a marginal interaction for Face x Public/Private x Severity ($r^2\Delta = .041$; $\beta = .21$, $p = .056$; see Table 22 and Figures 6 and 7). Slope difference tests revealed that when the transgression was severe, high-face participants perceived greater image threat in public situations more than in private ($t(75) = 2.60$, $p = .01$).

Discussion

We did not find direct support for any of our hypotheses in Study 2. Across the board, public context was the strongest predictor of image-threat appraisals and shame. However, another interesting finding emerged. Although dignity did not predict the tendency to make appraisals about threats to justice or intentions to repair the situation, it did *negatively* predict the tendency to make appraisals about threats to one's image and the tendency to withdraw from the situation. This trend suggests that dignity might be related to the importance of rejecting others' opinions and norms against walking away from a problem.

Another intriguing finding surfaced in our exploratory analyses: Face *did* predict image-threat appraisals in public more than in private, but only when the transgression was considered severe. This moderation could have occurred because some of the situations reported were not severe enough to induce image concerns. Alternatively, it could be that some high-face participants did not want to acknowledge the offense as severe and therefore were able to distort the situation in

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order to avoid considering potential threats to their image, but when the situation *was* severe they could not ignore the consequences.

This unexpected finding leads us to speculate about other potential factors moderating the relationship between face and appraisals, emotions and behavior. Because of the importance of maintaining intragroup harmony, closeness with the wrongdoer could be another moderator. However, this was not an appropriate variable to test in this study as some participants recalled wrongdoings associated with an individual and others recalled wrongdoings associated with the group at large, so we include IOS accordingly in Study 3 to explore as a moderator.

Although the mindset priming approach utilized in Study 2 was strong with respect to external validity, it was difficult to have confidence in our findings with such diversity in the kinds of situations recalled. Therefore, we decided to test our theory in a more controlled laboratory setting in Study 3.

Chapter 4: Study 3

In Studies 1 and 2, we provided a basis for understanding the cross-cultural differences in appraisals, emotional reactions and action intentions in response to hypothetical and past ingroup transgressions against outgroup members. Using a new experimental game, Study 3 examined real behavior in the laboratory in response to an ingroup member's transgression against a stranger.

Participants, Design, and Procedure

Participants were 128 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Maryland (96 female, 31 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 21.11). East Asian and European American participants were recruited through campus-wide flyers and student organization listservs, and those who signed up to participate were asked to bring a same-sex friend with them to their study appointment. In many cases, participants brought a friend of the same ethnicity. Friends brought to the study were also included in our dataset, unless they were not European American or East Asian ($n = 10$). Participants who misunderstood events that occurred during the exercise (i.e., they did not notice that their friend committed a wrongdoing, $n = 9$) or failed the public/private manipulation check ($n = 15$) were also removed from analyses because these individuals' responses either indicate that they might not have been paying attention, or they misinterpreted significant events (i.e. thinking their friend *gave* 80 tokens rather than *took* 80 tokens would elicit very different appraisals). Some individuals met more than one of these criteria. Therefore, our final sample consisted

of 98 individuals (74 female, 24 male, mean age = 21.02). Of the sample, 41

participants identified themselves as European American, and 57 participants

identified themselves as East Asian.

Upon arrival, participants were told that they would complete a computer-

based community interaction exercise involving the allocation of resources with their

friend and another pair of friends located in the lab upstairs. They were seated in

separate rooms and completed the exercise on the computer without ever seeing their

friend or other participants. In fact, there were no other participants, and all players'

actions were pre-programmed by the computer. Participants completed separate

exercises and did not actually engage with their friend during the exercise.

All participants provided consent before beginning the study. Prior to the

computerized exercise, participants completed the Inclusion of Other in Self Scale

(IOS; Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992). Participants first read instructions about the

rules of the game, and were quizzed on the rules at the end of the instructions section.

Following the quiz, the exercise began. During the exercise, the participant witnessed

their friend commit an infraction against one of the outgroup participants. Then, the

participant had an opportunity to punish and/or reward the outgroup victim and their

friend. The public/private nature of the transgression was manipulated. Following the

exercise, participants were asked to complete measures about their experience in the

game, including appraisals, emotional reactions and other behavioral intentions

associated with the ingroup member's transgression. After a distractor task,

participants completed the Dignity and Face scale and demographic measures. Once

participants completed the study, they were completely debriefed regarding the true

purpose of the study and the deception involved in the friend's transgression during the exercise. Participants were then thanked and paid $15 for their participation in the hour-long study.

Public/Private Manipulation

Half of participants were assigned to the public condition ($n = 53$), and half of participants were assigned to the private condition ($n = 45$). In the public condition, participants were told that they would meet with the other participants and the experimenter at the end of the study to discuss the results of the exercise, and were instructed to wear a nametag for that meeting. Participants in the public condition also saw their name, their friend's name, and the other participants' names[5] on the screen throughout the exercise. Therefore, all decisions made during the exercise were easily identifiable. The participant and his/her friend were represented by blue avatars during the exercise, and the other friend pair was represented by orange avatars.

In the private condition, participants were told that they would never have to meet the other friend pair, and that the experimenter would not know how he or she had behaved during the game. Names were not displayed on the screen, and instead players were identified by aliases like "Player 1" and "Player 2." Like in the public condition, the participant and his or her friend were represented by blue avatars and the other friend pair in orange avatars, so that participants would be able to identify themselves and their friend.

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[5] Other participants' names were same-sex names that were pre-tested and thought to be equally likely to belong to East Asian and European American individuals.

Community Interactions Exercise

We adapted a "gift-giving game" from paradigms used in past research (Shinada, Yamagishi & Ohmura, 2004; Gelfand et al., unpublished data). Participants were told that the players would be able to distribute tokens amongst themselves during the exercise. It was emphasized that the point of the exercise was *not* to earn the most tokens, but rather to understand how people behave in everyday life. This point was elaborated on with bogus citations about how the game had been applied to real-world topics like business and diplomacy.

Participants were told that in each round, all players would roll a die. The player with the highest roll would assume the role of "trader," and the player with the second highest roll would assume the role of "receiver." There could only be one trader, so if two people rolled the same highest number (e.g., two people roll a six), the die would be rolled again. However, there could be multiple receivers if more than one person rolled the same second highest number. For example, if one person rolled a six, two people rolled a four and one person rolled a two, both people who rolled the four would become receivers. This rule was illustrated in an example round.

Participants were told that the number of rounds would be randomized, and that some rounds would be "giving" rounds and other rounds would be "taking" rounds. During "giving" rounds, the trader would give a number of his or her own tokens to the receiver(s). During "taking" rounds, the trader would take a number of tokens from the receiver(s) for him or herself. There were rules associated with the

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"giving" and "taking" rounds. During "giving" rounds, the trader should give at least 25 of their tokens to each receiver. During "taking" rounds, the trader should take no more than 25 tokens from each receiver. Participants also received information pertinent to the public/private manipulation. At the end of the instruction session, participants took a short quiz regarding the rules of the game, including the purpose of the game, which color the player and his or her friend would be represented by, and the upper limit of how many tokens should be taken during a taking round. Then, the exercise began.

In the exercise, all die rolls and player actions besides the participant's own were pre-programmed by the computer. All participants started out with 100 tokens. The first round was a "giving" round. One outgroup player rolled the highest number and became the trader. All other players, including the participant, rolled the same number, thus all other players will became receivers. In this round, participants saw the outgroup player donate 30 tokens to each of the three players (five more than the required 25). This established that the norm of the game was to be generous and cooperate, because players will not cooperate when they expect other members to defect (Shinada, Yamagishi & Ohmura, 2004; Yamagishi, 2005). A summary of the round events was displayed for several seconds before proceeding onto the second round. See Appendix J for sample screen shots from the computerized exercise.

Ingroup Transgression

The second round was a "taking" round. In this round, the ingroup player rolled the highest number, becoming the trader, and the outgroup player who was not the trader in the first round had the second highest roll, becoming the receiver. Based

on the actions of the player in the previous round, it would be expected that the ingroup player would also play fairly. However, the ingroup player took 80 tokens from the outgroup player, 55 more than permitted. Thus, this move should have been seen as an unfair transgression toward the outgroup player.

Ingroup Punishment and Outgroup Reparations

Before the third round, a message appeared indicating that it would be the final round. The third round was a "giving" round. In this round, the participant rolled the highest number and became the trader. The ingroup member and the outgroup victim both had the second highest roll; thus, participants were able to allocate some or all of their tokens to each of the two players. Participants were reminded that they had 130 tokens and were asked how many tokens they wanted to give to each player.

Because participants may have been motivated to "equalize" the difference between their friend and the victim (i.e., see that the victim has 50 tokens and the friend has 210), the number of tokens that each player currently possessed was hidden from the screen throughout the game. Thus, the behavior of the players is the detail that should have remained salient rather than the present distribution of tokens between players.

Outgroup reparations were operationalized by the number of tokens given to the outgroup victim. Distancing was operationalized by the number of tokens given to the friend, such that lower numbers represented greater distance. Ingroup punishment was operationalized by the absolute difference in tokens allocated between the ingroup member and the outgroup member, as well as the ratio difference in tokens allocated to outgroup victim out of all tokens given. This measure is modeled after

work distinguishing between "ingroup love" and "outgroup hate," or in other words, whether people display ingroup favoritism out of concern for their ingroup or hate for their outgroup (Halevy, Bornstein & Sagiv, 2008). Our measure distinguishes between the opposite, "ingroup hate" and "outgroup love"; that is, whether people's interpersonal behavior is geared toward providing reparations for the victimized outgroup or punishing the transgressing ingroup.

Messages

At the end of the exercise, participants were given an opportunity to send up to three messages to other players. Participants were able to write freely and could indicate to whom the message should be sent. Participants could choose to send each message to their friend, the victim, the victim's friend, or some combination of all three. For example, a participant could send the first message to their friend, the second message to the victim and the victim's friend, and the third message to all three players. Participants were not forced to send any messages. Therefore, the minimum number of recipients for the three messages was zero (i.e. the participant did not send any messages) and the maximum number of recipients for the three messages was nine (i.e. the participant sent three messages, and each message was sent to all three players).

Measures

Dignity and face. As in Studies 1 and 2, we included the personal value Dignity and Face Scale. Because cultural differences have been recently shown to be pronounced on descriptive norm scales (e.g., what people think *others* would do;

Shteynberg, Gelfand & Kim, 2009), we also included this referent for the scale in this study. In particular, this version of the scale asked participants "To what extent did your parents, while you were growing up, believe…?" as opposed to "To what extent do *you* believe…?"

Appraisals. In order to preserve the cover story about the community interactions exercise, appraisal measures were not as explicit as in Study 1 and Study 2. For instance, we were unable to ask about severity of the transgression in this study. Instead, we first asked participants if their friend had taken a turn, and if so, whether it was a giving or taking round. We then asked how selfish, generous and fair they thought their friend was. These questions served two purposes. First, subsequent questions were related to the friend's taking behavior, so we had to reduce suspicion by making it seem like these questions were asked based on their response (i.e. "You indicated your friend took a turn…") and not because we already knew about the friend's behavior. Second, this allowed us to identify and remove participants who misunderstood their friend's role in the game.

We included items about perceived injustices during the exercise that were framed very generally (e.g., "There was a breach of fairness during the exercise") and participants' concerns about being associated with their friend during their friend's turn (e.g., "My image/reputation was at stake"). These items were written to sound quite vague rather than tailored to the specific offense so as to not make it obvious that the friend's transgression had been rigged.

We performed Principal Axis Factoring analyses to examine the underlying factor structure of our items. Based on factor loadings and correlations between

individual items, we arrived at two factors: Justice consisted of five items (three were reverse-coded such that higher scores reflected the perception that there had been an injustice, e.g. "the participants all received what they deserved"; α = .77), and Image Threat consisted of one item ("My image/reputation was at stake")[6]. Please see Table 23 for factor loadings and Appendix K for the full measure.

Emotional reactions. Participants were asked to indicate the emotions they experienced as well as other mental states during their friend's turn and their own turn. Because we did not want to induce suspicion by over-emphasizing guilt and shame, we changed some of the original items from the guilt and shame inventory used in Studies 1 and 2 and included several distractor items from the PANAS inventory such as "active" and "surprised." However, unlike in Studies 1 and 2, Principal Axis Factoring analyses revealed that all of the guilt and shame items loaded onto one factor rather than emerging as two clear guilt and shame factors. Thus, we created a composite Guilt/Shame factor for subsequent analyses (α = .90). Please see Appendix L for the full measure.

Behavioral responses. In addition to the actual token-giving behavior measured during the game, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they wanted to engage in other behaviors during the game, reflecting reparative and distancing tendencies. For example, a reparation-oriented behavior item was "I wanted my friend to apologize" and a distancing-oriented item was "I wanted to be

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[6] There were two additional factors that emerged. One item, "Other people were aware of my association with my friend," loaded separately and was not correlated with the image threat item, so it was not included in image-threat analyses. There was a second factor, Empathy, which consisted of three items (e.g. "I felt concerned for one or more of the participants during the exercise"). Because nothing was found for Empathy, an unexpected factor, it will not be discussed further. Additionally, the factor for Image-threat included two identical items; one related to the friend's turn and one related to the participant's turn. Because we are most interested reactions to the friend's turn, only the image-threat item framed at this level will be used in subsequent analyses.

unassociated with my friend." We also included several distractor items so as to not make it appear as if it were expected that the friend would commit an offense (e.g., "I wanted one of the other players to apologize to my friend").

We conducted Principal Axis Factoring analyses with a direct oblimin rotation to examine the underlying structure of our items. Based on the factor loadings and correlations between individual items, we decided upon four factors: Reparative behavior consisted of three items (α = .76), Avoidance consisted of three items (α = .61), Distancing consisted of two items (α = .86), and Punishment consisted of one item. Please see Table 24 for factor loadings and Appendix M for the full measure.

Additional measures. Participants completed the IOS circle task (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992) to indicate their closeness with their friend prior to the exercise. The seven circles demonstrated the overlap between "self" and "other" and were coded such that "1" represented the lowest amount of overlap and "7" represented the greatest amount of overlap. This variable was not found to correlate with predictors and so it was not included in the primary analyses. However, it will be discussed further as a moderator in exploratory analyses. Participants also completed several items as part of a manipulation check (see Appendix N) and were asked demographic questions about their age, gender and ethnicity.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables can be found in Table 25. First, we looked for differences between our East Asian and European American samples in the Dignity and Face scales, for both the individual-level and family socialization-level versions. Then, we conducted hierarchical regression

analyses to explore the relationship between our predictors and token-giving behavior. We then conducted hierarchical regression analyses to explore the relationship between our predictors and appraisals, emotions and non-token related behavioral intentions. Finally, we conducted some further exploratory analyses to examine the moderating effect of relationship closeness on token-giving behavior.

Manipulation Check

Participants in the private condition indicated that they felt more anonymous then participants in the public condition, during their friend's turn ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 1.15$ and $M = 1.87$, $SD = 1.09$, respectively; $t(96) = 4.20$, $p < .001$) and their own turn ($M = 2.90$, $SD = 1.17$ and $M = 1.77$, $SD = 1.01$, respectively; $t(96) = 5.05$, $p < .001$). Participants had also been asked whether information about their behavior would be shared with others and if they would have to meet the other participants later. Those who answered incorrectly were removed from analyses ($n = 15$).

Dignity and Face

As in Studies 1 and 2, we analyzed the personal-values dignity and Face scale with the five-item dignity and six-item face subscales. Dignity scores ($\alpha = .50$) did not differ between East Asian and European American participants ($M = 3.22$, $SD = .488$ and $M = 3.31$, $SD = .506$, respectively; $t(96) = .89$, n.s.) and face scores ($\alpha = .70$) were only marginally higher for East Asians ($M = 3.37$, $SD = .538$ and $M = 3.15$, $SD = .620$, respectively; $t(96) = .89$, $p < .10$).

Because of issues of socialization while living in a foreign country and research indicating that descriptive norms are a strong predictor of behavior

(Shteynberg, Gelfand & Kim, 2009), we decided to explore the version of the scale framed at the level of family upbringing. Reliability for the dignity subscale was α = .65, and reliability for the face subscale was α = .80. We looked for differences between our East Asian and European American sample. As expected, East Asians endorsed the concept of face more strongly than European Americans (M = 3.83, SD = .593 and M = 3.51, SD = .77, respectively; $t(96)$ = 2.32, p < .05) and European Americans endorsed the concept of dignity more strongly than East Asians (M = 3.80, SD = .64 and M = 3.40, SD = .61, respectively; $t(96)$ = 3.18, p < .005).

Although results for the subsequent analyses were similar between the personal values and descriptive norm versions of the measure, we decided that the descriptive norm measure would be more representative of our conceptualization of dignity and face as models of self-worth grounded in culture (as opposed to individual beliefs). Thus, we will only address results related to this version of the scale.

Tokens

We removed three outliers from token analyses because two individuals gave away all 130 of their tokens and one participant only gave away one token (with outliers removed, M = 62.8, SD = 23.76). We conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses including mean-centered terms for dignity and face along with an effect-coded term for condition (-1 = private, 1 = public) in the first step, and two interaction terms for face and dignity with condition in the third step created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once each with the mean-centered dignity and face terms.

Outgroup reparations (Number of tokens given to the victim). The mean number of tokens given to the victim, out of a possible 130, was 32.13. There were no significant predictors in any step of the model (see Table 26).

Ingroup distancing (Number of tokens given to the friend). The mean number of tokens given to the friend, out of a possible 130, was 30.67. There were no significant predictors in any step of the model (see Table 27).

Ingroup punishment (Absolute difference of tokens between the victim and friend). The absolute difference was calculated by subtracting the number of tokens given to the friend from the number of tokens given to the victim. The mean absolute difference in tokens allocated was 1.45, meaning that on average participants gave 1.45 more tokens to the victim than to the friend. None of the variables in any steps of the model significantly predicted the absolute difference of tokens given to the victim over the friend (see Table 28).

Ingroup punishment (Proportion of tokens given to victim over friend). The proportion of tokens given to the victim was calculated by dividing the number of tokens given to the friend by the sum of tokens given to the victim and the friend. The mean proportion of tokens given to the victim was .5095, meaning that participants on average gave 50.95% of their tokens to the victim. None of the variables in any step of the model significantly predicted the proportion of tokens given to the victim (See Table 29).

Messages to Participants

Because participants were not required to send any messages, there was very little variance in the content of the messages sent to the friend, the victim, and the

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victim's friend. Therefore, we did not have enough power to perform an analysis of the message content.

Appraisals

We conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses in order to test the hypothesis that dignity predicts Justice appraisals and face predicts Image-threat appraisals in public situations. We entered mean-centered terms for dignity and face along with an effect-coded term for condition (-1 = private, 1 = public) in the first step. In the second step we entered two interaction terms for face and dignity with condition, created by multiplying the effect-coded condition term once each with the mean-centered face and dignity terms. Three items in the justice appraisals factor were reverse-coded prior to creating the composite term.

Hypothesis 1.a predicted that face would be related to appraisals that one's image was threatened, but only in public. None of the predictors in the model accounted for the degree to which participants perceived a threat to their image (see Table 30). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 1.a.

Hypothesis 1.b predicted that dignity would predict appraisals that an injustice had taken place. This hypothesis was not directly supported. In the first step of the model, face predicted justice appraisals such that higher face scores were related to appraisals that people *had* behaved fairly during the exercise ($\beta = -.21, p < .05$; see Table 31). This was qualified by a marginal two-way interaction for Condition x Dignity in the full model ($r^2\Delta = .071; \beta = .27, p < .01$; see Figure 8). Dignity was related to fewer appraisals about justice in private ($\beta = -.51, p < .01$) as compared to in public ($\beta = .24$, n.s.).

Emotions Experienced During the Friend's Turn

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses identical to the ones performed with the composite appraisal variables, with the guilt/shame composite term associated with the friend's turn entered as the criterion variable.

Because we ended up with a single Guilt/Shame factor, our original hypotheses regarding emotion were not pertinent to the present analyses. However, there was a marginal two-way Condition x Face interaction in the full model ($r^2\Delta$ = .04; β = -.20, p = .054; see Table 32 and Figure 9). Although neither of the simple slopes were significant, it appears that the trend for face to be associated with increased guilt in the private condition was driving the interaction (β = .21; p = .12).

Behavior

We conducted hierarchical regression analyses identical to the ones performed with the composite appraisal and emotion variables, with the withdrawal, distancing, punishing and reparative behavior terms entered as criterion variables.

Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be associated with the desire to distance oneself from the ingroup wrongdoer, especially in public. We found no support for this hypothesis, but there was a significant two-way Condition x Dignity interaction ($r^2\Delta$ = .061; β = .24, p < .05; see Table 33) in the full model such that dignity was related to a decreased desire to disassociate with the friend in the private condition (β = -.48, p < .05).

Hypothesis 3.a also predicted that face would be associated with the desire to withdraw from the situation (i.e., exit the game early), especially when the transgression was public. There were two interactions in the full model (see Table

34). First, there was a significant Condition x Face interaction ($r^2\Delta = .14$; $\beta = -.29$, $p < .005$; see Figure 10) such that face was associated with a *decreased* desire to exit the game in the public condition ($\beta = -.59$, $p < .01$) as compared to in private ($\beta = .35$, n.s.). Because the interaction was in the opposite direction than predicted, we did not find support for Hypothesis 3.a. Second, there was a Condition x Dignity interaction similar to the one found with the composite distancing variable ($r^2\Delta = .14$; $\beta = .23$, $p < .05$; see Figure 11), such that dignity was associated with decreased withdrawal behavior in the private condition ($\beta = -.58$, $p = .01$) as compared to the public condition ($\beta = .18$, n.s.).

Finally, Hypothesis 3.a predicted that face would be associated with the desire to distance oneself from the friend via making the friend incur consequences for his or her behavior (i.e., punishment), but only when the transgression occurred in public. None of the predictors were significant in any step of the model (see Table 35). Therefore, this part of Hypothesis 3.a was not supported.

Hypothesis 3.b predicted that dignity would be associated with the desire to make reparations toward the victim. However, none of the predictors in the model accounted for the degree to which participants wished to make amends with the victim (see Table 36). Therefore, we found no support for Hypothesis 3.b.

Exploratory Analyses

Because none of our predictors influenced token-giving behavior, we began to explore potential moderators. We surmised that for participants who endorse face as a model of self-worth, the strength of the relationship with the friend might be an important qualifier of behavioral responses. Therefore, we conducted hierarchical

regression analyses including a three-way interaction for Condition x Face x IOS. In addition to the terms included in the original model, we entered a mean-centered term for IOS in the first step, and two-way interaction terms for Face x IOS and Condition x IOS in the second step. Some notable preliminary findings are described in what follows.

Ingroup distancing (Number of tokens given to the friend). In the first step of the model, there was a main effect for IOS such that closeness was negatively related to token-giving behavior toward the friend (β = -.21, p < .05; see Table 37). This effect was qualified by a marginal two-way interaction of Face x IOS in the second step of the model ($r^2\Delta$ = .047; β = -.25, p < .05). Simple slope tests revealed that closeness was related to a decrease in tokens given to the friend when the participant was high on face (β = -5.58, p = .005) as compared to low on face (β = -.67, n.s.). The three-way interaction in the full model was not significant.

Ingroup punishment (Absolute difference of tokens between the victim and friend). There was a three-way interaction for Condition x Face x IOS in the full model ($r^2\Delta$ = .047; β = -.25, p < .05; see Table 38 and Figures 12 and 13). Simple slope tests revealed that face was associated with less ingroup punishment, but only in private *and* when the relationship with the friend was not close (β = -11.42, p < .01; evaluated at one standard deviation below the IOS mean). In public, face did not predict token-giving behavior, although there was a nonsignificant trend for face to be related to *greater* ingroup punishment when participants were not close to the friend (β = 5.67, p = .15).

Ingroup punishment (Proportion of tokens given to victim over friend). Again, there was a marginal interaction for Condition x Face x IOS in the full model ($r^2\Delta$ = .041; β = -.24, p = .057; see Table 39 and Figures 14 and 15). The pattern was the same as the measure of absolute difference in tokens. Face was associated with less ingroup punishment but only in private and when the relationship was not close (β = -6.14, p < .05; evaluated at one standard deviation below the IOS mean[7]). These findings suggest that the relationship between face and ingroup punishment is not uniform. It was in the private condition that high-face participants gave more tokens to the victim than the friend, and notably, only for relationships that were *less* close. Therefore, the nature of the relationship appears to be an important moderator.

Discussion

We found no direct empirical support for our hypotheses. On the contrary, we actually found evidence in stark contradiction to our hypotheses. Even after a blatant rule violation, face was related to perceptions that everyone had behaved fairly during the exercise and predicted decreased willingness to withdraw from the situation in public. Dignity, in comparison, resembled some of the predictions we had made for face. Dignity was related to distancing and avoidance behavioral tendencies in public, but not in private. Perhaps participants who endorse the justice values associated with dignity cultures do not want to associate with those who break fairness norms, although this is not a trend we observed in Studies 1 or 2.

In conjunction with our exploratory analyses, the results raise questions about how face operates quite differently depending on the context. First, closeness to the

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[7] The dependent variable was multiplied by 100 prior to analyses for better interpretability of the simple slope test results.

friend emerged as an important qualifier in our exploratory analyses. In private, high-face participants who were not close to their friends punished the ingroup member *less* in private, but slightly more in public. This interesting pattern suggests that face concerns may be closely related to the nature of the relationship, and are not absent when removed from the public eye. Perhaps in public, high-face participants felt able to distance themselves from friends with whom they were not close. In private, however, high-face participants were concerned with saving face in front of their friend, particularly when the relationship was not as strong.

Second, the fact that high-face participants indicated that everyone played fairly suggests that they might not have thought taking coins in an experimental game was a problem, and did not find the offense to be particularly egregious. Despite that everyone witnessed the same offense, face participants were less affected by their friend's behavior. This raises the question of whether these participants may have been motivated to distort the offense so as to avoid experiencing vicarious guilt or shame, especially in public. Although not in line with our original hypotheses, these findings shed light on new theoretical directions for the study of ingroup wrongdoings in face cultures.

Chapter 5: General Discussion

Given the critical implications for intergroup relations, the role of culture in emotional responses to ingroup transgressions is a topic in need of greater understanding, which was the purpose of this research. Earlier we discussed how a process model of emotions could afford a better understanding of how the same ingroup transgression can lead to vastly different outcomes across cultures due to differences in focal concerns. We argued that cultural models of self-worth influence the trajectory of appraisals, emotional experiences and behaviors that unfold after witnessing an ingroup transgression. Specifically, we predicted that the justice concerns associated with dignity cultures and image concerns associated with face cultures could offer an explanation as to why these cultures have different key priorities in resolving a transgression (e.g., preserving ingroup reputation versus restoring justice), which promote emotional experiences like guilt and shame and action tendencies like reparations and avoidance, respectively.

We found partial support for our theory in Study 1. As predicted, face was related to the tendency to distance oneself from the fallout of an ingroup transgression, mediated by appraisals of image threat and shame, but only when the wrongdoing occurred in the public eye. Indeed, individuals who subscribe to a model of self-worth defined by reputation are particularly concerned about events that threaten one's public image, which introduce downstream consequences for emotions and behavior. Withdrawing from the situation or distancing oneself from the ingroup

member with the tarnished reputation can serve as effective methods of "damage control" when experiencing vicarious shame.

Unexpected findings in Study 3 unearthed some new complexities surrounding the relationship between face and responses to ingroup wrongdoings. Whereas we expected participants to experience shame and distance themselves from their friend, especially in public, we found the reverse. Face was related to more guilt in private than in public, and participants wanted to withdraw from the situation more in private than in public. Whether these findings are actually in direct opposition to our hypotheses, or are a reflection of motivated distortion, is a matter for further discussion.

We did not find any direct support for our hypotheses regarding the relationship between dignity and justice appraisals, guilt and reparative behavior. Justice appraisals and guilt were associated with reparative behavior in Study 1, but the link between dignity and these outcomes was not there. Because most of our subjects were entrenched in the values of a dignity-oriented society, we ran into ceiling effects with items regarding apologies and reparations. Instead, dignity was related to lower image-threat appraisals and the tendency to *not* withdraw from the situation in Study 2, and interacted with public/private context in Study 3 in that dignity was associated with less withdrawal, but only in private as opposed to public. Of course, people in dignity cultures are not totally immune to others' opinions. High-dignity individuals may not want to be associated with fairness-norm breakers.

Contribution to Theory and Research

This work makes several marked contributions to the vicarious guilt and shame and cross-cultural literatures. First, we add to the existing guilt and shame literature, which has been limited to North American and Western European domains, by exploring other cultural factors that influence emotional and behavioral reactions to ingroup wrongdoings. Although previous work has given attention to the tendency for different behavioral tendencies to emerge from the emotions guilt and shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007), what we have done is highlighted some of the factors that give way to this divergence of emotional and behavioral responses. Notably, individuals from face cultures may be predisposed to responding to ingroup transgressions in ways differently than what is currently reflected in the vicarious guilt and shame literature. Our results do not provide any further clarification with respect to the guilt and shame debate. Shame was associated with concerns about image (Study 1) and public situations (Study 2) but was not clearly demarcated from guilt, particularly in Study 3. This muddled distinction reinforces our emphasis on the appraisals and behavioral outcomes surrounding an ingroup transgression in the present research.

It is worth noting that although our hypotheses projected divergent paths of appraisals, emotions and behavioral outcomes for dignity and face participants, none of these responses are mutually exclusive. In addition to image threat, shame and avoidance, face was also related to justice appraisals and guilt in Study 1. Face might heighten awareness of other threats that have implications for one's ingroup reputation, such as a breach of justice. We discovered an interesting negative

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relationship between dignity and withdrawal in Study 2, and an interaction with public context in Study 3. Our analyses allowed us to explore the relationship between dignity and face with both approach and avoidance oriented responses.

Finally, we add to the cross-cultural literature by exploring two constructs, dignity and face, which are quite pertinent to the study of self-relevant phenomena such as ingroup transgressions. Until now, these dimensions of culture had not been explored in the domain of intergroup behavior. Through this work on ingroup transgressions we achieved the intermediate goal of better understanding the constitution of elements comprising dignity and face and how these models of self-worth interact with contextual variables to predict behavior.

Needless to say, our three studies each have their own strengths and weakness with respect to both methodological soundness and the ability to test the crux of the theory. Where we increased methodological rigor, we were sometimes faced with the trade-off of decreased ability to test the hypotheses as intended. We outline the limitations and future directions of this research program in what follows.

Methodology Meets Theory: A Trade-Off

The methods employed in Study 1 allowed for a good test of the theory as all participants read the same ingroup transgression scenarios, which were similar in severity. However, our outcome measures were not necessarily reliable proxies for actual behavior. The mindset priming method we used in Study 2 allowed us to explore individuals' actual responses to a past ingroup transgression, within a unique social culture that all participants shared. However, we were unable to control for the type of offense recalled, and the culture that participants belonged to was so strong

that our participants may not have been representative of prototypical dignity and face culture members. Study 3 provided a rigorous test of the theory by subjecting every participant to the same ingroup transgression. However, we were unable to tap into emotional reactions and appraisals in the same way as we could in Studies 1 and 2. Moreover, it is difficult to simulate an offense in the lab that compares to the types of offenses individuals witness in their everyday lives (i.e, the wrongdoing of the friend taking too many tokens may not have been taken seriously). Yet, the fruits of our labor are not in vain as the limitations of this work gave rise to unexpected findings and generated new ideas. These considerations lead us to propose 1) an expansion of the theory and 2) a discussion of methodological improvements for future research.

Theoretical Expansion

We were able to find partial support for our original theory in Study 1. The results of Studies 2 and 3, however, highlighted theoretical nuances warranting further investigation. We address these theoretical issues below.

The Nature of the Offense

We originally hypothesized quite broadly about dignity and face cultures' responses to ingroup wrongdoings. Because we did not initially theorize that reactions would depend on the severity or strength of the situation, severity was not measured consistently throughout the three studies, nor did we ask any other questions about the nature of the situation outside the domain of justice or image concerns. The vicarious guilt and shame literature also does not distinguish between different types of offenses. In Study 1, we did our best to develop scenarios that were representative of

a variety of realistic ingroup offenses that were similar in severity. In Study 2, however, some participants discussed minor, relational incidents involving bad-mouthing or rude behavior, whereas others discussed more severe, harmful instances of sexual harassment and violence. The diversity of responses may have accounted for the lack of consistency in the relationship between dignity and face and appraisals, emotions and behavior. We expected that the controlled context of the ingroup transgression in Study 3 would offer suitable conditions to test the theory, but it turned out that many participants were relatively unaffected by the friend's transgression. Though an undeniable breach of the rules, many participants did not take the exercise seriously.

Thus, it appears that not all ingroup wrongdoings generate the pattern of responding that we expected which suggests the theory needs to be much more specific about the nature of the offense situation. For example, individuals in dignity and face cultures may be more severely affected by different types of transgressions. The ingroup transgression in Study 3 in particular was somewhat of a "dignity" offense, since it was related to an allocation of resources. We did not have the power to further analyze the types of situations reported in Study 2, but this theory should be tested in the future with respect to situations that are clearly related to justice or reputation. We could also begin to explore other types of transgressions, such as those involving negligence versus active wrongdoing (Gonzales, Manning & Haugen, 1992).

Motivated Distortion

Although the nature of the transgression is certainly an important factor, it is also possible that participants may have distorted the situation in order to avoid experiencing an unpleasant emotion like guilt or shame (Baumeister & Catanese, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2012). In Study 2, a significant number of participants were unable to recall a time when a member of their sorority or fraternity member committed a wrongdoing. Although this may have truly been the case for some individuals, particularly those who were new to the organization, it is somewhat suspect that *so* many participants claimed that a member of their organization had never done anything wrong. Some participants said they simply couldn't remember an incident. Others were quite defiant; apparently offended by the prompt's suggestion that someone in their organization could have done something wrong. Participants boasted of their organization's character and moral integrity and denied that such a wrongdoing could have taken place. Although we did not have the power to investigate further, we wonder whether some participants were unable to recall a past wrongdoing in order to avoid guilt or shame, and if this trend might have been more common in high-face participants.

There was a relationship between face and this kind of distortion response in Study 3. Although many participants did not take the ingroup wrongdoing seriously in Study 3, some participants took it even less seriously than others. The trend for face to predict increased perceptions of fair behavior and guilt only in private suggest that other factors may have been at play. If participants were not taking the exercise seriously, we should not have seen a relationship between face and these variables.

Instead, it appeared that high-face participants may have been distorting the situation, justifying to themselves that a wrongdoing in the context laboratory exercise was not cause for concern.

Our exploratory analyses in Study 2 offer additional support for this hypothesis. We did not find a relationship between face and image-threat appraisals in our main analyses. When we added severity as a moderator, however, high-face participants did appraise the situation to threaten their image, but only when the offense was perceived to be severe. Therefore, it may be possible to distort the situation when the implications for the offense are ambiguous (such as was the case in Study 3 and for many participants in Study 2) but not in stronger situations (such as was the case in Study 1). Future research should explore this distortion hypothesis, with respect to how people from face cultures will respond to ingroup wrongdoings when it is easy versus difficult to distort the situation, and also what kinds of conditions allow for distortion.

It is also possible that people from dignity cultures gradually recognize the severity of situations as they become more serious (i.e. linearly), whereas people from face cultures may distort until a certain threshold where they can distort no more, at which point theorized distancing mechanisms are activated (i.e. nonlinearly). A dynamical tool has already been developed to study the cultural context of conflict escalation using progressive scenarios (Bui-Wrzosinska, Gelfand et al., 2009). We could adapt this tool to reflect ingroup transgressions and examine the linearity or non-linearity of responses in dignity and face cultures.

Relationship With the Wrongdoer

There are a number of situational elements that may make it more or less difficult to distort information. The nature of the transgression is one factor. The relationship with the wrongdoer is another. Because face is related not only to reputation but group harmony, individuals may feel "trapped" when witnessing an ingroup member commit a wrongdoing. When it is not possible to distance oneself from the wrongdoer, it may be easier to distort the situation so as to not experience guilt or shame.

Our exploratory analyses in Study 3 shed some light on this possibility. We found that high-face participants gave a lower proportion of tokens to the victim in private when they were not close to their friend. In public, though, there was a trend for high-face participants to give a *greater* proportion of their tokens to the victim when they were less close to their friend. In public, high-face participants could distance themselves from a friend who was not very close and save their own face by giving the victim more tokens. In private, the trend is less clear, although participants may have wanted to avoid creating discomfort between themselves and a friend who they did not know so well.

These interactions with closeness also offer insight to the important question of how face operates in different situations. Although the public condition certainly involved greater risks to one's public reputation, it would be naïve to claim that face concerns should be absent in the private condition. On the contrary, the importance of maintaining harmony may be even more paramount in the absence of judgment from outgroup others. Even in public, preserving a friend's face may be as important as

preserving one's own face in front of others. As one high-face participant in the public condition in Study 3 explained:

> "I thought my friend took too much and violated the rule […] I wanted to make up for the extra part my friend took from the receiver in her round […] At first I wanted to give my friend 30 […] Since my decision can be seen by my friend, I don't want her to feel bad as I give the other receiver 55 to make up for the extra-taken part, I raised the amount for my friend to 50."

This participant's explanation for her motivation to distribute tokens highlights the complexity of the face construct. Face may be associated with distancing from, increased commitment to, and protection of an ingroup wrongdoer, depending on the situation. Therefore, we should pay close attention to these subtle contextual factors in our theorizing about face-related behavior.

The Constructs of Dignity and Face

Although not new concepts, research on dignity and face is quite young in the field of cross-cultural psychology. Therefore, there is still much more to uncover about what aspects of dignity and face culture are particularly salient with respect to self-relevant events like ingroup transgressions. In our theorizing, we focused on the importance of fairness and egalitarian values in dignity cultures, and the importance of reputation as threat to group harmony in face cultures. However, our results (and also lack-thereof) cause us to consider other important aspects of these cultures that may not have been captured in our measures or were neglected in our hypotheses.

As discussed, the development and particularly the validation of the Dignity and Face Scale is still a work in progress. Reliability for the dignity scale in all three

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studies was suboptimal, especially in comparison to the face scale. Therefore, the content validity of the items may have led to problems with the predictive validity of the scale. The items included in the scale are more related to freedom and independence from judgment of others rather than the belief that every individual has equal worth or the unequivocal right to be respected.

These two aspects of dignity culture may predict quite different outcomes in response to ingroup wrongdoings. We would expect that endorsement of dignity values surrounding equal worth and egalitarian treatment would lead to appraisals about injustices and behavior directed toward repairing an ingroup wrongdoing. However, endorsement of dignity values surrounding freedom and independence from judgment might lead individuals to feel detached or indifferent in response to an ingroup transgression. In the most extreme case, the belief that individuals deserve an equal opportunity to succeed can translate into the belief that individuals who find themselves in a state of misfortune are on their own to get themselves out of trouble. Both our measures and our hypotheses do not distinguish between these dignity-related values.

With respect to face cultures, we have already alluded to some of the unforeseen complexities involving face culture that were not addressed in our hypotheses or measures. Although the internal consistency of the face scale was acceptable, our dependent variables may not have been operationalized appropriately to capture the range of responses induced by an ingroup transgression in face cultures. We were looking for conscious recognition of threats to one's image and clear instances of distancing and withdrawal. However, we may have failed to recognize

that because that the purpose of distancing and withdrawing is to save face and avoid disrupting harmony, it must be done in a way that is subtle, perhaps even too subtle to be picked up by our measures. We also did not consider that distortion might be another mechanism for avoiding the situation. If this is indeed the case, we might not be able to find support for our hypotheses with such explicit measures of appraisals and behavioral intentions.

Moreover, in our theorizing about the importance of public situations, we neglected to consider whether a public situation 1) makes salient concerns about one's reputation held by the public at large (as hypothesized) or 2) makes salient concerns about one's reputation held solely by one's ingroup, which would also be applicable in "private" situations. Because face cultures are deeply committed to maintaining intragroup harmony, the witness of an ingroup offense may be more concerned about the *wrongdoer's* perception that he or she is withdrawing from the group rather than the *public's* perception that he or she is associated with the group. Thus, we might actually find that individuals from face cultures will neither advance nor retreat, but will rather remain "paralyzed" in the desire to avoid disrupting intragroup harmony. It would be useful to address this distinction of ingroup-outgroup public audience in future work by manipulating who the public is, such as by highlighting the perceptions of significant others (Kim & Cohen, 2010) versus strangers.

Methodological Limitations and Future Directions

Sampling

As discussed, our American sample presented certain challenges in assessing the dignity and face constructs. Future studies should sample individuals who are actually immersed in a culture of face. To this point, we are working on a replication of Study 2, having just collected data at a university in Japan. We should also replicate this work in non-student samples, as college students are limited in the types of ingroup transgressions with which they can relate. We could test our theory in another setting such as a workplace or other organization, where individuals may bear witness to ingroup wrongdoings with a greater degree of frequency.

Stimuli and Measures

In our discussion of theoretical expansion, we addressed some parts of our methodology that made it difficult to test our theory as intended. In the future, we need to develop measures of appraisals, emotions and behavior that we can use in the lab without evoking social desirability concerns that may result in ceiling effects (e.g., desire to apologize) or motivated distortion (e.g., indicating one does not feel guilt to avoid feeling guilt). This will require devising creative, implicit measures that are more sensitive to the subtleties of face-driven behavior. For instance, we could use facial recognition or eye-tracking software to analyze participants' reactions to the news of a friend's wrongdoing rather than rely on self-report measures of guilt and shame.

We also need to generate stronger situations for the lab that do not allow for distortion. The community interactions exercise used in Study 3 was a brand new paradigm and can be modified in the future to improve external validity. For instance, "tokens" could be exchanged for another more meaningful resource, such as bonus study payment. Rather than have participants respond by giving their own tokens, which would be a conflict of self-interest, they could respond by helping or apologizing in an unrelated task. We could also improve the base rate of our messages measure by having participants choose from pre-written messages to send at the end of the exercise.

Alternatively, we could contrive a situation where it appears the ingroup friend has committed a more egregious offense, such as cheating, stealing or hurting another participant's feelings. In order to create a stronger situation, we could also use a minimal groups paradigm such that a confederate group member blatantly commits one of the aforementioned offenses. Conducting cross-cultural focus groups could help us identify situations that are considered equally atrocious in dignity and face cultures so that we can pilot different types of offenses in the lab.

Conclusion

Earlier, we recalled the incident when the President of Toyota was forced to respond to a highly public company failure. Although this was an extreme case, it is only one example of how misunderstanding can arise due to cross-cultural differences in concerns associated with ingroup wrongdoings. This research not only revealed that high-face individuals are indeed sometimes driven by image concerns and shame to distance themselves from the situation or the wrongdoer, but we also identified

other unexpected patterns of responding that can emerge in face cultures. This work

contributes to both the guilt and shame and cross-cultural literatures. We have

provided a theoretical expansion to the existing work on group-based guilt and

shame, unearthing new possibilities for how individuals can respond to self-relevant

offenses. We have also examined a relatively understudied cultural construct and

explored new domains in which it predicts intergroup behavior. Finally, this research

has afforded a better understanding of what motivates behavior in response to ingroup

transgressions across cultures, which has the practical potential to help attenuate

misunderstanding between cultures involved in conflict.

Table 10

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 1 Withdrawal Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.02	.19	.01	.15	.20	.08
Dignity	-.28	.23	-.13	-.30	.23	-.14
Condition	-.08	.12	-.07	-.09	.12	-.08
Condition x Face				.50*	.20	.26
Condition x Dignity				-.13	.23	-.06
R^2	.02			.09		
R^2_{adj}	-.02			.04		
R^2_{Change}	.02			.07*		
Overall F	.53			1.74		
df	95			93		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 11

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 1 Reparative Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	.16	.14	.12		.14	.14	.11
Dignity	-.03	.16	-.02		-.07	.16	-.05
Condition	-.06	.09	-.07		-.06	.09	-.08
Condition x Face					.05	.14	.04
Condition x Dignity					.34*	.16	.22
R^2	.02				.06		
R^2_{adj}	-.01				.01		
R^2_{Change}	.02				.05		
Overall F	.58				1.27		
df	95				93		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 12

Moderated Mediation for Distancing Behavioral Intentions

	B	SE	t
Mediator Model			
Image Appraisals			
Face	.56	.13	4.16**
Condition	.32	.08	3.94**
Condition x Face	.28	.13	2.06*
Shame			
Face	.51	.15	3.45**
Condition	.01	.09	.06
Condition x Face	.36	.15	2.46*
Dependent Model			
Image Appraisals	.29	.13	2.16*
Shame	.40	.12	3.31**
Face	-.18	.16	-1.11
Condition	-.29	.10	-2.92**
Condition x Face	.06	.15	.36

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

*p < .05 ** p < .01*

Table 13

Moderated Mediation for Withdrawal Behavioral Intentions

	B	SE	t
Mediator Model			
Image Appraisals			
Face	.56	.13	4.16**
Condition	.32	.08	3.94**
Condition x Face	.28	.13	2.06*
Shame			
Face	.51	.15	3.45**
Condition	.01	.09	.06
Condition x Face	.36	.15	2.46*
Dependent Model			
Image Appraisals	.24	.14	1.66†
Shame	.62	.13	4.74**
Face	-.29	.18	-1.60
Condition	-.13	.11	-1.21
Condition x Face	.19	.17	1.16

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† *p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01*

Table 14

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the variables in Study 2

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Face	3.35	.57	*.70*									
2. Dignity	4.01	.47	.04	*.50*								
3. Severity	2.40	.98	-.19	.13								
4. Image appraisals	3.39	1.20	-.02	-.21	.27*	*.82*						
5. Justice appraisals	3.51	1.11	-.06	.03	.36**	.06	*.86*					
6. Shame	2.20	1.08	.05	-.03	.23*	.52**	.23*	*.92*				
7. Guilt	1.88	.95	.04	.00	.03	.18	.13	.50**	*.79*			
8. Distance	2.72	1.34	-.11	-.13	.41**	.51**	.34**	.56**	.19	*.92*		
9. Withdraw	2.53	1.32	-.05	-.21	.27*	.49**	.22*	.58**	.36**	.87**	*.76*	
10. Repair	3.49	1.14	.02	.16	.35**	.27*	.43**	.48**	.32**	.53**	.50**	*.85*

Note: $N = 79$

Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients in italics on the diagonal

* p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 15

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Image-Threat Appraisals From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	-.07	.22	-.03	-.07	.22	-.03
Dignity	-.41	.27	-.16	-.49†	.28	-.19
Public/Private	.43**	.13	.36	.43**	.13	.36
Public/Private x Face				.29	.22	.14
Public/Private x Dignity				.38	.28	.15
R^2	.17			.22		
R^2_{adj}	.14			.16		
R^2_{Change}	.17**			.04		
Overall F	5.14**			3.96**		
df	74			72		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 16

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Justice Appraisals From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	-.12	.23	-.06		-.10	.23	-.05
Dignity	.09	.28	.04		.05	.28	.02
Public/Private	.05	.13	.05		.05	.13	.04
Public/Private x Face					-.35	.23	-.18
Public/Private x Dignity					.11	.28	.05
R^2	.01				.04		
R^2_{adj}	-.03				-.03		
R^2_{Change}	.01				.03		
Overall F	.16				.58		
df	74				72		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 17

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Shame From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.08	.21	.04	.08	.21	.04
Dignity	.03	.25	.01	.04	.26	.02
Public/Private	.37**	.12	.34	.37**	.12	.34
Public/Private x Face				.06	.21	.03
Public/Private x Dignity				-.03	.26	-.01
R^2	.12			.12		
R^2_{adj}	.08			.06		
R^2_{Change}	.12*			.00		
Overall F	3.35*			1.98†		
df	75			73		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 18

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Guilt From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.06	.19	.04	.07	.20	.04
Dignity	.01	.24	.00	-.01	.24	.00
Public/Private	.01	.11	.01	.00	.11	.00
Public/Private x Face				-.21	.20	-.12
Public/Private x Dignity				.03	.24	.01
R^2	.00			.02		
R^2_{adj}	-.04			-.05		
R^2_{Change}	.00			.02		
Overall F	.03			.24		
df	75			73		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 19

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Distancing Intentions From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	-.26	.27	-.11		-.26	.27	-.11
Dignity	-.33	.33	-.12		-.40	.34	-.14
Public/Private	.14	.15	.11		.14	.15	.10
Public/Private x Face					.10	.27	.04
Public/Private x Dignity					.33	.34	.11
R^2	.04				.06		
R^2_{adj}	.00				-.01		
R^2_{Change}	.04				.02		
Overall F	1.07				.86		
df	75				73		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 20

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Withdrawal Intentions From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	-.10	.26	-.04		-.09	.26	-.04
Dignity	-.58†	.32	-.21		-.70*	.33	-.25
Public/Private	.04	.15	.03		.03	.15	.02
Public/Private x Face					.19	.26	.08
Public/Private x Dignity					.53	.33	.19
R^2	.05				.09		
R^2_{adj}	.01				.03		
R^2_{Change}	.05				.04		
Overall F	1.24				1.42		
df	75				73		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 21

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Reparative Intentions From Face, Dignity and Public/Private Context

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.03	.23	.02	.04	.23	.02
Dignity	.42	.28	.17	.39	.29	.16
Public/Private	.08	.13	.07	.08	.13	.07
Public/Private x Face				.02	.23	.01
Public/Private x Dignity				.12	.29	.05
R^2	.03			.03		
R^2_{adj}	-.01			-.03		
R^2_{Change}	.03			.00		
Overall F	.81			.51		
df	75			73		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 22

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 2 Image Appraisals From Face, Public/Private Context and Severity

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	-.05	.23	-.02	-.07	.23	-.03	-.13	.23	-.06
Public/Private	.41**	.14	.34	.43**	.14	.36	.49**	.14	.41
Severity	.21	.14	.17	.20	.15	.16	.19	.14	.15
Public/Private x Face				.40	.23	.19	.37	.23	.17
Face x Severity				.09	.31	.03	.13	.31	.05
Public/Private x Severity				.10	.14	.08	.04	.14	.03
Face x Public/Private x Severity							.60†	.31	.14
R^2	.18			.22			.26		
R^2_{adj}	.15			.15			.19		
R^2_{Change}	.18**			.04			.04†		
Overall F	5.34**			3.26**			3.44**		
df	72			69			68		

Note: Public/Private is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 23

Factor Loadings for Appraisals Scale in Study 3

Item	Factor 1: Justice	Factor 2: Empathy	Factor 3: Association	Factor 4: Image
Everyone behaved fairly during the exercise.	**-.91**	-.02	.03	.10
There was an injustice between two or more of the players during the exercise.	**.65**	.28	.04	.10
There was a breach of fairness during the exercise	**.62**	-.21	-.04	.13
The participants all received what they deserved.	**-.56**	-.14	.16	.24
As a whole, the other participants were generous.	**-.44**	.09	-.11	-.10
Compensating for other participants' actions was none of my business.	.20	**-.58**	.04	-.11
I didn't care whether people were treated fairly during the exercise.	.06	**-.54**	.20	.01
I felt concerned for one or more of the participants during the exercise.	.22	**.49**	.01	.14
If one participant behaved unfairly during their turn, I could reverse the damage during my own turn.	.03	**.31**	.06	.00
Other people were aware of my association with my friend. (During the friend's turn)	-.02	.03	**-.91**	.09
Other people were aware of my association with my friend. (During the participant's turn)	.05	-.06	**-.84**	.05
My image/reputation was at stake. (During the friend's turn)	-.01	.14	.01	**.80**
My image/reputation was at stake. (During the participant's turn)	.03	.03	-.15	**.60**

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization

Table 24

Factor Loadings for Behavioral Intentions Scale in Study 3

Item	Factor 1: Reparations	Factor 2: Withdrawal	Factor 3: Distance	Factor 4: Punish
I wanted to apologize on behalf of my friend.	**.92**	-.12	.09	-.05
I wanted my friend to apologize.	**.70**	-.07	-.19	-.08
I wanted to reach out toward any participant(s) in the game who were treated unfairly.	**.58**	.16	.05	.06
I wanted to exit the exercise early.	-.02	**-.77**	-.03	.40
I wanted the exercise to last longer.	.03	**.56**	-.01	.12
I didn't want to take a turn.	.02	**-.47**	.02	-.10
I wanted to be associated with my friend.	.10	-.02	**.93**	.13
I wanted to be unassociated with my friend.	.10	.03	**-.86**	.17
I wanted my friend to experience consequences for what he/she did.	.31	.03	-.28	**.49**
I wanted my friend to receive positive recognition for what he/she did.*	-.13	.12	.31	**.49**

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization
*Because reliability for the punishment factor was low, this item was removed.

Table 25

Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among the Variables in Study 3

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Face (Family	3.69	.69	*.80*														
2. Dignity (Family)	3.57	.65	-.05	*.65*													
3. Face (Individual)	3.28	.58	.60**	-.02	*.70*												
4. Dignity (Individual)	3.26	.49	.01	.31**	-.06	*.50*											
5. IOS	4.47	1.24	.19	.02	.06	.03											
6. Image appraisal	2.00	1.10	.16	-.14	.05	-.15	-.07										
7. Justice appraisals	3.47	.91	-.18	-.06	-.17	-.10	-.17	.09	*.77*								
8. Guilt/Shame	1.47	.55	.06	-.09	.01	-.05	-.08	.37**	.12	*.90*							
9. Distance	2.58	.99	-.14	-.05	-.42**	-.10	-.15	.12	.25*	.20*	*.86*						
10. Withdraw	2.72	1.07	-.08	-.10	-.05	.04	-.10	-.17	.00	-.08	.03	*.61*					
11. Punish	2.70	1.29	.01	-.09	.00	-.10	.12	.20*	.14	.13	.37**	-.01					
12. Repair	3.09	1.07	.15	.00	.02	.06	-.04	.30**	.36**	.39**	.35**	-.01	.45**	*.76*			
13. Victim Reparations (tokens)	32.13	14.32	.08	.03	.00	.08	-.01	.03	-.19	-.03	.01	-.16	.26*	.21*			
14. Friend distance (tokens)	30.67	13.84	-.01	-.05	.06	.03	.00	.04	-.17	.05	-.18	.13	.07	-.06	.43**		
15. Ingroup Punishment (difference in tokens)	1.45	15.11	.09	.07	-.05	.05	-.20	-.01	-.02	-.07	.17	-.27**	.18	.25*	.56**	-.51**	
16. Ingroup Punishment (proportion of tokens)	.51	.11	.11	.01	-.08	.07	-.20	.00	-.01	-.03	.27**	-.23*	.25*	.29**	.55**	-.47**	.95**

Note: *N* = 98 for 1-11, *N* = 95 for 12-15

Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients are in italics on the diagonal

* p < .05 ** p < .01

Table 26

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Victim Reparations (in Tokens) From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	1.50	2.23	.07		1.42	2.25	.07
Dignity	.66	2.36	.03		.43	2.38	.02
Condition	.26	1.54	.02		.29	1.55	.02
Condition x Face					2.41	2.25	.11
Condition x Dignity					.63	2.38	.03
R^2	.01				.02		
R^2_{adj}	-.03				-.04		
R^2_{Change}	.01				.01		
Overall F	.21				.37		
df	91				89		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 27

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Distancing (in Tokens) From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	.09	2.16	.00		.20	2.18	.01
Dignity	-1.22	2.28	-.06		-1.14	2.31	-.05
Condition	-1.01	1.49	-.07		-1.02	1.50	-.07
Condition x Face					-.06	2.18	.00
Condition x Dignity					-1.56	2.31	-.07
R^2	.01				.01		
R^2_{adj}	-.03				-.04		
R^2_{Change}	.01				.01		
Overall F	.24				.24		
df	91				89		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 28

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Absolute Difference in Tokens) From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	1.41	2.34	.07	1.21	2.35	.06
Dignity	1.88	2.48	.08	1.57	2.49	.07
Condition	1.26	1.62	.08	1.32	1.62	.09
Condition x Face				2.47	2.35	.11
Condition x Dignity				2.19	2.49	.09
R^2	.02			.04		
R^2_{adj}	-.01			-.02		
R^2_{Change}	.02			.02		
Overall F	.60			.73		
df	91			89		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 29

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Proportion of Victim Tokens) From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	.02	.02	.10		.01	.02	.09
Dignity	.00	.02	.01		.00	.02	.00
Condition	.01	.01	.05		.01	.01	.05
Condition x Face					.01	.02	.07
Condition x Dignity					.01	.02	.09
R^2	.01				.03		
R^2_{adj}	-.02				-.03		
R^2_{Change}	.01				.01		
Overall F	.42				.46		
df	91				89		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 30

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Image Appraisal From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.23	.17	.14	.23	.17	.14
Dignity	-.22	.17	-.13	-.23	.17	-.13
Condition	.06	.11	.06	.06	.12	.06
Condition x Face				.09	.17	.06
Condition x Dignity				.03	.17	.02
R^2	.05			.05		
R^2_{adj}	.02			.00		
R^2_{Change}	.05			.00		
Overall F	1.53			.96		
df	94			92		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 31

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Justice Appraisals From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	-.28*	.14	-.21	-.29*	.13	-.22
Dignity	-.09	.14	-.07	-.13	.14	-.10
Condition	.09	.10	.10	.09	.09	.10
Condition x Face				-.04	.13	-.03
Condition x Dignity				.37**	.14	.27
R^2	.05			.12		
R^2_{adj}	.02			.07		
R^2_{Change}	.05			.07*		
Overall F	1.57			2.47*		
df	93			91		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 32

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Guilt and Shame From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1				Step 2		
	B	SE B	β		B	SE B	β
Face	.04	.09	.05		.04	.08	.05
Dignity	-.07	.09	-.09		-.07	.09	-.08
Condition	.02	.06	.04		.02	.06	.04
Condition x Face					-.16†	.08	-.20
Condition x Dignity					.02	.09	.02
R^2	.01				.05		
R^2_{adj}	-.02				.00		
R^2_{Change}	.01				.04		
Overall F	.42				1.04		
df	94				92		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 33

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Distancing Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	-.21	.15	-.15	-.22	.15	-.15
Dignity	-.08	.16	-.05	-.12	.15	-.08
Condition	.00	.10	.00	.00	.10	.00
Condition x Face				-.10	.15	-.07
Condition x Dignity				.36*	.15	.24
R^2	.02			.08		
R^2_{adj}	-.01			.03		
R^2_{Change}	.02			.06†		
Overall F	.74			1.68		
df	94			92		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 34

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Withdrawal Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	-.12	.16	-.07	-.12	.15	-.08
Dignity	-.17	.17	-.10	-.20	.16	-.12
Condition	-.06	.11	-.05	-.06	.11	-.06
Condition x Face				-.47**	.15	-.29
Condition x Dignity				.38*	.16	.23
R^2	.02			.16		
R^2_{adj}	-.01			.12		
R^2_{Change}	.02			.14**		
Overall F	.62			3.59**		
df	94			92		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 35

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.02	.20	.01	.02	.20	.01
Dignity	-.18	.20	-.09	-.20	.21	-.10
Condition	-.04	.14	-.03	-.03	.14	-.03
Condition x Face				.11	.20	.06
Condition x Dignity				.17	.21	.09
R^2	.01			.02		
R^2_{adj}	-.02			-.04		
R^2_{Change}	.01			.01		
Overall F	.27			.35		
df	94			92		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 36

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Reparative Intentions From Face, Dignity and Condition

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.19	.16	.12	.19	.16	.12
Dignity	.01	.17	.01	.00	.17	.00
Condition	.12	.11	.11	.12	.11	.11
Condition x Face				-.22	.16	-.14
Condition x Dignity				.13	.17	.08
R^2	.03			.06		
R^2_{adj}	.00			.01		
R^2_{Change}	.03			.03		
Overall F	1.08			1.15		
df	94			92		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 37

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Friend Distancing (in Tokens) From Face, Condition and IOS

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	-.47	2.12	-.02	.62	2.16	.03	1.17	2.21	.06
Condition	-1.33	1.47	-.10	-1.57	1.46	-.12	-1.78	1.47	-.13
IOS	-2.31*	1.16	-.21	-3.13*	1.22	-.28	-3.44*	1.25	-.31
Condition x Face				-1.51	2.17	-.07	-2.04	2.21	-.10
Face x IOS				-3.56*	1.73	-.25	-3.28†	1.74	-.23
Condition x IOS				.33	1.21	.03	.72	1.25	.07
Face x Condition x IOS							2.05	1.74	.14
R^2	.05			.10			.11		
R^2_{adj}	.04			.04			.04		
R^2_{Change}	.05			.05			.02		
Overall F	1.61			1.55			1.53		
df	87			84			83		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 38

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Absolute Difference in Tokens) From Face, Condition and IOS

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	1.74	2.43	.08	.80	2.49	.04	-.30	2.50	-.01
Condition	1.01	1.68	.07	1.26	1.68	.08	1.70	1.66	.11
IOS	-.04	1.34	.00	.67	1.41	.05	1.31	1.41	.11
Condition x Face				3.40	2.49	.15	4.46†	2.50	.20
Face x IOS				3.12	1.99	.19	2.58	1.97	.16
Condition x IOS				-.09	1.39	-.01	-.88	1.41	-.07
Face x Condition x IOS							-4.09*	1.97	.14
R^2	.01			.06			.10		
R^2_{adj}	-.01			-.01			.03		
R^2_{Change}	.01			.04			.05*		
Overall F	.39			.81			1.34		
df	87			84			83		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 39

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Study 3 Ingroup Punishment (Proportion of Tokens) From Face, Condition and IOS

Predictor	Step 1			Step 2			Step 3		
	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β	B	SE B	β
Face	.02	.02	.11	.01	.02	.08	.00	.02	.03
Condition	.00	.01	.03	.01	.01	.04	.01	.01	.07
IOS	.00	.01	-.02	.00	.01	.03	.01	.01	.08
Condition x Face				.02	.02	.10	.02	.02	.15
Face x IOS				.02	.01	.17	.02	.01	.13
Condition x IOS				.00	.01	-.03	-.01	.01	-.09
Face x Condition x IOS							-.03†	.01	.14
R^2	.02			.04			.08		
R^2_{adj}	-.03			-.03			.00		
R^2_{Change}	.02			.03			.04†		
Overall F	.45			.59			1.05		
df	87			84			83		

Note: Condition is effect-coded such that -1 = Private and 1 = Public

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Figures

Figure 1. Process model of responses to ingroup wrongdoings.

Figure 2. Two-way interaction of face and condition on appraisals of image threat in Study 1.

Figure 3. Two-way interaction of face and condition on shame in Study 1.

Figure 4. Two-way interaction of face and condition on distancing intentions in Study 1.

Figure 5. Two-way interaction of face and condition on withdrawal intentions in Study 1.

Figure 6. Three-way interaction of face, public/private context and severity on appraisals of image threat in Study 2 (in private).

Figure 7. Three-way interaction of face, public/private context and severity on appraisals of image threat in Study 2 (in public).

Figure 8. Two-way interaction of dignity and condition on justice appraisals in Study 3.

Figure 9. Two-way interaction of face and condition on guilt/shame in Study 3.

Figure 10. Two-way interaction of face and condition on withdrawal intentions in Study 3.

Figure 11. Two-way interaction of dignity and condition on withdrawal intentions in Study 3.

Figure 12. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in Study 3 (in private, absolute difference in tokens).

Figure 13. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in Study 3 (in public, absolute difference in tokens).

Figure 14. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in Study 3 (in private, proportion of tokens).

Figure 15. Three-way interaction of face, condition and IOS on ingroup punishment in Study 3 (in public, proportion of tokens).

Appendices

Appendix A: Study 1 Scenarios

Please write the first name of a friend or group member who attends the University of Maryland:

_____

Now, you will read some hypothetical scenarios involving you and your friend. Please read each story carefully. You will then be asked to answer some questions about these scenarios. Please answer the questions as if the scenario happened exactly as it was described, even if you find it difficult to imagine.

Scenario 1, private condition:
Imagine that [FRIEND'S NAME] picked you up from your apartment complex. When backing out of a parking space, [FRIEND'S NAME] hit a parked car in your lot and left noticeable damage. [FRIEND'S NAME] said "Oops!" and continued to drive out of the parking lot without leaving a note on the car that was hit. The parking lot was empty when this happened.

Scenario 1, public condition:
Imagine that [FRIEND'S NAME] picked you up from your apartment complex. When backing out of a parking space, [FRIEND'S NAME] hit a parked car in your lot and left noticeable damage. [FRIEND'S NAME] said "Oops!" and continued to drive out of the parking lot without leaving a note on the car that was hit. There were several other people in the parking lot who saw this happen.

Scenario 2, private condition:
Imagine that you live in a dorm on campus with your friend [FRIEND'S NAME]. There is a student on another hall who is somewhat quiet and withdrawn. You hear [FRIEND'S NAME] make some nasty, hurtful comments about this student that are completely unfounded. Eventually, these rumors start to spread. When the student finally hears the rumors, most people don't remember who actually started them.

Scenario 2, public condition:
Imagine that you live in a dorm on campus with your friend [FRIEND'S NAME] . There is a student on another hall who is somewhat quiet and withdrawn. You hear [FRIEND'S NAME] make some nasty, hurtful comments about this student that are completely unfounded. Eventually, these rumors start to spread. When the student finally hears the rumors, most people in the dorm know that [FRIEND'S NAME] started them.

In the following you will be asked your opinion about what [you think/your parents, while you were growing up thought] about various issues. Your responses are completely anonymous. Remember, these questions ask about what [**you** think/**your parents, while you were growing up**, thought]. To what extent [do you/did your parents, when you were growing up] believe...

	1 = Not at all	2	3 = Somewhat	4	5 = Very much
-People should make decisions based on their own opinions and not based on what others think	○	○	○	○	○
-People should NOT care what others around them think	○	○	○	○	○
-How much a person respects himself is far more important than how much others respect him	○	○	○	○	○
-People should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree	○	○	○	○	○

	1 = Not at all	2	3 = Somewhat	4	5 = Very much
-People should be true to themselves regardless of what others think	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
-People should speak their mind	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
-It is important to maintain harmony within one's group	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
-People should be very humble to maintain good relationships	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
-People should minimize conflict in social relationships at all costs	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
-People should be extremely careful not to embarrass other people	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
-People should never criticize others in public	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

	1 = Not at all	2	3 = Somewhat	4	5 = Very much
-People should control their behavior in front of others	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix C: Study 1-2 Appraisal Questionnaire

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. What happened was a violation of fairness.	○	○	○	○	○	○
2. What happened was a violation of personal rights.	○	○	○	○	○	○
3. What happened was an issue of injustice.	○	○	○	○	○	○
4. I believe what happened was fundamentally wrong.	○	○	○	○	○	○
5. The victim(s) did not deserve what happened to them.	○	○	○	○	○	○
6. It was important for the injustice between the wrongdoer and the victim(s) to be resolved.	○	○	○	○	○	○
7. What happened compromised harmony within my group.	○	○	○	○	○	○
8. What happened was a threat to my group's image/reputation.	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
9. This event caused me to lose face.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
10. I was being evaluated by other people.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
11. Other people were aware of my association with the person who caused the event.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
12. It was important to take measures to preserve my group's image/reputation.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Appendix D: Studies 1-2 Emotions Questionnaire

To what extent [did/would] you feel…

	1= Not at all	2	3 = Somewhat	4	5 = Very much
1. Guilty	○	○	○	○	○
2. Remorseful	○	○	○	○	○
3. Regretful	○	○	○	○	○
4. Ashamed	○	○	○	○	○
5. Disgraced	○	○	○	○	○
6. Humiliated	○	○	○	○	○
7. Embarrassed	○	○	○	○	○
8. Shamefaced	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix E: Studies 1-2 Behavioral Intentions Questionnaire[8]

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. Remember, these statements refer to AFTER the event has already taken place.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I would want to be completely unassociated with my group member who caused the event.	○	○	○	○	○	○
2. I would want to disappear from the situation.	○	○	○	○	○	○
3. I would want to distance myself from the group member who caused the event.	○	○	○	○	○	○
4. I would want to hide.	○	○	○	○	○	○
5. I would want to make my group member experience consequences for what they did.	○	○	○	○	○	○

---

[8] Items were framed in the past tense in Study 2.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
6. I would want my group member who caused the event to go away.	○	○	○	○	○	○
7. I would want do something after the event to make it better for the victim(s).	○	○	○	○	○	○
8. I would want to reach out toward the victim(s).	○	○	○	○	○	○
9. I would want to apologize for what happened.	○	○	○	○	○	○
10. I would want to express my concern for what happened.	○	○	○	○	○	○
11. I would want my group member to apologize to the victim.	○	○	○	○	○	○
12. I would want my group member to compensate the victim.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix F: Studies 1-2 Post-Scenario/Recall Questions

How severe was this incident?
○ 1= Very low severity
○ 2 = Low severity
○ 3 = Moderate severity
○ 4 = High severity
○ 5 = Very high severity

Did this incident occur in a public or private setting?
○ Public
○ Private

How many people seemed to observe this incident? (Note: the numbers below are part of a rating scale and do not represent number of people)
○ 1 = None at all
○ 2
○ 3 = A few
○ 4
○ 5 = Many

How easy would it be for other people to find out about what happened?
○ Very Difficult
○ Somewhat Difficult
○ Somewhat Easy
○ Very Easy

<u>Instructions</u>: Please circle the picture that best describes your current relationship with your friend.

How old are you? _____

What is your sex?
○ Male
○ Female

What is your major? _____

What is your race/ethnicity?
○ White/non-Hispanic
○ Hispanic
○ Asian
○ African American
○ Other

Please specify by country: _____

Were you born in the US?
○ Yes
○ No

If you were not born in the US, how many years have you lived here? _____

Was your mother born in the US?
○ Yes
○ No

Was your father born in the US?
○ Yes
○ No

In your opinion, what socio-economic class does your family belong to?

- Upper upper--(e.g., rich, influential, highly educated)
- Lower upper--(professionals such as physicians, lawyers; owner of a major business)
- Upper middle--(e.g., professionals, such as teachers, social workers; owner of a good business; owner of a large farm)
- Lower middle--(e.g. clerical, small entrepreneurs; farmer)
- Upper lower--(e.g., skilled worker, small farmer)
- Lower lower--(e.g., unskilled, unemployed)
- Would rather not say

Which sorority/fraternity do you belong to? _____

A lot of people occasionally witness or hear about times when members of their own groups do something that's wrong.

For the next 5 minutes, please write about a time when you witnessed (or heard about) a member of [SORORITY/FRATERNITY NAME] do something that somehow harmed or negatively affected others who did **not** belong to your group. Describe what happened. Who did what? How did you feel? Did you do something, or want to do something?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Appendix J: Screen Shots from the Community Interactions Exercise in Study 3

Sample instruction page:

RULES:
At the beginning of each round, all players will roll a die. The number of rounds in the game will be randomized.

■The player with the **highest roll** will become the "**trader**"
■ The player(s) with the **second highest roll** will become the "**receiver(s)**"

Note: There can be more than one receiver, but there can only be **one trader per round**. If more than 1 person rolls the highest number, all players will roll their die again.

■If you become trader during a <u>giving round</u>, *you should give at least 25 of your tokens to each receiver.*
■If you become trader during a <u>taking round</u>, *you should take no more than 25 tokens from each receiver.*

Please click "Continue" to see an example of a taking round.

Continue

Sample rules quiz question:

Question 3:

If you become trader during a taking round, how many tokens should you take?

☐ No more than 15
☑ No more than 25
☐ No more than 35

The correct answer is, no more than 25

Ingroup transgression:

Participant's turn:

Round 3:

Trader: You
Receiver(s): Michael
Eric

Andy

You have 130 tokens.
How many tokens will you give to Michael?

How many tokens will you give to Eric ?

Submit

Michael

Eric

John

Message Screen:

This is the end of the exercise. Before proceeding to the next part of the study, you may send <u>up to 3 messages</u> to one or more of the other participants.

Display this message to (check all that apply):
☐ Michael   ☐ Andy   ☐ Eric

Display this message to (check all that apply):
☐ Michael   ☐ Andy   ☐ Eric

Display this message to (check all that apply):
☐ Michael   ☐ Andy   ☐ Eric

Continue

Appendix K: Study 3 Appraisals Questionnaire

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, based on when [YOUR FRIEND was/YOU were] taking a turn.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Other people were aware of my association with my friend.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My image/reputation was at stake.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements according to the scale below, based on the exercise as a whole.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Everyone behaved fairly during the exercise.	○	○	○	○	○	○
There was a breach of fairness during the exercise	○	○	○	○	○	○
The participants all received what they deserved.	○	○	○	○	○	○
There was an injustice between two or more of the players during the exercise.	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I felt concerned for one or more of the participants during the exercise.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I didn't care whether people were treated fairly during the exercise.	○	○	○	○	○	○
If one participant behaved unfairly during their turn, I could reverse the damage during my own turn.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Compensating for other participants' actions was none of my business.	○	○	○	○	○	○
As a whole, the other participants were generous.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix L: Study 3 Emotions Questionnaire

How did you feel when [YOUR FRIEND was/YOU were] taking a turn as trader? Please indicate your answer using the scale provided.

	1 = Not at all	2	3 = Somewhat	4	5 = Very much
Active	○	○	○	○	○
Guilty	○	○	○	○	○
Proud	○	○	○	○	○
Blameworthy	○	○	○	○	○
Ashamed	○	○	○	○	○
Attentive	○	○	○	○	○
Dissatisfied with self	○	○	○	○	○
Determined	○	○	○	○	○
Embarrassed	○	○	○	○	○
Delighted	○	○	○	○	○
Regretful	○	○	○	○	○
Surprised	○	○	○	○	○
Remorseful	○	○	○	○	○
Observed	○	○	○	○	○
In control	○	○	○	○	○
Anonymous	○	○	○	○	○

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements according to the scale below, based on the exercise as a whole

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I wanted to be associated with my friend.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted to be unassociated with my friend.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted to reach out toward any participant(s) in the game who were treated unfairly.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted my friend to experience consequences for what he/she did.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted to apologize on behalf of my friend.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted my friend to apologize.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted to exit the exercise early.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I wanted the exercise to last longer.	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I didn't want to take a turn.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix N: Study 3 Post-Exercise Survey

Please answer some questions about your experience participating in the exercise.

Did your friend take a turn as trader?
◯ Yes
◯ No

Did you take a turn as trader?
◯ Yes
◯ No

You indicated that YOUR FRIEND took a turn. Was it a giving round or a taking round?
◯ Giving
◯ Taking

You indicated that YOU took a turn. Was it a giving round or a taking round?
◯ Giving
◯ Taking

Was identifying information about you shared with the other participants or experimenter?
◯ Yes
◯ No

Are you going to have to meet the other participants later?
◯ Yes
◯ No

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