

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: REVERSAL OF POLICY: THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE, AND THE ARMING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1946-1955

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Between 1946 and 1950, the U.S. State Department repeatedly expressed its determination to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized and offered pledges regarding the extended presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe. At the same time, and initially unbeknownst to the State Department, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were making plans to arm Germany in response to the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe. In September 1950, in reaction to the communist invasion of South Korea that had prompted fears the same would happen in Germany, the United States decided to arm the Federal Republic of Germany. Although coupled with a pledge to increase the number of U.S. troops in Europe, the U.S. decision resulted in a number of unintended consequences including a Congressional challenge to Presidential power, opposition by and discord among U.S. Allies, loss of control over the rearmament process, and the establishment of a new set of relations with its erstwhile enemy. While the actual outcome of that 1950 decision was positive, i.e., the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany was approved, the creation of a national German army was not what official U.S. policy had intended.

REVERSAL OF POLICY: THE DEPARTMENTS
OF STATE AND DEFENSE, AND THE ARMING
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
1946-1955

By

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2012

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Dedication

To my late son, Steven Lawrence Goldberg, of beloved memory, who achieved so much in such a short time under great adversity. And to my grandchildren, Rachel, Aaron and Barrett, to whom I hope this effort will be an example that learning continues throughout one's lifetime.

Acknowledgements

As with every student who undertakes a dissertation, I too had the true and constant support of a number of scholars and others who were and remain very important to me. First of all, I need to acknowledge my wife, Waltraud, who like so many other dedicated military wives spent many years accompanying me and moving our family from base to base and country to country throughout my U. S. Air Force career. She then tolerated my long hours and other absences while working for the federal government following my retirement from the Air Force and then, when I finally retired and we entered our “golden years,” stood by as I embarked upon my quest for a Doctorate, of which this dissertation is the result. Next in line is my advisor and dissertation director, Dr. Jeffrey Herf, who took me under his wing and opened up to me the wonderful world of modern European history and, especially, archival research. His challenge led me on a journey that continues to hold me in awe. Dr. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, a naval historian of renown, who, despite my 30 years of military service, made military history relevant and understandable and showed me that it was much more than just generals and battles. He, too, was a most valuable critic and supporter. I also need to thank Dr. Melvyn Leffler for the time he spent with me over a long lunch in Washington D.C. and for the insights he shared regarding U.S.-European policy during the period covered by this dissertation. There is also a debt of thanks and gratitude to Jodi Hall, the Graduate Studies Program Manager, who help me navigate the Graduate School bureaucracy to a safe landing.

Away from the University of Maryland, my thanks go to archivists of the Modern Military Records Branch, especially to Richard Boylan, and the archivists of the Diplomatic Branch at the National Archives in College Park MD. All of these individuals were

instrumental in leading me through the mysterious labyrinth of finding aids to find those records upon which this work is primarily based.

Further afield, Dr. Randy Sowell of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, who made my short stay very productive, and Dr. Christopher Abraham at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, who prepared my visit and made my research of pertinent records of the president and his advisors both easy and rewarding. Both of these gentlemen were also extremely helpful in answering questions and providing other information long after I departed.

Gary Trogden and James Tobias at the Center for Military History at Fort McNair were also extremely helpful at the beginning and end of my research, especially in finding among their holdings several unpublished documents that contributed significantly to the early chapters. And a special thanks to Dr. Gabriele Bosch of the *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*, Potsdam, Germany, who was extremely helpful in not only providing me with references to relevant German literature but also by sending me hard to find German journal articles via post and as e-mail attachments. Also Mr. David Read, archivist at the Soldiers of Gloucestershire Museum, Gloucester, UK, for his help in providing me with biographical information on Brigadier T. N. Grazebrook.

I also need to thank Dr. Malcolm “Kip” Muir, Jr., who encouraged me to enter the VMI Adams Center Cold War Essay contest, and to the judges who awarded an abridged version of my chapter on Operation ECLIPSE third place. Also, the officers of *Phi Gamma Phi*, who selected me to receive a “Love of Learning” grant. This grant gave me a very welcome impetus to continue with what I was doing and to venture outside my com-

fort zone in College Park MD to continue my research at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.

Last but not least, I extend my sincerest thanks to my very good friend, classmate, and excellent military historian, Dr. Ingo Trauschweitzer, whose scholarly advice, encouragement, and comments on my chapters were invaluable and who helped me keep my goal in sight.

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List of Acronyms

AAAFCE	Allied Air Forces, Central Europe
ACA	Allied Control Authority
ACC	Allied Control Council
ACS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AEAF	Allied Expeditionary Air Forces
ANCXF	Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APG	Advanced Planning Group
BTO	Brussels Treaty Organization
CCMS	Control Commission, Military Staff
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (West Germany)
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CICEUCOM.....	Commander-in-Chief, European Command
CINCEUR	Commander-in-Chief, Europe
CJCS	Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COMAAAFCE	Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe
COMNAVFORGER	Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany
COS	Chief of Staff
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
EAC	European Advisory Commission
EDC	European Defense Community
EDC-IC	European Defense Community - Interim Commission
EDF	European Defense Force
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, United States Army
EWP	Emergency War Plan
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FY	Fiscal Year
GSO	General Staff Officer
HICOG	High Commissioner for Germany
HICOM	High Commission
HQ	Headquarters
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSPC	Joint Strategic Planning Committee
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
JWPC	Joint War Planning Committee
LANDCENT	Land Forces, Central Europe
LSU	Labor Service Unit

MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MSB	Military Security Board
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHT	Navy Historical Team
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
NSC	National Security Council
OKH	High Command of the (German) Army (WWII)
OKL	High Command of the (German) Air Force (WWII)
OKM	High Command of the (German) Navy (WWII)
OKW	High Command of the (German) Armed Forces (WWII)
POW	Prisoner of War
PPS	Policy Planning Staff
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SCAF	Supreme Commander, Allied Forces
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SPD	Social Democratic Party (West Germany)
T/O and E	Table of Organization and Equipment
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces, Europe
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFET	U.S. Forces European Theater
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WSC	Working Security Committee

Chapter 1: Introduction

On 9 May 1955, exactly ten years after the armed forces of Germany's Third Reich surrendered unconditionally ending the war in Europe, the black, red and gold colors of the flag of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was raised at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Rocquencourt, France, alongside those of the other fourteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), most of whom had been Germany's enemies just ten years earlier.¹ A resurrected West Germany had been granted full sovereignty and authorized to create an armed force after years of debate within the United States Government and between it and the governments of its West European allies. This Cold War event occurred because of the reversal of a major U.S. policy decision made before World War II ended to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for generations. This dissertation is a history of that reversal and the complications that attended it.

In revisiting this rearmament debate, this dissertation will cover ground well trod by others, as the scholarly historical literature of this first decade of the Cold War is vast. It also reflects what Marc Trachtenberg has identified as a real "gap between the disciplines," i.e., that among diplomatic historians there has been a neglect of the military aspects of the period before 1950 whereas military historians have equally neglected this period's politics.² This dissertation examines both military and political dimensions of the

¹ Andrew J. Birtle, *Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany*, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991, p. 201.

² Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, P. viii.

German rearmament process and with respect to the evidence goes where others have not, i.e., with the exception of Chapter 6, my dissertation has been developed primarily from either unseen, neglected, or underexamined files of the Department of State and its Office of European Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Policy Planning Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) found in the National Archives as well as previously classified histories, some unpublished, of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and the U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE).³

These documents go beyond the existing literature on German rearmament by providing insights to the underlying discussions and rationale that led to the decisions made within the Departments of both State and Defense. Bringing these documents into the light of day and adding their contents to the existing scholarship adds context and depth to previously addressed but understudied issues such as the lack of U.S. preparedness to defend Western Europe in the face of possible Soviet aggression both before and after the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, and U.S. military plans to arm West Germany that began as early as 1948.⁴ They also document and provide additional meaning to the debates within the Department of State over the question of rearming Germany and those that took place between officials of the Departments of State and Defense prior

³ For example, in 1951 Congressman Richards (SC) introduced a resolution to amend the Mutual Security Act to withhold military aid from EDC countries if they did not ratify the treaty. Brian R. Duchin, "The Agonizing Appraisal: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 207. With the exception of Birtle, *Op. cit.*, who does an excellent job of explaining Congress's role during this period, the gap in planning by the individual military services has only recently been partially filled by James S. Corum and Douglas H. Peifer's contributions in James S. Corum, ed., *Rearming Germany*, Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2011.

⁴ See, for example, Laurence W. Martin, "The American Decision to Rearm Germany," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions*, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963, pp. 646-47.

to the formal presentation of the U.S. decision of September 1950 to arm the Germans. Using formerly classified USAREUR and USAFE documents, this dissertation will show the efforts of and the obstacles faced by the U.S. military services in planning for the creation of a new German armed force. Last, the archival documentation will show that while the United States had no intention of incurring a long-term defense commitment in Europe, American officials believed that they had no choice but to make repeated assurances that U.S. forces would remain in Europe as long as needed both to deter the Soviets and to protect its European allies against an imagined German revanchism.

The evidence I present supports several conclusions that call for a revision of certain conventional views about West German rearmament and the beginnings of the Cold War. These conclusions include the following. First, once the decision was made to change standing U.S. national policy and arm the Germans, the United States government lost effective control of the process when it ceded direction of the implementation of German rearmament to France. Second, despite the efforts by two U.S. administrations, neither their pleas nor their threats could save the European Defense Community (EDC) - the entity under which Germany was to be rearmed - from defeat. Third, the U.S.'s total commitment to German rearmament within the EDC precluded consideration of an alternative. When a solution to the German rearmament problem was found following the defeat of the EDC, the U.S. found itself pledging an open-ended troop commitment on the European continent, a pledge that remains in force today.

Conventional wisdom attributes the arming of the FRG to the Korean War. In his introduction to *The German Rearmament Question*, Robert McGeehan writes that "The German rearmament question was among the most important, and frustrating, concerns of

American diplomacy during the postwar period,” and that rearmament was the result of a unilateral U.S. decision in the summer of 1950 following the outbreak of the Korean War.⁵ This statement is echoed by a vast majority of the literature in one form or another. In reality, however, the documentation found in the National Archives shows that the issue of rearming the Germans has roots that go back as early as 1948 and possibly even 1947.⁶

The decision to rearm Germany was a result of what American political and military leaders perceived to be a growing Soviet threat that took on greater urgency following both the 1948 Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade, and the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in the late summer of 1949.⁷ Rearmament represented a reversal of U.S. policy to disarm and demilitarize Germany completely and keep it so for decades to come. Within five years of the war’s end, however, U.S. policy changed directions. Both President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson were strongly disposed to keeping Germany disarmed but succumbed to Cold War realities, to the fear in Europe resulting from the Korean War, and to the urgings of the Joint Staff to strengthen

⁵ Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971, p. xi.

⁶ David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996, p. 31.

⁷ JSPC 876, 21 April 1948, Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States Military Alliance with Nations of Western Europe, RG 218, Geographic Files, 092 Western Europe, Sect. 2. While the documents I reviewed for this dissertation say nothing about the impact of the Soviet nuclear explosion on the rearming of Germany, it represented the loss of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. This, in turn, would require a major reappraisal of Western defense strategy. Also, these weapons were not seen as a “pivotal weapon of war” and, given the city-busting nature of the nuclear weapons of the period, made the need for a strong ground-based defense imperative. See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 96 ff., and David A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill,” *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1983, pp. 3-71. See also Ernest R. May, “The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on European Security 1945-1957,” in R. Ahmann, A.M. Birke, and M. Howard, eds., *The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918-1957*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 513-532.

the defense of Western Europe. As a consequence, they reversed course and began to favor a German contribution to that defense.

The desire to arm the Federal Republic of Germany before 1950 was deeply imbedded in an international, politico-military conundrum that followed two separate but related paths from 1948 until the late summer of 1950.⁸ The differences, as Melvyn P. Leffler indicated in his study of the Truman Administration's national security policies, were not fundamental but tactical.⁹ The State Department saw the threat and took a path that sought to strengthen Western Europe by unifying it politically and economically, thereby creating a mechanism by which a rehabilitated Germany could be reintegrated into Western Europe without posing a threat to the peace and stability of its neighbors. Only then, so State Department officials thought, could one raise the question of arming the Germans. It was not that the leading officials of the State Department did not want the Germans armed, but they wanted to decouple this issue from other issues they deemed more important and less risky than the policy goals they were trying to achieve, such as strengthening the economies of the West European nations and integrating Germany economically and politically into the West. They believed that in this manner, the Soviet threat could be held at bay.

The Department of Defense, however, needing to devise rapidly a strategy to defend Western Europe, chose a path advocated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Outnumbered in manpower, limited by a budget ceiling, and associated with relatively

⁸ For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms West Germany, Germany, and Federal Republic of Germany will be used interchangeably.

⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 386. Although Leffler's rationale pertains to the arguments made just prior to the September 1950 New York Tripartite Conference, his definition of the differences is just as applicable to this time frame.

weak powers, themselves still recovering from the ravages of the war, the Pentagon sought a solution that would utilize the manpower and highly regarded fighting experience that the recently defeated Germany could provide, i.e., to place German “boots on the ground” as quickly as possible.¹⁰

The existing scholarship shows us that in addressing these issues, the U.S. policymakers and the administration were confronted with several difficult problems. One required reversing American attitudes about the Soviet Union and Germany - erstwhile ally and enemy, respectively - held throughout the war years. A second required finding a way to rearm Germany in a manner that would “deter the Russians but not scare the Belgians” while, at the same time, ensuring that the new Germany would not be able to act independently and threaten the peace of Europe again.¹¹ A third required convincing the European allies to strengthen their own defensive capabilities. And, lastly, convincing the American public that the preservation of democracy and the “American way of life” required the long-term presence of U.S. military forces on the European continent.

As the situation *vis-à-vis* the USSR worsened, the United States Departments of Defense and State saw a need to bind Western Germany to the West: the Pentagon wanted to do so by arming German troops, the State Department by integrating West Germany into a united European edifice. In 1949, the United States decided to join an "entangling alliance," NATO, and in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, it formally decided to arm West Germany but ran up against strong French opposition. This opposition

¹⁰ President Truman was committed to a budget ceiling of \$15 billion. He brought Louis Johnson in as Secretary of Defense to enforce this limit on the services and refused to change course despite the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat,” *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Autumn 1979), pp. 123-24.

¹¹ Large, *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

succeeded in wresting the initiative for German rearmament from the United States by initially introducing the French-devised “Pleven Plan, which metamorphosed into the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC, based on the principle of supranationality, was subsequently strongly supported by the Eisenhower administration to the exclusion of all other alternatives and U.S. foreign policy became predicated on the successful outcome of that European endeavor.¹²

Although military strategy is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it had an impact on the decisions that were made during this period. In part, as a result of the loss of its nuclear monopoly, the U.S. government shifted its military strategy from one of containing Soviet military power at all costs to one of deterring it at the least cost. Within a few years, the Pentagon had devised a nuclear strategy to defend Europe - the "New Look" – which would allow a reduction in the size of the U.S. military establishment.

The advent of newer tactical nuclear weapons after 1952 also made a reduction in defense expenditures possible but created dissent within the American military services over roles and missions. The Army, on the one hand, favored a “forward defense” role and sought an increase in its portion of the defense budget. On the other hand, the low numbers and physical size of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory favored the Air Force and supported advocates of a “peripheral” strategy. This strategy involved removing U.S. forces from the European mainland, thus ending the “forward defense” strategy, and depended upon the primarily nuclear deterrent abilities of airpower and sea power

¹² For an excellent review of the political aspects of the Pleven Plan and its affect on both France and Germany, see F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968, especially Chapters 6-8.

based in England, North Africa and in the Mediterranean to defend Western Europe¹³.

The Europeans welcomed the inclusion of nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union but at the same time, the ever-present fear that these weapons would allow the United States to revert to a peripheral defense became synonymous with the abandonment of Europe by the United States and a return to a “fortress” America.

Thus, in the first decade of the Cold War, 1946-1955, the changing international environment, particularly as it applied to Soviet-American relations, caused the United States to make several decisions that, as Secretary of State Acheson said, “took a step never before taken in [U.S.] history.”¹⁴ The first was to end an almost two-hundred year-old isolationist tradition and become part of an ‘entangling’ foreign alliance; the second was to reverse a key World War II policy by rearming its recently defeated foe, Germany. Confronting the policy makers, however, was the problem of how to implement this new course.

Chapter 1 presents a review of the existing literature on these matters. In order to discuss the rearmament of West Germany, there had to have been disarmament. Thus, it is only fitting that Chapter 2 tells the story of the disarmament of Germany through Operation ECLIPSE. Using archival material, Chapter 3 describes and analyzes the State Departments approach to the rearmament of Germany, including a detailed explanation of Acheson’s demand to arm the Germans. Chapter 4 will parallel Chapter 3, also using archival documents, to highlight the planning and efforts of the U.S. Department of De-

¹³ See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, “The Nuclearization of NATO and U.S.-West European Relations,” in Charles Maier, *The Cold War in Europe: The Era of a Divided Continent*, Princeton: First Markus Wiener Publishers, Inc., 1991, p. 348

¹⁴ Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz, “America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth,” in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., *Between Empire and Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, p. 1.

fense to convince the government the Germans needed to be armed. Chapter 5 continues the narration from the time immediately following Acheson's demand to arm West Germany to include the efforts of the Eisenhower Administration to save the European Defense Community from rejection by France. Chapter 6 lays out the activities taken and obstacles faced by the three U.S. military services during the "EDC phase" as they prepared to train what would become the new West German *Bundeswehr*, and Chapter 7 concludes this narrative.

This dissertation seeks to answer five major questions: When did thinking about the rearming of Germany become serious? Who facilitated the fundamental change to U.S. policy and why? Why was the United Kingdom able to solve the crisis that followed French rejection of the EDC? Why would President Eisenhower, so set on reducing the number of U.S. forces in Europe, commit to an open-ended continuation of their presence on the continent? And what role did the U.S. military services play in this process?

In addressing these questions, this dissertation will also highlight certain unintended consequences that resulted from this turnaround in U.S. national policy. Additionally, it will extend the existing and significant scholarship on the Cold War and German rearmament that underscores the previously ignored role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the military services, as well as certain State Department officers, thereby helping to explain the policy reversal. The examination of these issues as described provides a basis for new and important insights into such matters as the dedicated adherence of the JCS to the primacy of civilian leadership.

The disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, which is the starting point of this dissertation, leads us to look at the literature on this topic in three distinct periods.

The first period covers the immediate post-hostilities planning period from mid-1943 until mid-1946, looking specifically at the development of Operation ECLIPSE, the plan to disarm Germany and its aftermath. The second period took place from mid-1947 to September 12, 1950 when Acheson presented the “Single Package” demand for German rearmament to the Allies. The third was from September 13, 1950 until May 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was admitted first to the Western European Union (WEU) - the expanded Brussels Treaty Organization - and then to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a fully sovereign nation.

One finds a plethora of books and articles covering this latter period but again, with a few exceptions, the coverage is sporadic and overly general. The literature does not, for the most part, provide details of what lay behind the policies and actions taken and, in the case of some of the foreign literature, U.S. motives and decisions have been misrepresented because U.S. archival sources have not been examined carefully. By providing these details through archival and primary source research, a more accurate picture of the U.S. decision to arm the FRG and the unanticipated policy consequences that followed can be seen.

Post-Hostilities Historiography May 1943- September 1950

The concept of disarming and demilitarizing a nation was formed during the war without any serious thought being given to whether it could, in fact, be done, or what the consequences might be. Nonetheless, the idea began to take concrete form in the spring of 1943 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) (COSSAC), under Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan was charged by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to plan, among other things, for the occupation of Ger-

many in the event of a sudden German collapse.¹⁵ This plan, originally called Operation RANKIN, was initiated in May 1943. Following the establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) under General Dwight D. Eisenhower and the successful Allied landing at Normandy, a new plan - Operation TALISMAN - subsequently changed after its code name was compromised to Operation ECLIPSE - was begun.

My research for this dissertation adds a new element to the existing scholarship - a detailed account of Operation ECLIPSE, the plan to disarm Germany. With the exception of Kenneth O. McCreedy's article on Operation ECLIPSE, this post-hostilities plan for Germany is not mentioned anywhere in the scholarly literature and even the official histories of the WWII period only mention it briefly, if at all.¹⁶ Additionally, it is clear from the literature, whether it be American, British, or German, that the decision to totally disarm and demilitarize Germany stemmed from the failure of the World War I allies to impose restrictions on Germany that proved to be inadequate.¹⁷ Ironically, however,

¹⁵ Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jul, 2001), p. 716.

¹⁶ Aside from McCreedy, *Op. cit.*, there is a brief summary of Operation ECLIPSE found in *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, 1947. It is hardly mentioned at all in other documents, official or otherwise, and those that do cite only the name but fail to describe it in full or mention the several Memoranda that comprise this plan and provide the details that were to be implemented by the Allied forces. See, for example, *The First Year of the Occupation, Volumes 1 - 3*, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, 1947, and Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975.

¹³ Georg Meyer, "Die Entmilitarisierung in der amerikanischen, britischen und französischen Besatzungszone sowie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945 bis 1950, in *Entmilitarisierung und Aufrüstung in Mitteleuropa 1945-1956*, Alexander Fischer *et. al.*, Herford: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1983, pp. 11-14. There is also a large section in Henry Williams, *History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946*, Book VI, "Germany," unpublished draft manuscript that is devoted to taking lessons from history including an eyewitness statement that German units marched home from the front armed and in formation with bands playing and flags flying.

despite the emphasis given to the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany by the military, the literature ignores this two year-long planning process and its highly significant results.¹⁸

One reason there is so little detail in the literature on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany is that most of it addresses occupation policy as defined in JCS 1067, which was enacted approximately six months after the war ended. Many of the policies credited to JCS 1067 were, however, developed and in place before its promulgation. The lack of coverage regarding Operation ECLIPSE may be attributed to the fact that in the timeframe when most of the history covering that period was written, documentation on Operation ECLIPSE and many other military papers regarding the rearming of West Germany had not been declassified and were simply not available to researchers. While most of the State Department's policy documents were declassified in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, much of the military documentation was not declassified until the late 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s. Since their declassification, however, time has passed and interest has faded and thus a number of documents essential to a sound understanding of major policy remained largely unexamined. The initial narrative in this dissertation is thus devoted to the development of the disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization plan that became Operation ECLIPSE.

Lastly, the literature that exists on post-hostilities planning for what would be a defeated Germany highlights the bureaucratic infighting and turf battles that took place

¹⁸ McCreeedy, *Op. cit.*, pp. 713-39.

between the various departments of the U.S. Government.¹⁹ Its primary focus is on the development and establishment of civil government policy and procedures for the occupation that would follow, such as JCS 1067.²⁰ Neither the background to the disarmament plans nor the lack of guidance afforded first to the staff of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and later to General Eisenhower and his staff at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) have been adequately addressed in the Post-hostilities literature.

There is a great void in the scholarly literature regarding anything that relates to the issue of rearming of Germany in the period 1947-1950, although there are some works that briefly describe the inadequate plans to defend, or better said, evacuate the European continent.²¹ Similarly, when discussing the 1948 formation of the Brussels Treaty Organization (Western Union) or even NATO in 1949, the literature often refers to “secret” military discussions without providing details of those discussions. While the scholarly literature speaks of the weakness of the Allied military capability *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union in the early period and clearly states Allied fears that a Soviet invasion would overrun the continent, little has been written that acknowledges the reason for

¹⁹ See, for example, Leffler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-105ff. for a discussion of the disorganization in the administration in the early period after the war, leaving many agencies, such as the State and Defense Departments to fend for themselves.

²⁰ See, for example, Paul Y. Hammond, “Directives of the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy,” in Harold Stein, *American Civil-Military Decisions*, Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963, pp. 311-464, which also describes the bureaucratic conflicts in Washington government circles.

²¹ See, for example, Christian Greiner, “The Defense of Western Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany 1947-1950,” in Olav Riste, *Western Security: The Formative Years*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985 and Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955*, München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1967. Similar information can be found in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed., *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956*, Vol. 1, “Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevenplan,” Munich and Vienna, 1982, 1990 and Oliver Palkowitsch, “Westliche Verteidigungsstrategie,” *Militärgeschichte*, Heft 4-2005, pp. 18-21.

those fears, namely the lack of effective U.S. and Allied plans and forces to defend Western Europe. Existing defense plans left U.S. officials believing a Soviet invasion could not be resisted.²² Until late 1948 there is no scholarly mention of arming West Germany, and what mention there is drawn primarily from newspaper articles that are based on rumor and speculation. Thus the archival research undertaken for this dissertation extends the history of this subject backward and illuminates the initial rationale for rearming the Germans.

For example, according to a RAND Research Paper written by Eric Willenz, rumors about German rearmament were plentiful as early as the summer of 1948. He cites the *Hannoverschen Neuesten Nachrichten* of August 28 and *Die Weltwoche* of September 24 as early examples.²³ Norbert Tönnies writes that the first rumors of rearmament in Germany began during a November 1948 press conference in which Eugen Kogon, a journalist from Frankfurt, claimed there was an army in development in Germany already. Also in November 1948, the French newspaper *Le Monde* claimed that a Franco-German alliance with a common army had been suggested, and in December, 1948, Carlo Schmid, a leading member of West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), wrote in *Die Welt* that it was possible to create an international army of which Germany could be

²² Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed., New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 4. By 1948, the USSR was considered to be the greatest single danger to the United States, capable of overrunning Europe and the Middle East in six months and subjecting Great Britain to severe air and missile attack. See Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, pp. 204-207. See also pp. 315-34 for assessment of Soviet capabilities under U.S. war plans HALFMOON and OFFTACKLE. Others who also mention this are Lawrence S. Kaplan, "An Unequal Triad," in Olav Riste *Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947-1953*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 114. Melvyn Leffler, *Op. cit.*, says much about fear of the Soviets but gives this lack of defense planning short shrift.

²³ Eric Willenz, "Early Discussions Regarding a Defense Contribution in Germany (1948-1950)," RAND Research Memorandum, RM-968, 15 October 1958.

part. Tönnies writes further that throughout 1949, staff officers from various NATO countries, including France, discussed the addition of as many as five German divisions to help offset the Soviet's numerical superiority over NATO and to help defend against a Soviet attack. Discussion over a German contribution was, according to Tönnies, an open secret in NATO.²⁴

Also in November 1949, the *New York Times* reported that a congressional committee would recommend including Germany in the Western European Union and articles in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* in late November speculated on the meaning of a statement by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson that arming Germany was not being considered "at the present time."²⁵ However, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer gave an interview on 3 December 1949 to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* in which he stated that he was against rearmament and would not allow the creation of a national German Army, but that he would consider "a German contingent in the framework of the army of a European federation." The cat was now out of the bag. The subject of German rearmament became an official political topic of discussion and the subject of the first *Bundestag* debate just two weeks later.²⁶

As early as 1946, over-optimistic U.S. hopes of maintaining the wartime alliance relationship with the Soviet Union, always rocky, were being dashed. It was becoming

²⁴ Norbert Tönnies, *Der Weg zu den Waffen*, Köln: Erich Pabel Verlag, 196, pp. 28-31. The article referred to was Drew Middleton, "Europeans Ponder Army for Germany," *New York Times*, 16 Nov. 1949, pp. 1-2. C.G.D. Onslow also refers to this article and others in "West German Rearmament," *World Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jul 1951), p. 451.

²⁵ "Armed Germans," *Washington Post*, 29 Nov 1949, p. 12, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," *Washington Post*, 30 Nov 1949, p. 13. See also "Bradley Expresses Confidence," *New York Times*, 28 Nov 1949, p. 7, Drew Middleton, "Berlin Held Part of West's Defense," *New York Time*, 29 Nov 1949, p. 7.

²⁶ Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-1953*, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966, p. 267, See also Tönnies, *Op. cit.*, pp. 34-46.

obvious to both the United States and Great Britain that a defeated, apathetic, and virtually prostrate Germany was no longer the enemy to be feared but that the actions of the USSR, their former ally, had changed into those of a potential enemy. The works of John Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn Leffler and other historians of the Cold War, as well as the several biographies and autobiographies of Dean Acheson, make very clear the changes that took place in that relationship and the fears that somehow, without containing the USSR, a third World War would erupt even if the steps taken by the U.S. risked the very war it was trying to prevent.²⁷

The one exception to the above statement that German rearmament was limited to “rumor and speculation” was made during the aftermath of the Czech coup in February 1948. This coup was the catalyst that saw the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organization and its defense wing, the Western Union, the following month. It was in discussions during the formation of this organization that the question of a German military contribution first surfaced in an official European defense context but was quickly put aside as being premature.²⁸

²⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, and Leffler, *Op. cit.* See, for example, Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Beisner wrote that following the May-June 1949 Council of Ministers Conference on Germany, Acheson decided that there was no longer any point in talking to the Russians. He was convinced that Germany had to be integrated into the West and become part of the Western Alliance. To be strong enough to contain the USSR, the U.S. had to have “superior strength” and a policy based on a “situation of strength.” p. 127.

²⁸ See, for example, John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the continental commitment," *International Affairs* (London), 60:4, Autumn 1980, pp. 615-630, Grant S. McClellan, "Britain and Western European Union," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 24:11, October 15, 1948, pp. 122-132. Also Sean Greenwood, "Ernest Bevin, France, and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 1946," *European History Quarterly*, 14:3, July 1984, pp. 319-337. See also Norbert Wiggershaus, "Die Überlegungen für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag von 1948 bis 1950," in *Entmilitarisierung und Aufrüstung in Mitteleuropa 1945-1956*, Alexander Fischer *et. al.*, Herford: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1983, pp. 93-94.

The literature about this pre-1950's period is abundantly clear that from the end of the war until the September 1950 unilateral U.S. demand that West Germany be armed, the official U.S. position regarding Germany was that it remain disarmed and demilitarized. In November 1949, President Truman categorically denied rumors to the contrary and stated that the United States had no intention of creating a German army. An official British denial went even further, stating that there was not even a plan to rebuild the German police, and the *London Times* wrote that the Petersberg Agreement, signed on 22 November 1949 by the High Commissioners of the United States, Great Britain, France and Chancellor Adenauer, was a clear guarantee that Germany would neither rearm nor contest the demilitarization measures imposed upon it. The agreement stated explicitly that not only would the now renamed Federal Republic of Germany remain disarmed and demilitarized but that all military related areas of scientific research, industry and even civil aviation would remain sharply restricted, if not totally forbidden.

Along with the revised Occupation Statute, a tri-partite Military Security Board was created to ensure that the demilitarization of Germany continued. The Board remained in existence until the FRG was admitted to NATO in 1955 and never, during its existence, did the German government speak out against the disarmament regime the Board was tasked to enforce.²⁹ Even Adenauer, following his *Cleveland Plain Dealer* interview, went to great lengths to state that he was “fundamentally against the rearming of

²⁹ Georg Meyer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-17. See also Grosser, *Op. cit.*, p. 42 and Major General John P. Hodges, “Formula for Peace – Military Security Board,” *Military Government Information Bulletin*, Office of the Military Government for Germany (US), Control Office, Reports & Statistics Branch, Berlin, Germany, Issue No. 161, May 17, 1949, pp. 5-6, for a description of the Military Security Board.

the Federal Republic of Germany and against the establishment of a new German *Wehrmacht*.³⁰

It is also clear from the German literature that this U.S. and Allied position was in many quarters of Germany welcome. Georg Meyer quotes former German Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann as telling Adenauer in the fall of 1950 before the former's resignation from the Cabinet that:

As a result of the unconditional surrender the Allies are obligated to protect us against any attack and we must call upon them clearly to fulfill this obligation. Every step the government takes in that direction will have my full consent. Since one of the noblest Allied war aims was to disarm us and keep us disarmed into the future, and the Allies have done everything during five years of occupation to make the German military despicable, to destroy our defense capability, to include air raid shelters, and to educate the German people about military attitudes, it is therefore not for us to either search for or offer military measures. This would only bring about a spiritual confusion that would seriously threaten our young democracy today.³¹

The scholarly literature that covers this period is incomplete and misleading if not faulty. It is, however, underscored by two of the most often cited books on the German rearmament issue: Robert McGeehan's *The German Rearmament Question* and David Clay Large's *Germans to the Front*.³² McGeehan claims in his introduction that this issue

³⁰ Tönnies, *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-32, 34. The *Petersberg Agreement* was the first revision of the *Occupation Statute* imposed on Germany after the war. Paragraph III of the Petersberg Agreement contains the Federal Government's declaration of its "earnest determination to maintain the demilitarization of the Federal territory and to endeavor by all means in its power to prevent the re-creation of armed forces of any kind." Onslow, *Op. cit.*, p. 450.

³¹ Meyer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 18-19. See also Adenauer, *Op. cit.*, p. 292. According to Adenauer, Heinemann had told him on a different occasion that God had twice dashed the weapons from the hands of the Germans and that they should not reach for them a third time.

³² Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971, David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

was “abruptly” raised by Acheson in September 1950 and that the Korean War was the specific stimulus.³³ Written primarily from a political science perspective, his narrative seeks primarily to explain and understand the relationship between sovereign nations in an alliance. While he rightly claims that in the long run, the political integration of the Federal Republic was more important than the “eventual appearance of German soldiers,” he ignores the discussions that took place between 1947 - 1959 among personnel of the State and Defense Departments regarding the rearming of Germany. This results in a complete absence from his work of any discussion of the plans made and rationale given by these agencies.

Similarly, Large’s work, written a quarter century after McGeehan’s, uses the German rearmament issue to discuss how Germany, the Europeans, and the United States “hoped to reorder the post-war world.” He also examines the issues of sovereignty, authority and fundamental values that would confront a united Europe and how and where Germany would fit in. While Large also looks at the question of Germany’s history and asks what kind of military system could be devised to fit into the new, democratic Germany, he too is more concerned with the post-1950 period and, like McGeehan, relies primarily on the secondary literature for the pre-1950’s period.³⁴

That said, unlike McGeehan, Large briefly addresses the pre-1950 period and he shows that the issues of German rearmament and sovereignty were pursued long before the September 1950 “Single Package” demand was presented. He mentions, for example, several discussions held between U.S., British and French leaders in 1948 in which the

³³ McGeehan, *Op. cit.*, p. ix.

³⁴ Large, *Op. cit.*, pp. 4-8.

need for a German contribution to the defense of the West was discussed. Most significant is the number of senior French General Staff officers, including General Charles DeGaulle, who saw the need for a rearmed Germany. Large also relates that in April 1949, Assistant Secretary of Defense Tracy Voorhees told General Lucius D. Clay, then Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. Zone of Germany, that Voorhees' "planners assume it may become reasonable for the West Germans to contribute to the *armed security* of Western Europe." Clay agreed but cautioned not to make this public because of "our present emphasis on demilitarization."³⁵

Lastly, within this array of literature, there are other gaps and omissions, contradictory conclusions and an overall lack of detail. For example, while the literature acknowledges several previous calls for a "European Army" and France as having proposed the "Pleven Plan" as the answer to Acheson's "Single Package," almost everyone is oblivious to the fact that it was the United States that first came up with a detailed plan for a European Defense Force or European Security Force. This proposal was worked out by John J. McCloy, then U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, and Colonel Henry Byroade, then Director, Bureau of German Affairs, U.S. State Department, in the summer of 1950.³⁶ While it might have answered a question posed by President Truman who asked

³⁵ Large, *Op. cit.*, pp. 36-38. Emphasis added. French acknowledgement of a need to arm Germany as early as 1948/49 is also reported in Georges-Henri Soutou, "France and the German Rearmament Problem 1945-1955," in R. Ahmann, A.M. Birke, and M. Howard eds., *The Quest for Stability*, London: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 496-497. Soutou writes that Vice-admiral Lemonnier pleaded in November 1948 for German rearmament.

³⁶ Outgoing State Department Telegram, TS Eyes Only Byroade to McCloy, 3 August 1950, with attachment "An Approach to the Formation of a 'European Army,'" RG 59, Entry 1389, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Lot File No. 55D258, Box 1, NARA. This was a response to Bonn 962, McCloy to Acheson and Byroade, 3 August 1950, FRUS 1950:3, pp. 180-182. Byroade's paper was also sent to Major General J. H. Burns, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, by Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews on 16 August 1950, FRUS 1950:3, pp. 211-21.

in July 1950, “How can German manpower be used without establishing a German Army?” it begs the question why this scheme was not a part of the “Single Package” presented by Acheson. Given the subsequent hostile French reaction to the “Single Package,” one is left to wonder whether the result of that September 1950 foreign ministers meeting might have been different if Acheson’s offer had contained German contingents in a European army instead of a rearmed Germany.³⁷

Rearmament Historiography September 1950 - May 1955

When the literature for the latter period, i.e., 1950 - 1955, is reviewed, one is again overwhelmed by the great number of books and articles dealing with the arming of West Germany, but as before, the main focus is again at the higher policy-making levels and how policymakers viewed the European Defense Community and the problem of how to integrate Germany into this entity, not on the ongoing plans to rearm Germany.³⁸

Shortly after the 12 September 1950 meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France, and Acheson’s presentation of the “Single Package,” i.e., the U.S. demand that West Germany be armed - a step Acheson said was “never taken before in history” - the entire issue was taken over by the French “Pleven Plan,” which subsequently was transformed into what became the EDC. This plan, which was to be the

³⁷ What is interesting is that James McAllister, *No Exit, America and the German Problem, 1943-1954*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 187ff. argues that Acheson was forced into submitting this “Single Package” offer while President Truman cites a letter to him from Acheson in which Acheson in no way indicates that he felt forced or had any regrets about presenting the offer, Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II*, New York: The New American Library, 1956, pp. 292-296. Mark Trachtenberg also queries what might have happened had the plan not been made as “take it or leave it.” Mark Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz, “America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth,” in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., *Between Empire and Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, pp. 11-16. See also Appendix E.

³⁸ See, for example, Large, *Op. cit.*, and McGeehan, *Op. cit.*

cornerstone of a united Europe, was unquestionably a response to the U.S. demand to re-arm West Germany but it also led to a number of unintended consequences that impacted and delayed the rearmament process over the next four and one-half years..

Among other issues missing from the mainstream literature of German rearmament in this latter period is what Ted Galen Carpenter and Andrew Birtle have called “the great debate.”³⁹ After the “Single Package,” which contained a promise to send more troops to Europe, was presented, Congress became highly incensed at what appeared to them to be a lack of consultation. Congress was already full of an animosity toward both Truman and Acheson that reflected the discouraging events in Korea and Congress’ own fears of losing its voice in foreign affairs. The offer to send additional troops to Europe without consulting Congress led, in the early months of 1951, to a three-month debate in the Congress that, in turn, led to a resolution that could easily be called the forerunner of the Vietnam era War Powers Act.⁴⁰

While historians of the period tell us that by 1951 both Truman and Acheson, despite their misgivings, came around to support the Pleven Plan/EDC, as did the Eisenhower Administration, the literature sidesteps the fact that while Eisenhower was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), he vociferously opposed both German rearmament and the EDC. Grosser relates that in 1950, Eisenhower wrote that rearming the Germans “would repudiate a series of agreements extending from Potsdam in 1945 to the Petersberg Protocol of 1949.” Eisenhower continued that “...whatever gains from the

³⁹ See Appendix F.

⁴⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter, “United States’ NATO Policy at the Crossroads: The ‘Great Debate’ of 1950-1951,” *The International History Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, August 1986, pp 389-415. See also David R. Kepley, “The Senate and the Great Debate of 1951,” *Prologue*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 1982, pp. 213-236 and Birtle, *Op.Cit.*

military point of view of adding six or eight divisions of German troops to the forces of NATO, politically German rearmament is full of dynamite.”⁴¹ Eisenhower, in fact, hated the Germans during World War II and although he subsequently began to support the European army concept and made it a key element of his presidency, he initially considered it “as cockeyed an idea as a dope fiend could have figured out.”⁴²

That as president, Eisenhower became a strong supporter of EDC, as did his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is abundantly clear in the literature, but little is really known about Eisenhower’s conversion in favor of EDC when he was SACEUR or why he subsequently became so committed to EDC and how he influenced U.S. policy to make the success of EDC a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Jean Monnet claims to have converted Eisenhower during lunch at the Waldorf-Astoria in Paris and Schwartz and others tell us that as a result of his observations while SACEUR, Eisenhower came to believe that only a united Europe could solve Europe’s security problems. This eventually led him to see the EDC as a way to strengthen Europe and solve the German problem, a position he maintained as president.⁴³ By 1953 however, Eisenhower had become skeptical of EDC’s prospects and he ordered a study to recommend possible alternatives, one

⁴¹ Grosser, *Op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

⁴² Eisenhower’s initial hatred of Germans was deeply felt and he stated this repeatedly in his private letters. See, for example, Carlo D’Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life*, New York: Henry Holt, 2002, p. 371. See also Thomas A. Schwartz, “Eisenhower and the Germans,” in Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995, pp. 209, 211-213, as well as Ambrose’s *Eisenhower*, Vol. 2, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 120, and *Eisenhower: Soldier, General Of The Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 332, 400.

⁴³ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1978, pp. 358-359. Schwartz, *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-15.

of which was for the U.S. to adopt the peripheral strategy and allow Western Europe to become the “third power” that had been hoped for at the end of the war.⁴⁴

For Eisenhower, a man whose policies were driven by his commitment to budgetary restraint, however, EDC was also a way to reduce the numbers of U.S. troops in Europe. Eisenhower had repeatedly said the U.S. troop presence in Europe was never meant to be permanent.⁴⁵ Eisenhower’s thoughts regarding the U.S. troop presence in Europe also highlights another unintended consequence of the policy reversal, the open-ended commitment of U.S. forces to Western Europe that was made in 1955. Similarly, the failure of EDC in August 1954, despite U.S. attempts to keep it alive, highlights another unintended consequence, the creation of a national German army. Trachtenberg writes that both Eisenhower and Dulles “were livid” at the failure of the EDC in the French National Assembly but that they were left with no other option but to accept a national German army in NATO and the continued presence of American troops in Europe.⁴⁶

It is clear from the foregoing that while the question of German rearmament has been addressed, the scholarly literature has almost exclusively engaged it only at the level of very high policy - that is, the level of top civilian political executives. There is virtually little to no discussion of what the Pentagon was doing during this entire ten-year period., In addition, the literature on German rearmament has failed to deal adequately with the military problems brought about by the introduction of nuclear weapons, which had

⁴⁴ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 147.

⁴⁵ Marc Trachtenberg, “The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960, in Stephen Schuker, ed., *Deutschland und Frankreich vom Konflikt zur Aussöhnung: Die Gestaltung der westeuropäischen Sicherheit 1914-1963*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 46, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000. This reference, however comes from a copy of the original paper presented at a Historisches Kolleg conference in 1997, p. 15.

⁴⁶ Trachtenberg, *Loc. cit.*

generated political responses that created both reassurance and apprehension among U.S. allies and adversaries. The literature has also neglected to indicate that in some instances, particularly during the early period of the Cold War, military-diplomatic actions were taken without strategic guidance or even a strategic consensus. In addition, and as will be mentioned below, some of the foreign literature ignores U.S. archival material, and thus is necessarily based upon unsupported assumptions, which have led to unjustified conclusions.

British Historiography

It is also in this latter 1950-1955 period that one finds for the first time scholarly British and German literature on this topic.⁴⁷ Although this dissertation will not focus on this scholarship – it does not address U.S. military plans for rearming Germany - the literature brings a different perspective as well as interesting and little known information not found in the U.S. literature. For example, British authors disagree on the extent to

⁴⁷ I have intentionally omitted French literature. Aside from the fact that the French involvement in the rearmament process was extremely complex, the English-language French literature shows that in 1945 DeGaulle accepted the fact of a Soviet threat and later that year, a French National Defense memorandum, agreed to by General Alphonse Juin, Army Chief of Staff, advocated a 50-division Western defense organization with the possible participation of Germany, “under due control.” The English-language French literature written on the period following the 12 September 1950 U.S. demand to rearm Germany focuses primarily on the prolonged negotiations over EDC, continued French attempts to restrict the size of the German contribution and to keep Germany out of NATO, obtaining British and U.S. adherence to the EDC treaty and, subsequently, to distance itself from the treaty so as not to surrender part of its sovereignty – the glue that bound EDC together. See Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, Georges-Henri Soutou, “France and the German Rearmament Problem 1945-1955, in *The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918-1957*, R. Ahmann, A.M. Birke, and M. Howard, eds., London: Oxford University Press, pp. 487-512, Jacques Frémeaux and André Martel, “French Defense Policy 1947-1949,” in Olav Riste, *Western Security: The Formative Years*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 92-103, Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, “France and the German Question, 1945-1955,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 5-28, Peter Guillen, “France and the Defence of Western Europe: from the Brussels Pact (March 1948) to the Pleven Plan (October 1950),” Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster, eds., *The Western Security Community*, Berg: Providence RI, 1993, pp. 125-148, Roy F. Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1953*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, and William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

which British defense and foreign policy changed between 1950 and 1955. Saki Dockrill, for one, argues that because the British were obligated under the Brussels and NATO Treaties to aid the treaties' signatories in the event of an attack against any of them, British defense policy remained constant throughout the period.⁴⁸ However, the evidence she cites in her work strongly supports the position of Kevin Ruane that as a result of the German rearmament issue and EDC, Great Britain underwent a significant "agonizing reappraisal" of its continental policy by committing both ground and air forces to the continent.⁴⁹ That said, British and German scholarship, while well-grounded in their own national archives, lacks U.S. archival documentation and depends primarily on secondary sources and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.

Much like the United States, the British were very reluctant following the war to commit troops to the continent. London viewed the occupation as lasting no more than two years but they were also more concerned with their own economic situation and with Empire defense, primarily the Middle East. Due, in many respects, to financial considerations, British actions toward the continent were a "succession of half-hearted reassurances and token promises" that not always successfully masked "a determination to minimize peacetime engagements altogether."⁵⁰ It also appears from the British literature that continental policy was dependent primarily on the party in power.

⁴⁸ Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

⁴⁹ Kevin Ruane, "Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defense, 1953-54," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 151-185.

⁵⁰ Paul Cornish, *British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany, 1945-1950*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 5, 89.

Most British authors agree, however, that the British military recognized the Soviet threat as early as 1944 while the Foreign Office only began to come around in 1946-1948. In April 1946 Field Marshal Viscount Allenbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated that Germany should not be considered a threat unless it allied with the USSR. This view, that Russia was more dangerous than Germany, was reflected in the British Future Defence Policy Report of April 1947. That plan, adopted the following month however, saw no role for the British military in Germany.⁵¹ In February 1948, however, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin suggested that the Chief of Staff (COS) “examine ways of forming the West European national forces into a single force, and to work out the extra cost of providing two British divisions.” Referring to its World War II experience, Bevin wanted to insure that there would be no more Dunkirks.⁵² The issue of German rearmament, although discussed during the creation of the Brussels Pact and dismissed as premature, never surfaced in London until 1949.⁵³

By then, the British accepted the fact that an armed Germany was inevitable in the long term. It was, therefore, the British who first publically proposed in late 1949 to create a Federal *Gendarmerie* as a first step in that direction and its incorporation into a European Army, a subject then in early stages of discussion. The proposal was also designed to respond, on the one hand, to German Chancellor Adenauer’s argument that the Allies were “duty bound to maintain the security of the Federal Republic” and, on the other hand, to offset to some degree the creation and build-up of the East German *Kasernierte*

⁵¹ Cornish, *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-12, 104-105. See also Dockrill, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁵² Cornish, *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁵³ Dockrill, *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

Bereitschaftspolizei or “barracked” riot police who were being armed with infantry weapons and armor.⁵⁴

Great Britain had three goals according to the literature,: (1) to contain Germany within an evolving Western framework; (2) to prevent U.S. isolationism; and (3) to prevent a Soviet reaction and escalation in the Cold War.⁵⁵

Nonetheless, British policy was influenced by the “Germanophobia unleashed by two world wars” that made the British policy-making elite unwilling to consider early German rearmament. British policy was also stretched between the need to defend the West and insure a U.S. presence in Europe.⁵⁶ The British feared the U.S. would opt for a peripheral strategy, i.e., pull U.S. forces off the continent to bases in Great Britain, Spain, North Africa and Turkey. Thus, during this latter period 1950-1955, Great Britain, unwilling to sacrifice its “special relationship” with the United States and its loyalty to the Commonwealth, reluctantly committed itself to the support of EDC. It was this same fear of U.S. withdrawal following the failure of the EDC in 1954 that was the impetus for then Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to use an expanded Brussels Treaty Organization to integrate an armed and sovereign Germany into NATO and end the five-year impasse.⁵⁷

German Historiography

The Anglo-American literature focuses primarily on the need to get German “boots on the ground” rapidly, restore the conventional force imbalance and augment the

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁵⁵ Spencer Mawby, *Containing Germany*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999, p. 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Preface by Peter Caterall, pp. ix-x

⁵⁷ Ruane, *Op. cit.*, pp. 152-154.

Alliance's defensive capability against the Soviet Union. The German-language literature, on the other hand, while mindful of the Soviet threat, focuses more on the political aspects and ramifications of the rearmament issue such as West Germany's desire to gain the trust of the Western Allies, regain its sovereignty, and integrate into Western Europe as an equal in all respects.⁵⁸

Aside from differences in terms of the degree to which reunification was tied to the rearmament question, German scholars are quite unified in their approach and interpretation of this period of West German history.⁵⁹ This literature is also somewhat unique in that it underscores several unexpected consequences the rearmament issue brought to the surface. Dieter Budde, for example, connects the total demilitarization of Germany at war's end to the creation of the democratically-based *Bundeswehr* only ten years later, essentially saying that the latter would not have been possible without the former.⁶⁰ German scholars also argue that the initial U.S. demand to arm occupied West Germany resulted in the violation of not only U.S. and Allied policy in general but also several specific Allied Control Council laws as well as obligations placed upon West Germany by the Occupation Statute and its subsequent revisions.⁶¹

⁵⁸ A few of the works reviewed here were either written in English or English translations by German authors. German-language works were translated by the author.

⁵⁹ The rearmament-unification issue was primarily a contentious political issue between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the opposition Socialist Party Deutschland (SPD) and will not be treated in this dissertation.

⁶⁰ Dieter Budde, "Abrüstung, Entwaffnung und Rüstungskontrolle unter Berücksichtigung politischer und strategischer Aspekte und ihre Auswirkung auf Deutschland," published dissertation, Universität der Bundeswehr München, 200., pp. 252ff.

⁶¹ Norbert Wiggershaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

While this latter fact did not add to the delays in negotiations over German rearmament, it did lead to a “Catch-22” situation in which the U.S. promised sovereignty in return for rearmament while the German government insisted it could not arm until sovereignty was granted. This temporary impasse, combined with an inherent distrust of German intentions, led to Allied complaints about German “demands” while the Germans saw their “requests” as attempts to gain the Allies’ trust. Western interest in German rearmament, according to Julian Lider, gave Germany the opportunity to “press for rapid rearmament” and set “preconditions for her contribution.” Adenauer saw rearmament as an indispensable bargaining lever; it was the key component of sovereignty.⁶²

The German-language literature cited in this dissertation supports several key themes during this period. Perhaps first and foremost is the theme upon which all the cited authors agree, namely that Germany’s rearmament policy was very much Konrad Adenauer’s personal policy; a policy primarily oriented on an internal security argument focused on protection against a possible East German aggression as opposed to a Soviet aggression.⁶³ In this respect, Adenauer’s overriding goals were to prevent the U.S. from abandoning Europe, to integrate West Germany into Western Europe as an equal and respected partner, and to forge reconciliation with France.⁶⁴

⁶² Julian Lider, *Problems of Military Policy in the Konrad Adenauer Era (1949-1966)*, Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1984, p. 13. See also Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1967*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967 and Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-1953*, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965, pp. 38-39, 45.

⁶³ Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Adenauer’s Politik der militärischen Westintegration 1950-1956,” *Militärsgeschichte*, 5/1990, p. 420 and Lider, *Op. cit.*, p. 3. See also Hitchcock, *Op. cit.*, p. 137, (Adenauer) “brandished the horror of the *Volkspolizei* and the specter of war...” The East Germans had built a strong riot police force (*Bereitschaftspolizei*) of upward to 60,000 men equipped with heavy weapons and armor.

⁶⁴ Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War*, Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957, p. 157, Volkmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 421.

A second key theme was Adenauer's insistence that no national German army be created. For him, participation in an integrated European force and the establishment of a strong police force was the only way to insure German security. Despite his disdain for the initial Pleven Plan, Adenauer saw the subsequent EDC as an "end in itself, not a means to an end." For him, integration was the shortest route to unification. In addition, in Adenauer's eyes, the EDC fulfilled France's highest political needs and the integrated army it promised also promised France security both for Germany and from Germany.⁶⁵ Similarly, Adenauer's willingness to accept limitations on its military contribution was designed to build trust among the German population as well as among the Allies and to counter those who feared a resurgence of German militarism.⁶⁶

In this respect, German scholars point out that throughout the entire five-year period from the initial U.S. demand for German rearmament to the Federal Republic's admission to NATO, no military preparations of any kind were undertaken by the Bonn government; no barracks were built, no uniforms ordered, etc. Not even the *Bundesgrenzschutz*, the armed border police, were used to establish a training school for future German NCO's, as had been suggested, for fear it would be seen as an attempt to create a "secret army" like the *Black Reichswehr* following World War I.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Adenauer, *Op. cit.*, p. 267, Tönnies, *Op. cit.*, pp., 34, 41, 51, and Rolf Steiniger, "John Foster Dulles, the European Defense Community, and the German Question," in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 22.

⁶⁶ Ulrich de Maizière, "Zur Planung und Vorbereitung eines westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages," in *Entmilitarisierung und Aufrüstung in Mitteleuropa 1945-1956*, Alexander Fischer et. al., Herford: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1983, p. 83, Volkmann, *Loc. cit.*

⁶⁷ de Maizière, *Op. cit.*, p. 83 and Offner, *Op. cit.*, p. 429 states that even the JCS suggested this and that President Truman approved. Tönnies, *Op. cit.*, p. 17 relates that when the first *Bundeswehr* contingent was sworn in, only 10 of the 101 inductees wore uniforms.

This did not mean, of course, that no military security considerations were undertaken by the government during that period. Wiggershaus writes that as early as 1948 former German General Hasse von Manteuffel prepared a secret memorandum at Adenauer's request and in late 1948 Lt. General Hans Speidel wrote six memos dealing with the military-political situation in West Germany and the requirements necessary for a German contribution.⁶⁸ In 1950, both Theodor Blank and Gerhard Graf von Schwerin were appointed to advise Adenauer on military and security issues. Also in October 1950, the famous *Himmeroder Denkschrift* (Himmerod Memorandum), written by a group of former *Wehrmacht* officers, recommended a German force posture of 12 divisions (approximately 250,000 men).⁶⁹

A third major theme in the German-language literature, also found in the Anglo-American literature, holds that the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was the catalyst that made German rearmament a necessity. The Korean War became the rationale for America's fear and threat perception and thus the need to demand, on the one hand, the rearming of a country still seen by many as the enemy that needed to be controlled and on the other hand, to bind it to the West in order for it to act as a potential check on the USSR.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Wiggershaus, *Op. cit.*, pp. 94-97.

⁶⁹ Tönnies, *Op. cit.*, pp. 70-71. Schwerin was forced to resign in late October 1950 and was replaced by Generals Adolph Heusinger and Hans Speidel. See also de Maizière, *Op. cit.*, for personnel issues within Amt Blank and how that office was viewed by former *Wehrmacht* officers and Lider, *Op. cit.*, pp. 20-21. See also Hans Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus, *Die "Himmeroder Denkschrift" vom Oktober 1950*, originally published in *Militärgeschichtlichen Mitteilungen* 21/1977, pp. 135-206 and republished in a special edition by the *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*, Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 1985.

⁷⁰ Gunther Mai, *Westliche Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg: Der Korea-Krieg und die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung 1950*, Boppard am Rhine: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1977, pp. 3-8, Tönnies, *Op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff. This theme is also reflected in the Anglo-American literature. See, for example, Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 124-135.

The Korean War was a shock to West Germans who saw parallels to their own divided situation. West Germany's main concern, however, was that the Allies would see an attack by East Germany as a civil war and not respond. According to Luder and others, as early as April 1950 Adenauer had requested authority to form a mobile *Gendarmerie* to offset the creation in East Germany of the *Kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei*. Adenauer feared that the USSR would detach East Germany and give it a degree of independence, thus raising the question of how the occupying powers would respond if the East German *Bereitschaftspolizei* invaded their zones.⁷¹ These fears most likely stemmed from the memos written by both Generals Speidel and Heusinger in 1949, the central point of which was that the *Kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei* was the forerunner of an East German army designed to win a civil war in Germany once the occupation ended. The memos stressed that NATO did not provide any greater security for the Federal Republic, thereby making a military contribution by Bonn even more necessary.⁷²

U.S. Objectives

The objectives of the 1950 decision to arm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), aside from the goal of strengthening the defense of Western Europe, were two-fold: to bind the western half of the divided German nation to the West by forming a West German army within an *integrated* West European edifice, and to withdraw U.S.

⁷¹ Adenauer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 281-282, Budde, *Op. cit.*, p. 253, Hanrieder, *Op. cit.*, p. 87, Luder, *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-18. These fears are also reflected in Schwartz, *Loc. Cit* and Offner, *Op. cit.*, p. 431.

⁷² Wiggershaus, *Op. cit.*, p. 97. Offner, *Op. cit.*, p. 439 and Schwartz, *America's Germany*, p. 127 relate that U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy suggested that Germans be allowed to enlist in the U.S. Army; that they had a right to defend their land. McCloy felt that if Germany was not given the opportunity to fight, Germany would be lost politically along with its reserve of manpower.

occupation forces from the European continent.⁷³ The outcomes – a West German “national” army and a U.S. commitment to a virtual permanent military presence in Western Europe - were, however, completely at odds with established U.S. national policy.

That said, between 1946 and 1955, the United States made numerous statements and pledges regarding the continued demilitarization of Germany and the duration of the U.S. troop presence in Western Europe. Thus, the 1955 pledge to retain troops in Europe was one of several unplanned consequences of the U.S. decision in 1950 to arm the Federal Republic of Germany and was designed to regain U.S. control and leadership of the Western Alliance that had been lost during the five-year period that followed. The pledge also sought to undergird a “double containment” policy, i.e., to protect Western Europe against a Soviet invasion *and* to protect all Europeans against a possible resurgent Germany.⁷⁴ The NATO treaty imposed no requirement on any member nation to station troops either on the continent or in Germany, therefore, discounting altruism as a motive; the U.S. commitment was made to balance military imperatives with political realities. Regaining the initiative in and leadership of the Alliance would do just that.

While the initiative to arm the Federal Republic in 1950 came from the United States, the process did not proceed in a vacuum. Both Great Britain and France, the U.S.’s main NATO allies, had also been considering the matter. This dissertation will,

⁷³ Thomas A. Schwartz, *Op. Cit*, p. 219. Emphasis added. Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, my preliminary research indicates that the removal of large numbers of U.S. forces from Europe continued to be seriously considered less than a year after the commitment was made. Thus, this is a plausible thesis that is not addressed in the current literature and needs to be confirmed by further research.

⁷⁴ “Eisenhower Gives Promise to Keep Troops in Europe,” *New York Times*, 11 Mar 1955, pp. 1-2. The term “double containment” has been used by several authors. See Frank Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States, The Transformation of the German Question since 1945, Updated Edition*, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995, Thomas A. Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, and Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. Offner, however, seems to imply that the double containment was directed at France and Germany, not the USSR and Germany.

therefore, discuss, albeit to a lesser extent, the interaction of the United States, Great Britain, and France, together and alone with West Germany in pursuit of that policy. In that vein, the dissertation will show that while the objectives of the NATO allies were the same, i.e., the containment of possible German revanchism and deterrence of Soviet advances, the means were not. Each nation found itself at times working at cross-purposes to the others and even resorting to deception as its perception of political realities and strategic imperatives demanded.

Just as wars have their unintended consequences, so too does peace - or at least attempts to maintain peace. The irony of the rearming of Germany, as Heinz Schultz notes, is that it was agreed by all parties at the Potsdam Conference that Germany should be disarmed and demilitarized and that “all forces and all institutions or organizations which serve to keep alive the military tradition shall be *completely and finally abolished*.”⁷⁵ That said, Budde correctly underscores the most significant consequence of the changed policy when he writes that the Korean War made the Allies accept the reality of and need for German rearmament despite the lack of trust that still existed.

As an aside, and because of the focus of this dissertation, i.e., the actions of the U.S. government and military establishment to arm Germany, this dissertation will not delve into Soviet actions or policy except where it directly impacted the rearmament process. The Soviets were seen and continually portrayed as a growing threat to the West, particularly since the Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade in 1948, but even more so af-

⁷⁵ Heinz Schultz, “The Dilemma of German Rearmament After the Second World War,” *The Army and Defence Journal*, Volume 110, No. 2, 1980, p. 189. Emphasis added. See also the Potsdam Agreement, 1 August 1945, Article II.A.3.(i)(a) through 3.(i)(b)(iii), *Documents on Germany 1944-1959*, <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.BackgrndDocs>.

ter the suppression of the 1953 Berlin uprising. Nevertheless, with the exception of the occasional proposal for a Four Power or Foreign Minister Conference to discuss the demilitarization or neutralization of Germany, the Russians were relatively quiescent during this period as regarding German rearmament. In fact, during the 1954 Four Power Conference, the issue of West German rearmament was not even mentioned. It may be as Trachtenberg states that as long as Germany could be kept dependent, the *status quo* in Europe would not change. The Paris accords, which brought the FRG into the Western European Union and NATO, provided them with a constrained sovereignty. The newly authorized West German army would be integrated into NATO but not authorized to operate independently.⁷⁶ This apparently was a solution the Soviets could live with.

My goal in this dissertation is two-fold: to show by using archival documents, that there was much more to the process of rearming Germany than is evident in the existing literature, particularly the involvement of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual military services. It is also to test the hypothesis that despite the planned creation of what was to become the *Bundeswehr*, and despite long-held plans to remove U.S. forces from Europe, i.e., to build down as the Germans built up, the U.S. acquiesced to a British incentive to solve the problem of German rearmament by building up in order to facilitate an FRG military buildup. As a result, the United States was forced to assuage European fears of a resurgent Germany by promising an open-ended commitment to keep significant U.S. forces on the continent. One must remember that the U.S. envisioned a united Europe as a great “third power” and the EDC as the embodiment of that power; a power capable of taking care of itself and allowing the U.S. to withdraw its forces from

⁷⁶ Trachtenberg, *The United States, France...*, pp. 3-4.

Europe.⁷⁷ The failure of the EDC forced the U.S. into exercising a “double containment” policy, i.e., the U.S. was now called upon to protect Western Europe against a Soviet invasion and to protect all of Europe against a possible resurgent Germany. The end result was an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces on the European continent, which remained there in significant numbers until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, and residually even after.

Had Germany not been so thoroughly disarmed following World War II, simultaneously destroying the remnants of Prussian militarism, West Germany would not have been able to create a new army based on democratic ideals that led to an acceptance and partnership at all levels by the Allies in a relatively short period of time.⁷⁸ Thus, in the end, the U.S. policy to first disarm and then rearm the Germans succeeded.

⁷⁷ Both Walter LaFeber and Christopher Layne deny that this “Third Power” or “Third Force” idea was something desired by the United States despite the plethora of evidence in State Department papers and documents in favor of it (See Chapter 3). See Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977 and Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. Melvyn Leffler, however, in conversations with the author, agrees that the jury is still out on the “Third Power” concept.

⁷⁸ Dieter Budde, *Abrüstung, Entwaffnung und Rüstungskontrolle unter Berücksichtigung politischer und strategischer Aspekte und ihre Auswirkung auf Deutschland*, published dissertation, Universität der Bundeswehr München, 2000, pp. 253-254.

Chapter 2: Operation ECLIPSE

It is well known that on 6 June, 1944, the day Operation OVERLORD - the invasion of Normandy - began, Eisenhower, then Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, placed in his pocket a note in which he had written that he accepted blame for the failure of the invasion if that happened.¹ What is almost unknown is that just over a year earlier, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, the same officer responsible for the preparation of OVERLORD, had been tasked to prepare a plan to totally disarm and demilitarize Germany. While Eisenhower was prepared to lose a battle, the Allied governments were preparing for total victory.

This plan, originally called Operation RANKIN and then Operation TALISMAN before it became Operation ECLIPSE, was two years in the making, and this chapter, which relates it's never before written history, also serves to establish a counterpoint to the underlying theme of this dissertation - the rearmament of Germany - and the problems encountered by the United States as a result of its policy reversal. This chapter also highlights the lack of governmental guidance given to U.S. military forces as they prepared to occupy Germany and even, to a lesser extent, the belated and misguided plans and preparations of the government for civilianizing the occupation without a full understanding of what the occupation entailed.

Following World War II, Germany was, in fact, totally disarmed and demilitarized. However, the disarming of Germany, a goal first enunciated in the Atlantic Charter, involved much more than simply collecting the weapons of its surrendering soldiers,

¹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 418. Also Ambrose, *D-Day: June 6, 1944*, New York: Touchstone, 1994, p. 190.

sailors, and airmen. It meant a policy of total disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization, prompted by the belief, held by the two western Allies, the United States and Great Britain, that German militarism was ingrained in German politics and culture. It was this militarism that made Hitler inevitable and only by uprooting it could Germany ever be made to become a productive and peaceful neighbor in Europe. Thus, *the total demilitarization of Germany* became a major undertaking that required the development of agreed-upon guidance, policy directives, manpower and time.

The ideas concerning the post-hostilities period and the total demilitarization of Germany first began to take shape in summer of 1943. Ideas and plans were developed at various levels and in various agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, which found themselves embroiled in interdepartmental rivalries and tensions, left to act in the absence of authoritative guidance, and in the case of the United States, the object of presidential indecisiveness.²

The initial plans for the demilitarization of Germany were initiated by COSSAC - Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander - an organization established to prepare for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander, under the direction of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, who was also tasked to prepare the initial plans for Operation OVERLORD, the allied invasion of the continent.

In July, 1943, the British War Cabinet revised its 1942 organization to create a Post-Hostilities Sub-Committee under COSSAC with which to tackle the question of how

² For examples of the interdepartmental rivalries and tensions that existed in Washington, see Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol., 28, No. 4, July 1950, pp. 584ff. (hereafter "Occupation," and "The Dismemberment of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1950, pp. 487-498. One also gets a good sense of the same in Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives of the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, *American Civil-Military Decisions*, Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963, pp. 311-464.

Germany was to be treated after victory was achieved. The purpose of this new committee was “confined to the consideration of drafts for instruments to conclude hostilities and to enforce compliance with armistice or surrender terms.”³ It assigned Colonel T. N. Grazebrook⁴ (UK) and tasked the new sub-committee to “prepare drafts of documents...required in connection with the formal suspension of hostilities...and to submit plans for the enforcement of such instruments by armistice and disarmament commissions....”⁵

In December 1943, a British government report entitled *Occupation of Germany* outlined the case for and against total occupation and whether it was necessary. It specified that one of the United Nations’ objectives upon cessation of hostilities should be the “rapid and total disarmament of Germany and the breakup of the German military machine.” The case was made that the situation that obtained following WWI should not again be tolerated and that sufficient armed force should be distributed throughout Germany to prevent the delay, obstruction and difficulty in enforcing the terms of surrender that followed the Versailles Treaty. The point was further made that the sooner Germany was disarmed, the sooner the work of reconstruction could begin. It was believed that it would take two years from the cessation of hostilities to complete the total disarmament of Germany and destruction of its armaments industries.

³ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, Occupation Forces in Germany Series, 1945-46, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, 1947, p. 29.

⁴ Colonel Tom Neville Grazebrook, D.S.O., C.B.E, was an officer of the Gloucester Regiment who had seen action as commander of the 6th Inniskilling Fusiliers in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. He was subsequently promoted to Brigadier and served on the Secretariat of the Allied Control Commission. Grazebrook was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit in November 1945.

⁵ C.O.S. (43) 199 (Final), 25 July 1943. RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/2, Box 115, Folder 388 Germany, Early Post Hostility Planning, Vol. I, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD. Hereafter NARA.

To insure no repeat of the post-World War I scenario, the British proposed that to supervise the first two years of the post-hostilities period 11 divisions of land forces, seven regiments of armored cars plus the necessary non-divisional units would be required for a total of 310,000 personnel. To back this force up, 28 Air Force squadrons, to include light- and fighter-bomber, as well as reconnaissance aircraft, would be needed.⁶ The assumptions made in that report showed the distrust with which the British held Germany as well as British fears that a resurgent Germany would somehow find a way to circumvent the disarmament regime that would be imposed upon it.

The British also believed that once the Allies entered Germany they would find a significant amount of civil disorder as well as large numbers of German troops who would need to be disarmed, hence the need for the large number of ground forces. The report also indicated that the presence of a large number of Allied air forces would have a considerable effect on German morale by having mass formation flights from time to time to remind the Germans that Germany had, in fact, been defeated.⁷

It was not until 1944, however, that the broader concepts of occupation began to be reflected in Allied planning. With the establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under Eisenhower in January 1944, the disarmament and demilitarization issue became the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3), then Major General Harold R. Bull (U.S.) and following the cessation of hostilities, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs (G-5), Lieutenant General A.E. Grasset

⁶ C.O.S. (43) 311, 12 December 1943, Annex to Report: *Military Occupation of Germany*, pp. 4, 14, in folder COS (43) Papers, (Non (O) papers. RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry 3, Box 131, NARA. Occupation forces were assumed to be divided equally among the Allies, the USSR included.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

(UK).⁸ What little direction SHAEF could get came from the U.S. War Department, the British War Office, and the joint European Advisory Commission (EAC), established by the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943.⁹ It was, however, in the Post-Hostilities Sub-committee, now part of SHAEF's Operations (G-3) Division, that many of the most important demilitarization staff studies and memoranda were developed.

Among the various agencies responsible for formulating pre-surrender and post-hostilities policy for Germany, those in Washington were slow to recognize the need for post-hostilities planning and also were plagued by serious divisions and fundamental differences in outlook. Despite the creation in December 1943 of the Working Security Committee (WSC), composed of War, Navy and State Department representatives, agreement on the function of the Committee was never really reached. The perspectives of the State and War Departments as to the tasks to be performed by Allied military forces during the occupation were greatly at odds with one another. As an example, when the EAC held its first meeting in January 1944, three months after it was formed, Ambassador John G. Winant, the U.S. representative, had not received any guidance from Washington concerning the main task of the Committee, i.e., preparing surrender terms for

⁸ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Op. cit.*, pp. 30-31. General Eisenhower's position as Supreme Commander was often indicated in official correspondence by the acronyms SCAF (Supreme Commander, Allied Forces), SCAEF (Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces), and SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers).

⁹ For a brief overview of the European Advisory Commission, see Appendix A.

Germany. The infighting within the WSC precluded any effective communication or coordination until early March 1944.¹⁰

According to Winant's biographer, the Ambassador received only one policy directive with authoritative clearances between March and October 1944. During this period, Winant sent his political advisor, George F. Kennan, to Washington to seek guidance but to no avail, and in July 1944, Winant's military advisor, Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, also personally appealed to the WSC for policy guidance with little apparent success. Washington's failure to provide guidance was also felt by Eisenhower, who, following the entry of U.S. combat forces into Germany in September 1944, urgently requested guidance from Washington regarding the control and occupation of Germany.¹¹

From the archival documents available, it appears that the multiplicity of military and civilian agencies, in both the United States and Great Britain, made the post-hostilities planning process, albeit thorough and extremely broad in its coverage, overly bureaucratic, cumbersome and to some degree duplicative. From the end of the war in Europe until the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Council in 1948, the disarmament

¹⁰ Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 4, July 1950, pp. 583-585. See also Bernard Bellush, *He Walked Alone*, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, p. 197.

¹¹It should be emphasized at the outset that despite the delays and difficulties in Washington, its role, as well as that of the EAC, was one of providing broad guidelines for the occupation and subsequent military government of Germany and not specific details regarding the disarming of the German Armed Forces. Nonetheless, much of the delay in providing guidance was due to the lack of cooperation between the War and State Departments and also between the U.S. and British governments over the role of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington. See Pogue, Forrest C., *The Supreme Command*, U.S. Army in World War II series, European Theater of Operations, Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1996, pp. 77-78 and 339-48.

ment and demilitarization process became increasingly encumbered by political obstacles that left many tasks unresolved and, therefore, undone. Thus, as will be seen, it was left to SHAEF to formulate the plans that would permit Eisenhower to carry out his command's required post-hostilities tasks to disarm German soldiers, disband and demobilize Germany's armed forces, dispose of German war materiel and begin the process of demilitarizing Germany.

Initial Thoughts on Disarming Germany

In late November 1943, using the initial post-hostilities plan Operation RANKIN, Case 'C' (see below) COSSAC drafted an initial study suggesting the composition of disarmament detachments to supervise the process to be effected by the German High Command (*OKH*). This was, of course, predicated on the belief that German troops remained subject to the discipline of the German High Command. The disarmament detachments, as proposed by this study, were to be small and consist only of sufficient personnel to communicate the orders of the Allied High Command and supervise their observance.¹² In a follow-up study, a compilation of comments on the original paper highlighted several areas of concern, such as the guarding of dumps and the responsibility for disarming the German Air Force (*Luftwaffe*) and Navy (*Kriegsmarine*). It was also brought out that as the location of naval ports and facilities were on land, creating points of contact with land forces, they should not be the unilateral responsibility of the Admiralty.¹³

¹² COSSAC/2323/Ops, Subject: 'RANKIN' Case 'C' – Disarmament, 26 November 1943, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/27, Box 92, Folder 388.3-2 GPS Method of Disarmament, NARA.

¹³ COSSAC/2323/1/Ops, 29 November 1943, *Loc. cit.*

On December 23, 1943, the first full draft for General Staff Officers (GSO's 1) of the COSSAC disarmament study was forwarded.¹⁴ Its objective assumed a similar organization as that following World War I in that it outlined the steps to be taken by the Supreme Commander (SCAF) to enforce disarmament of the German Army in his area of responsibility (AOR) between the time of the envisioned Armistice and the transfer of responsibility to a Disarmament Commission. The scope of this paper covered German forces outside Germany, German forces in transit over the frontiers of Germany, and German forces in Germany. Contrary to the initial study, it stated that naval disarmament was an Admiralty responsibility and thus would not be considered in the paper.

The paper indicated further that the Post-Hostilities Sub-committee was drafting a paper on the composition and functions of a European Disarmament Commission for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff and, upon approval by the British Government, for submission to the EAC. That said, the paper postulated that the SCAF would be responsible for the complete disarmament of the German Armed Forces until the transfer of responsibility to the Disarmament Commission took place – a period expected to take approximately two months. It absolved the Supreme Commander from any responsibility for the disbanding of the German Armed Forces or the dismantling and destruction of German fortifications and “similar works.”

Of the several main considerations to be followed in this paper, the admonition that disarmament was to be immediate and that no German should be allowed to enter Germany bearing arms was one. The paper cited the experience following World War I, stating that “after the last war it was possible for the Germans to pretend that the German

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Army had never been beaten in the field because it returned to Germany still bearing its arms. This is another mistake which must not be repeated.” The paper prefaced this caution by reminding its readers that the German Army had been able to hinder the effectiveness of the Military Control Commission after the last war, hence total disarmament must be carried out immediately after the armistice without exceptions. By 1 January 1944, the second draft of this study had grown in size and detail, adding sections for action by the Air Commander-in-Chief, ground and Air Force commanders.

An unofficial assessment of this disarmament issue by the Land Forces Subcommittee estimated that the British alone would require 270 officers and 1300 other ranks to man the necessary disarmament detachments, both fixed and mobile. Aside from the security of dumps, depots and stores of war materiel, two key concerns were the belief it would prove difficult for Allied forces to enter Germany fast enough to ensure the rapid disarmament of the German forces already inside Germany, and their ability to supervise the expected millions of disarmed German soldiers found in barracks and camps both inside and outside Germany was questioned.¹⁵ That said, the British appeared to believe that creating new staff for disarmament at this time was a waste of scarce manpower. In its stead, it was determined to relieve a number of personnel from the Staff Duties Section to form the nucleus of a disarmament staff until RANKIN ‘C’ conditions obtained. Colonel Grazebrook was named to undertake this task.¹⁶

¹⁵ C.A. 7/BM/30/1 – Disarmament of Germany, undated (but based on the date of the cover letter, this estimate was written on or before 8 January 1944), RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/27, Box 92, COSSAC Disarmament Study, NARA.

¹⁶ COSSAC/17235/Ops, 10 January 1944, *Loc. cit.*

German evasions of the terms of the Versailles Treaty and their protestations that the war had not been lost were themes repeated both in Washington and London. According to the terms of the WWI Armistice, the Germans were required to evacuate German-occupied territories on the Western Front within two weeks. Any troops remaining in these areas were to be interned or taken as prisoners of war. Allied forces were to occupy the left bank of the Rhine within a month, and a neutral zone established on the right bank. In terms of military equipment, the Germans were to turn over to the Allies 5,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 2,000 aircraft, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway wagons, 5,000 trucks and its entire submarine fleet. The majority of Germany's surface naval fleet was interned; the remainder was disbanded.¹⁷

A memo by a prominent German lawyer who had fled to the United States and joined the U.S. Army, prepared for Major General John H. Hildring, Chief of the newly formed Civil Affairs Division in the War Department, and written from personal knowledge, stated that when the Armistice was signed in 1918, it had been signed:

[a]t Compiègne at a time when the German armies were holding in Russia, Turkey, the Balkans, Belgium and France. The German soldier did not realize he was defeated. ... [that] after the proclamation of the Armistice the German troops going back through France and Belgium gave the appearance of well organized fighting units. They had observed good marching discipline, and were fully

¹⁷ The Allies' Armistice Demands From World War I Document Archive, Official release by the German Government, published in the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, November 11, 1918, Official release by the German Government, published in the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, November 11, 1918, *The World War I Document Archive*, Ed. Richard Hacken. 15 July 2009. Brigham Young University Library. 15 May 2010, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Allies%27_Armistice_Demands and <http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/armistice.htm>.

equipped with rifles, machine guns and cannons. Their flags were flying and their bands were playing.¹⁸

On 14 January 1944, Major General C.A. West, Deputy CoS (G-3), highlighted the fact in a COSSAC Memo that there was a complete lack of United Nations policy to help deal with problems arising from Operation RANKIN. General West specifically addressed the issue of armistice terms and disarmament, stating that there had been considerable guidance from British sources but that they dealt exclusively with long-term policy after the initial occupation of Germany. It was essential now, he wrote, that papers on all these problems be prepared with some urgency. This would allow the SCAF to lay down policy for the first 90 days following the armistice. He then outlined ten issue areas that needed addressing to include armistice terms and disarmament, and he assigned both G-3 and G-4 divisions the responsibility for developing these papers. He also addressed both the Navy and Air Staffs and invited them to nominate officers to work on issues of interest to them.¹⁹

By 25 January, the draft COSSAC disarmament paper had become a SHAEF paper (SHAEF/21540/SD) and was sent to SHAEF's "Head Planners" indicating that significant amendments from the previous meeting had been incorporated and that unless controversial points arose (during the coordination process) there would be no further meetings on that paper. Among the various changes incorporated was a War Establish-

¹⁸ *Memo of Capt Oppenheimer for Gen Hilldring*, 23 Mar 44, Subject: Comments on Mr. Warburg's Proposal re Surrender and Post-Surrender Policy Toward Germany, cited in Wellig, *Op. cit.*, Book 6, "Germany," Section _____. Surrender, Introduction, p. 4.

¹⁹ COSSAC/17235/Ops, Subject: Operation 'RANKIN' 'C,' 14 January 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry 27, Box 92, NARA.

ment/Table of Organization (WE/TO) for the disarmament mission that now included manning for separate U.S. and British units.²⁰

The paper was released under the signature of Colonel Grazebrook, then Deputy Chief, Staff Duties Section, G-3 (Operations) Division. The 15-page paper contained four appendices and a map. Extremely detailed, it included suggested sizes and compositions of disarmament detachments to be set up in German military districts (*Wehrkreise*) as well as mobile missions, and outlined the responsibilities of SHAEF and the German commanders who were to be used to effect disarmament under Allied supervision. In April, the study, now entitled *Primary Disarmament of the German Armed Forces*, was forwarded to the SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, for approval. The cover letter indicated that the total personnel requirement for the necessary disarmament missions totaled 272 officers and 165 enlisted men/other ranks. This study, which was the second of four such studies, was approved on April 29 1944 and issued as PS-SHAEF (44)10.²¹

²⁰ SHAEF/21540/SD, Subject: Disarmament, 25 January 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/2, Box 115, folder 388.3 Germany: *Disarmament of German Armed Forces and Disposal of Enemy Equipment (Post Hostilities)*, Vol. I, NARA. SHAEF was stood up in mid-January 1944. Manning was as follows: Basic control team would be comprised of five officers, 18 other ranks, including signal personnel, a rifle platoon (for security), one 2½ -ton truck, six ¼-ton trucks with trailers and two motorcycles. Control teams at higher headquarters would consist of eight officers, two of whom were to be German speakers, a liaison officer from the other nation, 21 other ranks, a rifle platoon, three cooks, a motor pool non-commissioned officer (NCO), seven jeeps, seven ¼-ton trucks, and two motorcycles. Air Component control teams were even larger with 12 officers, 27 other ranks, a RAF Regiment/Headquarters platoon, six jeeps with trailers and two motorcycles. Mission control teams had ten officers, 26 other ranks, a RAF Regiment/Headquarters platoon or security detachment, three jeeps with trailers and two motorcycles, while an Air Component detachment control team consisted of eight officers, 35 other ranks, a RAF Regiment/Headquarters platoon or security detachment, eight jeeps with trailers and three motorcycles. All Air Force intelligence personnel were required to be fluent in German.

²¹ *Ibid.*

There was, however, one aspect of this study to which the Foreign Office objected. The offending paragraphs stated that German forces would be used to guard German arms and supply depots in liberated territories to prevent them from being raided by Allied nations. The Foreign Office suggested that Allied governments would be offended to learn that after their liberation from the Germans, German troops were being retained on their territory to do a job the Allies could do. Furthermore, the Foreign Office believed the Allies would be none too pleased that Germans were needed to protect the dumps from Allied nations. The Foreign Office expressed its hope that these paragraphs would be thoroughly reconsidered!²²

Several days later, a memo from the Allied naval staff was sent to the Admiralty asking for guidance on disarmament. The memo requested guidance on naval objectives that still needed to be occupied and on additional naval operations that were to be carried out. It also suggested that naval disarmament requirements could be met by including naval representation in the disarmament missions then being prepared by SHAEF. Lastly, an enclosure included a timetable establishing when various ports were to be occupied under the present plan as well as under an accelerated, modified plan. The timetable indicated that none of the German ports could be occupied sooner than 17 days after the armistice was signed.²³

²² Letter, SA/672/PO2, Subject: *Primary Disarmament of German Forces*, 3 July 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/27, Box 92, Folder 388.3-3, Primary Disarmament of German Forces; Training of Disarmament Cadres, NARA.

²³ 330/X/09240/1/10, 28 January 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/2, Box 115, folder 388.3 Germany, Disarmament of German Armed Forces and Disposal of Enemy Equipment (Post Hostilities), Vol. I, NARA.

In early February, the War Office sent a memo to SHAEF asking for estimates of manpower needs for the control/disarmament commission. The Memo indicated that the bulk of the requested technical personnel would come at the expense of 21st Army Group and forces in the UK that were otherwise required for reinforcement or maintenance. The War Office then requested that requirements be kept as small as possible, deferring as much as possible until the war was over. A summary of British Army personnel required totaled 383 officers and 2,586 other ranks for the disarmament process.²⁴

Responsibilities of the Supreme Commander

Concurrent with the planning taking place in SHAEF during 1944, questions concerning the post-surrender responsibilities of the Supreme Commander continued to be raised. In May, 1944, Eisenhower received his first directive on Military Government in Germany. Known as CCS 551, *Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender*, the directive vested in him supreme legislative, executive and judicial powers but contained nothing regarding disarmament or demilitarization.²⁵ The receipt of CCS 551, and its guidance for military government in those areas of Germany captured by the Allies *before* the war was terminated made the lack of definitive guidance regarding Eisenhower's responsibilities *following* Germany's surrender even more urgent. Accordingly, and shortly before planning for the post-hostilities plan Operation TALISMAN began, two additional documents, a staff study and a memorandum, the

²⁴ SD4/BM/207, 7 February 1944, Subject: Manpower Requirements for Control/Disarmament Commission, and Appendix 'C,' SHAEF/21540/1/SD, 16 February 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry NM8/27, Box 92, Folder 388.3-3, Primary Disarmament of German Forces; Training of Disarmament Cadres, NARA.

²⁵ Planning for the Occupation of Germany, *Op. cit.*, p. 47. CCS was the acronym for the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

first, entitled *Preparations for the Armistice and Post Hostilities Middle Period* and the second entitled *Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning*, addressed the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and his powers during the “Middle” or “Military Period.”²⁶

The key feature of the staff study was its recommendation that the *OKW* should be used to impose the will of the Allies upon a defeated Germany. Acknowledging that the EAC was still working on the *Instrument of Surrender* and that directives to complement the surrender document were still required from CCS, the study went on to consider the kind of problems the Supreme Commander would confront during the “Middle Period” and before an Allied Control Authority was established. Among the problems discussed were:

- Control of the German High Command, which it was believed would remain in existence for some undefined period to insure the terms of surrender were met.
- The initial stages of disarmament, subsequent problems associated with the disposal of enemy war materiel and captured arms, and the destruction of enemy fortifications.
- The disbandment of the German armed forces, to include their discipline, provisioning and use as labor before being demobilized, and
- The disposal of the German police forces and Gestapo and the denazification of those police forces that would be retained to impose law and order.²⁷

²⁶ PS/SHAEF(44)9, Preparation for the Surrender and Post Hostilities Middle Period, 29 April 1944, and SHAEF/21542/Plans, same date, as well as SHAEF/21542/Plans, Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning, June 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry 1, Box 72, NARA. See also *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, *Op. cit.*, pp. 37-42.

²⁷ Many of these problems were subsequently addressed by papers and directives that eventually appeared as memoranda appended to the Operation TALISMAN successor, Operation ECLIPSE.

The memorandum, written by Major General Bull, reflected the contents of a memo sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff by Grazebrook one month earlier. In his Memorandum, General Bull bemoaned the still confused state of post-hostilities planning and preparation and the fact that the CCS had yet to send any guidance relating to the Supreme Commander's responsibilities. Many different bodies, he continued, primarily in the UK were studying the problem in a vacuum but there was no real coordination between them nor in SHAEF, despite the "great deal of planning" that had been carried out by the various divisions.

Attached to Bull's memorandum was a second memorandum designed to be sent to the CCS by Eisenhower outlining action that needed to be taken by SHAEF to provide him with the necessary "special staffs" he would require to initiate plans for the immediate post-surrender period. Most important, it recommended that the SHAEF Planning Staff be placed at the disposal of the EAC for "consultation and exploratory work."²⁸ The attached memorandum recognized that it was not possible to predict when Germany would surrender and, while acknowledging that the EAC was working on establishing the necessary post-defeat machinery to be set up in Germany (and Austria), the actual surrender could come about before the Allies had agreed on what needed to be done. Therefore, the memorandum continued, it stood to reason that Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander, needed to be prepared to initiate the occupation and control of Germany immediately following the cessation of hostilities, and that his responsibilities in that respect would continue for some indeterminate period.

²⁸ SHAEF/21542/Plans, Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning, June 1944, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Entry 1, Box 72, NARA.

The attached memorandum also highlighted the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff had already established a Control Commission Military Staff (CCMS) and that extensive planning had been accomplished on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, it recognized that various working committees had been established in the British Foreign Office and other Ministries but that apart from the military staffs of each nation in the EAC, he, Eisenhower, was unaware of any comparable post-hostilities planning by either the Soviet Union or the United States except for that already done within SHAEF.

The memorandum then ended with a series of conclusions and recommended actions to wit:

- There might not be enough time for the EAC to complete its work nor select and train the specialist staffs needed for the part of Germany that will be occupied by the Allied Expeditionary Force.
- That the Supreme Commander must be prepared to cope with this outcome but would confine his responsibilities to only that portion of Germany to be occupied by U.S. and British forces.
- That there could be no duplication of effort. Those staffs selected by the Supreme Commander must be so organized as to fit the final British and U.S. organization for control in Germany and that SHAEF and the EAC must coordinate closely.

To that end, Eisenhower proposed to:

- Set up a short-term post-hostilities organization within his headquarters under a designated member of his staff.
- Obtain from British Service ministries and from the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) additional British and U.S. personnel as necessary to implement the planning and executive staff.
- To approve directives to these staffs and subordinate field commanders for “essential military action required to *inter alia*:
 - Occupy Western Germany.

- Seize control at all levels within the occupied territory of the German military, administrative and political machinery.
- Disarm the German forces in Western Europe.

The memorandum closed by stating that if the CCS agreed to the above, they might wish to modify the terms of reference for the CCMS as the Supreme Commander's planning for the immediate post-surrender period and the training of specialist staffs that would have already taken place. Additionally, it reemphasized the need for extremely close coordination between the EAC and SHAEF's post-hostility staff to ensure that the SHAEF staff marched in step with the EAC. Lastly, it recommended as desirable Russian representation on the planning staff "at the earliest possible opportunity."²⁹ Before the memorandum could be sent, however, a cable arrived from the Combined Chiefs that, as interpreted by SHAEF, gave "the Supreme Commander the responsibility to act for a period after the signing of the Armistice."³⁰

At approximately the same time, and for the reason outlined in Bull's memorandum, Eisenhower requested the establishment of the nucleus of an American Control Council to prepare for the post-surrender period. In a memo hand-carried to the JCS by General Wickersham, Eisenhower cited the existence of a British Control Council element while bemoaning the lack of any parallel U.S. or Soviet group in the UK aside from those assigned to the EAC. He also indicated a lack of knowledge of what, if any, such planning staffs existed in either the U.S. or Russia.

²⁹ Tab 'A' to SHAEF/21542/Plans, Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning, June 1944, *Loc. cit.* See also *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, pp. 50-52.

³⁰ *Planning for the Occupation*, p. 52.

Eisenhower related that SHAEF had begun a great deal of post-hostility planning and that U.S. and UK specialist personnel had been earmarked for training. A basic manual for military government had also been drafted based on previously received pre-surrender guidance. The problem, however, was the lack of top-down planning, i.e., nothing had been done to provide senior leadership for Allied Control Staffs, policy guidance or key personnel. The stage had now been reached, Eisenhower continued, where the appointment of a nucleus group had become an urgent necessity. Eisenhower then recommended that immediate appointments be made for deputies to the yet-to-be-named chiefs of the Control Council, for a U.S. equivalent to the British element to fill appointments in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Demilitarization Group, and for key personnel in the Military Government Group.³¹

On 4 August, the JCS approved Eisenhower's request and agreed that U.S. personnel should be so assigned. The JCS further concurred in the appointment of a General officer to be the Acting Deputy to the Chief, U.S. Representative to the Control Council and named Wickersham, still the U.S. Military Representative to Ambassador Winant on the EAC to fill the position. Ten days later, the JCS authorized the assignment of 289 officers, 32 warrant officers, and 356 enlisted personnel, some of whom were to come from the European Theater, as well as the War and Navy Departments, to man the U.S. element Eisenhower had requested.³²

³¹ JCS 923, 26 Jun 1944, Post Hostilities Planning, RG 260, Entry A1/17, Box 38, NARA.

³² JCS 923/3, 4 August 1944, Post Hostilities Planning and enclosure to JCS 923/4, 14 Aug 1944, RG 260, Entry A1/17, Box 38, NARA.

The failure to provide guidance to Eisenhower, however, remained unresolved as late as the fall of 1944. In mid-October 1944, Grazebrook submitted a number of papers to the Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF, outlining the need for a senior officer to be in charge of post-hostilities planning due to the failure of the EAC to devise any such policies, and the lack of agreement by the three Allied powers on any final policy as of that date. This vacuum meant that the Supreme Commander would not be afforded the luxury of having guidance provided him regarding the occupation of Germany. Grazebrook felt that a senior officer could direct a survey of all the tasks and responsibilities that would face the Supreme Commander to ensure that the plans, now coming to fruition in SHAEF, represented a sound policy for him to follow under any of the conditions he might face.³³

Once Grazebrook learned his memo had been approved, he submitted a second paper that contained recommendations to execute his proposal, a list of agencies with whom coordination would be essential, and the suggestion that due to its familiarization with the issues to be confronted, the Post-Hostilities Sub-section (G-3), of which he was chief, become the staff of the new senior officer/co-coordinator for planning. Grazebrook then appended a list of important papers that had been or were being prepared by SHAEF or outside agencies as well as a list of matters that required further attention, many of which were incorporated into subsequent studies, occupation directives and laws.³⁴

³³SHAEF/21540/5/PHP, Subject: Memo on Planning for the Occupation of Germany, 15 October 1944 and GCT/388.3-7/PHP, RG 331, Entry 40, Box 273, NARA, in folder 388.3-7 G.P.S., Planning for Occupation and Control of Germany, NARA.

³⁴Appendix 1 & B to SHAEF/21540/5/PHP and CGT-388.3-7, Subject: Coordination of Planning for the Occupation of Germany, 21 October 1944, RG 331, Entry 40, Box 273, NARA, in folder 388.3-7 G.P.S., Planning for Occupation and Control of Germany, NARA.

This planning coordination was undertaken by the Deputy Chief of Staff and the first meeting to coordinate plans and policies was called for 8 November 1944.³⁵ This initial meeting had far reaching results in that it highlighted a number of issues that needed review, revision or initiation, and a progress report issued a few weeks later, showed that various SHAEF staffs were rapidly working to resolve these issues.³⁶

Another April 1944 SHAEF Staff Study, *Preparation for the Surrender and Post Hostilities Middle Period* attempted to lay out the conditions and define the responsibilities that would confront the Supreme Commander upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe.³⁷ In terms of the need to disarm and demilitarize German forces on the continent, the study initially envisioned retaining the *OKW* intact in order to control the German Armed Forces. While SHAEF was to remain initially in Great Britain, it was deemed important for propaganda and psychological reasons to locate U.S. and British officers at the *OKW* to establish appropriate control and to transmit necessary directives from SHAEF to the German military.

The study also addressed the question of disarmament (excluding naval forces), placing responsibility on the Supreme Commander. Details had not yet been worked out but the assumption was made that disarmament would be controlled by the *OKW* while its execution would be supervised by Allied missions and mobile detachments. Disarma-

³⁵AG 387-1 COS-AGM, 27 October 1944 and SHAEF/21540/5/PHP and GCT 388.3-7 PHP, Subject: Coordination of Planning for the Occupation of Germany, 6 November 1944, RG 331, Entry 40, Box 273, NARA, in folder 388.3-7 G.P.S., Planning for Occupation and Control of Germany, NARA.

³⁶SHAEF 21540/5/PHP and GCT/388.3-7/PHP, Subject: Progress Report on Matters Considered at the Deputy Chief of Staff Conference held on 8 November 1944, 19 November 1944, RG 331, Entry 40, Box 273, NARA.

³⁷ SHAEF/21542/Plans, 29 April 1944, RG 331, Entry 1, Box 72, NARA. The "Middle Period" was defined as that period between the cessation of hostilities and the assumption of control by a "tripartite organization."

ment policy was to be formulated by the Supreme Commander with the advice of a yet-to-be-formed Control Commission. Additionally, the *OKW* was to remain responsible for the provisioning, maintenance and housing of German forces under its command. While the study stated that the terms of surrender would prohibit all forms of military training, it also indicated that demobilization might be delayed for a considerable time as there might be a requirement to use German manpower for labor, either in Germany or in the liberated countries.

In early July 1944, SHAEF sent a notice to the naval, air force, and major SHAEF staffs that a CCS message, which summarized the three stages of occupation in Western Europe, was understood to give the Supreme Commander the responsibility to act for an indeterminate period of time after Germany surrendered. As a result, the addressees were told that SHAEF now had to decide on the scope and limitations of those responsibilities. Two appendices were attached to the notice. The first was a draft that outlined the basis for Operation TALISMAN planning as it only covered the movement of Allied forces into the liberated countries and Germany and not what was required to enforce the terms of surrender. The scope of this latter issue was covered in the second appendix, entitled *Outline of Post-Hostilities Functions*, and it was meant to cover the period between the surrender of Germany and the assumption of responsibility for Germany by the Allied Control Commission (ACC).

The objectives of the post-surrender occupation of Germany, as stated in this appendix, were derived from an EAC document of 31 May 1944 and were as follows:

- To complete the disarmament Germany and the destruction of the German war machine.
- To convince the German people they had suffered a total military defeat.

- To destroy the National Socialist Party and system.
- To ensure that German militarism and National Socialism did not continue to operate underground.
- To lay the foundation for the rule of law in Germany, and
- To encourage individual and collective responsibility in Germans.³⁸

According to the appendix, the documents and proclamations being drafted by the EAC lacked the detail necessary to issue the required orders to the Germans pertaining to the occupation and the German Armed Forces. It was determined that SHAEF would therefore have to prepare these orders. The appendix stated further that as disarmament of German forces was an essential prerequisite of occupation, SHAEF would also have to provide special disarmament personnel with the requisite technical knowledge to assist in the disarmament and control of German bases and supply depots. In this vein, the outline recommended that planning be restricted only to the “immediate disposal” of surrendered war materiel and that the control of Germany’s armaments industry was not considered a priority.

The appendix also addressed the issue of the control of German forces, which it considered essential. It suggested that control staffs, placed at various German military headquarters would suffice and that the provision of previously trained personnel would also fall upon SHAEF but that they could be found in the several SHAEF headquarters and staffs.

The appendix erroneously assumed that demobilization and disbandment of German forces would *not* take place during this period and thus should not be included in this post-surrender planning without further instructions. As will be seen below, within

³⁸ SHAEF/21542/Plans, Subject: Post-Hostility Planning, 9 July 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/40, Box 262, NARA, in file SHAEF/215/GDP-2, Operation ‘ECLIPSE’ Directives. The CCS message referred to was presumably CCS 551.

six weeks following Germany's surrender, virtually all members of the German Armed Forces, with the exception of those cited as "war criminals," security suspects, or members of the S.S., etc., were disbanded and demobilized.

Lastly, to provide guidance to subordinate commanders, the appendix recommended that a post-surrender *Handbook* be prepared to obviate the necessity of preparing and issuing innumerable addition directives.

Operation RANKIN

Planning for the occupation and demilitarization of Germany was a complex matter. Planners were asked to envision the situation as it would be when the time came. Thus planners were given an "intellectual exercise of unusual difficulty," one that involved a task much broader than what military planners are normally given. In other words, since the plan they were asked to develop would cover the period following Germany's surrender, Germany's defeat would not be the objective. Instead, the plan would have to cover a myriad of problems ranging from displaced persons and allied prisoners of war to the disposal of captured German war materiel, the disbandment of the German Armed Forces, and the destruction of Germany's industrial war-making potential.³⁹

When COSSAC, under the direction of Lieutenant General Morgan, was established following the Casablanca Conference in 1943, he was charged with three tasks by the British Chiefs of Staff. Their directive, issued on 26 April 1943, read as follows:

You will accordingly prepare plans for:

- a. An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy

³⁹ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Op. cit.*, pp. 1-5.

in West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the United States 8th Air Force.

- b. A return to the continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.
- c. A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.⁴⁰

The first and third tasks were pure combat operations, i.e., to plan deceptive operations to keep German divisions in Western Europe and thereby help relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union, and to plan for the invasion of the Continent, i.e., to plan for what became Operation OVERLORD. Behind this directive was the idea, based on experience derived from the end of World War I, that Germany might suddenly collapse. It was also supported by naïve and wishful thinking that stemmed from recent German defeats in North Africa and Stalingrad and the planned Allied invasion of Sicily. This idea of German disintegration was voiced by Morgan in a directive that initiated the planning for the occupation of Germany that began on 22 May 1943.⁴¹ In the directive for the plan, which was given the code-name RANKIN, Morgan said that the expected German “disintegration” would not necessarily take the form of a complete collapse but that it could also be a partial withdrawal from occupied territory or the result of an Allied breakthrough.

This belief in a German disintegration was repeated by Morgan in the summer of 1943 and in the opinion of the Joint Intelligence Committee that, following its review of

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴¹ McCreedy, *Op. cit.*, pp. 714-16.

the German situation, was reflected in the RANKIN plan in August of that year as follows:

...the general situation as it exists today must appear to the German military leaders as verging on the desperate.... They are now faced with a serious situation of the Russian front and with the urgent problem of stopping the breach developing in Italy and the Balkans. Their U-boat campaign has met with a serious set-back. Finally, the ever-increasing Allied air offensive, to which there is no serious likelihood of a reply being possible, must be making the planning of the production increasingly difficult and must be causing serious doubts as to how long the home front can stand up to the combined strain of Allied bombing, the blockade, and military reverses.⁴²

As has been and will be repeated throughout this chapter, there was a dearth of guidance provided to the SHAEF planners. From the documentation available, it appears that “no theme is more prominent and continuous in papers relating to the planning for the occupation than the complaint that the military planners were left without guidance as to the policies of their governments.” The fact that SHAEF had to undertake these coordination meetings underscores this lack of guidance. That I have included reference to them and to the studies that were written as a result further illuminates the extremely broad and complex nature of the military and non-military problems the SHAEF staff was forced to solve on their own.

A clear example of this lack of guidance was voiced by Morgan in the transmittal letter to Operation RANKIN. In that letter he addressed “the essential difficulty in planning operations before the clear establishment of the political policy whence those opera-

⁴² *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Op. cit.*, p. 10.

tions derive their necessity.”⁴³ Post-hostilities planning was still being debated at the highest levels of government and a serious lack of agreement existed both within the Allied governments and between them. Much of this can be understood by realizing that post-hostilities thinking, aside from the obvious task of disarming German forces, was focused on the re-establishment of civil government in the liberated areas, the enforcement of the terms of surrender on Germany, and the establishment of military government in Germany to restore law and order.⁴⁴

While the first Quebec Conference provided no guidance to the COSSAC regarding post-hostilities planning, it did provide support for a continued planning effort.⁴⁵ Planning for Operation RANKIN therefore continued, developing three scenarios that were envisioned as signaling the end of hostilities. The first scenario, named RANKIN, Case ‘A,’ simply foresaw a rapid collapse or “substantial weakening” of German strength and morale, allowing Allied forces to land on the continent earlier than planned. The second scenario, RANKIN, Case ‘B,’ saw a German pull-back to its pre-war borders, also allowing Allied forces an early entry on the continent. Rankin Case ‘C,’ the third and final contingency, which foresaw an unconditional surrender, thereby allowing for an unopposed Allied entry into Germany with a force of approximately twenty-five divisions.

RANKIN Case ‘C’ did not, however, consider much beyond the immediate disarmament of the German armed forces. The plan provided only for stationing troops in certain strategic areas but not all those that eventually came under the responsibility of

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴⁴ McCreedy, *Op. cit.*, p. 719.

⁴⁵ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Op. cit.*, p. 11. The first of the two Quebec Conferences was held in August 1943 and was code-named QUADRANT.

the Supreme Commander. Furthermore, it failed to address what to do with German military forces once they were disarmed or how to treat German police or para-military forces. Neither did it address how Allied forces would be able to take up their positions with sufficient speed to disarm the German troops before they were able to retreat into Germany. In addition, it failed to address the question of Germany's military-industrial complex due, in part, to the lack of comprehensive post-war planning at the most senior levels of government.⁴⁶

With support for continued planning from the Quebec Conference, General Morgan gave priority to RANKIN, Case 'C' and a final draft was prepared in October 1943 and issued as a planning directive to both the British 21st and American 1st Army Groups. The revised plan now included occupation areas deep in Germany and included Berlin. It also specified the involvement of U.S. Forces. There remained, however, no additional guidance regarding the disarming of German forces. The above notwithstanding, Operation RANKIN - whose target date was set for 1 January 1944 - never went into effect. Despite the great effort and time that went into its planning, RANKIN continued to be based on what proved to be false assumptions. As late as July 1944, the senior officer of the British Control Commission Military Section (CCMS) stated his opinion that "the German surrender probably would take place with our forces still well outside the German frontier" and that planning in the CCMS was being conducted on that basis.⁴⁷

RANKIN's significance according to McCreedy, however, was that it began a "process

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 15. See also McCreedy, *Op Cit.*, p. 720, fn. 24 and p. 721.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25. See also Operation 'RANKIN' – Case 'C', Joint Plan, 23 November 1943, RG 331, Entry 27, Box 93, NARA.

of thinking and preparing for post-conflict operations that would continue through the rest of the war.”⁴⁸

This process was supported by General West, who underscored the importance of not waiting for policy to be laid down by the Allied powers. It was essential, he wrote in January 1944, “that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems,” i.e., armistice terms, disarmament, and the disposal of captured war materiel among other issues.⁴⁹ Thus, as D-Day approached, there was an explosion of planning activity and as early as April 1944, two post-conflict staff studies were underway and the subjects listed by General West as needing urgent attention eventually became Operation ECLIPSE Memoranda or Administrative Memoranda.⁵⁰ Thinking shifted from anticipation of a sudden military collapse, as envisioned by RANKIN, to the realization that the war would only be brought to an end by military operations.

Following Major General Bull’s direction to all chiefs in the G-3 division to submit to him a weekly progress report covering the activities they had completed or taken under study during the previous week, reports began to arrive. On 26 April, the post-hostilities planners indicated that two papers - *Primary Disarmament of German Forces* and *Preparation for the Armistice and Post-Hostilities (Military) Period*, PS-SHAEF(44)

⁴⁸ McCreedy, *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁹ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁵⁰ One of these studies was PS-SHAEF(44)10, Primary disarmament of German Forces, dated 29 April 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/27, Folder 388.3-3, GPS, Primary Disarmament of German Forces; Training of Disarmament Mission Cadres, NARA. See also *Planning for the Occupation of Germany, Op. cit.*, p. 36.

9, had been approved by the Chief of Staff. The 31 May report stated that Operation RANKIN 'C,' continental operations, had been re-designated Operation TALISMAN.⁵¹

Operation TALISMAN/ECLIPSE

By mid-June, the Post-Hostilities Sub-section, under Colonel Grazebrook, appeared to be fully engaged on several drafts dealing with the control and disposal of German forces and on 9 July, planning for Operation TALISMAN formally began.⁵² The objectives of TALISMAN were, *inter alia*, to disarm the Germans in the West to prevent a resurgence of hostilities and to occupy strategic areas on the continent to enforce the terms of surrender, all of which was to be accomplished in three stages. A supplement to the initial outline plan concluded that the Supreme Commander's first three responsibilities would include (1) Disarmament of the German forces, (2) Short-term disposal of surrendered war materiel, and (3) Control of German forces through subordinate headquarters but not through the High Command.⁵³

The plan encompassed a very narrow view of occupation and thus rejected responsibility for control of the German munitions industries, the disposal of enemy war materiel, and the disbandment of German forces.⁵⁴ The Planning Directive, initially issued in draft on 25 July, condensed the scope of the operation and made several technical

⁵¹ G-3 Ops Division, Supreme Allied Commander, Staff memo 3, RG 331, Entry NM8/26 Box 80 SHAEF, CoS, Future Plans, Decimal File 1943-45, in folder 18450/2 Planning Progress Report 381-9.

⁵² *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, p. 58. See also SHAEF/21542/Plans, Directive for Post Hostilities Planning, 18 July 1944, in File SHAEF/215/GDP-2, Operation ECLIPSE Directives, RG 331, Entry NM8/40, Box 262, NARA for the initial directive to start TALISMAN planning.

⁵³ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, pp. 60-61.

⁵⁴ See the summary of the TALISMAN Plan in *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, pp. 58-62.

changes to the three stages of the operation. Additional functions and tasks were also added to include the partial demobilization of the German armed forces for use as labor.

The directive also defined TALISMAN as:

Plans and preparations for operations in Europe (excluding Norway and the Channel Islands) in the event of German surrender. Operations in Europe will include the liberated countries until their indigenous governments are firmly established and in complete and independent control, and will include Germany until it is taken over by the Tripartite Military Government.⁵⁵

The TALISMAN Outline Plan was distributed as a planning directive on 13 August 1944 and it included a number of significant changes, to include the assignment of responsibilities to the major commands. It also redefined surrender as a “formal surrender signed by properly constituted German authorities, or the capitulation of the major portion of the German forces opposing the Allied Expeditionary Force.” In this latter case, the Supreme Commander would designate a date, to be known as ‘A’ -Day, signifying the beginning of TALISMAN. Thus, the plan allowed more flexibility in that it could be implemented not only upon Germany’s surrender but, at the discretion of the Supreme Commander should a significant portion of Germany’s forces surrender. In addition, the definition of German forces was expanded to include both para-military forces and the police, and a distinction was made between primary and complete disarmament and control of German forces.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, p. 63.

⁵⁶ On 18 April 1945, a cable from General Eisenhower to all SHAEF Commands indicated that unless there was a formal German surrender, there would be no arbitrary date selected for “A” Day to signify a changeover from Operation Overlord. The cable continued that Operation ECLIPSE will “assume to have begun in those areas of GERMANY progressively overrun by Allied forces....” FWD-19403, 18 Apr 45, RG 331, Entry 1, Box 72, NARA.

On 16 August 1944, Clay, then a Lieutenant General and Commander, 12th Army Group, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Commander, 21st Army Group, were directed to initiate plans and preparations in the event of a German surrender, which was not expected before 1 September 1944.⁵⁷ This operation, had four main objectives:

- The primary disarmament and control of all German forces.
- Enforcement of the terms of surrender.
- Establishment of law and order.
- The initiation of steps to control and completely disarm all German forces within SCAEF's area of responsibility.

To this end, both Army Groups were expected to plan and execute the operation in their area of responsibility (AOR) and to collaborate closely with one another. Appendices to the Outline Plan provided the estimated number of troops available to both commands between 1 August 1944 and 1 January 1945 as well as the number of troops required for each of the plan's three stages. Clay was informed that his Army Group would have a large surplus of forces in all three stages that might be required by 21st Army Group. One week later, both commanders were provided with drafts of the *Directive for Military Government of Germany* for their concurrence.

In early September, however, Lt. General Smith, SHAEF's Chief of Staff, sent a letter to the Chief of Staff, Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces (ANCXF), the Senior Air Officer, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), and key SHAEF staffs stating that as Allied forces would soon be entering Germany and thus facing TALISMAN conditions, it was essential that Army Groups and Air Forces receive early guidance. He therefore requested that memoranda for which they were responsible

⁵⁷ SHAEF/17014/2/Plans, 16 August 1944, SHAEF/G-5/Ops/604, 23 August 1944, RG 331, Entry NM 8/26, Box 75, NARA. The appendices with troop numbers, however, were not found in the file.

be prepared for distribution as soon as possible, even if incomplete. Several days later, Colonel Grazebrook, was authorized to issue several memoranda on a provisional basis.⁵⁸

Operation TALISMAN planning increased the size of the force required to thirty-nine and two-thirds divisions. A revised TALISMAN Outline Plan, distributed in October, delineated Zones of Occupation as decided on by the Second Quebec Conference.⁵⁹ On 30 October, 21st Army Group notified Supreme Headquarters that a captured German document indicated that the code name 'TALISMAN' was compromised. On 11 November, the new code name Operation ECLIPSE was substituted and planning continued under the new name. Two weeks later, on 24 November 1944, the Outline Plan for TALISMAN was officially superseded.⁶⁰

Operation ECLIPSE incorporated a number of items from TALISMAN, including the definition of its code-word name 'ECLIPSE' as "Plans and preparations for operations in EUROPE (excluding NORWAY and the CHANNEL ISLANDS) in the event of German surrender."⁶¹ ECLIPSE was different than its predecessors in that it specified that operations in Europe included "Operations in GERMANY until control there is taken over from the Supreme Commander by the Tripartite Military Government or by U.S.

⁵⁸ CGT 381-12/Plans, 5 September 1944, SHCGT FWD-14351, 9 September 1944, CGT 387.4-6/PHP, 25 January 1945, in RG 331, Entry NM8/23, Box 80, Folder 18450/2 Planning Progress Report 381-9.

⁵⁹ The second Quebec Conference, code-named OCTAGON, was held in September 1944. See also McCreedy, *Op Cit.*, pp. 722-23.

⁶⁰ GCT 370-27/Plans, dated 24 November 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/23, Box 21, NARA and *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, pp. 63-70.

⁶¹ Operation ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section I, Introduction and Objects, INTRODUCTION, para. 1, RG 331, Entry NM8/23, Box 22, NARA.

and British Commanders” while retaining the definition of ‘surrender’ from TALISMAN.⁶²

The “outline” of Operation ECLIPSE indicated that operations would most likely take place in two phases: the first would involve advancing to secure “especially important strategic areas deep within Germany, including BERLIN....” and the second would be, in part, to deploy forces to secure additional strategic areas and to “carry out the disarmament and disposal of enemy forces in GERMANY.”⁶³ The plan then provided guidance to the several Allied Army Groups and Air Forces as to their respective responsibilities in both phases, among which were the primary disarmament and masking of enemy forces in contact with Allied forces; flanking or astride the Allied axis of advance; the controlled concentration of enemy forces in areas selected by the Allies; the arrest and detention of individuals on the ‘black list;’ and the seizure and control of German war materiel. In this respect, the objectives of ECLIPSE were broadened to encompass not only the primary disarmament and control of the German forces, but para-military organizations and the police as well.

Operation ECLIPSE accepted the possibility that an overthrow of the Nazi regime by internal forces was remote and postulated that there would be no collapse of the German armed forces nor unconditional surrender until Germany had suffered “a further major defeat” that would enable the Allies to penetrate the homeland. The plan briefly discussed conditions expected to be found in Germany following its collapse and indicated

⁶² *Ibid.*, para 2.b.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Section III, paragraph 22.

that while there might be some resistance and sabotage, it would be isolated. The possibility of civil war, however, was not discounted.⁶⁴

Between 28 September and 13 December 1944, progress reports indicated that a study entitled *Disposal of the German Military Caste* had been circulated to planners and that TALISMAN Memo 9 (Army disarmament) and the *Operation 'ECLIPSE' Appreciation and Outline Plan* had been approved and issued. They also reported that the *Handbook* had been approved by the Chief of Staff and was in publication.⁶⁵ Also in preparation was the first draft of memo suggesting priorities for the destruction of war structures in Germany and the first draft of ECLIPSE Memo #17 (Disbandment of the German Armed Forces). In addition, the final draft of Memo 10 (Air Force disarmament) had been approved by the Planning Staff but despite General Smith's request, of the 16 ECLIPSE memoranda, only 10 had been issued by late January 1945

The ECLIPSE Memoranda

Operation ECLIPSE was spelled out in the Appreciation and Outline Plan and in nineteen Memoranda, of which five are of primary interest to the issue of disarmament, demobilization and disbandment of the German armed forces.⁶⁶

ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 1, *Instrument of Surrender, Surrender Order and Sanctions*, was originally issued in November 1944 but revised in April 1945. It was a lengthy, detailed Memorandum that contained a short series of opening paragraphs that laid out what would take place in the event of (1) a formal surrender, with or without an

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, SECTION II, paras. 13-17.

⁶⁵ *Planning for the Occupation of Germany*, pp. 70-71 and S-72170, 23 December 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/26 Box 80, in folder 381-2, SHAEF Weekly Planning Cables.

⁶⁶ For a listing of the ECLIPSE Memoranda, see Appendix B.

EAC-agreed *Instrument of Surrender*, in which case special orders to the German High Command had been prepared by SHAEF and were appended to the Memo as Appendix 'A,'⁶⁷ or (2) there was no formal surrender; and (3) sanctions that would be imposed if resistance to either form of surrender were encountered.

The main elements of this Memorandum were included in five additional Appendices:

- Appendix 'B': Supreme Commander Special Orders to the German High Command (OKW) of common concern to all three services or the direct concern of OKW only.
- Appendix 'C': Special Orders to the German High Command (OKH) relating to Land Forces.
- Appendix 'D': Special Orders to the German High Command (OKM) relating to Naval Forces.
- Appendix 'E': Special Orders to the German High Command (OKL) relating to Air Forces.
- Appendix 'F': Measures which may be taken to enforce the terms of surrender or in the event of no surrender to compel the enemy to comply with the Laws of War.

Part I of Appendix 'B' was quite all-inclusive and held the German High Command personally responsible for carrying out the orders of the Allied representatives and for ensuring that the commanding officers of all units of the German Armed Forces and their subordinates were notified that they would be held personally responsible for carrying out orders of the Supreme Commander in their areas of responsibility. It also established timelines by which the Allies were to be given information regarding the location of the High Command and all its departments and branches, as well as the location of all experimental/research facilities, underground installations of all kinds, and missile launching sites.

⁶⁷ Eclipse Memorandum No. 1, Instrument of Surrender, Surrender Order and Sanctions, Appendix "A," RG 331, Entry 2, Box 115, NARA. This appendix contained only general principles that had been agreed by the Allies. The actual Instrument of Surrender was not included for security reasons.

Part II of this Appendix was devoted to the “Control, Maintenance and Disarmament of the Armed Forces” and made the German High Command responsible for its “immediate and total disarmament.” It also provided initial guidance regarding the maintenance and guarding of war materiel, specifying that none was to be destroyed without prior orders from the Allied representatives and that all land minefields were to be clearly marked and that mines and obstacles on roads, railroads, waterways and ports were to be removed immediately. It also ordered the removal and destruction of all booby traps, demolition charges and concealed explosives.⁶⁸ The remaining parts dealt with Allied POWs and Civilian Internees, Telecommunications, Merchant Shipping and Ports, etc., and contained four Annexes, one of which contained a list of war materiels to be withdrawn from the Germans while a second contained a list of war materiel to be retained.

Part I of Appendices ‘C’ through ‘E’ mirrored Appendix ‘B’ by requiring each individual German armed force to provide information as to their order of battle and the location of their units, weapon systems, ships, etc. within a specific period of time. Part II, then, followed a similar pattern, specific to each particular service, e.g., all ships and submarines at sea were to report their positions and head for the nearest German or Allied port, breech blocks were to be removed from all guns and all torpedo tubes were to be unloaded. Aircraft were to be grounded and immobilized by methods described in the Appendix, removed from runways, guns unloaded and bombs removed. German Field and Home Armies’ armaments were to be placed in dumps as directed by “appropriate” Allied representatives and various classes of war materiels, delineated by the Allied rep-

⁶⁸ ECLIPSE Memorandum 1, Appendix ‘B,’ PART II, paras. 11 - 16, *Loc. cit.*

representatives e.g., armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, ammunition, etc., were to be laid out in stacks or parks within each dump. All other war materiel in factories, dumps, depots, etc., were to be maintained but were to remain where located. War materiel in transit, in the absence of orders to the contrary, would be allowed to proceed to its destination where it would then be placed in dumps/depots.

The three Appendices to the Memorandum also required all German commanders to immediately inventory all war materiel of any kind in any location within their area of responsibility. These lists were to be prepared in quadruplicate and were to be completed within two months following the cessation of hostilities. Standardized forms were attached to the Memorandum to be used for the inventory. Lastly, German Authorities were made responsible for handing over and delivering in good condition any war materiel that was requested by the Allies and they would remain responsible until such materiel had been accepted by the Allied representatives.

ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 9, *Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces*, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 10, *Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces*, and ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 11, *Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces*, dealt specifically with the three services and were, for the most part, quite similar. Memorandum No. 9 was, however, the most comprehensive of the three. It began by defining war materiel as “materiel intended for war on land, at sea, or in the air,” and included:

- a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implement of war of all kinds.
- b. All naval vessels of all classes, surface and submarines, auxiliary naval craft, all merchant shipping whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building.
- c. All aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices.
- d. All military installations and establishments including air fields, seaplane bases, ports and naval depots, storage bases, permanent and temporary

land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.⁶⁹

It continued by outlining the objectives of primary disarmament, which were to prevent a continuance or renewal of hostilities, to safeguard the deployment of the Allied Expeditionary Force during Operation ECLIPSE, and thereafter to facilitate the establishment of law and order in the Supreme Commander's area of responsibility.

Although this memorandum addressed the primary disarmament of German land forces, it also delineated the responsibilities of the Allied ground forces in the disarmament process by defining what comprised the German land forces. Thus, the *Herman Göring Parachute Panzer Corps* and German Air Force Field Divisions, Parachute Formations and other similar *Luftwaffe* units attached to the German Army became an Allied ground force responsibility. Similarly, the disarmament of German naval forces ashore, *Luftwaffe* and naval flak organizations, and the Nazi Party *Flieger Korps* also were also determined to be Allied ground forces responsibility.

Of particular interest was the guidance given that where the provision of Allied forces to guard and control dumps containing enemy war materiel was not possible, control would be maintained by German forces under the close supervision of the Allied commander in whose area the enemy war materiel was located. In fact, the Memorandum specified that "The fullest possible use will be made of the existing German military ma-

⁶⁹ Enclosure 2, Ltr, Supreme Hq AEF, AG 381-7 GDS-AGM, 16 May 1945, 'ECLIPSE' Memorandum No. 9, RG 331, Entry 11, Box 6, NARA.

chine, and orders will be issued through the recognized German channels of command wherever they survive the process of occupation.”⁷⁰

In line with ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 1, the maintenance, classification and inventory of enemy war materiel were made a German responsibility under strict Allied supervision. Lists of enemy war materiel that had to be surrendered and lists of materiel that could be retained in order that German forces could carry out orders given to them, to include limited numbers and types of weapons, e.g., rifles and pistols, were provided in two appendices.

Similarly, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 10 set out plans and policies for the primary disarmament of the *Luftwaffe*. For this task, the Memorandum specifically named the commanders of the Ninth (U.S.) Air Force and the Second (UK) Tactical Air Force respectively. This memorandum also defined what formations, units and personnel were included in *Luftwaffe* and followed Memorandum No. 9 in allocating primary disarmament responsibility for some *Luftwaffe* units to Allied ground forces.

This memorandum further delegated the exercise of the Air Commanders’ responsibilities to USAAF and RAF Air Disarmament Staffs and, given that the tactical situation on the ground did not reflect what would become the final zones of occupation, guidance was provided regarding the coordination and operational control of the national Disarmament Staffs while operating in the area of responsibility of a different national Allied commander, e.g., RAF units operating in Ninth Air Force areas. The memorandum also referenced ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 1, Administrative Memorandum No. 5, and

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

the *Occupation Handbook* regarding the disposition of captured enemy war materiel and “common use” items.⁷¹

Similar to ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 9, the Air Forces plan recognized the possibility that sufficient Allied forces personnel might not be available to guard every *Luftwaffe* establishment to effect direct control over *Luftwaffe* war materiel. Thus, German Air Force commanders were to be held responsible to ensure Allied orders regarding such materiel and its inventory were followed.

The memorandum expected that USAAF and RAF Air Disarmament Staffs would be in position behind advancing Allied forces and thus insure that German Air Force units, located within the area of advance were properly disarmed. It also specified that a “Reconnaissance Party” provided by both the U.S. and British Control Councils would be sent to the Air Ministry and that other elements would go to various *Luftwaffe* headquarters to compel compliance with the terms of surrender, if required. Specific tasks of these units were set out in an appendix to the Memorandum and two other attachments contained organizational diagrams of the respective U.S. and RAF disarmament organizations.

The third memorandum of this group, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 11, covering naval disarmament, was the briefest, being only two pages in length.⁷² It accepted the responsibility for disarming all German warships and merchant vessels, delegating the actual exercise of that responsibility to U.S., British and Allied naval officers-in-charge in

⁷¹ Administrative Memorandum No. 5 was entitled *Disposal of Enemy War Materiel and War Structures*, written originally in April 1944 but revised in January 1945. It governed the disposal of enemy war materiel in the liberated countries and, in a separate section, Germany. RG 331, Entry 27, Box 93, NARA.

⁷² ‘ECLIPSE’ Memorandum No. 11, RG 331, Entry 23, Box 21, NARA.

the areas under their control in accordance with instructions laid out in the *SHAEF Military Occupation Handbook*. In addition, it followed the line of responsibility for disarming naval forces ashore as stated in ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 9.

Section III of the memorandum addressed naval demolition stating that the demolition of naval defenses in Germany, which included submarine pens, fortifications, and underground storages, to name a few, would most likely not take place during the Supreme Commander's period of responsibility. Such demolitions, it indicated, would be carried out as part of a long-term policy by the Allied Control Council.

The last key memorandum, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 17, *Disbandment of German Armed Forces*, was put into operation on 9 May 1945, the day after Germany surrendered.⁷³ This memorandum laid down the policies by which Army Group commanders would carry out the disbandment of the German Armed Forces. Like many of the other memos, this memo began by stipulating that it was impossible to forecast conditions in Germany when the war ended. It therefore posited several assumptions upon which the plan was based, the essence of which was that Allied forces would have penetrated deep into Germany by the time hostilities ended and that those German forces, not already in POW camps, would have been moved into containment areas under the control of their own officers working under close Allied supervision.

Additional assumptions were that those Germans eligible for discharge would be released with as little delay as possible to avoid large-scale desertions. Furthermore, it

⁷³ ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 17, RG 331, Entry 11, Box 6, NARA. See also Cable SHGAP S-87506, 9 May 1945, RG 331, Entry 6, Box 30, NARA, in CALA File Vol. II of III, 387.4/1, Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces,

was believed that it would take as much as six months before the occupation armies were fully deployed in their respective zones.

While various memoranda and documents dealing with the anticipated surrender maintained the need for German military machinery to effect the terms of surrender and the control of surrendered German forces, the discharge plans of ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 17 was designed not to utilize German machinery in the discharge process if it could be avoided.⁷⁴ The discharge of captured and surrendered German forces would begin when directed by the Supreme Commander but would first be subject to the manpower needs of the Allied forces to assist in the occupation or those of the governments of Allied or “Liberated Territories” for purposes of reconstruction.

The remainder of the memorandum outlined very specific principles and responsibilities regarding the discharge process to include a very detailed set of statistical procedures by which members of the German armed forces were to be documented and prioritized for discharge. These procedures included the transfer of personnel who had been recruited in a different zone of occupation, non-German personnel, stragglers, deserters, and members of the *Volksturm*. Part II of this memorandum dealt specifically with the discharge of members of the *Waffen SS* and para-military organizations.

Shortly after this memorandum was issued, Major General R. W. Barker, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-1), SHAEF, wrote Lieutenant General Morgan, SHAEF’s Assistant Chief of Staff, that the memo lacked both a “clear definition of the object to be obtained”

⁷⁴ ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 17, para. 3, *Loc. cit.*

and “[P]ractical guidance to the recipients.”⁷⁵ With regard to the first omission, General Barker wrote that he would have a paper prepared that would provide a foreword or opening statement which would explain the purpose of the disbandment procedure. As to his second comment, Barker indicated that the disbandment issue had been more than adequately covered in the *Occupation Handbook* and that the Eclipse memo was “merely an extension of that handbook.”

That said, Barker indicated that the memo did offer a “systematic and efficient procedure” for implementing the disbandment under any of the various conditions that might arise. Furthermore, he added, the statistical and documentation procedures had been thoroughly considered by commanders and appeared to meet the needs of the Zone Commanders and SHAEF. The only difficulty with the documentation issue, he concluded, was the vastness of its scope.

Barker’s memo also stated that he did not believe SHAEF would be confronted with a shortage of guards as there were, on the U.S. side alone, 60 divisions in the field.⁷⁶ Barker also felt that the surrendered German forces would not have to be heavily guard-

⁷⁵ Memorandum To: General Morgan, Subject: Eclipse Memo No. 17 (Disbandment of German Forces), 11 March 1945, RG 331, Entry 2, Box 114, NARA.

⁷⁶ According to McCreedy, there were 61 U.S. divisions in Germany on VE Day. See his *Waging Peace: Operation Eclipse I and II – Some Implications for Future Operations*, USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 16 March 2004, p. 5. In early December 1944, an estimate of the forces needed to complete the occupation of Germany after the defeat concluded that there would be no problem. Operation ECLIPSE was a military operation, therefore all forces would be available as stated. The study signed by the Deputy Acting Chief of Staff, G-3, Major General J.F.M. Whiteley, stated further that it would take 10-18 months following Germany’s defeat for U.S. forces to be redeployed and by this time, all major tasks requiring a large occupation force would have been completed. Lastly, the study pointed out that the respective governments, not SHAEF, would determine the size of the “ultimate occupying force, CGT/387.4-6/PHP, 9 December 1944, Staff Study, Subject: Estimate of Forces Required to Complete Occupation Immediately After German Defeat, in Folder File 370 Germany: Allied Force Required for Occupation of Germany, Vol. I, RG 331, Entry NM8/2, Box 113.

ed, believing that "...from the German point of view, the advantages of obeying orders...under this plan, exceeded the disadvantages...."⁷⁷

Despite promulgation of the *Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation ECLIPSE* in November of 1944, of the three memoranda dealing with the disarmament of German Armed Forces discussed above, Memorandum 10 (Air Force disarmament) had not been completed or issued as of 31 January 1945. On 1 February, Lieutenant General Morgan directed that all memoranda that had not yet been issued be completed and those issued revised and/or amended by 10 February.⁷⁸ These memoranda were subsequently completed and confirmed as directives on administrative procedures in the disarmament of Germany on 10 March 1945.⁷⁹ That said, the first four months of 1945 saw accelerated progress in the development and issuance of additional memos and directives, to include ECLIPSE Memo 11 (Naval forces disarmament) issued, the *Interim Directive for Occupation of Germany* approved, Memo 17 (Disbandment of the German Armed Forces) approved by the Planning Staff and issued, as was Memo 10.⁸⁰

Demobilizing and Disbanding the German Armed Forces

More than a year before the final surrender of Germany, SHAEF's G-3 (Ops) Division was considering the manner in which members of the German Armed Forces were to be demobilized. Among the issues for which decisions needed to be made were:

⁷⁷ See *fn 69, Supra*.

⁷⁸ Memo CGT 381-12/Plans, Subject: 'Eclipse' Plans, dated 1 February 1945, RG 331, Entry 1, Box 72, folder 381 Eclipse, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. I, NARA.

⁷⁹ Memo, 370.2 (G-4), Subject: 'Eclipse' Policy, Hq 12th Army Group, 10 March 1945, RG 331, Entry 1, Box 72, folder 381 Eclipse, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. I, NARA. See also 12th AG 370.2 (G-4), 10 March 1945, Subject: ECLIPSE Policy, RG 331, Entry 11, Box 7, NARA.

⁸⁰ See CGT/400.93-1/PHP, CGT/387.4-5/PHP, CGT/381-9/Plans and the several Progress Reports in RG 331, Entry NM8/23, Box 80, NARA, in folder 18450/2 Planning Progress Report 381-9.

- What to do with non-German members of the German Armed Forces.
- Where to send Germans for demobilization, particularly those who had been recruited in what was to become the Russian zone of occupation.
- What demobilization papers would be needed and what form would they take.
- What pensions and/or gratuities would be allowed demobilized Germans.
- What articles of clothing and personal equipment would demobilized Germans be allowed to retain.
- The size of Allied staffs needed to supervise the demobilization process.⁸¹

On 15 July 1944, a draft Directive entitled *Disposition of German Armed Forces Subsequent to Surrender* was submitted by the Planning Committee of the U.S. Advisor to the EAC for consideration and for forwarding to the Department of State and the Secretariat, JCS. The Directive ordered the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief to implement the surrender terms and made them responsible for the demobilization and disbandment of the German armed forces in their respective zones and theaters of operation.” It directed the dissolution of the *OKW* and the Service Commands at the earliest possible date, but authorized temporary retention of portions of those organizations in order to effect the controlled administration of the German Armed Forces during the demobilization and disbandment.

This draft further authorized the Commanders’-in-Chief to keep and use disarmed German forces or prisoners of war (POWs) as required to accomplish tasks deemed necessary, such as the destruction of fortifications, rehabilitation projects, safeguarding surrendered German armament and equipment, etc. In addition, and in line with the ultimate objective of totally demilitarizing Germany, the Commanders’-in-Chief were directed to

⁸¹ SHAEF 21544/Ops, 6 April 1944, RG 331, 290/7/5/3, Entry 6, Box 30, NARA, in CALA File Vol. I of III, 387.4/1 Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces,.

“impress upon the German people the complete defeat of the German armed forces.” Accordingly, demobilized German personnel would be allowed to return home with only their approved personal effects and enough money and supplies to make the journey. Under no circumstances were returnees allowed to return home in military formation or with bands playing or flags flying as had been the case following the Armistice that ended World War I.

Other paragraphs of the draft directive dealt with the return of German units outside Germany’s 31 December 1937 borders and non-German personnel in the German Armed Forces. Lastly, Commanders’-in-Chief were cautioned to refer to an as yet unwritten guidance for instructions on the treatment of war criminals before disposing of German personnel or POWs.

This draft, circulated as U.S. Directive No. 15 and EAC(45)1, underwent several amendments and changes but was never approved and thus, never provided to SHAEF as official guidance. On 6 December 1945, more than a year later, and months after the war had ended and long after most disarmed German forces and POWs had been demobilized, the Allied Control Council issued Control Council Directive 18, *For Disbandment and Dissolution of the German Armed Forces*, which contained the same basic guidance as the U.S. draft.⁸²

In mid-1944, a key assumption of another draft study outlining the planning process for the disbandment of the German Armed Forces was that the bulk of these forces in the West would be outside Germany’s 1937 borders. Other assumptions were that some surrendered German forces would be used for labor in the liberated areas and that

⁸² RG 260, Entry A1/12, Box 12, and RG 260, Entry A1/28-31 Box 643, NARA.

some arrangement would have to be made with the Russians to transfer surrendered personnel to and from the Russian zone. What was decided at that time, however, was that disbandment during the Middle Period would be solely based upon the need for labor with priority given to medical personnel, agricultural workers and workers in certain essential industries. The draft also included details as to what articles of clothing would be issued to disbanded German Armed Forces members based on their rank (whether their clothing had been issued or paid for by the individual) and the availability of their own clothing. Pay, initially set at 60 *Reichmarks* for officers and 30 *Reichmarks* for other ranks and later modified to 80 and 40 *Reichmarks* respectively, as well as food allowances were also specified in this study.⁸³

On 28 November 1944, the SHAEF Post-hostilities Planning Staff produced a study which essentially recommended that with the exception of certain categories of personnel, all surrendered German Armed Forces personnel should be discharged and sent home as soon as possible. It portrayed the elaborate and bureaucratic procedures that were being developed and using the need for labor as the primary criterion as delaying discharge as long as eight months. It stated further that the large numbers of POWs, estimated at two and one-half million, would exceed the Allies' ability to control.⁸⁴

⁸³ GAP 387.4, August 1944, First Draft, Disbandment of the German Armed Forces During the Middle Period, in CALA File Vol. I of III, 387.4/1, Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces, RG 331, 290/7/5/3, Entry 6, Box 30, NARA. This draft was sent forward for coordination as GAP 387.4/1 on 19 November 1944. GAP 387.4/1, dated 22 May 1945 amended the pay. In CALA File Vol. II of III, 387.4/1, Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces.

⁸⁴ SHAEF/21544/PHP, GCT/387.4-5/PHP, 28 November 1944, RG 331, 290/7/5/3, Entry 6, Box 30, NARA. Also in CALA File Vol. I of III, 387.4/1, Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces.

Disposal of Germany's "Military Caste"

Along with discussions of the disbandment of the German Armed Forces and demilitarization of Germany in general to be discussed below, the issue of what to do with German general officers, especially the German General Staff Corps, collectively known as the "Military Caste" was a major issue. On 24 September 1944, Grazebrook disseminated a staff study for comment on "The disposal of the German Military Caste." The staff study indicated that one of the primary objects of defeating Germany was to effect Germany's "complete demilitarization and eradicate her traditional militarism." It continued that although plans had been made to disarm and disband the military and destroy its war-making potential, these plans were superficial. Germany's militaristic spirit and military caste of highly trained, professional officers remained. They contained not only the ability to rebuild the *Wehrmacht* but "the burning desire" to do so.⁸⁵

The study continued, explaining that although the Versailles Treaty forbade the re-establishment of the Great German General Staff, it was nonetheless resurrected in other forms. Grazebrook expressed his fear that while the surreptitious methods used in the 1920's would most likely not succeed in the 1940's, he was convinced that other methods would be found unless steps were taken to prevent that from happening. As long as qualified officers remained in Germany, they would remain a source of danger. This danger could be prevented by "the complete destruction or removal from Germany of the best brains of the military caste."

Grazebrook's study went on to distinguish General Staff Corps officers from a lack of a parallel organization in either the German Navy or Air Force, as well as from

⁸⁵ SHAEF/21544/PHP and GCT/387.4-5, Subject: Disposal of the German Military Caste, 24 September 1944, RG 331, Entry 27, Box 92, NARA.

the German officer corps in general. The study did specify, however, that German generals should not be allowed to retain any of their power or be allowed to continue in office in any capacity. The study concluded with the recommendation that to render these officers “impotent,” they be detained after their surrender and permanently exiled from Germany.

Because of the nature of the problem, which went well beyond the Supreme Commander’s level and was a tripartite matter, SHAEF indicated all it could do was recommend to CCS that a long-term policy statement be prepared.⁸⁶ A second draft of the study, apparently written on 12 November and designed to reach conclusions that would be incorporated in an attached draft cable to be sent to CCS, included policies suggested by both U.S. and British authorities but also highlighted discrepancies between the two. On the one hand, the U.S. *Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander regarding Military Government of GERMANY following the cessation of organised resistance*” that the JCS had given the CCS for consideration stated that: “All General Staff Corps officers who are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instructions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officer Corps.” A similar British directive submitted to the EAC, on the other hand, made no specific mention of the German officer corps or General Staff but stated instead: “You will be guided in the general disposal of forces under German Command by the following considerations: (1) All sections of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL and staffs which are not required for essential

⁸⁶SHAEF/21544/PHP and CGT/387.4-5, Subject: Disposal of German General Staff and the German Officer Corps, September 1944, RG 331, Entry 27, Box 92, NARA.

administrative control purposes will be detained under guard or disbanded as you may direct as early as practicable.”⁸⁷

The five-page staff study, which incorporated much of Grazebrook’s earlier statements, under-scored the importance of the problem by referring to history as having abundant examples of how the “German Armed Forces reduced by peace treaties to apparent impotence, reemerged in an astonishingly brief period as an effective and potentially dangerous organization.” Thus, the objective of the defeat of Germany, the study continued, was to “prevent a recurrence of this disastrous cycle by *effecting the complete and permanent demilitarization of GERMANY.*”⁸⁸

The study then divided the “Military Caste” into three categories: The Generals, The General Staff Corps, and The Professional Officer Corps. After dealing briefly with “The Generals,” and allowing that Generals who surrender should not be allowed to retain any vestige of authority or continue in office in any capacity, the General Staff Corps received the greatest censure. Defined as the “high priesthood of the German cult of war,” the General Staff Corps was cited as being “the repository of expert knowledge resulting from exhaustive study and experience, and who sought to perpetuate the teaching of von Clausewitz.” The study warned that unless drastic steps were taken, the General Staff Corps would plan and develop a future *Wehrmacht*, going even so far as to state that “The only fully successful method [of preventing a repeat of the rebuilding of the General Staff Corps after WW I] would be the *extermination* of the military caste,” but it immedi-

⁸⁷SHAEF/21544/2/PHP and GCT/387.4-1/PHP, Subject: Disposal of the German Military Caste, 12 November 1944, attached as Tab ‘A’ to Memo, CGT/388.4-1/PHP, same subject, 25 December 1944, RG 331, Entry 2, Box, 114, NARA.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, paras. 4 -5, Emphasis added.

ately recognized that if this would not be acceptable, some form of permanent control over all members of the General Staff Corps was essential.⁸⁹

The remainder of the study dealt with the need to detain these officers and when that detention should occur. It also advised that a number of German commanders and staff officers would be required to assist in the administration and disbandment of the German armed forces and that close supervision was needed. The study also cautioned that the detention of all *potentially dangerous* officers was needed to demonstrate Allied determination to stamp out German militarism.

A few days after the study was distributed, Colonel C.R. Kutz, the Chief, Ops A Sub-Section, forwarded his comments on this second staff study. He concluded that segregating or eliminating the German General Staff Corps would be, at best, a temporary expedient as long as German military writings remain. He also felt that their physical extermination (which had been recommended earlier) would only make martyrs out of them and give General Staff Corp officers even greater prestige. Kutz recommended that a way be found to discredit them in the eyes of the German people, that they be kept under strict surveillance and be required to report periodically to Allied authorities (presumably after discharge). He also recommended that SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division be directed to study the measures that could be used to discredit General Staff officers.

⁸⁹*Ibid*, paras 6-17, Emphasis added. As will be seen later in chapter 6, by the mid-1950's this was no longer a concern for either the British or the Americans. Both services had been working closely with German generals on historical studies and in the shadow defense ministry in preparation for the creation of the new German armed force. See James S. Corum, "Adenauer, Amt Blank, and the Founding of the Bundeswehr, 1950-1956," in James S. Corum, ed., *Arming Germany*, Leiden Boston: Brill, 2011, p. 45. It was also a group of German Generals and Admirals who, with the blessing of Chancellor Adenauer, drafted the *Himmerod Denkschrift* in October 1950 that formed the first German paper on how the new German armed force should be structured.

A draft cable was attached to this second staff study requesting guidance from the CCS regarding the ultimate disposition of German General Staff Corp officers and General officers “now being arrested” as none of the existing guidance provided an answer to that question. The draft cable suggested that “drastic steps” be taken and actually included the recommended “physical extinction” of these officers. If that was unacceptable, the draft continued, permanent exile or life imprisonment was to be considered. A policy decision was requested “as soon as possible” in order to “coordinate plans and put them into action.” Although this solution was not acceptable in the long run, the staff study, signed by Major General E.W. D. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, recommended approval!⁹⁰ Toward the end of December, however, General Morgan disapproved the several recommendations regarding this issue, stating that although not yet approved, the JCS directive, cited above, provided sufficient guidance.⁹¹

While indicating that final disposal of senior commanders and staff officers of the German Armed Forces had not been determined, guidance provided by SHAEF, which also included ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 7 and the *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany* specified that both active duty and retired General Staff Corps officers were to be arrested, not to punish them but to prevent them from again making plans or preparations for future wars and to ensure that their ability to mount subversive activities against the Allies were reduced to the minimum.

⁹⁰ GRI/CI/CS/091.711-1 (Germany), dated 27 April 1945, in CALA File Vol. I of III, 387.4/1, Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces, RG 331, Entry 6, Box 30, NARA.

⁹¹ Memo to Chief, Plans Section, Subject: Disposal of the German Military Caste, 14 November 1944, RG 331, Entry 27, Box 92, NARA and General Morgan’s Memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, same subject, 27 December 1944, *Loc. cit.* See also “Extermination had been recommended but subsequently withdrawn by Lt. Colonel John Counsel, Chief, PHP Sub-section,” Memo, GCT/388.4-1/PHP, same subject, 6 May 1945, *Loc. cit.*

Additional guidance, signed by the SHAEF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, indicated that they were to be segregated completely in special internment camps. Similarly, General officers, not needed to administer and control German Armed Forces personnel awaiting disbandment, were to be deprived of all authority, not permitted to wear decorations or “other symbols of military achievement,” and be sent to regular concentration areas. They were not to be discharged without the authority of Supreme Headquarters.⁹² British officers, in particular, were convinced that General Staff officers were no good and would do everything in their power to retain their power, re-create the General Staff, go underground, plan new wars, etc. As late as March 1945, 21st Army Group wanted them to be registered and placed under counter-intelligence supervision after their discharge.⁹³

The Disarmament School

In early 1944, while the planning for Operation RANKIN ‘C’ was underway and in anticipation of the need to implement those plans, Colonel Grazebrook had drafted a memo outlining the need to train cadre for the disarmament mission as well as a draft syllabus for that training.⁹⁴ Grazebrook’s suggestions were seen as a good idea by most, although the question of who would ultimately be responsible for the training and where it would be given was left open at that time. Of the several suggestions regarding topics to

⁹²CGT/387.4-5/PHP, Treatment of Senior German Commanders and Staff Officers, 29 April 1945, in folder Arrest and Disposition of German Military Personalities, File 250.3 GE, Vol. I, RG 331, Entry 27, Box 92, NARA. See also extracts from the *Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany* (para. 129) and ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 7 (para. 66) in RG 331, Entry 2, Box 113, NARA.

⁹³ 21st Army Group/209694/30/G(Plans)(1), German General Staff Corps, 5 March 1945, RG 331, Entry 27, Box 92, NARA.

⁹⁴ SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, Subject: Memo on Training of Disarmament Mission, 4 April 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/27, Box 92, Folder 388.3-3 GPS Primary Disarmament of German “forces;” Training of Disarmament Mission Cadres, NARA.

be in the syllabus, Colonel Grazebrook was reminded that there were still a number of officers around who had been involved in disarmament matters in the last war and that he would be well-served by having them give “a few informal talks to the cadres.”⁹⁵

A month later, on 9 May, the Civil Affairs section of the British War Office indicated that given a directive by either SHAEF or CCMS, they would be prepared to run a disarmament course and could do it with three weeks’ notice.⁹⁶ After much discussion with Headquarters ETOUSA and the British (to find a suitable location) the Disarmament School was established in London with a staff of twenty under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Frank Kowalski, Jr.⁹⁷

Grazebrook’s memo, now SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, on the “Training of Disarmament Missions” proceeded on the assumption that trained disarmament cadres would be authorized before the cessation of hostilities.⁹⁸ It suggested a four stage course of training that would include an introductory course in which students would obtain needed background information, a period of study covering both general and specific problems they would face, a discussion period in which to exchange ideas and formulate policies, and lastly a period in which the newly trained cadres would, in turn, train the remaining personnel of the Disarmament Missions and Detachments. The Memo further recommended that SHAEF (G-3) be responsible for the training and that it commence as soon

⁹⁵ SHAEF/1005/1/Log-P, Subject: Training of Disarmament Mission, 14 April 1944, *Loc. cit.*

⁹⁶ SHAEF/23003/Trg, Subject: Disarmament Course – Facilities, 9 May 1944, *Loc. cit.*

⁹⁷ Training Memo No. _____, Training Disarmament and Control Staffs, 8 October 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/40, Box 273, NARA.

⁹⁸ SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, Subject: Memorandum on Training of Disarmament Missions, 4 April 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/27, Box 92, NARA.

as possible. An appendix to the memo contained a syllabus of introductory courses that contained eleven topics ranging from the background of the Terms of Surrender to the Plan for the Occupation and Control of Germany, German Evasion of Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles,⁹⁹ the various military, police, para-military and armaments organizations, and Plans for the Control and Disposal of German Forces, Surrendered War Materiel, and the Imposition of Sanctions and Reprisals.

On 24 August, Grazebrook received information that Wickersham had received a reply to a letter Grazebrook had sent him in mid-July for forwarding to ETOUSA regarding the provision and training of disarmament staffs required for the U.S. Zone. According to the information received, ETOUSA had assumed responsibility for training these staffs and a directive had been prepared directing the theater commanders to provide the necessary personnel and to proceed with training. Attached to the notice was a detailed list of the numbers, ranks and qualifications needed by U.S. officers for the various disarmament staffs.¹⁰⁰ This directive was initially sent on 27 September 1944 and was expanded on 29 October 1944.

Thus, in early October 1944, the Commanding General, Communications Zone (ComZ) was directed to earmark U.S. personnel for cadres for Disarmament and Control

⁹⁹ The "Evasion" portion was most likely based on a survey prepared earlier by Brigadier W.E. van Cutsem, Chief, CCMS, Joint Historical Research Staff that outlined the methods by which the Germans had evaded fulfilling the military, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Van Cutsem later presented this topic in a lecture to the second running of the Disarmament course on 16 November 1944. RG 331, Entry NM 8/23, Box 54. See also the entry for van Cutsem's lecture in RG 498, Entry 672, Box 1, NARA, in Table of Contents, Volume I, Disarmament School Lectures Second Course Vol. II.

¹⁰⁰ Grazebrook's letter is SHAEF/21540/1/Plans, Subject: Provision of personnel for Post Hostilities Disarmament, 19 July 1944. Eyster's notice is SHAEF/23012/GDP, Subject: Disarmament Staffs, 24 August 1944, *Loc. cit.*

Staffs and to conduct a course of training for them.¹⁰¹ The first course was scheduled to start on 23 October but in actuality, the course started one week later on 30 October and lasted for three weeks. According to School Memorandum No. 3, the three weeks of instruction, comprising approximately 130 hours of instruction, was divided into five phases covering six subject areas: Organization for Disarmament and Control in Germany, Policy and Plans, German Political Organization, Organization of the German Armed Forces, German Industrial Organization, and German Supply and communication.¹⁰² The planned student capacity was 160 but more could be accommodated if sent by the Army Groups. Upon successful completion of the course, those officers attending were to be earmarked for duty with Disarmament and Control Staffs upon cessation of hostilities. A second function of the School was to provide reference manuals to assist Disarmament and Control Staffs in accomplishing their mission.

The first phase, entitled *General Background Subjects*, took approximately one-third of the total class time, half of which was presented during the first week and the remainder divided equally between the second and third weeks of the course. The second phase, approximately twenty hours in duration, provided technical training for the students in accordance with their branch or duty assignment, e.g., engineer, etc., and special instruction for executives and logistics officers (G-4's) of disarmament staffs. This training also took place during the last two weeks of instruction and included staff studies that each student had to solve on an individual basis.

¹⁰¹ Cable, SHGCT, FWD 16637, 2 October 1944. RG 331, Entry NM8/40, Box 273, NARA.

¹⁰² School Memorandum Number 3, Course of Instruction, 29 October 1944, *Ibid*.

Phase three consisted of lectures by British and American officers that were given throughout the course. Speakers were obtained from the Armed Forces Division, U.S. Group Control Commission (U.S. Group CC), U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, and the British CCMS. During the first course given there were a total of 26 lectures while the second running of the course contained 65 lectures.¹⁰³

Phase four consisted of end-of-the-day “controlled” discussions in lieu of question and answer periods after each lecture/presentation. These discussions were led by a member of the school staff and the instructors of the previous day, and went over materials presented the previous day. It was also used to underscore points made by the guest speakers.

Phase five took approximately one-fourth of the instruction time and was devoted to the development of staff studies by groups of students according to their duty assignments. It was believed that in this manner, the students would become familiar with sources of information and establish contacts with other groups with whom they eventually would need to establish working relationships.

In mid-September, staff level discussions indicated that a second running of the disarmament course was needed. Initially the discussions concerned training G-3 and G-4 officers but they eventually expanded to include a limited number of key officers involved in the disarmament and demobilization process, some of whom would be retained and assigned to the U.S. Group CC.¹⁰⁴ On 29 October, a letter was sent to the Command-

¹⁰³ Disarmament School (ETOUSA) Lectures and Staff Studies, RG 498, Entry 672, Box 1, NARA.

¹⁰⁴ Letter, Colonel F.M. Albrecht, A/Chief, Demobilization Section, U.S. Group C.C., to Colonel Karl F. Hausauer, PHP, G-4 Division, SHAEF, 18 October 1944. See also AG 353-12 GDS-AGM, Subject: Provision and Training of Cadres for Disarmament and Control Staffs, 27 September 1944, AG 388.3-1 GAP-AGM, Subject: Training for Cadres for Demobilization of German Armed Forces and Para-Military Organ-

ing General, European Theater of Operations by SHAEF's Adjutant General, Brigadier General T.J. Davis, informing him of this necessity and requesting that action be taken to conduct a second course of instruction. Two weeks later, Lt Colonel Kowalski, the School's Director, wrote Colonel Karl F. Hausauer, Chief, Logistics Plans Branch (G-4), Post Hostilities Section, that the subject of the second course would be "Demobilization of the German Armed Forces and Para-military Organizations."

This second, and last, running of the course, which began on 26 November 1944, also ran for three weeks and saw a major expansion of the syllabus and a realignment of the subject matter into five key topics: Organization for Disarmament and Demobilization in Germany, General Policy and Plans, Disarmament and Demobilization, Germany under the Nazis, and German Armed Forces. Air Force and Navy requirements were subsequently handled by their respective services resulting in the attendance of 15 naval and 20 Air Force officers.

In late December, Colonel William Whipple, Chief of the SHAEF Logistics Plans Branch wrote to the Assistant Chief of Staff, (G-4), SHAEF, informing him that the second running of the Disarmament School would end on 30 December and that present plans called for it to be disbanded. Whipple continued that a study undertaken by Hausauer's section and the 12th Army Group's G-3 and G-4 staffs saw a need for a third course. 12th Army Group wanted to permanently augment their staffs with officers trained in disarmament and disposal of enemy war materiel matters, possibly train French officers of the 6th Army Group, and provide an orientation course for 15th Army Group

izations, 29 October 1944, and AG 388.3-1 GAP-AGM, same subject, 25 November 1944. All in RG 331, Entry 40, Box 273, NARA.

officers responsible for ECLIPSE planning and planning for the occupation of the Rhineland.¹⁰⁵

Nonetheless, Brigadier General R.G. Moses, Assistant Chief of Staff, (G-4), 12th Army Group, wrote SHAEF that he could not at that time justify diverting additional officers for training. He recommended that the present school be discontinued but that when the tactical situation eased (U.S. forces were heavily engaged in the “Battle of the Bulge” at that time) the possibility of establishing a school on the continent at a later date be investigated.¹⁰⁶

Aftermath

Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945 (VE Day) and less than a month later, on 5 June, the Allied Control Council assumed responsibility for the control of Germany, relieving Eisenhower of his disarmament responsibilities. At 0001 hours, 14 July, Headquarters SHAEF was dissolved, the U.S. elements becoming part of U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET) under Eisenhower, who also became Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany and the U.S. representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany.¹⁰⁷

The plans laid out by SHAEF and contained in the ECLIPSE Memoranda to disarm, disband, and demobilize German forces was put into operation following VE Day. By late June, just over six million German troops had surrendered and between 15 May

¹⁰⁵ Memo, SHAEF/241/1/GDP-2, Subject: disarmament Schools, 22 December 1944, RG 331, Entry NM8/40, Box 273, NARA.

¹⁰⁶ Letter, Brigadier General R.G. Moses, ACofS, G-4, 12th Army Group to Major General R.W. Crawford, ACofS, G-4, SHAEF, 4 January 1945, *Ibid.* As it was, 103 officers completed the first course and 105 the second.

¹⁰⁷ Pogue, *Op. cit.*, pp. 512, 514-515.

and 6 July, six disbandment directives were issued, giving the Army Groups authority to discharge both prisoners of war and “disarmed German troops”¹⁰⁸ in groups according to age, sex, nationality, occupation, area of residence, etc. – except for those considered war criminals, security suspects or certain members/ranks of the SS.¹⁰⁹

Much however remained to be done, especially regarding the disposal of enemy war materiel and the destruction/demilitarization of German fortifications and war industries. For the most part, however, these issues were recognized early on as long-term problems to be handled by the ACC. In February 1945, for example, Brigadier W.E. van Cutsem addressed a meeting of the Standing Committee on War Materiel and suggested that one needed to differentiate between disarming Germany and preventing Germany from rearming. The disposal of Germany’s war industries addressed the rearming issue that was a long –term matter best handled at a later time when there might be a clear economic policy.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ In February 1945, in response to an EAC provision in the draft terms of surrender that would have forced SHAEF to treat all surrendered German troops as prisoners of war and thus impose upon SHAEF a burden that was beyond its ability to carry out, namely to provide rations to the surrendered Germans equal to that provided Allied forces, SHAEF stated that they intended to treat all members of the German Armed Forces captured after the cessation of hostilities or after the declaration of ECLIPSE conditions, as disarmed German troops whose maintenance would then be the responsibility of the German Army under Allied supervision. It was also considered undesirable to provide surrendered German forces with a level of rations that far exceeded that available to the civilian population. This was approved by the War Department in April. SHAEF (G-1) Staff Study, Subject: Status of Members of the GERMAN Armed Forces after the Cessation of Hostilities, 9 February 1945 and SHAEF Cable, SCAP S-81564, 10 Apr 45 and War Department Cable, FACS 198, 25 Apr 45 in RG 331, Entry NM8/6, Box 30, NARA. See also *Disarmament and Disbandment of the German Armed Forces, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946*, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, 1947, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ Oliver J. Frederickson, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953, pp. 89-90. See also *The First Year of the Occupation, Vol. II*, pp. 132-134 and *Disarmament and Disbandment of the German Armed Forces*, Op. cit., Chapter 3.

¹¹⁰ HQ/1873(Sec E), WMDD/M/45?5, 9th Meeting of the Standing Committee on War Materiel, 23 Feb 1945, RG 331, Entry NM8/27, Box 93, NARA.

Disarming the German forces had been relatively easy; most simply dropped their weapons, raised their arms and surrendered. According to a trip report written by Lieutenant Colonel A.F.S. MacKenzie, Assistant G-1 in SHAEF's German Affairs Division, following his visit to the headquarters and units of the U.S. 3rd Army, the disbandment process as directed by ECLIPSE Memo 17 was also working relatively well. MacKenzie concluded that "ECLIPSE Memo 17, as written is essentially sound, operational-ly, and should be continued in effect 'as is.'" He found, however, that although 3rd Army was not complying with the spirit of ECLIPSE Memo 17 its operating units appeared to be and that Germans were being discharged at a rate of 25,000 to 30,000 per day. The report highlighted several administrative and procedural problems but stated that as of 8 June, 3rd Army had discharged approximately 550,000 Germans.¹¹¹

As van Cutsem had stated, the remainder of the demilitarization program, which primarily needed to be directed at preventing the remilitarization of Germany was more involved and took longer. However, Allied forces were given little to no guidance regarding the destruction of enemy fortifications other than it was to be accomplished during the occupation period. It was not until the end of July 1945 that orders to destroy German fortifications and defensive works were issued by USFET with a completion date of 31 January 1946.

On 6 December 1945, the ACC issued Allied Control Council Directive 22: *Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of Fortifications, Underground Installations and Military Installations in Germany*. This directive began by stating that its purpose

¹¹¹ Report of Trip, To: Col. P.S. Lauben, GSC Chief, German Affairs Division, 9 June 1945, RG 331, Entry NM8/6, Box 30, NARA.

was to *forever* prevent Germany from using these facilities and all those listed in the appendix, except those needed by the occupation forces or civil population, were to be destroyed completely in accordance with a given timetable, e.g., Priority I, within 18 months; Priority II, within a further four years, so that all these facilities would be destroyed within five and one-half years from the date the directive was published. Military Zone commanders were given discretion to add to the list and to destroy any military structure not listed in the appendix.¹¹²

Report to the Council of Foreign Ministers

In February 1947, the ACC prepared a multi-part report to the Council of Foreign Ministers on demilitarization.¹¹³ The report covered six key areas of demilitarization for which the ACC had been made responsible upon its establishment. These areas and the corresponding report sections were:

- Part II - Dissolution of the German Armed Forces and para-military organizations, and control over the activities of their personnel.
- Part III - Disarmament, destruction and disposal of German war materiel.
- Part IV - Clearance of minefields and destruction of fortifications, underground installations and military installations in Germany.
- Part V - Control of Scientific Research.
- Part VI - Control of liquidation of industrial war potential and control of production and importation of war materiel.
- Part VII - Prevention of revival of militarism.

¹¹² Allied Control Council Directive 22, dated 6 December 1945, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/01LAW06.pdf. Priority I facilities included minefields and other explosive obstructions, non-explosive obstacles on main Allied lines of communications, fundamental obstructions on main routes, all underground airdromes and aviation facilities, pens for submarines, R-boats and E-boats. There were a further 18 Priority II facilities that included airfields, naval bases, special weapons installations, underground and surface communications centers, fortified coastal constructions, war materiel depots, POL storage facilities and military scientific research centers and testing grounds. *The Second Year of the Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-1947, Vol. 4*, Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff, U.S. Army, Chart IV, following p. 70.

¹¹³ "Report to the Council of Ministers from the Allied Control Authority in Germany," CONL/P(47)11, 24 February 1947, in folder CONL Report to CFM on Demilitarization (Feb 47) and Armed Forces Division Report on Aviation (Feb-Mar 47), RG 260, Entry A1/62, Box 799, NARA.

Each part of the report carried a “Summary” of the work done, a general “Statement of the Problem,” a discussion of the applicable “Laws and Directives,” enacted by the Allied Control Authority (ACA) and their implementation, agreed recommendations as well as disagreements between the powers. The report also contained two sets of four tables each showing each occupying power’s progress in the implementation of ACC Directive 22, *Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of Military Installations*, and ACC Directive 28, *Disposal of German War Materiel in Germany* (See Appendix C).

Part II on the dissolution of German forces and para-military organizations stated explicitly that all units and organizations of the German Armed Forces had been disbanded and dissolved and that nothing existed that would promote German military traditions alive.¹¹⁴ A table provided in the report showed that 8,106,046 prisoners of war had been released in Germany while 93,000 remained prisoners or ex-prisoners employed in the U.S., British or French Zones.

Part III, dealt with the disarmament and disposal of war potential and measures being taken to complete the destruction of this materiel and disarm the German population by the end of 1947. A table provided showed the type and amount of arms issued to the German police. Reference was also made to an appendix containing charts showing the progress made in each zone in implementing ACC Directive 28.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ The Soviets charged that “labor service” units and guard units in the U.S. Zone violated the Potsdam Agreement and other legislation. The U.S. position, backed by both the French and British, was that these units violated no agreements.

¹¹⁵ Control Council Directive 28 provided for the expeditious destruction and disposal of captured or surrendered war materiel located in Germany. It was later amended by Control Council Directive 46, which also set a target date of 1 May 1948. See Appendix C and also http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf

Part IV indicated that progress on the clearance of minefields and the destructions of fortifications was moving along and would be completed before the target date of June, 1951. A table indicated that 78-percent of Priority I and 70-percent of Priority II minefields and military objects in the U.S. Zone had been cleared or destroyed. A second appendix gave details on the implementation of ACC Directive 22 for all four zones.¹¹⁶

Part V proved to be a wide-ranging topic that fell under the provisions of ACC Law 25, *Control of Scientific Research*. The report stated that within the U.S. Zone, 28 war-related research establishments had been located and that all specialized equipment had been destroyed, as had specialized buildings. The report then specified the number of research applications that had been authorized in the U.S. Zone and the number of research projects licensed as of 1 January 1947, as well as a statement that the laws and methods adopted to enforce this law in the U.S. Zone were adequate.

Part VI indicated that no report could be made regarding the liquidation of industrial war potential because no agreement could be reached within the Allied Control Authority machinery to conduct a quadripartite system of free and unfettered inspection and verification (See following section).

The last part of the report, Part VII, dealt with actions taken to prevent a revival of militarism in Germany to include implementing the laws prohibiting the wearing of German military uniforms, the existence of para-military educational or training institutions,

¹¹⁶ By the summer of 1946, surveys were mostly completed in the U.S. Zone indicating that all 1,418 Priority I installations and approximately 48-percent of the 7,973 Priority II installations had been destroyed. Frederickson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 95-96. See also "Report of the Military Governor," OMGUS, No. 30, Jul 1 – Dec 31, 1947, in *Germany 1947-1949, the Story in Documents*, U.S. Department of State, Publication 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1950, p. 102. See also *The Second Year of the Occupation*, Vol. 4, Office of the chief of Military History, Special Staff, U. S. Army Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-1947. Chart IV, following p. 70.

and monitoring the possibility of militarism being taught in the schools and the number of teachers who were former military officers. This section also dealt with the number of former military officers who were either students, in the police, the fire brigades, or in transport services. While some instances of military-like training still took place, e.g., fencing, the degree to which former *Wehrmacht* officers could be admitted to these professions or activities was still under discussion. The three Western allies, however, felt that the current numbers posed no threat and were not dangerous.

A General Conclusions and Recommendations section closed the report and that focused on doing what was necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement and to prevent violations of the Allied Control Authority's decisions.¹¹⁷

The Quadripartite Commission

In the fall of 1947, a paper entitled *Complete Review of Quadripartite Negotiations on the Demilitarization Carried out After the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers Conference*, written for the Civil Affairs Division by the Armed Forces Division of U.S. Group CC, indicated that the question of limiting the activities and the employment of former members of the German Armed Forces remained under Quadripartite discussion in the Allied Coordination Council, as were the terms of reference for inspection teams for the Quadripartite Commission for Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment of Military Power in Germany.¹¹⁸ The only proposal agreed was an

¹¹⁷ Report to the Council of Foreign Ministers from the Allied Control Authority in Germany, CONL/P(47)11, 24 February 1947, in Folder CONL Report to CFM on Demilitarization (Feb 47) and Armed Forces Division Report on Aviation (Feb-Mar 47), RG 260, Entry A1/62, Box 799, NARA.

¹¹⁸ Attachment A, B, and D to Memo, AD to CAD, Subject: Demilitarization Material for Conference of Foreign Ministers, London, 17 November 1947, in Folder, CFM, London, RG 260, Entry A1/62, Box 799, NARA.

amendment to Control Council Law No. 8, *Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training* that would prohibit the possibility of Germans serving in the Armed Forces of any country.

Issues concerning the liquidation of Germany's industrial war potential were hampered by the growing Cold War environment which, by 1948, had left the ACC incapable of action. Thus, following the intent of the decision made at Potsdam in 1945, which called for "All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production" to be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed" and to prevent the maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of wars," General Clay, the U.S. representative on the Allied Control Authority's Coordinating Committee (CORC) introduced a proposal in May, 1946 to create what became known as the "Quadripartite Commission for Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment of Military Power in Germany."¹¹⁹

The Coordinating Committee approved the proposal, named the assistants to the members of the Coordinating Committee to the commission and directed them to draft the commission's Terms of Reference for approval.¹²⁰ The terms of Reference were drafted but ran into the immediate disagreement of the Soviet delegate regarding the scope of the Commission's duties. The Soviet delegate refused to accept a need for the Commission to examine the "economic field" as was deemed necessary by the other three

¹¹⁹ Potsdam Agreement, Section III, para. 3(1)(b). *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee, Allied Control Authority, Germany (1945-1948)*, Military Legal Resources, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/enactments-home.html.

¹²⁰ CORC/M/46/26, dated 17 May 1946. Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA. The members were Major General Erskine (UK), Brigadier General Bapst (FR), Lieutenant General Lukyanchenko (USSR), and Major General Adcock (US).

members and also took exception, along with the U.S. member, to the manner in which the sub-commissions (inspection teams) would carry out their inspections in the four Zones of Occupation. The issue was thus passed to the Coordinating Committee for resolution.¹²¹

The basis of the Soviet objection to economic inspection teams lay in the alleged failure of the Control Commission to take any action to speed up the delivery, as reparations, of German war plants, heavy industry and other facilities that represented German war potential. As a result of this failure, according to the Soviets, there would be nothing to inspect as German war industry remained intact. When the issue reached the Control Council in mid-June, Marshal Sokolovsky explained further that the USSR was not opposed to economic inspections but that they could take place once effective measures for the economic disarmament of German, i.e., reparations, had begun. Unable to resolve the differences, the Control Council agreed that each member should refer the issue back to his respective government.¹²²

At some point between that meeting of the Control Council and January 1947, the inclusion of an economic team was agreed and Terms of Reference, Method of Operation, Rules of Procedure, and Chairmanship were drafted.¹²³ The new proposal met with several Soviet objections to the requirement for “free and unfettered access,” the Com-

¹²¹ CORC/P(46)186, CDIS/P(46)1 (Revise), *Draft Protocol* and CORC/P(46)186, *Note by Allied Secretariat*, dated 22 May 1946. May 1946. Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA.

¹²² Extract of 31st Meeting of the Control Council (CONL/M/46/16), 20 June 1946. RG 260, Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA.

¹²³ Extract of 3rd Meeting of the Combined Services Directorate (DOCS/M(47)3, 23 January 1947, RG 260, Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA.

mission's *raison d'être*, i.e., the need to inspect any aspect of the demilitarization, disarmament process, including industrial disarmament. The Soviet position was that free and unfettered access was agreeable but only to facilities listed on a Coordinating Committee pre-approved plan.¹²⁴

At the end of March, the Economics Directorate informed the Combined Services Directorate that a special economic sub-commission was unnecessary; that they would assume full responsibility for investigating progress in the liquidation of Germany's industrial war potential and the control of restricted and prohibited production. It subsequently drew up and submitted to the coordinating Committee in April its Terms of Reference.¹²⁵

The independent position taken by the Economics Directorate initiated a whole new set of problems that included Soviet insistence that two Commissions be established; one for the military disarmament of Germany and a second for its economic disarmament, a demand that was refused by the other three powers. By late April 1947, the question of even having a Quadripartite Commission was discussed. While the Terms of Reference for certain inspection teams under Allied Control Council Directives 39, *Liquidation of German War Potential* and 47 *Liquidation of German War Research Establishments* were agreed, those for the Quadripartite Commission and the Economic Commission were deferred until after the Council of Foreign Ministers met and provided its deci-

¹²⁴ Translation Combined Services Directorate, *Proposal by the Combined Services Directorate for the Terms of Reference of a Quadripartite Commission for the Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment of the Armed Forces and Military Power in Germany*, 14 February 1947. This paper became DOCS/P(47)1/14.

¹²⁵ Attachment to DECO/P(47)62, 8 April 1947. RG 260, Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA.

sions on German disarmament. It was also agreed that the French delegation would submit a new proposal for a special, inclusive commission.¹²⁶

The French proposal was, in fact, similar to the proposal first put forward by Clay in May 1946 but the creation of this new commission, however, was again stymied by the continued refusal of the Soviet delegate to accept the principle of “free and unfettered access” to any and all facilities deemed by any member of the inspection teams to be a known or potential site capable of reviving German militarism. The Soviet delegate instead insisted that the inspection teams be limited to a prioritized, prepared, and agreed upon list of sites representing the “greatest danger from the point of view of the rebirth of war potential and military power in Germany:” that any other visits would be a waste of time.¹²⁷

Thus, the negotiations over establishing a disarmament commission, which began in earnest in July 1946 and continued into February 1948, remained partially unresolved.¹²⁸ Ironically, at the same time this thoroughly invasive inspection proposal to ensure that a German military potential could never be recreated was being pushed forward by the western Allies, the U.S. Army staff was beginning to draft its first studies on re-arming that part of the soon-to-be-divided Germany under Allied control!

¹²⁶ Extract from Minutes of the 120th Meeting (CORC/M/47/24) of the Coordinating Committee, 29 April 1947, RG 260, Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA.

¹²⁷ Extract from Minutes of the 147th Meeting (CORC/M/48/1) of the Coordinating Committee held on 15 and 19 January 1948. RG 260, Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022 Inspection Teams, NARA.

¹²⁸ An agreement was reached on providing inspection teams from the Combined Services Directorate to check on the demilitarization of Former German Armed Forces personnel, the liquidation of war materiel and the destruction of military installations. DOCSECO/P(47)/1. See also Extract from the Minutes of the 17th Meeting of DOCS (DOCS/M/48/2), 13 February 1948, RG 260, Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022 Inspection Teams, NARA.

Chapter 3: The Diplomatic Path to September 12, 1950

As Heinrich August Winkler wrote, the successful Allied invasions and aerial bombardments that took place during World War II brought Germany to its knees. The bombs, the expulsions, and the internal collapse changed German society far more than the first ten years of the Reich had done.¹ The existing scholarship, however, tells us that despite the advent of the Cold War and the increasing hostility of the Soviet Union, the U.S. State Department, in particular, was slow to recognize the significant transformation that had taken place among the war-weary Germans in the western zone and continued to view them with distrust.

Nonetheless, U.S. policy toward Western Europe underwent a major alteration beginning in early 1949. It was a change that precluded the United States from returning to its pre-war isolationism and pushed it, by necessity, into a deep and lasting involvement in Western Europe. It resulted, furthermore, in vigorous debates within the Department of State and between them and the Department of Defense over the direction of U.S. - West European/West German policy. And it was a change that, in the middle of President Truman's second term, saw several senior State Department officials including Secretary of State Acheson revise their long-held opposition to German rearmament, leading the United States reverse its European policy completely and formally demand on 12 September 1950 that West Germany be armed.

¹ Heinrich August Winkler, *Germany: The Long Road West, 1933-1990*, "Democracy and Dictatorship 1945-1961" Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, Vol. 2, Chapter 2, p.113.

Throughout this period, the “German problem” remained in the forefront of U.S. policy deliberations regarding Western Europe. The Department of State’s position regarding the possibility of German rearmament was contained in the answer to a question posed by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee in June 1949. When asked “What will be the relationship of Germany...to the problem of increasing the defensive military strength of the Western European countries?” the State Department responded, in part, that “The United States Government does not envisage that Germany will be in a position to undertake cooperative military efforts with other Western European Governments, as *we are fully committed to the complete and absolute disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. She will not have military forces of her own. She will not have industrial capacity for the production of armaments.*”² The question of German rearmament, however, was on the table during the formation of the Brussels Treaty Organization and this issue influenced decisions regarding the duration of the occupation and the need to keep U.S. forces in Germany. Nonetheless, the focus of the Department of State was on political and economic integration and continued disarmament. The scholarly literature, however, contains little about considerations of German rearmament during this timeframe.

The Cold War Begins

Beginning in 1946, relations with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate and the U.S. increasingly saw the Soviet Union as a real military threat to both European and U.S. security. These perceptions, fortified by Stalin’s “Election” speech of February 9,

² RG 59, Central Decimal File, 862.20/6-2149, MAP D-G/8 June 21, 1949, Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee, Hearing Book, Part G, “Germany and MAP.” Emphasis added.

1946 and by George Kennan's "Long Telegram" two weeks later, as well as Soviet actions in Iran and toward Turkey led, in part, to the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the merging of the U.S. and British Zones of Occupation in May, and the initiation of the European Recovery Program (The Marshall Plan) in June of that year.³ This perception of the Soviet threat was voiced again in mid-February, 1947, for example, by John D. Hickerson, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs. In a memo written to his boss, H. Freeman Matthews, Hickerson wrote that Soviet actions in foreign affairs "leave us no alternative other than to assume that the USSR has aggressive intentions." Hickerson stated further that the U.S. must be determined to resist that aggression by force of arms if necessary because "there could be no deals or arrangements" with the USSR.⁴

By early 1948, the communist-led coup d'état in Czechoslovakia deepened the perception that the Soviet Union was bent on dominating Europe.⁵ Following discussions between Great Britain and the United States in which the British sought U.S. participation in an Atlantic defense pact, the British were given to understand that they and the

³ See, for example, "(Subannex) Memorandum by the Consul of the Department of State (Bohlen), FRUS, 1947: Vol. 1, pp. 763-765. There are any number of books that discuss the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations and the beginning of the Cold War from a wide variety of perspectives. Chief among them are a series of histories by John Lewis Gaddis that include: *the United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, *The Long Peace*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, *We Now Know*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 and *The Cold War*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2005. See also Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977, Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967, and Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996*, New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 8th Ed., 1997. For background to the "Long Telegram" and his subsequent "Sources of Soviet Conduct," see George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. "Sources of Soviet Conduct," otherwise known as the "X-article," can be found in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1947, pp. 566-582.

⁴ Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), February 17, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 715-16.

⁵ See, for example, PPS/13, "Resume of World Situation," November 6, 1947, which predicted the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, FRUS, 1947, Vol. L, pp. 770-75."

West European nations would first have to organize themselves. Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, took the lead and on March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. While outwardly directed against a resurgent Germany, the possibility of German participation in the Pact was supported by all the signatories except France.⁶ Three days later, on 20 March, the Soviet military delegation to the ACC in Berlin walked out and on 1 April, the Soviets initiated restrictions on travel to Berlin followed in mid-June by a total blockade of the city that lasted until May 12, 1949.

Nonetheless, in early 1949 Truman transferred responsibility for German policy from the U.S. Army to the Department of State.⁷ The United States departed from its age-old policy of "non-entanglement" and became a major force behind the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), joining with the five Brussels Treaty nations, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Italy and Norway in a defensive alliance designed to deter Soviet aggression but also to contain if necessary a possible resurgent and expansionist Germany.⁸ The major policy of keeping Germany disarmed and demilitarized still remained front and center, but the State Department's focus shifted to ending

⁶Richard Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe*, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973 (pb), p. 187. On the day the treaty was signed, President Truman told a special session of Congress: "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so. See also John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the continental commitment," *International Affairs* (London), 60:4, Autumn 1980, pp. 626-27 (hereafter Baylis B); David Dilks, "The British View of Security: Europe and a Wider World," in Olav Riste, ed., *Western Security: The Formative Years*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 53, describes the depression by relating that the remark of one foreign minister that the Russians would be in Paris by August was agreed to by the French Chief of Staff! See also Memorandum of Conversation (Hickerson-Inverchapel), 21 January 1948, and (Achilles-Berard), 13 February 1948 in RG 59, Entry (A1) 1189, Lot 53D44, Box 11, NARA.

⁷ Offner, *Op. cit.*, p. 427.

⁸ Lord Ismay, who was the first Secretary General of NATO is reputed to have said that NATO was founded to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.

the occupation, returning some degree of sovereignty to Western Germany, and tying her closely to the other west European states in some form of federal entity or union.⁹ The unexpected outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula on 25 June 1950, however, resulted in a major reversal of U.S. policy, which would strain relations between the United States and its European allies, especially the French, and would lead to West German rearmament.

U.S. Thinking on Disarmament

Memories of German troops marching home in formation and with flags flying following the 1918 Armistice ending World War I, and of watching the expansion of the *Wehrmacht* following Germany's withdrawal from the Geneva Disarmament Conference in October 1933 led to a decision that the mistakes made in the Armistice agreement and Versailles would not be repeated.¹⁰ Even before World War II ended, it became the unalterable policy of the United States that Germany would be completely and totally disarmed and demilitarized following its surrender. This policy was made very clear on numerous occasions following the war, the last of which ironically came only weeks before Acheson presented the U.S. demand that West Germany be armed to the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France on 12 September 1950.¹¹

⁹ Contrary to a major thesis presented by Layne, *Op. cit.*, the idea of a union of Western Europe as a "third force" is prevalent in U.S. policy statements of this period. See, for example, PPS-23, February 24, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. I, pp. 510-18.

¹⁰ See *fn* 13, Chapter 1 regarding "flags flying." Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 482.

¹¹ On 5 June 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the U.S. "would continue to promote German demilitarization." Earlier, on 1 May, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that talk about rearming Germany was "very undesirable." Robert J. McMahon, *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order*, Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009, p. 136. See also the cable from Acheson to John J. McCloy dated 21 June 1950 regarding Count von Schweinin's visit to London and British belief that the U.S. could "be brought into line quickly" regarding German rearmament in *FRUS*, 1950: IV, pp. 689-90.

Perhaps the first and most definitive enunciation of the U.S. policy toward the defeated Germany came at the 1946 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris on 30 April when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes presented the text of a draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany. The *Preamble*, which indirectly referred to the *Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany* of 5 June 1945, stated that the four Allied Powers “declared their intention to effect the total disarmament and demobilization of Germany...” and that this total disarmament and demilitarization “...will be enforced as long as the peace and security of the world may require.”¹²

The body of the draft Treaty reflected and expanded upon that *Declaration* by stating that *all* German forces “shall be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobilized and disbanded” and it specifically included the German General Staff. The final article, Article V, specified that this proposed treaty was to remain in force for a period of twenty-five years and be renewable, if deemed necessary. It was meant to be incorporated in a future peace treaty with Germany, thereby making it the “law of the land,” thus binding Germany to it.¹³

Byrnes subsequently addressed keeping Germany disarmed and demilitarized for a generation in an address delivered in Stuttgart, Germany on 6 September and again in a speech he gave to the American Club in Paris in October.¹⁴ In that latter speech, he re-

¹² *Documents on Germany, 1944-59*, University of Wisconsin Digital Collection, The History Collection, <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.BackgrndDocs>

¹³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. II* “Council of Foreign Ministers,” pp. 190-93, hereafter FRUS. See also *Germany 1945-1949, The Story in Documents*, Department of State Publication 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1950, p. 101.

¹⁴ Restatement of U.S. Policy on Germany, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 15, No. 376, 15 September 1946, pp. 496-501 (hereafter DOSB).

peatedly cited the proposed draft treaty and stressed that there should be no doubt as to American foreign policy toward Germany. He emphasized the U.S. government's firm opposition to any revival of German militarism and proposed that the occupation of Germany not end until a German government accepts the disarmament and demilitarization clauses of the Four Power Treaty. Even then, Byrnes underscored the need to maintain "limited but adequate Allied armed forces" to ensure compliance, and he suggested the use of Allied bombers "from France, Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union" to enforce immediate compliance should the German government fail to do so. While the United States initially proposed to continue the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany for 40 years after the peace settlement, Byrnes asked only that the Allies agree to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for at least a generation. This, he indicated, would assuage the fears of France and the other European nations as Germany rebuilt its powerful industrial economy.¹⁵

Byrnes' replacement as Secretary of State, George Marshall also proposed the treaty in Moscow in 1947. Although it was rejected by the USSR on both occasions, U.S. policy remained unchanged. This continuity was evident in the *Summary* to the February-March 1948 London Tripartite Conference which referred to several agreements made by the western Allies that the occupation of Germany would continue for a long time as would the prohibition on the German armed forces and General Staff. Further, it was agreed that the Military Governors should continue to exercise controls pertaining to dis-

¹⁵ Address of the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State of the United States of America, at the American Club, Paris, France, 8:00 A.M., E.S.T., Thursday, October 3, 1946, Papers of Howard Trivers, State Department File, Germany File, Box 1, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter HSTL).

armament and demilitarization, and that a working party should be established to define the industries that should remain prohibited and establish production levels for those that were no longer prohibited. The *Summary* indicated further that a Military Security Board would be established in the Western Zones of Germany whose function would be to cover the entire spectrum of disarmament and demilitarization. Lastly, the *Summary* concluded that even after the occupation ended, Germany would not be allowed to become a military threat and that an inspection mechanism should be created to insure that it remained disarmed and demilitarized.¹⁶

By 1947, the United States had decided it had to move forward on Germany without Russia. The idea then developed in higher policymaking circles that Western Europe should develop a 'political personality' of its own and that Western Germany could be integrated into that Western European community, which might in time develop into a 'third force' able to stand up to the Soviets without direct U.S. involvement.¹⁷ In discussions regarding what became the Brussels Treaty Organization and its relation to Germany, Hickerson told Lord Inverchapel that the U.S. envisaged the creation of a "third force" - a real European organization capable of saying "No" to both the U.S. and USSR. It was further believed that so integrated, West German

¹⁶ Report "Talks on Germany," no date, in RG 260, Entry A1/62, Box 799, folder Armed Forces Division and Military Security Board. A second, more succinct summary was dated 4 Nov 1948. A copy of "Talks on Germany," (resumed session) Draft Report on Security (as amended 26 May 1948) is in RG 335, Entry 24, Box 8 in folder 334, Military Security Board. Earlier, in a July 1947 Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, paragraph 3 stated explicitly the "U.S. determination to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized (Four-power Pact)." The parenthetical referred to the above Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany. FRUS, 1947: III, p. 336.

¹⁷ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 62-63, 114-115.

freedom of action would be sufficiently constrained as to no longer pose a threat.¹⁸

The Search for Security - The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties

As the gulf between East and West became both wider and sharper, West Europeans began to acquire a "European" consciousness.¹⁹ What was initially a political struggle, however, increasingly came to be seen in military terms. The military situation in Europe by this time, however, was not what it had been at war's end.²⁰ Several proposals and discussions between Europe's leading statesmen had taken place during the war concerning Europe's future and the possibilities of some form of Western European Union.²¹ One of the key topics was how to contain a resurgent Germany in the future and The Dunkirk Treaty was an attempt to do just that.

Among the studies and proposals regarding Europe's post-war future was a study by Sir Nigel Ronald, an undersecretary in the Foreign Office, written in 1945. Ronald had suggested that a Franco-British alliance, to include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Lux-

¹⁸ *Memorandum of Conversation (Hickerson-Lord Inverchapel)*, 21 January 1948, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 840.00 1945-1949, Box 5643, NARA. See also Schwartz, "Case for," p. 297. Trachtenberg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 62-63. See also PPS/13, November 6, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. I., pp. 770 ff. Leffler makes a persuasive case that a third force was not desired by the U.S., Leffler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 461-62 and fn 71. The difference, however, is one of interpretation and whether one includes the word "independent." I would argue, however, that the Truman Administration's support of EDC and the even stronger support by the later Eisenhower Administration contains within it support for a "third force." The degree to which it would be independent remains open to question and dependent on the political, international circumstances at any particular time.

¹⁹ Robert Schuman, "France and Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 31:3, April 1953, pp. 350-351.

²⁰ Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes*, New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953, pp. 32-33. Also Alan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1952," *Naval War College Review*, 33:3, pp. 10-11. At war's end, the U.S. had 68 divisions and 149 air groups in Europe (3,500,000 soldiers). By March 1946, only 400,000 remained. British forces worldwide went from 4,700,000 to 1,247,000. During the 1948 Czech coup, the Western Allies had less than 200,000 troops in 7 poorly organized divisions facing 500,000 Soviet troops in almost 30 divisions. Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett was quoted as saying: "All the Russians need to get to the Channel are shoes."

²¹ Vaughn, *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

embourg, Denmark, Norway, and Spain, would be the keystone of a European defense system. He believed this system would both contain Germany and protect the smaller allies from falling under Soviet influence.²² The British Foreign Office, however, was skeptical because it felt that without U.S. assistance, defense against the Soviet Union was unrealistic. Alfred Duff Cooper, British Ambassador to France, however, contended that U.S. interference would prevent Great Britain from achieving a position of equality between the two new superpowers. A federation of states of western seaboard Europe plus the major Mediterranean powers would become "an alliance so mighty that no power on earth would ... dare to challenge it."²³

The Anglo-French alliance idea was not followed up, however. Churchill did not believe that France -- or any other West European country -- would be of value to British security. Current Franco-British relations, moreover, were less than ideal. French and British troops had narrowly avoided a clash in Syria, and DeGaulle, incensed over his wartime treatment by the Allies, was demanding the resolution of several Franco-German border disputes before discussions about an alliance could take place.²⁴

The 1946 election of a Socialist caretaker government in France under Leon Blum allowed much Franco-British hostility to be put aside and on New Year's Day 1946, Blum wrote Britain's Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, that he was willing to sign a Franco-British treaty. The problems that exercised DeGaulle remained, but Blum assured

²² John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 5:2, June 1982, pp. 240-41 (hereafter Baylis A).

²³ Ibid, p. 241-242. Also Sean Greenwood, "Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo French Treaty of March 1947," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 6:4, December 1983, p. 57, hereafter Greenwood A.

²⁴ Greenwood A, p. 50. See also Sean Greenwood, "Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union': August 1945-February 1946," *European History Quarterly*, 14:3, July 1984, p. 321, hereafter Greenwood B.

Bevin that they would not present a barrier. Accordingly, negotiations on a 50-year treaty began that month.²⁵

When this treaty, the Dunkirk Treaty, was signed on 4 March 1947, it became the first specifically European post-war security arrangement. Although designed specifically to prevent the reoccurrence of German aggression, it also became the first of several attempts to develop both an Anglo-Western European Defense Group and a North Atlantic Security System.²⁶

The collapse of the London Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1947 gave Bevin the necessary incentive to launch his plans for a Western Union. The London Conference had broken down over the question of reparations and the Allied refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands. It was the last attempt to obtain a major East-West agreement on Germany.²⁷ On 17 December, Bevin spoke in turn to French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, Marshall, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner in London. The gist of these conversations was that the time had come to create "some sort of federation" in Western Europe.²⁸

The first step toward such an arrangement would involve Britain and France signing bilateral treaties -- modeled after the Dunkirk Treaty -- with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Bevin publicly outlined his plan in a speech to the House of Com-

²⁵ Baylis A, pp. 242-243 and Baylis B, p. 618.

²⁶ Baylis A, p. 236. See also Edward Fursdon, *The European Defense Community: A History*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980, pp. 28-29, and Vaughan, *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

²⁷ Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981, p. 55. This was Ireland's Ph.D. dissertation and it gives an excellent account of the political environment leading up to the signing of the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.

²⁸ Baylis B, p. 619.

mons on 22 January 1948, saying that Britain could no longer stand outside Europe nor could it "...be diverted, by threats, propaganda, or fifth column methods, from our aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe...who are ready and able to cooperate."²⁹

Bevin was also clearly attempting to get the U.S. to commit itself to the defense of Europe. Without an American security guarantee, the British were not sure they could make the Western Union work. Until the union was successful, however, the U.S. would not discuss participation.³⁰

The Benelux countries also put pressure on Great Britain. They did not like the Dunkirk model because they believed it was directed solely against Germany and did not reflect current realities. This view was strongly advocated by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, who also urged that the collective arrangement be economic, cultural, and social as well as military.³¹ Paris, however, held to the Dunkirk model because of French sensitivity concerning Germany. Any pact directed against the Soviets that did not deal with the possibility of a rearmed Germany was unacceptable to France, a view Britain also shared.³² France had previously approached the U.S. and asked, in light of

²⁹ Henderson, , p. 3; Baylis *B*, pp. 620-21.

³⁰ Baylis *B*, pp. 622-23. To make matters worse, the British government had not yet committed itself to a continental policy to which several military service chiefs were opposed.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 624. See also Mayne, *Op. cit.*, p. 187 and "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State," January 19, 1948, FRUS, III, p. 6.

³² Baylis *B*, p. 625.

the fact that the treaty on German demilitarization was dead, whether the U.S. would be interested in entering a three-power treaty that contained similar stipulations.³³

On 24 February 1948, a Soviet-backed *coup d'état* toppled the Beneš government in Czechoslovakia. The effect of this event sent a shiver of fear throughout Western European governments, which was magnified by the weakened state of the almost totally demobilized Allied forces. The *coup* prompted France to take a much broader view of European security and Britain now also accepted the need for a multilateral pact. Bevin was convinced the Soviet Union was preparing to extend its grip over the rest of Europe; there were fears of a *coup* in Italy, and the Soviets were pressuring Finland and Norway to sign treaties of friendship and mutual assistance.³⁴ As a result, on 4 March, negotiations between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg began in earnest and on 17 March, in an atmosphere of pessimism and crisis, the Brussels Treaty was signed.³⁵

The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was more than a response to the apparent Soviet threat. It contained a Consultative Council, a Permanent Commission and a Permanent Military Committee comprised of the five defense ministers, meeting as the Western Union Defense Committee and it was envisioned by Bevin as a basis for the organization of all of Western Europe, and as a vehicle to convince the U.S. that Europe

³³ Memorandum of Conversation, M. Berard, Mr. Achilles, Mr. Wallner, February 13, 1948, Subject: Security Against Germany, RG 59, Box 11, Lot 53D444, NARA.

³⁴ David Dilks, "The British View of Security: Europe and a Wider World," in Olav Riste, *Op. cit.*, p. 52; Baylis *B*, pp. 625-626; Mayne, , p. 187.

³⁵ Mayne, *Op. cit.*, p. 187. On the day the treaty was signed, President Truman told a special session of Congress: "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so. Baylis *B*, pp. 626-27; Dilks describes the depression by relating that the remark of one foreign minister that the Russians would be in Paris by August was agreed to by the French Chief of Staff! Dilks, *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

could stand on its own. The immediate U.S. response was a speech by President Truman supporting the new European organization as well as a request to Congress to complete its action on the Marshall Plan. Unknown to the Europeans, however, studies were initiated both within the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to determine how best to support the Western Union, to include association with it (see Chapter 4).³⁶

The French government, however, remained unsatisfied with the U.S. response to the Brussels Pact. In May, France's Ambassador to the U.S., Henri Bonnet told Theodore Achilles of the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs that Europe was disappointed that the U.S. has not acted faster in support of the Brussels Treaty. Achilles said that the U.S. had made it abundantly clear that the Brussels Treaty countries needed to first formulate and carry out their own plans for an integrated defense before asking U.S. for help. Bonnet's response was that United States needed to understand "French psychological difficulties" and need for reassurance on security in general. Achilles replied that France needed to understand U.S. psychology as well. According to Achilles, the U.S. response to the Europeans was: "You made a start, but it's still a small start. Put some military 'bones' on that Treaty, preferably some collective ones."³⁷

³⁶ See also *fn 35 supra* and Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, Vol. 2, New York: the New American Library (Signet pb), 1956, pp. 277-84.

³⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, French Ambassador Bonnet to Achilles, 21 May 1948, RG 59, Box 11, Lot 53D444, NARA and transcript of Oral History Interview with Theodore Achilles, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/achilles.htm>. See also the TS Memorandum of Conversation, Lovett-Baydur, 25 May 1948, RG 59, Box 11, Lot 53D444, NARA, in which Lovett told Turkish Ambassador Baydur that security guarantees were "contrary to the tradition of the United States."

The existence of the Brussels Treaty Organization as a viable, independent entity was short-lived, however.³⁸ Concerned by events in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, which followed in June 1948, the five Brussels Treaty members joined the United States, Canada, and five other West European nations (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy) to sign the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, creating NATO. Two defense organizations -- one of which spanned the Atlantic and the other, which contained the germ of a future integrated Europe -- now existed in Western Europe where but a little more than a year earlier there had been none.

Beginning with Truman's second term as President, U.S. foreign policy fell into the hands of a small group of individuals, later known collectively as the 'wise men,' all of who had a hand in the formulation of policy toward Germany.³⁹ Two of them, Acheson and John J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, played extremely important roles. A third, lesser-known individual, Henry A. Byroade, a U.S. Army colonel on loan to the Department of State as Director, Office of German Affairs, was at least as important -- if not instrumental -- in helping to develop the State Department's German policy during this very volatile period. The fact that Byroade, as an Army officer, could discuss key German issues informally with Pentagon staff officers during a period when Secretary of Defense Johnson, a foe of Acheson's, forbade JCS staffers to speak to the State Department without his

³⁸ For an interesting but pessimistic view of the Brussels Treaty, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Western Union and European Military Integration 1948-1950 - An American Perspective," in Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster, *The Western Security Community*, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992, pp. 45-68.

³⁹ Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.

express permission, proved to be of crucial importance.⁴⁰

Published State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) papers shed little additional light on State Department thinking about German rearmament and those that do appear to duplicate thoughts mentioned below in documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).⁴¹ For example, in March 1948, the PPS recommended that the Western Union should be encouraged to “include eventually...Germany...and to deepen its cooperation in all aspects foreseen in its charter...as well as military.” Both George F. Kennan, then head of the PPS, and Hickerson opposed the focus on Germany, conceding, however, that it must eventually “have its place” in that Union. Both felt that the Union should be more than just a defensive entity, at which point there would be no question of U.S. support⁴²

In June of that year, another PPS paper concluded that the United States should undertake the Washington Conversations (prelude to the NATO Treaty) as requested by Bevin and Bidault (now French Premier). It was also noted that the Department of State should explore with the Western Union the problem of increasing the security of several European countries through integration or some form of association with the Brussels Treaty Organization, to include a recommendation that “when circumstances permitted,” the adherence of Germany, (or the Western Zones)

⁴⁰ Thomas Alan Schwartz, “The Case for German Rearmament,” *Fletcher Forum*, Vol. 8, Summer 1984, p. 298. Also, Lawrence W. Martin, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions*, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963, p. 649.

⁴¹ See Chapter 4 below.

⁴² “Memorandum by the director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” January 20, 1948, FRUS, III, pp. 7-8 and Hickerson Memo to Secretary of State, *Op. cit.*, p. 7. See also Memorandum for the President, “Security Against Germany,” February 11, 1948, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files: (PSF), Subject File, Box 155, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter HSTL).

be explored. France's Minister in Washington, Armand Berard, had cautioned earlier in February, however, that his government believed that any German participation in European security measures meant the reestablishment of a German army, which his government would not favor unless the British were full participants.⁴³

During this same period, Bevin had conveyed his thoughts to the State Department on an Atlantic defense system and the future inclusion of Germany "without whom no Western system can be complete." In State Department discussions with or about the Western Union, the issue of Western Germany often arose, but the State Department's position remained constant, i.e., that Germany's participation in Europe's defense was premature. In addition, the U.S. remained adamant that it could not and would not offer any security guarantees.⁴⁴

Rumors of Remilitarization

U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-West European diplomatic encounters in this period, however, raised press speculation about German rearmament. For example, on 21 February 1948, a *New York Times* article reported that the French Foreign Ministry learned the U.S. had dropped the Byrnes treaty objective of keeping Germany disarmed for forty years. The article stated further that an assumption being "freely discussed in some quarters" indicated that the Soviets would "enlist German rearmament

⁴³ PPS/27, Western Union and Related Problems, 23 March 1948, and PPS/27/2, The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries, 24 June 1948, in State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, Vol. II, Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983, pp. 161-64, 171-74. See also Memorandum of Conversation, M. Berard, Mr. Achilles, Mr. Wallner, February 13, 1948, Subject: Security Against Germany, RG 59, Box 11, Lot 53D444, NARA.

⁴⁴ [Enclosure] "Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union," FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 4-6. See also Norbert Wiggershaus, "The Decision for a West German Defense Contribution," in Olav Riste, ed., *Western Security: the Formative Years*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 198. Martin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 646-47.

ment in its service” sufficed to let the U.S. not commit itself “to keeping Germany down in the matter of armaments.”⁴⁵ Although rumors continued, the topic of German rearmament dropped out of view for the most part until late 1949 when it picked up again following the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Thus, throughout 1948, the Department of State and its ambassadors in Western Europe reiterated that the fundamental U.S. policy objective toward Germany was “to insure that Germany does not again menace the peace of the world and makes a vital contribution to the economic rehabilitation and political security of Europe.” Specifically, “disarmament, demilitarization and reduction and lasting control over Germany’s capacity to make war, including security against renewed German or other aggression...” was one of several major U.S. policies that would be sought by a closer U.S.-West European association.⁴⁶ On 31 December 1948, an article in the *New York Herald Tribune*, by Marguerite Higgins stated that the United States, Great Britain and France had appointed a “three-man Military Security Board which will send inspection teams throughout West Germany to insure continued disarmament...” The three appointees were Major General James P. Hodges (U.S.), Major General Victor J.E. Westropp (UK), and General Etienne Paskiewicz (FR).⁴⁷

Toward the end of 1948, the Consulates in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Bremen were reporting on additional rumors and active discussions among West Germans

⁴⁵ Pertinax, “Byrnes Arms Pact Reported Dropped,” *New York Times*, February 21, 1948, p. 4.

⁴⁶ “Department of State Policy Statement,” Germany, August 26, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 1297-98.

⁴⁷ “Board to Insure Disarming of Germany Set Up,” *New York Herald Tribune*, 31 December 1948, p.1. See also “Formula for Peace,” *Information Bulletin*, No. 161, May 17, 1949, Office of Military Government for Germany (US), Control Office, Reports and Statistics Branch, Berlin Germany, APO 742, US Army, pp. 5-6, at <http://digioll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=header&id=History.omg1949n161>.

regarding plans to remilitarize Germany. In November, a report from the Consulate in Bremen told of rumors pertaining to the building of a strong police force as the nucleus of a future Germany army had begun to circulate.⁴⁸ In December, the Consulates in Frankfurt and Stuttgart were reporting on statements made by Lieutenant General Franz Halder, until 1942 Chief of the General Staff of the *Wehrmacht*, Dr. Rudolph Vogel, a member of the Land Executive Committee of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and Eugen Kogon, publisher of the *Frankfurter Heft*, and a prominent German in Württemberg-Baden [sic], calling for the rearmament of Western Germany. Dr. Vogel's articles, several of which had appeared in the *Schwäbische Post*, were allegedly inspired by a 24 October article written by Walter Lippman in the *New York Herald Tribune*.⁴⁹

In essence, the German discussions were in favor of a voluntary German contribution to an allied force in the event of an East German or Russian attack. These rumors and discussions were abetted by rumors stemming from Moscow and East Berlin that the British were not only recruiting Germans and putting them in British uniforms, but that they were forming German artillery, cavalry and engineer units as well as establishing special flying and armored schools. While the discussions appeared to have run their

⁴⁸ Bremen 639, November 8, 1948, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 862.2, Box 6705, NARA.

⁴⁹ Letter, Stuttgart 492, American Consul General to Secretary of State, 1 December 1948, *Ibid*. See also Frankfurt 318, December 10, 1948, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 740.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3758, NARA.

course by January 1949, one effect was to force the West German political parties to take positions on this issue, which they did by rejecting it.⁵⁰

As 1949 unfolded, the unsettling issue of arming West Germany remained, particularly in France. On 3 January, for example, Berard was given instructions from Paris to query the State Department about information the French had received that the U.S. was contemplating the establishment of a German Army. The French government, he was told to say, would view such a step with “extreme seriousness.” Samuel Reber of the European Division replied that the position of the U.S. government as regards the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany, which had been set forth repeatedly, had not changed nor was there any intention to change that policy.⁵¹

Then, in mid-January, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall wrote President Truman strongly recommending that all non-military functions of the occupation be taken over by the Department of State and that a High Commissioner for Germany be appointed. This shift had originally been proposed in early 1948 but the Berlin Blockade and fears what it might lead to found everyone in agreement that the Army should continue its total control of Western Germany. Royall went on to say that the problems now being confronted in the administration of Germany were primarily political and economic and, as a result, problems that arose between the Army and the

⁵⁰ See Moscow 2515, 2 November 1948, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 862.2, Box 6705, NARA. See also Stuttgart 492, December 1, 1948, *Ibid.*, Frankfurt 314, December 15, 1948, *Ibid.*, Frankfurt 332 and 333, December 16, 1948, *Ibid.*, and Frankfurt 18, January 12, 1949, *Ibid.*,

⁵¹ Memorandum of Conversation, 3 January 1949, Berard-Reber, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 862.2, Box 6705.

Department of State were often difficult to reconcile.⁵² Subsequent inter-departmental correspondence within the State Department covering the role of the High Commissioner recommended that its responsibilities be taken on simultaneously with the establishment of the new West German government. It was in this correspondence that the name of John J. McCloy was first suggested to be the High Commissioner and the suggestion made that the office of High Commissioner be occupied not earlier than 1 July.⁵³

Two months later, in March 1949, the Department of State undertook a review of its Germany policy and again established that the primary interest of the United States with respect to Germany was to guard against any renewal of German aggression. Regardless in what form Germany would take in the foreseeable future -- divided or whole -- an essential element of U.S. policy had to be security. It was therefore in the interest of the U.S. "to prevent the Germans, or any part of them, from developing military forces until any security threat inherent in them is obviated by European union or other collective safeguards against aggression." The review stated further that the U.S. would look with favor upon the creation of such a union but that it could only assist in whatever initiative the Europeans themselves took. This latter statement was significant because it reflected the core of what would become Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's key policy issue, i.e., that the inclusion of West Germany

⁵² Letter, Kenneth Royall- President, 17 January 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 140.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3760, NARA.

⁵³ See, for example, the letter from Assistant Secretary of State Arthur A. Kimball to Robert Murphy, 22 April 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 140.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3772, NARA. On 6 June 1949, President Truman, by Executive Order 10062, established the post of High Commissioner and nominated McCloy, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 140.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3775, NARA.

in such an undertaking must be as an equal.⁵⁴

A major problem, at that time however, was that despite the desire to “integrate” Germany into Europe, there was no body -- no European union -- within which Germany could be integrated. As one State Department official put it, “Plainly, Germany cannot be fitted into the European community in a satisfactory manner until there is an adequate framework of general European union into which Germany can be absorbed. The other countries cannot be expected to cope with the problem of Germany until there is a closer relationship among them than the existing one.”⁵⁵

That same month, however, a policy paper written by Kennan indicated that there was still considerable belief among U.S. policy elites that even the advent of a West German government would not solve the “problem of Germany.” The new West German government, the paper stated, would become “the spokesman of a resentful and defiant nationalism....” And that the “...dominant force in Germany will become one not oriented to the integration of Germany into Europe but the re-emergence of that unilateral German strength which has proven so impossible for Western Europe to digest in the past.... A Western German government...will thus be neither friendly nor frank nor trustworthy from the standpoint of the western occupiers.” For his part, Kennan only wanted a provisional German administration,

⁵⁴ Undated, unsigned paper “United States Policy Concerning Germany,” RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 140.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3768, NARA. Note: Between May and September 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with limited sovereignty came into existence. An Occupation Statute, drawn up by the United States, Great Britain and France, defined the roles and responsibilities of the new government while establishing the right of the Allies, vested in three civilian High Commissioners, to keep occupation forces in the country and specifically to control, *inter alia* disarmament and demilitarization.

⁵⁵ Extract from ONSC D-3 in “Statement of the Problem,” an attachment to a letter from Ware Adams to Robert Murphy, March 18, 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 740.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3768, NARA. This was one of four policy papers written by Adams for Murphy.

leaving the ultimate authority over security, etc., to remain in the hands of the three High Commissioners. The U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Lewis Douglas appeared to believe, like Kennan, that once a West German government was established, U.S. freedom of action would be gone.⁵⁶

Thus by 1949, the United States was forced to recognize that until a decision was made on Germany it would be necessary, both for its own and Germany's security, to maintain occupation forces in the Western German Zones until the peace of Europe was secured. The Department of State, however, also recognized that as the "German people, or a large part of them," might become part of a structure of free European nations, their contribution to the "armed security" would be a rational expectation. This was further emphasized on the eve of the signing of the NATO treaty during a meeting between Truman, the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the Foreign Ministers of the NATO nations.

The purpose of the meeting was to outline a policy toward both Germany and the USSR that would focus on orienting Germany to the West by encouraging economic revival, accelerating the development of democratic institutions, and combating Soviet subversion. The U.S. had long come to the belief that the earlier proposals for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, such as those first enunciated by former Secretary of State Burns and then by his successor Marshall, no longer corresponded to the current situation. It was clear, however, that other means to provide security against a revival of German aggression had to be found. Thus this poli-

⁵⁶ Policy Paper, 8 March 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 740.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3767, NARA. Kennan was, and remained, an outspoken foe of German rearmament. George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967, pp. 446-48.

cy did not envisage the abandonment of security controls, e.g., prohibition of key industries, or *the prohibition of any armed forces*. The overall goal was to make Germany a full-fledged partner in an increasingly unified Western Europe [and] by “*combining any future German armed forces into a unified Western defense....*”⁵⁷

Rearmament Rumors Persist

1949 saw two momentous events take place that changed the face of European security. The first took place on 4 April when the United States ended one hundred sixty-two years of steering clear “...of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” and signed the North Atlantic Treaty along with eleven other West European and North American nations, thereby committing itself to participating in the security of Western Europe.⁵⁸ The second event took place on 23 May when the three merged zones of occupied Western Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), albeit with limited sovereignty. Although military government ended and the military governors were replaced by civilian High Commissioners, the occupation status remained and certain powers were reserved by the Allies. Chief among them was to guarantee security against a revival of German military power and to insure that all agreed disarmament and demilitarization measures remained in

⁵⁷ “Memorandum for the President,” March 31, 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, Box 178 and “Memorandum for the President,” February 11, 1948, PSF, Subject File 1940-1953, Foreign Affairs File, Box 155, HSTL. See also Memorandum of Conversation, 3 March 1949, RG 59, Memos of Conversation, Folder March-Apr 1949, Lot 53D444, Box 12, NARA, Emphasis added.

⁵⁸ The original signatories of the NATO treaty were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States, *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995, pp. 20-21. The partial quote is from George Washington’s Farewell Address, 19 September 1796, <http://www.bartleby.com/43/24.html>

force. To this end, the Military Security Board was created.⁵⁹

These events, particularly the U.S. entry into NATO, caused the State Department to again reiterate its position on Germany and to dissemble somewhat regarding the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe. During Senate hearings on the NATO Treaty, Acheson was asked by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa whether Article 3 of the NATO Treaty meant that the U.S. would be expected to send “substantial numbers of troops” to Europe as a “more or less permanent contribution.” Acheson replied by saying that the answer was “a clear and absolute ‘No.’” While Acheson had not intended to deceive - he subsequently recognized his answer was “deplorably wrong.” It was clear that the U.S. had, in fact, committed itself to a permanent presence in Europe and although the troop numbers at the time were relatively small, they were to increase rapidly over the next several years.⁶⁰

According to a Department of State and Department of Army Memorandum to the President on German policy, the United States, France and Great Britain were involved in a process of enabling Western Germany to participate in the West European economic program and to become self-supporting. Germany’s economic and industrial potential, however, led the U.S. to recognize that were Germany to be taken over by a hostile power for purposes of aggression, it would pose a danger to the security of the U.S. and German’s neighbors.

⁵⁹ See Paper B of the Agreements on Germany, the Final Text of the Occupation Statute Defining the Powers to be retained by the Occupation Authorities, 8 April 1949, FRUS, III, 1949, p. 179, and the speech given by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 28 April 1949, Papers of Howard Trivers, State Department File, Germany File, Box 1, HSTL. The Military Security Board was established by the London Conference of 1948 and came into being on December 10, 1948. “Formula for Peace,” *Loc. cit.*

⁶⁰ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, p. 26, quoted in Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, New York: A Signet Book, 1969 (Pb), p. 375.

The memorandum concluded, however, that economic and industrial recovery by West Germany and its neighbors, to include a “satisfactory military posture” by those nations would diminish the possibility of aggression throughout all of Europe, including Germany. Nonetheless, security considerations had to be taken into account and for that reason, the U.S. recommitted itself not to withdraw its occupation forces until the peace of Europe was established.⁶¹

In this same memorandum, the U.S. further recognized that as Germany became firmly embedded in a free European structure, a German military contribution to the security of that structure would be possible, but only if the other free nations of Europe deemed it necessary. That said, in talking points prepared for Acheson, dated 17 May 1949, just six days before West Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany, Acheson was advised to reply to questions regarding German entry into NATO by saying that

[n]o consideration has been given to the inclusion of Western Germany for a number of reasons. These include the fact that Western Germany is under the military occupation of several North Atlantic countries, that it has no government, that all Germany will presumably one day be reunited, and that the German people have yet to prove their attachment to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁶²

One month later, on 21 June, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee was told that although U.S. policy was fully committed to the *complete and absolute disarmament and demilitarization of Germany*, “Germany is and can to an increasing

⁶¹“Memorandum for the President,” March 31, 1949, *Op. cit.*

⁶² Records Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1947-1953, RG 59, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Lot File 57 D 271, Box 8 of 10, NARA.

extent contribute to the general economic strength of the Western European Countries, which is the essential foundation of military strength.” This answer allowed for the possibility of Germany exporting materiel that could be used by other countries for the production of armaments.⁶³

The birth of NATO and the Federal Republic inevitably led to discussions about the role West Germany would play in the defense of Western Europe. For example, in July, the U.S. Embassy in The Hague reported on the contents of a memo presented to the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers at Luxembourg by Netherlands Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker. The memo essentially stated that West Germany should be integrated as closely as possible but such integration carried a risk. If allowed to remain independent, the FRG could turn to the East and upset the existing balance, therefore the memo concluded that the occupation needed to continue until Western Europe was stronger than at present, both politically and militarily; that the FRG was not to have an armed force; and that she would not be allowed to manufacture war materiel. Many Council members believed that West Germany should be at least an associate member (due lack of full sovereignty) but in the end, no action was taken.⁶⁴

On 10 October, an Office Memorandum was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, George W. Perkins, stating that the author, Wayne G. Jackson, a State Department officer, had learned from an unnamed individual who would be speaking with the President on 11 October that U.S. military authorities in

⁶³ MAP D-G/8, June 21, 1949, Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee, Part G - Hearing Book, “Germany and MAP,” RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 862.20, Box 6705, NARA. Emphasis added.

⁶⁴ Hague 275, 12 July 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, File 840.00, Box 5646, NARA.

Germany were in favor of the “prompt rearmament of Germany,” and that 25 divisions was the goal. This individual understood further that the Department of Defense, specifically Army Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins, was also in favor.

Perkins subsequently wrote Acheson a memorandum the following day that these rumors of German rearmament were “much exaggerated and substantially without foundation.” Perkins went on to write that “it is true that Pentagon thinking envisages use of German manpower in the defense of Western Europe at some time in the future....” It was not true, however, that the prompt rearmament of Germany, the raising of 25 divisions or the inclusion of Germany in either the MAP program or NATO was being considered or favored. Perkins concluded by saying “We have no reason whatever to believe, and compelling reasons not to believe, that the military are Acting in anyway [sic] in this field without our knowledge....”⁶⁵

Many newspaper articles and editorials, both in the United States and Europe dealt with this issue throughout the remainder of the year. The gist of these articles was simply that even with NATO, there was a significant force imbalance between the military forces of the Allies and those of the Soviet Union. Further, as the French were fighting in Indochina and the belief that U.S. occupation forces would be unable to hold off a Soviet attack until additional forces from the West were able to join the battle, the rearming of Western Germany would be inevitable.⁶⁶ Adenauer had

⁶⁵ See Office Memorandum, Jackson-Perkins , 10 October 1949 and a Memo by Perkins to the Secretary of State, October 11, 1949, both in RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 862.20, Box 6705, NARA. A similar memo, “Note on German Rearmament,” no author, written on October 12, 1949, can be found in HST Papers, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Box 155.

⁶⁶ See, for example, Arthur Krock, “Whether to Rearm Germany or Just Some Germans,” *New York Times*, Dec 1, 1949, p. 30, and Joseph and Stewart Alsop, “Matter of Fact,” *Washington Post*, Nov 30, 1949, p. 13.

also expressed growing concern about the creation of paramilitary “police” forces in the Soviet zone, the so-called *kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei* or “barracked” riot police.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, high ranking military officers were, in fact, making statements that led many to believe that the U.S. favored German rearmament of some type.⁶⁸

Despite Perkins’ denial of any interest in rearming Germany and similar denials by Schuman and Acheson, a cable from Paris indicated that French deputies continued to speculate about German rearmament and felt that it was coming “nearer and nearer.” Schuman’s denial came in the form of a statement made by him before the French National Assembly on 24 November in which he said that it was a “a strange paradox” that despite confirmation by the Allies that the demilitarization of Germany would be completed, the idea of a rearmed Germany “has been able to spring up and persist in spite of the denials and in spite of all that is being done to the contrary.” Schuman concluded with a pledge, apparently given to him by Adenauer that read:

The Federal Government asserts its firm determination to maintain the demilitarization of the federal territory and to endeavor, by all means in its power, to prevent the reconstitution of armed forces of any nature whatsoever.

⁶⁷ “Paraphrase of Telegram From U.K. High Commissioner to Foreign Office, London. Dated 9th December,” RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 740.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3787. See also Konrad Adenauer, *Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53*, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965, pp.271 ff.

⁶⁸ Press speculation was further fueled by remarks made by Generals Omar Bradley and Lucius Clay. Bradley, speaking at an Overseas Press luncheon, stated that not only was a “strong ally needed on the continent,” but also that as the Russians had put East Germans in uniform as police, the West Germans might also need “some uniforms” if only to maintain security. Clay’s remarks, made at a fundraiser for The Arthritic and Rheumatism Foundation and not carried in the domestic press, spoke of the need for a “composite military force of Western European nations to which Germany could contribute limited forces of a special type.” Clay also stated that he hoped such a force could be created if the West European nations integrated but that it was a European and not American problem. *FRUS* 1949, Vol. III, pp. 317-19 (Bradley), pp. 340-42 (Clay). See also Drew Middleton’s article in the *New York Times*, 16 November 1949.

To this effect the Federal Government will cooperate fully with the High commission and in the activity of the Military Security Board.⁶⁹

Even the British press reported that the United States wanted a “small German Army.” The U.S. position was further muddled somewhat by Secretary of Defense Johnson and JCS Chairman Bradley who, arriving in France for a NATO Defense Ministers meeting, and despite initially emphasizing that the U.S. had no intention of rearming Germany and that there was no hedging or dodging about the American position on that point, subsequently stated that German rearmament was not favored “at this time,”⁷⁰

In November, Acheson went to Europe himself and met with Adenauer, now the new West German Chancellor. During his discussions with Adenauer on 13 November, Acheson told Adenauer that from his talks in Paris, he felt that French public opinion was ready for cooperation with West Germany and that France’s premier, Robert Schuman, had the full backing of his cabinet regarding policy on Germany. As the discussion moved to that of the legal problems involved in ending the State of War with Germany, Adenauer stated that “[the German Government] had no interest in the rearmament of the German nation...it was just too dangerous to provide Ger-

⁶⁹ “Statement Concerning Germany Made by M. Robert Schuman Before the National Assembly,” attachment to *Memorandum of Conversation*, Acheson-Bonnet, December 1, 1949, RG 59, Records of the Executive Secretariat (Dean Acheson), Box 13, Lot 53D444, NARA. See also Harold Callender, “Schuman Defends Policy on Germany,” *New York Times*, Nov 25, 1949, p. 5.

⁷⁰ “Bradley Expresses Confidence,” and “The Defense of Europe,” *New York Times*, Nov 28, 1949, pp. 7, 26. See also Harold Callender, “French Skeptical on Bonn Rearming,” *New York Times*, Nov 29, 1949, p. 5. See also “Armed Germans,” *Washington Post*, Nov 29, 1949, p. 12.

many with arms at this stage.”⁷¹

Several days later, Acheson was asked whether Adenauer had addressed the establishment of a small German army of 5 divisions as reported in the *New York Times* and the President was asked the same question at a press conference the following day. Both Acheson and President Truman emphatically denied that report, calling it one of several rumors on this issue.”⁷²

Some members of Congress, however, initially appeared to feel differently. While in Berlin in late November, a four-man Congressional study mission of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Representatives Joseph Pfeiffer (D-NY) and which included Representatives Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), Thomas S. Gordon (D-IL) and Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), stated that they would recommend including West Germany in the Western European Union. The group also advised against the early withdrawal of occupation forces, and Pfeiffer said that he was in favor of eventual German rearmament but within the context of a United States of Europe. Of the four representatives, only Javits stated his opposition to German rearmament “under any circumstances. On their return, Javits said the mission’s report would “condemn rearmament whether of German soldiers to be used under German or Allied com-

⁷¹ “Review of Discussions which the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean G. Acheson, had in Bonn on Sunday, November 13, 1949, with the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, Dr. Konrad Adenauer,” RG 59, Records of the Executive Secretariat (Dean Acheson), Box 13, Lot 53D444, NARA.

⁷²*The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)*, November 21, 1949, *Op. cit.*, pp. 341-42. The article in question in the *New York Times* indicated that European staff officers were discussing the difference five German divisions would make to the defense of Western Europe and not a plan for German rearmament. Drew Middleton, “Europeans Ponder Army for Germany,” *New York Times*, Nov 16, 1949, pg. 1.

mand.”⁷³

Nonetheless, speculation continued and on 1 December, Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador met with Acheson to state that the “persistent rumors” of German rearmament were upsetting public opinion in Europe and particularly in France. They were, he continued, interfering with the main task of integrating Germany into the European scene, as rearmament was not part of this integration. Acheson replied that the State Department would continue to do everything it could to stop the rumors. Several days later, the State Department transmitted a cable to “certain” American diplomatic officers telling them to respond to any possible queries regarding the November Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris that there were “no rpt no agreements, discussions or conversations of any kind re: authorization Ger armed forces or any modification existing disarmament and demilitarization agreements and regs pertaining to GER. “[sic]⁷⁴

Two days later, on 3 December, Adenauer gave an interview to John P. Leacacos of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* which, according to Adenauer’s autobiography, was garbled when it appeared in the U.S. and caused “great excitement in the world press.” In the interview, Adenauer reiterated his opposition to rearmament and stated that the presence of the occupying powers put the Federal Republic under the protection of NATO; “Since the western powers have disarmed Germany, it is their duty by morals and under international law to care for the security of Germany.” When asked

⁷³ “Congressmen Ask West Bid Germans,” *New York Times*, Nov 22, 1949, p. 11 and “House Group Bars German Rearming,” *New York Times*, Dec 14, 1949, p. 19.

⁷⁴ *Memorandum of Conversation*, Acheson-Bonnet, December 1, 1949, RG 59, Records of the Executive Secretariat (Dean Acheson) , Box 13, Lot 53D444, and Unnumbered, outgoing State telegram, Dec 7, 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 862.20, Box 6705, NARA.

about a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe, Adenauer responded first that the government would not allow the recruitment of Germans into other military services as that would be the same as “buying a people to have mercenaries.” He then opened Pandora’s box when he told Leacacos that “Germany should contribute to the defense of Europe in a European Army under command of higher European headquarters at which time it will not only be urgent but necessary for the United States military aid program to be extended to Germany.”⁷⁵

Even more interesting is what Adenauer told Leacacos off the record. According to Leacacos, Adenauer said: “The Germans are the only people who can stop the Russians. However, with the passage of time, the trained soldiers from general to private are forgetting their military skills. Therefore, if the Allies wait too long before they begin training a German army, it may be too late to be of immediate use to defend Germany against Russia.”⁷⁶

On 8 December, Adenauer had a discussion with the three High Commissioners in which he stated that his recent statements regarding German rearmament were made to allay fears in Germany that were caused by a number of issues. The recent NATO meeting in Paris, he said, had given no indication as to how Germany might be defended in the case of Russian aggression. Press rumors indicated that two alternatives had been discussed: a European defense on the Rhine and, respectively, a defense on the Elbe. In addition, Adenauer stated he had information that an army was being created in Eastern

⁷⁵ Adenauer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 267-268 and HICOG A-671, 12 December 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 862.20, Box 6705, NARA. The *New York Times* reported this interview in a short article on 4 Dec 1949, p. 23, and the *Washington Post* similarly on 6 Dec, 1949, p. 3.

⁷⁶ HICOG A671, *Loc. cit.*

Germany and that it was no longer possible to believe that these troops were mere police formations.

The Allies, he said, were “duty bound to maintain the security of the Federal Republic” and that he believed that to speak of a defense on the Rhine was “a hollow phrase.” Germany was living under a serious permanent threat and unless the Russians were stopped where they were, Western Europe would be “finished.” Adenauer then asked that the Western Allies make a declaration to the effect that West German territory would be defended against an attack and that his views be reported to their governments, which was agreed. It was further agreed that all should refrain from public statements on this issue...it was a matter for “no comment.”⁷⁷

Adenauer agreed but stated that these remarks might be directed to the press as they were the “chief cause of the trouble.” Nonetheless, two days later, on 10 December, the *Washington Post* reported that in his fourth statement in a week, Adenauer “virtually demanded” that German armed forces be included in any West European army. The *Post* article went on to say that while mindful of the memories of those countries invaded by Germany twice in the past 25 years, Adenauer asked “Which is the greater danger - the Russian threat to the Western world or a German military contingent to operate with forces of the other Western nations?” Adenauer stated further that “The Germans should

⁷⁷ “Paraphrase of Telegram From U.K. High Commissioner to Foreign Office, London. Dated 9 December,” *Loc Cit.* Whether a result of Adenauer’s comments or not, it appears that the U.S. was prepared to make a protest to the Soviet Union regarding the existence of an East German army. On 9 December 1949, however, Byroade wrote Acheson stating that all information available indicated that there was neither an East German army or police or para-military forces that could be considered an army. What did exist in East Germany was a Border Police force (*Grenzpolizei*) and an Alert Police force (*Bereitschaftspolizei*) with a combined total of 30,000. Their training was primarily military and they were equipped with light infantry weapons but they had “practically no combat effectiveness.” *Memorandum*, Byroade-Acheson, December 9, 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 862.20, Box 6705, NARA.

be represented in a European striking force with rights similar to those granted other European nations.” This time, however, Adenauer did not include the phrase “if the Allies insist.”⁷⁸

As 1949 came to a close the issue of German rearmament was becoming what Hansen Baldwin called “one of the ‘hottest issues’ in a world-wide catalog of hot issues.”⁷⁹ The State Department was well aware that NATO’s military leaders had decided that a realistic defense of Europe needed a significant increase in the number of available forces, i.e., the addition of West German troops. It was not that the Department of State was unequivocally against arming the Germans, but rather the case that the Department believed that arming the West Germans then would have significant domestic and foreign political repercussions that could undermine the entire structure of Western defense and the reconciliation process that was U.S. policy. There was also the fear that by arming Western Germany, any hopes of reuniting the two Germanys would end. To this must be added the fact that Acheson seriously believed that the key to progress toward integration was in French hands...that “France and France alone can take decisive leadership in integrating Western Germany into Western Europe.”

It thus became U.S. policy that France would play the key role in European integration, that France needed to first be built up and stabilized, and that she be allowed to determine the speed of Germany’s integration into the West. This policy set the stage for what I argue as the U.S.’s abdication of leadership. It relegated the U.S.

⁷⁸ “Adenauer Virtually Demands German Unite in West’s Army,” *Washington Post*, Dec 10, 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Hanson W. Baldwin, “German Arming Issue,” *New York Times*, Dec 20, 1949, p. 6.

to the sidelines and into the role of onlooker when arming the Federal Republic became a reality. The French government, however, remained “absolutely” opposed to German participation in NATO.⁸⁰ To the Department of State, these factors outweighed any military advantage that might accrue as the result of remilitarization, thus they continued to deflect and even disinform somewhat on this issue.⁸¹

In what would appear to seal the Department of State’s position on German rearmament, the three High Commissioners sitting in Council on 15 and 16 December approved and signed a law on the elimination of militarism which replaced the obsolete provisions of the ACC and the Military Government. The new law provided a single text which prohibited “[the] teaching of principles and theory of war and related activities; manufacture possession and distribution of articles and devices which may be used for militaristic activities, unless authorized by the Council.” It also prohibited “organizations of a military or Nazi character.”⁸²

1950 - Year of Crisis, Year of Decision

1950 was the year that the State and Defense Departments finally agreed in principle on the basic issue of arming the Federal Republic of Germany.⁸³ It was also the year in which the United States was confronted with the unexpected invasion of South Korea by North Korea. Seen in many quarters as the prelude to war in Europe,

⁸⁰ DEPTTEL 4013, October 19, 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 711.40, NARA and Synopsis C, Aug-Dec 1949, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars File, Box 78, HSTL.

⁸¹ See, for example, *New York Times*, 16 November 1949, p. 1; 22 November 1949, p. 11; and 30 November 1949, p.13. See also Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to Secretary of State, 11 October 1949, *FRUS* 1949, Vol. III, p. 285.

⁸² Bonn 66, 17 December 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 7740.00119 Control(Germany), Box 3787, NARA.

⁸³ As will be seen in Chapter 4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had long advocated the rearming of Germany.

the Korean conflict left the Europeans fearful that the U.S. would overreact to the communist provocation. Yet despite the attack in Korea, State Department policymakers maintained their focus on Western Europe but fought a losing battle against the question of German rearmament.

Perhaps in part, due to Adenauer's *Cleveland New Dealer* interview and continued controversial press statements, rumors and press reports about possible German rearmament continued into the New Year. For example, in mid-January, Drew Middleton reported in the *New York Times* that Adenauer was being advised by a group of German generals that in the event of rearmament, Germany needed one German infantry division by June 1950 and an additional German armored corps by 1951.⁸⁴

On 20 January, Deputy U.S. High Commissioner, General George P. Hays, sent a cable to Acheson containing a statement released by High Commissioner McCloy regarding a story in the *New York Herald Tribune*. The *Tribune* story, attributed to a spokesman for the West German Chancellor, alleged that former German generals had been asked by the Allies for their recommendations regarding the defense of West Germany. The story, according to McCloy was without foundation and distorts facts "all out of proportion." Neither had there been requests from any American authorities to former *Wehrmacht* generals nor had there been any change in the oft repeated government policy that Germany would not be allowed to recreate

⁸⁴ Drew Middleton, "German Officers List Arms Needs," *The New York Times*, Jan 14, 1950, p. 1.

armed forces or to rearm.⁸⁵

The following month, Averell Harriman wrote Acheson following a luncheon with Winston Churchill, then in opposition, of Churchill's stated belief that "we are neither agreeing to protect [Germany] nor are we permitting them to defend themselves." Churchill felt that German manpower and industrial production should be used at "the appropriate time" to strengthen an integrated Western European defense force....a new sort of SHAEF, to which the Germans could contribute as part of the whole but without a rounded military force of their own." He indicated, however, that none of these things could be done without U.S. participation.⁸⁶ On 16 March, Churchill addressed the House of Commons telling them that the "long western European front against the Soviet Union...could not be successfully defended without the 'active aid' of Western Germany." The Foreign Office quickly distanced itself from Churchill and assured Britain's continental allies and France that it did not favor German rearmament.⁸⁷

In early April, Drew Middleton reported that the West Germans would be asking the Allied Foreign Ministers for some declaration of their intent to defend Germany when they meet in London in May. While Middleton's German sources said they were not asking for immediate rearmament, they did want to know when and at

⁸⁵ Frankfurt 602, 20 January 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA. It is possible that these stories of German generals being asked by Americans could have been based on those generals who had been recruited by the U.S. Army to write the history of the war on the eastern front.

⁸⁶ Dean G. Acheson Papers, Secretary of State File 1945-1972, Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953, HSTL, Box 66.

⁸⁷ Benjamin Welles, "Britain Rules Out Rearmed Germany," *The New York Times*, Mar 18, 1950, p. 4. It should be noted however that both field Marshall Viscount Montgomery and France's General Jean de Latre de Tassigny had openly spoken in favor of German rearmament. See Middleton, "German Officers List Arms Needs," *Loc. cit.*

what strength they would be allowed to rearm. Their main concern was the growth of the East German *Volkspolizei*, which they felt posed a grave political danger to West Germany. There was, they said, no German force in the Federal Republic capable of dealing with the *Volkspolizei* and they wanted to have some form of constabulary to maintain internal security. The occupation powers should not be the ones to police Western Germany, the sources said further, as it would allow the Communists to claim that the Federal Government is kept in power by “foreign troops against the popular will.”⁸⁸

This view was echoed later in the month by Kennan. In voicing his disagreement to a paper on German defense, Kennan stated that it was “unrealistic to expect a demilitarized West German state to have stability unless there is an efficient federal constabulary...to balance off the East German police forces.” Kennan went even further indicating his belief that the para-military units being developed in East Germany should be approximately matched “man for man and weapon for weapon.” It did make a difference who defended western Germany as there was “nothing the Russians want more than to see our forces become engaged in fighting Germans, while they sit on the sidelines and make political capital out of it.”

At the same time, Kennan was unequivocal in his opposition to German rearmament or assurances of defense, believing that as long as West Germany was occupied, an attack against it would be an attack on the Western occupation forces.

⁸⁸ Drew Middleton, “West Germans Ask Assured defense,” *The New York Times*, Apr 10, 1950, p. 8. About this time, Chancellor Adenauer engaged General Graf Gerhard von Schwerin as his “Advisor for Military and Security Issues.” Von Schwerin was a strong advocate of a large national police force that would become the cornerstone of a future German army. See James S. Corum, “Adenauer, Amt Blank, and the Founding of the Bundeswehr 1950-1956, in James S. Corum, ed., *Arming Germany*, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011, p. 34.

There was time, Kennan said, to talk about West Germany's future security when the end of the occupation became imminent. Lastly, he was also opposed to German entry into NATO. Using Iceland, Italy and Denmark as examples, Kennan felt it "unsound" to ask "substantially demilitarized" countries to enter into arrangements that implied mutual military obligations, which would be the case if West Germany was admitted.⁸⁹

Cracks in the State Department Wall

One day after Kennan's delivered his paper, McCloy sent a cable to Byroade informing him that he, McCloy, had decided that the U.S. approach to Germany was unrealistic. "We have attempted to improve on Versailles," he wrote, "by absolutely forbidding Germany to rearm...." McCloy felt that the restriction, which had made sense in the context of post-war cooperation, no longer held in the now divided world. Real security for Western Europe, he continued, would only occur by adding Germany as a full partner. Although he also felt that pressing for German rearmament now was premature and that it might be a while before it became urgent, the issue, he stated quite presciently, "may well rise from our need rather than German demand."⁹⁰

At approximately the same time, according to a *New York Times* article by Drew Middleton, a directive was circulated to all European Command force headquarters to draft plans for a "logistical development based on a further five-year oc-

⁸⁹ Letter to Mr. Lewis (GER), April 24, 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NA-RA.

⁹⁰ United States High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 25 April 1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. III, pp. 633-35.

cupation” of West Germany. Middleton saw this as an answer to Germany’s need for a security guarantee and indicated that while there would be no troop increase, one could assume that the progressive takeover by German civilians of the Army’s administrative duties would allow a “corresponding increase in the ratio of combat to non-combat soldiers in the theater.” Without knowing that McCloy was slowing changing his mind as regards German rearmament and defense needs, Middleton stated that the extended occupation “explained” McCloy’s recent, unequivocal statements rejecting German rearmament.⁹¹

Despite the increased discussion regarding German rearmament - even former German generals were producing papers on German participation in a European-Atlantic Armed Force complete with active and passive air defense - the Military Security Board promulgated a law, to remain in effect for two years, designed to prevent German rearmament and insure its industrial demilitarization.⁹² This law, announced on 8 May, the fifth anniversary of Germany’s defeat, limited German industry in four ways: it prohibited and limited certain types or quantities of products; prohibited bulk increases on the capacity of certain types of industrial production; required Military Security Board approval for certain industrial activities; and provided for the surveillance of industrial production facilities and equipment affecting the security field.⁹³

⁹¹ Drew Middleton, “U.S. Drafts Plans TO Occupy Germany for 5 Years More,” *The New York Times*, Apr 23, 1950, p. 1.

⁹² “A Memorandum on the Issue of an Active Participation by Western Germany in the Defense of Europe and the Western World,” 25 April 1950, attachment to Memo For: ADPC, 31 May 1950, Subject: Western German Rearmament, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA.

⁹³ Drew Middleton, “West Imposes Ban on German Arming,” *The New York Times*, May 9, 1950, pp. 1, 6.

In early June, NSC 71 was issued containing extracts of three statements by the JCS regarding German remilitarization. While the second of the three advocated the “appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany,” the last dealt specifically with a Federal police force in Germany. It stated:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed by their representative in London that the three High Commissioners to West Germany have agreed to recommend to the Council of Foreign Ministers that Germany be authorized to have 5,000 Federal police to be termed “Republican Guard.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff *strongly urge that the Foreign Ministers approve this recommendation, since such a force could well be the initial step in the eventual rearming of Germany.*⁹⁴

NSC 71 drew the immediate attention of the President who sent a memo to Acheson telling him that he had read NSC 71 and that it was “decidedly militaristic” and in his opinion, not realistic with present conditions. He told Acheson that he desired to discuss it with him on Monday, June 19. Byroade then prepared and coordinated within the European Division a long, impassioned paper for Acheson to use at the NSC in which he addressed both the rearming and police issue. In his cover letter to Acheson, Byroade said that McCloy told him that he now had direct evidence that the British representative in Germany had instigated the letter Adenauer had sent to the High Commission requesting 25,000 federal police. Byroade recommended that a message be sent to Ambassador Douglas in London to speak “quite frankly” with Bevin, as these tactics could rapidly destroy the effectiveness of the High Commission. Byroade then suggested that the U.S. adopt an earlier French proposal to

⁹⁴ NSC 71, A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on United States Policy Toward Germany, June 8, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, National Security Council - Meetings File, Box 180, HSTL. Emphasis added.

strengthen the police situation by creating additional units within the *Länder* (states) with more effective weapons and greater mobility and to define a procedure whereby the Chancellor could call upon those units.⁹⁵

The paper Byroade wrote stated both the meeting in London of the three Foreign Ministers and meetings in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) made it clear that the rearmament of Germany and its inclusion in NATO were premature “to the point where profitable discussion cannot yet be held on this subject.” The paper continued that the next 18 months would be crucial in shaping Germany’s development and that neither the German people nor their elected leaders wanted to see a German armed force. World conditions, Byroade wrote, could cause this position to change but the advantages of not adding German forces to those of the West far outweighed the risks. An abrupt reversal of this policy, he continued, could undermine Allied unity and without unity, there is no strength.

Additionally, Byroade’s paper continued, Germany could not continue to pay its share of occupation costs, currently 22-percent of its budget, and contribute to the military defense. Thus, it would be necessary to look at other, non-military ways that Germany could contribute to the strength of the West and the reconstruction of Europe. Byroade then looked at the possibility of the use of German manpower in a

⁹⁵ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, June 16, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Foreign Affairs File, Box 155, HSTL. Byroade’s paper, a comment by Perkins and Byroade’s cover letter are all attached to a Memorandum for Mr. Jessup, June 14, 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA. Byroade’s paper became NSC-71/1, 3 July 1950, RG 273, NSC Policy Papers, Box 9, NARA. According to Spencer Mawby, Adenauer allegedly made the request for 25,000 police on 28 April 1950. Ironically, Adenauer does not mention this in his autobiography nor is there any mention of Graf von Schwerin. It should also be noted that both Mawby and Saki Dockrill write that by late 1949, the British had accepted the rearming of Germany but preferred a gendarmerie that would serve as the first step in that direction. See Spencer Mawby, *Containing Germany*, New York, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999 and Saki Dockrill, *Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955*, Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1991. Also Adenauer, *Memoirs*, *Op. cit.*

balanced North Atlantic force, a concept that if successful, could provide a framework within which limited German rearmament might be possible. That framework, however, had not been worked out sufficiently to solve the existing obstacles.

Byroade also added a note of caution, saying that although Germany was predominantly anti-communist and outraged by past Soviet behavior, the outrage was not such that they might not be tempted to make a deal with the East. Thus, it would not add true strength to the West by creating a strong Germany military force whose loyalty could not be counted on with “reasonable certainty.”

The paper concluded by agreeing that the current German police force needed strengthening but questioned whether, given Germany’s history with a centralized police force, additional and specially trained forces should be created in the German states that could be called upon by the Federal Government. He indicated that this question, which had not yet been decided, was really of no interest to the Department of Defense and that a Federal force would require a constitutional change. This question was before the High Commissioners and, he added, was not considered a step in the initial phase of the rearmament of Western Germany.

A few days earlier, on 13 June, the issue of a West German Federal Police force took yet another turn. McCloy cabled Acheson telling him that German General Graf Gerhard von Schwerin had gone to England on a trip to discuss German remilitarization with certain British officials and Ministers of Parliament, to include Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the British High Commissioner for Germany, among others. Schwerin, according to the cable, was told that the majority opinion in Great Britain, once opposed to German remilitarization, was now in favor and that the U.S. “would

present no great problem and could ‘be brought into line quickly’” McCloy stated that, based on Schwerin’s admissions regarding his England trip and other information, “it is becoming increasingly evident that the UK is utilizing pressure for the creation of a German police force as a first step toward the remilitarization of Germany.” McCloy further surmised that Adenauer may have concurred although both the U.S. and the French view Adenauer’s request for a Federal police force at face value and not as a Trojan horse for a future German army. McCloy concluded that it was his impression the U.S. was not prepared to agree to remilitarization and that it was his opinion that it would be premature until a stronger democratic Germany emerged. He then requested the Department’s views on the police question.⁹⁶

On the same day that he read NSC-71, President Truman wrote Acheson that he had received a telegram from McCloy on the rearming of Germany. Truman ventured that it seemed to him that “the British were doing everything to break up western European unity [by advocating] the rearmament of Germany. Truman cautioned against making the same mistake as was made after World War I when Germany was allowed to maintain one hundred thousand soldiers that became the foundation for “the greatest war machine that ever came forth in European history.” He then told Acheson that McCloy should be called home and that he, Acheson, McCloy, and the Secretary of Defense should discuss the proper approach to a police force in Germany, one that could maintain order locally but not be allowed to develop into “a training ground for a military machine that can combine with Russia and ruin the rest of

⁹⁶ Frankfurt 5052, June 13, 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA.

the world.”⁹⁷

Toward the end of June, Acheson responded to McCloy’s earlier cable with a cable of his own condemning the British ploy and the instigation of Adenauer’s letter requesting a 25,000-man federal police force. He agreed with McCloy’s position and conclusions and included for McCloy a copy of Byroade’s paper. Acheson concluded by stating that in regard to Adenauer’s request, the U.S. was not prepared to see the creation of a large, centralized barracks police. A small force of 500-2000 men under federal control for the Bonn enclave was acceptable but beyond that, Acheson said, “widespread disorders” could be dealt with by adequately built-up and strengthened *Land* police. This should suffice to meet Adenauer’s plea without creating a danger to democracy inherent in a centralized German police force.⁹⁸

McCloy’s response urged Acheson to seek a common understanding among the three allied governments regarding German remilitarization and to make a comprehensive pronouncement that should be more than a “mere reaffirmation that we do not intend to rearm Germany....” Acheson agreed but wanted to wait until the NSC had an opportunity to discuss the issue. McCloy also told Acheson that Adenauer told him about Schwerin’s trip to the UK and that a source close to departing Deputy UK High Commissioner General Robertson told McCloy that Robertson had urged Adenauer to request 25,000 police and that the UK would support that request.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 16 June, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Foreign Affairs File, Box 155, HSTL.

⁹⁸ Unnumbered Deptel, 24 June 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA.

⁹⁹ Frankfurt 5449, 24 June 1950 and Deptel 3224, 30 June 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA. The name of the source was redacted on the cable.

Korea Forces the Debate

Five days before Acheson's cable to McCloy was sent, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel separating North and South Korea, attacking both South Korean and U.S. forces. Although U.S. policy focus would remain on Europe, the situation and the tenor of discussions regarding German rearmament would change. For many Germans, in particular, the parallel between Germany and Korea was unmistakable: both were divided into western-oriented and communist-oriented states. Added to this was the nature of the military buildup in East Germany, specifically the *Kassernierte Volkspolizei/Bereitschaftspolizei*, which was more like an army and made the possibility of aggression from the east more likely.¹⁰⁰

With the outbreak of the Korean War, McCloy began to change his mind regarding German rearmament and on 14 July sent an "Eyes Only" cable to Acheson and Byroade describing a talk Sir Ivone had with Adenauer, which he reported to McCloy and French High Commissioner André François-Poncet. Adenauer, according to Sir Ivone, had again expressed his concerns over the question of security for the Federal Republic in light of Korea and the lack of concrete preparations by the Allies in Europe. Adenauer acknowledged that the creation of a German army was out of the question but that some means had to be made in the event of an attack by the *Volkspolizei*.

Sir Ivone felt that the Germans needed to know that the Allies were doing all they could to protect them and said that, at a minimum, an "effective German auxiliary," was

¹⁰⁰ These views are expressed by Wolfram Hanreider, *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1967*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, p. 37 and by Gunter Mai, *Westlichesicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg: Der Korea-Krieg und die deutsche Wiederbewaffnung 1950*, Boppard am Rhine: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1977, p. 1.

needed - whether it be federal or *Land* police was immaterial - to control refugees and to keep order while Allied forces prepare for an attack. McCloy indicated he was skeptical of Sir Ivone's concern, thinking that it might have been a way for him to again press the British interest in creating a federal German police force using Korea as a "gambit." McCloy did feel, however, that continued bad news from Korea could disturb the general equanimity of the population.

In separate inserts in his cable, McCloy added that Poncet subsequently told him that German service troops with our armies should be trained and in an emergency be a "means for Germans to fight with us," and also that he had seen Adenauer and was told much of what Adenauer had told Sir Ivone. McCloy concluded that he believed there was a lack of sufficient emergency planning regarding the use of Germans and that in his judgment, "it is necessary to advise the Germans that at some point we would permit them to fight shoulder to shoulder with us when the need should arise." He then stated his belief that those Germans who wished to, should be permitted to enlist in the U.S. Army and that he had already told General Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, United States European Command (CINCEUCOM), of this and that he understood that Handy was about to request permission to do just that. McCloy concluded that "...it would be to our advantage to start planning for the use of German manpower along the line suggested above and subject to the conditions stated above. Please give us some guidance as soon as possible."¹⁰¹

Ironically, as many of the senior State Department officers were slowly changing their minds and favoring the rearmament of Germany, Averell Harriman

¹⁰¹ Bonn 26, July 14, 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA.

among them, an office memorandum written by John Hay of Public Affairs to Geoffrey W. Lewis, Deputy Director of the Office of German Affairs, stated that the U.S. Government's consistent policy has been that Germany should not be rearmed. It referred to the 23 May formal note by the American, British and French governments to the Soviet Government regarding the remilitarization of the East German police by citing that in every agreement, the U.S. had been "committed unequivocally to the principle that Germany will be demilitarized, that her military forces will be completely and finally abolished, and that no revival of German military activities will be allowed." The memo referred to press statements made by the Secretary on 7 and 16 June that referred to this protest note and ended by stating that there had been no change to the State Department's position on that subject."¹⁰²

In mid-July, McCloy again cabled Byroade stating that if the United States did not find the means to allow Germany to fight in an emergency, the U.S. would lose her politically and militarily without hope of getting her back. If there was a real war, McCloy continued, the U.S. would lose a most valuable reserve of manpower – a reserve the Russians would certainly use against the U.S. McCloy's conclusion was that given the situation regarding Korea, it was time to consider the radical changes needed for German participation in Europe's defense.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Office Memorandum (Hay-Lewis), Subject: Policy on Remilitarization of Western Germany, July 17, 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA. Quotes in original. On 25 July, Byroade met with General Schuyler and mentioned that Harriman was one of many in the Department who believed Germany should be rearmed. Byroade also mentioned that the Department had given full approval to the immediate formation of a 10,000-man police force. Memorandum for General Gruenther, 25 July 1950, RG 319, TS Decimal File, 091 Germany, Box 21, NARA.

¹⁰³ Acheson, *Op. cit.*, p. 566. Schwartz, *America's Germany*, p. 128.

Acheson's "Conversion"

Acheson, benefiting from his own and the State Department's "great deal of thinking" on this subject met with the President at the end of July. This meeting marks what many have called Acheson's 'conversion.' Acheson argued that the NSC was asking the President to first decide if West Germany should be rearmed and then, only after he approved, would methods for executing the decision be looked into. Acheson felt this was the wrong approach. The question, Acheson said, was no longer one of whether Germany should be rearmed but "how this could be done without disrupting anything else we were doing and without putting Germany into a position to act as a balance of power in Europe."

Acheson then suggested the idea of a European or Atlantic Defense Force as a mechanism by which a Western German military contribution could be integrated into the defense of Europe without the creation of a German national army, Ministry of Defense or General Staff. Truman gave his approval and directed Acheson to proceed along those lines. Acheson said himself that his conversion to German participation in European defense was quick; "If there was to be any defense at all," he had said, "it had to be based on a forward strategy. Germany's role must [be] primary."¹⁰⁴

Acheson's "conversion" may not have been a sudden as it appears. Beisner relates that as early as 1949, Acheson had decided that U.S. policy had to be one of "situations of strength." He later states, although no time frame is given, that Acheson had been

¹⁰⁴ Meeting with the President, July 31, 1950, Item 2. The Position of Germany in the Defense of Western Europe, 1950, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 762A.5, Box 3896, NARA. The Memo is also found in *FRUS* 1950, Vol. IV, p. 702. See also JCS History II, p. 194. Acheson quote from Dean Acheson, *The Struggle for a Free Europe*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971, p. 132.

thinking about rearming Germany privately but disavowing it in public, and again, that Acheson realized that the need for a “forward strategy” - a defense line as far east as possible - made it imperative that Germany be involved militarily.¹⁰⁵

The idea of a European Defense Force had been germinating in the minds of McCloy and Byroade and had been discussed in a State position paper prepared for the London Tripartite Conference in May. But it was during the first week in August that these ideas began to jell and come to fruition. On 3 August, McCloy sent Byroade a cable in which he offered a number of conclusions, namely, that the basic solution to the problem of the defense of Western Europe cannot be solved merely by strengthening Western Europe’s national armies and that France lacked both the capacity and will to build an army capable of bearing the brunt of West European defense. He was, McCloy continued, opposed to the recreating of a German national army “now or in the foreseeable future,” but he recognized that an effective defense of Western Europe would require a real contribution of German resources and men. He concluded that the time was ripe for the creation of a genuine European army that would give the French hope of an effective defense without the risk of a German national army.¹⁰⁶

Byroade responded the following day, telling McCloy that his cable had “filled in the missing portions” of a paper he, Byroade, had formulated the day before on the formation of a European army. According to Marc Trachtenberg, Byroad-

¹⁰⁵ Beisner, *Op. cit.*, pp. 127, 357. See also Chapter 1, fn 18.

¹⁰⁶ United States High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 3 August 1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. III, pp. 180—82.

e's plan described a highly integrated European army with as much an international character as possible,. It was an attempt to apply the Schuman Plan concept to the military field, allowing for a German contribution without a German national army. It was, as someone had said, an effort to “arm the Germans sufficiently to deter the Russians but not scare the Belgians.” Byroade’s paper became the State Department’s official position and it was forwarded to the Defense Department for concurrence and to satisfy the President’s directive that the two Departments reach a common position. The most politically significant portion of the paper was the statement that if United States participation was forthcoming, conditions appeared favorable for creating a really effective European Defense Force which could assimilate a direct contribution by Germany, but that “This involves...the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital of all elements of sovereignty, i.e., the security field.”¹⁰⁷

Yet again, the Department’s official pronouncements, as well as some of its internal communications continued to blur the issue. Just the day before Byroade’s response to McCloy, a *Summary of Telegrams* pertaining to Germany informed the Secretary that Charles Spofford, the U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council of Deputies had been told that when speaking to other NATO representatives, he should indicate that given the current world situation, the U.S. felt that the required

¹⁰⁷ “An Approach to the Formation of a European Army,” RG 59, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Lot File 55 D 258, Box 1, NARA. The paper and its cover cable, dated 4 August 1950 is in RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 740.5/8-450, NARA. See also Deputy Undersecretary of State to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Affairs and Military Assistance, 16 August 1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. III, pp. 211-19. See also Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz, “America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth,” in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., *Between Empire and Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, pp. 8-9.

defense effort could not be met without the contribution of Germany's productive capacity to turn out non-combat equipment. Spofford was further instructed to make clear that this proposal did not reflect "any change in the basic U.S. position on German rearmament...."¹⁰⁸

Just over a week later at the 11 August Council of Europe meeting, Churchill called for the creation of a European Army, to include German participation,. Anticipating questions on the U.S. reaction to this resolution, both Byroade and James Webb recommended diplomatic responses for the Secretary of State and the President, respectively, neither of which however mentioned the official U.S. position of no German rearmament. Instead, it was recommended that both men disavow any detailed knowledge of the scope of German participation in Churchill's proposal and that the U.S. Government could not usefully comment on it.¹⁰⁹

As will be seen in Chapter 4, the Department of Defense had been working since early 1948 on arming western Germany and had been in constant contact with the Department of State, especially since early August, regarding the question of when and how to arm the Federal Republic. Although the positions of the two departments were not that far apart, there were several significant differences that needed to be ironed out and clarified, specifically the JCS position that the German contribution be a national army in NATO. Thus, on 26 August, and in light of the upcoming meeting between Acheson and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and

¹⁰⁸ "Summary of Telegrams," August 2, 1950, Papers of HARRY S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Conference File, Box 141.

¹⁰⁹ Secretary of State Memos to President, (12 Aug 50 and 16 Aug 50), RG 59, Lot 53 D 444, Box 4, Folder Aug 1950, NARA.

France on 12 September that was to be followed by a meeting of the NAC, President Truman sent each Secretary an identical letter that contained eight key questions for which he requested that both departments work together in developing recommendations for his decision by September 1:

The most significant questions asked essentially whether the U.S. was prepared to:

- commit additional forces to the defense of Europe;
- support the concept of a European defense force, including Germans, on other than a national basis;
- look forward to the eventuality of a Supreme commander for that force;
- support creation of a combined staff for that Supreme Commander; and
- consider full U.S. participation in a European defense force; i.e., to accept responsibility for having an American Supreme Commander, and
- whether there were other ways in which the U.S. could invigorate NATO.¹¹⁰

On August 30, Acheson, Byroade, Paul Nitze and Perkins met with General Bradley to discuss the JCS response to Truman's questions, and according to a memorandum of that meeting prepared by Byroade, there did not appear to be any major disagreements.¹¹¹

As an aside, it is of interest to note that on 29 August, Adenauer sent a memorandum to McCloy in which he pointed out that events in the Far East and belief in

¹¹⁰ "My Dear Mr. Secretary," August 26, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Conference File, Box 141, HSTL.

¹¹¹ Memorandum for S/S, August 30, 1950, Dean Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations File, Box 67, HSTL. For the JCS response and its amendment, see Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 August 1950, Subject: Position on Recommendations to be Submitted to the President Regarding a European Defense Force and Related Matters, and Proposed Joint Reply to the President's Letter of 26 August 1950, 7 September 1950, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Lot 55 D 258, Box 1, NARA.

the ability of the West to counter Soviet moves in Western Europe had been badly shaken to “an alarming extent and had led to a dangerous lethargy among Germans.” Adenauer again pointed out the weakness of the Federal Republic police *vis-à-vis* the East German *Volkspolizei* and wrote that he had repeatedly requested that Allied occupation forces be reinforced as the defense of the FRG was in their hands. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Adenauer stated that the FRG was prepared to contribute a German contingent should an international European army be formed. “This shows unambiguously,” he wrote, “that the Federal Chancellor rejects the remilitarization of Germany by a separate national military force.”¹¹²

Adenauer sent a second, undated *Aide Memoir* to Allen Dulles, who forwarded it on 8 September to his brother, John Foster Dulles who forwarded it further to Byroade on 11 September. The *Aide Memoir* reiterated Adenauer’s position that the events in Korea had caused a serious loss of confidence in the FRG and that to save the psychological situation there, the occupying forces needed to be significantly reinforced with at least two to four armored divisions. To fully thwart a Soviet attack, however, at least twelve armored divisions sent to Germany’s eastern border would be required. “Only when this is done,” wrote Adenauer, “will it be possible to recruit troops in Germany and to place German industry at the service of Western defense.”¹¹³

¹¹² Adenauer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 279-280. A second memo that same day to McCloy stated that the FRG now felt it necessary to place its relationship with the occupiers on a new basis, i.e., end the state of war, repurpose the occupation to protect against external dangers, and place the relationship on a contractual basis. See also Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus, *Die Himmeroder Denkschrift*, Karlsruhe: Militärisches Forschungsamt, 1985, pp. 13, 35-36.

¹¹³ John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 47, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

12 September 1950 - The "Single Package" is Presented.

Acheson relates in his memoirs that both the State and Defense Departments debated the issue for two weeks before a compromise was reached, which he then carried to the Tripartite Meeting in New York. The compromise, also known as the 'single package,' contained several key elements and was intended to be offered to the Allies on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis. The "package," approved by Truman just a few days earlier, offered to increase U.S. forces in Europe by approximately 6 divisions, 8 tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and participation, along with the United Kingdom and all the other NATO armies in a combined European defense force, with an international staff and a 'supreme commander.' However, this was to be contingent on the Allies boosting the capabilities (and size) of their forces and accepting the inclusion of German contingents that would be added at division level but without a German General Staff.¹¹⁴

Acheson later called the 'single package' a "mistake" and claimed he was forced into accepting it from the military, a claim that is accepted by many historians. Of particular interest in this respect is David S. McLellan's comment that Acheson may have wanted to avoid a conflict with Bradley and that the JCS insisted that the "recommendations must be submitted and accepted as a whole." This claim and other similar statements, however, are not supported by the available documentation and Acheson was neither a person to be easily cowed nor one who would subscribe to a position he did not

¹¹⁴ Acheson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 568-71 and his *The Struggle for a Free Europe*, p. 133. See also *JCS History II*, pp. 200-03; Martin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 655-60; Thomas Alan Schwartz, "The 'Skeleton Key' – American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, 1949-1954," *Central European History*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Dec 1986, pp. 375-377; James McAllister, *No Exit, America and the German Problem, 1943-1954*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 187ff. ; Trachtenberg and Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-16.

approve, as both Trachtenberg and McMahon so eloquently describe.¹¹⁵ Referring again to Trachtenberg, if the package as presented to Bevin and Schuman was a mistake, it was not that it mandated the arming of the Federal Republic but that it was presented as a virtual all or nothing demand.¹¹⁶ Thus the stage was set for the long, drawn-out four and one-half year battle to put Germans back in uniform.

It is obvious from the above that the determination of the United States to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized came face to face with political reality. Some officials within the State Department began to see the situation in a different light, some before the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, others afterward. Of interest, and not developed to any great extent in the scholarly literature, is the fact that it was McCloy and Byroade, two State Department officers, who first developed a definitive plan to arm West Germany within a European Defense Force and not the French. As will be seen in the following chapters, aside from a not too favorable review by the JCS, this plan was never put forward. This begs the question of whether the following four years, during which the Pleven Plan/European Defense Community was offered as the solution to the German question, would have ended differently had Acheson made it a part of the “Single Package” and not ceded the initiative to France.

¹¹⁵ See Appendix E for additional comment on this issue. See also Acheson, *Ibid.*, and Trachtenberg and Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-22. See also Robert J. McMahon, *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order*, Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009, pp. 11-17, 48, David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson, the State Department Years*, New York: Department of Defense, Mead & Company, 1976, p. 329; McAllister, *Op.Cit.*, pp. 187 ff. General Bradley called Acheson “an uncompromising hawk,” but Bradley left no personal or official papers that describe the 30 August meeting or that would indicate he forced the German rearmament issue on Acheson. Omar Bradley, *A General's Life*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 519, and e-mail correspondence between me and archivists at the U.S. Army Military Historical Institute, Carlisle Barracks, December 2010.

¹¹⁶ Trachtenberg and Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

Chapter 4: The Military Path to September 12, 1950

Official histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and even the individual military services address this period. They are, however, by design brief, highlighting only the major issues or major points of an issue or strategy debate. Similarly, non-military historians have addressed this period and the military problems that confronted the United States during the early Cold War period. While together they address the issue of German rearmament, they do not go into either depth or detail sufficient to understand the decision-making process. They fail, therefore, to explain the specific motives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the manner in which it dealt with the Department of State. By bringing the contents of plans, memos, cables and other correspondence of the Joint Staff, the Joint Strategic Planning Committee, and other involved military agencies found in the archives to light, this chapter presents a much more complete and nuanced picture of the period. It will also delineate clearly the unchanging position the Department of Defense on the question of German rearmament and the variance with the policy being followed at the time.

Simply put, the Department of Defense wanted a national West German army to be formed while the State Department, as seen in Chapter 3 above, wanted to have German armed units in an integrated European army. The difference was a question that Clausewitz had addressed and answered over one hundred years previously - whether a

unified federal (national) army or separate armies of an alliance is more effective. For Clauswitz, as for the Department of Defense, the answer was the national army.¹

Defend or not Defend, 1946-1949

When the war in Europe ended in May, 1945, there were 61 U.S. divisions, approximately 915,000 men) in the Allied force under Eisenhower.² Less than one year later, on 1 January 1946, after a much faster than expected demobilization, a rate of demobilization that forced Eisenhower to complain to Congress, there were only 622,000 U.S. troops assigned to the European Theater, a number that was estimated to be reduced to 307,000 by 1 July 1946.³

By 1947, just one year later, only 12 under-strength divisions, primarily trained and equipped for occupation duties, remained of the total U.S. Army ground divisions (97) active at the end of the war, and only two were in Germany.⁴ At the same time, however, according to intelligence estimates used by the Joint War Planning Committee (JWPC), the USSR had retained 50 divisions in their zones of Germany and Austria, 20 divisions in Poland, 20 divisions in Hungary and Yugoslavia,

¹ Carl von Clauswitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 636-637.

² Dwight David Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1952, p. 429.

³ "Statement by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Supplementing his remarks on Demobilization made to members of Congress in the auditorium, Library of Congress, 10:00AM, EST, Tuesday, January 15, 1946," Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: General File, 1945-1953, p. 5, Box 102, HSTL. See Also the report to the President by Robert F. Patterson, Secretary of War, 11 June 1946, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Box 155, HSTL. Lord Ismay gives the total of U.S. forces in Europe on V-E Day as 3,100,000 in *NATO, The First Five Years, 1949-1954*, publisher and date unknown.

⁴ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 87. JCS History, II, p. 187. Christian Greiner, "The Defense of Western Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1947-1950, *Western Security: the Formative Years*, in Riste, *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

and a further 152 divisions as reserve in the Soviet Union along with a number of frontline aircraft. JWPC also estimated that an additional 61 divisions belonging to Soviet satellite countries in Europe would also be available. Freely admitting Soviet superiority, the JWPC concluded that the USSR could, in the event of war, overrun Europe and reach the English Channel in its initial drive. Under those circumstances, they saw no other alternative but to have U.S. forces withdraw from the continent as rapidly as possible.⁵

There was little if any thought within the U.S. military establishment in the immediate years following the end of World War II about rearming Germany. The U.S. Army of Occupation was deeply involved in carrying out the disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization directives of the Allied Control Authority. The War Department, however, which was soon to become the Department of Defense following the National Security Act of 1947, was slowly recognizing a growing military threat from its erstwhile World War II ally, the Soviet Union. This threat took on greater urgency following the 1948 Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade later that year, forcing the JCS to think seriously about the defense of Western Europe. Outnumbered in manpower, and associated with relatively weak allies, themselves still recovering from the ravages of the war, the Pentagon sought a solution that would utilize the manpower and fighting experi-

⁵Condit, Kenneth W., *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume II, 1947-1949*, Washington DC: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1978, pp. 152-153. (hereafter JCS History). A hardcover version, published in Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1979, but with slightly different pagination has also been used and will be identified as JCS History - Glazier. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) believed the USSR would keep 5.5 million men under arms. See also Walter S. Poole, "From Conciliation to Containment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Coming of the Cold War, 1945-1946," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb 1978), p. 13. It should be pointed out, however, that U.S. divisions were larger than Soviet divisions.

ence that the recently defeated Germany could provide. Therefore, to better understand why the U.S. military turned so quickly consider rearming the recently disarmed Germans, it is imperative to gain an understanding of the military situation as seen by the newly organized JCS in the early post-war years.

Strategic Planning for War with the USSR Begins

Prior to 1947, strategic planning consisted primarily of studies of specific areas or problems. For example, Soviet actions in 1946 - in Iran and subsequently toward Turkey - combined with Stalin's speech of 9 February and George Kennan's analysis of it, led the JCS to fear the loss of the Mediterranean and to contend that the Soviet Union constituted "the greatest threat to the United States in the foreseeable future." By mid-April, a Joint Staff analysis concluded that the Soviets could conquer most, if not all, of Western Europe.⁶

Following passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, the newly reorganized JCS was made responsible for war planning. The earliest plans, which were prepared without political guidance as none was given, assumed the United States would use nuclear weapons.⁷ As Lawrence Freedman writes, however, the Joint Staff had concluded as early as 1946 that the use of nuclear weapons might not be decisive. 'Victory' would require the "actual capture and occupation of the enemy homeland...." Furthermore, U.S. demobilization had been such that the few atomic bombs

⁶ Poole, *Op. cit.*, pp. 13-15. See also Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, *America and the Cold War, 1941-1991*, Vol. 1, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010, p. 106. See also Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973, especially pp. 235, 249-52, and 261. Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett was quoted at that time as saying: "All the Russians need to get to the Channel are shoes."

⁷ *JCS History - Glazer*, pp. 284-286.

possessed by the U.S. would do little if anything to compensate for the lack of troops on the ground. Nonetheless, for a number of technical and strategic reasons, e.g., the development of the B-36 long-range strategic bomber, which lessened dependence on overseas bases, the U.S. military came to believe that strategic bombing with nuclear weapons could be decisive.

These ideas were embodied in the first plan, code-named BROILER, which was approved in December 1947. BROILER was a plan for the initial stages of war beginning anytime within the next three years. Its aim was to secure the United Kingdom and the Cairo-Suez area by launching a strategic air attack against the USSR. That said, the force disparity between the U.S. and the USSR forced planners to accept the loss of both Western Europe and the Middle East. Given the requirements and time it would take to mobilize, it was believed that an offensive to retake the continent would not be possible for at least 10 months after D-Day.⁸

BROILER, however, elicited doubts among members of the JCS regarding its reliance on atomic weapons. Both Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Staff, but especially Admiral Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations, saw BROILER as a complete surrender to the Soviets of all of Western Europe's manpower, resources and industrial capacity – resources that could then be used against the U.S. Denfeld believed a more realistic strategy would have the U.S. align itself with the West European powers to defend along the Rhine. In addition, he felt that together with the Western Union, the military arm of the then newly created Brussels Treaty Organization, and additional U.S. forces, it would be possible to hold part of

⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed., New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 48, 51-52. *JCS History - Glazer*, pp. 283-84.

Western Europe.⁹

In April 1948, U.S., British and Canadian planning officers developed and approved an outline Emergency War Plan (EWP) – an abbreviated version of BROILER – code-named HALFMOON, which included a larger list of nations allied against the USSR that was to be the basis for each nation to develop “unilateral but accordant” plans. As a global war plan, however, HALFMOON, approved in May 1948, was focused on securing and/or regaining Middle East oil. Its major flaw, which was recognized as such, was its failure to provide assistance to Western Europe. Again, the shortage of forces left the planners no alternative. Only the United Kingdom, which was to act as a platform for U.S. strategic air forces, was to be defended. No serious effort would be made to hold Western Europe and Allied occupation forces were to withdraw to the Rhine, hold as long as possible, then withdraw to French and Italian ports for evacuation. Sufficient mobilization to retake the lost territories was expected to take approximately 12 months.¹⁰

To facilitate future planning, Eisenhower, who had been recalled from retirement by President Truman to be the acting Chief of the Joint Staff and Special Advisor to the President, issued a policy memorandum on 25 February 1949 setting forth wartime objectives for Europe. A portion of the guidance stated: “The security of the United States requires...the holding of a line containing the West European complex preferably no farther west than the Rhine.” Eisenhower, however, recognized that the forces available, including those from members of the Western Union, were insuffi-

⁹ *JCS History II*, pp. 285-287.

¹⁰ *JCS History - Glazer*, pp. 291-292.

cient to hold the Rhine, so he called for plans to hold a “substantial bridgehead” in Western Europe and to provide for a “return” at the earliest possible moment.¹¹

This new plan, designated OFFTACKLE, was approved on 8 December 1949. It was the first plan based on political guidance as well as the first that directed the defense of Western Europe. Both HALFMOON and OFFTACKLE reflected the doubts of both the Army and the Navy as to the efficacy of an “atomic blitz,” and their belief that slowing a Soviet advance in Europe had to be an objective as well. OFFTACKLE also eliminated the Middle East as a U.S. priority.¹² Nonetheless, and despite the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. and allied forces remained numerically insufficient to hold the Rhine or maintain a bridgehead north of the Pyrenees. Withdrawal and return, possibly only 24 months after D-Day, most likely from North Africa, remained the only possible alternative.¹³

Marc Trachtenberg writes that even before the Soviets acquired the atomic bomb in August 1949, it had become clear that a build-up of conventional capability was of importance. General Omar Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, stated that a strategy of first abandoning then liberating Western Europe would produce impotent and disillusioned allies who, in the event of war, could not be counted on: “...we cannot count on friends in Western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates

¹¹ *JCS History - Glazer*, pp. 295-296.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 287-289, 294. Freedman, *Op. cit.*, p.52.

¹³ By 31 December 1949, the ever-decreasing size of the U.S. Army left it with fewer troops (638,824) than on 30 Jun 1947 (683,837), *JCS History*, Vol. II, Appendix 1, p. 301.

that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation.”¹⁴

Although what lay behind these thoughts was only voiced loud and clear several years later, it was becoming evident to some that if war was to fought on German soil, Germany had to be defended as an ally as it was obvious that she would contribute to her own defense. A German contribution, however, required a significant change in West Germany’s status. The rationale was that Germany’s willingness to provide troops in her own defense would be a test of her commitment to the West. As early as 1947, Clay had remarked that “in the event of another war, the Germans probably would be the only continental people upon whom we could rely.”¹⁵

Predating these thoughts was a Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) of 29 April 1947 and a staff study drafted for the Joint Strategic Planning Committee (JSPC) in March 1948, which addressed the issue of West German resources. Paragraph six of the Enclosure to the Appendix of the JSSC Report stated that: “Potentially, the strongest military power in this area [Western Europe] is Germany. Without German aid the remaining countries of Western Europe could scarcely be expected to withstand the armies of our ideological opponents until the United States could mobilize and place in the field sufficient armed forces to achieve their defeat. With a revived Germany fighting on the side of the Western Allies this would

¹⁴ Trachtenberg, *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-101. Once the Soviet Union had acquired a number of atomic bombs, this option - to stage a “return,” – a Normandy-like invasion of the European continent was no longer open. The mass of troops and ships needed for such an assault would have made an excellent atomic target and would have thus been unthinkable after 1949. Thanks to Professor Sumida for this insight.

¹⁵ Letter to Senator Robert A. Taft from Forrest Davis (representative of Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson), 29 January 1947. RG 319, Records of the Army Staff , Plans and Ops Division Decimal File 1946-48, P&O 091 Germany (Section I) (Cases 1-20), NARA.

be a possibility.”¹⁶

The JSPC study stated that “[German] resources in manpower should be put to building forces to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe.” It further recommended that staff conversations be undertaken with European Allies to determine the military uses to which West Germans might be put. Finally, the study concluded that the current EWP had to be changed to indicate a preparedness to fight and contain a Soviet attack on a line east of Denmark, West Germany and Italy, and to put German resources to use militarily to fill the military vacuum after consultations with the West Europeans and in light of their recommendations.¹⁷ Ironically, this recommendation unknowingly supported the Western Union’s 1948 objective to fight as far east as possible in Germany, an objective the JSSC found unrealistic.

Knowing that the U.S. could not assist the West Europeans, the JSSC simply did not believe that even after years of intensive preparation the “potential of the democracies to be increased enough to do other than simply delay Soviet encroachment.” The U.S., it stated further, would use offensive air and naval operations with ground support, to include atomic warfare, “designed to secure the offensive initiative and bring about, at the earliest possible date, the capitulation of the enemy.”¹⁸ Even so, a ‘return’ to Western Europe was not expected to be feasible for 24 months when the necessary forces, totaling 41 U.S. divisions and 63 tactical air groups

¹⁶ FRUS, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 740.

¹⁷ Coordination of United States – West European Military Resources to Counter Soviet Communism, TS Staff Study for the Joint Strategic Planning Committee, 2nd draft, 1948, RG 218, Entry UD7, 092 Geographic Files – Western Europe, 1948-1950, Sec 1, NARA.

¹⁸ For Western Union objectives, see Greiner, *Op. cit.*, p. 151. For JSSC thoughts, see, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (on its own initiative) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Strategy, 5 April 1948, RG 218, Entry UD7, 092 Geographic Files – Western Europe, 1948-1950, Sec 1, NARA.

would invade, World War II style, from England and North Africa.

In a December 1947 study looking to develop military and security implications of a possible Soviet proposal for the early withdrawal of occupation forces, the Army Chief of Staff recommended a change to the wording of a paragraph so that it would read: “The German people have the potential of ultimately providing effective resistance to forceful expansion into Western Europe. If they should be permitted to develop their military potential by the Western Allies, they are the people most likely to provide such resistance unless the United States abandons them to Soviet domination before a German government is set up which is capable of effectively resisting Soviet penetration.”¹⁹

The study was based on the already accepted assessment that the Soviets would occupy Western Europe to the English Channel in the west and to the Pyrenees in the south before the U.S. could act effectively. The basic thrust of the Army Chief’s memo was that Germany’s potential could only be realized by a radical change in the Allied position regarding the disarming and demilitarization of Germany. Thus, by the end of 1947, thoughts regarding Germany and its relation to European defense were advancing slowly but surely in American military circles.

During the April – May 1948 period, a series of papers from the Joint Strategic Planning Committee (JSPC) concerning the U.S.’s involvement in Western Europe were sent to the Joint Chiefs. One such report, like the previously mentioned staff study, recommended the EWP be revised to provide that U.S. forces would

¹⁹ JCS 1811/12, 1 December 1947, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Implications of an Early Withdrawal of Occupation Forces from Germany, RG 218, Entry UD4, Geographic Files 1946-47, 092 Germany, Sect. 19, NARA.

“fight and delay” as cleverly as possible and not deliberately evacuate.²⁰ It further assumed that if there were no war by 1953, U.S. and Allied forces would be able to stop the Soviets from advancing west of the Rhine. In accepting the ability of the Soviets to “conquer and substantially occupy” the whole of Western Europe within six months, the report concluded that in order not to lose Western Europe to Communism, the U.S. had to show the Allies a determination to fight shoulder to shoulder with them, but still, only to ensure the integrity of Western Europe west of the Rhine. A British report of conversations with the JCS stated that while the UK, planned no withdrawal from the Rhine, the U.S. envisaged ultimate withdrawal to the Pyrenees where they planned to retain a foothold on the continent.²¹

This report also addressed the use of West German resources, including manpower, contingent on their political reliability, the degree to which their use in preparation might provoke the USSR, but most importantly, the attitude of other West European countries (notably the French) toward a possible resurgence of German military power. This report was followed immediately by another document cautioning that as the EWP did not envision the introduction of additional U.S. forces on the European continent for the defense of France or the Benelux nations, these plans were not to be discussed with them. The document went on to say in so many words that this policy would avoid lowering the morale of those nations and that they could best

²⁰ JSPC 876, 21 April 1948, Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States Military Alliance with Nations of Western Europe, RG 218, Entry UD7, Geographic Files, 092 Western Europe, Sect. 2, NARA.

²¹ JSM-496, 17 April 1948, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 092 Western Europe, 1948-50, Box 89, NARA.

help by vigorously defending their own territory.²²

A third document stemming from a planners conference in May 1948 found the British contingent to the conference proposing that Clay be authorized to participate in planning discussions for the evacuation of Allied forces from Germany, Austria, Trieste and other locations. One of the more important assumptions in the document, one that had direct consequences on U.S. military thinking later on, was that in a conventional war, the Western Powers could not put up any great resistance to a Soviet advance, and first by excluding nuclear weapons, a protracted war would ensue that would “so destroy Western Europe that recovery might be impossible.”²³

This posed an almost insolvable dilemma. To withdraw, after pledging to remain, would be to give Western Europe to the Soviets. To use nuclear weapons in an attempt to forestall an invasion would destroy Germany at the very least, while not to use them, given the weak conventional forces available, would most likely also result in both the destruction and the loss of Western Europe.²⁴

Cooperation with the Western Union

On 19 March 1948, two days after the Brussels Treaty Organization was formed, a staff study initiated by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, then the Army’s Director of Plans and Operations, was sent to the JCS and Bradley. The study suggested overall political and military means to be employed by the United States *vis-à-vis*

²² JSPC 876, *Ibid.* See also JSPC 880, 22 April 1948, Policy Governing the Extent and Nature of Military Planning to be Discussed with Representatives of France and Benelux, RG 218, Entry UD7, Geographic Files, 092 Western Europe, Sect. 2, NARA.

²³ JSPC 877/4, 15 May 1948, Planners Conference, RG 218, *Ibid.*

²⁴ As late as July 1950, there were only two combat ready U.S. divisions on the continent and they were in West Germany, *History of the JCS, Vol. IV*, p. 187.

Western Europe to check and ultimately reverse the expansion of Soviet communism. Written after the Czech coup, it highlighted several risks to be avoided and strongly urged the creation of a military European Recovery Program, i.e., a “military Marshall Plan” to coordinate efforts.²⁵

Wedemeyer’s paper emphasized a need to change the strategic concept that was based on re-conquering Europe after Soviet occupation. As translated in the JCS paper derived from Wedemeyer’s study, the U.S. could no longer proceed on the strategic concept basis that Europe must first be conquered and occupied by the Soviets, denuding the U.S. of allies before there was any prospect of adopting a policy for victory. The current EWP, HALFMOON, which called for the “immediate and frantic” evacuation of U.S. occupation troops, had to be changed. The United States, it continued, must be prepared to fight with its allies in Europe against any odds.

Paragraph 15 of the JCS version of Wedemeyer’s paper, which cited his study verbatim and mirrored the above cited March 1948 JSPC study read: “Any use to which German resources, including resources in manpower, should be put *militarily* in building forces to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe.” It added his caveat that this “should be determined only after consultation with other peoples of Western Europe and then in light of their recommendations.” The JCS draft was entitled “Coordination of U.S. West European Military Resources to Counter Soviet Communism” and concluded that no choice existed “but to provide Western Europe, within our capabilities, every assis-

²⁵ As an aside, it should be noted that on 20 March 1948, in response to the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organization three days earlier, the USSR removed Marshal Sokolovsky from the Allied Control Council, effectively ending the wartime Four Power Alliance, Heinrich August Winkler, *Germany: The Long Road West, 1933-1990*, Vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.120.

tance, including both economic and military assistance, which may be required to counter the Soviet threat.”²⁶

In April 1948, a National Security Council paper, NSC 9, proposed that the U.S. associate itself with the recently formed Brussels Treaty Organization and until such a time as a defense agreement was signed, declare that an armed attack against any of the BTO signatories to be an armed attack against the U.S. The JCS, however, was not too happy with NSC-9. They felt that military commitments should only be taken after commensurate increases in appropriations and military potential had been made, as well as authorization for necessary civilian and industrial readiness. There was yet a further mention of a German contribution in April when Denfeld recommended a change to the draft of NSC-9/1, which would add a new paragraph that would allow “when circumstances permitted,” other countries such as Germany to be invited to “adhere to the Five-Power Treaty and the Defense Agreement.” NSC-9/1 was withdrawn and replaced by NSC 9/2 with a somewhat different thrust.²⁷ The JCS, however, reinserted Denfeld’s words and the newer version was approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 19 May 1948. NSC-9/2 concluded that the President was prepared to authorize U.S. participation in the London Five-Power

²⁶ The text of General Wedemeyer’s study, Dept of Army, P&O, Study, 19 March 1948, is found in RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 840.00, Box 5651 and the JCS version of that paper is dated 18 March 1948. I am unable to account for the discrepancy in the dates of the two papers but it is obvious that the JCS paper was derived from General Wedemeyer’s staff study. It appears from the available archival documentation that this study became JSPC 876, dated 21 April 1948, found in RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 092 Western Europe, 1948-1950, Box 89, NARA. Emphasis added.

²⁷ JCS-1868/4, 1 May 1948, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 092 Western Europe, 1948-50, Box 89, NARA.

military talks on a non-member basis.²⁸

A few weeks later, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall told the NSC, most likely in reference to NSC 9/1, that any agreement with the Western Union regarding European defense should leave the possibility of German accession open. The NSC, however, in line with President Truman's thoughts, found the question of German participation in Europe's defense premature.²⁹ Nonetheless, on 23 June, Undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, wrote Secretary of Defense James Forrestal that the provision of NSC-9/2 for the U.S. to associate itself with the BTO should be carried out and requested that he be informed who was being sent and how soon.

A further revision to NSC 9/2, NSC 9/3 acknowledged the Vandenberg Resolution but was otherwise identical to its predecessor. It was approved by the President on 2 July 1948 and one week later, on 8 July, Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer was selected to lead the U.S. delegation to the military arm of the BTO, the Western Union Military Committee. The small group led by Lemnitzer was to participate on a non-membership basis to discuss military plans and draw up a tentative, coordinated supply plan.³⁰ That said, it was not until 15 July that the U.S. received a formal invitation from the Chairman of the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission, Gladwyn Jebb, to send American military experts to participate in the work of the

²⁸ NSC 9/2, 11 May 1948, *Op. cit.*

²⁹ JCS 1868/6, 19 May 1948, Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and other Free Countries, RG 218, *Ibid*, Sect. 2. See also Martin, *Op. cit.*, p. 648.

³⁰ (TS) 091752Z NCR 17175, 9 July 1948, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 5, File: Western Union, Jul-Oct 1948, NARA. DELWU 4, 23 July 1948 indicated that Canada would also participate as a non-member, *Loc. cit.*

Western Union's military committee.³¹

It was the French, however, who took credit for initiating the invitation. According to Jefferson Caffery, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, he had been shown in strict confidence the draft of a document on French views concerning the security problems of the Western democracies that was to be sent to Foreign Minister George Bidault once it had been cleared by Prime Minister Robert Schuman and Minister of National Defense Pierre Henri Tietgen. The key elements of the draft were that France saw Germany as an eventual threat but saw the Soviet Union as an actual threat but one whose intentions were unclear and difficult to define. It was this threat and Western Europe's current weakness that led France to believe that cooperation with the United States was imperative, hence the invitation to participate in the Western Union's Military Committee as observers. In return, however, France wanted to be admitted to the U.S.-UK military commission.³²

At about the same time, Wedemeyer, now Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans & Combat Operations, travelled to Europe to appraise the situation created by the Berlin Blockade. He sent a cable to Undersecretary of the Army Kenneth Draper telling him of a meeting with Tietgen, Armed Forces Inspector General, General de Lattre de Tassigny, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, Generals Revers and Lecheres. Most significant from that meeting was Tietgen's acknowledgment that France recognized that there was "No purely German danger" at the time and

³¹ *JCS History - Glazer*, p. 366-367. See also London NIACT 3216, July 15, 1948 and Department of State Outgoing Telegram 2765, 16 July 1948, accepting the invitation to participate in the Western Union Military Committee, RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 840.00, Box 5649, NARA.

³² Paris 3646, 29 June 1948, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 6, Folder: Western Union, 1948, NARA.

that France was ready to accept the American view that the only real present danger was the Soviet Union.³³

Tietgen went on to say that the defense of Europe, which would be fought in Germany as far east as possible, required 60 divisions of which France was prepared to provide 25-30 in two years, but would need heavy materiel from outside. In addition, Tietgen warned that unless the U.S. guaranteed assistance, the French people, sensing defeat, would turn to communism and the “internal battle” would be lost. As the French government had ordered a stand on the Rhine until the last man, he asked “What will the U.S. do?” Bidault explained that because France was governed by Roman law, written and signed guarantees were of extreme importance.

A few weeks later, Wedemeyer cabled Bradley and Major General Ray Maddocks, Director of the Army’s Plans & Operations Division, with an appraisal of European personnel and their thoughts. Wedemeyer repeated that French had definitely decided to fight as far east of the Rhine as possible and that Field Marshall Montgomery had told him the French planned on raising 45 divisions if appropriate equipment could be made available.

Wedemeyer also reported that Montgomery had told him the British had been ordered to fight east of the Rhine or to use the Rhine as an obstacle; no retreat was allowed nor could there be a retreat to a peripheral strategy - the Rhine had to be held and as the Allies grew stronger, the defensive line would move further to the east. Montgomery also felt that the five-nation Western Union should immediately appoint a British officer as Supreme Commander but that should war occur, the Su-

³³ Memorandum of Conversation, General Wedemeyer - Mr. Draper, 26 June 1948, RG 218, Chairman’s File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 6, *Op. cit.*

preme Commander should be an American.³⁴ The JCS agreed that a defense of the Rhine required a Supreme Commander and if the Western Union wanted an American officer for that position, it would be given to Clay.³⁵ A few days later, Lemnitzer recommended that the U.S. delegation to the Western Union remain as the association was both necessary and highly desirable. The U.S. presence, he said, had had a notably good effect and a great ability to influence planning.³⁶

In mid-August, the U.S. and the UK Chiefs of Staff reached an agreement that due to the plethora of additional duties imposed on Clay as the U.S. Military Governor in West Germany, he could not serve as the Supreme Commander for Western Europe. It was therefore suggested that the Supreme Commander be a French officer who was to be supplied with an integrated staff. The two Chiefs of Staff also agreed to appoint an Allied Commander-in-Chief for Western Europe and suggested either Field Marshalls Montgomery or Alexander or French General Juin.³⁷

During the last few days of August, a meeting of senior officers from the Department of Defense - the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and senior civilian officials - met in Newport Rhode Island. While the discussions ranged wide over a number of issues pertaining to the services, it focused at one point on the appointment of a Su-

³⁴ (TS) L-1370, 11 July 1948, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 5, *Op. cit.* A 17 June report by the British Joint Services Mission on the result of talks with the U.S. JCS, confirmed the British determination to hold the Rhine but stated that the U.S. envisaged withdrawal to the Pyrenees in order to retain a foothold on the continent. JSM 496, 17 June 1948, RG 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic Files, 092 Western Europe, Box 89, NARA.

³⁵ (TS) WAR 86482, 27 July 1948, *Op. cit.*

³⁶ DELWU 9, 31 July 1948, *Op. cit.*

³⁷ Enclosure to SM10699, 16 August 1948, Memorandum for Admirals Leahy and Denfield and Generals Bradley and Vandenberg. See also Attachment to SM 10764, 24 August 1948, Memorandum for the JCS Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 6, NARA.

preme Allied Commander for Europe. Secretary of Defense Forrestal felt that the appointment of Eisenhower would be a clear indication to the USSR of the consequences of going to war and probably the only way to avoid war. Wedemeyer, however, countered that Eisenhower's appointment would compel the United States to send additional forces to Europe and mentioned that the current U.S. war plan focused on the Middle East. Wedemeyer also volunteered that under conditions at that time, the U.S. would be unable to fight a successful war in Europe for a period of one year to eighteen months.³⁸

Toward the end of September, Lovett sent an *Aide Memoire* to the French advising them that on 16 July, the JCS had authorized Clay to participate in the formation of a joint planning staff for the purpose of planning coordinated operations for the withdrawal to and defense of the Rhine. The three allied Commanders-in-Chief, however, were already engaged in that planning process in Wiesbaden, Germany.³⁹ At about the same time, the JCS advised the Western Union Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Western Union would not have any control over U.S. strategic air forces, as they would report directly to the JCS.⁴⁰ Actually, from the tenor of the traffic between the JCS and the U.S. delegation to the Western Union, it appears that the U.S. had no real problem in giving operational control of U.S. forces to the Western Union in the event of war. What the JCS wanted, however, was evidence of complet-

³⁸ Newport Meeting Minutes, 20-22 August 1948, RG 335, Undersecretary of the Army (Draper/Voorhees) Decimal File, Box 10, NARA.

³⁹ The authorization was contained in WAR 85967, 16 July 1948, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 6, Folder: Germany. See also the attachment to Memorandum for the JCS, Command Structure for Western Europe, 30 September 1948, *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ WARX 89860, 24 September 1948, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 5.

ed operational plans so that a timely decision could be made at government level.⁴¹

At the first meeting of the newly established Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee in early October, Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, the Western Union's Chief of Staff, privately told General A. Franklin Kibler, who had replaced Lemnitzer as head of the U.S. delegation, that contrary to previous assertions, under the then existing conditions all available British army forces would be sent to the Middle East at the outbreak of war and not to Europe! Kibler apparently responded by telling Tedder that before the U.S. could make any commitment to the defense of Western Europe, it needed to be assured that the Western Union had a sound defense plan and that they were doing the maximum to help themselves and each other improve their capabilities.⁴²

In November, the U.S. was also invited to participate in the Western Union's Committee on Equipment and Armament. Both invitations - to participate in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Equipment and Armament Committee - were approved and Kibler was named to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Nonetheless, the U.S. remained adamant that participation in all these committees would be on a non-member basis as the U.S. would not join the Western Union.⁴³ Kibler, however, rec-

⁴¹ See, for example, WARX 81100, 7 December 1948, *Ibid.*

⁴² (TS) DELWU 70, 6 October 1948, and DELWU 72, 7 October 1948, *Op. cit.*

⁴³ See London, 4525, October 15, 1948, as well as a series of letters between Robert E. Lovett and James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, dated 22 October 1948, 27 October 1948, 16 November 1948, 18 December 1948, 4 January 1949, and Department of State Outgoing Telegram 4741, 23 December 1948, accepting the invitations to participate in the Western Union Chiefs of Staff and Equipment and Armament Committees, all in RG 59, Central Decimal Files, File 840.00, Box 5649, NARA. Western Union was the name given to the military organization of the Brussels Treaty Organization. At the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, French General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was quoted as saying "It is an indication of courage and an act of faith in itself that the CinC's Committee are meeting to plan a defense for

ommended to the JCS that when important U.S. policy decisions or announcements affecting the Western Union were made, a high-ranking JCS officer should be present at the Western Union Chiefs of Staff meetings.⁴⁴

Also in the fall of 1948, an Army initiated study set out a number of basic and additional assumptions, most of which were almost utopian, but nonetheless were used to determine whether or not the defense of Western Europe could be successful undertaking. The basic assumptions put forth were: (a) it was cheaper and more effective for the security of the United States to give the West Europeans the capability to defend themselves; (b) if attacked, the West European nations will defend themselves to the utmost, and (c) that a program of rearming Western Europe would be initiated not later than 1 January 1949.⁴⁵

The additional assumptions put forth were that (a) the defense of Western Europe was possible if a strong rearmament program was initiated by the West European nations with U.S. aid; (b) that the West European nations included the United Kingdom, France Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West Germany and Austria (Denmark, Norway and Sweden were considered “possible” but for the most part, viewed in a separate category); (c) West European nations would develop an organization that would be able to coordinate and utilize their combined strengths; (d) the European Recovery (Marshall) Plan would continue to a successful conclusion; and (e)

which they have not the means.” DELWU 75, 13 October 1948, RG 218, Geographic File, 092 Western Europe, Box 91, NARA.

⁴⁴ (TS) DELWU 94, 1 November 1948, RG 218, Chairman’s File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, *Op. cit.*

⁴⁵ These assumptions and the following are found in *the Defense of Western Europe* 10th draft, 27 September 1948, RG 335, Records of the Undersecretary of the Army (Draper/Voorhees), Decimal Files, 1947-1950, Box 10, NARA.

that the combined productive efforts of Western Europe and the United States would be sufficient to provide enough armament to make defense practical and effective.

The study assumed that the Soviet Union and its allies would attack without warning; that they would have sufficient stockpiles of materiel to conduct operations for nine months, and that military operations would be conducted primarily on land and with conventional weapons, at least until 1955. Lastly, the study's allied assumptions began by assuming that the allies would use the atomic bomb; that the Western Union would have already agreed on weapons and equipment standardization; that each nation would have pooled its existing production capability and would contribute its fair share. It also assumed that U.S. equipment requirements would be based on a force of 25 divisions plus reserves, and lastly, that equipping and rearming would not have prohibitively affected the civilian economies of either the West European nations or the United States. The study stated that it was purely an Army study but nevertheless, made the assumption that sufficient air support would exist to ensure at least tactical air equality.

West Europe's Defense Needs Appraised

To defend Western Europe, it was determined the most practical and advantageous defense line, which would run from the North Sea to the Adriatic would be to the west and south of the line Rhine River-Lake Constance-high Alps-Piave River - a total distance of 887 miles. To defend this line against an enemy force that was determined to be 50 divisions strong on D-Day, increasing to approximately 100 divisions by D-Day plus 30, an Allied force of 78 divisions - 57 in the Northern Group of Armies and 21 in

the Alps Group of Armies - would be needed.⁴⁶ To achieve this force, the study looked at available manpower both under arms and total manpower (15-49 years of age) available. The numbers provided in the study indicated that as of 1 August 1948 there were 2.4 million men already under arms, excluding West Germany, or the equivalent of 61½ divisions but that they lacked mobility, signal communications, anti-aircraft artillery and ammunition. When total available manpower was addressed, it was found that there were 59.7 million men between 15 and 49 available of which 19.8 million were already trained reserves (9.6 million men and 4.0 million reserves were German).

From the above, the study concluded that there was no shortage of manpower or trained reserves and that the defense of Western Europe along the Rhine-Alps line could be effective. It also concluded that, given the initial assumptions, the Allies could field 60 divisions by 1 October 1948 and build up to a grand total of 96 divisions by 1 January 1953. The cost of this build-up to the U.S. in surplus military stocks, to include processing, handling, and transport was estimated to total \$14 billion.⁴⁷

The dreary outlook for the defense of Western Europe continued to be the main theme in November as well when the JSPC sent a memo to General Gruenther confirming the findings of an earlier Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee report indicating that as West Germany would not be in any position to assist in checking a Soviet advance

⁴⁶ A breakdown of these 78 divisions was as follows: United Kingdom - 12; France - 30; Belgium & Luxembourg - 7; U.S. (in W. Germany) - 1-1/2; Switzerland - 5; Italy - 10; Spain - 5; U.S. (in Austria and Trieste) - 1/2. Combined they would make 16 armored divisions, 52 infantry divisions, 4 airborne divisions and 6 reinforced mountain divisions.

⁴⁷ The total build-up was envisaged as being 70 divisions by 1 January 1949, 76 divisions by 1 January 1950, 80 divisions by 1 January 1951, 86 divisions by 1 January 1952 and finally 96 divisions by 1 January 1953. This is very close to the Force Goals program developed at the 1952 NATO Summit in Portugal of 92 divisions.

for many years, there was no question of holding West Germany with the forces available. Allied forces would have to withdraw to assist in the defense of the Rhine. The defense of Italy and Trieste was not contemplated. The line to be held was the Ijssel-Rhine-Franco-Italian border on the Mediterranean.

The JSPC memo essentially agreed with the Western Union report but felt that the ability to hold the Rhine for any length of time was questionable and that the key aim should be the deployment of forces in such a manner as to delay the Soviets for as long as possible. A few days later, a joint U.S.-British intelligence report on Soviet Intentions and Capabilities stated that the West Germans could be neither relied upon nor expected to provide military support as they continued to harbor some hostility against the West. Maps accompanying the report showed Soviet forces on the English Channel in the vicinity of Amsterdam in D+10 and at the Franco-Spanish border at D+60.⁴⁸

As 1948 drew to a close, the Secretary of the Army travelled to Germany, Austria and Trieste. In a paper entitled "Things to do on Trip," a series of notes indicated that he was to discuss with Clay the rearming of Germans in the West Zone, a centralized West German police force, Kennan's study on the withdrawal to the perimeters of the Occupation Zones, and the moving of U.S. supply depots to ports in France.⁴⁹

Distrust of Germany was again made manifest when, stemming from the May 1948 London Conference that reaffirmed the disarmament of Germany, a Military Securi-

⁴⁸ The Western Union report is C.O.S.(48) 200 (0), "Short Term Strategic Aims in Europe at the Outbreak of War," 8 September 1948, RG 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File 092 Western Europe, 1948-50, Box 90, NARA. See also JSPC Memorandum to General Gruenther, 1 November 1948 and A.B.A.I.S.5 (American-British Agreed Intelligence), 9 November 1948, *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ "Things to do on Trip," 9 December 1948, RG 335, Undersecretary of the Army (Draper/Voorhees) Decimal File 1947-50, Box 8, NARA.

ty Board was appointed on 10 December to “ensure observance of clearly-worded laws regarding disarmament and demilitarization.” Its task was to further ensure that “the development of general activity in Germany, the purpose of which is economic and political recovery, is not deflected from its peaceful aims, and does not create significant war potentials.” The board was composed of a Commission of three general officers, one from each of the allied occupying powers (France, UK and U.S.), representing the respective Military Governors, a Committee of Deputies, and three divisions: Military, Industrial, and Scientific Research. Within each division, national elements of each of the three powers were represented and tasked with working in a coordinated manner to ensure compliance, make recommendations, and report any violations.⁵⁰

At the same time, and as indicated in Chapter 3 above, rumors of German rearmament began circulating in the German and foreign press. Also, as a result of earlier discussions between Secretary of the Army Royall, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and General Clay, a staff study was initiated in the Army’s Plans and Operations Division/Policy Branch on the subject of a German Police Force for the Western Zones that recommended the establishment of a centralized police force. Undersecretary of the Army Draper wrote Clay asking for his thoughts. Assistant Secretary of the Army, Tracy

⁵⁰ Major General James P. Hodges, “Formula for Peace -- The Military Security Board,” *Information Bulletin*, 17 May 1948, pp. 5-6. The three Commissioners were the author, representing the U.S., Engineer General Etienne Paskiewicz (France), and Major General V.J.E. Westropp (UK). See also Marguerite Higgins, “Disarming of Germans Set Up,” *New York Herald Tribune*, December 31, 1948, RG 335, Undersecretary of the Army (Draper/Voorhees) Decimal File 1947-50, Box 8, Folder: 334 Misc/MilSecBd, NARA.

Voorhees cautioned that any indication that “we are forming the nucleus of a German army” had to be avoided. Secretary Royall, however, overruled the conclusions.⁵¹

NATO and the Growing German Question

1949 was a watershed year for the United States and the U.S. military establishment. As mentioned in chapter 3 above, on 4 April 1949, after a long series of negotiations with the Western Union member-nations, Canada, and five other West European governments, the United States became one of 12 signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. Five months later, in September, the Federal Republic of Germany came into being and the question of Germany’s military potential now became an explicit Cold War issue. *Le Monde*, the French newspaper commented that “the rearming of Germany is contained in the Atlantic Pact like the yolk in an egg.”⁵²

NATO was, in its formative year, according to Paul Nitze, “a North American political commitment to the defense of Europe rather than a framework for a military organization.” Although functional, the initial NATO organization was cumbersome and diffuse. Each member nations’ forces were assigned tasks for which they appeared best suited in one or several Regional Planning Groups. There was, however, no command organization.⁵³

Furthermore, Allied response to Soviet military strength was hesitant and re-

⁵¹ Memorandum for Director, Plans and Operations Division, Subject: German Police Force for Western Zones, 26 October 1948 and Letter, Personal to Clay from SAOUS, 10 December 1948, RG 335, Undersecretary of the Army (Draper/Voorhees) Decimal File 1947-50, Box 10.

⁵² Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 113. The first members of NATO were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Ismay, *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁵³ *JCS History - Glazer*, Vol. IV, 1950-52, pp. 180-183. See, for example, the NATO organizational chart as of December 1949 in Ismay, *Op. cit.*, p. 26. NATO really did not become an “organization” until it was reorganized in 1951.

strained. The West European allies refused to divert funds from rebuilding and economic programs to build up their militaries. In February, for example, General Clarence Huebner, CINCEUCOM, discussed the need for a defense organization inside the upcoming NATO organization. He pointed out that in the ten months since the Brussels Treaty Organization had been in existence, it had been impossible for the members to reach any agreement on the contribution of forces for the defense of Western Europe. Not only that, they refused to guarantee that they would even provide forces on any particular date in the future. Huebner stated that as a result, U.S. occupation forces, which represented an insignificant number of the total forces needed and available, took on an exaggerated place in the planning process and thinking of the Western Union. The British, for example, refused to give an estimate of their force contribution until they were assured that the continental countries would put up sufficient forces to make a defense of the Rhine possible.⁵⁴

Even the U.S. Congress was slow to appropriate monies to assist the Allies. As of April 1950, for example, only \$42 Million out of a promised \$1.3 Billion Military Development Assistance Plan (MDAP) had been spent. U.S. strategy, which also became NATO strategy, continued to be one of 'liberation' following a Soviet attack, and evacuation to a line behind the Pyrenees remained the ground forces' only option. It was hoped, however, that with the presence of even the few U.S. troops available acting as a 'trip wire,' U.S. nuclear capability would deter the Soviets from

⁵⁴ (TS) SX 1498, 10 February 1949 and (TS) DELWU 65, 1 March 1949, RG 218, Chairman's File, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, *Op. cit.*

attacking at all.⁵⁵ As of 1 July 1949, those ‘few’ occupation troops in Germany amounted to one and two-thirds divisions and 175 aircraft.⁵⁶

During discussions between the JCS and the British Chief of Staff in August 1949, for example, the JCS reiterated that the U.S. could either support the Cairo-Suez area or keep a toe-hold in Europe on the Rhine. Once NATO became effective, however, the JCS indicated that holding further east might be a possibility. If that was not possible, however, the U.S. would be prepared to return to Europe as soon as possible.⁵⁷ It should be remembered that OFFTACKLE, the then operable EWP, conceded most of West Europe to the Soviets, and focused on securing the United Kingdom and protecting the Mediterranean littoral while looking to French Morocco to serve as the initial assembly point for U.S. forces. Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, told Air Marshal Lord Tedder that it would take three months for the U.S. to get forces to the Rhine, but only if it was evident the Rhine could be held. Otherwise, U.S. forces would go elsewhere and hold the enemy at the Pyrenees. It was still believed that it would take 24 months after the beginning of the war to be able to make an attempt to defeat Soviet forces on the European continent.⁵⁸

All in all, there was little talk of defending Western Europe, much less West Germany until late 1949. In fact, and as will be seen below, it was only after the out-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116. For an excellent account of Congress, MDAP and German rearmament, see Birtle, *Op. cit.*

⁵⁶ *JCS History-Glazer*, Vol. II, p. 373.

⁵⁷ 3 August 1949, Agenda for Discussion with British Chief of Staff, RG 218, Central Decimal Files, Box 132, Folder CCS 337 (7-22-48) S. 1, NARA.

⁵⁸ 4 Oct 49-DM-205, U.S.-UK-Canadian Planning Matters, and 5 October 1949, Meeting between CJCS Bradley and Air Marshall Lord Tedder, *Loc. cit.* See also *JCS History - Glazer*, Vol. IV, pp. 162-163.

break of the Korean War in 1950 plans for the defense of Western Europe were developed by NATO. Furthermore, as West Germany was not considered part of the North Atlantic Treaty area, there was no obligation on the part of either NATO or the Western Union to defend her.⁵⁹

1950 - Year of Decision

In mid-January 1950, a lengthy background study entitled “U.S. Policy Respecting the Disarmament and Demilitarization of the Federal German Republic” was used by the Army’s G-3/Plans Division/International Branch to answer a broad spectrum of questions.⁶⁰ The questions covered German participation in the defense of Western Europe, Soviet use of armed forces being created in East Germany, West German political reliability, the psychological effects on other West European countries as a result of German rearmament, and the ability of the Allies to control German rearmament.

The answers provided indicated that the provision of German troops in a war against the USSR offered several advantages, not least among which was their singular experience in being the only West Europeans to have fought against the Soviets. Combined with fact they would be fighting to protect their own soil and as “comrades-in-arms” with the Western powers and not as a defeated nation, it was believed that their fighting qualities would not be exceeded by any other West European force. It was further determined that unless industrial restrictions were lifted, Ger-

⁵⁹ For two of the exceptions, see Greiner, *Op. cit.*, pp. 150-158, and Oliver Palkowitsch, “Westliche Verteidigungsstrategie,” *Militärgeschichte*, Heft 4/2005, pp. 18-21.

⁶⁰ Tab “A,” “U.S. Policy Respecting the Disarmament and Demilitarization of the Federal German Republic,” RG 319, Army - Operations Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 20, NARA.

many would not be in a position to contribute what would be necessary to a reconstituted armed force.

The study went on to indicate that over seven million German men were considered fit for military service and that given the training many underwent in the *Wehrmacht*, they would be fit for military service after a relatively short period of refresher training. In addition, the study found the German male to be “temperamentally well-suited for military service” with a fighting ability “judged to be among the highest in the world,” making him without equal in Western Europe.

The disadvantages were, first and foremost, the belief that a remilitarized Germany would be a provocation to the Soviet Union and that it would end any possible Franco-German rapprochement. The study also underscored a belief that, considering Germany’s past history, any permission to rearm would see the Germans rearming as rapidly (either secretly or overtly) to the fullest extent the international community would allow. The study concluded, however, that once the armed strength of the West European powers was rebuilt, then and only then could some form of German defense participation be considered.

There was also a favorable consensus in the study regarding German reliability, with respect to both the armed forces and the State.⁶¹ The study indicated that with the establishment of a German armed force, the government would insist that its status as a defeated enemy nation end and that there would most likely be demands

⁶¹ Ironically, although much effort had been put into assuring the Allies that former Nazis would not become part of the new German military, this never became a concern of either the U.S. or British military staffs. The Germans also set up a “Personnel Screening Board” (*Personalgutachterausschuss*) and an “Acceptance Organization” (*Annahme Organization*) to vet applicants. See Corum, “Adenauer, Amt Blank...” *Op. cit.*, pp. 45-48. See also John L. Sutton, “The Personal Screen Committee and the Parliamentary Control of West German Armed Forces,” *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XIX, Jan 1960, pp. 389-401.

for a peace treaty and full sovereignty. It also indicated that the government could possibly threaten to align itself with the USSR if its demands were not met, but it doubted that these threats would be carried out given that West German's leaders were considered traitors by the Soviets, and that West Germans, according to the study, were strongly opposed to communism and hated and feared the Soviets.

The study concluded that a) given the expected political repercussions in the European countries, France in particular, it was not yet time to consider rearming Germany; b) long-range strategic plans should, however, consider a part for German armed forces in the defense of Western Europe; and c) accordingly, "careful political and psychological preparations should be put into motion to make the execution of this program palatable to the peoples [of Western Europe]."

The JCS Speaks Out

It appears that by this time, the State Department was becoming well aware of the Pentagon's interest in rearming West Germany. In early April, a Lieutenant Colonel Daley, G-3/Plans Division/International Branch wrote a staff study on "Possible Contributions by Germany to her own Security" for informal distribution to the JSSC, the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Military Affairs, Operations Division/Joint War Plans Branch and to Colonel Byroade at the State Department.

The study cited all the limitations posed by the U.S. and Allies on the creation of a German armed force and a centralized Police Force/Gendarmerie. It cited Senate Bill, SB-2269, which, if passed, would have authorized up to 10,000 aliens (Germans) to enlist in the U.S. Armed Forces. It also cited West Germany's logistic con-

tribution to support the occupying powers, which was in the region of \$600 - \$700 million, more than the total defense budget of some of the West European nations. Colonel Daley concluded that a decision was needed whether Germany was to be armed or not.⁶²

In mid-April 1950, in preparation for Tripartite meeting in London the following month, the Department of State had, as part of the normal coordination process between departments, given the JCS a number of papers for review. It was noted by the JSSC in a memo to the Director of the Joint Staff that there was no mention in those papers of German rearmament as an element of U.S. policy.⁶³ A few days later, Army G-2 (Intelligence) commented on an Army General Staff staff study with the recommendation that a paragraph in the General Summary be re-written to remove an implicit tone of criticism. The suggested rewrite was:

It is well to reexamine the political basis for United States policy of disarmament. The present United States Policy Directive for Mr. McCloy is to insure that "the country (Germany) will not be a threat to the independence of other nations or the peace of the world." The basis for this policy would appear to be invalid. In order to attempt to avert a possible (but unproven) long-term threat to the peace of the world (a rearmed Germany) the Western Powers are denying themselves material help in off-setting a definite known present threat -- Soviet Russia. Recognizing the political difficulties which must be overcome in order to profit by a German contribution to the security of Western Europe, the goal would appear to be an armed Germany. With such a decision, steps should be taken toward the objective of a major German contribution to the Security of Western Eu-

⁶² Staff Study, "Possible Contributions by Germany to her own Security," 7 April 1950, G-3/Plans Division/International Branch, RG 319, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Decimal File, 1950-1951, Box 94, NARA.

⁶³ Memo, JSSC to Director, Joint Staff, 18 April 1950, RG 218, Central Decimal Files, Box 134, NARA.

rope.⁶⁴

On 2 May, the Joint Staff made their first, unequivocal statement regarding their position on German rearmament. In a memo to the Secretary of Defense, regarding the draft of a Department of State paper entitled “The Problem of Germany,” the JCS stated that they are:

*...firmly of the opinion that, from a military point of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe against the USSR. In order to insure that the energy and resources of the German people become a source of constructive strength to the free world rather than again becoming a menace, either independently or with the USSR primarily, the present disarmament and demilitarization policy with respect to Western Germany should be changed. The Western Germans should, as soon as possible, be given real and substantial opportunity to participate in Western European and North Atlantic regional arrangements.*⁶⁵

This paper, originally State FM D A-2/3b (McCloy’s paper), had been forwarded to the JCS for comment/concurrence in preparation for the May Foreign Ministers Conference in London. JCS concurred but recommended the addition of “previously expressed JCS views on German rearmament and export controls.” As mentioned above, State had refused to incorporate those views in an earlier paper (*Protest to Soviet Union Concerning East German Militarized Police*), because State felt these views should have first been discussed in the NSC. The JCS felt that even though a reiteration of its views

⁶⁴ “TAB “A” Comment on Modification of U.S. Policy with Respect to German Disarmament,” 21 April 1950, RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1950-1951, Box 20, NARA.

⁶⁵ Derived from JCS 2124/2, 10 May 1950, Enclosure “A,” RG 319, Assistant Chief of Staff/G-3, Operations, Records Section, Decimal File, March 1950-51, Box 94, NARA. Emphasis added.

would not alter State's position, it was necessary and appropriate to repeat them for the record, which they did in JCS 2124/2 (see quotation above).⁶⁶

On 8 June, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, the views of the Joint Staff on the subject of "United States Policy toward Germany" were made known in NSC-71. In this document, the JCS repeated comments made in late April 1950 in which they underscored their belief that U.S. disarmament policy prevented Germany from contributing to the strength of the North Atlantic community. While the JCS comments focused on Germany's economic strength, pointing out its value to the West and the importance of denying it to the USSR, it stressed that before further progress could be made toward developing Western Germany into a valuable asset to the Western European and North Atlantic communities, France needed to be prevailed upon to agree to modify the overly restrictive controls on German industry.

The NSC document repeated the 2 May JCS statement regarding the early rearming of Western Germany and concluded with the following recommendation "that the United States adopt the following policy:

Bring about recognition by the Western European nations, particularly France, of the necessity of changing the present disarmament and demilitarization policy with respect to Western Germany so that Western Germany can contribute effectively to the security of Western Europe.

It is recognized that the political and psychological in Western Europe will have to be overcome if the present Allied policy is changed. Pressure should be brought on France to insure that unilateral action by France, such as that recently taken by France regarding the Saar Basin, is not repeated but that France be persuaded to recognize that

⁶⁶ Memo to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: The Problem of Germany (JCS 2124/2), 10 May 1950, RG 319, Assistant Chief of Staff/G-3, Operations, Records Section, Decimal File, March 1950-51, Box 94, (Sec. I-C) (Book I) (Case II Only), NARA.

the USSR is a greater menace to the independence of France than is Germany.⁶⁷

The document concluded with the JCS again strongly urging the Foreign Ministers of the three Allied powers to approve the recommendation of the three High Commissioners and authorize Western Germany to have a 5,000-man Federal Police Force.

The Korean War Begins

At the end of June, most likely in reaction to the North Korean attack on South Korea that had taken place five days earlier, Bradley wrote a memorandum to Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff. In this document, Bradley stated that he had been thinking for some time about making a study on the rearming of Western Germany. "If our Chiefs feel that steps should be taken toward the rearming of Western Germany, I believe we should make a specific recommendation to the President to this effect." Bradley felt it unrealistic to continue talking about building up the defense of Western Europe "without facing up to this subject of at least partially rearming Western Germany."⁶⁸

The Department of State responded to the JCS's comments in NSC-71 in the first week of July. Their lengthy response appeared to reflect the anti-German biases of George Kennan and others in the State Department at the time and ignored the Defense Department's oft repeated statement of 2 May that they believed "...the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe...." The State Department's response significantly down-

⁶⁷ NSC-71, June 8, 1950, RG 218, Geographic File 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4, Box 25, NARA. The JCS had urged approval of the Federal Police Force on 17 May 1950.

⁶⁸ Memorandum for Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, 30 June 1950, RG 218, Chairman's File, General Bradley 1949-53, Box 1.

played the JCS's statement stating that "It is understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not pressing for the immediate rearmament of Western Germany, but rather recognizing the political conditions, are urging that steps be taken to create conditions in Europe under which agreement could be obtained from all concerned on this question."⁶⁹

The State Department's response went on to say that all were agreed, i.e., the U.S., French and British governments, that Germany had to be quickly brought into a close and firm association with the West, but it had to be done in such a way as to ensure her commitment to the West. The response continued that the London Tripartite and recent North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings concluded that Germany's rearmament and inclusion in NATO was "premature to the point where profitable discussion cannot yet be held...." It also stated that the majority of Germans did not want an armed force and that they did not feel their government was truly representative. More time was needed, it continued, to "develop democratic tendencies on the part of the German people and a more responsive form of government." It cautioned that arming the Germans would reverse the progress made by France and that the Germans, already contributing 22-percent of their budget to cover occupation costs could hardly contribute more.

It briefly addressed the possibility of the production of "non-ordnance" items in Germany for NATO forces and alluded to the possibility that a rearmed Germany "could not yet be counted on with reasonable certainty." Lastly, the response stated

⁶⁹ NSC-71/1, July 3, 1950, can be found in either RG 218, Geographic File 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4) Box 25 or RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091. Germany, Box 21, NARA.

that after building up strength in the West, and before seeking to rearm Germany, “we shall probably wish to make a further effort to reunify Germany.”

Three days later, after reviewing both NSC-71 and 71/1, the Secretary of the Army wrote the Secretary of Defense that in view of the possible world-wide implications of the Korean situation, the United States “should avail itself of at least a part of the industrial and military manpower potential of Western Germany...through controlled rearmament.” He recommended that the Secretary of Defense should take that position in NSC discussions and that the NSC staff prepare papers to that, to include dissenting views. His proposal also included the controlled rearmament of Japan and the need to firmly control the export of strategic items to the Soviet-controlled areas.⁷⁰

Later that month, General Thomas Handy, who had replaced Huebner as CINCEUCOM, wrote a letter to General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, describing a conversation he had had with McCloy a few days earlier in which the subject of German rearmament had come up. McCloy told Handy that in a conversation with Chancellor Adenauer, Adenauer stated that in case of war, the West Germans should have some form of organization that could assist in the defense of their country. He spoke in terms of a defensive force of approximately 250,000 men in 10 divisions and indicated that the East Germans did not have that problem as they in fact have an army in the form of their *Bereitschaftspolizei*.

Handy continued that he told McCloy he had given much thought to the subject as the “successful defense of Western Europe was extremely difficult, if not im-

⁷⁰ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Germany (NSC 71, NSC 71/1), 6 Jul 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091. Germany, Box 22, NARA.

possible, without German assistance.” His studies, Handy continued, brought him to the same goal as the Chancellor. Handy pointed out the JCS position had been made in a number of papers but that it had not been accepted by the NSC. While McCloy stated he could not support the rearmament of Germany at this time, he suggested a three-phased approach that would gradually bring us to the same point. McCloy then suggested the following:

- a. Phase one, an additional 10,000 German Industrial Police be recruited;
- b. Phase two, institute military training in all Industrial Police units to include training as a cadre for Germany military organizations;
- c. Phase three, the eventual organization of a West German Armed Force.

Handy then wrote that he had taken steps to increase the German Industrial Police by 10,000, with funds coming from the German Mark budget to which the Chancellor had agreed. Plans for the organizing, training, housing, etc., of the addition Industrial Police were progressing rapidly while some steps were being taken covertly. Handy included as an attachment to the letter a brief description of the EU-COM Labor Service/Industrial Police units and functions, and promised to keep General Collins informed.⁷¹

In a follow-up letter that same day, Handy told Collins he had received a series of telegrams between McCloy and Byroade which emphasized McCloy’s belief that Germans should be allowed to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. McCloy also wrote that once the 10,000 Industrial Police were absorbed, a further increase should be sought. Handy said it appeared that McCloy’s thinking regarding German rearm-

⁷¹ Letter, General Handy to General Collins, 19 July 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, From 091. France to 091. Germany, Box 20, NARA. The attachment indicated that there were 8,075 Industrial Police and 13,456 Labor Service units. It also indicated that action was underway to arm with carbines all 5,375 Technical Service personnel (a subset of the Labor Service), except those assigned medical and chaplain duties.

ament was changing in that he wrote “While my view is that we should make no plans to permit Germans to fight with us if an emergency arose, we should make no commitment in this regard unless we have the equipment and the means to enable them to effectively do so.”⁷²

Ironically, Byroade also sent the three cables to Collins on 20 July, asking him in the accompanying letter if he would designate an appropriate person in the Pentagon with whom he could talk about these cables. Byroade indicated that he was somewhat confused by them and felt, on the one hand, that McCloy did not yet have a clear concept. On the other hand, he stated that McCloy appeared to have very definite views about enlisting Germans in the U.S. armed forces and that if that were feasible, it might provide an option without taking the political decision to create a German armed force.⁷³

A few weeks later, in early August, Handy again wrote Collins, telling him that plans “for the organization, housing, employment, and training of the 10,000 additional industrial police are well along.” 1,000 had already been recruited and when he was queried regarding the issuance of arms to industrial police units, he answered only that the industrial police were being reorganized and issued small arms to make them more efficient. He wrote further that discussions with McCloy on this matter continued but that he disagreed with parts of a paper prepared in office of the High Commissioner that was dis-

⁷² This was a second Letter, General Handy to General Collins, 19 July 1950, *Loc. cit.*

⁷³ Letter, Colonel Byroade to General J. Lawton Collins, July 20, 1950, *Loc. cit.* The first of the three cable mentioned contained the gist of a report to McCloy and the French High Commissioner Poncet by the British High Commissioner Kirkpatrick of a discussion he held with Chancellor Adenauer regarding the need for some form of defensive capability for West Germany. Kirkpatrick raised the issue of an effective auxiliary force and Poncet felt that German service troops (Labor Service) with the U.S. Army could be increased and trained to fight in an emergency.

cussed at a conference in Frankfurt. Specifically, General Handy stated that he questioned the accuracy of statements regarding German unwillingness to support a German army and he disagreed with statements that it was undesirable or politically unfeasible to create national German armed forces “at this time.” Handy did not disagree with McCloy’s or the State Department’s approach that German rearmament was only possible within the context of a European army or any other approach that would make it politically feasible. However, he wrote, “I do feel that the use of German manpower, resources, and productive capacity is a prime necessity for the successful defense of Western Europe.”⁷⁴

On the same July day that Byroade wrote Collins, the JSSC sent a lengthy report on the rearmament of Germany to the JCS for passage to the Secretary of Defense. The report went to great lengths to counter the State Department’s response in NSC-71/1 and put the case for the necessity of rearming West Germany. The report indicated that despite the military aid the U.S. had already provided and continued to provide Western Europe, the lack of the West European nations’ military strength invited both subversion and attack by the USSR. The report argued that a certain amount of military strength must be available at the outset of any conflict and that this strength must relate to the defensive position to be held. Current forces in Western Europe were too small and neither the U.S. nor the UK were in a position to do more in the beginning stages of a war. Nor were the mobilization plans of the other West European countries such that they could mobilize in time to prevent being overrun by the USSR.

⁷⁴ Letter, General Thomas T. Handy, Commander-in-Chief, EUCOM to General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 9 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 22, 091-Germany, NARA.

The report continued indicating that even by 1954, when war might occur according to NATO plans, the planned strength of Alliance forces would still be insufficient without the addition of German forces. It pointed out that the agreed upon line of defense - the Ijssel-Rhine River - afforded no defense to Denmark or to one-third of the Netherlands, and that it sacrifices the industrial complex of the Ruhr while permitting the physical unification of Germany under the Soviets. The promise that occupation forces could protect West Germany was illusory without “substantial German military participation.”

It accepted that a risk could be incurred if the rearmament of Western Germany was not controlled and indicated that there would be no threat to West European unity as had been alleged in NSC-71/1, because “all of the military leaders of the Western European nations have expressed themselves privately in favor of controlled rearmament of Western Germany.” Although there was much more, the report concluded by recommending that with respect to the rearming of Germany, the President be advised that:

a. A successful defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack is not now possible nor is it likely to be possible by 1954 unless a rearmed Germany participates;

b. The United States Government should immediately press for a controlled rearmament of Western Germany and for the organization of an adequate federal police force for Western Germany as the initial phase of its rearmament program; and

c. If Western Germany is not to be rearmed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must revise their war plans and consider that the United States must rely on political measures rather than military measures for the protection of Western Europe against invasion.⁷⁵

The last week of July saw additional action regarding attempts to obtain a positive decision on German rearmament. General Charles Bolte, Assistant Chief of

⁷⁵ JCS 2124/9, 20 July 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091, Germany, Box 21, NARA.

Staff/Operation (G-3) wrote General Alfred M. Gruenther, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, about a discussion between General Cortland Schuyler, Chief of Plans and Policy Group, Army General Staff, and Byroade. Bolte told Gruenther that Byroade indicated that a number of State Department officers, particularly W. Averell Harriman, believed a decision to rearm Western Germany should be made and that Secretary of State Acheson was undecided but could conceivably be convinced to make this decision in the near future. Bolte went on to say that Byroade felt that those opposed to German rearmament, including himself, would be forced to accept it if the international situation continued to deteriorate. Byroade said that the State Department does not want to decide because "it means a resurgence of the military clique in Germany and the virtual abandonment of the hope for eventual development of a truly democratic government for West Germany."

Byroade also confirmed that the Department of State had given full approval to Handy's proposal to increase the Industrial Police by 10,000 and that they would attempt to obtain French and British concurrence. Bolte concluded from the above that it would be best to give Acheson more time to make up his mind before pushing too hard in the NSC for a decision on the German issue. If Acheson could get NSC support, Bolte surmised, it would be much easier to get Presidential approval.⁷⁶

Based on some of the objections and comments made by the Army Chief of Staff, but without changing the thrust of the argument, JCS 2124/9 was revised and the last paragraph, recommending the President be advised, read as follows:

⁷⁶ Memorandum for General Gruenther, Subject: Discussion with Col Byroade on German Rearmament, 25 July 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091, Germany, Box 21, NARA.

a. The early rearmament of Western Germany, seen in the light of the new United States program of increased military assistance for the countries of Western Europe, could contribute decisively to a successful defense of Western Europe. Without Western German forces, it will not be possible to hold the Ruhr which is vital to Western Europe;

b. The United States Government should immediately press for a controlled rearmament of Western Germany and for the organization of an adequate federal police force for Western Germany as the initial phase of its rearmament program; and

c. The question at this time is not none of whether we should risk the success of our political objectives vis-à-vis Western Germany, but rather whether or not we can afford to jeopardize the security of the United States by not utilizing all of the forces that are available to us.⁷⁷

On 1 August, Bolte sent a letter with an attached Staff Study to Gruenther informing him the Army G-3 staff had given the matter of a controlled rearmament of Western Germany a great deal of study and concluded that “*the only practical way...would be to provide for the entrance of Western Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization...to permit her to furnish her pro rata share of ground forces as her contribution to the collective security...of Western Europe.*” The Memorandum continued by stating that the objective was to establish an approved position within the NSC in order to conduct talks with the French and British. It further recommended that the attached staff study become the official Department of the Army position, that Gruenther discuss this matter with Averill Harriman and others at State and even provide them with a copy of the staff study, and that G-3 should be pre-

⁷⁷ JCS 2124/11, 27 July 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091, Germany, Box 21, NARA. The only available copy of this document indicates that additional changes may have been made to sub-paragraph b. and c., so that they would have read:

b. The United States Government should immediately press for a controlled rearmament of Western Germany and for the organization of an adequate federal police force *of at least 25,000 men* for Western Germany as the initial phase of its rearmament program; and

c. The question at this time is not none of whether we should risk the success of our political objectives vis-à-vis Western Germany, but rather whether or not we can afford to jeopardize the security of the United States *and of Western Europe* by not utilizing all of the forces that are available to us.

pared to use the staff study to make the necessary changes to JCS 2124/11.⁷⁸

What is of interest is that the staff study assumed, for its purposes, that the Departments of State and Defense were both in “entire agreement” that Western Germany had to be rearmed. It then concluded that various recommendations, i.e., enlistment of German aliens in the U.S. Army or the utilization of German “service troops” as a first step toward German rearmament should not be accepted. Nor should any other alternative method, such as the establishment of a European Army outside NATO or the Western Union defense organization or the absorption of German units into British, French or any other West European army be concurred with. It further concluded that the Department of Defense should no longer press for the establishment of a federal West German police force. It was unpalatable to the Department of State and no longer necessary since agreement had been reached on rearmament. The Department of Defense should instead exert all its efforts toward obtaining authorization for a controlled rearmament of Western Germany.

The study also concluded that the Department of Defense should immediately press for West Germany’s entrance into NATO and only after consultation with the Governments of Great Britain and France should there be a decision on the number of divisions to be furnished by West Germany and the exact nature of the controls to be placed on its rearmament. It suggested, however, that for planning purposes, 15 or

⁷⁸ Memorandum For: General Gruenther, Subject: Rearmament of Western Germany, 1 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany (Sect. 1C)(Book 1)(Case 12), NARA. In a handwritten note dated 5 August, on the bottom of the first page of the memo, General Gruenther wrote to General Schuyler “In view of your current discussions with State I assume you will notify me when it is again appropriate to raise this subject with JCS.” Emphasis added.

20 divisions should be provided.⁷⁹

Several days later, on 5 August, a conference was held at the State Department with Byroade representing the Office of German Affairs, and Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Mock and Major J. G. K. Miller representing the Department of the Army's G-3 Division.⁸⁰ Byroade, who had read the 1 August staff study, indicated that the Army misunderstood the Department of State's position regarding German rearmament. He stated that the Department of State was opposed to it unless there was a "proper political formula and organizational framework" that would be acceptable to the European powers, particularly France, and which would not jeopardize German internal political objectives. He stated further that public opinion polls taken in West Germany showed that the Germans were opposed to a German army but would accept service in a European army. He argued that the Army proposal appeared to be for the rearmament of a German national army, thus indicating that the views of the Department of State and the Army were far apart.

Byroade then presented the outline of an idea he was working on regarding a European Army.⁸¹ Both Lt. Colonel Mock and Major Miller replied that Byroade's plan was nothing more than the present Western Union organization expanded to include the U.S. and Western Germany. They also indicated that it was unrealistic to

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Memorandum for General Schuyler, Subject: Record of Conference Attended, 5 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany (Sect. 1C)(Book 1)(Case 12), NARA.

⁸¹ Byroade's concept for a European Army, worked out with McCloy, was discussed in chapter 3. A comparison of his plan and the G-3 plan was attached to a Memorandum for General Gruenther, Subject: Rearmament of Germany, 10 August 1950, stamped NOT USED, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany (Sect. 1C)(Book II)(Case 12), NARA.

continue both NATO and the Western Union with their complicated structures and the great amounts of equipment being provided to both by the U.S. under MDAP, and then add yet a third and separate European Army, also in need of equipment from the United States.

Both sides however agreed that something had to be done to provide a combined command structure and that the division was the largest German unit that would be permitted under a rearmament program. The conference concluded with Byroade speaking about the security problem and the psychological nature of the problem. If it were leaked that the U.S. was contemplating the use of German manpower, he stated, it would confirm to the Germans that the U.S. considered them as “cannon fodder.” Additionally, a leak of plans to supply Germany might discourage French participation in NATO. Lastly, he believed that the first step of his plan required foreign minister level talks on the political aspects and if agreement was reached, he felt the French should take the lead.

After the two G-3 representatives reported to Bolte on their meeting with Byroade, Bolte drafted a memo to Gruenther on 10 August briefly summarizing the meeting and the State Department’s insistence on Germany’s integration in a European Army. Bolte wrote that Byroade had informed the G-3 representatives that this position had been endorsed by Ambassadors Bruce (in Paris), Douglas (in London), and of course, High Commissioner McCloy. Bolte stated that, in his opinion, the Department of State’s proposal would “reduce the military sovereignty status of the European countries to the level of Germany,” while it was G-3’s intention to “raise Germany’s status to that of the other countries and accept her, subject to controls,

into NATO and Western Union arrangements.” Nationalism, which the Department of State appeared to fear, was the foundation of the defense efforts of the Western Union and NATO. Bolte’s memo then recommended that the JCS forward its views on German rearmament to the Secretary of Defense, indicating that revisions to JCS 2124/11 were being forwarded separately, and that Gruenther brief the JCS on the elements of Byroade’s proposal, which was attached to the memo.⁸²

That same day, Schuyler met with Byroade and his assistant, Colonel Gerhardt to discuss German rearmament and the differences between the positions of the Departments of State and Defense.⁸³ According to the memo written of this meeting, Schuyler explained to Byroade how NATO worked and planned, and that Byroade’s idea of having one American commander in charge of both field forces and economic issues was inappropriate. Schuyler explained a number of other issues that, ultimately, caused Byroade to change his mind and even to agree that German forces could, in fact, be integrated into NATO providing an American was made commander of these NATO forces.

Byroade then showed Schuyler a memorandum for record from the Secretary of Defense indicating that the President had given his general approval to the idea of German military units in some form of Army for the defense of Western Europe and that the Secretary of State would be presenting a paper to the NSC on that subject. Byroade finished by saying that he would be drafting that paper but that he would

⁸² Memorandum for General Gruenther, Subject: Rearmament of Germany, 10 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany, NARA.

⁸³ Memorandum for Record, Subject: Conversations with State Department on German Rearmament, 10 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 22, 091-Germany, NARA.

coordinate fully with G-3. Nonetheless, he specifically stated that the paper would stipulate that any German units created would be integrated into a European force which would have an American commander.

It appears that the above mentioned staff study, the JCS's repeated position given in NSC 71, and continued Army insistence that West Germany had to be armed and integrated into NATO through a program of controlled armament supervised by NATO, convinced Secretary of Defense Johnson. On 14 August, he concluded that due to "present developments in the international situation" the rearming of Germany was necessary to the defense of Western Europe.⁸⁴ Johnson's position undoubtedly led to the revisions to JCS 2124/11 and the wording inextricably linking the security of the United States with that of Western Europe that became the Defense Department's response to the Department of State's 16 August paper on establishing a European Defense Force

This paper on the establishment of a European Defense Force, sent by Undersecretary of State H. Freeman Matthews to the Secretary of Defense, stated that it was the desire of the Department of State to reach an early agreement on the subject of the paper in order to present it to the President by the beginning of the following week due to the upcoming September meeting between Acheson and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Enclosure to JCS 2124/12, 15 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany, (Sect IC)(Book II)(Case12), NARA.

⁸⁵ The paper, was received by Major General James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and sent to the JCS as JCS 2124/13, 18 August 1950. RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 22, 091-Germany, NARA. Secretary of Johnson initial 17 August response to State was included in this paper but can also be found in RG 218, Geographic File, 1948-1950, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4, Box 25, NARA.

The Department of State paper began with a long “Estimate of the Situation,” which described the inability of Western Europe to defend itself and the failure of United Nations forces, including U.S. forces, to staunch the North Korean aggression. This had caused the West Europeans to “contemplate their own fate” and, despite trust in an eventually mobilized America, fall hopeless and despondent at the thought of another occupation. It then recognized that the need for some form of German contribution to the defense of Western Europe was apparent but that the Department of State still strongly opposed the creation of German national forces, a view supported by the U.S. Ambassadors in Western Europe and by France “who is assuming more and more the position of leadership on the Continent.”

The paper continued that if the U.S. was willing “to accept the responsibility of full participation in the European defense effort....[that the U.S.] believed conditions may now be favorable ...for creating a really effective European Defense Force which could assimilate a direct contribution by Germany in a manner acceptable to all concerned.” It then stated what Bolte had earlier stated to Gruenther, i.e., “This involves in practice the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital elements of sovereignty, i.e., the security field.” The State Department paper then made the assumption that given an international commander with “real authority,” the European nations would accept this and that this surrender of sovereignty would be a further driving force toward further European unification.

The Department of State’s paper went on to describe the basic elements involved in forming a European Defense Force, i.e., Government direction, Command and General Staff direction, organization of field forces, production, procurement

and supply, individual national security organizations, except that Germany would have no General Staff but there would be a federal ministry to organize the recruitment of German national units and act as a service and procurement agency.

The paper concluded that the U.S. should accept this force, that a Chief of Staff for Western Europe should be appointed to prepare for the advent of an eventual Supreme Commander, much like the COSSAC organization of World War II. It further recommended the centralized direction of procurement and production, that the Supreme Commander be an American, and that this matter should be discussed as a matter of urgency with the European nations concerned.

JCS's response was to recommend that its memo, previously included in JCS 2124/11, but with some minor revisions be submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The key revision, one that clearly stated the Defense Department's position was the change to paragraph 8, which now read:

It is realized that the Western Allies have taken and are taking steps toward the re-admission of Germany as a member of Western society. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff would urge, however, that the United States insist upon participation of Western Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements.* This participation is a logical and necessary step in the implementation of German rearmament and the establishment of German forces as a factor in NATO planning. The integration of German forces into NATO would contribute materially to the ultimate success of the political and economic measures being undertaken to join Western Germany firmly with the West. Furthermore, this indication that Western Germany was being accepted as an integral and coequal member of the Western community should generate in the German people an instinctive will to fight in the defense of that community.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ JCS 2124/16, 26 August 1950, p. 151. RG 218, Geographic File, 1948-1950, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4, Box 25, NARA. Emphasis added.

It should be noted that in recommending the early rearmament of Germany in JCS 2124/11, the JCS was unequivocal in stating that “[t]he question at this time is not one of whether we should risk the success of our political objectives vis-à-vis Western Germany, but rather whether or not we can afford to jeopardize the security of the United States and of Western Europe by not utilizing all of the forces that can be made available to us.”⁸⁷

JCS Response to President Truman’s Letter

As related in Chapter 3, on 26 August, President Truman sent each Secretary a letter that contained eight key questions for which he requested that both departments work together in developing recommendations for his decision regarding German rearmament. On 28 August, G-3 responded to the Army Chief of Staff with general answers to be used as a basis for discussion. G-3, however, suggested that final answers be deferred until the JSSC had completed its study of the questions. Briefly, a synopsis of G-3’s general answers were to:

1. Agree to the principal of committing additional U.S. forces to the defense of Europe but no valid capability existed to do so until June 1951.
2. Strongly recommend German participation in the defense of Europe but the State Department’s concept of a unified European Defense Force is unrealistic. The only practical method to defend Western Europe is to strengthen NATO and integrate Germany therein.
3. Favor a Supreme Commander, but only in time of war. A COSSAC type headquarters is all that is needed now.
4. Favor a Combined Chief of Staff organization. See answer 3.
5. Not comment on supporting a European War Production Board. It is a question for the Munitions Board to answer.
6. Favor full U.S. participation in European defense organs with and

⁸⁷ JCS 2124/11, *Op. cit.*

American as head of COSSAC and an eventual U.S. Supreme Commander in time of war.

7. Favor transforming the Standing Group into a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization.
8. Invigorate NATO, in favor of the immediate integration of Germany and Spain into NATO.⁸⁸

On 1 September, the JSPC drafted a memo for the Secretary of Defense in which it acknowledged that the initial response to the President's questions was only an outline position for the Defense Department to adopt.⁸⁹ It then offered comments to the "Conclusions" of the Department of State's paper to "fill out the outline." In addition to the general answers provided to the President's questions, which were expanded, the memo stated emphatically that the U.S. should not accept the European Defense Force concept and repeated that this concept reduced the military sovereignty of the European nations to Germany's level while JCS proposed to raise Germany's status to that of the other West European countries. It further reiterated that the Department of Defense believed, contrary to the Department of State, that the controlled rearmament of Germany under NATO would not bring about the creation of a German Defense Ministry, a General Staff+0, or a war industry that would terrorize Europe.

In an Appendix to the memo, the JSPC laid out a plan for the development of what it termed German Security Forces. It opened by stating that "[t]he active and effective integration of the people of Western Germany into the defense of Western

⁸⁸ Memorandum for the chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Identical Letters from the President to the Secretaries of State and Defense, on the U.S. Position with Respect to the Defense of Europe and the Nature of the Contribution by Germany to this Defense. (SM 2012-50), 28 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 22, 091-Germany, NARA.

⁸⁹ JCS 2124/18, 1 September 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany, (Sect IC)(Book II)(Case 12), NARA.

Europe would add materially to the assurance that Europe can be held against a Soviet invasion.” It repeated again the U.S. could not afford to jeopardize its security and that of Western Europe by not utilizing all of the forces that could be made available. Furthermore, it reiterated the U.S. position that NATO was “the appropriate framework for promoting the integrated defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area,” and that the U.S. should participate fully in all of NATO’s defense agencies. The Appendix continued that at the appropriate time, there should be a NATO Supreme Commander; that the Military Production and Supply Board should be strengthened; and that the U.S. was prepared to accept responsibility for its chairmanship. Most prophetically, it also stated that a strengthened NATO made a separate Western Union organization superfluous and that it should be absorbed into NATO at an appropriate time.

On 2 September, a page was added to the Appendix that outlined the program for West German Security Forces. In it, it recommended that U.S. and Allied policy regarding Western Germany be changed, stating that it would provide the following: “(a) The immediate provision of adequate security forces for Western Germany, including police forces adequate to counter the threat from the East German indigenous forces; and, (b) The initial steps toward entry of Germany into NATO at the earliest practicable time.” It then allowed for the creation of a German training command under a German officer, possibly titled “Inspector General, German Security Forces,” and recommended the initial organization of two to four infantry divisions, subsequently growing to a total of ten to fifteen. It specified that weapons and supplies would come, in part, from other NATO countries while deficiencies and heavy

equipment would come from the U.S. Military Assistance Program.

Lastly, the addendum outlined controls to be placed on the German forces, to wit: no Air Force or Navy; German forces in being in Germany would be proportionally smaller than French forces in being in France; the largest German unit would be the division which, following training, would be allocated to each of the Allied forces in Germany; German industry would produce only light transportation and equipment; heavy equipment, such as tanks and heavy weapons would come from other sources; the highest rank for German commanders would be at the division level; and lastly, there would be no German General Staff.

Following discussions in the Joint Staff and the individual service staffs, the Chief of Naval Operations recommended that two significant changes be made to the Appendix. Both changes dealt with the force size and composition, the first allowing West Germany to have a tactical Air Force and limited naval forces such as those required for harbor defense and coastal patrol activities. The second recommended that once trained, German divisions would be deployed as directed by the NATO Standing Group and that advanced training would be accomplished under appropriate Allied Force Commanders.⁹⁰ As will be seen in chapter 5, these recommendations were approved.

Thus from the earliest days of the Cold War, the Department of Defense, mindful of U.S. policies that were meant to keep Germany disarmed, recognized early the need to join forces with the U.S.'s West European allies to establish a line of defense in western Europe but also the impossibility of doing so without West Ger-

⁹⁰ JCS 2124/20, 6 September 1950, RG 218, Geographic File 1948-1950, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4, Box 25, NARA.

man participation. In particular, it recognized and valued the additional combat power German troops and combat experience would bring to the defense of Western Europe. To that end, the various Department of Defense organs spent a great deal of time and effort in their attempts to provide the President with the best military advice possible within the constraints imposed upon them. In doing so, they never wavered in their belief that a national German army in NATO was the best solution to the “German question.”

Chapter 5: From EDF to EDC to NATO: The Fight to Arm the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1955

Acheson's presentation of the "Single Package" on 12 September 1950 initiated a chain of events that led to the French-inspired Pleven Plan/European Defense Community (EDC) concept ostensibly designed to integrate West Germany into a European defense force. But by allowing the French to take the lead, the U.S. became an onlooker, unable to direct the course of the initiative it had created. Over the next four years, the EDC concept became U.S. policy. The Department of Defense attempted to support it but never abandoned its advocacy of West Germany in NATO. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, however, clung to EDC as the only way to integrate a West German military contribution to the defense of Europe.

The final joint response to President Truman's eight questions was not signed by Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson until 8 September. It was forwarded to the President that same day.¹ As part of the answer to the first question, whether the U.S. was prepared to send additional forces to Europe, Johnson recommended that additional troops should be committed at the earliest possible date and indicated that the overall strength of U.S. forces in Europe should be "about 4 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 1½ armored divisions, 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate naval forces...."² The answer continued, however, that "The U.S. should make it clear that it is now squarely up to

¹ Doris M. Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, Vol. II, Washington D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988, p. 319. This response subsequently became NSC 82.

² *Ibid.* See also JCS 2116/30, 8 September 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 091-Germany, (Sect IC)(Book III)(Case 12), NARA.

the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide the balance of the forces required for the initial defense.” The following day, President Truman made public his decision to reinforce Europe based on the “degree to which our friends match our actions.” Our plans,” the President continued, “are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action on their part.”³

Acheson relates in his memoirs that the Departments of State and Defense debated the rearmament issue for two weeks before the compromise was reached, which he then carried to the Tripartite Meeting in New York. This compromise, also known as the ‘Single Package,’ was intended to be offered to the Allies on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis and contained several key elements. In addition to the increase in U.S. forces in Europe, it offered U.S. participation along with the United Kingdom and all the other NATO armies in a combined European defense force, an international staff, and a ‘Supreme Commander.’ The offer was contingent on the Allies boosting the capabilities (and size) of their forces and accepting the inclusion of German contingents that would be added at division level but without a German General Staff.⁴

The September Tripartite meeting of the “big three,” Acheson, Schuman, and Bevin, in which the U.S. position on the rearmament of West Germany was presented, and the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting that followed have been examined by a num-

³ “Statement by the President,” 9 September 1950, George Elsey Papers, Folder: Harry S. Truman, Foreign Relations -- Western European Defense, Box 65, HSTL. See also Condit, *Op. cit.*, p. 320.

⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, New York: The New American Library, 1969, pp. 568-71. See also *JCS History II*, pp. 200-03; Martin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 655-60; Thomas Alan Schwartz, , “The ‘Skeleton Key’ – American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, 1949-1954,” *Central European History*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Dec 1986, pp. 375-77; and Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz, “America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth,” in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., *Between Empire and Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003, pp. 11-16.

ber of scholars. So too have the negotiations over the French alternative, the Pleven Plan, and its successor, the European Defense Community.⁵ Thus, while it is not my intent to repeat what has already been so well covered, I will argue that the “Single Package,” dubbed “the bomb at the Waldorf” by the French, was no “bomb” at all, neither was it a surprise as Schuman claimed. If anything, it was most likely a misunderstanding by both Schuman and Bevin as the issue of arming West Germany was not on the Meeting Agenda. While this may have added to the misunderstanding, both Foreign Ministers had been informed beforehand of Acheson’s thoughts.⁶

Ten days earlier, on 2 September, Acheson had sent Ambassadors Bruce in Paris and Douglas in London an ‘Eyes Only’ cable instructing them to “call urgently on” the French and British Foreign Ministers and tell them that the U.S. Government had been closely following European suggestions to create a unified European Defense Force and that if created, there would have to be a provision to establish a Supreme Commander. “In this event,” Acheson wrote, “*it should be necessary to integrate into such a force German units in a controlled status without thereby creating a German National Army.*” Acheson wrote further that the U.S. Government felt that for this to be effective, additional U.S. troops might be required. He added that the U.S. Government felt these suggestions were important and that he *proposed to raise them at the September Tripartite*. Furthermore, he specifically asked that Schuman and Bevin be told that U.S. participation in the defense of Europe would involve greater commitments than the U.S. has previous-

⁵ Among those who have covered these meetings and the proceedings of the Pleven Plan and EDC are: Lord Ismay, *NATO, The First Five Years, 1949-1954*, publisher and date unknown, McGeehan, *Op. cit.*, Large, *Op. cit.*, Schwartz, *Op. cit.*, McAllister, *Op. cit.*, Birtle, *Op. cit.*, Christopher Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, to name just a few.

⁶ See the following section.

ly been willing to consider and that such commitments would be dependent on Europeans willingness to make greater efforts to increase their forces in being.⁷

In addition, on 6 September, Bevin sent Acheson a personal message, the substance of which was also communicated to French Prime Minister René Pleven, in which the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that "...we cannot build up the necessary strength to assure the defence of the territories of N.A.T. [North Atlantic Treaty] Powers without the participation of Germany."⁸ Bevin wrote further that His Majesty's Government was not prepared to agree to the re-creation of a German Army although the incorporation of German contingents in the Western defense forces, should the U.S. or France wish to discuss it, would not be excluded. He believed, however, that the German government would find it impossible to remilitarize on the scale recommended by the Chiefs of Staff and thus felt it most important to first create the Federal Police Force that Chancellor Adenauer had asked for on 17 August, i.e., 150,000 men.

Bevin's message also included a number of pro's and con's, including the statement that the Germans would have "a regrettable, if understandable, malicious satisfaction that the western Allies who have so effectively disarmed Germany should now stand in need of German assistance." He summed up his thoughts by stating that the Alliance is caught up in a vicious circle. "The French," he wrote, "will not agree to any form of German rearmament until France is strong. But France will not make the effort to be

⁷ McMahon, *Op. cit.* p. 135. The text of the cable cited above was addressed solely to Ambassador Bruce in Paris, Telegram 1124, *FRUS*, 1950:3, pp. 261-62. A footnote states that a similar Eyes Only cable, Telegram 1197, was also sent to Ambassador Douglas in London. Emphasis added.

⁸ *Personal Message From Mr. Bevin to Mr. Acheson*, 5 September 1950. RG 59, Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3428, NARA. In this paper, Bevin stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had recommended that the German contribution should consist of local naval forces, a balanced army of 20 divisions with a reserve of 10 divisions, a tactical air force of 1,100 aircraft, an air defense force of 1000 fighters and a "substantial anti-aircraft force equipped with guided weapons."

strong unless there is a real prospect of assuring Western defence, which in turn cannot be done without a measure of German rearmament.”

There is also evidence that Acheson believed in advance that his proposal would be taken positively because on 8 September, four days before the Foreign Ministers met, the State Department drafted the following optimistic communiqué:

...the Ministers are fully aware of the natural desire of the German people to participate in the defense of their homeland in case of necessity. The Ministers have accordingly discussed the association of Germany in an improved organization for European defense, in which the United States would play a full role. This matter will continue to be studied and will be the subject of discussions with the Governments of the German Federal Republic ... as well as the other free European governments. The German people can be assured that they will be permitted to join in the defense of Germany as part of the common defense of the common freedom of Western Europe.⁹

The September 1950 Tripartite Meeting

The minutes of the opening meeting on 12 September indicate only that Acheson stated it was unreasonable to defend all of Germany without getting assistance from the Germans; that the U.S. preferred to see German units serve in a European defense force rather than create a German police force. No concept of what that European defense force should look like, as so painfully worked out by both McCloy and Byroade, was presented - only the U.S. preference that there be one. Of interest also is the fact that Schuman appeared to agree, stating that it would be illogical to defend Western Europe, including Germany, without contributions from Germany. His opposition, however, initially stemmed from his belief that due to the scarce resources available for defense, they need-

⁹ September Foreign Ministers Meeting, *Communiqué on Germany*, SFM D 4/6, September 8, 1950, RG 43 Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 48, NARA.

ed to first be distributed to the NATO countries and that when a “minimum level” was reached, when the combined staff and Supreme Commander had been created, only then might France be in a position to consider the German matter. While it was expected that France would be difficult, it was not expected that France would refuse to even consider German rearmament “in principle,” which it did. This setback and subsequent attempts by the new Secretary of Defense, George Marshall to “relax” the U.S. proposal did not sit well with the JCS.¹⁰

Bevin’s response was to voice concern that such a plan would put the Germans in a “bargaining position,” which would make the situation very difficult. He believed the Germans would not go along and thought it better to give the Germans what they asked rather than asking them for something. Bevin again voiced his fear of a German resurgence but allowed that the UK would examine the matter with the best people available.¹¹

Acheson sent cables to the President on a daily basis during the Tripartite meeting. Following the first day’s afternoon session he met both privately and separately with both Bevin and Schuman but each discussion was primarily about the President’s statement that the U.S. would participate in creating forces in Europe for its defense, unity of command, and financial and supply matters. Both Bevin and Schuman agreed to strengthen West Germany’s police, but Schuman insisted that the police could not be allowed to become a German Army. The result of that meeting was to agree to ask the High

¹⁰ Walter S. Poole, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Vol. IV, 1950-1952, Wilmington: Michael S. Glazier, 1980, pp. 209-210. JCS reaction to Marshall’s attempts to relax the criteria was quite clear; German participation was absolutely essential, otherwise the U.S. contribution to European defense should be re-examined.

¹¹ Minutes of the Tripartite Meeting, September 12, 1950, (Dean Acheson), Memos of Conversation (Sept. 1949 - Sept. 1950), Lot 53D444, Boxes 13, NARA.

Commissioners to formulate views on the integration of German contingents in a European force and to instruct the NATO Defense Ministers to submit an agreed medium term defense plan for 1954 and plans for force composition and distribution for 1951 and 1952.¹²

On the morning of 14 September, Acheson confessed to President Truman that he felt that Bevin and Schuman “do not seem to have yet grasped [the proposal’s] full significance and implications.” He mentioned that while Bevin did not support the U.S. position on using German forces, he did not oppose it. Schuman on the other hand, “expressed the very strong and firm opposition of his government which would provide for the recreation of purely German units.” Acheson indicated the three would again meet privately in an attempt to find some formula that the French could accept.¹³

The minutes of the 14th, however, repeat much of earlier meetings, i.e., the need for German forces to enable Western Europe to be defended as far east as possible, Bevin’s response that he could not yet give an answer and Schuman’s reply that it was a question of manpower versus materiel, and that adding German manpower would give the Russians cause to go to war. Acheson countered that it would take time to increase production and even longer for Germany to even begin to draft soldiers. He stated further that Russia was currently deterred by the U.S. atomic arsenal but that would not always be the case...and that was where the danger lay, not by the creation of German forces.

¹² SECTO 2, September 12, 11:59PM, RG 43, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 50, NA-RA.

¹³ SECTO 8, September 14, 10:32AM, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Conferences File, Box 141, HSTL.

Acheson then asked Schuman and Bevin for a decision on German participation but the decision, he stated, would not have to be put into effect for some time.

Bevin again responded that he wanted to give an answer but could not and even though McCloy stated that Adenauer had asked that German forces participate, Schuman again replied that the French public opinion would not accept a rearmed Germany until France was armed. He did say, however, that he had asked his government for a “conditional decision” and expected an answer by 18 September.¹⁴

On 15 September, Acheson wrote that the previous two days had “persistently failed to come to grips with the central problem of the defense of Europe.” Acheson wrote that he had pointed out in a private meeting with Bevin and Schuman and the three High Commissioners, that the President had brought about “a complete revolution in American foreign policy” and the steps to put substantial U.S. forces in Europe and place them in an integrated force, to agree to a command structure, etc., were “unprecedented steps in U.S. history.” He subsequently stated that it was clear that the British and French were prepared to accept what the U.S. offered but not prepared to accept what the U.S. asked - they “flatly refused in any way the question of German participation.”¹⁵

¹⁴ Minutes of the Meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, New York, September 14, 1950, RG 59, Records of the Executive Secretariat (Dean Acheson), lot53D444, Box 13, NARA. General Hays wrote McCloy that he had passed McCloy’s message to Adenauer who was gratified for the information regarding the communiqué but unhappy with statements allegedly made by Schuman that Germany would not be permitted combat troops but would work as auxiliaries such as labor forces and truck drivers. Nonetheless, Adenauer stated that he stands by his secret offer to contribute to the European Defense Force but would prefer that the Conference of Foreign Ministers put that question to the Federal Republic to put him in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* the *Bundestag*. See Bonn 149 and Bonn 150, 17 September 1950, RG 43, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 50, NARA.

¹⁵ SECTO 13, 14 September 1950, 12:15AM, RG 43, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 50, NARA. Acheson concluded that he was dictating the cable himself so that the President “may know my mind fully and instruct me at any point you think I may be wrong or give me guidance which you want me to have.” At the private meeting with Bevin on the 15th, Bevin was able to agree to German participate but advised that some time should lapse before putting the decision into effect. See RG 43, *Loc. Cit.*, and Pri-

That same day, Acheson addressed the fifth session of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting and spoke quite eloquently and specifically about what the U.S. desired. He immediately put aside the question of German police, saying that while necessary in whatever form it might take, it was an internal security issue and not the kind of force that would oppose the *Bereitschaften* from East Germany or a Soviet invasion. He then addressed the German military issue stating, again quite unequivocally, that he did not mean a German national army. German units, he said, would be incorporated in and under the command of the force for the defense of Europe. He said that he hoped the unit size would be kept quite low so that they could be combined with English, French or Canadian units, and the ordnance should be produced outside Germany to preclude any capacity for independent action. Furthermore, he explained, German unit would be equipped in such a manner that its equipment would be of little use unless it remained part of the European defense force.

Acheson then addressed the time factor, emphasizing the fact that Germany had no governmental structure or legal basis at the present to deal with the military question. By the time necessary changes to West Germany's constitution the Basic Law, were made, a list of men of military age created, train them, etc., at least two years would have passed. In order to develop Western European strength in time, it would be necessary to act soon. He also countered arguments that creating German units would interfere with equipping members of NATO, indicating that it would take 18 months to two years to produce that equipment in volume and that there would be no diversion of equipment.

vate Meeting with Mr. Bevin, 2:40 PM, September 15, 1950, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat (Dean Acheson), Lot 53D444, Box 13, NARA.

Lastly, he indicated that NATO should not fear provoking Russia as a reason not to gain strength because staying weak is what might bring on an attack.¹⁶

The following day, 16 September, a member of the Army staff wrote Admiral Robbins, the U.S. military advisor to Acheson, that General Schuyler believed the Joint Staff felt quite strongly that “we,” i.e., the Army, should stand for acceptance of the full U.S. concept, particularly the acceptance of German participation. The Army felt a limited delay of a week, should an impasse among the Foreign Ministers be reached, was acceptable before they reconsidered the issue. They also saw a month’s delay acceptable but then desired a showdown at the Defense Ministers meeting in October. The Army was willing to accept an even greater delay but insistent that German integration take place and that it not be deferred too long.¹⁷

While the three foreign ministers and the remainder of the NATO foreign and defense ministers discussed the pros and cons of arming West Germany, the Defense Department continued to move forward in the expectation that West Germany would, in fact, be armed. On 19 September, for example, General Bolte cabled General Handy that “in view of the imminence of possible decision by Foreign Ministers and North Atlantic Council authorizing creation of a West German security force, believe we should accelerate planning for such forces.”¹⁸ Two days later, on 21 September, General Bradley sent two memos to Marshall. The first indicated that the JCSs recognized it would take time

¹⁶ Verbatim Record No. 2, C5-VR/2 (Part), North Atlantic Council, Fifth Session, New York, 15th September 1950, RG 43, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 50, NARA.

¹⁷ Memo for Admiral Robbins, 16 September 1950, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File, 1950-1951, Box 22, NARA.

¹⁸ Bolte to CINCEUR, Routine Cable, 19 September 1950, RG 319 Army - Operations, General Decimal File, 1950-1951, Box 20, NARA.

before German divisions could be formed but that the ultimate objective should be kept in mind during negotiations. Bradley also recommended that a program leading to some security forces in Germany be started immediately. The second memo stated in part that “our eventual objective must be, without creating a German national army, to obtain a German contribution to a European defense force equivalent to about 10-15 divisions, with certain safeguards, to including no aviation, limitations on armament production, and no national German General Staff.”¹⁹

The following day, Byroade sent a memo to Spofford at NATO, telling him that the U.S. should take the position that the U.S. plan already contained safeguards to prevent the creation of an independent German force that could be misused by the German Government. However, within those safeguards, Byroade continued, Germany had to be incorporated in a way that gave it substantial equality.²⁰

Byroade’s memo contained additional safeguards that he stated had not been previously discussed, e.g., a limit on the number of German divisions. U.S. thinking, he said, was that the German contribution should not exceed one-fifth the total force or about 12-

¹⁹ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, CJCS 091 Germany, 21 September 1950 and Memorandum for General Marshall, 21 September 1950, RG 218, Chairman’s File, General Bradley, 1949-1953, Box 01, NARA. The steps suggested in the second memo were approved on 23 September 1950. See USDEL Minutes 3, Third Special Meeting of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, New York, September 23, 1950, 10:00 a.m., RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 48, NARA. It was also sent out as SECTO 45, 23 Sep 50, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File 1948-50, Box 25, NARA. On 27 September, McCloy cabled Acheson expressing his disappointment that German *Länder* police would have armored motorized and engineer units. This, to him, was a half-way measure that constituted the nucleus of a German army. It compromised propaganda against the East and played in to the hands of those who wished to avoid any definite alignment with the West, such as Heineman, Noack and Niemoller, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1948-50, Box 25, NARA.

²⁰ Memorandum to Mr. Spofford, *Safeguards on German Contribution*, September 22, 1950, RG 59, Department of State Decimal Files, 762A.5/9-2250, Box 3896, NARA.

15 divisions, which is less than the numbers of French divisions in being. Additionally, to facilitate additional safeguards, Byroade suggested that Germany should:

- a. be restricted to a ground force role without either air or naval forces, or offensive equipment, even in “the long distant future;”
- b. utilize only the best of the present German senior officers and begin training a new officer corps over which the Allies could retain significant influence as soon as possible;
- c. allow a required Federal Ministry to perform necessary administrative and logistical functions, normally performed by G-1 (personnel) and G-4 (logistics - less major items) staffs, but very little G-2 (intelligence) and no G-3 (operations) functions; and
- d. continue to prohibit and restrict industries in Germany and use the Military Security Board to enforce certain demilitarization controls, thus maintaining those fundamental controls that would prevent future German aggression.

On 23 September, Ambassador Bruce in Paris, sent a cable to Acheson suggesting that Acheson approach both Schuman and French Defense Minister Jules Moch and suggest that Schuman should offer a French suggestion as to how to best utilize German troops similar to the French plan regarding the pooling of European coal and steel. Bruce wrote further that Acheson should tell both French ministers *that leadership in this matter should come from France.*²¹ This suggestion, I believe, led to the Plevin Plan, France’s plan for a European Defense Force, named after Prime Minister Plevin and arguably designed to limit severely the manner and degree of Germany’s contribution.

On 26 September, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued the final communiqué of the September meeting, which was intentionally vague and reflected the impasse brought about by French fear and intransigence. The communiqué read:

The utilization of German manpower and resources was discussed in the light of views recently expressed by democratic leaders in Germany and elsewhere. The Council

²¹ Paris 1534, September 22 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. III, pp. 337-38. Emphasis added.

was in agreement that Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defense of Western Europe and, noting that the occupying powers were studying the matter, requested the Defense Committee to make recommendations at the earliest possible date as to the methods by which Germany could most usefully make its contribution.²²

Two days later, in a separate and unrelated twist, Bolte received a memo from his G-3 Plans Division informing him that none of the available Fiscal Year 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) funds allocated for equipment could be used to fund a possible rearming of Germany.²³

As a result of the impasse in the NAC, Marshall decided to have the Defense Department immediately begin drafting a unilateral U.S. proposal on Germany, using the joint State-Defense position of 8 September, to present to the NATO Defense Committee during its October meeting.²⁴ One week later, Byroade wrote Acheson that he had heard from Paul Nitze that Marshall was not happy with the joint paper. Marshall, according to Byroade, felt the paper should “deal with a series of steps which would automatically lead to the desired end result instead of defining the end result as an objective to be agreed.” Byroade believed that the approach taken in the paper was correct and that Marshall’s objections indicated he wanted a different approach.

In the view of the Bureau of German Affairs, according to Byroade, the key issue before the NATO Defense Ministers as regards Germany, was “to record and reach

²² “Integrated Force Under Centralized Command To Defend Western Europe,” *DOSB*, Vol. 23, 9 October 1950, p. 588. See also Lord Ismay, *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

²³ Memorandum for ACS/G-3, 28 September 1950, RG 319, Army Operations , General Decimal Files, 1950-51, Box 21, 091 Germany (Sect. i-C)(Book III)(Case 12), NARA.

²⁴ Letter, General Burns to Admiral Davis, 2 October 1950, RG 218, Geographic File, 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4, Box 25, NARA.

agreement to the principles on which the French failed to agree to in New York,” i.e., to include German units in a European Defense Force. In other words, it was of little value to move slowly on Germany, as Marshall wanted, i.e., moving through the steps to first get approval for German companies, then battalions, then regiments, and finally divisions, if there was no agreement in principle on allowing Germany participation to begin with. Byroade concluded that all that was needed from the NATO Defense Ministers was agreement on a list of safeguards they considered appropriate.²⁵ As a possible result of this letter, Acheson spoke with Robert A. Lovett, now Deputy Secretary of Defense, the following day and noted that “Lovett agreed that the U.S. should not back off its position but keep the heat on France. If France refuses, it should be up to them to come up with a new proposal. The U.S. should insist on a solution to the German participation question as it is essential to the whole plan.”²⁶

At about the same time, several U.S. Senators were also voicing their thoughts regarding German participation in the defense of Europe. On 4 October, Senator Willis Smith (D-NC) visited Major General Kohler, Director, Joint American Military Advising Group, Europe, and told him that he considered arming Germany essential.²⁷ A few weeks earlier, on 22 September, Senator Tom Connally (D-TX), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke in the Senate regarding Germany and said:

²⁵ TS Letter, Henry A. Byroade to the Secretary, October 9, 1950, RG 59, Decimal File, 1950-54, File 762A.5/10-750, Box 3896, NARA.

²⁶ “Notes growing out of my talk with Mr. Lovett,” 10 October 1950, RG59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Lot File 55D258, Box 4, NARA.

²⁷ Letter, Major General Kohler to General Gruenther, 4 October 1950, Gruenther Papers, TS Correspondence (2), HSTL.

We must acknowledge the right and indeed the duty of the Germans to contribute not only to their own defense but to the defense of Western Europe as well. It is time that provision is made for the inclusion of German units in the integrated European army toward which we are working.

Now I understand fully and sympathize thoroughly with the natural reaction of the French people to anything that looks like German rearmament. The sound of Nazi hobnails goose stepping down the boulevards of Paris is too fresh in their memory for them to have any other reaction. But they must be convinced that what is sought does not involve the creation of a German army. What is sought is the creation of a European army. What is sought is the use of German troop units in an integrated European force under a supreme allied commander. With this sort of arrangement French people will have an iron-clad guaranty that a German army, under a German general staff, will never again menace France's eastern borders.²⁸

On 11 October, a high-level meeting between State and Defense officials was held that included Acheson, Marshall, Lovett, Ambassador Bruce, as well as members of the Office of European Affairs and the JCS. During this meeting, Acheson provided Marshall with a copy of a cable sent by McCloy that contained a number of recommendations on how to proceed *vis-à-vis* the French on the issue of German rearmament. Acheson then stated that *there was merit to allowing the French to take the leadership in European unity, which included military unity*. He also suggested that Marshall stand firm and make no concessions to the French regarding German units in the European Defense Force. He also gave Marshall a copy of a message Bevin had sent to Schuman that sup-

²⁸ Senator Tom Connally, "Reviewing American Foreign Policy Since 1945," *DOSB*, Vol. 23, 9 October 1950, p. 564.

ported the position that, given French opposition, it was up to the French to make a counter-proposal.²⁹

Over the next several days, both Handy and the Joint Staff drafted papers that contained recommendations and proposals regarding the organization, training and equipping of German forces. In a three part cable to General Collins, Handy underscored the inability of his command to support logistically any police, civil defense or labor service programs with his resources. He then referred to a September 1950 EUCOM study on the organization of the West German army and outlined his command's position on it. Essentially, he felt that responsibility for the creation of the army should be given to the Bonn government and that its training and operational control be the responsibility of the Supreme Command. He further recommended that equipment for German units be furnished and maintained by the German Government, augmented as necessary from other sources. Lastly, he recommended the German contingent be initially composed of 250,000 men organized into 10 divisions, including supporting troops and tactical aviation. Of these 10 divisions, 3 Infantry Divisions should be placed in the British Zone, 3 Infantry Divisions in the French Zone, and 2 Infantry and 2 Armored Divisions in the American Zone. These units would be organized similar to U.S. divisions, have the nec-

²⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, *Participation of Germany in European Defense Force*, 11 October 1950. The McCloy cable is Frankfurt 2919, 8 October 1950 and the Bevin-Schuman letter is an attachment to ODM-1-2. All three documents are in RG 218, Geographic File 1948-50, Box 25, NARA. What is of interest in the Bevin-Schuman letter is Bevin's statement that no more than France, he did not accept German participation in the integrated force with any enthusiasm. His attitude, he stated, reflected that of the Cabinet. That said, he did admit that Western Europe was defenseless and that a defense line in Germany means "unavoidable that Germany must play a part." He further wrote that "It is certain that we shall not get the contribution from the U.S.A., which is absolutely essential for the defence of Europe unless we are prepared to accept that conclusion." He concluded that "...we both have a duty to ensure the immediate defence of Western Europe and we hope the French Government will be persuaded to agree with us that this cannot be done without acceptance of the principles that German units should be incorporated in the integrated force." Emphasis added.

essary lines of communication support to give them sustained combat capability, and be provided with major equipment items by Allied nations.³⁰

The EUCOM study was followed by a report from the JSPC for use by the Secretary of Defense at the upcoming NATO Defense Ministers meeting. Among the report's enclosures was a memo for the Secretary of Defense that contained perhaps what may have been the first threat by the United States to reexamine its options should agreement on German participation not happen. Most significantly, paragraph 4.f. stated that if the NATO Defense and Military Committees could not come to agreement on the "immediate initiation of the organization of German military units within the integrated force for the defense of Western Europe...the U.S. course of action for the conduct of a war against the USSR...should be reexamined."³¹

French Counter-proposal: the Pleven Plan

On 24 October, French Prime Minister Pleven submitted a plan for "the creation of a European army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe."³² It is obvious

³⁰ SX 2848, 11 October 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File, 1950-1951, Box 20, NARA.

³¹ JCS 2124/24, 12 October 1950, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on German Contribution to an Integrated Defense, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File, 1950-1951, Box 21, NARA. JCS 2124/24 was approved as amended and the Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense was forwarded separately on 13 October 1950, *Loc. cit.* The recommendation to the NAC was submitted as ODM - 1/3 (Final) on 18 October 1950, RG 218, Geographic File, 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 1-4, Box 25, NARA. Bolte also wrote Collins and recommended against raising the issue of authorizing German tactical aviation at the October NATO Defense Ministers' meeting. Bolte argued that every effort should be expended in an effort to secure French agreement in principle to the contribution of German ground forces. Memorandum for the Army Chief of Staff, *German Contribution to an Integrated Defense*, 13 October 1950, RG 319, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File, 1950-1951, 091 Germany (Sect I-C)(Book III)(Case 12), Box 20, NARA.

³² Lord Ismay, *Op. cit.*, p. 33. For an interesting perspective on the birth of the Pleven Plan, as the French plan for the European army first was known, see Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1978, pp. 345-350. Additional information on the Pleven Plan can be found in McGeehan, *Op. cit.*, pp. 79 ff. and Large, *Op. cit.*, pp. 91 ff.

from a memo Bradley wrote to Marshall that he, Bradley, was somewhat confused as to what the French intended. Bradley pointed out that regarding the size of units, the French definition, depending on who one spoke with, was contradictory.³³ In one instance they spoke of divisions but in another, suggested they would not consent to German divisions.³⁴ The proposal also specified that the Supreme Commander would be placed under the European Minister of Defense and not NATO and furthermore, the European Minister of Defense would receive guidance from a council composed of ministers from the participating countries and thus act as an intermediary between the European community and NATO. The bottom line, Bradley wrote, was that the position of European Minister of Defense cut across almost all NATO lines and would make NATO inoperable.³⁵

Defense Minister Moch formally presented the French plan to the NATO Defense Committee the following day, 28 October³⁶ The 'Pleven Plan' took Acheson and the State Department by surprise. They had expected a Schuman Plan-like proposal, similar to the one created for the European Coal and Steel community, but for military collabora-

³³ Pleven's proposal had stated that "The contingents supplied by the participating States would be incorporated in the European Army *at the level of the smallest possible unit.*" Monnet, *Op. cit.* p. 347. Italics in original.

³⁴ According to notes written by Acheson for his Princeton Seminars, the French Council of Ministers said: "The formation of German divisions or the establishment of a German ministry of defense would lead inevitably sooner or later to the reconstitution of a national army and in this way to the resurrection of German militarism." Dean G. Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars File, 1953-1970, Section *Towards SHAPE* (Page 3), Box 78, HSTL.

³⁵ Memorandum for General Marshall, 27 October 1950, RG 218, Chairman's File, General Bradley, 1949-52, 092.2 North Atlantic Treaty, Box 2, NARA.

³⁶ Lord Ismay, *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

tion. Instead, what they saw was a plan that would rearm the Germans without rearming Germany and turn German soldiers into cannon fodder.³⁷

The French refused to discuss any proposal other than theirs. The gap between the French and the U.S. positions was such that the Defense Committee was left with no other option than to submit the German question to both the Military Committee and the Council of Deputies to study the issue and report back. At the Defense Committee meeting on 31 October, Marshall made it clear that no decision could be made on the next two agenda items - the creation of an integrated force in Europe and the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the reorganization of NATO - without first agreeing to the scale and nature of German participation. The threat of withdrawing the U.S. contribution caused the ministers to agree to a recess to allow the French to reexamine the issue.³⁸

On 8 November, Chancellor Adenauer addressed the *Bundestag* during a foreign policy debate and made the following declaration regarding the French plan:

³⁷ Poole, *Op. cit.*, pp. 211-212.

³⁸ Memorandum for the Record, *30th and 31st October Meetings of the North Atlantic Defense Committee*, 1 November 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091 Germany, Box 22, NARA. The disagreement lies in the fact that the U.S. proposal was a military proposal that sought immediate action while the French proposal was a political proposal that would need time to solve the political issues before addressing the military issues. A few days later, on 6 November, the Netherlands Ambassador, Von Reijan gave H. Freeman Matthews a paper written by NL PM Stikker in which he related the French were unhappy with the U.S. regarding the September FM meeting; that Schuman was totally surprised and completely unprepared for discussion of German participation (Acheson had sent a cable to U.S. Ambassador in Paris to give to Schuman outlining his thoughts for the meeting about 9 September). Schuman was also upset that the U.S. had not taken impending French elections, in which the Plevin government's chances appeared uncertain, into consideration. French fear of a revived German militarism was such that no solution other than the French plan was conceivable. Despite the opposition of the French Defense Minister, France was prepared to work out a formula. Stikker said that Schuman did not like the final plan form - he was not a Federalist, but that he believed the French proposal re: smaller unit would not hinder negotiations. RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Lot File 55D258, Box 4, NARA.

The Federal Republic considers the Plevan Plan a valuable contribution to the integration of Europe which is one of the pre-eminent aims of the Federal Government. The Federal Government considers, however, that the present international tension requires an earlier solution than would be possible through the implementation of the Plevan Plan. It is of the opinion that a general settlement might come about through negotiations with the Soviet Union. These negotiations can only be successful, however, if the Soviet Russian threat is faced by a defensive front of Western powers which is at least as strong as that of the Soviet Union. The Federal Government is of the opinion that the Federal Republic of Germany must be prepared to make an appropriate contribution to the building up of this defensive front, should such be requested by the western powers in order to secure its existence, the freedom of its population, and the further existence of western cultural ideals. *Prerequisites for such a contribution are Germany's full equality of rights within this defensive front side by side with the other participating powers* and further, that this defensive front be strong enough to make any Russian aggression impossible.³⁹

In mid-November, the Army G-4 (logistics) reported that a decision had been reached that for logistical planning purposes, the MDAP stockpile for Austria could be considered a source of equipment for early delivery to Germany. In line with the above, Bolte cabled Handy, informing him that the JCS had an allocation of \$200 Million from the FY '51 supplemental MDAP appropriation for grant aid for West German rearmament and equipment to be stockpiled in the U.S. and EUCOM until the creation of German armed forces was approved. These funds would also be used to train a minimum of

³⁹ Bonn 284, November 8, 1950, RG 59, Department of State Decimal File 762.00/11-850, NARA. Emphasis added.

four West German divisions but that politics would keep German units no larger than Regimental Combat Teams (RCT's).⁴⁰

At the same time, the State Department was also making its position clearer. State Department *Summaries of Telegrams*, copies of which were sent to President Truman, indicated on 10 November that the State Department had informed its missions in the North Atlantic Treaty countries that most members of the NATO Defense Committee had indicated that the Pleven Plan was militarily unsound, impossible to realize politically, and that it failed to meet the problem of rapidly building up a European defense system. Also, that the U.S. believed that to find a compromise solution, three criteria had to be met: the plan had to be militarily sound, agreed to by all the NATO members and West Germany, and capable of immediate implementation.

A Supreme Commander is Appointed

On 20 November, the State Department provided guidance to Spofford at NATO, regarding the size of German units to be contributed, the need for the early appointment of a Supreme Commander, and the timing of steps needed for the creation of a defense force. As to the unit size, the Department of State indicated that Spofford was to make clear that the minimal acceptable size for German units was the division; however, during a transitional period, smaller units could be considered providing it is clear that they be

⁴⁰ See G-4 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on JCS2124/25, dated 10 November 1950 and JCS 2124/25, Decision on Logistics Aspects of German Rearmament, 15 November 1950. See also un-numbered cable, G-3 (Bolte) to USCINCEUR, 17 November 1950, all in RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File, 091 Germany, 091-GE-TS (Sect 1-C)(Book IV)(Case 12), Box 21, NARA. A RCT is approximately 5,000-6,000 men strong.

assembled into divisional units for effective use by the Supreme Commander as soon as he determined it to be necessary.⁴¹

The first week in December saw a flurry of activity at both the Defense and State Departments, much of it regarding U.S.-French disagreement on the size of German units and whether the U.S. would approve appointment of a Supreme Commander before the size issue was settled. A teleconference on this issue took place on 3 December between Spofford, members of the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army and the NATO Standing Group. Spofford was able to report that as a result of negotiations and a proposal he had made, and to which the French had agreed, there was a reasonable chance for U.S.-French agreement that week.⁴²

That same day, 3 December, the Joint Staff was asked for their views on a State Department paper stemming from discussions between the President and Prime Minister Clement Attlee of Great Britain on the subject of European defense arrangements including German participation. The essence of the paper was that the world situation would not allow further delay and that the lack of an agreement on German participation was resulting in a deteriorating situation in Germany.

The point was made that if agreement with France could be reached on the participation of German units in a European defense, the U.S. could immediately proceed, without waiting for German acceptance, with the appointment of a Supreme Commander

⁴¹ See Summary of Telegrams, Western Europe, 10 November 1950 and 20 November 1950, Papers of Harry s. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Conferences File, Box 141, HSTL. President Truman wrote "approved" and put his initials next to the segment of the 10 November summary cited above.

⁴² Memorandum for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Telecon 3 December 1950, Between State and Defense Representatives and Mr. Spofford.*, 4 December 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File, 091 Germany, 091-GE-TS (Sect 1-C)(Book V)(Case 12), Box 22, NARA.

and the creation of an integrated force for the defense of Europe. The State Department paper also indicated that German participation warranted a change in the relationship between the Allies and the German Government through the relaxation of occupation controls (the State Department felt the British would concur but not the French). Nonetheless, the State Department felt that the U.S. should support the French efforts to consolidate the continent as a possible solution to both the European defense and the German problem.

The JCS did not object to the State Department paper but they believed there should be no new U.S. military commitments “of any nature” made to [Indochina] or Europe, other than aid until the Korean emergency was resolved. They were also greatly concerned about the politico-military solidarity of the NATO countries but believed that if the early appointment of a Supreme Commander would improve the situation materially, they would “consider” such an appointment. Lastly, they emphasized that the need for the early utilization of Germany’s war potential and for increased effective forces in being to achieve a “tangible measure of increased defense capabilities in Europe” was imperative.⁴³

A few days later, President Truman met with Prime Minister Attlee. When the discussion turned to Western Europe, Marshall was asked to speak. Marshall stated that many in Congress felt the U.S. position on European union and rearmament was impractical and that they wanted assurances that the plan for the defense of Western Europe had

⁴³ Enclosures “A” and “B” to JCS 2124/29, 4 December 1950, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on European Defense Arrangements including German Participation, RG 218, Geographic File 1948-1950, Box 26, NARA. A personal letter from Acheson to Schuman was also an enclosure in which Acheson urged Spofford’s compromise proposal that sought to de-link approving in principle German participation from the creation of an integrated force and the build-up of the political entity sought in the Plevin Plan.

a reasonable chance of success. Without such assurance, he maintained, there would be no further appropriations for European rearmament. Without French cooperation and a real assurance of German build up, Marshall insisted, “we would get nowhere.” Acheson interjected that he thought the appointment of a Supreme Commander would help and General Bradley underscored the need to assure Congress that both European rearmament and the plan to defend Western Europe would be efficient.⁴⁴

Before that meeting took place, Acheson called Lovett, telling him that there would be a “row with the British on the views that we are discussing with the French to encourage them to solve the problem.” Acheson then asked Lovett for clarification of the JCS position that they would be “prepared to consider [appointment of a Supreme Commander] when the North Atlantic treaty organization reached agreement on German rearmament” expected by the end of the week. Acheson then said he would take the JCS paper to the meeting with Attlee and tell him that if the French agreed, he was authorized to agree to the appointment of a Supreme Commander.

The following day, 7 December, Bolte wrote Collins that there had been several important developments since his last memo. Bolte wrote that the French had indicated that NATO should not proceed with the “actual” rearmament of Germany until an attempt has been made to reach a negotiated settlement with the USSR. Bolte also wrote

⁴⁴ Meeting of the President and the Prime Minister, 3:30 P.M., December 6, 1950, In the Cabinet Room, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953, Box 142, HSTL. Minutes of this meeting can also be found in RG43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, New York, Tripartite Meeting, September 1950, Box 52, Folder: US, UK, Washington DC, 1950, US Minutes, NARA.

that press reports indicated the French had agreed to the participation of German units of RCT size in an integrated force under a Supreme Commander.⁴⁵

The very next day, Bolte sent another memo to Collins with a summary of a teleconference held with Spofford that day. Spofford reported that the French had accepted, and the NATO Deputies had approved, the U.S. version of the NATO report, which read: “The size of the German formations to be constituted should not under present conditions exceed that of a regimental combat team or brigade groups. *However*, when these regimental combat team or brigade groups are formed and trained, the question of the manner in which they should be used must be determined in the light of conditions at the time, due weight being given to the views of the Supreme Commander.”⁴⁶

The summary also included concerns of the French representative, Hervé Alphan, that German RCT's not be combined together or placed under control of the German Government during the interim period. The French feared that German divisions could be formed clandestinely or that the RCT's would be unrestrained under direct German Government control. The NATO Deputies agreed that this issue should be referred to the Military Committee.

⁴⁵ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Bolte to Collins), *German Rearmament Developments 4-6 December*, 7 December 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File, 091 Germany, 091-GE-TS (Sect 1-C)(Book V)(Case 12), Box 22, NARA. Some suggest that the U.S. refusal to negotiate German issues with the USSR between 1949-1954 was to avoid having these negotiations present a platform for the Soviets to offer West Germany a settlement, such as unification in return for neutrality or, at a minimum, non-alignment with the West. What is forgotten, however, is that Adenauer, who saw West German salvation only in the west, would have refused such an offer. See Joseph B. Egan, “The Struggle for the Soul of Faust: the American Drive for German Rearmament 1950-1955,; unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1985, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Telecon, 8 December, with Mr. Spofford*, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File, 091 Germany, 091-GE-TS (Sect 1-C)(Book V)(Case 12), Box 22, NARA. Emphasis added.

The NAC met again in Brussels on 18 and 19 December to approve, among other things, German participation in the defense of Western Europe and to request the appointment of a Supreme Commander. Previously, on 15 December, Lovett had called Acheson to advise him of a conversation he had held with Eisenhower the day before. Among the issues discussed was Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander, which was a foregone conclusion. Eisenhower suggested that instead of offering the appointment to any particular individual, the Europeans be asked to invite the U.S. Government to select an individual and then ask those governments if that individual was acceptable.⁴⁷ The NAC did, in fact, make such a request, and at its sixth session on 18 December it approved a resolution that Eisenhower be appointed Supreme Commander. It then sent a recommendation to President Truman that he appoint Eisenhower to the position. The President's formal reply stated, in part, that he was in agreement with the view of the NAC that Eisenhower's "experience and talents make him uniquely qualified to assume the important responsibilities of this position."⁴⁸

Always in the background, however, was the Soviet threat, its impact on U.S. readiness and on German rearmament. In briefing notes prepared for the President at the 11 December NSC meeting, it was suggested that the President ask Bradley to discuss U.S. military position vis-à-vis the USSR and probable development during the initial

⁴⁷ Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Under Secretary Lovett, December 15, 1950, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Secretary of State File, 1945-1972, Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953, Box 68, HSTL.

⁴⁸ RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 48, NARA, and a Confidential Press Release, December 18, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: General File, 1945-1953, Box 102, HSTL. See also 6th Session of the NAT Council, Minutes of the 1st and 2nd Meetings, 18 December 1950, and also Brussels 983, 985, and 986 dated 18Dec50 and Brussels 996, 1002 dated 19Dec50, RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, New York, Tripartite Meeting, September 1950, Box 53, NARA.

stages were a general war to occur in the near future. The notes suggested the U.S. should not gamble that the USSR was bluffing and that the U.S. should prepare for total war in the near future. It could be avoided, however, if the U.S. acted with unity, determination and wisdom. The U.S. should do all it could to avoid war with the USSR without sacrificing self-respect or endangering U.S. survival. The U.S. should prepare for full mobilization and meet the 1954 defense targets as rapidly as possible. Lastly, in light of the Soviet declaration it would not tolerate German rearmament, U.S. efforts to organize and train West German units should be done with the greatest of care.⁴⁹

In the last week of 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued *National Intelligence Estimate 17* (NIE-17), entitled “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany.”⁵⁰ In its short, two-page estimate, the CIA indicated that a rearmament of Western Germany as then contemplated, i.e., creation of defensive forces, would not be considered by the USSR as menacing their security. It continued, however, that the USSR was unlikely to believe that once started, it would stop short of complete remilitarization. The Soviets recognized, however, that a remilitarization program would take time and thus, their immediate objective would be to hinder and delay its progress and to exploit the disagreements that exist over it within Western Europe to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, prevent its strengthening, and seek to bring about German unification on Soviet terms.

⁴⁹ Briefing Notes for President at the 11 Dec NSC Meeting, 9 December 1950, RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Records of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Box 53, Folder: US, UK, Washington December 1950 Miscellaneous, folder 1 of 2, NARA.

⁵⁰ NIE-17, “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany,” 27 December 1950, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimates Concerning the Soviet Union, 1950-1961, Box 1, NARA

The USSR had already expressed its concern in notes sent to the Western powers calling for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as well as separate notes to the British and the French. The NIE also indicated that the Soviets might increase their forces in Eastern Germany and their satellites and suggest to all that German remilitarization would result in German aggression. The NIE also suggested that if Soviet diplomacy and propaganda failed to halt German rearmament, the USSR might adopt more drastic measures that could involve the risk of war, e.g., it would justify an increase in Soviet forces in East Germany and the satellites. Lastly, the NIE concluded that the Soviets would most likely exhaust all practical means of preventing German rearmament and suggested that if the USSR became convinced that complete German rearmament, together with NATO rearmament and political solidarity between West Germany and the western powers could not be stopped, the USSR would seriously consider going to war.

Despite having reached agreement on German participation in principle, the Plev-en Plan, which subsequently became the EDC, and despite French insistence on the construction of a European Army complete with its complicated bureaucracy and its multitude of political and legal restrictions, the actual recruitment and building of cadres for the FRG's contribution was placed in limbo.⁵¹ Neither blandishment from the U.S. nor the Truman Administration's subsequent acceptance of EDC and the European Army concept as the only way to put West Germans in uniform moved the French. In addition, aside from high level talks with the Germans, the French insisted that until the EDC Trea-

⁵¹ The EDC concept officially came into being when its Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952. It is not my intent, however, to go over the negotiations over the EDC that lasted almost four years before it was rejected by the French in August 1954. The story of the EDC has been well covered by Large, *Op. cit.*, McGeehan, *Op. cit.*, McAllister, *Op. cit.*, Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, and Edward Fursdon, *The European Defense Community, a History*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980, among others.

ty was ratified, there be no official military to military talks with the Germans. The impact of this on U.S. military planning created a number of program delays and problems that will be discussed below in Chapter 6.

At this juncture, it should also be noted that Eisenhower was initially skeptical of the EDC - he did not want, he had said, any “reluctant Hessians” in his army.⁵² In June 1951, however, after a lunch with Jean Monnet that had been arranged by McCloy, Eisenhower “embraced” the concept of a “United States of Europe” and gave his support to the EDC. One month later, in July, he sent a personal message to both Marshall and Acheson in which he said he was

convinced the time has come when we must all press for the earliest implementation of the European Army concept. Bruce, McCloy and I are in full agreement that implementation of the European Army concept despite the many complicated details which will have to be worked out, offers the best and earliest possible chance for a solution to the problem of (a) obtaining the necessary def [sic] contribution from West Ger [sic]....” Having become convinced that the establishment of an [sic] European Army will be a major constructive step, I now propose to support it in every possible way.⁵³

And later that month, on 22 July, Eisenhower met with a visiting subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at SHAPE and told them: “When I came over here I disliked the whole idea of a European Army and I had enough troubles without it.

⁵² Birtle, *Op. cit.*, p. 91. On not wanting unwilling {German} contingents, see C.G.D. Onslow, “West German Rearmament,” *World Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 4, (July 1951), p. 483.

⁵³ See Thomas Schwartz, “The Case of German Rearmament: Alliance Crisis in the ‘Golden Age’,” *Fletcher Forum*, #8, (Summer 1984), p. 307 and Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1978, pp. 358-59. Eisenhower’s message to Marshall and Acheson is ALO 208, 18 July 1951, and was included as an attachment to NSC 115, August 2, 1951, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 110-117, Entry 1, Box 15, NARA. It can also be found in *FRUS*, 1951:3, Part I, p. 838.

However....I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet...and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to think that I am crazy. But...joining Europe together is the key to this whole thing.”⁵⁴

In giving its support to the EDC, the U.S. placed four conditions on the emerging organization. They were:

1. The EDC must create administrative arrangements that would allow it to participate in the defense of Europe.
2. The European Army would be under SACEUR’s command.
3. The lengthy negotiations establishing EDC and its superstructure would not impede the build-up of German units.
4. EDC’s administrative machinery was not to interfere with NATO.⁵⁵

This decision, enunciated in NSC 115, put the German rearmament question squarely in the context of a broader European policy. As a result, U.S. basic goals remained the same but on a sounder basis. The question, however, was whether the U.S. commitment to EDC had put the U.S. in the “hands of the French?”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Birtle, *Loc. cit.* p. 92. Birtle’s quote is not absolutely correct and the correct quote, truncated above, was found on p. 24 of the original stenographic version of the meeting at <http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-ID=HRG-1951-FOR-0034>. In a later letter to Secretary of Defense Marshall on 3 August, Eisenhower again stated that he was initially “firm in my refusal to get tied up in the project because it seemed, almost inherently, to include every kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that misguided humans could put together in one package.” He also wrote that the “plan was not above suspicion that it may have been put forward in the certainty that it could not be achieved....” Putting his hopes on the new French Government, he was shifting his beliefs, however, because he saw that 1) most governments involved are sincere in their efforts to develop the European Army; 2) a spectacular accomplishment is “vitally necessary” to get the whole security program moving and generate confidence in Europe and America; 3) the plan offers the only immediate hope, acceptable to other Europeans, of developing “the German strength that is vital to us;” and 4) there will be no progress toward European unity except through “specific programs of this kind.” Attachment to Letter from Marshall to the President, 27 August, 3 August 1951, Harry s. Truman Library Student Research File, (B File) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, #34A, Box 1 of 2, HSTL. Eisenhower made similar statements to President Truman, “...the idea of an European Defense Force was as ‘cockeyed’ an idea as a dope fiend could have figured out.” Meeting of the President with General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Cabinet Room of the White House, 3:15 P.M., November 5, 1951, p. 10, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: General File, 1945-1953, Box 102, HSTL.

⁵⁵ NSC 115, August 2, 1951, *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁶ Birtle, *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

Building a New German Military

Discussions between the three Allied High Commissioners and the West German Government on constructing the German contribution began in early January 1951. One of the first questions asked by Germany was what they were expected to contribute by the end of 1951. The Allied High Commission had agreed on 100,000 men as an interim measure but the Army's G-3 Plans division recommended a stronger program and proposed a figure of 195,000. This number was based upon several things: the German desire for equality; to secure the maximum effective German contribution; that sufficient equipment from the Austrian MDAP stockpile was available to equip four divisions; and that \$200 Million from the supplemental FY 51 MDAP funds had been recommended by the JCS for the German rearmament program. The memo prepared to justify these numbers also contained Allied safeguards, i.e., all German units to be under SHAPE's control; total German land formation would not exceed one-fifth of the total of Allied land formations; German formations would not exceed RCT size until authorized by NATO; and German units would not be developed at the expense of other forces.⁵⁷

Over and above the safeguards described above, the Joint Report of the NAC Deputies and the Military Committee to the NATO Defense Committee, approved on 18 December 1950, contained yet over a dozen additional militarily significant limitations placed on Germany, to include:

- Limiting its Air Force to the defense of western Germany and the support of its ground units,

⁵⁷ Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Negotiations on German Military Contribution to the Defense of Western Europe*, 12 January 1951 and Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Size of German Military Contribution to the Defense of Western Europe*, 13 January 1951, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File, 1950-1951, 091 - Germany (TS)(Sect II)(Cases 21-40), Box 22, NARA.

- Limiting German naval units to mine, patrol, and harbor craft only,
- Prohibiting Germany from contributing complete armored formations,
- Prohibiting Germany from supervising its own officer recruitment and training,
- Prohibiting German plans, operations or intelligence staffs to function above the level of tactical units,
- Maintaining prohibitions and limitations on German industry, thus prohibiting the production of heavy military equipment, military aircraft, and naval vessels other than minor defensive craft,
- Prohibiting the production of atomic, biological or chemical weapons, and the possession of long-range missiles,
- Limiting research and development to requirements laid down by the Military Committee and then only under Allied supervision.⁵⁸

One month later, on 18 January 1951, McCloy responded to the German size recommendations asking an additional set of questions, among which were:

- What was total strength of the German forces to be created by end 1952?
- Whether the allies could train 15 percent of the German contribution with the equipment available within 3 months beginning 15 Sep 51?
- What proportion of the 15 percent could be trained by British, French or U.S. forces? (Germany, however, preferred that the U.S. train its nuclei).
- Would equipment for 50 percent of the German force contribution be available by the end 1951 and the remainder by 1 April 1952?
- Which U.S. schools were available to train selected Germans?⁵⁹

The JCS response limited itself to providing only a recommendation on the end 1952 strength of German forces, justifying its limited response to the fact that the military aspects of German participation was up to NATO in accordance with the Medium Term

⁵⁸ The limitations were part of NATO Document C6-D/1, December 13, 1950, and were sent in a memo to Mr. Bromley Smith at State by Ridgeway B. Knight, and Advisor to Ambassador Bruce on 26 January 1951. See Memorandum for Mr. Bromley Smith, *Negative limitations concerning German participation in the NATO defense structure for Western Europe*, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Records Relating to the European Defense Community 1951-1954, Lot File 56D38, Box 34, NARA. The figure of 195,000 was broken down as follows: 165,000 Army (12 RCT's with support and service troops), 25,000 Air Force and 5,000 Navy.

⁵⁹ Bonn 468, January 18, 1951, RG 218, Geographic File 1948-1950, Box 26, NARA. This cable was also part of JCS 2124/33, 23 January 1951, RG 319 - Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 23, 091- Germany (TS) (Section II-D)(Book I)(Case 38)

Force Goals. As to the questions related to training, the JCS felt that as West Germany had not yet agreed to nor accepted the invitation to contribute forces, it was premature to discuss those issues.

Nonetheless, the force strength recommendation made by the JCS for forwarding to the U.S. Representative on the NATO Standing Group was as follows:

TOTAL ARMY 440,000

Ground Combat: 247,000

30 RCT's (187,000)

3 AAA Brigades (15,000)

Combat Support (40,000-45,000)

Ground Service: 107,500

Technical Service Support (100,000)

Administrative Service Support (7,500)

Overhead and Mobilization Base: 85,000

Administrative Operations (35,000)

Trainees, transients, patients (50,000)

TOTAL NAVY 10,000

TOTAL AIR FORCE 45,000 (10 fighter wings/3 squadrons each)

Ground personnel (43,000)

Pilots (2,000)

The JCS added a caveat to these figures, stating that while they were considered suitable for ongoing negotiations, the JCS could give no positive assurance that there would be sufficient armament and equipment produced by the NATO countries or German industry to justify creation of those forces in 1952. The phased build-up, the caveat continued, had to be adjusted to plans allocating equipment to the Allies that would only be known over the next several years.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ JSPC 965/4, 1 February 1951, *German Participation in European Defense Arrangements*, RG 218, Geographic File 1948-1950, Box 26, NARA. The figures given are found in Enclosure "B." This JSPC docu-

1952 - Bureaucracy and Fear Slow Progress

Throughout 1952, the State Department, with assistance from the Defense Department, was involved in discussions on various financial and other requirements of the EDC, as well as cajoling the various European nations regarding the timing of the ratification of the EDC Treaty⁶¹ On the more military level, planning for the arrival of German troops continued and discussions regarding the creation of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) for Germany began.⁶² On 22 February, the NAC reaffirmed the urgency of the defense of Western Europe and the early establishment of the EDF, including a German contribution of the size and nature recommended by the NATO Military Committee.⁶³ In March, the Secretary of Defense assigned an officer from his office to be his representative to the Paris-EDC-High Commissioners-SHAPE discussions assessing the validity of the costing estimates of the German contingent to EDC. An Air Force of-

ment was finalized and distributed as JCS 2124/40 on 15 February 1950 and the actual letter to the U.S. Representative on the Standing Committee was dispatched as SM-536-51, 28 February 1951, RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-195, Box 23, 091- Germany (TS) (Section II-D)(Book I)(Case 38), NARA. NOTE: The JCS envisaged 10-15 German divisions maximum for implementation of the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan (App A to JCS 2124/24) but as divisions were forbidden during the transition period, JCS wanted 10-15 division equivalents by 1 July 1951 (10 division equivalents = 30 RCT's or "Groupements," which in turn would comprise 13,000 men in an infantry RCT; 12,600 in an armored RCT; and 12,600 in a mechanized RCT. RG 319, Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-195, Box 23, 091- Germany (TS) (Section II-D)(Book I)(Case 38), NARA. At some point in late February or early March, however, the number of RCT's was reduced to 24. See SM-678-51, 14 March 1951, Enclosure "A" to JCS 2124/43, 4 April 1951, RG 218, Geographic File 1951-53, Box 17.

⁶¹ See, for example, the numerous Memoranda of Conversation with the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Great Britain found in Dean G. Acheson Papers, Secretary of State File, 1945-1972, Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953, Box 71, HSTL.

⁶² G-3 Memo to Chief of Staff, Army, 21 August 1952. See also JSPC 956/24, 7 August 1952, RG 319 - Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-51, 091 Germany (TS), (Section II-D)(Case 30), Box 12, NARA.

⁶³ North Atlantic Council, C9-D/19, *Resolution on German Participation in Western Defense*, 22 February 1952, RG59 -Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Community, 1951-1954, Lot File 56D38, Box 31, NARA.

ficer from the USAFE was also assigned to assist him. The U.S. sought to begin furnishing training equipment in phase with the German build-up beginning in CY 1953.⁶⁴

One issue that continued to plague U.S. attempts to speed up the process of obtaining German soldiers was that of funding the creation of a German military. It had already been determined that no German forces could come into being until the EDC Treaty was ratified. Once that was done, however, and before the U.S. could provide military assistance to that country, U.S. law required Germany's eligibility to receive military assistance be certified. Accordingly, in early July the Secretary of Defense requested that to avoid delays in providing assistance to German military units in the European Defense Force, the JCS provide a military determination as to German eligibility.

The JCS was requested to advise whether the FRG "is of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic Area" and whether its increased ability to defend itself is "important to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area, and to the security of the United States." It was also asked to advise whether the grant of military assistance to the FRG would strengthen U.S. security.⁶⁵

Along those same lines, in mid-July, the JCS sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that any consideration for the organization of a MAAG-Germany be held in abeyance until the EDC came into force and Germany's require-

⁶⁴ Memo, 26 March 1952, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File 1952, 091 Germany (TS) (Section II-A)(Book I)(Case 21 only), Box 115, NARA. The Secretary's representative found the German estimates too high, much to the dismay of the Germans and shadow Defense Minister Blank.

⁶⁵ Enclosure to JCS 2099/212, 8 July 1952, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File 1952, 091 Germany (TS), (Section IV-A)(Case 61), Box 11, NARA. On 4 Jun52, JCS 2099/205, contained an earlier, similar request from the State Department whether Germany was eligible for arms assistance on a reimbursable basis. This document cited NSC 115, which established the fact that the ability of Germany to defend itself or participate in the defense of Western Europe was important to the security of the United States.

ments were determined. The JCS also recommended that until that occurred, USCIN-CEUR should be charged with planning activities related to the MDAP as it applies to German units created for the EDC.⁶⁶

The following month, the JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that USCIN-CEUR had been officially assigned responsibility for interim military planning regarding military assistance to Germany. This planning was to be coordinated with the Embassy Paris Observer's Group.⁶⁷

Towards the end of September, the continued mistrust of Germany on the part of the French was evident during discussions held with Theodor Blank, West Germany's future defense minister and General Hans Speidel regarding end-item delivery schedules. One of the problems Blank was confronting was the question of German troop deployment. He knew, he said, how many barracks he already had and, based on the planned German contribution to the EDC, how many he would need to build. What he didn't know was where to build them. The French, he related, felt that it would be dangerous to provide Germany with that information as they believed the Germans would then start working *sub rosa*.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, *Implementation of Possible Military Assistance to Western Germany*, 16 July 1952, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File 1952, 091 Germany, Box 116, NARA.

⁶⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, *Implementation of Possible Military Assistance to Western Germany*, 22 August 1952, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File 1952, 091 Germany, Box 116, NARA. Based on a Memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for the Chief of Staff, US Army, same subject, and attached to this Memorandum, it appears that the directive to USCINCEUR was contained in JCS 2099/226, as amended, 22 Aug 1952. G-3 recommended approval and indicated that the Navy and Air Force were also recommending approval. See Chapter 6.

⁶⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, 28 September 1952, RG 319 - Army Ops General Decimal File 1952, 091 Germany (TS) (Section IV-A)(Case 61), Box 12, NARA. See, for example, Frank M. Buscher, "The U.S. High Commission and German Nationalism, 1949-52," *Central European History*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 57-75.

This mistrust, as well as a concern over rising German nationalism, was not confined to the French. In a two-part letter to Paul Nitze, John Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff wrote about discussions he had had on Germany with George Kennan, former Army Undersecretary and now U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William Draper, Walter J. Donnelly, who had replaced McCloy as U.S. High Commissioner, and David Bruce in London. According to Ferguson, Donnelly said that France would not be able to control Germany in EDC as in NATO. The problem of FRG membership in NATO was not yet urgent but it would arise after the EDC Treaty was ratified. He feared that the FRG in EDC was simply an attempt to get the Allies to help it regain East Germany. Kennan was even more fearful. He felt that if the FRG was admitted to NATO, a civil war would ensue.⁶⁹

On 18 November, just a few weeks after Eisenhower was elected President of the United States, he was invited to a meeting with Truman and Acheson to “establish the framework for full understanding of our problems and our purposes in the interim until January 20.” Truman saw two problems regarding European defense. The first dealt with the need to have a meeting with the NAC to discuss the military programs of the NATO members whose proposed force contributions far exceeded their economic capabilities.

The second problem, according to Truman, was the problem of EDC Treaty ratification. The U.S., Truman said, had hoped the Treaty would be ratified by the end of 1952 or even January or February 1953 at the latest. But after the attack on the treaties by France, a recent “unwise” press conference by Schuman, and the defeat in the German

⁶⁹ Letter, John Ferguson to Paul Nitze, 26 September 1952, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, Box 16 (folder 1), NARA.

Bundestag of a motion to take up the treaties on 26 November, there was a real crisis in West European collaboration. France and Germany were “jockeying” to see who should act first and neither was willing to do anything until the new Eisenhower administration came in.⁷⁰ It was serious in respect to the defense of Western Europe but could also initiate a reaction against the continuation of the occupation and postpone implementing the treaty with Germany.⁷¹

Just a week before the inauguration, Samuel Reber, Deputy U.S. High Commissioner sent a cable to the Secretary of State describing the impact of delays in the EDC Treaty ratification process. Doubts that the treaty would ever be ratified were slowing down planning on German forces and military production. The EDC-Interim Commission (EDC-IC) had not made progress developing organization and procedures, nor had it been possible to develop a German utilization plan, develop policies on production and procurement in Germany, or to begin contracting for infrastructure and equipment. The one piece of good news was that within the Military Security Board, both the French and the British agreed to allow the U.S. member to unilaterally approve German requests for increased capacity in shipbuilding, synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, and precision bearings, if necessary. Reber concluded that despite continued criticism from the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Adenauer government’s western orientation would not

⁷⁰ Toward the end of 1952, three-time pre-war Radical Prime Ministers Édouard Herriot and Édouard Daladier had denounced the EDC, placing France’s ratification of the EDC Treaty in a precarious position. Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, *European Items Raised by Mr. Eden in New York*, November 12, 1952, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Secretary of State File, 1945-1972, Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949-1953, Box 71, HSTL.

⁷¹ Memorandum of Meeting at the White House Between President Truman and General Eisenhower, November 18, 1952, *Ibid.*

change and that West European progress and recognition of Germany's role would only increase German integration.⁷²

The Eisenhower Administration Takes Over

A week before the inauguration, on 14 January 1953, Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, sent a memorandum to the JCS in which he stated that the NAC had recognized that “[t]he defense of Europe, including Western Germany, as far to the east as possible will require a German contribution in terms of effective military units.” He continued that the “simplest and quickest” way to accomplish this would be to end the occupation and bring the FRG directly into NATO. Recognizing that this was politically unacceptable to France, the NAC also stated in the same document that an EDF, as part of an integrated NATO Defense Force, was acceptable as long as it did not delay a German contribution.⁷³

Admiral Davis wrote further that “it is now, however, two years since this method of providing for German participation...was initiated and it is obvious...that there will be further and probably prolonged delay in ratification of a European Defense Community treaty....” He concluded by recommending that the JCS consider, as a matter of priority,

⁷² Bonn 3204, January 12, 1953, 8 p.m., RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Records Relating to the European Defense Community, Entry A1 1601-G, Box 33, NARA. For a description of the EDC-IC, see Chapter 6 below. Six months later, on 2 Jul 1953, the U.S. High Commissioner in Bonn wrote Dulles informing him that French intransigence and refusal on the Military Security Board to allow defense items to be produced in Germany was jeopardizing the entire program. The U.S. must tell France they can no longer veto such issues in the MSB and must allow production of up to \$150 million in 1954 if they wish to obtain their share of the program. RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Community, 1951-1954, Lot File 56D38, Box 32, NARA.

⁷³ DUSM-12-53, 14 January 1953, Memorandum for the Joint chiefs of Staff, *Re-examination of Position on Participation of the German Federal Republic in Western European Defense*, Enclosure to JCS 2124/79, 15 January 1953, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Geographic File, 1951-1953, Box 18, NARA. The NAC document is C-6-D/1.

“the increasingly urgent status of the problem with a view to the possible advisability of developing and recommending alternative action leading to German participation as soon as possible....”

Almost immediately after his inauguration, Eisenhower, now an avid proponent of European integration, sent his new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and Harold Stassen, the Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to Europe to observe and to listen. Before he left, however, Dulles spoke on national television about the purpose of his and Stassen’s trip. He made a point of telling viewers that the U.S. had made a major \$40 billion investment in Europe and he concluded that “if it appeared that there were no chance of getting effective unity, and if in particular France, Germany and England should go their separate ways, then certainly it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America’s own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe.”⁷⁴ While there, he met with the leader of the German SPD, Erich Ollenhauer, and stated that the U.S. would not accept a German National Army *under any conditions*. It was his belief that the establishment of such an army would lead to another Franco-German war, a position that was incomprehensible to the SPD leaders. Dulles left the impression that the U.S. had “completely closed the door” to any alternative to the existing European defense plans, i.e., EDC.⁷⁵

Several weeks later, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Fechteler, responded to the JCS concerning Vice

⁷⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, New York: Signet Books (pb), 1965, pp. 184-185.

⁷⁵ Unnumbered Bonn cable sent via pouch,, February 6, 1953, RG59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Community, 1951-1954, Lot File 56D38, Box 32, NARA. Emphasis added.

Admiral Davis's memorandum about a possible alternative to EDC. Collins's lengthy response was thorough and critical. He began by stating that he did not "consider it appropriate" for the JCS to offer gratuitous and premature recommendations and comments on this complex problem to the Secretary of Defense. While he agreed that no new course of action should be recommended, Collins stated that *Germany's membership in NATO was the most desirable alternative if the EDC Treaty is not ratified*. Collins acknowledged that this method was unacceptable to France and posited other possible alternatives. He also restated JCS's position of October 1950, in which the Chiefs had declared that in the event a German contribution was not possible, the U.S. should re-examine its contribution to the defense of Western Europe. He did not believe that this would of necessity lead to a "peripheral strategy," but *he indicated that there had been no analysis made of possible U.S. courses of action should German rearmament not be allowed* and that now was the time to undertake such an analysis.⁷⁶

Fechteler's response consisted primarily of modifications to what was a follow-on report by the JSSC and reply to Davis. He too felt that if the most desirable arrangement could not be had, alternatives should be explored to avoid an "all or nothing" situation. He also opposed a target date of 1 July 1953 for ratification of the EDC Treaty and beginning of the German build-up as proposed by the JSSC. It was unreasonable, he wrote, to expect ratification and build-up by any specific target date. His rationale was that if the date was not met, the project would be abandoned and if German membership in NATO

⁷⁶ Reexamination of Position on Participation of the German Federal Republic in Western European Defense, February 20, 1953, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Geographic File, 1951-53, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 8-14, Box 18, NARA. This was a response to JCS 2124/83 (not found), which apparently included a reply to Admiral Davis from the JSSC. Emphasis added.

was unobtainable, the U.S. should undertake action to rearm Germany by other means.⁷⁷

Both Collins and Fechteler recommended that the JCS take no action regarding alternatives to EDC until requested by the Secretary of Defense.

On 3 March 1953, Leon W. Fuller, Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs and member of the Policy Planning Staff, circulated a paper he had written entitled “An Alternate U.S. Course of Action Respecting EDC and a German Settlement.” Among the points raised in the paper, Fuller highlighted the following:

- Chances for EDC ratification by mid-year ('53) are less than even.
- French attitudes are still not adjusted to fact that Russia, not Germany, is the enemy.
- France sees EDC as an emergency act to meet exigencies of the Cold War and to contain German power but only incidentally to augment the strength of European defense.
- Germany has bought EDC but only due to the absence of admissible alternatives; unarmed neutrality preferred by probably 2/3 population.
- Rearmament grudgingly accepted by Germany but it confirms the division of Germany.
- Both [France and Germany] believe ratification [of EDC] will come only due to U.S. pressure.
- EDC, for the U.S., is a response to the Soviet threat to Europe.
- The U.S. does not see [within EDC] the revolutionary reform, i.e., the merger of national sovereignty that EDC demands. It is something that neither the U.S. nor the UK would do.

Fuller argued that EDC was a means to an end, not the end itself.

- The U.S. has yet to explain how EDC would lead to German unity or peace.
- *The new [Eisenhower] Administration is even more explicitly committed to EDC than its predecessor.*
- Failure of EDC would force alteration of U.S. military strategy in a manner “highly adverse” to U.S. security and political interests in Europe, inasmuch as no satisfactory alternative to EDC is available.
- Ratification of EDC could intensify the cleavage of Germany and launch the U.S. irretrievably upon a power struggle with the USSR.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

- France and Germany believe that an effort should first be made to achieve a settlement with the USSR or come to a showdown to make clear, once and for all, who is thwarting a reasonable settlement.⁷⁸

Fuller concluded with a 10-step course of action to be taken by the U.S. in which he said it was necessary for EDC to be ratified in order to impress upon France and Germany that failure would possibly fatally weaken the West in any political “trial of strength” with the USSR.

On 6 March, the JSSC forwarded JCS 2124/84 (a second revision of JCS 2124/79) to the JCS. This report contained virtually all the recommendations made by Collins and Fechteler. The Appendix to the Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense outlined the JCS’s rather pessimistic view of the situation. While repeating that German membership in NATO was preferable to EDC, it accepted the fact that France would never accept Germany as a full-fledged member in the Alliance. The JCS suggested that no other alternatives would be as effective but had to be examined. However, they continued, the absence of full participation in the common defense effort by France and Germany opened up the possibility that the concept of forward defense might have to be abandoned, possibly leading to a peripheral defense strategy “with all of its grave military disadvantages.”

Presenting their position, as all JCS papers did, from the “military point of view,” the JCS addressed the delays in arming the Germans, stating that there should already have been a substantial German contribution. The military appreciation for years 1954-1955 indicated it would be a dangerous period and considering the time required to cre-

⁷⁸ RG 59 – General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 64D563, Box 16, Folder 3, NARA. Emphasis added.

ate, organize, equip, and train German forces, a protracted delay in ratification of the EDC Treaty could lead to serious military consequences. Furthermore, if EDC was abandoned and German NATO membership vetoed, the U.S. needed to take “vigorous action” to rearm Germany within the framework of “other suitable political arrangements.”

The Appendix closed by stating that given the State Department’s awareness of the urgency of the situation and its efforts to bring about EDC ratification, the JCS would exert no further pressure. The JCS also indicated, however, that if called upon to comment, they would be prepared to express their views on the German rearmament issue to include the degree to which they would support limits on additional military aid or other military concessions to France to further induce her participation in EDC.⁷⁹

Toward the middle of March, most likely after the above memorandum had been sent to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS sent a brief reply to Admiral Davis. In it, the JCS opined that without a substantial German contribution, the defense of Western Europe would be “shallow and expensive” and probably ineffective. Nonetheless, how Germany was to be rearmed was a political matter to be determined by “the political elements of the government.” Regardless of how this is accomplished, the speedy creation of effective German combat units and maximum use of Germany’s productive capacity were “definite and urgent military requirements.”⁸⁰

While the idea of putting pressure on France to ratify EDC by limiting the amount of military aid given to her floated around the Defense and State Departments, Eisenhow-

⁷⁹ JCS 2124/84, 6 March 1953, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Geographic File 1951-53, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 15 to 387 Germany (12-17-43) Sec. 16, Box 19, NARA. JCS’ concern stemmed from the fact that no German forces could be raised until the EDC Treaty was ratified.

⁸⁰ SM-609-53, 20 March 1953, *Ibid.*

er threw out another possible inducement at a meeting of the NSC on 25 March. During the discussion, Secretary of State Dulles painted a rather bleak picture of what might happen in Europe if EDC, which he saw as the last chance for European unity along lines desired by the U.S., “went down the drain.” The FRG would unilaterally assume a larger measure of sovereignty with U.S. and British support but engendering “irreconcilable French hostility.” Dulles, however, indicated that he and other U.S. officials would explore, together with the French, ways to reduce the strain on France imposed by its involvement in Indo-China. It was beyond France’s capabilities, Dulles explained, to shoulder the load imposed by its European commitments and those in Southeast Asia.

Eisenhower then inquired whether the JCS might find it of value to examine the possibility of offering the French a “preeminent command position” in Europe. Given that military prestige was very important to the French, he suggested that they might be offered either the Central European Command or even General Matthew B. Ridgway’s job as SACEUR. Dulles agreed that such an offer would offset France’s fear that the EDC meant loss of French identity and leadership on the continent. Dulles then turned to General Bradley, asking whether the JCS could proffer an opinion within the next two days. Bradley indicated it could but ventured that the question was more political than military and that the State Department should consider the political implications as well as the degree of opposition the U.S. would encounter from the other European states. The President’s proposal and his desire that State and Defense explore its feasibility were noted.⁸¹

⁸¹ Eyes Only, TS, “Discussion at the 138th Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, March 25, 1953,” March 26, 1953, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 4, DDEL.

On 7 April 1953, Frank C. Nash, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs provided Adenauer with a summary of budgetary action the U.S. had taken to provide the FRG with certain items of major military equipment. The summary, subsequently known as the “Nash Commitment,” did not, however, provide an itemized list of equipment to be provided nor did it indicate the size of the program. The statement read by Nash to Adenauer contained, in part, the following:⁸²

Taking into account the equipment availabilities for and requirements of the EDC countries as a whole...the United States has made budgetary provisions...to provide to the [EDC] the major equipment required...for the first six German groupements and twenty-four German air squadrons, on a basis comparable to that used in providing equipment to the other EDC countries. This equipment will include:

a. For Army Contingents:

In general, only those items having a primary military application, such as tanks, combat vehicles, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and basic signal and engineering equipment, including components and spare parts.

b. For Air Force Contingents:

Fighter-bomber aircraft, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, primary and jet training aircraft, ground handling equipment, maintenance training units and related equipment, electronics maintenance training units and related equipment, electronics and communications

⁸² *USAFE's Assistance to Create a New German Air Force*, K570.04M, 1952-1955, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Historical Division, Office of Information Services, Wiesbaden, Germany, 1956, pp. 75-77. Hereafter *USAFE, AND History of Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 July- 31 December 1957 (S)*, K - 570.01, Jul-Dec 1957, Vol. I, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Historical Division, Office of Information Services, Wiesbaden, Germany, 8 October 1958, pp. 102-10. Hereafter *History*.

equipment, machine guns, bombs, rockets, and miscellaneous ammunition.⁸³

The statement contained other, general information regarding ongoing negotiations for the return of certain confiscated naval vessels, conditions under which the equipment would be delivered, and the need to complete arrangement regarding plans for the build-up of German forces in order that delivery plans could be formulated. It also stated that more detailed information would be available once the EDC Treaty had been ratified.⁸⁴

A Question of Alternatives to EDC?

Recall that several months earlier, Leon Fuller had written: “The new [Eisenhower] Administration is even more explicitly committed to EDC than its predecessor.” This was made evident in a nationally televised speech Eisenhower gave on 16 April in which he said “It [This free world] knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively demands the unity of purpose and action made possible by [NATO], embracing the European Defense community. It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal partner in this community....”⁸⁵ The following day, John Ausland of the Bureau of German Affairs wrote his colleague Coburn Kidd that Eisenhower’s speech “added up” to the [U.S.] belief that German unification “should be achieved within the framework of a broad European community based on the west European community” and only through

⁸³ Bonn A - 1507, April 9, 1953, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1953, 091. G, Box 34, NARA.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, and *USAFE*, p. 75. As a matter of fact, however, an itemized, but still incomplete list was not provided to the FRG until 22 November 1954.

⁸⁵ DOSB, Vol.28, April 27, 1953, p. 600.

membership in the EDC.⁸⁶ This idea was further enunciated by Eisenhower in a personal letter to Winston Churchill in which the President wrote: "...another subject of vital interest to us both...is the need, in Europe, for uniform progress on the Common Defense Plan and for *greater political and economic unity*."⁸⁷

There is evidence, however, that growing dissatisfaction with the slow pace of EDC discussions led to a discussion of alternatives within the State Department, specifically between the Bureau of German Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff. The Bureau of German Affairs, for example, saw five possible alternatives to EDC while the Policy Planning Staff saw only three. Each saw German national forces as one possible alternative. NATO was the preferred alternative for the Bureau of German Affairs but only a "possibly" preferred course in the Policy Planning Staff's eyes. The Bureau of German Affairs, however, saw no real "practical" alternative to EDC while the Policy Planning Staff proposed to temporarily give up the effort to get a German defense contribution if EDC failed. Instead, it recommended opening a new set of negotiations to obtain "some acceptable arrangement" serving the same purpose as EDC.⁸⁸

In early July, Adenauer wrote Dulles suggesting that a Four Power Conference on the German question meet in the fall. A week later, a meeting between Dulles, Acting British Foreign Secretary the Marquess of Salisbury, and Georges Bidault, the French

⁸⁶ Note, John C. Ausland to Mr. Coburn Kidd, *The President's Speech and German Unity*, April 17, 1953, RG 59, Office of German Affairs, Subject Files 1949-1960, Box 14, NARA. The note indicated, however, that Eisenhower did not make clear which countries comprised the European community other than the FRG and Western Europe.

⁸⁷ Undated "personal and secret" letter, Eisenhower to Churchill, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 1, DDEL.

⁸⁸ Undated paper. "Main difference between GER and S/P drafts," RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, Lot 64D563, Box 16, NARA. A handwritten annotation on the paper indicated it was used for discussion of German paper on 6-23-53 in RB offices; see LF Memo of 6-24 re: mtg.

Foreign Minister took place in which the three governments concurred with Adenauer and proposed an early autumn meeting with the USSR. The possibility of a four-power meeting led the NSC Planning Board to develop an updated position paper with respect to Germany. This led to a Department of Defense position paper to place against a State Department position paper in the NSC.⁸⁹

On 30 July, the JCS responded to a request from the Secretary of Defense to examine the draft Department of Defense paper. Having learned, however, that the NSC intended to use the State Department's draft as its working document, the JCS elected to discuss only the "fundamental security considerations" involved rather than addressing the Department of Defense draft, and it recommended that its comments be used to present the Defense Department's position. That said, the JCS found itself in general accord with the draft and the risks it entailed but feared that pursuing its objectives, i.e., negotiating with the USSR over Germany, could lead to prolonging the EDC negotiations, thus delaying the attainment of a German contribution which the JCS still considered an urgent requirement. Prolonged negotiations, according to the JCS, would allow the Soviets to progressively increase their nuclear capabilities and thereby possibly use the transition period, i.e., during the necessary drawdown and redeployment of Allied occupation forces and redesign of NATO defense plans, to launch a general war. It was, therefore, im-

⁸⁹ Letter, Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, July 8, 1953, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Office of German Affairs, "Subject Files," 1949-1060. Lot 63D166, Box 06, NARA; "Communiqué, No. 379, July 14, 1953, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 1, DDEL; ACofS, G-3, Plans Div to ACofS, G-2, Intelligence Estimate (Germany) , G-3 091 Germany (24 July 1953), RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal Files 1953, 091. G, Box 34, NARA.

perative that the U.S. impress upon its Allies the urgent need to ratify EDC and rapidly integrate German forces into the West's defense efforts.⁹⁰

NSC 160/1, the U.S. position paper approved by Eisenhower on 13 August, restated the existing U.S. position on Western Germany. This paper, however, also asserted that while a unified Germany, free of Soviet occupation forces was essential for an “enduring settlement, both in Germany and in Europe,” a free and united Germany, oriented to the West, would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and a “neutralized” Germany, armed or not, would entail sacrifices and risks to the West “incommensurate with any possible gains.”

NSC 160/1 also recognized the Department of Defense's fears, stating that possible four-power talks would most likely delay progress toward EDC but that French ratification appeared unlikely until such talks were held or blocked by the USSR. It called for the U.S. to support “with all available means” the creation of the European Community and the ratification of the EDC Treaty as no satisfactory alternative to EDC had been found. Nonetheless, the U.S. should review alternative courses of action should delays be prolonged to include not only the preferred NATO alternative but also bilateral steps with West Germany if it could be done without serious diplomatic repercussions from France.⁹¹

⁹⁰JCS 2124/87, “Memorandum For the Secretary of Defense,” 30 July 1953, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File 1951-53, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 15 to 387 Germany (12-17-43) Sec. 16, Box 19, NARA.

⁹¹ NSC 160/1 United States Policy with Respect to Germany,” August 17, 1953, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 159-160, Entry 1, Box 23, NARA. The reference to a “European Community” obviously refers to the initiation of talks among the EDC signatories to the parallel European Political Community (EPC).

The delays in ratification also had an effect on West German party politics. In late October, the U.S. High Commissioner to the FRG, James Conant wrote Dulles that due to nationalistic elements in Adenauer's coalition, the Chancellor may be "flirting" with the idea of a national German army in NATO. This was also in part due to French delay in ratifying the EDC Treaty. Conant was deeply concerned about the possible creation of a national army and was aware that some in the Pentagon were also in favor of the NATO option, as was the former UK High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. Conant suggested that Washington have a serious discussion regarding a German national army and possible alternatives. Conant stated that he personally favored the withdrawal of all but a token of the occupation forces as part of a strategy of peripheral defense, rather than see a German national army evolve.⁹²

Two weeks later, Conant wrote an even more pessimistic letter to Dulles, stating that it was clear to him that Adenauer was clearly seeking an alternative to EDC. He accused "some American Army and Naval officers" of making statements to Theodor Blank, and some German officers of advocating a German-American military alliance and criticizing the French. Conant recommended that Adenauer be sent a letter from Eisenhower stating that the U.S. would not support a German national army and that the defense of the Europe depended upon good Franco-German relations.⁹³ The following week, on 20 November, Dulles wrote Adenauer at the behest of the President indicating the President's concern about reports that Germany was seeking alternatives to the EDC.

⁹² Letter, Conant to Dulles, 28 Oct 1953, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, Lot 64D563, Box 16: (folder 2), NARA.

⁹³ Letter, Conant to Dulles, 13 November 1953, *Ibid.*

Dulles stated unequivocally that the U.S. position with respect to Europe was based “on the imperative necessity of a Franco-German unity as the only foundation of any real strength in Europe,” and that it was not based upon a choice of either France or Germany but on both. The U.S. was convinced that effective Franco-German integration in the military and related fields provided the only adequate security arrangements for Europe. Dulles closed by saying that *there was no alternative to EDC*.⁹⁴

As 1953 came to a close, the frustration experienced by the administration over the continued delay in ratifying the EDC Treaty was clearly visible. On 22 December, Dulles presented “A Report on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” to the National Press Club. He spoke of Eisenhower’s address in London on 3 July 1951 in which Eisenhower spoke of the immense gains unity could bring but also that “the project faces the deadly danger of procrastination....” That was 2½ years ago, Dulles said, and his observation has come to pass.⁹⁵ Dulles then mentioned his 14 December address to the NAC, in which he repeated, but in more forceful terms what he had told the nation earlier in the year, namely that “...if, however, the European Defense Community should not become effective, ...there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United

⁹⁴ Letter, Dulles to Adenauer, 20 November 1953, Alfred M. Gruenther Papers, 1941-1983, Box 1, DDEL. That same day, Dulles also wrote Conant that Conant’s concerns troubled him as well. He also stated that the key to EDC ratification was solving the Saar problem - an issue beyond the scope of this paper - and that Adenauer should go to the extreme to reach a settlement with France on that problem. Emphasis added.

⁹⁵ DOSB, Vol. 30, No. 758, January 4, 1954, p. 5.

States policy.” This latter phrase, somewhat rephrased, was repeated later that day in a press conference given by Dulles.⁹⁶

1954 - EDC Defeated

While in Berlin for the Four-Power Conference in February 1954, Dulles sent a cable to the State Department advising that should Pleven and General Ely come to the U.S., to discuss Indochina, EDC should also be included. Dulles underscored the support the U.S. had given France in the United Nations, and materielly in both Europe and Indochina. The U.S. had also made it clear to the world that France shared in the leadership of the free world alongside the United States and Great Britain. If France rejects EDC, however, he cabled that it would be impossible for the U.S. “to maintain[the] fiction [that] France is capable of [a] role of leadership in European and world affairs when France, by its very action in killing EDC...[France] will have demonstrated its incapacity for such leadership.”⁹⁷

Despite his and the President’s annoyance with the French and their belief that no alternative to EDC was immediately available, Dulles was instructed to provide France with certain assurances in writing. Thus the United States committed itself to:

- *maintain in Europe, including Germany, its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the Atlantic area*
- to consult with NATO and the EDC on questions of mutual security and on EDC force levels to be placed at SACEUR’s disposal.
- encourage closest possible integration between EDC and NATO forces.
- extend increased security by sharing more information on new weapons utilization and techniques to improve collective defense.

⁹⁶ FRUS, 1952-1954:5, p. 463 and editor’s note, p. 468. For an excellent summary of the U.S. position *vis-a-vis* Europe and the EDC, see Brian R. Duchin, “The “Agonizing Reappraisal”: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 201-21.

⁹⁷ (TS) DULTE 83, February 16, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Dulles Herter Series, Box 2, DDEL.

- regard any action that threatens the integrity or unity of the EDC as a threat to the security of the U.S.
- *not leave NATO as long as the solid core of unity which the EDC will provide to the European Continent exists.*⁹⁸

By April, however, despite the U.S. assurances and assurances by the new French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel that the debate on the EDC would take place in the National Assembly, the actions of the French Socialist Party and the deteriorating situation in Indochina had cast an additional pall on French views of EDC. Thus, in the afternoon of 22 April, Dulles cabled the President that the repudiation of EDC by French Socialist leader Guy Mollet the previous night, and the Socialist Party's desire to add additional preconditions to the EDC Treaty was, according to Bidault, a "grave and perhaps mortal blow" to hopes for ratification. Additionally, the virtually hopeless situation in Indochina, for which U.S. support was requested, was such that if Dien Bien Phu fell, France would pull entirely out of Southeast Asia and assume no other commitments. The next evening, Dulles spoke with Laniel who also told him that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would have "a profound effect on EDC, probably destroying [the] possibility of [a] favorable French action." The situation here, Dulles wrote even later that night, "is tragic."⁹⁹ Tragic was not an understatement. On 7 May, Dien Bien Phu fell and five weeks later so did the La-

⁹⁸ Enclosure, "United states Assurances to the EDC with proposed changes indicated," to "Memorandum for the President," March 19, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 2, DDEL. One month earlier, General Gruenther wrote the President of a visit by a group of French industrialists who appeared to favor EDC. One, Rene Fould, "the big noise in steel in France" to Gruenther "if the U.S. could give us a satisfactory guarantee that they will stand by France, I think I could promise you here and now that France will approve EDC promptly." Excerpt from letter from General Gruenther to the President, dated 2/14/54, *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

⁹⁹(TS) DULTE 2, April 22, 1954, Eyes Only For The President, DULTE 9, April 23, 1954, and DULTE 8, 23 April 1954, Eyes Only For Acting Secretary, *Ibid.*

nier government. Radical politician Pierre Mendes-France became the new Prime Minister.¹⁰⁰

By the latter part of June, a number of issues - continued delays in ratification; Mendes-France's talks of possible changes to the EDC Treaty in order to obtain a majority in the National assembly in favor of the Treaty; the failure of the Four-Power conference in Berlin; and the Soviet Union's granting of sovereignty to East Germany - led the Secretary of Defense to ask JCS to make recommendations for alternative measure to obtain a German contribution. JCS again concluded in JCS 2124/119 that "concurrent agreements to end the German occupation and to accept West Germany as a full-fledged, sovereign partner in NATO would be the most desirable method...provided the participation of France or other NATO countries in the common defense effort is not jeopardized thereby."¹⁰¹

The JCS's response also indicated that they could make no prediction as to when, if ever, France would ratify the EDC Treaty. They concluded further that the FRG would not accept anything less than full sovereignty, that EDC without France, while technically possible, fell short of what EDC was designed to achieve, as was an arrangement in which Germany would only make a non-military contribution. As an alternative to full NATO membership, the JCS posited the possibility of an associate member status in NATO for the FRG with restrictions on size and force composition not to exceed those it would have had in EDC.

¹⁰⁰ For more on the French defeat in Indochina and the political situation in France in 1954 see Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 217-18, and George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962*, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965, p. 51.

¹⁰¹ JCS 2124/119, 24 June 1954, "EDC Alternative Planning," RG 218, Records of the Joint chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1954-56, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 22-30, Box 23, NARA.

The final JCS recommendation was that to achieve a German contribution, the U.S. and the British should approach the French jointly and tell them that in the event France failed to agree to either EDC or German entry into NATO, the two countries would bilaterally restore sovereignty to the FRG and assist in its rearmament and eventual integration into NATO.

Interestingly, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Nathan F. Twining, voiced strong disagreement to this approach. “For almost two years,” he wrote, “the Western nations have attempted to obtain French and Italian consent to European Defense Community (EDC), so that a German contribution to the defense of Europe can be obtained. All of their efforts have been fruitless, and in my view, EDC is consequently a dead issue.” Twining continued that Germany presented the greatest potential defense against Soviet expansion and that he was so strongly convinced of this “that I believe the United States must take the risk of adversely affecting friendship with France and perhaps other nations by moving for the immediate rearmament of Germany, Germany’s integration as an equal member with all others in NATO, and complete political sovereignty for Germany.”

German rearmament, Twining continued, should be accomplished, if possible, by the U.S. acting jointly with the other NATO nations or, if not possible, jointly with the UK and failing that, unilaterally. The U.S. should inform the other nations of its intentions and give the French a limited time to decide what their policy would be. Twining closed by recommending that the JCS study be returned for restudy and rewriting.¹⁰²

On 25 June, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State, forwarded to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a copy of a letter

¹⁰² Undated Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force on EDC Alternative Planning, *Ibid.*

that Conant had sent to Livingstone Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, a week earlier. The letter reflected Conant's pessimism over French ratification of the EDC Treaty and contained a document that proposed, in the event the French were unable to bring the EDC to debate before the National Assembly adjourned for the summer, that the High Commission's Charter be "stretched" to allow a majority two-to-one vote to suffice to grant West Germany sovereignty and allow the recruitment of Germans for military training to proceed. Conant also suggested that this action be publically announced. He opined that it was possible that neither Adenauer nor the British would be satisfied with this proposal as it meant "hanging on to EDC." Conant felt that if a start could be made recruiting and training these troops as auxiliaries to British and U.S. forces, they would be available if a decision to create a national German army within NATO were made.¹⁰³

On 25 June, the JCS submitted its revised response to the Secretary of Defense on the EDC Alternatives study. It recommended, in order of priority, full NATO membership for West Germany or the independent rearming of West Germany by the U.S. and UK. The JCS further recommended that the U.S. and UK take measures to bring about

¹⁰³ Letter, James B. Conant to Livingstone Merchant, June 18, 1954, with enclosure, attached to a note from Robert Murphy to Admiral Radford, June 25, 1954, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman's File, Admiral Radford, 1953-57, Box 9, NARA. Ironically, Conant's letter was written the same day as was a message from Ambassador Bruce, the U.S. Observer to the EDC-IC, to the Department of State reporting on a dinner conversation with Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak the previous night. Spaak discussed French "inspired" rumors that the U.S. and UK were seeking alternatives to the EDC Treaty as drafted. He told Bruce that if France wanted to renegotiate the treaty before voting on it (this had been intimated by Mendes-France), Belgium would refuse to take part in such negotiations and he believed he spoke as well for Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Spaak wanted the U.S. and the UK to take a strong stand against any attempt to modify the treaty until France has voted on it. Furthermore, Spaak said that if France votes against EDC, BENELUX and the FRG would seek only one alternative - full FRG membership in NATO without discrimination. Coled 281, Ambassador Bruce to State Department, 18 June 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Western European Security, Part 1, p. 975. See also Paris 4946, June 21, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 1953-1961, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3, DDEL.

French ratification of EDC or an agreement to accept Germany in NATO. If this were not possible, the U.S. and UK should make it clear to France that they would proceed bilaterally to restore German sovereignty, assist Germany in its rearmament efforts, and seek Germany's full integration in NATO. The JCS concluded its response by stating that "[I]f none of these courses of action can be implemented, the United States should then reappraise its basic policy toward Western Europe and its NATO commitments."¹⁰⁴

Three days later, on 28 June, the U.S. and the UK agreed to a secret Minute on Germany and the EDC. It reaffirmed the two countries' support for EDC and contained, in essence, Conant's earlier recommendations regarding the granting of German sovereignty but disregarded his recommendations to arm the FRG. Instead, the Minute stated that an agreement would be reached with Adenauer to "defer for the time being the unilateral exercise by Germany of the right to rearmament."¹⁰⁵ The German view, according to Dulles, was that the FRG was perfectly willing to accept the same limitations on its forces as applied to other NATO members but would refuse to be singled out by limitations applicable only to Germany. Adenauer did not favor a separate national army, Dulles said, but he would not accept an inferior military position.¹⁰⁶

On 13 July, the three service secretaries indicated in a note to all holders of the EDC Alternative study that they agreed with the secret Minute. However, as the last par-

¹⁰⁴ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Subject: EDC Alternative Planning," 25 June 1954, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1954-56, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 22-30, Box 23, NARA.

¹⁰⁵ Deptel 7143, "Agreed United States-United Kingdom Secret Minute on Germany and the EDC," *FRUS: V, 1952-54*, pp. 988-989.

¹⁰⁶ 205th Meeting of the National Security Council, 1 July 1954, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 1953-1961, NSC Series, Box 5, DDEL.

agraph addressed the possibility of French rejection of EDC, they requested the views of the State Department in order to begin “appropriate contingency defense planning.”¹⁰⁷ One week later, the State Department issued a lengthy position paper in which they discussed what the U.S. should do in the event of either continued delay of EDC or outright rejection by France. As with previous State Department position papers, this paper began by reconfirming the U.S. position that EDC was the best means to obtain a German defense contribution and that the primary goal of the U.S. was to obtain approval of EDC by the French National Assembly before the summer recess.

That said, the paper enunciated the position that in the event of continued delay, a slightly modified version of Conant’s proposal be implemented, i.e., that the U.S. and UK initiate training of German cadres who would become “potential instructors of future German contingents of the European Defense Force” and attach them to U.S. and UK forces in Germany, along with appropriate technical MDAP agreements. This would keep pressure on the French to ratify EDC and place the Germans on an equal footing with all. It would also convince the French that the “agonizing reappraisal” was not a bluff.

The State Department paper continued that if the French rejected EDC, full German membership in NATO would become the best alternative. Failing that, bilateral U.S.-UK rearmament of Germany would become the only other alternative. The paper also stated that aside from being “quick and simple,” any proposal for bringing Germany into NATO had to be acceptable to France and could not discriminate against Germany. It recognized that reconciling these conflicting criteria would be a problem. It then set out

¹⁰⁷ “Note by the Secretaries,” 9 July 1954, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1954-56, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 22-30, Box 23, NARA.

a six step program to achieve this goal, one of which included consideration of a separate, formal U.S.-UK-French-German security treaty.¹⁰⁸

On July 27, Congress again reflected its dissatisfaction with the continued delay in ratifying the EDC Treaty. This time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a “sense of the Senate” resolution informing the President that he should take whatever steps he deemed appropriate and constitutional to restore sovereignty to Germany should he judge this to be desirable and in the national interest.¹⁰⁹

The Curtain Falls

At the beginning of what proved to be the fateful month of August, the State Department revised its position paper. It was shortened considerably and it now included the French in the training of German cadres and in an interim defense agreement, if they were willing. Other sections, including the one on a separate, formal U.S.-UK-French-German security treaty, were deleted and in their place the paper gave a role to the three High Commissioners, emphasizing their ability to function by majority vote to insure that France could not block through the High Commission any necessary changes to Germany’s Basic Law to implement its military contribution.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ “U.S. Position on German Defense Contribution in Event of EDC Delay or Rejection,” retyped 7/20/54, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Special Functional Problems, Subject and Country Files, Committee on Occupational; Deferment to Johnson Act, Entry A1 3071, Box 2, NARA. On that same day, Secretary of State Dulles was in France for the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina and spoke with French Premier Mendes-France, telling him that if EDC did not happen soon, “...it would be better to write off what we have tried to do to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive experiment.” Memorandum of Conversation, July 13, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 1953-1961, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3, DDEL.

¹⁰⁹ Senate Resolution, 7/27/54, *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Revised Draft, “Interim Measure for German Rearmament in the Event of French Failure to Act on EDC Prior to Recess,” 4 August 1954, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1954-56, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 22-30, Box 23, NARA.

As the month of August progressed, cables crisscrossed the Atlantic, particularly between Churchill, Eden, Dulles, and even Adenauer. Several relayed to Dulles conversations held between Churchill and Mendes-France while the latter was returning from a EDC-signatory conference in Brussels.. Mendes-France promised to hold a vote on EDC by month's end but indicated his cabinet refused to allow it to be a vote of confidence. He repeated his belief that despite his efforts, he would not be able to garner a majority and that EDC would fail in the National Assembly. Ironically, Mendes-France told Churchill and Eden that he was ready to consider German entry into NATO and as a first step, to restore political sovereignty to Germany.

Churchill often mentioned the need to take on the NATO solution in his cables to Dulles but Dulles disagreed. Dulles responded that even if it were possible, the NATO solution would confront the same indecision and procrastination. In fact, as late as 24 August, while forwarding to Eisenhower an exchange of messages with Churchill, Dulles indicated that he hoped it was not too late for EDC and cited from a telephone call he had with Ambassador Douglass Dillon in Paris that Dillon, Bruce and John Hughes still felt there was a "shred of hope" for EDC. In fact Dillon and Bruce, supported by Assistant Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, proposed a last minute Brussels Conference of the EDC-signatories, the U.S. and UK, to be held on 30 August, the same day the National Assembly was scheduled to vote on EDC. They hoped in this way to make one last attempt to pressure France into voting for ratification. Both Churchill and Eden opposed

this idea and the matter was dropped.¹¹¹ On 30 August 1954, the French National Assembly employed a parliamentary procedure to table the vote on the EDC. EDC was dead.¹¹²

For almost exactly four years, from September 1950 until August 1954, the U.S. Government pleaded, cajoled, and even threatened France in various economic and political ways in an attempt to force it to ratify EDC.¹¹³ Having allowed France to take the lead in the process to arm the FRG and despite repeated U.S. assurances that American troops would remain in Europe, U.S. policymakers were unable to overcome French fear of a resurgent Germany.¹¹⁴ Neither were they able to contemplate a solution that did not include France in some way. That said, the JCS continued to voice its opposition to EDC throughout this period, but U.S. policy remained unalterably committed to EDC until the bitter end.

¹¹¹ These exchanges, dating from 10 to 27 August 1954, can be found in Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 1953-61, Dulles-Herter Series, Boxes 3 and 4, DDEL.

¹¹² EDC's defeat was due to a complex set of internal French politics, least among which was the view that support for EDC meant that France was doing America's bidding in rearming Germany. For a comprehensive discussion of French objections to EDC and the events leading to its demise, see Hitchcock, *France Restored*, Chapter 6.

¹¹³ See, for example, Hitchcock, *France Restored*, p. 181.

¹¹⁴ Hitchcock, *Op. cit.*, especially Chapter 6.

Chapter 6: The Role of the Three U.S. Military Services

During the long, drawn out Pleven Plan/EDC phase, only NATO member-nations were eligible for Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) assistance. This meant, of course, that the FRG was excluded. The Defense Department, however, impatient and unwilling to wait on political decisions, began planning a provisional rearmament program for the FRG without its actual participation.¹ Thus, as related in Chapter 5, in mid-1952 USCINCEUR was made responsible for planning activities related to the MDAP as it applies to German units created for the EDC.

The real effort from all the services began after the EDC Treaty was signed in May, 1952. As will be seen however, each of the three U.S. military services became involved at different times and in different ways. The USAF, for example, became more deeply involved in the creation and development of its sister service in the new West German military and the training of its recruits than any of the other two U.S. services. However, information on the actual training plans and policies formulated by each of the services remains incomplete and somewhat spotty.²

It was not until immediately after the rejection of the EDC Treaty by the French National Assembly that the Department of Defense decided to continue its plans for German rearmament with the British, with or without French cooperation. Thus, on 2

¹ On 2 December 1953, the three U.S. services were advised that on 23 November 1953, the FRG became eligible for Reimbursable Military Assistance under the MDAA. "Memorandum For the Chief, Foreign Aid Division, G-4," 2 December 1953, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal Files 1953, 091, G, Box 34, NARA. See also Wolfgang Schmidt, "Von der 'Befehlsausgabe' zum 'Briefing': Der Amerikanisierung der Luftwaffe Während der Aufbau phase der Bundeswehr, *Militärsgeschichte 11 (2001), Heft 3*, p. 44.

² For example, postwar archival documentation for COMNAVFORGER is, as of this writing, still classified and not available to the public.

September 1954, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson directed the JCS to prepare a plan for the Secretary of Defense by 15 October with recommendations for logistical and military assistance to the FRG.³ Specifically, the request was for recommendations regarding:

- Facilities Force composition, to include Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E).
- requirement for both U.S. and German forces.
- Procedures for logistical support of German forces.
- Deployment plans for German forces, and
- A revision of the existing MDAP for Germany.

USCINCEUR directed the commanders of the three service components in Germany, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany (COMNAVFORGER), to prepare appropriate recommendations and to assume that the EDC planning basis of 12 Army divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 300 naval vessels would still be applicable. All three service components met in Paris on 16 September to assist in drawing up a program for U.S. military assistance based on JCS's recommendations. There would be no waiting for any specific international political guidance. German forces would be limited to the EDC allocation, U.S. training would cover the Germans from cadre to combat ready status and be time-phased to match the build-up of the German armed forces, and most significantly, *German forces would be developed as a national force* - something the Defense Department had wanted from the very beginning. It was also decided that the Defense Department

³ Dr. Edward F. Fisher, *USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance (U)*, Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Historical Division, 1955, <http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/pubs.htm>, p. 3. Hereafter *USAREUR*. See also *USAFE's Assistance to Create a New German Air Force, Wiesbaden: Wiesbaden: Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe, Historical Division, Office of Information Services, 1956*, pp. 50-56. Hereafter *USAFE*. *USAFE* says it was Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson who asked for a new German rearmament plan.

and the services should plan to assign sufficient personnel to the Military Assistance and Advisory Group-Germany (MAAG-Germany) to preclude any delay in the build-up of German forces, and that training and rearmament would take place even before a political settlement was agreed if circumstances so warranted.⁴

There were, however, as Acheson had earlier pointed out, several obstacles to overcome before a German armed force could be created. For example, there was neither a German governmental entity nor constitutional authority to raise, command, finance or man an armed force in the FRG. Chancellor Adenauer was well aware of this problem and until those entities came about, he requested assistance from U.S. authorities to ensure that as the governmental and constitutional processes unfolded, the new German military would develop in a democratic manner.⁵

A key obstacle that hindered each of the services in providing training assistance was the inability to disclose classified information to the Germans. U.S. regulations on disclosure handicapped discussions between U.S. planners of all services and their German counterparts throughout the period. Even as late as December 1954, there were only 43 of the 800 or so employees of *Amt Blank*, also known as *Dienststelle Blank*, the precursor of the German Defense Ministry, who were cleared for NATO classified infor-

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp., 3-5. See also *History of Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 July - 31 December 1967*, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Historical Division, Office of Information Services, Wiesbaden, Germany, 8 October 1958, p. 101 (note 22). Hereafter *History*. The JCS recommendations were contained in JCS 2124/142.

⁵ *USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance*, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, Historical Division, 22 September 1955, p. 7. This report was made available by the USAREUR History Office and can be accessed at <http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/pubs.htm>. Hereafter *USAREUR*.

mation.⁶ This absurdity was demonstrated again in early 1955 when German planners gave USAREUR its draft plan. According to previous agreements, USAREUR was obligated to classify the German plan at the same level the German's had classified it. In this case, the classification was Top Secret. As a result, USAREUR planners were prohibited from discussing the German plan with its authors! Each service was, however, able, to have certain "workarounds" approved without changing the disclosure regulations, thereby allowing classified information to be released on a strict "need to know" basis. Nonetheless, the development of assistance plans was hampered.⁷

Each of the three service components in Europe - USAREUR, USAFE, and COMNAVFORGER - were subordinate to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and eventually were given responsibility for providing training assistance to their new German counterpart service. Some, however, had already been involved in planning for the FRG's rearmament as early as 1951. That said, each service played a significantly different role in the rearmament process. For example, former German *Wehrmacht* and German *Lufwaffe* officers viewed U.S. military assistance, training, and organization in completely different lights.

On the one hand, German army divisions had been organized differently than U.S. divisions and their tactical doctrine was also unlike American practice. Former *Wehrmacht* officers considered U.S. weapons, such as tanks and machine guns, inferior to those the Germans had developed during the war. In addition, they felt that the German

⁶ The official, proper name for *Amt Blank* or *Dienststelle Blank* was *Dienststelle des Bevollmächtigten des Bundeskanzlers für die mit der Vermehrung der alliierten Truppen zusammenhängenden Fragen* or Plenipotentiary for the Federal Chancellor for Questions Regarding the Reinforcement of Allied Troops.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32. This "obstacle" could also be seen as an unintentional consequence that resulted from a lack of planning or foresight on the part of the U.S. military authorities who had known for a long time that discussions with the Germans, requiring disclosure of classified information would be necessary.

army had been the better army in all respects – the war was lost due to the Allies overwhelming superiority in manpower and materiel. Had not the U.S. Army used former German generals to write about the war and lessons learned so that the Americans could learn from German experience? They did not consider themselves a junior partner and, therefore, saw little need for training or tutelage.

On the other hand, former *Luftwaffe* officers had seen their Air Force decisively defeated and they recognized that air combat had changed significantly since the war. Despite having flown the first jets in combat, they knew that technology had advanced well beyond the point where they had been at the end of the war. Additionally, each of the German military experts that participated in the *Himmerod* Conference knew that a new *Luftwaffe* would be dependent upon a technologically superior mentor - the results of the disarmament and dismantling program following the end of the war and the prohibition on any aviation activity had left German aviation knowledge and technology at the level it was in 1945. Only the United Kingdom and the United States qualified as possible guides.⁸ Thus, they were eager to copy what the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had to offer in the way of organization, equipment, tactics and training. It was, they believed, the only way to build a modern and sizeable air force.⁹

The U.S. Navy

The role of the U.S. Navy was, perhaps, the easiest and least important. Despite the demilitarization of Germany following World War II, the British Royal Navy orga-

⁸ Schmidt, *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁹ James Corum, “Building a New Luftwaffe: The United States Air Force and Bundewehr Planning for Rearmament, 1950-60,” *Op. cit.*, pp. 94-97. Hereafter *Building*.

nized on 12 July 1945 a German Minesweeping Service Authority (GM/SA) to clear the Baltic and the North Sea of mines. GM/SA utilized approximately 40-percent of the former *Kriegsmarine*'s mine-sweeping personnel which amounted to nearly 27,000 personnel.¹⁰ In 1947, the GM/SA was disbanded and reestablished as the Minesweeping Group Cuxhaven under the Allied Control Authority, and its personnel given German Civil Service status. In November 1950, following the September NATO meeting and Acheson's "Single Package" presentation, a plan by COMNAVFORGER was initiated to disband the Cuxhaven group, reclaim its leased minesweepers and establish three Labor Service Units: LSU (A) at COMNAVFORGER headquarters in Heidelberg, LSU (B) at the U.S. Naval Base Bremerhaven, and LSU (C), which reported to the U.S. Navy's Rhine River Patrol and was divided into three flotillas based at Wiesbaden-Schierstein, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim to provide assistance in manning the Navy's ships and shore facilities at those locations. All three LSU's benefitted from the transfer of personnel from the Cuxhaven group and were operational by 1 July 1951.¹¹ Although LSU (B) at Bremerhaven continued its minesweeping duties, advanced training programs for all LSU personnel were established by the U.S. Navy following the German government's ratification of the EDC Treaty in 1953. Instruction in naval weaponry, sonar, navigation, electronics and engi-

¹⁰ David R. Snyder, "The United States and the Build-Up of the German Federal Navy, 1950-1960," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Apr. 2002), p. 479 and *fn* 6. See also Friedrich Ruge, "The Postwar German Navy and its Mission," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 83, No. 10, October 1957, p. 1038. The German armaments industries, including all ship building and construction facilities were completely dismantled.

¹¹ Douglas C. Peifer, *The Three German Navies: Dissolution, Transition, and New Beginnings, 1945-1960*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002, pp. 153-55. Peifer's book utilizes only German sources. Snyder, *Op. cit.*, cites the Peifer's dissertation, *Origins of the East and West German Navies: From the Kriegsmarine to the Volksmarine and Bundesmarine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996) stating that LSU (A) was the German Liaison Office. LSU (C), with a strength of 171 men, was under the U.S. Navy's Rhine River Patrol, and LSU (B) consisted of "three flotillas employing thirty-three minesweepers, three fast patrol boats, and a plethora of support craft manned by 850 officers and ratings."

neering were provided under the unspoken assumption that these personnel would be turned over to the German Government once Germany's role in EDC was finalized. These efforts had the approval of *Amt Blank*. The U.S. Navy made classrooms and equipment available to the German LSU personnel and encouraged them to avail themselves of the many course offered. The Navy even went so far as to place minesweeping boats in dry-dock to allow their crews and additional LSU personnel to obtain the training that was being offered. By 1955, 33-percent of LSU personnel were taking the various courses offered.¹²

Similar to what the Army had done in employing former German officers to write histories of the war, the U.S. Navy assembled a Navy Historical Team (NHT) at Bremerhaven to "reconstruct the German perspective of the war at sea." The NHT, however, also evolved into a semi-covert "coordinating staff" that examined the organization and needs of a future West German navy. In October 1950, at the request of General Adolf Heusinger, the senior officer in *Amt Blank*, several officers on the NHT were reassigned to be on his staff and to act as naval specialists to the EDC Conference. Also in October, former Admiral Friedrich Ruge joined the *Himmerod* Conference and brought with him a paper composed by the NHT team, which was incorporated into the final *Himmerod Memorandum*. Following some minor modifications by Admiral Gerhard Wagner, the head of the NHT, the naval proposal, now renamed the Wagner Paper, was adopted as the basis for negotiations at the EDC Conference by *Amt Blank*.¹³

¹² Snyder *Op. Cit.*, p. 480. See also Peifer, p. 157.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 482. See also Peifer, P. 176. Peifer states that the initial NHT proposal was for a minimum force of 12 larger torpedo boats, 36 fast attack boats, 24 small submarines (U-boats), 12 convoy escorts, 12 small anti-submarine warfare (ASW) boats, 36 patrol boats and 36 landing craft and 144 naval aircraft. A revised proposal, which became the German negotiating position at the HICOM Conference in Bonn, added two

The first negotiations regarding the creation of a West German navy actually took place between then General Eisenhower and Adenauer in January 1951 at the Bonn Conference. In September 1951, the JCS set, for planning purposes, the strength of the future German navy at 183 active vessels, just three less than had been agreed at the EDC Conference. While negotiations over the EDC treaty ratification continued in 1953, the U.S. drafted two initiatives to assist the future German navy: the first was to earmark MDAP funds for the new navy and the second was the return of over 300 vessels confiscated from Nazi Germany and allocated to the United States by the Tripartite Naval Commission. Many of these returned boats later entered service with the *Bundesmarine*, as the new navy was named in 1956. Also, in April 1953, eighteen minesweepers were included for delivery as part of the Nash Agreement.¹⁴

Interestingly, the French, Belgians, Dutch and Italians saw no need to have an EDC naval component. The Germans, however, insisted on one and Wagner brought the German position to Captain George Anderson, U.S. Navy, who acted as arbitrator. Anderson supported the German position but recommended a smaller force. Ironically, once this issue was solved and numbers and armaments decided upon, the French naval representative on the EDC-Interim Commission (EDC-IC) became a strong supporter of the Germans and worked diligently to support them.¹⁵

minelayers, one net layer, nine escort vessels, 30 airplanes and 30 helicopters, three air bases, three weapons depots, two coastal artillery sections, one signals section and a headquarters. It also increased personnel requirements from approximately 15,000 to over 20,000.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 484, 486-488. Ruge, *Op. cit.*, p. 1038, lists a82 ships of various types and 58 planes that were “originally planned” for delivery to the German navy. Among them were 18 destroyers and 12 submarines, vessels strenuously objected to by the French.

¹⁵ Peifer, *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

The U.S. Army

In late March, early April 1951, HQ EUCOM was requested to support a request by *Amt Blank*, for assistance in ensuring that the new German armed forces would be established in a democratic manner. HQ EUCOM tasked the Personnel & Administration Division to develop appropriately written material to fulfill that request. HQ EUCOM specified that the material should not be in the form of recommendations but as expositions of the subject being treated, i.e., how it came about, reasons why it has been applied, and the advantages and disadvantages, if any, to be obtained. All staff divisions were expected to participate.¹⁶

There does not appear to have been any further contact between the Germans and EUCOM until 1953. As stated earlier, the JCS had recommended in July 1952 that final organization for administering a military assistance program for the FRG be deferred until the EDC Treaty came into force. In the interim, However, the JCS also recommended that to prevent any overt planning activities from jeopardizing the EDC program, all activities be coordinated with the EDC-IC.¹⁷ As will be seen below, this created major obstacles for both the Army and the Air Force.

In early 1953, former *Wehrmacht* Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, Chief of the Planning Section in *Amt Blank*, attempted to establish closer contact with USAREUR. These attempts were denied by HQ EUCOM as being in violation of JCS policy, i.e., all queries of a military nature had to be placed through the EDC-IC. Thus, on 4 May 1953, CIN-

¹⁶ RG549, Records of the U.S. Army, Europe, USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3) OPOT, School Section Classified General Correspondence, 1951-1952, Box 210, Folder: Training Branch, School Section 092.2-352, NARA.

¹⁷ *USAREUR*, p. 9.

CEUR requested 63 additional personnel and authority to establish a Detachment 'A' (Det. A) to facilitate coordination with the EDC-IC. He was told, however, that until the FY '54 MDAP was approved by Congress, which was expected in July, no personnel allocations could be made.¹⁸

In June 1953, a joint State-Defense-Foreign Operations Administration message addressed the need to re-evaluate military assistance planning. At this point in time, however, USAREUR's role was limited and the command had little knowledge of German plans. Forced to being an "info" copy recipient of correspondence between EUCOM and the Office of the High Commissioner, Germany, USAREUR's planning activities were confined to recommending the use of training areas and providing lists of possible casernes/barracks and depot facilities for release to the Germans. Again, because of concerns about French sensitivities, USAREUR was unable throughout 1953 until the collapse of EDC in August 1954 to develop definitive and all-encompassing plans for assistance to the proposed German EDF contingent.¹⁹

Several months later, on 20 August, a second CINCEUR request for specialized school-trained personnel was also denied because the EDC Treaty had still not been ratified. However, CINCEUR was authorized to finally establish Det.A, but only by using personnel from his own resources.²⁰ Once formed, Det. A was made responsible for liaison between EDC-IC and HQ EUCOM. The EDC-IC was made up of military, econom-

¹⁸ Letter, ACS G-3 to CINCEUR, RG 319, Army Operations - General Decimal File, Box 34, (Section I)(Case 1-20), NARA.

¹⁹ *USAREUR*, pp. 8-9.

²⁰ Letter, ACS G-3 to CINCEUR, RG 319, Army Operations - General Decimal File, Box 34, (Section I)(Case 1-20), NARA.

ic, political and legal committees. The military committee, chaired by French General R.M.E. Delaminate, despite its many accomplishments, was nonetheless hindered throughout its existence in its efforts to create a German contingent by so-called “political events.” In fact, USAREUR considered the EDC-IC to have been a failure, i.e., unable to function due to the delays imposed on planning activities by the several French committee members and chairmen that brought planning assistance by U.S. military entities “virtually to a standstill.”²¹

In addition, however, Det. A was further limited in that the assistance it was authorized to provide to the EDC-IC and its working groups pertained only to U.S. forces’ organization and procedures. Although some of that information was provided to German members of the Commission, Det. A was reluctant to form a closer relationship with the Germans for fear of repercussions from the French. As mentioned above, USAREUR saw the EDC-IC as an obstacle and not as a help in providing assistance to the Germans. Every attempt by USAREUR to assist in planning for German contingents had to be cleared by the Commission and Det. A was in no position to pressure it into allowing more specific planning out of fear it would jeopardize EDC’s future in the French National Assembly. Thus, the EDC made little progress in obtaining a viable West German contribution to the defense of Western Europe²² One year later, in the fall of 1953, Det. A was replaced by an Advanced Planning Group in EUCOM’s Military Assistance Division.²³

²¹ *USAREUR*, pp. 1-3.

²² *USAREUR*, pp. 2-3. See also unnumbered outgoing State cable, 23 May 1953, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Lot Files 56D389, Records Relating to the European Defense Community, Entry A1 1601G, Box 32, NARA. Referencing Amembassy TOPOL 2256, State was also upset with the negative French attitude, i.e., France had been setting the tempo for the EDC-IC’s work, which was extremely slow as regards planning for the German contribution. State told Paris to make

Throughout the EDC phase, USAREUR expected to be required to initiate a training program for the future West German army but it was not until 15 July 1954 that its capabilities to support such training was delineated. Thus, immediately after the collapse of the EDC in August, USAREUR G-3/Operations Division instructed all staff divisions to begin the development of appropriate plans but to ensure that the amount of assistance offered would not affect USAREUR's combat readiness. Similar to concerns voiced by USAFE, USAREUR was concerned that its role in training the German army would expand its mission beyond its capabilities.

As a result, a series of conferences were held in Paris on 18-19 November 1954 between USAREUR and EUCOM. At the third such conference, a compromise was reached based upon Congressional action that specified EUCOM as having full authority and responsibility for providing assistance to the German army. The final letter of instruction, issued on 1 December 1954, delegated to USAREUR responsibility for providing German cadre and specialist training and logistical support, as well as certain financial responsibilities.²⁴

The Army's Advanced Planning Group

A few months earlier, in September 1954, the JCS designated the Advanced Planning Group (APG) to act as the single point of contact between EUCOM and the German planners. In this respect and until the FRG regained full sovereignty, APG would repre-

clear to Hervé Alphan, France's Permanent Representative to the NAC, that this attitude has made a very "unfortunate impression here."

²³EUCOM Letter to Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, December 12, 1953, Establishment of an Advanced Planning Group, Military Assistance Division, Headquarters US EUCOM," RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal Files 1953, 091, G, Box 34, NARA. See also *USAREUR*, p. 8.

²⁴ *USAREUR*, pp. 13-15.

sent the military part of the U.S. Country Team in West Germany. U.S. policy, as it concerned only its military relationship, was to consider the FRG as a sovereign nation. The APG would, therefore, function as a proto-MAAG until an actual MAAG-Germany was established. It would continue discussions with German military planners and the EU-COM component command planners, and would arrange direct contact between them. EUCOM planned to man APG with 69 personnel - one-half the strength of the future MAAG - by 31 March 1955. If additional personnel were needed during the actual training phase, they would be acquired from the Army and the Air Force.

The APG's manifold responsibilities included advising the U.S. Ambassador to the FRG as needed, coordinating the MDAP for West Germany, and assisting the West German government in preparing requests for aid and training. In this respect, it would screen all assistance requests before forwarding them to USCINCEUR. Responsibility also extended to preparing deficiency lists and recommending end-item requirements, delivery requirements, and to prioritize the distribution of supplies among the various German units. Last but not least, the APG was given responsibility for obtaining space in U.S. service schools for German military personnel and for exercising control over U.S. training and technical personnel assigned to German units. Thus, a sound working relationship between the APG and USAREUR became a high priority.²⁵

On 2 September 1954, after the collapse of the EDC, USAREUR G-3 distributed to various USAREUR staff divisions and subordinate commands a directive entitled *Planning in USAREUR for Assisting in the Formation of the German Army*. The directive's basic assumption was that the EDC manpower levels for the West German con-

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp.16-19. APG had been established by EUCOM in November 1953. See the Air Force section below. APG was also described as APG/MAAG or APG (Bonn) in some USAREUR documents.

tingent would remain, that *Amt Blank* would become the West German Defense Ministry, and that restrictions on contacts with *Amt Blank* would be relaxed. It was also assumed that when requested, USAREUR would provide all practical training assistance to German planners, to include mobile training teams and making space available as needed in USAREUR training schools.

USAREUR's staff divisions responded by submitting their preliminary plans to G-3, which were then incorporated into a staff study. This study, which included a time-phased planning program, was first coordinated with the APG and then sent to the USAREUR Chief of Staff for approval and for forwarding to HQ EUCOM by 1 February 1955. Due to changes in the German plan following the demise of EDC, e.g., German forces would now be created as a national force. The new plan called for the creation of an army of 6 infantry and 6 armored divisions as well as 5 armored, 2 mountain, and 2 airborne brigades. Because the plan's due date of 1 February could not be met, several time-consuming conferences between USAREUR and *Amt Blank* planning staffs were needed to make adjustments but the lack of lists of MDAP items that would be available precluded determining logistics and maintenance requirements. As a result, USAREUR requested an extension until 1 April, which was approved.²⁶

To further complicate matters, however, the new German plan required the U.S. to provide a total of 284 officers and 1,507 enlisted men to fill the training team complements. This exceeded the EDC training personnel requirement by 16 officers and 1,039 enlisted men. Additionally, the Germans wanted to retain the U.S. trainers for a period of six months while U.S. plans foresaw only three months. After the dust settled, the num-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

bers were whittled down considerably and the final total of army trainers that the U.S. agreed to provide was 222 officers and 680 enlisted men, to be supplied by USAREUR, the APG and the Department of the Army. One hundred German interpreters were added to that number, however.²⁷

Army Training Areas and Logistics Planning

The question of providing training areas for the six army RCT's the FRG would be providing under the EDC concept proved problematic. USAREUR claimed that the three large training areas then in use - *Grafenwehr*, *Hohenfels*, and *Wildflecken* - were barely sufficient for use by U.S. and French forces. German utilization could only be on a "space available" basis. German attempts to acquire additional land in CENTAG's area proved fruitless due to heavy opposition by the German populace and a lack of support from USAREUR.²⁸

In October 1954, the JSPC looked at the issue of training areas and decided that the areas used by U.S. forces in Germany would have to be shared equally. USAREUR was initially opposed but relented somewhat after accepting the fact that combat-ready German divisions would be a major asset to the West's defenses. As long as the training of U.S. forces would not be affected, they accepted the reality of the situation. Enter the Department of the Army who, based on previously reached agreements, e.g., "Forces Convention and Relations," and the "Convention on Rights and Obligations," stated that

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-28.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

the Germans were required to find their own training areas. With that, USAREUR reverted to its original position and the problem was elevated to SHAPE.²⁹

Following a conference involving SHAPE, LANDCENT, NORTHAG, and CENTAG a decision was reached that once the FRG became a member of NATO, she would be able to utilize all of NATO's training areas within and outside West Germany, and that additional training areas should be provided by whichever country was best able to do so.³⁰ Thus USAREUR developed plans in February 1955 so that German forces could use either German or USAREUR resources for the first ten months of the planned 36-month build-up phase and that USAREUR facilities would be on a "space available basis" for the next two months. As for the remaining two years, German planners were unable to provide USAREUR its requirement as they did not know which areas would be made available or released to them. This problem, as well as several others, bounced back and forth between USAREUR and SHAPE but no permanent solution was found prior to Germany's entry into NATO in May, 1955.³¹

The most intractable planning problem that faced USAREUR was that of logistics support for the new German army. The logistics problem was, in fact, two problems. The first involved providing support to the U.S. training teams deployed to 14 German train-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

³⁰ Under the new NATO organization, LANDCENT was Headquarters, Land Forces Central Europe) later changed to AFCENT, Allied Forces Central Europe), while NORTHAG the Northern Army Group (British) and CENTAG the Central Army Group (US) were the two subordinate commands.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38. USAREUR was responsible for only the first 12 months of the 36 month training period. See also Outgoing telegram Bonn 4617, March 19, 1953, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Lot Files 56D38, Records Relating to the European Defense Community, 1951-1954, Entry A1 1601-G, Box 33, NARA.

ing sites and the second involved receiving, storing, maintaining, and distributing MDAP items destined for the German army.

In February 1954, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to provide storage facilities for equipment that would be given to the Germans. USAREUR, however, lacked sufficient storage capability west of the Rhine, where it would be less vulnerable to attack. USAREUR was then authorized to store the MDAP materiel east of the Rhine and two areas were selected, one near Bremerhaven in northern Germany and one near Darmstadt in the south. No action was taken, however, as the NASH Plan had not begun and the entire future of the EDC was still in question. When EDC collapsed, USAREUR was forced to change its plans. It decided that it wanted the Darmstadt facility for its own use - NATO plans had changed to now hold east of the Rhine rather than fall back to a defensive position on the west bank - and it discarded the Bremerhaven area depot as too far away and too vulnerable. Furthermore, the Germans had selected, and EUCOM had approved, an unused *Eberstadt* area for their southern depot.

As a partial solution, German civilian storage facilities were contracted for use but only after additional MDAP funds were made available. In addition, EUCOM arranged for materiel stored in the U.S. to remain there until called for by USAREUR. It was also stipulated that the FRG was not to receive anything until a renegotiated NASH agreement, i.e., a new MDAP agreement had been negotiated. Despite the above, as late as March 1955, nine weeks before Germany was admitted to NATO, the full extent of the types and amounts of U.S. equipment that was to be furnished to the FRG was still unknown, thereby hindering the completion of USAREUR's plans.

Problems were also encountered in the hiring of German personnel who were to be trained as assistant instructors and materiel maintenance personnel. On the one hand, hiring was difficult because of housing shortages at the mostly rural training sites. On the other hand, German nationals who were to be hired and were supposed to be integrated into the German army after the EDC Treaty was ratified could not be told for what they were being hired due to security regulations. In addition, *Amt Blank* could not guarantee their integration into the army.³²

In mid-March 1955, USAREUR G-3 submitted a revised draft assistance plan. It was forwarded to HQ EUCOM who forwarded it further to the Department of the Army without comments or recommendations that differed from those made by USAREUR. The “USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan,” was subsequently approved by the Department of the Army in August 1955. However, those portions of the draft plan that required German action or agreement in order to be implemented had not been coordinated with the German planners. When the plan was forwarded to the Army, it contained a statement that the plan was only a basis for initiating training assistance and that once coordinated with the Germans, ultimate implementation would be affected.

Therefore, on 29 April, a meeting between USAREUR representatives and the APG was held to determine which portions of the plan could be released to the Germans. Finally, on 9 May, the day Germany was admitted to NATO, modified copies of the assistance plan were released to *Amt Blank*. The Germans were told, however, that the plan was only a draft and did not imply a commitment by the United States.³³ The plan, as ap-

³² *USAREUR.*, pp. 38-41.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

proved, envisaged 18 training teams and two equipment maintenance teams for a total of 910 officers and enlisted personnel. The majority of the personnel were to be in place approximately 1 June 1956 and would be required for 5-8 months. The training program was to be phased out by February 1957 assuming actual activation of the German army took place on 1 January 1956. It was also requested that the maximum numbers of assigned personnel receive German language instruction or refresher training as needed.³⁴

It should probably be pointed out here that not all of the delays or obstacles faced by the U.S. military planning elements were due to EDC restrictions or U.S. regulations. *Amt Blank* was also responsible. According to James Corum, Theodor Blank, who had been appointed by Adenauer to head the office and who became Germany's first Defense Minister, was a trade unionist with little knowledge of military matters and not a very good manager. *Amt Blank* was also severely undermanned, given to factional debates between "traditionalists" and "anti-traditionalists." As a result, many of the mundane planning issues so important to the creation of a new armed force were either given a low priority or ignored. Corum states that although the manning of *Amt Blank* increased from 100 military personnel in 1952 to 300 in 1954, they were simply overwhelmed. There were, Corum writes, 28 sections in the *Luftwaffe* staff of which six, to include organization, personnel, and communications sections, had no section leader. Corum states further that on the eve of rearmament in January 1955, the *Luftwaffe* admitted it had neither the time nor personnel to prepare its own plans for logistics, basing and support structure.³⁵

³⁴ "USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan," RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, ACS/Ops (G-3), Security Classified Correspondence, Box 44, NARA

³⁵ James S. Corum, "*Adenauer, Amt Blank, and the Founding of the Bundeswehr 1950-1956*," in James S. Corum, ed., *Rearming Germany*, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011, , pp. 38-44.

The U.S. Air Force

In February 1951, a few months after the arrival of General Lauris Norstad as CINCUSAFE, the USAF War Plans Division formulated the service's first thoughts on German air rearmament. A staff study, sent to USAFE, contained five points:

1. The new German Air Force (GAF) should have a minimum of 750 front-line fighters capable of both air defense and ground support missions.
2. The German Air Force should be equivalent to 10 U.S. fighter wings, organized in self-contained bases with German technical and administrative support.
3. German Air Force personnel should be trained outside of Germany.
4. The German Air Force should be supplied with major equipment under the same policies as other continental countries, with MDAP aid forthcoming as necessary, and
5. 1 January 1954 should be the completion date, with force formation beginning in November-December 1952.

A revised study was sent to USAFE the following month which assumed that 10 fighter wings would require 65,000-70,000 men and 1,200 pilots (using a ratio of 1.5 pilots per aircraft). The study also concluded that a sufficient pool of experienced personnel existed in West Germany that would require only minimal training; there would be no problem in providing bases for the 10 wings; and of the three aircraft deemed suitable for the German Air Force - the French "Vampire 53," the British "Venom," and the U.S. F-84E "Thunderjet" - the Venom was considered the best but the ability of the British to produce sufficient numbers of surplus aircraft was unknown.

USAFE responded in May with a staff study in which it opposed the limit of 750 aircraft. USAFE felt that this number should not be a ceiling that Germany could not exceed if it were able to obtain equipment from sources other than the U.S.³⁶

³⁶ USAFE, Footnote 19, p. 8 underscores the point that building a German armed force was a "monumental planning task." Not only had Germany been disarmed and its armaments industry completely destroyed, but it lacked a basis for organizing and equipping an armed force. Everything, including a federal office to

Actual USAF participation in planning for German rearmament, however, began on 6 April 1951 when an invitation was received by USAFE asking that a representative be sent to the eighth meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and German representatives in Bonn. This Allied Rearmament Conference (the Bonn Conference) provided Germany a forum from which to offer their first official proposal for a new air force. The Germans, proposed an air force of approximately 1,900 aircraft with emphasis placed on the tactical support of ground operations. USAFE disapproved of this concept and recommended the establishment of an independent air force.³⁷ General Heusinger, the German representative stated that the new *Luftwaffe* would require approximately 88,000 personnel of which 3,000 would be flight personnel. At another meeting, several weeks later on 20 April, Heusinger suggested that about 9,000 former *Luftwaffe* veterans were living in West Germany and that as many of them who would volunteer and qualify should be retrained. Since USAFE was not authorized to consult with the *Luftwaffe* planners in Bonn, nothing further was done.³⁸

The next significant event took place in November 1951 when former German Colonel Eschenauer, Chief of the Air Planning Group in *Amt Blank*, invited USAFE to discuss the reconstruction of airfields, deployment of German air units, and training for future air force personnel. Until then, USAFE had not been aware that such an office ex-

develop policy and administer military matters had to be built from the ground up. General Norstadt became CINCUSAFE in October 1950 and COMAAFCE in April 1951. In July 1953 he became Deputy SACEUR and on 20 November 1956 and made SACEUR, a position he held until his retirement in January 1963. He was a major supporter of the German Air Force. See also *Building*, p. 94.

³⁷ *History*, pp. 97-98., The German representative was former *Wehrmacht* General Adolf Heusinger. See also *USAFE*, pp. 7-8.

³⁸ *History*, p. 98 and *USAFE*, pp. 9-10. The figures presented by Heusinger were 46,000 front line troops, including 3000 flight personnel, 30,000 ground staff, 6,000 aint0-aircraft personnel, and 6,000 communications personnel. See also *Building*, p. 98.

isted within *Amt Blank*. USAFE accepted the invitation and saw the opportunity to involve full staff participation. Brigadier General Robert F. Tate, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations told Major General Truman H. Landon, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, USAFE that the time had come to increase USAFE's efforts to liaise with this agency in Bonn. Tate initially envisioned a program similar to that run by the Army's Historical Division with ex-*Wehrmacht* officers, but that was not accepted. However, on 8 January 1952, Landon informed Eschenauer at a meeting in Wiesbaden that political complications prevented him from sending an Air Force liaison officer to Bonn. Nonetheless, Landon authorized the establishment of informal staff-wide contacts between USAFE personnel and the German Air Planning Group as an interim measure in order to develop a coherent plan. However, as no official contact was authorized and no formal plan for the rearmament of Germany had been agreed, both sides were urged to be discrete to avoid upsetting the French.³⁹

Thus, between January 1952 and the end of March, eight meetings were held and because organization and manpower issues were of primary concern to the Germans, the Manpower Organization Division of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations assumed responsibility for the liaison effort. The discussions covered a wide range of topics, to include headquarters organization, intelligence procedures, and ground and air warning operations, and included the involvement of the appropriate USAFE staff agencies. USAFE also provided unclassified guidance materials to the Germans to study and to use as planning aids. By April 1952, however, the lack of authority to disclose

³⁹ *USAFE*, pp. 10-12. See also *Building*, pp. 98-99.

classified information to the German planners had become a serious limitation, affecting especially communications and air defense planning.⁴⁰

On 20 May, 1952, Norstad informed Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the informal meetings and what had been accomplished to date and he requested that direct contact between USAFE and the *Luftwaffe* planners be authorized.⁴¹ Norstadt made the argument that formalizing these discussions and designating USAFE as the interim Air Force agency to administer unilateral MDAP responsibilities would allow USAFE to exert influence over the new *Luftwaffe* from the very beginning. He also stressed that much time would be saved by giving the German planners the benefit of USAF experience and that the needed aid would be for rebuilding an air force, unlike the aid being given to other Allied nations. Despite the rationale provided by Norstadt, HQ USAF denied his request due to the “current status and sensitivity of negotiations” outside military channels.⁴²

The following month, on June 21, 1952, USAFE made another request in conjunction with CINCEUR’s request to establish a MAAG-Germany Advanced Planning Group to establish contact with German representatives on the EDC-IC. Landon wrote Norstadt that:

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13. Despite numerous requests to disclose classified information, authority was not given until August 1953. The authorization provided an exception to the National Disclosure Policy, allowing “RESTRICTED” military information to be released to the FRG on a “need to know” basis. In December 1953, authorization was amended to include disclosure of certain categories of “CONFIDENTIAL” information.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14 and *History*, p. 98. According to the author of *USAFE*, this was the first indication the USAF had that these meetings had been taking place.

⁴² *History*, pp. 98-99 and *USAFE*, pp. 13-15.

This entire problem of assisting the Germans in their planning is made more acute by the fact that the Air Planning Group constitutes only a very small group in the Defense Ministry [sic], a body which is primarily composed of former German army officers of relatively greater rank than the air people. In addition, the only formal contact the Germans have had with U.S. Military Forces has been through the High Commissioner's office to his advisors, who are officers from EUCOM. We have feared, and in some of our early reports concerning the plans being formulated by the Germans have indicated, a possibility of subordination of the air arm to ground control to an undesirable degree.⁴³

On 7 July, 1952, Norstadt wrote General Thomas White, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, urging support of the USAREUR request and stressed again the need for a strong USAF liaison with the Germans. He wrote that "one of our greatest concerns in this matter has been in seeing that the German Air Force, when it is formed, is patterned along the lines that will permit its effective use as part of the defense forces of the Western Powers rather than see it parceled out by direct assignment to ground units for limited objectives. We have been disturbed that this might happen unless qualified advisors were on hand to work directly with the Germans in their early planning."⁴⁴

Recall that at Himmerod, the Germans decided to build a new *Luftwaffe* and to do so by copying the logistical and organizational structure of the USAF. They also decided to subordinate *Luftwaffe* units to the Army command but failed to consider an air defense role for the *Luftwaffe*. To USAF planners, this was not only naïve but a "doctrine of a defeated enemy." During World War II, the U.S. Army Air Force units in North Africa had

⁴³ *USAFE*, p. 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

been subordinated to Army commanders and the system had been a failure. Subordination, as such, was anathema to USAF tactical thinkers and doctrine. It limited the flexibility of airpower and its ability to operate across a combat theater, using its speed and range to mass at decisive points when needed. The USAF wanted a *Luftwaffe* equal to the other services, capable of a variety of missions, and fully integrated into NATO's Allied Tactical Air Forces.⁴⁵

In mid-July, a week after Norstadt wrote White, Eschenauer was transferred and replaced by Colonel Richard Heuser. Before he departed, Eschenauer requested that Heuser be allowed to visit USAFE and that the informal meetings, forced to cease in early June when the French learned of them, be resumed. Confronted with the problem of re-establishing the informal contacts, Headquarters, USAF, decided that although permission to establish formal relationships had been denied, informal meetings had not been prohibited. It appears that the delays in the EDC ratification process gave USAF reason to allow the meetings to continue but they advised that they should not receive any undue publicity. Thus, on 8 August, 1952, Heuser was invited to visit USAFE and the suspension of the informal meetings ended.⁴⁶

Former *Luftwaffe* officers were not only allowed to visit USAFE but to visit U.S. tactical units in West Germany as well. They were provided with briefings and presentations on organization, technology, operations and even given orientation flights in the T-33 jet trainer. Following his orientation flight, former *Luftwaffe* ace Colonel Johannes Steinhoff, one of the few former *Luftwaffe* pilots with jet fighter experience, came away

⁴⁵ *Building*, pp. 90, 93-94, 99-100.

⁴⁶ *USAFE*, pp. 16-17.

believing that refresher training would be successful only for the most experienced German pilots and that knowledge of English was absolutely essential.⁴⁷ It appears that during this same period, USAF officials had also begun making inquiries regarding the number of pilots the new *Luftwaffe* would need. They were also interested in learning how many former *Luftwaffe* pilots would require refresher training but more importantly, how many could meet USAF physical and English language requirements.⁴⁸

Also in August, USAF influence scored a major victory. *Amt Blank* announced that the concept of subordinating *Luftwaffe* units to the Army was being dropped. The future *Luftwaffe*, it had decided, would be a fully independent service and would be fully integrated with Allied air operations. Nonetheless, the planning effort continued to be hampered by both political and bureaucratic restrictions imposed by the EDC, NATO, and even the U.S. Defense Department. In particular, just as USAREUR was being hampered, security regulations precluded the sharing of information necessary to various aspects of air force planning. It was not until December 1953 that the Air Staff, at the urging of USAFE, granted an exemption and allowed USAFE planners to share classified defense information with accredited German personnel.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Wolfgang Schmidt, "Von der 'Befehlsausgabe' zum 'Briefing: Der Amerikanisierung der Luftwaffe während der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr," *Militärgeschichte*, Heft 3, No. 11 (2001), p. 46. Steinhoff was a highly decorated pilot, having flown 993 missions and 176 victories. He was severely burned when his ME-262 crashed following a blown tire on take-off. He is credited with helping to build the German Air Force within NATO and served, among his various positions as Chief of Staff of the German Air Force and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Building*, p. 100.

USAFE, Detachment 'A' and the Advanced Planning Group

Despite the existence of Det. A in Paris as the single, mandatory, channel of contact between USAREUR, the EDC-IC and the German planners, USAFE was only allowed to officially participate in planning for German rearmament when directed by USCINCEUR or higher authority. Det. A, however, was not manned sufficiently to perform its tasks nor, as mentioned above, able to effect close liaison with the German planners.⁵⁰ USAFE, therefore, again sought a clearly defined responsibility for *Luftwaffe* planning. Similar to USAREUR's requests to be given significantly more responsibility for the German Army portion of the MAAG when it came into existence, General William H. Tunner, then CINCUSAFE, pointed out that while EUCOM retained overall planning responsibility, it continually turned to USAFE to perform the majority of the planning activity without giving the command any "discretionary and creative" planning responsibility. Thus at the 3 December 1953 EUCOM CINC's Conference, the USAFE presentation stated that "[I]t is clear that USAFE, among U.S. elements, has not only a legitimate interest, but indeed a paramount interest in German Air Force planning and development and logically should have commensurate responsibility. There is no question of our ability to do the job. USAFE has been doing it and, despite deterrents, has produced realistic planning."⁵¹

USAFE's entreaties and efforts to obtain more specific responsibilities had as little success as USAREUR's. Just a few weeks earlier, however, EUCOM established a tri-service Advanced Planning Group to form the nucleus of a MAAG-Germany within EU-

⁵⁰ USAFE, p. 17.

⁵¹ USAFE, p. 19.

COM, which included five Air Force officers. As related above, the new organization moved to Bonn in August 1954 where it served as the single point of contact between HQ EUCOM and *Amt Blank* and its 800 plus German planners on all military assistance and training matters. The above notwithstanding, USAFE continued to seek authority for German Air Force planning. USAFE's views were presented to EUCOM on 16 September 1954 and again on 11 October 1954. Finally, on 3 December 1954, USCINCEUR defined the specific responsibilities of all three service commands as they applied to German rearmament planning. Those given to USAFE were considerable but significantly less than the command desired.⁵²

The Sands Plan

In June, 1953, Lt. Colonel Warren Sands arrived in West Germany with a team from Air Training Command. Sands initiated a joint EUCOM, USAFE, German Planning Group effort to prepare a comprehensive training plan, the object of which was to coordinate personnel training with aircraft delivery and unit activation schedules. The plan was based on the EDC goal for Germany of 1,326 aircraft. The aircraft delivery schedule, as per the MDAP, was 978 combat aircraft and 270 training aircraft within three years of EDC ratification. Based on that, the Sands Plan, otherwise known as the German Flying and Technical Training Program, was completed in early July 1953.⁵³

The Sands plan provided for refresher training for approximately 600 pilots, basic flight training for 1,000 aviation cadets, and for non-flying technical courses. While most of the flying training would be conducted in West Germany, some would take place in

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

the United States. HQ USAF approved the Sands Plan and gave USAFE operational control of the training until the MAAG-Germany was established. It also assigned to USAFE responsibility for all aspects of the training program outlined in the Sands report. In September 1953, a decision was made at USAF headquarters to establish the 7330th Training Group, - the first of three - which was activated at *Fürstenfeldbrück* Air Base in southern Germany on 1 November 1953. Two other training bases under consideration, *Erding* and *Landsberg*, would not be available until 1955 and a fourth, *Kaufbeuren*, which was being used by the U.S. Army, would not be transferred until September 1954.⁵⁴ Forty-six T-6 propeller and 47 T-33 jet trainers were scheduled to arrive shortly after 1 January 1954.⁵⁵

Not long after the 7330th Training Group was activated, its Plans Division undertook a study of the Sands Plan and found that it needed significant revisions and that there were areas that had not been covered and, therefore, needed development. These deficiencies were brought to the attention of USCINCEUR on 19 January 1954 and USAFE's recommendation that it unilaterally refine the plan and select the sites for training the Germans was approved on 2 February.⁵⁶ Two days later, on 4 February 1954, the 7330th Training Group and an officer from EUCOM's Advanced Planning Group began work on the *Plan for the Implementation of the Federal Republic German Air Force* (GAFP 55-1), the first draft of which was completed three weeks later.

⁵⁴ *History*, pp. 99-100.

⁵⁵ *USAFE*, p. 23. Pre-stocking aircraft for Germany prior to ratification of the EDC Treaty had been prohibited, but with the establishment of the Training Group, aircraft deliveries could begin. Hereafter *Starting*.

⁵⁶ *USAFE*, p. 27.

This large-scale training program would be located at the four bases named above, with *Erding* serving as the USAFE logistics support base. A full USAF Training Wing would be created with approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel and 1,000 American and German civilians at each base. The end goal was to train a German cadre in 18 months, after which they would take over the training and during that process the bases would be turned over to full German control.⁵⁷

Although the program had been approved on the U.S. side, it was realized that the assumptions made regarding the *Luftwaffe* structure had not been verified by German authorities and would, therefore, require modification. Coordinating with the Germans required authorization to release to them MDAP programming equipment delivery data and a host of other required actions, to include the release of site surveys, information on the redeployment of USAFE units from NATO bases destined for allocation to the Germans, the development of a German Air Force logistical support plan, and a determination of USAF capability to support German training needs in the U.S.⁵⁸

On 31 March, HQ USAF informed USAFE that it could not support the large number of training spaces that had been requested in the U.S. It then directed USAFE to expand its capability to the maximum in Germany and to assume all, or at least the greater portion of the refresher training that had originally been scheduled for completion in the U.S. Based on this and a number of other issues needed to expand USAFE's training capability, USAFE was directed to prepare a modified training plan - GAFP 55-2, re-named *The German Air Element of the EDC Force*.

⁵⁷ *Building*, p. 102.

⁵⁸ *USAFE*, pp. 28-29.

The revised training plan contained two new sections. The first contained a concept of operations and integration of the German Air Force into the EDC force structure. The second provided for an English language training course. The revised plan also specified that the build-up period would last four years and it even included manning details such as pilot to aircraft ratios and training wing locations.⁵⁹ It was also designed to produce within the first four years 1,800 pilots (80 percent of the total) and 17,000 technicians (maintenance, intelligence, communications, etc., personnel).⁶⁰

In June, USAF had revised the aircraft delivery schedule but due to a lack of disclosure authority, most of USAFE's plans and programs were done without knowledge of German capabilities to support them. On 1 August 1954, the revised GAFP 55-2 was completed and subsequently approved pending revisions that also required input from the German Air Planning Group. As a result, there were many discrepancies between the USAFE plan and what the German planners had developed based on EDC guidance. To facilitate contact with German planners, HQ EUCOM moved the APG to Bonn on 11 August 1954. On 3 December 1954, GAFP 55-2 was again revised to include a training program that included both flying and technical training that had been approved by the Germans.⁶¹ The newly revised plan provided for a refresher course of 16 months for vet-

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 29-31. The pilot to aircraft ratio was set at 1.25:1 for all tactical aircraft, 1.5:1 for all-weather interceptors, and 2:1 for transport aircraft.

⁶⁰ Schmidt, *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁶¹ *History*, pp. 100-101, 103 and *USAFE*, p. 32. EDC, for example, required each unit to be 100-percent manned at peacetime strengths at activation, with all personnel fully trained and combat status achieved three months after activation. USAFE, however, provided for a phased build-up over four years with combat readiness dependent on pilot-aircraft ratios, aircraft deliveries, and flying time that would accrue over time until the units attained its specified numbers of aircraft and pilots. Similarly, EDC expected the full complement of 1326 aircraft would be available by the end of the third year. USAFE's manning procedures were tied to the USAF delivery schedule, which was to provide the full complement of aircraft by the end of the fourth year. According to James S. Corum, "Starting From Scratch: Establishing the *Bundesluftwaffe*

eran pilots who could speak some English, while those whose English proficiency was low were required to study English for an additional three months. Aviation cadets were sent to the U.S. for 22 months of training. Following refresher and basic training in the T-6 and T-33 respectively, the new *Luftwaffe* pilots would enter the tactical aircraft course. Both officers and enlisted personnel would attend technical training courses and NCO's would be selected from the enlisted trainees based on their academic performance, experience, and leadership abilities.⁶² GAFP 55-2 was distributed on 25 August 1954 and endorsed by USCINCEUR, USAF, JCS, and the Secretary of Defense as the initial U.S. plan to support the German Air Force rearmament program. Five days later, on 30 August France rejected the EDC Treaty and the differences between it and GAFP 55-2 became moot. GAFP 55-2 served as the basic planning document until a new plan, GAFP 56-1, was completed several years later.⁶³

Air Force Facilities

At the same time that USAFE was dealing with *Luftwaffe* training issues, the command was also attempting to acquire additional facilities and bases for them. During the 1951 German Rearmament Conference, Heusinger set out a tentative proposal for 25 air bases. The German Air Planning Group had also raised this question with CINCUSAFE in the summer of 1952 and again in the early months of 1953. Nothing could be accomplished at the time however, as no authorization had been received from

as a Modern Air Force, 1955-1960, " *Air Power History*, Vol. 50, Issue 2, 2003, p. 19, the plan called for a total of 1326 aircraft as follows: 6 fighter-bomber wings and 8 day fighter wings (75 aircraft each), 2 all-weather interceptor wings (36 aircraft each), 2 reconnaissance wings (54 aircraft each), and 2 transport wings (48 aircraft each) .

⁶² *History*, pp. 103-104.

⁶³ *USAFE*, p. 34, note 110.

the EDC agency responsible for determining where future *Luftwaffe* units would be deployed.

Finally, in January 1953, SHAPE authorized both AAFCE and ALFCE (LANDCENT) to begin discussions with the EDC-IC on facilities for both the German Army and the *Luftwaffe*. AAFCE and the EDC-IC failed to come to an agreement, causing planning for *Luftwaffe* facilities to fall behind. The result was that several former *Luftwaffe* bases were earmarked for use by German land forces. USAFE's requests for additional meetings to discuss the issue were denied and in May, 1953, COMAAFCE advised that further meetings had been postponed. One month later, however, on 26 June, COMAAFCE asked USAFE for a list of air bases that could be released to the Germans and in late July, the EDC-IC reopened discussions on the allocation of non-operational facilities.

USAFE and USAREUR representative met on 6 August 1953 to discuss availability and procedures and decided that Army-type installations no longer needed by USAREUR would be offered to USAFE, the German Army, and the *Luftwaffe* in that order. Air force-type facilities not needed by USAFE would be offered to USAREUR, the *Luftwaffe*, and the German Army in that order. USAFE declared that surplus space would be available at *Neubiberg* and *Landsberg* in September 1954, at *Fürstenfeldbrück* after December 1955, and *Erding* after March 1956. All four bases, however, would be reserved for joint USAFE- *Luftwaffe* use. Aside from the above, no further decisions were made.

The problem of installations was further exacerbated when USAFE's dispersal program to reduce vulnerability increased the command's bases requirements. Thus, in

September 1954, USAFE notified USCINCEUR that unless the FRG provided alternate facilities at no expense to the U.S., or unless agreement could be reached on joint occupancy, USAFE would be forced to keep for itself all the bases foreseen in the German Air Force program. This problem remained unresolved during the period covered by this dissertation.⁶⁴

Air Force Post-EDC Issues

As 1955 dawned, the biggest problem confronting USAFE planners in building the new *Luftwaffe* was finding qualified personnel. While the new German Army would benefit from thousands of former professional soldiers who had been cleared and carefully screened as politically reliable, a number of them already trained and under arms in the *Bundesgrenzschutz* (the Border Police), and fully trained former German Navy officers and Non-commissioned officers had manned several minesweeper flotillas maintained by the Allies, the *Luftwaffe* had no one who had been trained in high-performance jet aircraft, current radar systems or electronics.⁶⁵ Of the six thousand *Luftwaffe* pilots who had survived the war, only 160 were available and considered qualified to fly jets when the *Luftwaffe* began recruiting in 1955-56.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, undeterred by the number of unresolved issues, such as the lack of facilities, sufficient training aids, and the long-awaited but still insufficient delineation of its responsibilities, USAFE had a training network in place by the time the FRG was admitted to NATO and given full sovereignty on 5 May

⁶⁴ *USAFE*, pp. 35-39, 49-50. The author was present and part of the ceremony when *Fürstenfeldbrück* was turned over to the German Air Force in October 1957.

⁶⁵ *Building*, p. 101.

⁶⁶ *Starting*, p. 19.

1955. It was fully prepared to play a substantial role in building the new *Luftwaffe* and to accept the first *Luftwaffe* volunteers at the beginning of 1956.⁶⁷

All in all, and despite being beset by internally and externally imposed obstacles, lack of resources, and often real responsibility, each of the three U.S. services took on and successfully completed the task of laying the groundwork and preparing to train the nucleus of the new German Armed Force, the *Bundeswehr*. And although the actual training took place after the time frame of this dissertation, the navy being an exception, and although the operational readiness of the *Bundeswehr* took longer to achieve than initially planned, U.S. military planners had done their job and done it well.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ *History*, p. 105 and *USAFE* p. 49.

⁶⁸ For an excellent essay on four critical areas of German-U.S. defense cooperation: personal and materiel American aid for West German rearmament and its impact on the character of the *Bundeswehr*, see Ingo Wolfgang Trauschweizer, "Learning With an Ally: The U.S. Army and the *Bundeswehr* in the Cold War." *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 477-508.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

At the beginning of this dissertation I indicated that I would show, by using previously unseen, neglected, or underused archival material, that there was much more to the process of rearming Germany than is evident in the existing literature. I also stated that as a result of my archival research, this dissertation would call for a revision of several conventional views of the German rearmament issue, particularly the relationship between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, the involvement of the JCS in this matter, the relationship between the U.S. and its European allies, and the “suddenness” of Acheson’s “conversion.” From my research, I have concluded that: first, once the decision was made to reverse standing U.S. policy and arm the FRG, and it was communicated to the Allies, the United States government lost effective control of the rearmament initiative -- it was ceded to France. Second, despite the efforts by two U.S. administrations, neither their pleas nor threats could save the European Defense Community (EDC) - the entity under which the FRG was to be rearmed - from defeat. Third, that the U.S. had so committed itself to German rearmament within EDC that the Eisenhower Administration refused to consider any U.S. alternative. When the solution to the German rearmament question was implemented, the U.S. found itself pledging an open-ended troop commitment on the European continent despite long-held U.S. plans to remove its forces from Europe, i.e., to build down as the Germans built up. This pledge, which remains in force today, served to assuage continued European fears of a possibly resurgent Germany (as well as a potentially aggressive Soviet Union).

Before continuing, I should like to remind readers that this dissertation has brought to light, for the first time, an in-depth narration of Operation ECLIPSE. This plan, two years in the making, to disarm, demobilize and demilitarize Germany following its defeat in World War II now adds to the existing literature and highlights a segment of World War II and post-hostilities history previously known only to a very few.¹ The narration of Operation ECLIPSE in Chapter 2 thereby brings to the surface the fact that:

- The degree of interservice and interagency rivalry and squabbling, specifically in Washington D.C. over post-hostility policy and responsibility had the effect of leaving General Eisenhower and his staff at SHAPE with little or no guidance as to how to proceed after the surrender;
- The driving force behind Operation ECLIPSE was a combat-proven British Colonel by the name of Tom Neville Grazebrook.
- The European Advisory Commission, whose function it was to lay out, *inter alia*, the terms of German surrender, failed in that and in many of its key tasks and that the actual surrender document was put together at the last minute by Eisenhower's staff.
- The U.S. military contemplated exiling for life the officers of the German General Staff and their families.
- U.S. and British authorities, thinking there would be massive disorder in Germany following the defeat, believed that a massive show of ground forces and air power would be required for several years after Germany's surrender to insure compliance with the surrender terms and prevent a repeat of the violations of the Versailles Treaty.

Beyond the surrender of Germany and once the Cold War began, however, the use of archival documents enabled this dissertation to highlight the fact that the initial U.S. strategic war plans were developed without political guidance.

And even afterward, when that guidance was given, this dissertation underscores

¹ This statement in no way wishes to demean the essay by Kenneth McCreedy in the *Journal of Military History*, , *Op. cit.* McCreedy, however, did not have access to the large amount of archival material available on Operation ECLIPSE, and, therefore, did not contain the amount or the breadth of information I provided in Chapter 2.

the early recognition by senior Defense Department officials that the U.S.'s initial nuclear superiority notwithstanding, there was no way Western Europe could have been defended without the addition of German troops, which meant that the continent would have to be lost and subjected to Soviet occupation for two or more years before the Allies could even hope to win it back again.²

This dissertation also shows that while the State Department's official policy was to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for decades, and that Germany needed first to be brought into the Western camp economically and politically. This policy, however, did not reflect a consensus. While there were many in the Department of State who felt that arming the FRG would provoke the Soviets into attacking before rearmament was complete and German forces could be fielded, others however, including Acheson, believed that if anything would provoke the Soviets, it would be the continued weakness of the Allied military position. Acheson had long been an advocate of the necessity of dealing with the USSR from "positions of strength."³ Furthermore, he obviously had thought privately about German rearmament long before the outbreak of the Ko-

² One week after the Eisenhower Administration took office in January 1953, Dulles asked General Bradley about alternatives to EDC in the event it was not approved. Aside from telling him that the JCS had always seen full NATO membership for the FRG as preferable, Bradley repeated the need for 12 German divisions to force the Soviets to concentrate their forces. "I don't have enough atomic weapons," he said, "to plaster all of Europe." Richard M. Leighton, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, Vol. III, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 553.

³ Wells, *Tocsin*, p. 126. See also *DOSB*, Vol. 22, No. 559, March 20, 1950, p. 427 and No. 560, March 27, 1950, p. 478. By late 1953, lower level State Department officials were telling their Department of Defense counterparts that they too, favored NATO over EDC for the FRG. Leighton, *Op. cit.*, p. 574.

rean War, which strongly suggests, as I argue, that his “conversion” was not as quick or surprising as many have come to believe.⁴

Another set of issues addressed in this dissertation was the extensive involvement of the three U.S. services in planning for the training of the new German armed force. Although this matter has only recently surfaced in the scholarly literature, the role and interrelationship of the three services in preparing and planning the rearmament of the FRG has not previously been looked at in a comprehensive fashion, nor does it appear that the authors have had the use of previously classified histories, such as those that I was able to obtain and used.⁵

This dissertation makes it clear that despite the repeated urging by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense to arm West Germany by bringing it rapidly into NATO, Acheson decided that the process had to be led by the French. As a result, and despite having a U.S. plan for an integrated European Defense Force, Acheson allowed the French to assume the leadership but he did not expect them to present a plan that was unworkable from the start. It also makes clear that the JCS never fully supported EDC and then only because it was the only “available option.”⁶

Additionally, while the argument has been made that the U.S. remained the leader of the Alliance, this dissertation argues that when it came to the actual

⁴ Acheson was well aware of the many military studies and papers that had been written advocating the rearmament of the FRG and he, himself stated that the State Department had “not yet gotten that far.” He also felt early on that the French attitude opposing German rearmament was wrong. Acheson, *Struggle*, pp. 124, 130.

⁵See Chapter 6.

⁶Leighton, *Op. cit.*, p. 553.

process of arming the FRG, the U.S. Government became an onlooker, relegated to the sidelines.⁷ Nothing that either the Truman or the Eisenhower Administrations did, whether it was accepting and blindly supporting the EDC, providing repeated assurances of maintaining an adequate troop presence in Europe as long as needed, or even threatening France with a cutoff of aid funds, enabled them to induce France to ratify the EDC Treaty - a plan of French making - and accept German rearmament.

Lastly, research for this dissertation shows that even after the defeat of the EDC, the U.S. commitment to it was such that U.S. policymakers were left without an alternative; “[they] did not have any constructive proposals to advance.” In 1953 for example, the JCS had been directed to “suspend” consideration of alternatives, and as the defeat of the EDC became obvious, the State Department refused to face the possibility that the EDC would not be approved. It refused to discuss alternatives for fear the French would find out, thus dooming the EDC’s chances for ratification.⁸ Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles continued to seek a way to bring a German contingent into an *integrated* European Defense Force as a means of controlling the Germans while adding their combat power to the defense of Western Europe.⁹

⁷ Aside from Steininger’s statements in fn 4 *supra*, Melvyn Leffler in personal conversations with the author disagreed. He felt that leadership was retained by “nudging and persuading,” but I would argue that nudging is not leading - one does not lead from behind.

⁸ Steininger, *Op. cit.*, p. 104. See also Leighton, *Op. cit.*, p. 574.

⁹ “JCS Agreed Statement Submitted to the Secretary of Defense as of Possible Use to the Secretary of State,” 15 September 1954, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s File, Admiral Radford, 1953-57, Box 9, NARA. Emphasis added.

The NSC, however, continued to debate internally what it and the Secretary of State should do, i.e., whether or not another form of EDC would work or whether it should seek to arm Germany unilaterally or together with the UK. On 16 September, the NSC Planning Board drafted a paper, NSC 5433, *Immediate U.S. Policy toward Europe*. This paper, was an attempt to formulate an approach that would assist the U.S. in reaching its objective of arming the FRG. It began by stating that in view of France's rejection of EDC, the U.S. should pursue "its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC." It also laid out a program of action that included restoring sovereignty to the FRG, admitting the FRG to full membership in NATO, and obtaining acceptable safeguards on German rearmament among others, to include being prepared, with appropriate legislative authority and if necessary as a quid pro quo, *to commit the U.S. to maintain troops in Europe*.

Secretary Dulles told the NSC that he was convinced the Europeans were more concerned with a replacement for EDC as it was their problem and not a U.S. problem. He continued by saying that if the Europeans agree on a substitute for EDC, they would want to know if the U.S. would cooperate with them as was done with EDC. Dulles also told the NSC that if France "torpedoes" the NATO solution, *there was no good alternative and that the U.S. must not assume it could unilaterally rearm Germany if the French refused to agree.*¹⁰

¹⁰ Memorandum of Discussion at the 215th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, September 24, 1954, Ann Whitman File, File, Papers as President, NSC Series, Box 6, DDEL. Also in *FRUS*, 1952-1954. Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2, pp. 1263-1271. Steininger writes that Dulles believed the JCS plan was unworkable but he also feared that discussion of any alternative, including "peripheral defense" would be interpreted as a weakening of support for EDC. Neither he nor President Eisenhower saw admitting W. Germany to NATO as an alternative and felt that EDC had been the only means for

The Department of Defense -- obviously tired of repeated delays, debates and what appeared as procrastination on the part of the State Department -- sought what it always had sought -- the immediate, controlled rearmament of a national German army that would be integrated directly into NATO with or without French participation. It acknowledged that “[F]ailure to obtain French cooperation for a German contribution ... will require a basic change in NATO commitments and structure...” but that this should not deter the United States from working out the best possible arrangements with Western Germany in our own interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.¹¹ Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson was quite explicit telling the NSC that if the U.S. had to “buy the French into supporting the program of action, the deal wouldn’t be worth anything.”¹²

Ironically, according to both Hitchcock and Trachtenberg, it was Mendes-France who came up with the essential elements of a plan to solve the German question.¹³ Dubbed “little NATO,” he passed this idea to the British and it was put into motion by Prime Minister Anthony Eden using the Brussels Treaty Organization. Nonetheless, Dulles remained “skeptical,” continuing to stand by EDC. He did not approve of Eden’s solution because it did not have enough “su-

achieving a German defense contribution. Neither was he in favor of offering a commitment. Steininger, *Op. cit.*, pp. 82, 92, 93, 97, 106. Emphasis added.

¹¹ The British also preferred the NATO option. In a telegram to President Eisenhower, Churchill called the EDC a “sludgy amalgam” and said he didn’t “blame the French for rejecting EDC but only for inventing it.” Message from the Prime Minister to the President, 18 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 4, DDEL.

¹² Memorandum of Discussion at the 215th Meeting of the National Security Council, *Loc. cit.*

¹³ See Hitchcock, *Op. cit.*, pp. 192-193 and Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 124. According to Hitchcock, the Mendes-France called upon Alexandre Parodi, Georges Boris and André Gros to find a compromise solution. See also Leighton, *Op. cit.*, p. 575.

pranational characteristics. The U.S. again stood aside, “defeated and demoralized,” realizing that the Europeans did not want an American plan, only American encouragement and assurances.¹⁴ Lastly, when the British made its historic commitment of four divisions and a tactical air force to the defense of continental Europe, the U.S. was left with no choice but to give its own assurances to maintain troops in Europe as long as needed in order to recapture the leadership on the “German Question” that it had given up five years earlier.¹⁵

The London and Paris negotiations Eden engineered with the EDC signatories led to the expansion of the Brussels Treaty (Western Union) Organization and the creation of the Western European Union with West Germany as a member in December 1954, and eventually to the final admission of West Germany to NATO in May, 1955. These actions brought closure to America’s most important European policy issue of the period. In the end, there was nothing the U.S. could do, as Dulles had indicated earlier, but to cooperate. On 1 February 1955, Eisenhower again provided the assurances the Europeans had been looking for, committing U.S. forces to an open-ended stay on the European continent, thus proving the hypothesis set forth at the beginning of this dissertation. Three months later, on 9 May 1955, ten years after World War II in Europe ended, Germany

¹⁴ Message from Churchill to President Eisenhower, 18 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter File, Box 4, DDEL. Immerman also says that Dulles was “unenthusiastic in no small measure” because the United States had ceded the initiative to the British. Richard H. Immerman, “John Foster Dulles, Piety..., *Op. cit.*, p. 105. Hitchcock, *Op. cit.*, p. 196. See also Leighton, *Op. cit.*, p.575.

¹⁵ (TS) DULTE 3, 28 September 1954, Dulles to the President, the Summer White House, *Ibid.* Dulles told president Eisenhower that the British commitment will probably make the [9-Power] Conference succeed “providing we reaffirm what we said in connection with EDC,” i.e., the assurances given previously to maintain U.S. forces in Europe as long as needed. These assurances were given on 1 February 1955, *Ibid.*

was formally admitted to NATO. The way was now clear for the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Appendix A - The European Advisory Commission (EAC)

The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was a creature of the Tripartite Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of October 1943. Britain's Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, who proposed the Commission, desired it to have a broad scope that would include a wide range of European problems caused by the war but excluded military operations. The Commission was to be consultative only and not have any executive authority, thus it could only accept issues recommended by the governments of its members and its decisions required unanimity. One of its first tasks was to make detailed recommendations regarding the terms of surrender and, by implication, the disarmament and demilitarization of the European states at war with the three Allies. The EAC held its first formal meeting in London on January 14, 1944 with John G. Winant, the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain representing the United States, Sir William Strang of the Foreign Office representing Great Britain, and the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Feodor T. Gousev representing the USSR.¹ In early November 1944, the Provisional French Government was invited to join and its Ambassador to London, Renè Massigli took his seat toward the end of the month.²

In all, the EAC held 20 formal meetings and issued twelve signed agreements, of which five pertained to Germany. Of those five, only three provided broad guidance regarding the demilitarization of Germany. They were:

¹ Bellush, *Op. cit.*, p. 193. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3, 1943, *General*, "Summary of the Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 22, 1943, 4.p.m.," p. 605, hereafter FRUS. See also Conference Documents nos. 6-9, pp. 705-71, *Annex 2*, pp. 756-57, Conference Document No. 20, pp. 720-23, and FRUS, Vol. 3, 1945, *Diplomatic Papers, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*, "Report on the Work of the European Advisory Commission," pp. 544-58. For a history of the beginning and precursor of the EAC, see Bruce Kuklick, "The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Oct 1969), pp. 189-201.

² FRUS, 1945, *Diplomatic Papers: European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*, Vol. III, pp. 545-46.

1) *The Unconditional Surrender of Germany*. There were two versions of this document; the first, which took six months to negotiate, was approved on 25 July 1944, and amended on 1 May 1945 to allow for France's accession to the EAC and to allow the French representative to sign it while the second, which contained a paragraph that discussed the dismemberment of Germany, was never shown to the French.³ On 4 May 1945, just days before Germany's surrender, SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith informed Ambassador Winant that SHAEF had no authoritative copy of the surrender instrument nor had the Allied governments delegated to SHAEF the authority to sign that document. Thus none of the two drafts that had been sent to SHAEF were used. Instead, SHAEF drew up and used a briefer surrender document but, at the urging of Ambassador Winant, revised it to include a paragraph (paragraph 4) that did not preclude the use of a surrender document drawn up by the EAC at a later date.⁴ The only mention of disarmament contained in the EAC document was in Article 2 (a), which stated that "All armed forces of Germany or under German control...equipped with weapons, will be completely disarmed...." The SHAEF document makes no mention of disarmament at all.⁵

2) *Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany*. This document was approved on 21 May 1945 and signed by the four powers in Berlin on 5 June 1945. Virtually all of the 15 articles in this declaration directed the German Armed Forces to undertake certain actions following the cessation of hostilities regarding their weapons and equipment, etc., but only Article 2(a) specifically stated that "All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including

³ For a detailed history of the negotiations on this document see Richard M. Wellig, *History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946, Book VI, Germany*, unpublished manuscript, Center for Military History Library, Ft. McNair, Washington DC, Box 2-3.7 AA.Q (two copies, both incomplete).

⁴ Pogue, *Op. cit.*, p. 485.

⁵ FRUS, 1944, *Diplomatic Papers, General*, Volume I, p. 257, also FRUS, 1945, *Diplomatic Papers, 1945. European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*, Volume III (1945), pp. 544-58 and Pogue, *Op. cit.*, p. 488.

land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces of auxiliary organizations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.”⁶

3) *Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany*. This document, agreed on July 25, 1945, contained thirteen sections with various additional restrictions that *inter alia* related to finances, shipping, property, and the abolition of German militaristic organizations. Specifically, Section I, paragraph 1 stated that: “all German land, naval and air forces, including the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo and all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished....” Paragraph 2 continued by prohibiting “All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities of whatever nature...as well as the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans’ organizations or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry on the German military tradition....”⁷

In the same vein, Section V, paragraph 13, prohibited the “manufacture, production and construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war materials....” It also required that all “research, experiment, development and design directly or indirectly related to war or the production of war materiel....” be placed at the disposal of the Allied Representatives.

⁶ *Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers; June 5, 1945*, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/ger01.htm>.

⁷ FRUS, 1945, Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, p. 1011-1023. This document was repeated on 20 September 1945 as Allied Control Council Proclamation No. 2, (CONL/P/(45)26), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/01LAW01.pdf

A fourth document, *Control Machinery in Germany*, signed on 14 November 1944, provided for the initially tripartite and later quadripartite control of Germany through the Allied Control Authority (ACA). While not mentioning disarmament *per se*, it delineated the composition of the ACA, mandating an Allied Control Council and a Coordinating Committee. It also provided for the Coordinating Committee's subsidiary agencies whose function it was *inter alia* the control and disarmament of Germany.⁸

The EAC came to the end of its existence with the publication of the *Communiqué, Report on the Tripartite Conference on Berlin* on 2 August 1945. The *Communiqué*, which also announced the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, noted "with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principle tasks" but felt that further work for the control of Germany fell within the competence of the Allied Control Council. It therefore recommended that the EAC be dissolved.⁹ The EAC accepted the recommendation as a mandate and agreed to it. Its final report was dated 10 September 1945 although discussion on it continued into November.¹⁰

In his report on the activities of the EAC, Ambassador Winant pointed out that the support given the Commission by the U.S. had been uneven, given the difficulties within the government in formulating a unified German policy.¹¹ Commending the work of the U.S. Joint Advisors to the U.S. Representative, he reported that the U.S. Joint Advisors had prepared 36 draft Directives designed to provide General Eisenhower with agreed policy guidance. Of this total, 24 draft Directives (seven of which dealt disarmament issues) and five draft Agreements were approved by "appropriate authorities" in Washington for circulation and negotiation in the EAC.

⁸ FRUS, 1945, *Diplomatic Papers, 1945. European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*, Volume III (1945), pp. 544-558. See Also JCS 1130/3, (Mar 45, pp. 33-34, RG 260 , Entry 13/A1, Box 23, Folder JCS 1130, NARA.

⁹ FRUS, 1945, *Conference of Berlin*, Vol. II, p. 1501.

¹⁰ FRUS, 1945, *Diplomatic Papers, 1945. European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*, Volume III (1945), pp. 544-558.

¹¹ For an account of Winant's frustrations, see Bellush, *Op. cit.*, pp. 192-210.

Although these Directives had been circulated within the EAC, none had reached the point of being negotiated. Winant, however, stated that they had informed and influenced the policies of the other Allied governments and that these draft Directives had provided the U.S. Group Control Council (U.S. Group CC) its first systematic guidance for preparatory planning. They also were incorporated to a large extent in the *General Directive for Germany*.¹²

¹² FRUS, Vol. I, 1945, *Diplomatic Paper: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945, The Work of the European Advisory Commission, A Summary Report, 12 July 1945*, pp. 292-294. For a list of the U.S. draft Directives, see FRUS, Vol. 3, 1945, *Diplomatic Papers, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany*, pp. 537-539 that says only 23 Directives were circulated. Winant stated that the lack of agreement on these directives was due to the failure of the Soviet government to provide instructions to its delegation to negotiate on them. See Appendix C for a list of the seven U.S. approved Directives.

Appendix B – List of Operation ECLIPSE Memoranda¹

Memo No.	Title and Nature of Document
1.	Instrument of surrender, surrender order and sanctions
4.	Outline Air Plan
5.	Supplies, services and facilities in GERMANY
6.	Signal communications and RADAR
7.	Intelligence requirements and plan
8.	Care and evacuations of PW
9.	Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces
10.	Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces
11.	Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces
12.	CA consideration in Liberated Territories
13.	CA consideration in GERMANY
14.	Control of displaced persons
15.	Psychological Warfare Requirements and plan
16.	PR considerations and plan
17.	Disbandment of German Armed Forces
18.	War criminals and security suspects
19.	Powers and rights over German persons

¹ Appendix A, Ltr, Supreme Hq AEF, AG 381-1 GBI-AGM, dated 6 May 1945, RG 331, Entry NM8/11, Box 6, NARA.

Appendix C: Orders, Directives and Laws dealing with the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany

Military Government Law No. 12: Abolition of Employment Preferences in Favor of Former Members of the German Armed Forces and Others

Military Government Law No. 12, enacted on 1 Aug 1948, repealed any provision of GE law that required employment preference be given to former members of the German armed forces or other Versorgungswärter (officials with claims on the government?) for government posts or other public positions, or conferred upon them preferential treatment in appointment to, remuneration for, or promotion in any government post.

Military Government Law No. 54: Use of Wehrmacht Property

Military Government Law No. 54, enacted on 27 Aug 1945, returned *all* military property could be used for agriculture and/or the settlement of Germans and others to the *Land* (State) in which it was situated.

Military Government Law No. 56: Prohibition of Excessive Concentration of German Economic Power

Military Government Law No. 56, also known as the *Decartelization Law*, was enacted on 12 Feb 1947 expressly to "(i) prevent Germany from endangering the safety of her neighbors and again constituting a threat to international peace, (ii) to destroy Germany's potential to wage war...."

Military Government Law No. 154: Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training

Military Government Law No. 154, which became effective on 14 Jul 1945, specified various punishments, to include the death penalty, for violation of this law.

Military Government Ordinance No. 1 made the unlawful possession or control of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or "war materiel" a capital offense punishable by death.

Military Government Ordinance No. 4 prohibited the wearing of German military uniforms.

Allied Control Council Law No. 8: Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training

Allied Control Council (ACC) Law No. 8, had a somewhat controversial beginning. Initially drafted sometime in 1944 – it was referenced in JCS 1124, 20 Oct 1944

and in JCS 1103 as well. On 4 November 1944, a recommendation was made to amend paragraph 9 of JCS 1103 to include prohibition of all forms of parades, e.g., military, political, civilian or sports. It also recommended the prohibition of military music and other German and Nazi anthems as well as the display of German national and Nazi flags and paraphernalia. On 19 February, 1945, officers of the Demobilization Branch, Army (Ground) Division conferred and established that such a law was necessary and recommended it be published by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The draft was subsequently approved by U.S. Group Control Council (U.S. Group CC), who also recommended SHAEF approve and promulgate it.

SHAEF's G-5 Division (Legal Branch), however, saw several redundancies in the draft, claiming that much of what was in the draft was either covered already by existing laws and ordinances or would soon be. As a result, G-5 felt the law was not needed at that time but should be considered again after SHAEF was no longer responsible for Germany. These arguments were rebutted by U.S. Group CC who argued that the provisions of the draft law were covered by existing ordinances only in an "extremely technical sense." U.S. Group CC argued further that this law on the *Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training* was a "fundamental and basic element of Allied long-range policy" and its contents needed to be presented to the German people in a clear and understandable manner. This argument won the day and the ACC promulgated the law on 30 November 1945 with but few changes to the original version.

Allied Control Council Law 23: Prohibition of Military Construction in Germany

This law, which was enacted on 17 April 1946, prohibited, among other things:

- The preparation, possession, or even making use of models or plans of any military installation.
- The design, planning, fabrication, erection or construction of any military installation, or any civil installation that could possibly be used for war purposes, whether for land, sea or air.

Penalties for violating this law, depending on the seriousness of the violation, encompassed a wide range of prison terms up to and including the death penalty.

Allied Control Council Law 25: Control of Scientific Research

Enacted on 7 May 1946, this law prohibited all research on a number of subjects, outlined in four schedules, that had military application. This law was supplemented by an OMGUS Regulation that refined the requirements of the Law and included forms that required approval for the conducted of scientific research.

Allied Control Council Law 34: Dissolution of the Wehrmacht

Although the Wehrmacht was dissolved by Allied proclamation No. 2 and Disbandment Directives -9, this Law, enacted on 26 August 1946, was seen as necessary to prevent the future establishment of the Wehrmacht or any of its organizations by any

other name and to declare such any such reconstitution illegal. According to Article V of this Law, violators could also be subject to the death penalty.

Allied Control Council Law 43: Prohibition of the Manufacture, Import, Export, Transport or Storage of War Materiels.

This Law was enacted on 20 December 1946 to prevent the rearming of Germany. It's very specific provisions were determined to include even the production of such materiels for the occupation forces, as it would then create a conflict with ACC Law 25, i.e., it would allow the Germans to retain a degree of "technical know-how" regarding the manufacture of weapons of war.

Allied Control Council Law 46: Abolition of the State of Prussia.

As it had been determined that the Prussian State had been the bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany from the earliest days, this Law was enacted on 25 February 1947 to "assure the further reconstruction of the political life of Germany on a democratic basis...."

Allied Control Council Directive 16: Arming of German Police.

This Directive, published on 6 November 1945, authorized the rearming of the German police for purposes of maintaining law and order. It prohibited the use of automatic weapons, however, and weapons or ammunition of German manufacture, at least until there were sufficient non-German weapons available. The Directive further limited the issuance of weapons to pistols and handguns except that rural and frontier police were allowed to be armed with carbines. No weapon was to be issued to any unit that had not completed denazification and had not removed any person deemed hostile to the military government. Ammunition was strictly limited to 10 rounds per municipal police and 20 rounds to rural and frontier police. Police units were to be held to strict accountability for all weapons issued and for all ammunition issued and expended.

Allied Control Council Directive 18: For Disbandment and Dissolution of the German Armed Forces.

This Directive was issued on 6 December 1945 to specify procedures by which former members of the Wehrmacht, POW's and non-German members would be demobilized, discharged, and sent to their previous homes or repatriated as the case might be.

Allied Control Council Directive 22: Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of Fortifications, Underground Installations and Military Installations in Germany.

This directive, published on 6 December 1945, began by stating that its purpose was to *forever* prevent Germany from using these facilities. All those listed in the appendix, except those needed by the occupation forces or civil population, were to be destroyed completely in accordance with a given timetable, e.g., Priority I, within 18

months; Priority II, within a further four years, so that all these facilities would be destroyed within five and one-half years from the date the directive was published. Military Zone commanders were given discretion to add to the list and to destroy any military structure not listed in the appendix.

Allied Control Council Directive 23: Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany.

Issued on 17 December 1945, this directive prohibited all sport activities, organizations, clubs, etc., that were involved in aviation, parachuting, gliding, fencing, military drill or display, and shooting with firearms.

Allied Control Council Directive 28: Reports on Disposal of German War Materiel.

Issued 26 April 1946 provided for the expeditious destruction and disposal of captured or surrendered German war materiel located in Germany. It was amended by Control Council Directive 46 which set a target date of 1 May 1948.

Allied Control Council Directive 30: Legislation Dealing with the Liquidation of German Military and Nazi Memorials and Museums.

Enacted on 13 May 1946 amended on 12 June 1946 prohibited the “planning, designing, erection, installation, posting or other display” of a wide range of objects, to include street signs, statues, tablets, etc., that would keep German military tradition alive, serve to revive it, or serve to “glorify incidents of war.” The same directive prohibited the re-opening of military museums and exhibitions. Only monuments erected to the memory of deceased members of military organizations - except paramilitary organizations, the S.S. and the Waffen S.S. - were allowed as were tombstones that existed or were to be erected in the future as long as they carried no indication of militarism or Nazism.

Allied Control Council Directive 32: Disciplinary Measures Against Managing and Administrative Staffs of Educational Institutions, Teaching Staffs, and Students Guilty of Militaristic, Nazi or Anti-Democratic Propaganda.

Enacted on 26 June 1946, this directive, as its titled implied, provided for the dismissal/expelling of such individuals and left them liable to criminal prosecution.

Allied Control Council Directive 39: Liquidation of German War and Industrial Potential.

Issued on 2 October 1946, this directive was written to take into consideration those remaining elements of German war-making potential that had not been covered by previous laws and directives. The principles guiding the implementation of this directive

were to either destroy completely, declare available for reparations, or leave intact for peace-time economic use (in accordance with certain stipulations).

Title 2: Eradication of Nazism and Militarism.

Dealt with the responsibility of the Military Government to accomplish the task of destroying German militarism and removing all Nazi and militarist influences from the public, cultural, and economic life of the German people. This was one of the principle objectives of the war as well as having been mandated by the Potsdam Agreement.

In the main, the Title pertained to the de-Nazification procedures, which was made the responsibility of the Germans. Demilitarization had, by 1946, been completed in terms of personnel and was still underway in terms of physical plant, such as military installations, industries, and the like.

Appendix D: U.S. Approved Draft Directives of the U.S. Joint Advisors to the U.S. Representative to the European Advisory Commission¹

1. Disposition of German and German Controlled Naval Craft, Equipment and Facilities
EAC(44)34, 24 Nov 44.
2. Disposition of German and German Controlled Aircraft, Aeronautical Equipment and Facilities
EAC(44)37, 24 Nov 44.
3. Disposition and Control of the German Police
EAC(44)38, 25 Nov 44
4. Control and Disposal of Nationals, Armed Forces and Property of Enemy Countries other than Germany
EAC(44)39, 25 Nov 44
5. Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training in Germany
EAC(44)43, 8 Dec 44
6. Disposal of German Armed Forces
EAC(45)1, 1 Jan 45
7. Disarmament of the German Armed Forces and Disposal of Enemy Equipment
EAC(45)12, 16 Feb 45

¹ RG 260, Entry A2 B1 C3, Box 363, NARA.

Appendix E: The Himmerod Conference and the Bonn Report

Unbeknownst to the U.S., the September 1950 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in New York led Chancellor Adenauer to call a conference of German military experts to meet from 6-9 October 1950 at Cloister Himmerod, near Wittlich, in the Eifel Mountains to discuss and lay out the manner and form in which a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe should take. Fifteen former *Wehrmacht* officers took part: nine from the Army (*Heer*) and three each from the Air Force (*Luftwaffe*) and Navy (*Marine*). Despite some significant differences, it is interesting that this conference, which dealt with a wide range of military issues, to include recruitment, education and training, and most important, the nature of the military tradition that could be imparted to soldiers serving in a democratic society, as well as strategy, arrived independently at the size of a German contribution that roughly paralleled that discussed above by the JCS.¹

The conference concluded that the Federal Republic's contribution by end 1952 should consist of an army of 12 armored divisions, to include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, in six Corps, for a total of 250,000 men. While manpower numbers were not given, the conference saw a minimum need for a *Luftwaffe* of six tactical air wings

¹ Rautenberg and Wiggershaus, *Op. cit.*, pp. 36-60. See also Large, *Op. cit.*, pp. 97-103. The officers who attended the conference were: Army: Colonel General Heinrich von Vieringhoff-Scheel, General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, General Herman Foertsch, General Hans Röttiger, Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger, Lieutenant General Dr. Hans Speidel, Colonel Eberhard Graf von Nostitz, Colonel Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, Major Wolf Graf von Baudissin; Air Force: General Dr. Robert Knauss, General Rudolf Meister, Major Horst Krüger; Navy: Admiral Walter Gladisch, Kapitän zur See Schulze-Hinrichs, and Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge. Of these fifteen, seven obtained General rank in the Bundeswehr, six died before or during the creation of the *Bundeswehr*, and two obtained high positions in the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, the Federal Intelligence Service. Interestingly, James S. Corum writes that only one Air Force officer, General Knauss, attended the Conference. See James S. Corum "Starting From Scratch: Establishing the *Bundesluftwaffe* as a modern Air Force, 1955-1960, *Air Power History*, Vol. 50, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 16-29 and his "Building A New Luftwaffe: the United States Air Force and Bundeweher Planning for Rearmament, 1950-1960," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 89-113.

totaling 831 aircraft: 180 reconnaissance planes, 279 fighter-bombers and 372 fighters. Similarly, no manpower figures were given for the naval contingent but the conference underscored the Soviet strength in the Baltic and thus indicated a need for landing craft, small submarines, torpedo boats and minelayers, naval aircraft (both reconnaissance and fighters), submarine hunters and minesweepers.

In June, Army G-3 Plans Division circulated a paper containing a summary of the High Commissioners-FRG talks (the Bonn Report) that began in January.² The summary indicated that the FRG accepted a number of the safeguards proposed by NATO, among the more important were German acceptance that its participation would be under NATO, that German air units would be under SACEUR (Himmerod recommendations were that they be under German Army command), that recruitment of Germans would initially be by volunteers followed by conscription, that a German arms industry would be established only as requested by France, that a German defense administration would be civilian and under the control of the *Bundestag*, and that the end strength of German land formations would not exceed 20% of the total available to SACEUR.

The Germans rejected the RCT size limit and insisted that the basic unit for German ground forces be a 10,000 man division, preferably armored. Accordingly, they also rejected the prohibition on heavy armored formations. They also insisted that there should be a central German Defense Ministry. Consistent with Germany's demand for equality, they rejected Allied control of the future German defense administration as well

² G-3/Plans Div/Int'l Br, 091 Germany TS German Contribution to the Defense of Western Europe, 14 June 1951, RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091. Germany, Box 23, NARA. It should be noted that in a cable from Acheson to Ambassador Bruce, repeated to Ambassador s Gifford and Spofford in London and General Hays, the Deputy High Commissioner in Frankfurt, Acheson wrote that as serious difficulties over the Bonn Report from France were expected, and if Tripartite agreement on the report was not possible, he was prepared to send it to the North Atlantic Council without such agreement. Deptel 6898, 21/7 PM Jun 51, Enclosure "A" to JCS 2124/47, 30 June 1951, *Ibid*.

as supervision of officer recruiting, and the restriction on not having intelligence, plans and operations functions above the tactical level. Lastly, they rejected the limit on the division being the largest national ground force contribution.

Not too long afterward, Handy forwarded to the JCS comments of its European representative on the Bonn Report in which he praised the German approach as being realistic and sound. He opined that more desirable results would be obtained if each nation, including Germany, would be allowed to contribute forces at corps or even army level. The message approved the establishment of a single German defense ministry and cautioned that the “progressive creation of German military forces must be keyed to the ability of the Allies and the Germans to provide the requisite amounts of arms and equipment.”³

On 6 August, the JCS submitted its assessment of the Bonn Report and with few exceptions, considered the German proposals acceptable. The JCS agreed that German ground formations should be of at least division size but they disagreed with the German desire to have all armored divisions as not coinciding with NATO requirement and logistically difficult. Regarding the German desire to have Corps commands, the JCS waffled somewhat and addressed the possibility of an “international” corps as meeting Germany’s requirements. In the end, the JCS indicated that any corps organization should be flexible and allow SACEUR to deploy all NATO forces as he deemed necessary.

Regarding the *Luftwaffe*, the JCS accepted the view that materiel procurement provided the greatest obstacle to its organization. They recommended that for planning

³ SX 5322, 241001Z Jun 51, RG 218, Geographic File 1951-53, 092 Germany (5-4-49) Sec. 8-14, Box 18, NARA. On 2 July, General Handy weighed in on the Bonn Report with a 5-page, detailed letter to the Army Chief of Staff. *Ibid.*

purposes, the *Luftwaffe* seek to contribute a total of only 750 aircraft, organized into ten fighter wings of three squadrons each, by end 1954. JCS estimated that an eventual minimum *Luftwaffe* contribution would be in the neighborhood of 1,600 to 1,800 aircraft. Lastly, JCS concurred with the Army Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), that the primary mission should be tactical air support for the German ground forces, a position that was anathema to the U.S. Air Staff and would be changed.⁴

On 1 September, G-3 Plans recommended adoption of the Bonn Report but did not agree with U.S. Air Force and Navy recommendations to create a Deputy Inspector General for each of the three German services. G-3's rationale was that "present planning is largely for the establishment of Army forces."⁵

On 10 September, the JCS drafted a memo to the Secretary of Defense stating that they had reviewed the Bonn Report and the interim Report of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community and noted that while the concept of a European Defense Force had been accepted by NSC 115, the Interim Report did not provide for the raising of German forces at the earliest possible date as required by NSC 115. The JCS then stated that a specific plan to insure an immediate German contribution was essential and that such a plan should be developed under SACEUR's direction.⁶

⁴ JCS 2124/52, 6 August 1951, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A," RG 319, Army - Operations General Decimal File, 1950-1951, 091. Germany, TS, (Section II-D)(Book II)(Case 38 Only), Box 23, NARA. It appears that this submission was withdrawn until the Foreign Ministers Conference on 12 September 1951.

⁵ JCS2124/59, 1September 1951, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, 091-Germany (TS) (Section II-D)(Book IV)(Case 38), Box 23, NARA.

⁶ Enclosure "A," JCS2124/59, 1September 1951, *Ibid.* The Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community took place in Paris from January 1951 until May 1952 when the EDC Treaty was signed. These views and views on a State drafted position paper for the Washington Foreign Ministers

Along with those thoughts, the JCS submitted an updated “Force Basis” to be used for planning purposes for the German contribution. This “Basis” specified ten Army divisions, of which four would be armored and six infantry along with Corps and Army type service support units. It allocated 10 fighter-bomber wings (to include tactical reconnaissance aircraft) to the *Luftwaffe*, and for the *Marine* it allocated 11,500 personnel and 183 vessels of various types, to include mine layers, submarine hunters, torpedo boats and E-boats.⁷

(Tripartite) Talks, that the Pentagon considered inadequate, were sent to the Secretary of Defense. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, *Washington Foreign Ministers Meeting (Tripartite Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T-4/2a)*, dated 8 September 1951, entitled “*European Defense Forces and the Question of German Contribution to Defense*,” 12 September 1951, *Ibid.*

⁷ Appendix “B” to Enclosure “A,” JCS2124/59, 1 September 1951, *Ibid.* The E-Boat’s actual designation is S-Boot for *Schnell* or fast boat. The WW II Allies used the designation “E” to signify the vessel as an “enemy” fast attack boat. On 18 October 1951, the Military Committee of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community agreed on the basic unit size for the various “*Groupements*” of the European Defense Force and settled on peacetime/ wartime strengths as follows: Infantry - 14,500/17,000; Armored - 12,500/14,500; Mechanized - 12,700/14,700. This agreement resolved the long-standing differences between the French and the Germans as the French had initially insisted that any German formation larger than an RCT of 4,000-6,000 personnel was politically impossible. To alleviate French sensibilities, however, the term division was avoided. Attachment to Paris 2269, October 18, 6 p.m., RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Lot 56D38, Records Relating to the European Defense Community, 1951-1954, Entry A1, Box 32, NARA.

Appendix F: Acheson's "Single Package"

How Acheson's "Single Package" came to be is still a matter of debate. Most scholars take their cue from Acheson's *Present at the Creation* in which he relates that State and Defense debated the issue for two weeks before a compromise, which he then carried to the Tripartite Meeting in New York on 12 September, was reached. The "package," which had been approved by President Truman just a few days earlier and which the French labeled the 'Bombshell at the Waldorf,' was intended to be offered to the Allies on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis. It contained several key elements: an offer to increase U.S. forces in Europe by approximately 6 divisions, 8 tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and participation, along with the United Kingdom and all the other NATO armies in a combined European defense force, with an international staff and a 'supreme commander.' This offer, however, was contingent on the Allies boosting the capabilities (and size) of their forces and accepting the inclusion of German contingents that would be added at division level but without a German General Staff.¹

Acheson later called the 'single package' a mistake and claimed that he was forced into accepting it from the military, a claim that is supported by many. However, all the available evidence and documentation indicates that by the time the so-called compromise with the military was reached, Acheson had already decided on the necessity for Germany to be armed: "If there was to be any defense at all," he had said, "it had to be based on a forward strategy" and Germany's role had to be primary.

¹ Acheson, *Op. cit.*, pp. 568-571 and his *The Struggle for a Free Europe*, p. 133. See also *JCS History II*, pp. 200-203; Martin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 655-660; Thomas Alan Schwartz, "The 'Skeleton Key' – American Foreign Policy, European Unity and German Rearmament, 1949-1954," *Central European History*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Dec 1986, pp. 375-377; James McAllister, *No Exit, America and the German Problem, 1943-1954*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 187ff. ; Trachtenberg and Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-16.

Acheson also stated that “the Pentagon needed no persuasion,” a fact we know from Chapter 4.² Of particular interest in this respect, however, is David S. McLellan’s comment that Acheson may have wanted to avoid a conflict with Bradley and that the JCS insisted that the “recommendations must be submitted and accepted as a whole.” While one cannot prove a negative, this claim and other similar statements by McClellan are not supported by the available documentation. On August 30, 1950, Acheson, Byroade, Paul Nitze and George Perkins met with General Bradley to discuss the JCS response to Truman’s eight questions. According to the only memorandum of that meeting, prepared by Byroade, the two men agreed on the Army’s answers to the President’s questions. The memorandum contained no mention of any major disagreement.³

Furthermore, both Trachtenberg and McMahon agree that Acheson was neither a person to be easily cowed nor one who would subscribe to a position he did not approve.⁴ Thus, as Chapter 4 relates and underscores the Joint Staff’s position of wanting Germany armed through NATO, one would have to conclude that if Acheson had been forced to accept the military position, it would have been an national Germany army in NATO.

² Robert McMahon, *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order*, Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009, pp. 132-133. For a significant disclaimer, see Christopher Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’: American Policy on German Rearmament, 1950,” in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 135-160.

³ Memorandum for S/S, August 30, 1950, Dean Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations File, Box 67, HSTL. For the JCS response and its amendment, see Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 August 1950, Subject: Position on Recommendations to be Submitted to the President Regarding a European Defense Force and Related Matters, and Proposed Joint Reply to the President’s Letter of 26 August 1950, 7 September 1950, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Files Relating to European Defense Arrangements, 1948-1954, Lot 55 D 258, Box 1, NARA.

⁴ Acheson, *Ibid.*, and Trachtenberg and Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-22. See also McMahon, *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-17, 48, David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson, the State Department Years*, New York: Department of Defense, Mead & Company, 1976, p. 329; McAllister, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 187 ff. General Bradley called Acheson “an uncompromising hawk,” but Bradley left no personal or official papers that describe the 30 August meeting or that would indicate he forced the German rearmament issue on Acheson. Omar Bradley, *A General’s Life*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 519, and e-mail correspondence between this author and archivists at the U.S. Army Military Historical Institute, Carlisle Barracks, December 2010. McMahon, doesn’t even mention the Bradley meeting, and states that Acheson took the “lead role” in developing this “Single Package,” McMahon, *Op. cit.*, p. 137. For an excellent article that supports this thesis, see also Christopher Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package,’ *Op. cit.*, pp. 135-60.

According to a Memorandum of Conversation regarding German rearmament in which Bevin, Acheson, Roddy Barclay and Lucius Battle took part, Acheson is cited as saying that if he had to present the matter [at the forthcoming meeting of the Defense Ministers], he would “do so as one complete conception pointing out the importance of all parts.”⁵ Thus, I am convinced, as is Trachtenberg and Gehrz, and I believe the evidence supports the conclusion that if the package as presented to Bevin and Schuman was a mistake, it was not that it mandated the arming of the Federal Republic but that it was presented as a virtual all or nothing demand.⁶

Lastly, the alleged “bombshell” was, in fact, no bombshell at all. Recall from Chapter 5 the 2 September cable Acheson sent both Ambassadors Bruce in Paris and Douglas in London instructing them to “urgently call” on the French and British Foreign Ministers, Schuman and Bevin, to inform them of U.S. thinking regarding the creation of a unified Defense Force in Europe, the appointment of a Supreme Commander and the integration of German units in such a force without creating a German National Army. Acheson specifically asked that Schuman and Bevin be told that “US participation in the defense of Eur [sic] and in the direction of such a unified Force would involve greater commitments than we have heretofore been willing to consider. Whether or not we actually make such commitments will depend on whether or not the Europeans are themselves willing to make greater efforts resulting in adequate steps to increase their forces in being.”⁷ Thus the stage was set for a significant unintentional consequence of the U.S.’s German policy, the refusal of France to accept the “arm Germany” portion of the U.S. offer and the five-year battle to put Germans back in uniform.

⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, 28 September 1950, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat (Dean Acheson), Lot 53D444, Box 13, NARA.

⁶ Trachtenberg and Gehrz, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁷ McMahon, *Op. cit.*, p. 135. The above cited text of the cable to Paris, DEPTTEL 1124, is in *FRUS, 1950, III*, pp. 261-262. A footnote states that a similar cable, DEPTTEL 1197, was sent to London.

Appendix G: The Great Debate

The “Single Package” and the decision to send additional troops to Europe to support the request that the FRG be armed created a second unanticipated consequence - this time, however, the challenge was to the President’s powers and authority as Commander-in-Chief, and it came primarily from the Senate. While there was unanimity within the Senate on the need for the U.S. to check Soviet expansion in Europe, this unanimity did not extend to how that was to be accomplished.¹

Already incensed over the “loss” of China to the communists, the setback in Korea resulting from Chinese entry into the war in November 1950, and the administration’s push for a European strategy that included sending additional U.S. troops to mainland Europe, the Senate turned even more against the President and his Secretary of State. What became known as “The Great Debate of 1951” actually began in late 1950, but took shape when the 82nd Congress convened in January 1951.

Led by Senators Robert A. Taft (R), Ohio, and Kenneth S. Wherry (R), Nebraska, the key argument revolved around the President’s authority to send troops to Europe without Congressional approval. To this end, and bolstered by earlier statements by Acheson that neither the NATO Treaty nor the Military Assistance Program (MAP) would commit troops to Europe, Senate Resolution 8, introduced on 16 January, gave the sense of the Senate that no ground troops could be sent to Europe pending formulation of

¹ David R. Keply, “The Senate and the Great Debate of 1951,” *Prologue*, Winter 1982, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 213-226. See also McLellan, *Op. cit.*, Chapter 17.

a Congressional policy. President Truman's response was that as Commander-in-Chief, he had the authority to send troops anywhere, and that while he was not required to consult with Congress, he was polite and usually always consulted with them, "I don't ask permission, I just consult them."

On 1 February, Eisenhower, by then confirmed as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), spoke to a joint session of Congress of the need for unity (regarding the U.S. and Europe) and stated that "someone in achieving that unity has to take the leadership, and I mean one nation, not some one individual." He continued that this was the role of the U.S. and that he believed that "the transfer of certain of our units should be in direct ratio to what Europe is doing, so that we know we are all going forward together...."²

Two weeks later, on 15 February, Marshall addressed a joint session of the Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs Committees and, referring to Eisenhower's earlier testimony, told the assembled Senators that after obtaining express permission from the President, he could inform them that the JCS had recommended to him, and he had recommended to the President - who had approved - that the U.S. maintain in Europe approximately six divisions of ground forces. As there already were in Europe approximately two divisions on occupation duty, only four more divisions would be sent.

²Dean G. Acheson, "The Great Debate and Troops to Europe, December 1950-April 1951," Synopsis H, p. 6, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminar File, 1953-1970, Box 78, HSTL. Acheson writes further that Eisenhower also testified to a closed joint session of the Senate Armed Services and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees, after which the "Great Debate" became focused on the more specific question of what, if any, contribution the U.S. should make to the defense of Western Europe. Acheson, *Loc. cit.*, p. 7.

Marshall reminded the committees that what was being done was, in fact, carrying out Congress' earlier instructions regarding the preparation of integrated plans for the defense of the North Atlantic area. Those plans were well advanced, he said, and for General Eisenhower to accomplish his mission it was imperative that he not be denied the freedom of action necessary to a military commander.³

The "Great Debate," however, continued on into April with amendments to S.R. 8 offered, new proposals made, and even a proposal submitted by the administration through Senators Tom Connally (D), Texas and Richard Russell (D), Georgia, was introduced. In the end, however, not wanting to force a Constitutional showdown, the Senate passed a simpler concurrent resolution, S.R. 99 on 4 April, which not only approved the designation of Eisenhower as SACEUR but also approved the President's actions and the dispatch of four divisions but qualified it all with the sense of the Senate that the President *should* consult with Congress and submit semi-annual reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴

³ Statement of General Marshall Before Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services Committees Thursday, February 15, 1951 at 10 A.M. (EST), Student Research File (B File), the Integration of Western Europe, Box 1 of 1, HSTL.

⁴ S. Res 99, 82d Congress, 1st Session, "Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area," Papers of George M. Elsey, Harry S. Truman Administration, Speech File, Box 55, HSTL. It is of interest to note that McLellan writes that in mid-August, 1950, the State Department "set before the Pentagon a proposal...combined with the dispatch of four to six divisions to reinforce American ground forces in Europe." He argues further that this gave the Pentagon a "voice in U.S. policy on that subject. McClellan does not, however, provide any sourcing for that statement and I have found nothing in either State Department archives or the Acheson Papers to support that. McLellan, *Op. cit.*, p. 328.

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