Title of dissertation: ACTIVIST GLOBALIZATION: HOW MARKETS, SOCIETIES AND STATES EMPOWER CAUSE-ORIENTED ACTION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS

Rodrigo G. Pinto, Doctor of Philosophy, 2011

Dissertation directed by: Professor Ken Conca
Department of Government and Politics

This study examines how transnational conditions of markets, societies and states empower civic groups, social movements, advocacy networks or resisters to participate in cause-oriented action that connects two or more polities. Preliminary theses infatuated with the latest and thickest wave of globalization have blown back into a solidified antithesis. Under this influential antithesis, international interactions between states create more opportunities for transnational activism than do global flows between societies or markets. The evidence analyzed here suggests a refutation of that prevalent antithesis. Instead, it supports the synthesizing hypothesis of this study: The more markets and societies globalize and the more states interact, the more transnational activism occurs.

The research conducted here develops on a promising explanatory typology that is the best attempt to answer the main question about activism in international relations (IR) studies at present. This dissertation builds on such theory, moderating short-range and statist imbalances in conventional IR and cross-national (comparative) research on the
consequences of interstate regimes and political opportunity structures, respectively. The study goes on to make this prior scholarship more accurate, comprehensive and reflective. First, tests of the prime theory over a longer history, which predates 1945, here elevate globalism toward a favorable condition that is as consequential as internationalism for activism across borders. Second, this study conceptualizes four explanatory processes—or chains of causal mechanisms—that link activism mainly to encouragement from globalization. These original models expose a grand, causal theory to have outpaced its necessary processual, mechanismic bases. Finally, the study addresses the spatial transnationality and transnationalization of activism. It extends the typology of explanatory processes to distinguish the primary scale of activist actions from the locus of activist causes, along a domestic-foreign frontier. The extension renders as unexamined a conventional assumption that activism transnationalizes through a one-dimensional globalization from local toward global proportions.

The dissertation uses qualitative, case-study and process-tracing, methods to compare and generalize beyond two transnational activist campaigns. These campaigns are situated temporally from the 1860s to the 1950s, geographically through inclusion of actors based in Brazil, and thematically via incorporation of biodiversity in activist deed or discourse.
ACTIVIST GLOBALIZATION: HOW MARKETS, SOCIETIES AND STATES EMPOWER CAUSE-ORIENTED ACTION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Rodrigo G. Pinto

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2011

Advisory Committee:

Professor Ken Conca, Chair
Professor Virginia Haufler
Professor Margaret E. Keck
Professor Roberto P. Korzeniewicz
Professor James V. Riker
Professor Karol Soltan
© Copyright by
Rodrigo G. Pinto
2011
Acknowledgements

I am thankful for a Harrison Fellowship from the Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda, and for an Ann G. Wiley Dissertation Fellowship from the Graduate School—both at the University of Maryland. This study would simply not exist without their financial support. Additional grants from the Department of Government and Politics proved invaluable in the preparation of this study.

I was privileged to rely on ‘doutor’ Ken Conca as a doctoral mentor who walks his talk in being the change he wants to see in the world. I was also fortunate to work with a stellar committee whose commitment went well beyond departmental and/or university obligations—whether to University of Maryland units, American University or Johns Hopkins University.

I also owe thanks to a “virtual committee” of professors whose guidance in doctoral and pre-doctoral educational programs has culminated in this dissertation: UMD’s Herman Daly and Regina Igel; former UMD faculty members Dennis Pirages and Miranda Schreurs; Mauro Maida and Marcelo Medeiros at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE, Brazil); and Jonathan Wight, Jimmy Kandeh, John Outland, Vincent Wang and John Whelan.

This study also benefited from the comments of colleagues elsewhere. I am grateful to fellow members of the GVPT Environmental Politics Group such as Allison Berland-Kaul, Martin Elissetche and Özgüç Orhan for their comments on 2007-2008 papers that evolved into this study. I am in debt to Jørgen Wettestad, Rabih Helou and Jennifer Wallace for their valuable suggestions as discussants for a part of this dissertation presented in academic conferences during 2008. I am thankful to Jessica Green, Paul Wapner and Michael Butler for their constructive feedback as discussants for other portions of this study presented during 2010. The generosity and collegiality of those I interviewed was worthy of my deepest gratitude.

I thank family and friends who, among their other support, enabled my travel for conferences and field research by hosting, releasing, endorsing, replacing and/or guiding me during the completion of my Ph.D. program (listed alphabetically by first names, according to Brazilian convention): Alan L., host student Allyson R., godparents-in-law Chris and Paul E., cousin Dinorah B. and aunt Theresa B., aunt Edna and Evaldo M. A., grandfather Eudes S. L. P., Eve B., Felipe M., Fernando M., Marco V., grandparents-in-law Helen and Andrew S., parents Izabel Christina and Ricardo P., parents-in-law Janet and Ken S., Jason and Patrícia W., Jason H., Judy P., sister-in-law Karen S., Kinfu, host-parents Lindomar and Fernando B., the Lucena Sá family, Marcelo W., Maureen C., Raphael and Sarah F., host-parents Roger and the late Suzanne D., Suzanne H., host-family Harp, and the USCIS immigration offices in Baltimore and Indianapolis.

The writing of this study was reinvigorated by the team camaraderie of various groups: the DC Malês Capoeira group; the DC Sul da Bahia Capoeira group; the GVPT Environmental Politics group, particularly its founders Ken C. and Mike B.; GVPT Guerrillas Soccer; tennis teams mixing Bernardo D., Brian S., Carolina V., Nadia O., Quddus S. and Tobias F.; UMD’s Ecological Economics Student Group (EESG) and Environmental Policy Roundtable; environmental group with UMD’s Latin American Studies Center (LASC), especially professor Janet Chernela; UMD’s Education Abroad team and its collaborators; UMD’s Department of Government and Politics, especially Irwin Morris, Ann Marie Clark and my undergraduate students; UMD’s Language Media Services team; various teams with GVPT colleagues Ben A., Benli S., Jeremy B., Mike M., Shanthi G., and Steve M.-S.

Last but certainly not least, this dissertation and this author were completed with the loving support of Andie Sonstrom Pinto.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
   1.1. Statement of the Research Problem, Specific Aims, Expectations, and Hypotheses .......... 1
   1.2. Review of the Literature and Significance .................................................................. 7
   1.3. Research Plan ................................................................................................................. 11
   1.4. Purposes, Themes and Traditions .................................................................................. 26
2. Theory .............................................................................................................................................. 33
   2.1. Activist Globalization: Transitology from Local to Global ........................................ 33
   2.2. Conceptualized Processes ............................................................................................. 36
   2.3. Extending a Typology of Processes: Into the Gray-Zone, Dual Level of Analysis ....... 42
   2.4. Conceptualizing Dual-Level, Socioeconomic Processes .............................................. 57
3. Campaign to Protect Birds from Hunts for Women’s Wear, 1868–1941 .................................... 69
   3.1. BRAZIL IN THE CAMPAIGN ....................................................................................... 78
   3.2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CAMPAIGN ........................................................................ 80
   3.3. GLOBAL ISSUE FRAMING ......................................................................................... 93
   3.4. INTERNALIZATION ...................................................................................................... 97
   3.5. DIFFUSION ................................................................................................................. 105
   3.6. SCALE ALTERATION ................................................................................................. 108
   3.7. EXTERNALIZATION .................................................................................................. 111
   3.8. COALITION FORMATION ............................................................................................ 116
   3.9. ‘CAVE! HIC DRAGONES,’ BEYOND STATISM AND TRANSITOLGY .................. 120
   3.10. DIVERSION .............................................................................................................. 122
   3.11. RADIATION ............................................................................................................. 176
   3.12. INCUBATION ............................................................................................................ 201
   3.13. LOCAL ISSUE FRAMING ........................................................................................ 207
   3.14. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 211
4. Campaign on the (Inter)National Institute of (the Hylean) Amazon (Research), 1945–1956 .. 215
   4.1. BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION VERSUS CONQUEST IN THE CAMPAIGN .... 225
   4.2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CAMPAIGN ........................................................................ 231
   4.3. INTERNALIZATION ..................................................................................................... 234
   4.4. EXTERNALIZATION ................................................................................................... 270
   4.5. ‘CAVE! HIC DRAGONES,’ BEYOND STATISM AND TRANSITOLGY .................. 279
   4.6. INCUBATION .............................................................................................................. 281
   4.7. LOCAL ISSUE FRAMING ........................................................................................... 315
   4.8. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 324
5. Case Comparison ............................................................................................................................. 330
   5.1. Causal Accuracy ......................................................................................................... 332
   5.2. Processual Scope ......................................................................................................... 334
   5.3. Accuracy and Scope of Causal Mechanisms ................................................................ 335
   5.4. Reflectivity of Pre-Analytic Transnationalization ...................................................... 339
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 342
   6.1. Generalization ............................................................................................................. 346
   6.2. Implications: Theoretical, Methodological, Substantive and Practical ...................... 362
   6.3. Future Research .......................................................................................................... 374
   6.4. Pneumonic, Poetic License to Predict Transnational Activism around Biodiversity .... 380
7. Bibliographical References ............................................................................................................. 382
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Two Cases Selected from Nine Campaigns .............................................. 18
Table 2: Cases of Transnational Activist Campaigns Traced / Sketched through Causal Processes ................................................................. 21
Table 3: Case Timeline ......................................................................................... 82
Table 4: Inductive Campaign (IIHA-INPA) Case and Deductive Causal Chain ........ 220
Table 5: Globalist Flows Causing Transnational Activism ..................................... 224
Table 6: Case Timeline ......................................................................................... 233
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ten Processes of Transnational Activism</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Six Processes of Transnational Contention</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A Typology of Forms of Transnational Coalitions</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dynamic Multilevel Governance</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Processes of Transnational Activism</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Six Processes of Transitologically Transnational Activism</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ten Processes of Transnational Activism</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>A Model of Diversion</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A Model of Radiation</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A Model of Incubation</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>A Model of Local Issue Framing</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

1.1. Statement of the Research Problem, Specific Aims, Expectations, and Hypotheses

The study tests meta-theory and builds alternate mid-range theory on the causes and processes of transnational activism, defined as cause-oriented action that connects actors located in two or more nation-states. In particular, the international relations (IR) research conducted here develops on a typology that holds the most promise to explain cause-oriented action across borders. Tarrow (2005) uses two main elements to explain the activism of civic volunteers, non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy networks, social movements, and every-day resisters in world politics. First, processually, transnational activism is said to consist of six key processes that can be identified empirically, and used to formulate and test theses about the growth or decline of activism over time. Second, causally, the key political opportunity said to produce these processes is growth in internationalism, defined as “interstate ties” and “multilateral interaction” through inter/trans-governmental “institutions, regimes, and practices.” (Tarrow 2005:3-9, 25, 27, 205)

Meta-theoretically, Tarrow (2005) suggests that his internationalist thesis offers a superior—more direct and general—explanation for the surge of transnational activism in recent decades, in comparison with socioeconomic globalism as an alternative independent variable. Internationalism is understood as a sort of “coral reef” onto which transnational activism attaches itself, as a directly proportional accretion (Tarrow 2005:27, 205). Tarrow (2005:5, 8) adopts a restricted version of Keohane’s (2002:194) definition of globalism as flows of capital (finance), goods (trade), information, ideas and people that connect actors between countries. Simply put, Tarrow posits that
internationalist interactions between states encourage transnational cause-oriented action to a greater extent than do globalist flows between societies or markets.

The mid-range theoretical component of Tarrow’s (2005) work consists of the six processes in his typology—the non-bolded processes listed in Figure 1 below. He posits dynamic and relational sequences of causal mechanisms to be recurrent in transnational activism. Tarrow uses each process to identify empirical episodes of said cause-oriented action that conform to its sequence. The typology maps the locus or the main site of activist processes. One dimension locates activist actions on a vertical continuum from internal to external, and the other charts activist issues on a horizontal spectrum from local to global.

**Figure 1: Ten Processes of Transnational Activism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site of Orienting Cause</th>
<th>Site of Oriented Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
<td><strong>External</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Issue Framing</td>
<td>Local Issue Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>Incubation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale Alteration</td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>Radiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bolded content extends and underlined content refines Tarrow (2005:33)

Combining mid-range and meta-theory, Tarrow (2005) takes the frequency with which episodes—i.e. units of observation—can be traced through the processes as a proxy measure for the dependent variable of transnational activism (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; 2008; Falleti & Lynch 2008; Earl 2008; Lichbach 2008; McAdam, Tilly, &
Tarrow 2008). In doing so, he rejects globalism as his null hypothesis. This study challenges these prime explanations (Tarrow & della Porta 2005; Kesselman 2005; Smith 2006). The present research argues that the prevailing scholarship has not gone far enough in assembling mid-range theory, which conceptualizes the causal mechanisms of activist processes, and thereby has gone too far in drawing meta-theoretical conclusions about the causal origins of transnational activism. In light of the broader array of causal processes and mechanisms in this study, these scholars also ignore an alternative scholarly assumption that transnational activism can follow a localizing trajectory, which moves from external (transnational level) to internal (national level) politics (Grove 1995; Lewis 2000; Johnson & McCarthy 2005; Tarrow & McAdam 2005; Hertel 2006). Tarrow assumes the reverse; that the dependent variable originates in a spatially globalizing path ‘beyond borders,’ which transitions from internal to external politics.

The study first builds mid-range theory by extending Tarrow’s (2005) prevailing typology. The present research conceptualizes four new processes of cause-oriented action across borders—namely, the bolded processes listed in the upper right and lower left quadrants of Figure 1 above. These additional processes are all dual-level. In other words, they mix domestic-foreign sites of their oriented action and orienting cause (i.e. principled commitment, normative ideal, public interest). The current work also theorizes that their dual-level or ‘glocal’ frontier sites throw into question the Tarrowian model’s situating of transnational activism along a transitional trajectory that naturally globalizes from internal to external in both action and cause—from the upper left of Figure 1 to the lower right.
Beyond offering these additional processes, the study also addresses Tarrow’s meta-theoretical inferences about internationalism and globalism as relative drivers of transnational activism. The dissertation uses the broader set of processes to test activist origins: asking what institutional conditions in world politics cause transnational cause-oriented action and what trajectory that activism follows in relation to national borders. A broader set of processes, which generate the proxy dependent variable, raises anew the relative causal weights of statist internationalism and societal or market-based globalism as independent variables.

The available theory is of little help to scholars interested in explaining the origins and processes of transnational activism across a broad litany of empirical issues: health or infectious disease, development assistance, environmental sustainability, socioeconomic human rights or fair trade, humanitarian or disaster relief, democratic or civil society promotion, and international peacemaking or conflict resolution (Hulme & Edwards 1997; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Murray & Raynolds 2000; Ottaway & Carothers 2000; Conca 2002a:10-39; Cooley & Ron 2002; Nelson & Dorsey 2007: 192, 194; W. Lance Bennett 2005; Wilkinson 2007). Existing causes, trajectories and processes cannot fully explain transnational activism on these types of issues.

In light of a mismatch between conceptual theorizing and these empirical settings, the present research aims to answer both theoretical and empirical questions. In what ways, if any, can current theorizing be revised to explain processes that transnational activists initiate while pursuing their causes in such socioeconomic, dual-level issue settings? Conversely put, how does transnational activism originate and proceed, as observed through such issue settings? Deductively, to explain transnational activism of
this sort, theorists must overcome state-centrism in unit of analysis and transitology in level of analysis. State-centrism refers to privileging the state a priori as a unit of analysis. Transitology here is the assumption that an activism which moves away from one level (e.g., internal) can be considered an activism in transition toward another level (e.g., external) through a set sequence of stages. One such path progresses between the “global issue framing” and “coalition formation” processes (transposes Carothers 2002:6, 14; see Eschle & Stammers 2004:334-335, 342-343, 354-355; Smith 2006:547).

Inductively, transnational activism on such issues tends to proceed in a more diverse repertoire of modes, and to originate in contingent, path-dependent manners poorly suited to the development of covering laws (generally, see Tilly 2001; Rosenau 1997).

The empirical evidence analyzed in this research suggests that in the prevailing literature, meta-theory has outpaced its necessary mid-range theoretical bases. Tarrow’s (2005) six activist processes—and the dependent variable they generate—in their own strict explanatory terms pre-select tautologically for internationalism and for inside-out spatial globalization. As such, they do not convince as evidence (see e.g., Andrew Bennett 2004; Mitchell & Bernauer 2004). They do not offer convincing evidence for the prime theses that transnational activism originates mainly in statist internationalism through an inside-out globalizing transition.

Just as a thin mid-range foundation has led to some premature meta-theoretical conclusions, meta-theory on the origins of transnational activism has in turn undermined the development and integration of mid-range theory. The predominant synthesis and empirical mapping of transnational activism found in the literature does not include causal mechanisms that have been conceptualized by scholars but which do not correlate
neatly with statist internationalism or spatially transitioning globalization. To balance such neglect, the present research synthesizes these conceptualized mechanisms into four previously-obscured processes that are mainly associated with societal globalism and that are located in quadrants that straddle internal and external levels. On that note, the study continues to echo Tarrow’s (2002:230-2, 234-7) earlier call for an analytical turn “from lumping to splitting”: from knowledge that generalizes “lumpy” concepts—such as transnational resistance/movement or global civil society—to knowledge that disaggregates between modes of activism—such as service work associated with NGOs, lobbying and information flow associated with advocacy networks, and contentious and sustained mobilization associated with social movements.

As an “antidote” to the “long lists” that might result from a “multiplicity of causal mechanisms,” the research conducted here is fully based on the positivist caution that “the only good set of mechanisms is… an organized set of mechanisms, an organization that is both logical (research programs) and empirical (stylized facts and historical narratives).” (Lichbach 2005b:228, 241; 2008) Indeed, “social order can only be comprehended through research programs,” and mechanisms “can only be evaluated through statistical and historical studies.” (Lichbach 2005b:228, 241) Yet, the prevailing literature poorly organizes the origins of transnational activism, purchasing an arbitrarily neat shortlist of activist processes (i.e. mechanism series) at the expense of a pile of other processes left under the carpet (contra e.g., Lichbach 2005b; McAdam et al. 2008:365-366). The current work draws on a broader range of empirical sources (below) and on research programs of theoretical traditions associated with internationalist and globalist theses; inside-out and other theses. The present reorganizing also minimizes
“multiplicity”: The study conceptualizes fewer processes than those that the predominant typology offers.

1.2. Review of the Literature and Significance

The increasingly consolidated IR study of activism has clarified some confusion over the half-century since Meynaud (1961) originally transposed activism research from comparative politics to IR (i.e. level of analysis), and defined activism as cause-oriented action that is by a definitional fiat not dependent on state actors (i.e. unit of analysis). Indeed, the present work deepens recognition and initiates resolution to a long-standing pair of challenges in research on transnational activism: unit and level of analysis (Meynaud 1961; Wapner 1995; Sikkink 2002:6; Eschle & Stammers 2004:334-335, 342-343, 354-355; Pinto 2010).

The focus of studies in IR has evolved largely from a rich history of activism, to activism as an independent variable, increasingly to activism as a dependent variable. Interest in comparative politics has moved in the reverse direction (see della Porta & Rucht 2002; Risse 2002; Price 2003; Rootes 2004; Betsill 2006:178, 186). The casual swap leaves such legacies to IR as independent variables that cross-national studies have debated or refuted—as in post-materialism or ‘deprivation,’ respectively (Pinto 2010; cross-nationally, see McCarthy & Zald 1977; Lowe & Rüdig 1986; Eckersley 1989; van der Heijden et al. 1992:3-6; Dalton 1994; Maheu 1995:3; Carter 2007; internationally, see Mandel 1980; Lipschutz 1992; Princen & Finger 1994; Bob 2005; 2010; Pirages 2007:619).

Meynaud’s (1961) movement tradition (lately incorporated into ‘contentious politics’) has regained dominance in the study of transnational activism through Tarrow’s
(2005) contribution to the current interest in said activism as a dependent variable. The tradition extends comparative social movement studies. It conceptualizes activism in the world political system as collective action on behalf of particular causes, and as similar to activism within national political systems (Feraru 1974, 32-33; Princen and Finger 1994; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; see Pinto 2010). The IR focus on activism as a dependent variable is emerging, but is still fragmented. Other major scholarly traditions that venture alternative hypotheses—globalist or ‘bifurcated,’ non-transitional or ‘outside-in’—have not yet explained the causes and trajectories of transnational activism with an equally focused, process-tracing attention to causal mechanisms (Pinto 2010; see Rosenau 1997, 334-338; Eschle & Stammers 2004).

Like much of the juridical approach, which tends to study the influence of NGOs on international law, the movement tradition is partial to the internationalist thesis (see Krasner 1995:260-267, 278-279; Young 1997; Smith & Wiest 2005; Tarrow 2005; van der Heijden 2006). Juridical and social-movement scholars who advance the internationalist thesis continue to ignore the alternative conclusion that activism is caused to a comparable extent by the absence of intergovernmental or transgovernmental interaction combined with transnational flows among societal units (Pinto 2010; see e.g., Sikkink 1986; Wapner 1995; 1996; Paterson 1999; Murray & Raynolds 2000; Zhouri 2000; Newell 2001; Broad 2002; Conca 2002b; 2005; 2006; Hafler 2003; Masjuan & Martínez-Alier 2004; van Koppen 2006; Raynolds & Murray 2007; O'Brien 2008). The most substantial reference to such an alternate explanatory model hints that the missing accumulation is enabled and perpetuated by “major flaws that prevented [alternative studies] from providing an effective bridge from [socioeconomic] globalization to
[activism];” flaws including ‘rare’ specification and demonstration of causal mechanisms to relate societal globalism and activism (Tarrow 2002:233; Olesen 2005).

Although social movement scholarship is the most promising among the analytical approaches to transnational activism as a dependent variable, it suffers from level-of-analysis shortcomings that combine into an expendable transitology in level of analysis. A simple, causal logic runs transitionally across Tarrow’s (2005:12, 204-5) original typology in “three orders of processes” from a “domestic-domestic” level through a “transitional-transitional” level to an “international-international” level (in Figure 1 above, diagonally from the upper-left quadrant through the center to the lower-right quadrant). Thus, technically two-dimensional processes compress into merely one-dimensional.

A review of the literature as accomplished in this study deduces two key processes for each of the blank spots in the typology (see Figure 1). This work posits that the empty space on the internal-external (upper-right) quadrant of the typology features two processes in which activists engage in action that is primarily intra-national to promote causes that are mainly international. First, ‘incubation,’ in both spatial and temporal terms, is a process that combines and extends conceptual frameworks from transnationalist and duel-functionalist research traditions and from other complementing scholarship (Nye & Keohane 1971; Peluso 1993; Wapner 1995; Hulme & Edwards 1997; Lewis 2000; Ottaway & Carothers 2000; Steinberg 2001; 2003; Avant 2004; Johnson & McCarthy 2005, 88-89; Wu 2005). It is a process that begins from the outside-in and ends from the inside-out. Spatially, incubation refers to activism on primarily external issues

---

1 Wapner’s (1995:317-320, 1996) three sets of causal mechanisms, short of full application to the globalist thesis, are as neglected as is his caution that theses which posit transnational activism to be “derivative of interstate behavior” risk once again prematurely silencing research on activism in a state-centric IR.
that entails advocacy and implementation at the internal level, and to a lesser extent advocacy at the external level to either avoid or reinforce the internal work. Temporally, incubation stands for transnational activism that pursues its cause over the long-term, often through efforts themselves long-lived. Second, ‘local issue framing’ draws on conceptual frameworks from social-movement and juridical approaches (Princen & Finger 1994; Krasner 1995:260-267, 278-279; Kaufmann & Pape 1999; Tarrow 2005; Tarrow & McAdam 2005; Hertel 2006). The process refers to the translation of global disputes through the use of localized and/or nationalized ideas and identities. It entails the mobilization of local and/or national symbols to define international conflicts.

A careful reading of the literature also suggests that a blind spot on the external-internal (lower-left) quadrant of the typology could include at least two processes in which the site of the action is primarily international and the site of the cause is mainly intra-national (see e.g., Haufler 2003:240, 242, 245; Brooks 2005:135-138). First, a ‘diversion’ process transposes and extends conceptualization found in the juridical literature (DeSombre 2000; see Darst and Dawson 2008; see also Nowell 1994; Conca 2006). Diversion refers to a process in which activists and industry interest groups reconcile to harmonize a regulatory change in their polity and another regulatory change in a polity that hosts an industrial competitor via transnational trade, investment, or finance. Second, ‘radiation’ is a process that is informed by several contributions from juridical, social movement and duel-functionalist research traditions (Haufler 1993; 1999; 2003; Wapner 1995; Broad & Cavanagh 1999; Burke 1999; Sachs 1999:84-85; Broad 2002; Schurman 2004; W. Lance Bennett 2005; see Lipschutz & Fogel 2002). Radiation refers to activism that appends itself to a transnational commercial chain, the radius of
which links a relative center and a relative periphery in the global economic sphere; and that extends responsibility to match the distance of the socio-environmental impacts that are distributed along the radius.

1.3. Research Plan

1.3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research designed for the dissertation uses qualitative methods centered on neopositivist case study comparisons. These qualitative methods fit both the theory-testing (logic of confirmation) and theory-building (logic of discovery) of this study better than do quantitative or formal methods. Two relative advantages of these case study methods particularly match and support the theoretical purposes of the work. Relative to quantitative or formal methods, qualitative case studies are better able to “identif[y] new or omitted variables and hypotheses”—in this context, the four new ‘globalist’ processes—and to “us[e] contingent generalizations to model complex relationships such as path dependency and multiple interactions effects”—in this context, the causal mechanisms at work in both the ‘globalist’ and ‘internationalist’ processes (Andrew Bennett 2004:19, 21; see Mitchell & Bernauer 2004:93-94, 95-96; see also della Porta & Rucht 2002:2-3).

Relative to quantitative methods, case study methods carry two inherent disadvantages that entail two weaknesses for the dissertation’s theory-testing: “Their relative inability to render judgment on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases and their weak capability for estimating the average ‘causal weight’ of variables”—e.g., weighted impact of internationalism and globalism (Andrew Bennett 2004:20). To be sure, “these are inferential [procedures] for which case studies are not designed and
cannot be used except in a rudimentary manner,” and these limitations “correspond almost exactly with the [relative] advantages of statistical methods, which give various measures of frequency and can estimate the expected causal weight of a variable.”

(Andrew Bennett 2004:20)

The study did conduct preliminary quantification of activism through original datasets created for network analysis, but that data is beyond the scope of this dissertation as the state of the art in the scholarly explanations of transnational activism renders quantitative efforts into a lower priority than qualitative efforts at the present time.2

Because the case-study method “allows disaggregated and in-depth analysis of… ‘causal mechanisms’ that connect independent variables and the dependent variable,” it has a “process-tracing” “advantage over quantitative methods in… examining causal pathways… [that] identify how the independent variable explains variation in the dependent variable.” (Mitchell & Bernauer 2004:95-96) Case study methods also cope more effectively with the high operational research demands of causal process-tracing (Mitchell & Bernauer 2004:96; Andrew Bennett 2004:23-24). In line with both theoretical purposes of the present work, process-tracing aims

“to establish which of several possible explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from hypothesized cause to observed effect. The power of process tracing arises from the fact that it requires continuity and completeness in explaining a case… If even a single significant step in a hypothesized process is not as predicted, the hypothesis must be modified, sometimes trivially and other times substantially, if it is to explain the case. (…) This contrasts sharply with statistical methods, which rely on probabilistic associations but do not require continuity or completeness in any given case.”

(Andrew Bennett 2004:22-24; see Earl 2008; McAdam et al. 2008)

2 As per Braumoeller and Sartori’s (2004:139-143) reliance on Lakatos (1970), fuller testing of a theory does not advance science more than further development of an otherwise absent alternative theory; hence for the proposed project the opportunity cost of statistical testing in forgone qualitative theory-building would charge a decision in favor of additional quantitative methods with an unwarranted “sin of omission.”
This dissertation combines two types of case studies—hypothesis-generating case study (processes) and theory-confirming/infirmining case study (causes)—in a research design nested in three layers (Andrew Bennett 2004:21-22 citing Lijphart 1971). The nesting includes issue-based analysis at the most aggregated level, area-based analysis at an intermediate level, and campaign-based analysis at the most disaggregated level. If the present case study is viewed as a nested Matryoshka (Russian) doll, at its outward layer it is an activist issue; at its relatively inner layer it is a location of activism; and at its core layer it is an activist campaign. This design incorporates growing calls in the scholarly literature for research that builds on the social movement tradition’s synthesis of the overall literature on transnational activism by narrowing the gaze in terms of theme (see Nelson 2002:378, 382-384; Nelson & Dorsey 2007; Lichbach & de Vries 2006); geography (Tarrow 2005:11); and conflictual struggle (Keck & Sikkink 1998; della Porta & Rucht 2002; see Nelson 2002:378, 382-384). At the outer layer, an issue denotes a specific substantive theme on which activists make claims, as sifted here from IR literatures on activism and issue-based international regimes; and from comparative policy network analysis (see Krasner 1983; Sikkink 1986; Sikkink 1993; Haufler 1993; Keck & Sikkink 1998:26-28, 203-206; della Porta & Rucht 2002; Nelson 2002; Tarrow 2005:27, 33; see also Carpenter 2007; Mitchell 2003; Carter 2007). At the inner layer, a campaign refers to a series of interactions that are temporally bounded; that the campaign carriers perceive as geared to a concrete aim; and that mobilize a set of actors in conflict over a campaign target—usually a policy or project decision (della Porta & Rucht 2002:2; Keck & Sikkink 1998:6-8). Combining these three layers, the present study analyzes the causal variables and mechanisms of transnational activism for one issue
area—biodiversity—involving actors based in one nation-state—Brazil—within two specific campaigns that occur at specific moments between the late 1860s and the present time.

The restriction in this study, as would any such narrowing, better allows empirical research to overcome the challenge of ‘re-organizing mechanisms’ while simultaneously scrutinizing more than a single complex question. These restrictions allow scholars to consider the comprehensiveness of Tarrow’s (2005) process set, and to take the next steps in research on transnational activism by Tarrow’s (2005:208) own account: testing and integrating different processes. Partiality in the existing set of causal processes and a web of process-crossing episodes of transnational activism are more visible within a more restricted area, issue and campaign (see e.g., Lichbach 2005b). Hence, the dissertation’s narrowing supports the future task of integrating discrete processes—existing or newly-conceptualized. Integration can discover possible patterns among the said processes over time—e.g., sequence, cycle or institutionalization—as well as at a given time—e.g., relative prominence, clustering or interactive effects.

Ultimately, a sound restriction of the observations to thematic, geographic and conflictual cases is deliberate. It must investigate issues, areas and campaigns with sufficient variety not to constrain the mid-range theoretical purpose of the research design. There must be variety within cases in order for the process-tracing to support “robust processes” that “involve recurrent combinations and sequences of mechanisms that operate identically or with great similarity across a variety of situations.” (Tarrow 2005; McAdam et al. 2001:27) For a research design to contrast the internationalist and the globalist meta-theses, it must also restrict observations to cases that do not pre-select
at the dependent variable or the independent variable, and that are of sufficiently large
number from which to generalize (see e.g., Andrew Bennett 2004; Mitchell & Bernauer
2004). Not only do the case studies, as they must, compare cases that are varied and free
of selection bias. As they should, the cases also pay equal attention to Tarrow’s (2005)
explanation and to that of its alternate model; based on the premise that “internal validity
is enhanced if alternative explanations are considered and found ‘less consistent with the
data and/or less supportable by available generalizations.’” (Mitchell & Bernauer 2004,
96; George 1979, 57-58)

1.3.2. RESEARCH SITE AND SOURCE OF DATA

Biodiversity can be considered an issue case of a representative kind—i.e. normal—in the wider domain of transnational collective action (see e.g., Peluso 1993; Wapner 1995; Sikkink & Smith 2002:33, 43; Johnson & McCarthy 2005; Tarrow 2005:27, 33; van Koppen 2006). The biodiversity case involves activist mobilization that makes claims about variety of living species and/or ecosystems (see e.g., Steinberg 1998). This sample serves the work’s process-tracing aims well given its long and widely-documented history (see e.g., Grove 1990; 1995; Adams 2004; van Koppen & Markham 2007), cross-sectoral breadth (Steinberg 1998; van Koppen 2006), and its post-1940s’ sharp, unexplained growth in transnational activism (see e.g., Chapin 2004; Bailey 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2007).

Focusing the analysis on Brazilian transnational relations serves as a second-order
case of a representative type (e.g., Goldstein 1992; Pádua 1992; Hochstetler 1994; 2002;
First, it has a long and rich history as both transmitter and receiver of transnational activism on biodiversity—arguably more so than any other single country (see e.g., Martin 1918; Medeiros 1938; Crampton 1972; Doughty 1975; Galey 1977:128-179; Dean 1985; J.A. Padua 2000; Franco & Drummond 2009). Second, Brazil has experienced dramatic variation in its relative power position in the transnational political and economic order during the two hundred years analyzed in these cases, which generally makes it more representative. Third, Brazil has long been enmeshed to a comparable extent in both the internationalist and globalist forms of transnational relations that are contrasted in this research, making it possible to compare causality. Last but not least, this author’s language skills and experience (a Brazilian native) provides an opportunity to leverage rich primary, archival and personal sources in Brazil, many of which remain untapped in the English-language research on these cases. In this vein, the footnotes to Table 1 below include examples of primary sources in Portuguese from which the dissertation benefits empirically and to which the present work contributes theory that is not otherwise available within the literature in Portuguese.

At the core layer, two specific campaign cases provide “conflict stories” that serve as third-order cases of a representative kind (della Porta & Rucht 2002:3). Campaigns offer series of instances traceable through more generic processes and their relational streams of causal mechanisms.

While temporal episodes are the primary unit of analysis within the multiple processual chains of causal mechanisms that occur in each campaign, campaigns also serve as a unit of analysis at the intersection between processes in each case study (chapters 3 and 4) and at the comparison of cases (chapters 5 and 6).
As highlighted in Table 1 below, these two campaigns are selected from a larger set of potential case studies drawn not only from transnational biodiversity activism, but also from transnational bioenergy activism—an issue area with similar features that revolves around fuel from processed or unprocessed biomass, as in ethanol or whale oil. The nine campaigns constitute comprehensive coverage of all transnational biodiversity and bioenergy campaigns involving Brazil-based actors that this author has identified after an exhaustive search of the historical scholarship. In other words, although this study relies on the scholarship of historians for a reflection of the universe or full set of empirical campaigns involving Brazil-based actors in both issue areas prior to the 1960s, the study is based on a very thorough search of the historical scholarship. Seven of the nine cases are historical. These sorts of campaigns are used to establish a long record of recurring episodes that conform to all processes and their mechanisms, and to test theses on origins over a long timeframe that maximizes variance in the values of the independent and dependent variables. The remaining cases are each contemporary sets of campaigns in the strict sense. Their contemporary scope and timing is of a magnitude and non-finality that would prevent comprehensive treatment in this research.  

---

3 These sorts of cases would offer snapshots of the whole relational structure for each current campaign set (with ties along all ten processes), and trace a few episodes through newly-conceptualized processes. They would cover current biodiversity with a population-wide network analysis, a focus on episodes traced via incubation and local issue framing, and a sketch of episodes traceable through diversion and radiation; and bioenergy with another whole network analysis, attention to episodes traced via diversion and radiation, and an outline of episodes traceable through incubation and local issue framing. Each network analysis and process-tracing selection would be used to illustrate the mechanisms of the four newly conceptualized processes, the relative causal role of globalism and internationalism in enabling said processes, and the importance of said processes relative to Tarrow’s six counterparts.
Table 1: Two Cases Selected from Nine Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Biodiversity Campaign</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Bioenergy Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1780s-1888</td>
<td>Luso-Brazilian Annihilation Campaign to Uproot Colonialism (through entry of exotic</td>
<td>1780s-1888</td>
<td>Luso-Brazilian Annihilation Campaign to Uproot Colonialism (through conservation of plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>species/ecosystem extinction)</td>
<td></td>
<td>charcoal and whale oil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843-1869</td>
<td>Abolitionist Campaign to Open (navigate, commercialize and settle) the Amazon Basin</td>
<td>1787-1851</td>
<td>Campaign to Suppress Forced Migration of Enslaved Africans across the South Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from the Mississippi</td>
<td></td>
<td>(trafficked with whale oil, jatropha oil and palm wax, and forced to extract fuelwood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-1941</td>
<td>Campaign to Protect Birds from Hunts for Women’s Wear</td>
<td>1901-1945</td>
<td>Agricultural Fuel Campaign (for bioenergy cultivation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1956</td>
<td>Campaign on the (Inter)National Institute of (the Hylean) Amazon (Research)</td>
<td>1954-1989</td>
<td>Campaign for the Peasantry and Rural Labor on the Sugarcane Fields of Northeast Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s-now</td>
<td>Current Biodiversity Conservation Campaigns: network, select episodes</td>
<td>1970s-now</td>
<td>Current Biofuel Expansion Campaigns: network, select episodes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only as research into each of the nine cases progressed within the length constraints of a doctoral dissertation, did it become foreseeable that careful examination of two campaigns would support this study more effectively than brief, superficial surveys of all nine cases. Well-founded considerations of substance and method served as pillars for this contingency. A drastic temporal imbalance in the scholarship on transnational activism and especially on transnational environmental activism—with steep skews toward the present (and future) time—inform an initial working assumption that prior to the 1960s campaigns would be fairly episodic and small. This suggestion in the literature meant that pre-1960 data would be sufficiently concise to collect and explain as to allow room for analysis of seven historical campaigns within the

---

4 E.g., Pádua 2002; Holanda 1959.
6 E.g., Mould de Pease 1993; Zorzetto 2000.
7 E.g., Tavares 1967; see Northrup 1976; Soumonni 2002.
8 E.g., Franco 2002; Duarte 2006.
10 E.g., Petitjean & Domingues 2000; Magalhães 2006; Geraldo 2007.
11 E.g., Inoue 2004.
12 E.g., Mundo Neto 2009.
length constraints of this study. However, one of the substantive findings that most surprised this author and the analysts who encountered preliminary versions of this study is the sheer continuity and enormity of the pre-1960 campaigns, meaning that their data collection and explanation cannot fit alongside all the campaigns that this study initially sought to accommodate. In terms of method, the processual purpose of the study still requires a large number of observations in order to have sufficient process-tracing data to test multiple and long chains of causal mechanisms. Yet, an unforeseeably constraining length means that if such process-tracings were to fit into this study, they would leave no room to address the meta-theoretical question of causality. In other words, unforeseeable length constraints introduce a tension between the processual and the causal purposes of the study.  

Rather than undertake cursory and casual analysis of a broader sample of campaign cases, which would leave the explanatory question of causality only tentatively tested, this study focused on the smaller sample of two campaigns, leaving the processual question of causal sequence only tentatively tested. This research plan built on critiques of an earlier study that had erred on the other, processual side of caution only to be rectified in Tarrow (2005; see McAdam et al. 2001). As mentioned above, these critiques argued that “social order can only be comprehended through research programs” that organize mechanisms logically into a coherent theoretical framework such as internationalist or globalist causality (Lichbach 2005a; 2005b:228, 241).

There are empirical as well as theoretical reasons to include two longitudinal campaigns from the same issue area rather than a cross-section of one case from each biodiversity and bioenergy. Just as the biodiversity campaign at the turn of the 20th

---

13 In the longer term, this author hopes to circumvent that tension by restructuring the two cases analyzed here as part of a larger research project that is not bound by the length limits of a doctoral dissertation.
century is needed to fully understand the post-WWII biodiversity case that follows it in the dissertation, the bioenergy case at the turn of the 20th century would have been necessary to fully comprehend the subsequent, post-1959, bioenergy campaign. There are also theoretical reasons to lean toward one longitudinal issue area. Only the combined examination of two campaigns over the longer term allows the study to analyze evidence for Tarrow’s argument and assumption about transnational activism over the long run. In other words, it is only because the study staggered two cases in the same issue area over the decades from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries that it eventually pointed to a prolonged narrowing in modes of transnational activism as the net effect of an oscillating increase in internationalism and a sharp decrease in globalism during that period.14

There were more specific intellectual reasons for why these two particular biodiversity campaigns were the ones examined in this study. As a reflection of the relative state of the art across these two issue areas empirically, the study confirmed and completed the post-WWII biodiversity case much sooner than the bioenergy campaign that is epitomized by the 1959 revolution out of the sugarcane fields of Cuba. The work flow turned out to be theoretically fortuitous insofar as compared to the two recent bioenergy campaigns the biodiversity struggles better encompass the full range of crucial test cases for Tarrow’s antithesis. The 1945-1956 is an easy, most-likely case and the 1868-1941 campaign is a hard, least-likely case for the internationalist antithesis. That wide, surveying reach is particularly useful at present when the scholarship is still in its initial forays toward testing the antithesis. Moreover, as Table 2 below shows, the combination of modes of transnational activism that are traced and briefly sketched in

---

14 This observation emerged after case selection rather than as a criterion used to select cases. It did not constitute a questionable methodological practice of case selection a priori, at the dependent variable.
these two biodiversity campaigns better lends itself to balancing the causal and processual purposes of this study within the due length limits.

Table 2: Cases of Transnational Activist Campaigns Traced / Sketched through Causal Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Biodiversity Cases</th>
<th>Sketching (x) / Tracing (xx)</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Bioenergy Cases</th>
<th>Sketching (x) / Tracing (xx)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1780s - 1888</td>
<td>Luso-Brazilian Annihilation Campaign to Uproot Colonialism (through entry of exotic species, and prevention of species/ecosystem extinction)</td>
<td>Global issue framing x</td>
<td>1780s - 1888</td>
<td>Luso-Brazilian Annihilation Campaign to Uproot Colonialism (through conservation of plant charcoal and whale oil)</td>
<td>Internalization x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing</td>
<td>x?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843-1869</td>
<td>Abolitionist Campaign to Open (navigate, commercialize and settle) the Amazon Basin from the Mississippi</td>
<td>Global issue framing x</td>
<td>1787-1851</td>
<td>Campaign to End Forced Migration of Enslaved Africans across the South Atlantic (trafficked with whale oil, jatropha oil and palm wax, and forced to extract fuelwood)</td>
<td>Internalization x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation</td>
<td>x(x)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-1941</td>
<td>Campaign to Protect Birds from Hunts for Women’s Wear</td>
<td>Global issue framing x</td>
<td>1901-1945</td>
<td>Agricultural Fuel Campaign (for bioenergy cultivation)</td>
<td>Global issue framing x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1956</td>
<td>Campaign on the (Inter)National Institute of (the Hylean) Amazon Research</td>
<td>Global issue framing xx</td>
<td>1954-1989</td>
<td>Campaign for the Peasantry and Rural Labor on the Sugarcane Fields of Northeast Brazil</td>
<td>Global issue framing x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scale alteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Incubation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing</td>
<td>x(x)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s - now</td>
<td>Current Biodiversity Conservation Campaign: network, select episodes</td>
<td>Incubation</td>
<td>2005-2005</td>
<td>Current Biofuel Expansion Campaign: network, select episodes</td>
<td>Incubation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local issue framing x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion xx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radiation xx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There was an important analytical reason for why this study does not examine one or both contemporary cases. Contemporary campaigns have been much more extensively explained by variants of Tarrow’s six processes, which constitute the alternative hypotheses tested in this study. This would create a quandary for analysis of current cases in this study. Contemporary inquiry would trap itself into a cruel choice. It would be forced to either duplicate while fully considering alternative hypotheses, or refer to explanations elsewhere while unable to fully consider alternative hypotheses in a self-contained study.

Another analytical reason not to examine one contemporary case—accompanying one historical case—in this dissertation is that current campaigns have multiplied to a point that they would create another quandary for analysis. The study would have to choose between maintaining either breadth of generalizability toward other contemporary campaigns or consistency with the companion historical case in terms of the campaign unit of analysis—i.e. ‘campaignhood’ or ‘campaignness’ of the historical but not of the contemporary case.

Methodological considerations also directed the study away from analysis of two contemporary cases and toward historical cases. First, as detailed in the following section of this chapter, analysis of semi-structured interview data from contemporary campaigns would fail as a means to the systematic process-tracing end that is one of the theoretical purposes of this study. Second, if in hindsight the combination of historical breadth and theoretical purposes within the length of this study turned out to be a weakness in terms of leaving the four processual models no more than tentatively tested, historical cases did generate major methodological strengths. Because the historical scholarship that is the
source of the bulk of the data collected to explain these case studies has already systematically described those campaigns, productivity in analyzing more than one struggle is greatly augmented. That feature makes this study similar to other social science analyses of contemporary cases that frequently rely on policy, practitioner and/or descriptive accounts as supplements to less mediated sources of original data. Moreover, reliance on historians makes the use of primary, historical data residual and that of strictly historiographic methodology to collect such data unnecessary. Finally, a methodological consideration that recently might have led one from historical to contemporary cases no longer points in that direction. In recent decades, historians have increasingly overcome a state-centrism that used to distort their narratives in a theory-laden manner that would have been problematic for the theoretical purposes of this study. While one still needs to be cognizant of that penchant in the historiographic scholarship, the moderating trend means that the residue of partiality toward the state may even serve this study well in providing the data collection and observation with some cautious, conservative safeguard in favor of the alternative hypothesis—namely, the internationalist antithesis.

1.3.3. DATA ANALYSIS PLANS

The dissertation is mainly based on qualitative data collection techniques, but is also informed by some quantitative equivalents. The study used interviews and participant observation to carry out a preliminary analysis of the contemporary campaigns (see Lichterman 2002). It relied on primary archival resources and secondary sources to analyze historical campaigns (Clemens & Hughes 2002). In keeping with the study’s focus on activist dynamics, it was also informed by relational, structural analyses
of transnational activist networks on biodiversity and bioenergy (Diani 1995; 2002; 2003; Tilly & Wood 2003; McAdam 2003; von Bülow 2007; see Carpenter 2007). The bulk of the analysis that generalizes from the two historical campaigns to contemporary cases is based on interviews; thus, the following discussion of data collection and analysis focuses on this qualitative technique.

The interviews were semi-structured due to that technique’s good match with this study’s process-tracing method through mixed techniques. This approach is especially useful in studies where the goal is “interpretation of complex social events and processes and when combined with participant observation and/or documentary” techniques (Blee & Taylor 2002:93).

Compared to more rigid, structured interviews based on a standardized survey or questionnaire, semi-structured interviews offer greater breadth and depth of information (Blee & Taylor 2002:92). However, these relative benefits come “at the cost of a reduced ability to make systematic comparisons between interview responses.” (Blee & Taylor 2002:92, 93) Therefore, the study mainly conducts historical process-tracing based on primary or archival documentary sources.

The study interviewed and surveyed individuals involved or informed—in university faculties, cause-oriented groups, government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, institutes/think tanks, labor unions, businesses, and the wider associations to which such organizations may belong. Most of these individuals were located in Brazil, the United States and Western Europe. The relevant subjects from each type of group and location have been found through public events and documents, participant observation, secondary literature, and news reports. Subjects were identified based on the
information and/or involvement they hold and their activist experience. Interview subjects were identified in a deliberate sampling procedure typical in semi-structured interviewing: on the basis of their “particular experiences… rather than because their experiences are representative of the larger population.” (Blee & Taylor 2002:92, 100) To ensure random selection, interview subjects were then culled at random from this wider set of actors identified as informed/involved. As another screening procedure, interviewee samples were situated based on organizational roles (regular equivalence) identified through population-wide network analyses. Additional subjects were also recruited through referrals volunteered by initial subjects.

The study also conducted ‘snowball’ sampling that it first used in its preliminary analysis of activist networks, by selecting additional actors as identified by major or prominent groups. In keeping with sound methodology in activism research, the aim here is to “choose (1) respondents who are knowledgeable about the topic under investigation, and continue to add new interviewees until the topic is saturated, that is, the interviews are garnering the same kinds of narratives and interpretations;” and (2) “to see how the interpretations or accounts of similarly situated respondents compare, as well as to ascertain how those respondents with very different characteristics or in different circumstances differ.” (Blee & Taylor 2002:100; Herbert J. Rubin & Irene Rubin 1995) The network analysis provided a solid base for drawing the lines of saturation and situation, as the study strives to meet the two sampling principles associated with them. At present, a preliminary analysis of the biodiversity issue campaigns includes reciprocal data on collaborative transnational relations between nearly 300 activist organizations in a two-mode network arranging actors based inside and outside Brazil.
The research took a few systematic precautions to avoid sampling bias. It ensured that both the independent and snowball sampling did not lead to getting stuck in one network cluster, and did not prevent observation of other non-overlapping cliques that also matter. All interviews included direct and indirect queries to identify salient network outsiders. Lists of participants for events, meetings, projects, programs and news listservs were also culled with an eye toward including additional actors. In the biodiversity issue area that is briefly reported in the conclusion of this dissertation, the study interviewed more than 30 subjects.

All information used in the research project was non-attributable—except in cases where publicly available sources of information were used—and subjects were informed of that procedure. Information from the interviews was not attributed to an identified individual. Any quotation used was anonymous and not objected by its source in a prior notice of confirmation.

1.4. Purposes, Themes and Traditions

The core purpose of this dissertation is to conceptualize dual-level processes of transnational activism that are rendered invisible in a predominant model that Sidney Tarrow (2005) offers. Study of the interaction between international and intranational levels is currently “the least well developed” of the established levels of analysis in international relations (IR), and will be served by this project. As a review of Sikkink (2005) will confirm, the proposed activist processes will prove highly relevant for research efforts examining “whether there is a growing fusion between domestic and transnational activism.” (Tarrow 2005, p. 25, 212-216; see also Rosenau 1997)
and intranational levels of analysis. Fruitful as it has been, the decade of research culminating in the seminal volumes that Tarrow (2005) as well as della Porta and Tarrow (2005) contribute could hardly be expected to cover all of the relevant scholarship on transnational activism in all of its variety. There are at least four robust processes not captured by Tarrow’s (2005) six processes synthesizing transnational activism. Existing studies between international relations and comparative politics offer seeds for such processes. They can be consolidated and conceptualized with a process orientation compatible with Tarrow’s (2005) mapping. Four irreducibly dual-level types of transnational activism are explained in this study: one is transposed and extended from elsewhere, and three are consolidated and conceptualized here.\(^{16}\)

A secondary purpose of this study is to take the four newly-conceptualized processes into account in reevaluating broader IR arguments about the centrality of state actors in international politics and the impact(s) of globalization on regulatory standards.\(^{17}\) The dissertation will revisit two causal factors of transnational activism. Tarrow (2005:3-9, 27) argues that the rise of “international institutions, regimes, and practices [as] ‘coral reefs’ in a broader sea of complex internationalism,” more directly and generally than globalization, drives the growth of transnational activism. A rise in

---

\(^{16}\) The diversion process transposes conceptual work by DeSombre (2000) and extends it relying on Nowell (1994) and Conca (2006). The process of radiation is original, and inspired by the work of scholars such as Haufler (1993, 1999, 2003), Schurman (2004) and Burke (1999). The ‘local issue framing’ process is also original, and inspired by an inverse “global issue framing” by Tarrow (2005) and Tarrow and McAdam (2005) as well as Princen and Finger (1994) and Hertel (2006). The process of incubation is also original, merging and extending conceptual frameworks by scholars such as Nye and Keohane (1971), Hulme and Edwards (1997), Steinberg (2001) and Wu (2005).

“internationalism”\textsuperscript{18} may indeed continue to drive the six existing processes of transnational activism “to become more prominent.”\textsuperscript{19} However, such a rise may have more ambiguous effects on the four proposed processes of transnational activism if the newly-conceptualized quartet results more from globalism than internationalism. Indeed, globalism shows signs of driving the four newly-identified processes more directly and generally than internationalism. If so, the effects of rises in internationalism and globalism are process-contingent. The broader context of ten rather than six processes of transnational activism may demonstrate that “globalization”\textsuperscript{20} is a comparably or even more direct and general driver of surges in transnational activism than the rise in internationalism. Put simply, if Tarrow (2005) did not go far enough with mid-level theory that conceptualizes activist processes, he may have gone too far with meta-theory that explains the source(s) of the recent explosion in transnational activism. The environmental activist issue areas utilized for such a demonstration will make the analysis a crucially strong test of Tarrow’s (2005) internationalism hypothesis.\textsuperscript{21} Causal relationships from globalization to activist-led processes of transnational cause-oriented

\textsuperscript{18} Tarrow (2005:3-9, 25, 27, 205) defines internationalism as “a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system.”

\textsuperscript{19} Tarrow 2005, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{20} The demonstration may follow even by the conservative standards of the narrow or strict definition of globalization that Tarrow (2005:5) adopts from Robert Keohane (2002): The “increasing volume and speed of flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and forces that connect actors between countries.” Indeed, it may follow even according to the even narrower or firmer definition that Tarrow (2005:8) seems to apply: “increased flows of trade, finance, and people across borders.” (see Eschle & Stammers 2004).

\textsuperscript{21} Past research has found internationalism to have an exceptionally high impact on transnational environmental activism, rendering the more specific environmental issue areas of biodiversity (and bioenergy) into most-likely empirical grounds where Tarrow’s (2005) hypothesis should be reliable if it is reliable anywhere (Sikkink & Smith 2002:33, 43; but see Conca 1995; Johnson & McCarthy 2005). Tarrow (2005) openly relies on transnational environmental activism to build his case regarding internationalism.
action will also allow the proposed dissertation to engage the IR controversy on the impact(s) of globalization on regulatory standards.

Over the last two decades, research on transnational activism, and on environmental activism in particular, has begun to overcome its historiographic triviality within two main fields, IR and social movement theory (SMT). IR scholars are becoming less “myopically state-centric” and SMT scholars are becoming less “myopically domestic.”

Tarrow (2005) synthesizes decades of research in which a number of mainly European and North American scholars have focused on the political processes of transnational activism. He undertakes “to identify the processes and their constituent mechanisms that are constituting transnational [collective action]” with “focus on the political processes that activists trigger to connect their local claims to those of others across borders and to international institutions, regimes, and processes.” (Tarrow 2005:29, 11) Tarrow (2005:11) disclaims the “attempt to examine transnational activism in all its permutations,” and seems to disclaim an exhaustive analysis of the subset of robust such processes. However, he considers these six processes comprehensive enough to extrapolate from activism along their lines to all activism in his argument that the growth of transnational activism, writ large, is more a consequence of internationalism than globalization. Tarrow (2005) specifies processes as “frequently recurring causal chains, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms. Processes worth singling out here

22 There has been tremendous growth and development in the quantity and quality of such research. Within IR, as within its subset literature on global environmental politics, activism has come into being as a worthwhile and increasingly respectable area of study (Risse 2002; Price 2003; Dauvergne 2005; Betsill 2006; Stevis 2006). From sociology and comparative politics, activism across national borders has also come into being as a worthwhile and increasingly respectable domain of study within SMT and its subset scholarship on environmental activism (Tarrow 2005; della Porta & Rucht 2002).

23 Quoted evaluations from Khagram et al. (2002:6).
Levels of analysis are the foundation for Tarrow’s (2005) seminal study of different modes of transnational activism, and for the response of this study. He considers Putnam’s (1988) “two-level games” a “simple dichotomy,” but two of the six processes that Tarrow (2005) (internalization and externalization) synthesizes amount to refined duplicates of patterns originally conceptualized in an edited volume that grew out of the “two-level games” metaphor (i.e. Evans et al. 1993). Tarrow (2005) highlights convergence as well as interplay between levels of analysis, partly echoing Rosenau’s (1997) “domestic-foreign frontier”: “Not all activism that is relevant to transnational politics takes place in the international arena. Relevant processes are found within domestic politics, in transitions from the domestic to the international level, and between states and within and around international institutions.” (Tarrow 2005:30, 9; see also Sikkink 2005; Litfin 2000) Tarrow (2005:12, 204-205) identifies and illustrates “three orders of processes that link domestic activists to the international system: two ‘local’ processes, global framing and internalization; two transitional ones, diffusion and scale shift; and two ‘global’ processes, externalization and… coalition formation.” He offers a “two-dimensional grid” reproduced in Figure 2 below.24 The x-axis “consists of the degree to which a particular issue is of primarily domestic or international importance,” and the y-axis of “the extent to which [an issue] brings activists out of their domestic

---

24 To capture the “two-dimensional grid” in brief terms that do justice to the seminal, authoritative status it has probably acquired, this study refers to the grid as the typology. See an indication of such a status in Bob (2006). This dissertation brackets the ultimate fluidity of the typology’s ideal types, which is in keeping with the categories’ lack of integration to date. See Tarrow (2005:29, 208) for brief indications on the typology’s fluidity.
context into transnational space.” (Tarrow 2005:33) The six processes “sometimes occur alone but often [occur] in combination.” (Tarrow 2005:33)

Figure 2: Six Processes of Transnational Contention

The research questions and hypotheses orienting the dissertation project are in keeping with the process-based tradition of the “dynamics of contention” research program (see McAdam et al. 2001). They adopt a mechanism- and process-based approach to explanation, accepting Charles Tilly’s (2001) argument that such explanatory accounts “deserve more attention than they have received in recent political science,” which has generally favored some combination of propensity and covering law explanations (Tilly 2001). The approach aims at selective explanation of salient features of episodes defined as bounded streams of social life that are bound according to analytical purposes (Tilly 2001). It uses an episode unit of analysis; and explains by means of partial causal analogies based on robust mechanisms of relatively general scope and on recurrent concatenations of mechanisms into more complex processes (Tilly 2001). The research program calls “for a move away from static, variable-driven

---

25 In a review of Tarrow (2005) that reflects how that work’s lacking process integration undermines its statement that different processes occur mostly in combination, Smith (2006:547) argues: “The analytic distinctions seem to draw confusing and possibly misleading analytical boundaries… between the different activities of political agents.”
structural models,” and from “efforts to explain all salient features of whole episodes.” (Tarrow & McAdam 2005:124; McAdam et al. 2001:309-310) It calls for “a more dynamic relational analysis.” (McAdam et al. 2001:307, 309)²⁶

That program inspires two research questions: How can existing theory be used and/or complemented to identify processes that transnational biodiversity and bioenergy activists awaken? How has a growing wave of transnational bioenergy and biodiversity activism come about? The working hypotheses here aim to overcome the national-level nearsightedness and state-centric shortsightedness that still limit current scholarship on transnational activism: To explain transnational activism in issue areas such as biodiversity and bioenergy, scholarship needs to overcome ‘transitology in levels of analysis,’ and conceptualize activist processes that are not as state-centric as the conceptualized processes.

²⁶ A complementary relational analysis is also emerging through a more recent collective volume that focuses on “global governors” (see Haufler 2010).
2. Theory

2.1. Activist Globalization: Transitology from Local to Global

The capacity of existing scholarship to identify and explain dual-level processes of transnational activism or the relationships between discrete processes has been limited by logic of “transitology” regarding levels of analysis. Conceptually, four assumptions distinguish the logic of transitology here, as follows, transposing Thomas Carothers’ (2002) critique of another “dynamics” research program.27 The following quoted or paraphrased content replaces entities of domestic regime change by those of transnational activism, as transpositional adjustments to transitology manifestations in this context.

The first premise, which underlies all the others, is that any activism moving away from the intranational level can be considered an activism in transition toward the international level (transposing Carothers 2002:6, 14). Indeed, others have noted “Tarrow’s [(2005)] treatment of national and international political spheres as dichotomous, where one gains strength at the expense of the other” (Smith 2006:547), and his analysis as one that “most clearly elaborate[s]” a prevailing “simplified and hierarchical conceptualization of the relationship between global and local [“domains of politics’”].” (Eschle & Stammers 2004:334-5, 342-3, 354-5) The assumption is unreliable if common political patterns among the ‘transitional activist processes’ include elements of the international level but should be understood as alternative directions, not way stations to international activism (transposing Carothers 2002:14). Indeed, this study supports the assertion that Tarrow’s (2005) “analytic distinctions seem to draw confusing

---

27 I transpose a “transitology” critique that Carothers (2002) offers in his discussion of another prominent process-oriented research program straddling political science and sociology. Carothers (2002) argues that the democratic transition research program, sparked in 1970 by Dankwart Rustow’s seminal article tellingly entitled “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” glosses over gray zones in “transitions” from authoritarian to democratic regimes.
and possibly misleading analytical boundaries between… national and international levels.” (Smith 2006:547)

The second assumption is that different modes of transnational activism “tend to unfold in a set sequence of stages,” hierarchically stratified in their transnationality—from low to high—from global issue framing, to internalization, to diffusion, to scale shift, to externalization, to coalition formation (transposing Carothers 2002:7, 15; see Tarrow 1998:193-194; della Porta & Tarrow 2005:6; Tarrow 2005). Activist modes “can and do go backward or stagnate as well as move forward along the path. Yet even the deviations from the assumed sequence… are defined in terms of the path itself. The options are all cast in terms of the speed and direction with which [activist modes] move on the path, not in terms of movement that does not conform with the path at all.” (transposing Carothers 2002:7, 15) The premise is unfounded if “the various assumed component processes of [transnational] consolidation (…) are chaotic processes of change that go backwards and sideways as much as forward, and do not do so in any regular manner.” (transposing Carothers 2002:15) This study shows such contingency.

The third assumption is a belief in the determinative importance of territorial borders. It is assumed that in attempted ‘transitions’ to activism at the international level, border crossings will be not just a foundation stone but a key generator of further transnational transformations over time (transposing Carothers 2002:7-8, 15-16). The premise would come up short if it turns out that in many dual-level modes of activism reasonably regular, genuine border crossings are held but transnational activism beyond that associated with such modes remains shallow, with low transnationality (transposing Carothers 2002:15). This study demonstrates that these possibilities occur widely.
Finally, there is the most reflective assumption or explicit premise, as manifested in the context of research on transnational activism (see Tarrow 2005; Tarrow & McAdam 2005:124-125). The fourth assumption is that the underlying conditions in and between activists’ polities—societal globalism, statist internationalism, relative deprivation (environmental degradation), postmaterialism, new middle classes or other ‘structural’ features—“will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition.” (transposing Carothers 2002:8) In Tarrow’s (2005) model, as in the assumptions of international regime theorists, statist internationalism imparts an amply dominant impact on transitions in transnational activism for societal globalism to be safely ignored. The fourth assumption is faulty if “a contrary reality—the fact that various structural conditions clearly weigh heavily in shaping transition outcomes—work[s] its way back in.” (transposing Carothers 2002:16) This research shows such a contrary reality.

These questionable assumptions allow for substantial further contributions to a broad survey that for over a decade has been fulfilling initial “hopes of producing an intelligible map of the field, a synthesis of recent inquiries, a specification of scope conditions for the validity of available theories, and an exploration of worldwide changes in the character” of transnational activism (McAdam et al 1996). Such a panoramic map continues to be much needed. The state of knowledge with regard to transnational

---

28 These two works at the transnational level depart from the research program that McAdam and colleagues (2001:84, 312) call for (while working at the national level of analysis): “Abandon efforts to specify necessary and/or sufficient conditions for whole classes of episodes through yes/no comparison or correlational analysis; for example, shift studies of strike waves away from identifying general conditions under which they occur to an explanation of their dynamics. Use those same methods sparingly, and chiefly to specify what must be explained; for example, having demonstrated through regression or other correlation-based analyses that mobilization typically occurs in established social settings, intervene with different methods to determine what dynamic, interactive mechanisms typically shape the mobilization process.”
activism remains as Catherine Eschle and Neil Stammers (2004:333) evaluated it in a systematic review:

“Attention… across several different academic disciplines has failed to generate the intellectual and disciplinary synthesis needed to understand [transnational activism]. On the contrary, the limitations of each discipline have simply been replicated by others, leaving the field cluttered with incommensurable or overlapping analyses, concepts, and jargon.” (see also Olesen 2006; Pinto 2010)

Tarrow (2005) employs “great skill at synthesizing the work of many scholars to review an impressive array of cases of transnational activism.” (Smith 2006) Because issue and geographic areas such as those in focus here do not fit his mapping, the aim of this study is to contribute to the advancement of knowledge about transnational activism in general.

2.2. Conceptualized Processes

2.2.1. GLOBAL ISSUE FRAMING

At the top left quadrant of the typology, “global issue framing” is a “mobilization of international symbols to frame domestic conflicts.” (Tarrow 2005:32) The process has also been defined as translating “domestic disputes in the language of globalization.” (Tarrow & McAdam 2005:122) Global issue framing works through the global thinking or structural equivalence of activists cross-nationally (Tarrow 2005:60-61).

2.2.2. INTERNALIZATION

In the same area of the typology, where the cause and action are primarily internal, internalization is defined as “a response to foreign or international pressures within domestic politics,” or as “the migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics.” (Tarrow 2005:32, 80; see Walton 1989; Kahler 1993:370, 382-383, 386-387, 390; Nelson 2002; Sikkink 2005; Almeida 2007) The process has also been named “domestication” with its definition phrased as “the playing out on domestic
territory of conflicts that have their origin externally.” (della Porta & Tarrow 2005:2-4) A third source defines it as “domestic claims-making against international or foreign targets.” (Tarrow & McAdam 2005:122)

This study adopts a broad understanding of internalization from the causal process of transnational activism that has come closest to full specification. Tarrow (2005:79-80) claims that “international pressures can take a variety of forms” and that there is a case of internalization whenever “domestic groups employ contentious politics against international, state, or nonstate actors on domestic ground.” (emphasis added) Tarrow also offers a disclaimer in stating that his model of internalization “is intended as a scaffolding on which to develop evidence about the reciprocal interactions among international institutions, national governments, and their citizens,” and that “it offers no specific hypotheses about how different combinations of mechanisms intersect.” Thus, this study interprets “contentious” in his delimitation of internalization cases broadly and relaxes the sequencing of the “implementation” mechanism within them. In this study, internalization is taken to refer to activism regardless of the adversarial status of its repertoires; to activism that may prevent rather than react to the implementation of policies which governments are under external pressure to implement; and to activism that may not involve activists’ domestic government.

2.2.3. DIFFUSION

At the center space in Tarrow’s typology, diffusion denotes the horizontal “transfer of claims or forms of contention from one site to the other.” (Tarrow 2005:32) The diffusion process splits into three variants. “Relational diffusion” relies on “attribution of similarity” between initiators and adopters; “nonrelational diffusion” on
“theorization” as an impersonal mean of transfer; and “mediated diffusion” on third-party “brokerage.” (Tarrow 2005:139) Diffusion proceeds from an initial mechanism of localized action; to internationalization and communication; to a mechanism (“attribution of similarity,” “theorization” or “brokerage”) that depends on which of three diffusion variants; to “emulation;” and finally to “non-localized action.” (Tarrow 2005:103-106)

2.2.4. SCALE SHIFT

In the same central area of the typology, the “scale shift” process consists of the vertical “coordination of collective action at a different level than where it began.” (Tarrow 2005:32) The term “scale shift” is somewhat misleading. Its connotations of

---

29 Diffusion and scale shift as processes have more in common than their shared position in the typology. Scale shift was initially conceived as a subset of diffusion, but is now considered a distinct process. Compared in few words, the scale shift process is more complex in kind and more intense in degree than the diffusion process. According to Tarrow (2005:121-122), the process of diffusion is at the core of the process of scale shift, except that whereas the diffusion process itself “is horizontal and has an initiator and an adopter, scale shift involves the coordination of episodes of contention on the part of larger collectivities against broader targets, new actors, and institutions at new levels of interaction.” Unlike diffusion, scale shift has the complexity that it can affect not only the geographic range of activism, but also its character and claims—not to mention its tentative impacts on identities (Tarrow 2005:122; Tarrow & McAdam 2005:130-131). In terms of degree, the “scale shift” process is more intense than that of diffusion in the sense of the vague concepts of “contagion” and “grassfires” through which it initially appeared in the social movement theory literature as special instances of diffusion (Tarrow & McAdam 2005:126-127). Finally, the two processes share the mechanisms of “theorization,” “brokerage” and possibly “attribution of similarity”—depending on the scholarly model adopted. The mechanism of “attribution of similarity” is included in the “scale shift” process by Tarrow and McAdam (2005:128-129) but not in that by Tarrow (2005:120-138). As shared mechanisms of diffusion and scale shift, the trio of “theorization,” “brokerage” and possibly “attribution of similarity” merit a brief review in this study. “Theorization” refers to “a kind of ‘folk theory’ that defines some thing or activity in abstract terms and locates it within a cause-effect or functional scheme,” and “can be highly abstract and complex… or it can be reduced to a few symbols and guides to action.” (Tarrow 2005:104) “Brokerage” is used to indicate “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social actors by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites.” (Tarrow 2005:190) Brokerage in transnational activism works through international NGOs, foundations, international institutions, halfway houses, immigrants, private missionaries, some combination of these agents, or other institutions (Tarrow 2005:190, 104). Brokers can be latent agents of activism in that although they may never purposively participate in it, “their key position in between otherwise unconnected sites can influence the content of the information that is communicated” and of the activist processes that may flow from that communication (Tarrow 2005:104). The phrase “attribution of similarity” as Tarrow (2005:103-104) uses it captures activists’ identification with their counterparts as well as their preparedness to emulate the actions of the latter. In the terms of Tarrow and McAdam (2005:128-129), “attribution of similarity” is defined as “actors in different sites identifying themselves as sufficiently similar to justify common action.” It results either from deliberate attempts to be joined to “others” or from less purposive, institutionalized tendencies to identify with perceived counterparts (Tarrow & McAdam 2005:128-129).
rupture, threshold or tipping point fit poorly with the understanding that intranational activism that shifts in scale to the international level (or vice-versa) does not automatically become international (or intranational). Transposition of part of the activists’ activities is considered to be far more common than wholesale transformation with liquidation at the original level (Tarrow & McAdam 2005; Tarrow 2005). The conceptual meaning of scale shift is better conveyed through ‘scale alteration,’ owing to the more fitting etymologies of the prefixes “alt” which pertains to change in altitude or elevation and “alter” which connotes change that is open-ended.

Tarrow’s (2005:122, 139) model of the “scale shift” process proceeds from the initial mechanism of “local action;” to “coordination” via cross-spatial collaboration and joint planning; to the combination of “brokerage” and “theorization” that permits the aggregation of a variety of claimants and claims; to the final mechanism of a shift in claims, targets and perhaps identities as activism shifts between levels.

More developed than similar foils, the model of “scale shift” that Tarrow (2005:139) puts forth is one that still can only “operate in two directions: upward, in which case local action spreads outward from its origins; or downward, when a generalized practice is adopted at a lower level.” These two directions explain more than an exclusively unidirectional, upward coverage in the work of Tarrow and McAdam (2005:125), McAdam and colleagues (2001:331-332), or Smith (1993). Sewell (2001:67-68) builds a downward direction—between international and intranational as well as national and local—into the equivalent process of “jumping scales” that Neil Smith (1993) put forth. According to Sewell (2001:67-68), “although scale jumping is usually a matter of calling broader-scale [national] forces into a local struggle, it can also work in
the opposite direction, with national-scale forces seeking refuge from unequal struggles by retreating to a more local scale where their chances are much better.” In parallel work, Johnson and McCarthy (2005:71-72, 91) question the “scale shift” account of Tarrow and McAdam (2005), in which an upward, unidirectional “assumption is taken for granted”: “that transnational movements are established as the outgrowth of national movements.” Whereas Tarrow and McAdam (2005:125) as well as McAdam and colleagues (2001:331-332) name downward scale shift and go on to “neglect” it as not their concern—in international-intranational and national-local analyses, respectively—Johnson and McCarthy (2005:71-72) stress “the importance of top-down, transnational to national organizational processes” such as scale shift in a downward direction.

If the activist processes here shown to be in the dual-level spaces are indeed robust, two horizontal directions for scale alteration (or “scale shift”) need to complement Tarrow’s (2005) two vertical ones (upward and downward). *Sideways* directions are logically implied with the addition of dual-level processes in the external-internal and the internal-external corners within the typology of transnational activism. Sideways scale alterations characterize instances when activism in an arena under internal site of action with external site of cause moves to another arena under external site of action with internal site of cause, or vice-versa (see Figure 1, page 2 above). Arenas mixing internal and external sites could generate vertically-ambiguous “scale shifts” that alter the scale of activism horizontally, in a sideways directionality.

---

30 Again, the order of dual-level labels here follows the y-axis by x-axis convention so that site of action precedes and site of cause follows the hyphen in international-intranational (or vice-versa) hybrids.
2.2.5. EXTERNALIZATION

At the bottom-right corner of Tarrow’s typology, where the site of the issue and the activism are primarily international, “externalization is the vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors.” (Tarrow 2005:32) In the externalization process, nationally weak actors seek the external support of more-powerful nongovernmental or governmental allies (Tarrow 2005:ch. 8; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Tarrow (2005) takes the “boomerang model” that Keck and Sikkink (1998) put forth and parses it out into three pathways of an externalization process. The first proceeds through information transmission and international monitoring, the second through international agency authority and institutional access, and the third via direct action and international ties. “Externalization” is a particularly apt term to the extent that the first and second pathways depend on leverage of external activists over international or foreign governmental institutions, a leverage that renders external activists more likely to dominate transnational activist alliances (Wood 2005:98; see also Rodrigues 2003; Bob 2005; Hertel 2006). Two out of the three said pathways of externalization are especially governmental in that they rely “heavily on national actors and state-to-state pressures, in a ‘boomerang’ process that [is] more international than transnational.” (Seidman 2005:180; see Nelson 2002)31

2.2.6. COALITION FORMATION

In the same bottom-right area of the typology, the transnational process of “coalition formation” “is the horizontal formation of common networks among actors from different countries with similar claims.” (Tarrow 2005:32) Coalitions are strictly defined so as to refer to “collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct

31 In this vein, Nelson (2002) refers to the “boomerang pattern” as internationalization.
organizational entities to pool resources in order to effect change.” (Tarrow 2005:164 quoting Levi & Murphy 2004:5) Their formation and longevity are considered to depend on four or five factors\(^{32}\): framing, (establishment of trust), credible commitments, management of difference (resolving tensions), and selective incentives (resolving tensions) (Tarrow 2005:164-166 citing Levi & Murphy 2004:5). In addition, four methods of collective action are noted as enabling of or conducive to transnational coalition building: “the leadership of movement brokers; the development of shared, democratic forums; the creation of a flexible organizational culture; and the perception of success or legitimacy of coalition endeavors.” (Bandy & Smith 2005:240-246) Tarrow (2005) offers four sub-types of transnational activist coalitions in a typology that is reproduced in Figure 3 below. The duration of such coalitions ranges from the low of a discrete event to the high of a coalition that becomes a permanent organization. Their intensity of cooperation ranges from the low of loaning an organization’s logo to the high of forming a single umbrella organization (Tarrow 2005:167).

Figure 3: A Typology of Forms of Transnational Coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity of Involvement</th>
<th>Short-Term</th>
<th>Long-Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Instrumental Coalition</td>
<td>Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Event Coalition</td>
<td>Campaign Coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2.3. Extending a Typology of Processes: Into the Gray-Zone, Dual Level of Analysis

This study concurs with William Sewell (2001:87-88) in his suggestion that the study of activism has much to gain from “a more systematic and theoretically informed

\(^{32}\) While the four (at the international level of analysis) or five (at the national level) factors seem to serve as mechanisms for the “coalition formation” process, Tarrow does not explicitly conceptualize them as such.
treatment of space.” He argues that “with rare exceptions, the literature has treated space as an assumed and unproblematicized background, not as a constituent aspect… that must be conceptualized explicitly and probed systematically.” (Sewell 2001:51-52) As Olesen and Rosenau (2005:3) have suggested, “it is crucial that we define distance in a far more comprehensive way than has heretofore been the case in social movement studies.”

Tarrow’s (2005) inquiry relating modes of activism to spatial levels of analysis stands out as exceptional in this regard, mapping activism in these two senses. Tarrow (2005) builds on the work of fellow “analytical pragmatists” such as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), and Thomas Risse and colleagues (1999). As Risse (2002:267, 264) puts it, these scholars “started specifying the conditions and causal mechanisms by which transnational advocacy networks manage to link the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ levels,” in “models linking the international and domestic levels.”

*Figure 4: Dynamic Multilevel Governance*

*International Opportunity Structure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Opportunity Structure</th>
<th>Closed</th>
<th>Open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>A. Diminished Chances of Activism</td>
<td>B. Boomerang Pattern and Spiral Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>D. Democratic Deficit / Defensive Transnationalization</td>
<td>C. Insider / Outsider Coalition Model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Reproduced from Sikkink (2005:156).*

A review of Sikkink (2005) lends weight to the concern of this study with addressing intranational-international gaps in knowledge of transnational activism.

Based on a classic social movement concept of “political opportunity structures” (POS),

---

33 This author owes that brief description (and indeed a first impression) of Tarrow’s (2005) inquiry to Ken Conca. For another fertile research agenda that treats space seriously in the context of transnational activism and with a focus on how the international and intranational levels impact each other, see Meyer (2003).

the scholar puts forth four characteristic patterns of activism in a typology reproduced above in Figure 4 (on POS, see Adamson 2005; Schurman 2004; Barrett and Kurzman 2004; Meyer 2004; Khagram et al 2002:17-20; Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986).

Sikkink (2005:164-165) suggests that the pattern of transnational activism labeled “C” “is the least studied, and thus of particular interest,” and asks of it: “What happens when both international and domestic opportunity structures are relatively open?” Her definitions of types “D” and “B” on the bottom-left and top-right of her typology are equivalent to the well-understood “internalization” and “externalization” processes in the top-left and bottom-right areas of Tarrow’s (2005) typology, respectively. She argues that the pattern “C” of open-open political opportunities across external-internal sites “may be a key dynamic,” and “propose[s] that the interaction of groups in the context of the relative access to domestic and international institutions may help us think about and explain the emergence of new forms of dynamic multilevel governance.” (Sikkink 2005:164-165, 172)

However, only as a result of an oversight does Sikkink (2005) demonstrate a need for new explanations of transnational activism next to those in Tarrow’s (2005) processes. Sikkink (2005:166) analyzes human rights organizations that “launched a series of innovative [domestic] legal challenges…, and… cooperated with and initiated some international and regional tactics as well.” In characterizing a “two-track”—“insider-outsider,” “activists within and beyond borders,” internal-external—instance of pattern “C,” she claims that “human rights groups were able to selectively scale shift up and down as required by the demands of the particular situations they faced.” (Sikkink

There are at least three shortcomings to Sikkink’s (2005) “scale shift” formulation. One problem is that Sikkink (2005) fails to outline an internal pattern from/to which activists shift, one that would match the internal track of the two-track activism that she conceptualizes—just as she matches the “boomerang” pattern (or externalization process) to her external track.35 A second problem is that Sikkink characterizes a process and component mechanisms within her ‘scale shift’ that are not compatible with those which constitute either scale shift as elaborated by Tarrow (2005) and Tarrow and McAdam (2005), or indeed scale jumping by Sewell (2001).36 A third problem with such a presumption of “scale shift” is one of simultaneously representing change to or from continuous change. Here, suffice it to ask: How would a “scale shift” process (whatever its direction) shift into or out of Sikkink’s shifting or “up and down” “scale shift?” These three problems are compounded as Sikkink (2005:164) asserts that

35 None of the strictly internal activist processes—including “internalization” (democratic deficit / defensive transnationalization), “global issue framing” or any other process—is typical of Sikkink’s (2005) internal, judicial track of her presumed two-track “scale shift.” The conceptual gap is particularly serious to the extent that Sikkink (2005:165) believes that “domestic activists will… privilege domestic political change, but will keep international activism as a complementary and compensatory option. Domestic political change is closer to home and more directly addresses the problems activists face, so they will concentrate their attention there. However, activists who have learned how to use international institutions in an earlier boomerang phase will keep this avenue open in case of need.” In a parallel two-track analysis of transnational environmental activism that sheds light on an internal “court-based strategy” on par with an external boomerang/spiral-based approach, Kathryn Hochstetler (2002) lends weight to the need for an internal conceptualization. She argues, “The five-phase spiral model helps to describe the potential succession of state responses to a boomerang strategy. However, the model’s focus on international norm socialization as the source of movement between the phases fails to adequately capture the role of domestic political developments in shaping the interaction between states and NGOs in environmental politics after a boomerang throw.” (Hochstetler 2002:54)

36 Sikkink (2005) does not conceptualize a pattern that matches the overall metaphor of scale shift, let alone its constituent mechanisms and process as detailed by Tarrow (2005) or Tarrow and McAdam (2005). According to the latter, scale shift occurs as a portion of activism moves to a different level than that at which it began. Indeed, as Sewell (2001:67-68) argues about the parallel process of scale jumping, scale shift is fundamentally a means available to activists “for transforming the spatial structures that face them.” The difference between circumventing and transforming would at least need to be challenged.
activists in boxes “D” and “B,” despite their differences, are both pushing to move into the arena “C” she associates with scale shift.

Overall, the process of “scale shift” clearly cannot and needs not bear the weight that Sikkink (2005) puts on it—perhaps misled by a challenging combination of the conventional process typology and the same conventionally understudied phenomena to which she calls attention. That even a path-breaking scholar as is Sikkink could be constrained into such an oversight lends weight to the need to reconsider internal-external arenas within Tarrow’s (2005) typology. Slips in Sikkink (2005) are shown through *Figure 5* below, on a one-dimensional combination of Sikkink’s (2005) and Tarrow’s (2005) typologies simplified for clarity. Sikkink’s (2005) “scale shift” formulation runs into the first of two major dangers that Colin Elman (2005:321) detects in his treatment of analytic steps used in working with typologies in qualitative studies of international politics: “[C]ell names should not become so reified that scholars lose sight of the underlying theory from which the explanatory typology was derived.”

*Figure 5: Processes of Transnational Activism*

*Political Level*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>? (?)</td>
<td>“Scale Shift”? (Insider / Outsider Coalition Model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization (Democratic Deficit / Defensive Transnationalization)</td>
<td>Externalization (Boomerang Pattern and Spiral Model)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Inferring from Sikkink (2005), and Tarrow (2005).*

While referring to Sikkink (2005), Tarrow (2005:166-170) severs her “two-track” pattern under his “coalition formation” process and briefly mentions that activist success

---

37 In a setback to an earlier research effort, the author of this study also reified “scale shift.”
in the specific instance that he uses as an illustration “was not due [to] transnational efforts alone.” Tarrow (2005) renders Sikkink’s (2005) internal track as exogenous to his map of transnational activism. If Sikkink’s (2005) scale jumping can be visualized as activism jumping rope irreducibly between an aired external level and a grounded internal one (as in her “up and down”), Tarrow’s (2005) rendition of it can be viewed as activism that at times appears on the transnational trampoline catching external air from some given internal confine. Such a fallback on an exogenous, strictly national and un-conceptualized arena runs into a second typological danger that Elman (2005:321) detects: “[R]edrawing a property space to accommodate an empirical anomaly, in effect finding a cell it can call home, will not always be evidence of a constructive theoretical amendment.”

Sikkink’s (2005) and Tarrow’s (2005) “flattening” show early signs of conceptual misuses similar to those that led McAdam and colleagues (2001) to turn toward dynamic processes and reject a static SMT research agenda which they had themselves set (see Mische 2003:85). It is worth recalling that the McAdam and colleagues’ (2001:13) turn to activist dynamics did not “intend to pour all forms of contention into the same great mold, subjecting them to universal laws… and flattening them into a single two-dimensional caricature.” Signs of such flattening in Sikkink (2005) are more tangible,

---

38 Sikkink (2005) does not mention “coalition formation.” In prior work, Tarrow (1998:185, 188-9) considered the boomerang pattern of transnational advocacy networks—which he has come to subsume within an elevated externalization process—to be a subset (federation subtype, high duration or timeframe and low intensity or integration) of a transnational activism 2x2 typology that he has come to conceptualize under the coalition formation process (or “transnational collective action,” as in della Porta and Tarrow (2005:6-8)). The admittedly confusing “insider-outsider coalition” label that Sikkink (2005:165) assigned to her pattern may have misled Tarrow (2005:168-169) into categorizing her pattern through his “coalition formation” process.

39 The two-dimensional mold to which McAdam and colleagues (2001:13, 78-80) were hinting was different in substance if not in principle. Their earlier “taxonomy” of contentious politics was arranged from low to high in the dimensions of “state capacity” and “extent of democracy.”
if less transparent, in the two one-dimensional molds that Tarrow (2005:168-169) implicitly puts forth in his conceptual rendition of Sikkink’s (2005) work.

Flattening tendencies not to conceptualize Sikkink’s (2005) pattern as its own original process or as a compatibly revised “scale shift” process are due to a prevailing logic of activist “transitology” from the intranational to the international levels. Figure 6 below highlights transitology in that the block-arrow shaded dark on Tarrow’s (2005) typology runs diagonally from a “domestic-domestic” level through a “transitional-transitional” to an “international-international” level. A transitological approach represented by that mono-, isomorphic block-arrow matches the flattening rationales represented in the one-dimensional (‘political level’) rectangle block in Figure 5: For example, a redundant “domestic-domestic” process lends itself to being compressed into a merely “domestic” process. Sikkink’s (2005) two-track pattern could take place in amorphous internal-external blind spots overshadowed in the lightly shaded corners of Figure 6.

*Figure 6: Six Processes of Transitologically Transnational Activism*
Tarrow’s (2005) analysis, as it treats Sikkink (2005), is implicitly crossing a key mile marker from “splitting” (or disaggregating) to “lumping” (or aggregating) in its search for a classification middle ground that avoids confusion by balancing these two poles. Earlier, Tarrow (2002:230-2, 234-7) called for a move “from lumping to splitting” analysis that disaggregates such general concepts as “lumpy” transnational resistance/movement or global civil society into less-aggregated ones—distinguishing between such forms of activism as service work associated with NGOs, lobbying and information flow associated with advocacy networks, and contentious and sustained mobilization associated with social movements. Tarrow (2005) does not sufficiently situate the turn from disaggregating to aggregating. As Kesselman (2006:688) reviews the work, “the way in which processes and mechanisms are identified remains underspecified. (…) Why these six processes? Why not others? How can one measure their importance in specific situations?”

Scholars of all major theoretical approaches that grapple with transnational activism may find it useful to go on “splitting” into the gray zone and to leave behind their wide-spread “lumpy” perspective of ‘activist transition’ from the intra- to the international level. Rather than ask how activism is moving in its journey “beyond borders,”

---

40Tarrow (2002:229-30, 234-6) hints at the importance of the poles with a taxonomic analogy in the following quotation: “Modern biologists are divided into the two camps of the splitters and the lumpers. The first are in favour of making a species out of every petty variety; the second are all for lumping unimportant minor forms into a single species.” (attributed to Cornhill Magazine, no. 295, March 1894). In the context of transnational collective action, Tarrow (2002:234-235) translates the camps as lumpers on one side in favor of “simple dichotomous pairing [of] ‘globalization’ and ‘resistance,’” and splitters on “the opposite pole” all for “tales of the activities of individual movements.” For a similar analytical spectrum and call for an analytical middle ground, see della Porta and Rucht (2002). Citing Brand (1995), Görg and Hirsch (1998) take on a “lump” that Tarrow (2002, 2005) does not split in their argument that NGOs “are characterized by such a diversity of highly specific formations that ‘NGO’ becomes a nondescript ‘sponge word.’”

41A transitological perspective with regard to activist levels pervades all major approaches to the current study of transnational activism. Tarrow (1998, 2001, 2005) only “most clearly elaborate[s]” a prevailing “simplified and hierarchical conceptualization of the relationship between global and local [‘domains of
it may be more useful to ask, what is happening to activism in relation to borders (inspired by Carothers 2002)? Until that question is rephrased, abandoning a transitological perspective seminal through Tarrow (2005), the earlier Tarrow (2002) will remain incorrect in arguing that “though social movements have most often been studied at the national level, there is little in the conceptual canon of social movement studies that is inherently parochial. (…) [Concepts] can be adapted to the world of transnational contention.” (emphasis in original) SMT parochialism that is currently inherent can, however, be overcome if SMT’s underlying transitology in activist levels is eradicated by expanding the SMT typology of transnational activism so as to disaggregate (or split) dual-level, gray-zone process types:

“Expansion allows analysts to spot important combinations of attributes that were overlooked in the partial typology, and to draw attention to cases that need further attention. The procedure may also help theorists to make explicit the assumptions that were used by the original analyst to suppress particular combinations. (…) Because explanatory typologies are derived from underlying theories, they should be permanently open to being reconfigured as the theories change.” (Elman 2005:294, 308, 321)
Expansion to include “a complex and open-ended relationship between localized activism and global processes,” undertaken here, solves a “key problem” rife in the research field (Eschle & Stammers 2004:334-335, 342-343, 354-355). 44

2.3.1. DUAL-LEVEL PROCESSES: INTERNAL ACTION AND EXTERNAL CAUSE

The explosion of transnational activism, as it were, was initially noticed as a “global associational revolution” clustered in the top-right blind spot of Tarrow’s (2005) typology, where the activism is primarily internal and the issue is primarily external (Hulme & Edwards 1997 quoting Salamon 1993; see Salamon 1994). Yet, the foremost SMT synthesis (Tarrow 2005) is reminiscent of the dictum that one carrying only a hammer sees only nails. SMT conceptual tools have not led it to recognize, let alone explain, a surging internal-external45 cluster of transnational activism involving “the service work of such groups as Doctors without Borders and Save the Children.” (Tarrow (2002:237)

Familiar with that activist cluster and with different theoretical traditions, Nelson and Dorsey (2007:208) analyze such activist issue areas as human rights-based water, HIV/AIDS (focusing on Doctors without Borders); and to a lesser extent “debt relief, agrarian reform, and the rights to information and to education.” The scholars “do not specify at what levels (national or international) [advocacy] takes place,” finding “methodologies, strategies and a source of leverage at both national and international levels that [are] not captured in the recent social movement literature.” (Nelson & Dorsey

|typologies “allows the analyst to discover missed combinations and suppressed assumptions, and to identify important cases.” (Elman 2005:294)
|44|Such a solution to a ‘top-four’ problem in SMT is proposed in outline form by Eschle and Stammers (2004:334-335, 342-343, 354-355).
|45|The order of dual-level labels here follows the y-axis by x-axis convention so that site of action precedes and site of cause follows the hyphen in external-internal (or vice-versa) hybrids.
Nelson and Dorsey (2007:188, 197) turn to the idea of a “global public domain” to convey “domestic and transnational policy ‘spheres’ [that] blur and intermingle” in advocacy that involves “diverse political arenas (national and international).” They point to parochialism:

The leading accounts of NGOs as international political actors… tend to exclude an important set of (…) cases… [that] are a significant and now increasingly visible body of international political activity (…) Development, environmental and human rights advocates are engaged in an important strain of international activity that is not sufficiently explained by contemporary [IR], social movement or human rights literature. (Nelson & Dorsey 2007:192, 194; see Wu 2005)

The transitological blind spot in Tarrow’s (2005) typology clearly leads to such a finding of misfit with SMT and other relevant theorizing. However, once transitology and its gaps are exposed, the primary levels of the activism and the causes presented in Nelson and Dorsey’s (2007:189, 193-194, 202-203, 205, 209) narrative could easily place their pattern of transnational cause-oriented action on the SMT typology’s dual-level, internal-external, space: “The advocacy explicitly draws on international standards”—as in international cause—“but it may draw on [NGO, social movement and media] international influence to shape domestic policy choices, or on domestic initiatives to influence an international process”—as in internal activism.

This study suggests that the blank, empty space on the internal-external (top-right) corner of Tarrow’s (2005) typology could feature at least two processes in which the site of action is primarily internal and the site of the issue is primarily external. Such processes take place in Sikkink’s (2005) “key” “box C” where activists perceive international opportunity structure to open for them to the extent that they pressure and participate in accessible national institutions (open internal opportunity structure) from

---

46 “Global” here indicates a convergence that resembles Rosenau’s (1997) notion of a domestic-foreign frontier.
the domestic inside more so than from the foreign outside. In these processes, non-profit NGO, industry and/or governmental allies seek to address causes that are of primarily external importance through activism that for the most part does not bring activists out of internal contexts between which material and ideational resources link powerful actors and the “junior” allies they support (see Brooks 2005; Seidman 2005; see also Hertel 2006; DeSombre 2000).47

Regardless of whether internationalist or globalist, the two internal-external causal processes included in this quadrant are more sensitive to global social than global economic flows. In other words, flows of ideas and identities—as in transfers of technical resources and fragmentation of national identities—are more central in these causal chains than are flows of investment or trade—as in transfers of financial resources.

2.3.2. DUAL-LEVEL PROCESSES: EXTERNAL ACTION AND INTERNAL CAUSE

A review of Haufler (2003:240-241), for one, shows that the explosion of transnational activism has also taken place where the activist action is primarily external and the activist cause is mainly internal—that is, in another dual-level corner void in Tarrow’s (2005) grid.

Haufler (2003) shows that in the 1990s transnational activist groups increasingly targeted transnational corporations in high profile campaigns seeking to change business policies on issue areas such as environment (broadly) and human rights (political-civil as well as social-economic). Haufler (2003:239-241) indicates that voluntary industry self-regulation and multi-stakeholder regulation “have expanded tremendously” in the 1990s

47 The term “junior” ally is drawn from the idea of “junior partner,” an activist organization that is “vulnerable to the whims of head offices” in transnational coalitions (Wood 2005:100). Lesley Wood (2005:98-100) highlights the latter in her discussion of poorer, Southern activist groups that depend upon the resources and the leverage over transnational institutions of wealthier, Northern NGOs for their very survival (see also Bandy & Smith 2005:233-234, 237; Brooks 2005:125-126, 135-136; Rodrigues 2003).
mainly as a result of activist mobilization of consumers and investors, and in certain circumstances through partnerships between transnational activists and businesses (see also Haufler 1993; Broad & Cavanagh 1997, 1999; Jordan & Maloney 1997; Lipschutz & Fogel 2002; Micheletti 2003; Micheletti et al 2004; Stolle et al 2005; Hopgood 2006; van Koppen 2006; Trentmann 2007).

Echoing Haufler’s (1993:238-239, 2000:128-133, 2003) analysis of activist involvement in mixed and private regimes, Lipschutz and Fogel (2002:116-117) also note that activist groups have “become instrumental in the establishment of a growing number of semi-public and private ‘transnational regimes’ intended to regulate negative environmental and social externalities that have, so far, not been addressed through public international conventions and laws.” Mainly due to transnational activism, “fair trade”—a unique multi-stakeholder subset of such private and/or mixed (semi-public) transnational regimes that focuses on producers and terms of trade more so than on product and production—“changed drastically” beyond its “politically and economically marginal” status in the early 1990s (Wilkinson 2007:219, 221, 223, 230; see also Broad 2002:173-174).

All these analyses specify Robin Broad’s (2002:173-176, 185) assertion regarding the locus of such activism: “While many of the code and certification initiatives grew from activist and consumer concerns in the North,” as in internal site of cause, “some of the more effective campaigns either involved intimate coordination with groups on the ground in the producing countries in the South or actually took their lead from Southern groups,” as in external site of action. Bennett (2005:225) notes parochialism along these lines, SMT “should pay more attention to the proliferating experiments involving direct
relationships with corporations, including labor standards monitoring in the apparel industry, forest certification regimes, and fair-trade campaigns in the coffee sector, among others.” The present study suggests that external-internal dynamics at the bottom-left empty quadrant in Tarrow’s (2005) typology could encompass these processes in which actors engage in action that is primarily external to address chiefly internal causes.

A common thread across all the understudied transnational activist dynamics just mentioned, at the external-internal space, can be extrapolated from Haufler (2003:240, 242, 245): “Activists, finding themselves blocked [in relation to states] at the national and intergovernmental levels, pushed to develop alternative [multi-tiered] mechanisms.” In other words, such heretofore invisible transnational activism often comes from Sikkink’s (2005) “box A.” At that point, activists perceive state-based internal and external institutions to be closed to their pressures and participation—closed-closed access to opportunity structures, more specifically state opportunity structures. Transnational activism later goes on to take place in Sikkink’s (2005) “key” “box C.” Activists change focus from state- to market-based institutions, both internal and external, that they come to perceive to be open to their efforts (see Broad 2002:72, 173-174)—open-open access to opportunity structures, more specifically “industry opportunity structures.” (Schurman 2004)\textsuperscript{48}

This characterization takes Sikkink’s (2005) axes of “international” and “domestic” “opportunity structures” to be inclusive. As a growing literature on the

\textsuperscript{48} Schurman (2004) conceptualizes “industry structures” as “composed of economic, organizational, and cultural features, and function to enhance or constrain social movements’ efforts to change industry behavior.” See also Burke 1999; Chapman 2001; Brooks 2005, p. 136; Hertel 2006; Khan et al 2007; Wilkinson 2007; Schaper 2007. Sikkink’s (2005) “box A” is fertile ground for understudied non-campaigns or failed campaigns of transnational activism that Risse (2002), Price (2003) and others point out to be particularly in need of further research.
politics of private authority would imply, and as Eschle and Stammers (2004:354) put it:

“The analysis of transnational opportunity structures should not be limited to a focus on
the narrowly political realm of interstate institutions, but should encompass broader kinds
of social relations and structures.”

More generally, in at least two processes within this international-intranational
space, the site of activist action is external in the sense that activists mainly reach outside
their borders, often by appending their agendas to the reaches or effects of transnational
trade, production or investment (see Broad 2002, p. 185; Brooks 2005, p. 136; Hertel
2006; Chapman 2001; Schurman 2004; Khan et al 2007; Wilkinson 2007; Schaper 2007;
see also Hertel 2006). In these processes within the external-internal space, at the
invisible (bottom-left) quadrant of Tarrow’s (2005) typology, causes that are consistently
constructed as predominantly internal tend to show divergent facets in the different
nation-states where they take place. For example, in a transnational campaign, the
nation-state (Bangladesh, India or Pakistan) that activists singled out as a target appeared
to other nation-states (North American and European) as the particular, aberrant,
backward site of the “child labor” cause in a broader transnational industry thereby
normalized. Conversely, in the same transnational campaign, the latter nation-states
appeared to the singled-out nation-state as the particular, imperialist, protectionist site of
the cause of “imperiling the jobs of adult workers” in a broader transnational industry
thereby normalized (Brooks 2005:135-138; see Chapman 2001; Schurman 2004; Hertel
2006; Khan et al 2007; Schaper 2007; Wilkinson 2007). The perceptions of activists do
not converge on any single internal or external cause as the one at stake in a single
occurrence of activism.
Regardless of whether internationalist or globalist, the two external-internal causal processes included in this quadrant are more sensitive to global economic than global social flows. In other words, flows of investment or trade are more central in these causal chains than are flows of ideas and identities.

2.4. Conceptualizing Dual-Level, Socioeconomic Processes

Building on earlier scholarship, this study deduces four alternate processes that complement those six which Tarrow (2005) in turn sifts from the scholarly literature. The following sections highlight how this study cumulatively distilled, deduced and posited each of these four original processes. In the following chapters, the study goes on to use each original process—alongside each of Tarrow’s process—to identify the existence and trace the causality of modes of transnational activism. In another parallel to Tarrow’s (2005) six models, each of the four new processes built in this study is also illustrated in the graphical form of a model. This study refers to these four figures as ‘models’ because they are deductively conceptualized steps of cause-and-effect relationships rather than sequential observations from a small number of inductive instances.

As introduced in the preceding chapter, the length constraints of this dissertation do not suffice to fully support the processual hypotheses of this study with respect to either the sequencing or the continuity of the causality that the four models posit. In line with Tarrow’s (2005) scholarship, in this study the four causal processes are only theorized and tested as integral wholes—in terms of graph or narrative. Their sequences of steps must remain formulaic at this point in order to advance the collective state of knowledge about transnational activism even while only tentatively conceptualizing and
probing the mechanisms in the process-tracings that the subsequent chapters feature. In other words, although the empirical case narratives go much further than Tarrow’s (2005)—deliberately casual—illustrations in testing the mechanisms along these four processes and his six, their plausibility probes remain tentative. Similarly, Tarrow (2005) and this study each fall short of being processually self-contained in the causal mechanisms and arrows that they conceptualize, but that they can only micro-theorize through references to the work of other scholars whose studies they integrate. In sum, in terms of processual mechanisms, the models featured in the figures imply a degree of precision that is impossible to substantiate to an adequate extent in this study, but they are provided on a tentative, transparent basis as ideal types: The mid-range layer of this study does not let the elusiveness of perfect theories and tests hide promising concepts and probes within any given process.

Four central processes of transnational activism evident in biodiversity and bioenergy issue areas are not captured by the processes Tarrow (2005) conceptualizes. In the biodiversity and the bioenergy substantive literatures, the patterns stressed are inconsistent in the case of the former and incipient in that of the latter.49 Partly due to neglect from scholars of political economy and political sociology, the transnational activism literature has not adequately addressed the socioeconomic setting of activism (exceptions include Burke 1999; Kaufmann & Pape 1999; Cooley & Ron 2002; Avant 2004; Schurman 2004; Kousis & Tilly 2005; Bob 2005; Brooks 2005; Hertel 2006). That

49 In transnational biodiversity activism, externalization processes for example have been considered rare by U.S.-trained social scientists (Steinberg 2001; Lewis 2002; Wu 2005), and routine by non-U.S.-trained scholars social scientists (Hufty & Muttenzer 2002; Inoue 2004; Duffy 2006) as well as geographers and historians generally (Adams 2004; Lewis 2004). For leads on bioenergy (fuel ethanol, biodiesel, biogas, unprocessed biomass etc.), see Nowell (1983), Castro Santos (1985), Barzelay (1986), Maniates (1990); Oliveira (2002) and Hess (2007). Only Maniates (1990) and Hess (2007) concentrate on transnational activism in the bioenergy issue area, and their works suggest the incubation and radiation processes as central, respectively.
setting looms as large as Brazil over the activist issue areas and processes researched here (see Castro Santos 1985; Kolk 1996; Hufty & Muttenzer 2002; Avant 2004; van Koppen 2006; Hess 2007).

*Figure 7: Ten Processes of Transnational Activism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site of Orienting Cause</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Global Issue Framing</td>
<td>Local Issue Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td>Incubation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>Scale Alteration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of Oriented Action</td>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Formation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proposed modifications and additions to Tarrow’s (2005) typology are incorporated into *Figure 7* above. The y-axis of the typology is labeled ‘site of oriented action’ instead of Tarrow’s (2005:33) “site of activism,” a category which previously implied action as more consequential to the transnationality of activism than the action-orienting cause that “brings activists out of their domestic context into transnational space.” The x-axis is labeled ‘site of orienting cause’ as a modification to Tarrow’s (2005) “range of issue” label so as to more clearly and consistently reflect his apt definition for that continuum: the primary setting in which a “particular issue” is important to activists rather than any ultimate scope of an issue or of its importance. Similar logic leads to the replacement of the “domestic” labels with ‘internal’ labels, and of the “international” labels with ‘external’ labels (see Rosenau 1997). *Figure 7* also includes the revision of “scale shift” into “scale alteration,” and the addition of four
external-internal (dual-level, ‘glocal’) processes. The former has been considered, and the latter are conceptualized in the next four sections.

2.4.1. DIVERSION

Diversion refers to a process in which activists and industry interest groups reconcile to harmonize a regulatory change in their polity and another regulatory change in a polity that hosts an industrial competitor via transnational trade, investment, or finance. Diversion transposes DeSombre’s (2000) “Baptist and bootlegger” conceptual framework,\(^5\) and supplements it with some reliance on Conca’s (2006) “complex institution building,” and Nowell’s (1994) “transnational structuring.” As DeSombre (2000) demonstrates, international regulatory harmonization often arises from the pressures of cause-oriented activists and industry interest groups that reconcile to divert their state(s) (labeled X below) into spreading a domestic regulatory standard newly adopted in the original nation-state(s) (X below) to (an)other state(s) (Z below). For the cause-oriented activists, the transnational spread increases the protection of the human or natural resource in question, since more states refrain from harming the resource and from depleting human or natural capital. “For industry actors, [the spread] avoids a situation in which they suffer competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign

---

\(^5\) As the work of DeSombre (2000) documents, the incentives for policy-making collaboration between cause-oriented and industry groups—labels representing Baptists and bootleggers, respectively, in an analogy from the U.S. alcohol prohibition—differ depending on the structure of issues and their levels of policy-making (intranational or international). Such structures often render it accurate to understand the process of diversion as one that is harmonizing (or converging) in the sense of bringing previously-opposed cause-oriented and business activists into alliance as activism moves from an internal to a primarily external site. However, this study intends to convey a process leading to regulatory harmonization (or convergence), or to an increase of compatibility in the policies of two or more states, moving from policies that work differently or at cross-purposes to ones that work similarly or toward the same purpose. Although regulatory harmonization is itself a misleading term which evokes Habermasian ideal standards ill fit to color mere “synchronization” phenomena fraught with conflict and the exercise of power (Habermas 2003), the project defers to its wide use in scholarly and practitioner circles merely in the interest of maintaining traces of a common terminology in the fragmented intellectual fields of international relations, comparative politics and social movement studies.
competitors who do not otherwise have to bear a costly… regulation.” (DeSombre 2000:245) “Certainly the incentive exists for states that have already passed domestic regulations to push for international acceptance of these standards to avoid competitive disadvantages for their industries.” (DeSombre 2006:12 referencing DeSombre 2000)

Apart from five extensions original to this study, which are discussed in the next paragraph, the model of diversion in Figure 8 below is largely a graphical representation of patterns that DeSombre (2000) scrutinized in her narrative: it transposes and supplements her work into a dynamic process-orientation.51

*Figure 8: A Model of Diversion*

---

51 The graphical representation of the DeSombre (2000) conceptual framework expands its scope beyond (1) *multilateral* mediation of regulatory spread (transgovernmental, bilateral and less than multilateral still count as diversion), (2) *states* as the agents and targets of pressure (societal entities also count), (3) *states* as sources of regulation (provinces/States or cities also count), (4) *regulation adoption* (regulation consideration and enforcement also count), and (5) *avoidance* of domestic regulations’ international competitive disadvantage via trade and investment effects (advancement of domestic regulations’ international competitive advantage via said effects also counts).
Drawing on Conca (2006) and Nowell (1994), four of DeSombre’s (2000) premises are relaxed here. Firstly, the study relaxes the exclusive focus on bilateral or multilateral treaties as institutional pathways for the spread of national regulations internationally, so as to include the conduits of international or transgovernmental organizations (such as the World Bank or the International Biofuels Forum, respectively). Secondly, the dissertation also includes private actors to the extent that it relaxes both DeSombre’s (2000) sole concentration on State(s) X entities as the immediate agents of pressure on State(s) Z, and her unique focus on State(s) Z entities as the unmediated targets of pressure. Thirdly, the dissertation relaxes the exclusive focus on the national scope of initial regulations in State(s) X, so as to include sub-national regulation at the city or State/province levels. Fourth, this study relaxes the sole concentration on regulatory diversion to avoid competitive disadvantage through transnational trade and investment, and also includes diversion to advance international competitive advantage of domestic regulations via said market forces.

2.4.2. RADIATION

Radiation refers to activism that appends itself to a transnational commercial chain, the radius of which links a relative center and a relative periphery in the global economic sphere; and that extends responsibility to match the distance of the socio-environmental impacts that are distributed along the radius. The conceptualization of “radiation” is approached through a wide stream of scholarship on private authority and transnational governance. The fruits of such scholarship can be turned into a robust process of transnational activism with the support of the work of Haufler (1993, 1997, 2001, 2003), Micheletti and colleagues (2003, 2004) as well as the research of Sikkink

There is significant cultural transfer of norms between business actors and the societies in which they are an embedded subsystem (Haufler 1997). Contrary to a conventional wisdom in the literature on transnational activism—which features industry actors in transnational activism as exogenous targets at best—industry actors participate substantially, are embedded in transnational issue networks and act in a quasi-public role typical of state actors or cause-oriented activists (Burke 1999; for exceptions since, see Cooley & Ron 2002; Avant 2004; Seidman 2005; Brooks 2005; Hertel 2006; Hess 2007; Wilkinson 2007; Holzer 2007). Indeed, business actors can even behave as activists at times when they are cause-oriented despite their profit-orientation, albeit often after non-profit activists have initially politicized them (Burke 1999; Martin 2003; see Haufler 2007). Martin/Burke (1999, 2003) substantiates an argument that Wapner (1996) and Strange (1996:44, 65) make: Transnational businesses have become political institutions that have political relations with activists. A layer of that business context is the “individualized collective action” of investors and consumers that may itself also be socially and politically embedded, as Micheletti and colleagues highlight: “When compared with most other forms of participation, the phenomenon of political consumerism appears to be more individualized in nature, although it may be embedded in collective societal and political values.” (Stolle et al 2005; see Micheletti 2003; see also Maniates 2001) Institutional investors or consumers also play a crucial role as private actors here.
A synthesis of the literature allows this study to theorize the process with further specificity. Weak states, which tend to have lower regulatory capacity and be more dependent upon the resources of businesses, are more porous to the process of radiation (Burke 1999:229; Haufler 2003). Consumer items, as opposed to industrial inputs, are more susceptible to becoming the subject of such activism (Haufler 2001; see also Schurman 2004; Schaper 2007). More particular still, the literature has also found that natural resources that have not been processed much beyond their raw material form attract such activism (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Analysis of industry opportunity structure could specify further (Schurman 2004), for purposes other than cogent process-tracing.

2.4.3. INCUBATION

Incubation is a process that begins from the outside-in and ends from the inside-out. Spatially, incubation refers to activism on primarily external issues that entails advocacy and implementation at the internal level, and to a lesser extent advocacy at the
external level to either avoid or reinforce the internal work. Temporally, incubation stands for transnational activism that pursues its cause over the long-term, often through efforts themselves long-lived. Incubation shares with Tarrow’s (2005) process of internalization its tendency to feature a migration of conflicts or pressures from the international to the intranational level. However, incubation differs from internalization in that it does not solely model conflicts or pressures that are originally external or international, nor does it merely model intranational claims-making responding against such external or international targets. Incubation conflicts or pressures may also originate intranationally and then expand to the external or international level only to return to intranational level with or without responding to external or international targets.

The activist process of incubation combines and extends the conceptual frameworks of Lewis (2000), Steinberg (2001; 2003) and Wu (2005) with the additional support of original modeling and other scholarly work (e.g., Avant 2004; Auer 1998; Johnson & McCarthy 2005:88-89; Nye & Keohane 1971; Hulme & Edwards 1997). Lewis (2000) argues that biodiversity activist groups select nations based on political criteria according to “lifeboat ethics,” and that nations most in need of assistance are neglected. Steinberg (2003:28) uses biodiversity activism as a case study to design a “spheres of influence” framework to explain how domestic policy change occurs within the scope of “problems that carry widely recognized global implications.” He explains that the extent to which activists combine resources from outside a nation-state with resources from inside the said nation-state is a key factor causing policy change.
At the bottom right of Figure 10 below, a conceptual starting point for the transnational activist process of incubation lies with Lewis’ (2000) explanation of the strategy that activist groups use in selecting the nation-state(s) that they target for influencing public policies and developing private systems of cause realization (i.e. biodiversity protection). Incubation also follows the institutional resources featured in Steinberg’s framework. Steinberg (2001; 2003) argues that the intersection (or pooling) of financial and scientific resources flowing in from outside the nation-state, and political resources accumulated inside the said nation-state is central.

Figure 10: A Model of Incubation

While scientific (i.e. expertise) and financial (i.e. funding) resources are self-evident, Steinberg’s (2003:16) concept of political resources includes “expansive social

The ideational resources in Steinberg’s (2001; 2003) framework—foreign “transmission” of external policy ideas and the domestic “translation” of such ideas to refine them so as to match and cultivate an internal political culture conducive to the policy change—permeate the processes of diffusion and local issue framing addressed elsewhere in this paper.
networks, an intricate knowledge of institutional relationships and tacit rules of political engagement, and a decades-long presence needed to take advantage of sporadic opportunities for agenda setting and to ensure long-term program success.” Political resources are domestic because accumulating such things as extensive personal contacts; lessons on institutional design, policy processes and political tactics; preparation to take advantage of fortuitous windows of agenda-setting opportunity; and formal and informal process expertise requires a long-term presence in a given nation-state (Steinberg 2003:19-21). Steinberg (2003) also mentions that they are domestic because in most nation-states there are “formidable legal and normative barriers against direct foreign involvement” in policy-making issue areas such as environment (or natural resources) (Steinberg 2003:19-21). The “national” resource included in the incubation Figure 10 above specifies conceptually what Steinberg merely implies: Such barriers to entry become resources to policy advocates and implementers who are deemed to be nationals in the informal social construction of citizenship identity and/or allegiance. What Steinberg (2001; 2003) designs as the pooling of “international” financial and scientific resources with “domestic” political resources alone is modified here as the pooling of financial and technical resources from actors outside the given nation-state(s) with political and nationalist resources from actors inside the said nation-state(s).

2.4.4. LOCAL ISSUE FRAMING

The process refers to the translation of global disputes through the use of localized and/or nationalized ideas and identities. It entails the mobilization of local and/or national symbols to define international conflicts. The process of local issue framing is supported by the idea of “translational linkages” in the work of Princen and
Princen and colleagues (1995:53) suggest that activists make linkages between the local and the global levels, “thus framing the issue as one that is not singularly local nor singularly global.” They argue that “with such NGO-constructed linkages, actors at all levels begin to realize and act on the interconnections and begin to understand the local in terms of the global and vice versa.” (Princen et al. 1995:53, emphasis added) In addition, inverting the “local” and the “global” in a definition for the process of “global issue framing” that Tarrow (2005) offers has led to a definition of ‘local issue framing.’ Accordingly, local issue framing is defined as the mounting of transnational disputes in local or national language through the mobilization of local or national symbols to frame transnational conflicts. A working model can be found in Figure 11 below, a model turning that of Tarrow’s (2005:63) “global issue framing” on its head and adding elements to it. The component mechanisms of the ‘local issue framing’ process that are not included in Tarrow’s counterpart process (“blocking”) or are not fully developed at the transnational level (“frame bridging” and “frame transformation”) are derived from the work of Hertel (2006), which conceptualizes “blocking” and “backdoor” moves as framing mechanisms.

*Figure 11: A Model of Local Issue Framing*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Outside-In Claim from Nation-State A</th>
<th>C. Communication and Convergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/ \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/ \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\ B. Blocking \ \ XXXXXX Nation-State B D. Frame(r) Bridging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\ F. Local Issue Framing \ E. Frame(r) Transformation &lt;—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|
3. Campaign to Protect Birds from Hunts for Women’s Wear, 1868-1941

During the nearly seventy years of the transnational campaign, primarily in the United Kingdom and United States, more than 200 million birds worldwide were killed annually for their feathers to decorate women’s hats, dresses and fans primarily in the West but also in other regions following Western fashions. The purpose of activists in the campaign was generally to proscribe women’s wear that was embellished with hunted bird feathers and to a lesser extent with other parts of hunted birds such as skins or whole bodies. Activists campaigned with the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in England and with “kindred Societies in Europe, America (North and South), India and other parts of the world.” (RSPB 1911:7) They testified that although “few parts of the world where birds of any commercial value exist[ed]… escaped” bird hunting for women’s fashion, the main “areas of destruction ha[d] been India, South America, especially Brazil and Venezuela; North America, especially Florida; China, Burmah, and New Guinea.” (RSPB 1911:7) In addition to the United Kingdom, United States and these numerous supplying nation-states, bird activists campaigned in places including but not limited to present-day Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Madagascar, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden and Tunisia (e.g., Doughty 1975:74-79, 121, 153-156; Spennemann 1998a; Boardman 2006:36-38; Duarte 2006:4-7).

As naturalist advocates clarified, “it is chiefly, if not solely, at the breeding-season that the most beautiful, and therefore the most valuable, feathers are developed in birds;” aggravating the danger of extinction for several of the species hunted in that “age
of extermination” or “extirpation.” (Doughty 1975:76-79, 121, 153-156; RSPB 1911:6-7, 46; see Price 1999:58-59, 88-89; Spennemann 2006) The activists who gathered and responded to these threats constructed them as a problem, and served as norm entrepreneurs who institutionalized the prevention of extinction as a transnational norm (see Keck & Sikkink 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Adams 2004). As a reflection of these norm dynamics, actors from the industry that revolved around hunted bird feathers—commonly known as ‘fancy feathers’ from ‘wild,’ common-pool bird species—began to hesitate in dismissing extinction as unimportant. They decreasingly resorted to framing extinction as an inevitable by-product of continued progress, and went to great lengths to deny that bird species hunted for plumage were rare or in danger of “extermination.” (Doughty 1975:87-88, 120; Price 1999:86, 90; see RSPB 1911:5; Anon. 1914a) The historiography estimates the use of at least 125 bird species on millinery—i.e. women’s hats (e.g., Doughty 1972:7). Birds sought by plumage hunters came to the verge of extinction even in Pacific islands as out of the reach of Western progress as were present-day Guam and numerous uninhabited atolls of the central Pacific Ocean (Spennemann 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2006; see Doughty 1975; Moore-Colyer 2000; see also Hornaday 1913a:117-120). Indeed, at the turn of the 20th century, from 1897 to 1914, “over 3.5 million seabirds were killed on islands in the central Pacific Ocean in the name of fashion for the millinery trade.” (Spennemann 1998a)

More presciently and closer to the West, the plumage production chain was based on a “post-Fordist” precursor that historically predated the “Fordist” model (on post-Fordism, see Amin 1994). In this network form of transnational production, “Paris and London supplied the bulk of both treated and untreated feather millinery imported into
the United States;” and only “fractional values of ornamental material came directly from such places as China, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina” or from “British, Dutch, French and German colonies.” (Doughty 1975:27-28, 153; see Swadling 1996; Spennemann 1998a) An estimated 80 percent of the bird feathers and skins that were shipped to the British isles from tropical U.K. colonies “was re-exported in the rough to France and Germany where it was processed into the fancy decorations required by milliners” before additional re-exporting (Moore-Colyer 2000:62). Moreover, a similarly complex form of transnational production prevailed in an older commodity chain that operated as variously a substitute or a complement to that of feathers from hunted birds: “When it became financially advantageous for the higher grades of ostrich plumes to be exported from the Sahara by parcel post and trans-Atlantic steam ship via Lagos [(Nigeria)], as it did after about 1907, the feathers were re-exported from London back to Tripoli [(Libya)] for processing.” (Stein 2007b; see Stein 2008:17) Facing an elusively networked supply chain, some anti-plumage activists were also prescient in their focus on Western consumption nodes instead of more resilient production nodes (Doughty 1975:4-5, 24, 123-124; Swadling 1996:17, 236, 263; Price 1999:91-97; Mason 2002:12; see Conca 2002). Along these lines, resilient producers killed activists who targeted U.S. production through service as private wardens with associations such as the Audubon Society in the enforcement of bird laws that their campaign had advocated (Price 2004; Doughty 1975:110-113, 154; Ossa 1973:49-52; see Wright & Dutcher 1906:34-35; Hornaday 1931:249).53

53 Three such murders are identified by these authors in U.S. bird conservation areas. Many more deaths associated with hunted bird fashions occurred as bird hunters perished in such places as the Amazon (Ossa 1973:47-49).
In keeping with the bird parts that decorated women’s hats and other wear, “bird hat” has become a conventional concise label for a campaign the “very strangeness” of which points to one reason why the contention “has not endured well in historical memory.” (Price 1999:57, 61-62; 2004; see Birdsall 2002) Nonetheless, plumage and stuffed birds also embellished dresses and fans; and “real flowers, sea mosses, leaves, grasses and medium-sized animals” too decorated women’s hats (Price 1999:82; see Doughty 1975; Boardman 2006:34; Duarte 2006:5).

In terms of the hats singled out in the campaign, post-1960s activism that has targeted fur coats to a greater extent than other fur fashion products offers a more recent historical analogue except for an important chronological caveat. This qualifying exception is that already by 1889 both bird hats and fur coats were being jointly addressed by U.K.-based activist groups such as the present-day Fauna & Flora International (FFI) or the Fur, Fin and Feather Folk—which eventually merged with the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (see McCormick 1989:4-5; Kastner 1994; Clarke 2004:9-10, 37-38).

Another caveat avoids a more fundamental anachronism in comprehending ‘hats’ across all the meanings attributed to them during the campaign, particularly in dimensions of gender that have since changed with the times.

“[F]ew topics evoked the nether definitions of womanhood [as “petty, ignorant, vain, selfish and thoughtless”] more effectively than hats: spring, summer, fall and winter hats, and morning, afternoon and evening hats. Walking and traveling

---

54 The stirring “bird hat” campaign label has become conventional due to activist framing mechanisms not unlike those which spin such labels as ‘for biodiversity’ out of ‘against unregulated extinction in either species or ecosystems,’ or which spin ‘for bioenergy’ out of ‘against the environmental degradation, financial drain or price instability of fossil fuels.’ (see Price 1999, 2004)

55 Incidentally, the “fin” on the name of the activist group Fur, Fin and Feather Folk probably referred to closely related and similarly transnational activism regarding the exploitation of penguins (king and crested) for oil and fire in Antarctica, itself a bioenergy (unprocessed) appearance in this biodiversity campaign case (see Boardman 2006:38; Croxall 1992:120; Page 1992:17; see also Dorsey 1995).
hats. Church, garden, mourning, golf and carriage hats. (…) In sum, the fact that bird hats were hats made them doubly evocative as a threat to the cause of moral womanhood. As the [activist] societies tapped into a volcanic dialogue about who women are, hats already had become a chief energy source in that conversation.” (Price 1999:74-77 with emphasis in original; see Doughty 1972:4-6)

This historical context in terms of feminine headgear, regardless of whether specifically bird hats, clarifies a scholar’s felicitous recognition of campaign mobilization in lending a new meaning to the expression “hats off to Audubon” civic groups (Price 2004).

As for birds, contemporary icons offer other historical analogues in terms of the tropical naturalism that cuts across the campaign against hunting for ‘exotic feather’ fashions. That the term ‘exotic’ was increasingly used to describe hunted or ‘fancy’ feathers, particularly in European polities, itself reflects the ever more tropical and sub-tropical origins of the bird parts supplied for feminine wear as the campaign evolved (see e.g., Haynes 1983; Moore-Colyer 2000:59-60). In the 1880s, “the ‘natural look’ stormed into women’s high fashion,” including women’s hats “piled so high with feathers, birds, fruit, flowers, furs and even mice and small reptiles that they seemed literally to match the hat’s metaphoric size as a target.” (Price 1999:76, 82) Not unlike the present time, “in an era of rapid social and economic change and mobility, the use of Nature to set human standards was becoming a powerful hallmark of modern thinking.” (Price 1999:76, 82; see Doughty 1972) As late as today, a female artist (Carmen Miranda) who wore tropical fruits on her hats during the decline of bird hat fashion at the end of the campaign remains the basis of a famous banana business logo (Chiquita); and the natural looks of low-density accommodations, sport utility vehicles or outdoor products themselves negatively impact resources and environments.
The bird hat campaign, which occurred in synchrony with women’s movements for voting enfranchisement and economic equity, evidently reflected a strong gender dimension—albeit one perhaps not as self-evident as the contention’s biodiversity facet of variety in (bird) species. Historians who examine the campaign reach discerning conclusions with regard to this gender layer across a transnational contention that epitomizes ecofeminist conceptual ties between oppression of women and oppression of the environment.

Each of two historians interprets a distinct piece of publicized campaigning—a magazine’s editorialized cartoon in the United States and a published essay in the United Kingdom—that amounts to a somewhat non-essentializing variant of ecofeminist commentary on fashion’s oppression of both avian species and women (Birdsall 2002:36, 39, 68; Abbott 1995:278). Understood in terms tantamount to such ecofeminism, an illustrative cartoon portrays the caption’s “slaughter of the innocent birds” as well as a caricatured “woman’s expression [that] makes it look as if she too was oppressed by her [large bird] hat.” (Birdsall 2002:36, 39; see Scarborough 2009:91-92). Interpreted in terms that fall in line with the same ecofeminism, an essay in which Virginia Woolf wrote “The Plumage Bill” as a residual “champion of birds” self-declaredly merged “anti-plumage argument with ‘an outburst of sex antagonism,’” marking “the first feminist statement of the early twentieth century’s most eloquent and influential ‘champion of women.’” (Abbott 1995:278 quoting Woolf)

56 Inasmuch as “Woolf emphatically defends women against being blamed for the predation and near extinction of some bird species for millinery purposes… [her] position is a distinctly ecofeminist one, pointing the blame for environmental destruction on the male-dominated institutions behind an industry aimed at exploiting women’s socially induced desire to be attractive to men.” (Walker 2001:154; see Birdsall 2002:61-62)
However, each of these historians highlights a remnant of essentialism at the
gender-ecology nexus; a tinge that obscures another sort of ecofeminist oppression in the
commentary of the occasional campaigner which each considers. This other oppression
of females and the environment stems not from hunted bird fashion’s degradation of both
women and ecology. Instead, it springs from a post-plumage fashion’s environmentalist
mitigation through further subordination of female workers within the industry in
feminine wear from hunted birds. In the words of one historian, “while some women
found notions of ‘fashion’ confining and oppressive, for others the fields of dressmaking
and millinery offered new opportunities” to the extent\(^\text{57}\) that the female-staffed “fashion
industry gave women autonomy in many of the same ways as the [women’s] club
movement.” (Birdsall 2002:55; see Gamber 1997; Stein 2008) In the words of the other
historical scholar, “women as workers or artists who produce or create hats and millinery
is a point missed by the class-bound Woolf, or intentionally ignored so Woolf could
focus on the ‘male producers’ and ‘profiteers’ in the plumage trade and in patriarchal
society as a whole.” (Abbott 1995:274)

Two other historians note conflict between more essentializing definitions of
‘woman’ and the symbolic aspects of the ways in which birds were hunted and displayed
on feminine attire:

\(^{57}\) Child labor, low wages and lethal working conditions limited the extent of this liberation that feathered
millinery and dressmaking offered to women workers. To work in these industries young girls had to forgo
additional education and older working women in particular incurred other opportunity costs associated
with their low wages. Females in each age group also incurred dangerous health risks of tuberculosis and
mercury-poisoning, which inspired the expression ‘mad as a hatter.’ Both risks threatened workers through
their respiratory systems as feather particles and mercury fumes—used in the felting of bird feathers and
skins—added to the exposure to indoor air pollution that was also common in other Western industries at
the time. These very limitations would presumably figure among the motivations that mobilized labor
groups such as the French-based Society for Paternal Assistance to the Children Employees in the Flower
and Feather Industries (La Société pour l’Assistance Paternelle des Enfants Employés dans les Industries
des Fleurs et Plumes) to liberate themselves through a different sort of women’s movement during the
campaign (see e.g., Grant 1969; Doughty 1975:55; Stein 2008).
“The conspicuous numbers of birds and their parts seen along the sidewalks of fashionable quarters angered many people because the motives for using them appeared to be paltry and inexcusable. The sight of a white tern affixed to the crown of a lady’s hat made patently clear to some that mankind had not merely betrayed his dominion over creatures, but had done so with gusto and with an eye only for immediate gain.” (Doughty 1975:56, 64, 156; see Riley 1998; see also RSPB 1911:46)

“The separate-spheres [gender] code had always made space for women in two directions from men’s sphere: Above and Below. If women and men were different, exactly how was a matter for contestment, and the same disengagement from the public pursuits of business and politics that made women natural guardians of morality could also render them… petty, ignorant, vain, selfish and thoughtless. (…) The definition of Woman as the keeper of morality made this one [bird-hat] issue resonate at a higher volume than any other. (…) Club women [in the “Woman Club movement” subset of the larger women’s movement] meant to exalt and deploy the moral side of womanhood, but also to make the petty side obsolete. (…) Scientists, club women, sportsmen, nature writers and humane activists… split divisively over the meanings of birds and nature but unified around the deeply meaningful definitions of who women are. And no aspect of the feather trade dramatized these meanings more flawlessly or vividly than the raids in south Florida on the snowy egret rookeries… The egret plumes, which women’s hats had featured in abundance since the 1880s, were the long, soft, beautifully white dorsal mating feathers that male and female egrets grow only in the spring breeding season. The plume hunters raided the nesting colonies soon after the eggs hatched, when the parent egrets’ refusal to abandon their nests made the adults effortless to shoot. (…) That women—the very upholders of civilization—wore the hats made [the bird hats] of course particularly objectionable. (…) What… early conservation advocates all agreed on, really, was that it was wrong for higher-class women of superior morals to let lower-class men kill mother egrets, particularly for [women] mothers and by taking advantage of maternal instincts, and especially if the baby birds were left to starve. That was a powerful cause to rally around…” (Price 1999:61-101; 2004; see Doughty 1972:7; 1975:65; Gates 1998:114-124; Birdsall 2002:41-42; Scarborough 2009:86-89)

Altogether the titles of these historical, gender studies of the bird hat campaign would combine into a telling string of “feather fashions,” “woman’s nature” and “bird preservation” “when women were women, men were men, and birds were hats.”

(Doughty 1975; Price 1999; Birdsall 2002; see Abbott 1995; Mason 2002; Merchant 2010)
The bird hat campaign features some continuity between biodiversity campaigns that predate and lag behind it. At least one actor who had participated in the Abolitionist Amazon campaign also took part in the ecofeminist campaign. Elizabeth Agassiz had collaborated with her husband Louis Agassiz and his fellow campaigners in an expedition to the Amazon that proved to be decisive for the earlier contention, and went on to become a vice-president of the Audubon Society at the U.S. State of Massachusetts over the course of the bird hat campaign (Merchant 1984:70; Birdsall 2002:34-36; Mason 2002:10). In relation to the earlier Luso-Brazilian Annihilation campaign, the ecofeminist contention portrays a legacy inherited from physiocratic advocates that contrasts with a conventional wisdom positing discontinuity in such advocacy and analysis over the past two centuries, from classical political economists to contemporary ecological economists (see Daly 1996:4, 73; Pádua 2002). In this vein, it is worth quoting at length the testimony of a leading advocate based in Brazil, Emilio Goeldi, during 1895-1896:

“I do not desire to proclaim a supposed and theoretical utility that predominates in the herons. (...) But, besides the fish that they devour, they likewise seek innumerable other river- and lake-animals, both living and dead, and... produce a beneficent effect in cleansing the adjacent lands,—serving thus as a voluntary health department. The abundance of fish... at the mouth of the Amazon [River] is, moreover, so great that there is no necessity for driving away... the herons from the hospitable board which opulent nature has spread out before them.

Seeing that... the graceful herons in the Amazon Valley are, from a purely utilitarian view-point, so to speak, neutral... my reasons for condemning the excessive warfare [of bird hunting for millinery] are predominantly on the esthetic and humanitarian side.

(...) The senseless heron-hunting is not only a violence wreaked on nature but, at the same time, an indescribable squandering of a sacred and inviolable patrimony. To man has ever been, and still is accorded the right to a wise use of what we might call the ‘profits’ of nature’s treasures, but never the annihilation of the capital itself. If the present generation destroy (sic) brutally the legacy received
intact from previous generations, it renders itself liable to the reproach of the future.” (Goeldi 1902:5-6, 14; see Doughty 1975:58-63, 90-91)

The same advocate would appear indirectly but centrally in the Amazonian campaign at the turn of the 1950s. He would be represented through the formative influence that the museum soon renamed after him would have on the institute around which the later campaign revolved.

3.1. BRAZIL IN THE CAMPAIGN

This brief section demonstrates how the ecofeminist campaign fulfills the case-selection criteria of this study, particularly highlighting that actors based in Brazil participated in the struggle over bird hats. Whereas the inclusion of biodiversity issues in activist deed and discourse is self-evident in this contention, which centered on variety of bird species, there is also substantial empirical evidence that Brazilian territory hosted actors who were involved in the campaign.

In addition to the aforementioned involvement of Goeldi, subsequent sections of this chapter demonstrate that there were numerous other campaign participants located in Brazil. These actors included at least the Animal Protective Society of Brazil, a German expatriate, the Brazilian Zoological Club, a colleague of Goeldi’s at the museum where both men worked, the Fish and Game Club, and the State government of Pará (see Duarte 2006:4, 9-11).

The process-tracing sections of the chapter also show that the bird hat struggle satisfies the spirit as well as the letter of the geographical case-selection criterion. As a supplement to the minimal threshold for the selection of the campaign into this case chapter on the basis of Brazil-based participants, both activists and business interest groups located outside of Brazil frequently addressed the polity as part of their discourse
on the ecofeminist conflict. When a bird advocate in the United Kingdom issued the
most immediate call for the formation of activist groups such as the RSPB in the 1880s,
he explicitly mobilized birds hunted in places including Brazil. While Audubon Societies
at various U.S. States discussed whether or not to collectively reconcile themselves with
millinery industry groups in 1900, a leading Audubon activist shored up her position
against the truce by drawing a picture of a hypothetical scenario that revolved around
birds hunted in Brazil. As an advocate affiliated with two activist groups—among which
was the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS)—orchestrated what proved to
be the main impetus for the U.S. government to legislate a ban on fashion-related imports
of hunted bird parts in 1913, he further specified hummingbirds hunted in Brazil and
relied on the advocacy of Goeldi in the same territory decades earlier.58 Besides invoking
the polity, campaigning activists evoked Brazil through countless implicit mentions under
such regional rubrics as ‘the Amazon’ or ‘South America.’ For example, the discourse of
a one-time ecofeminist campaigner who asked her audience to “imagine a blazing South
American landscape” was suggestive of the political territory named after the ember-

58 The U.S.-based champion of bird species buttressed his advocacy of import bans through his own press-
mediated recruitment of reinforcement from Goeldi’s activism in Brazil two decades earlier: “[F]rom Prof.
E. A. Goeldi, of the State Museum Goeldi, Para, Brazil, have come bitter complaints of the slaughter of
scarlet ibises in South America by plume-hunters in (sic) European pay. I know not how other naturalists
regard the future of the... species named above, but my opinion is that unless the European feather trade is
quickly stopped as to wild plumage, they are absolutely certain to be shot into total oblivion, within a very
few years.” (Hornaday 1913a:20, 26, 117-122, 128-129; see Underwood 1913:5307-5327) Bird species
exported from Brazil for use in women’s wear went well beyond the hummingbirds, scarlet or red ibises,
and herons spelled out elsewhere in this chapter. These species were among those most highly exported by
Brazil-based suppliers into global commodity chains. For example, a single supplier in Brazil exported
20,000 annual skins of humming birds to France. Yet, legal exports—which amount to approximate
fractions of total figures—rank the identified species at the highest export levels alongside rheas, parrots,
parakeets, macaws, euphonious finches, toucans and rallidae (Duarte 2006:7; see Schindler 2001:1090,
1097; see also Hornaday 1913a:117-122). The official records are also mere approximations due to
misnamed species, as in the jabiru stork that was often categorized as albatross (RSPB 1911:27; Hornaday
1913:120, 123; Underwood 1913:5316).
repeatedly acclaimed advocacy within Brazil, businesses in hunted bird fashions on both sides of the North Atlantic themselves extolled Brazil-based farmers for their ostensible breeding of non-domesticated birds used in women’s wear. In short, even where based outside of Brazil, activist groups and their campaign opponents addressed the polity’s actors and objects in their discourse during every major phase of the bird hat struggle.

3.2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CAMPAIGN

This section offers a comprehensive chronicle of the campaign, summarizing salient events in the chronological order that they occurred during the ecofeminist contention as a whole. The events listed in the timeline on Table 3 below mark major episodes of transnational activism not only within this case study, but also beyond it. In addition to serving as moments that combine into an evolving synopsis of the campaign, they also constitute milestones in the longer term evolution of transnational activism over campaign sequels from one era to the next.

Three examples, which follow in the temporal order of their occurrence, serve to highlight these defining moments for the bird hat campaign and for campaign sequels over the ages. First, when U.S.-based Audubon advocates promoted White Lists that labeled businesses where conscious consumers could buy Audubonets certified to include no plumage from hunted birds, they crossed a campaign marker of consolidation in their consumer recruitment even as they transplanted from women’s activism a mode of cause-oriented action new to transnational species-protective campaigns. Second, when campaigners based in the United States and the United Kingdom prevailed in their

59 Whereas U.K.-based mobilization of Goeldi’s advocacy is traced elsewhere in this chapter, the U.S. equivalent is only briefly illustrated here, in the preceding footnote.
advocacy for U.S. and U.K. policies that “banned imports of endangered species as a means of thwarting this deleterious traffic” they took a decisive turn in their campaign even as they turned their struggle into “one of the first” campaigns to have accomplished such a “striking” use of trade measures (Charnovitz 1998a; 1998b:341). In a third and final example, bird protective groups on both shores of the North Atlantic consolidated a section of the International Ornithologists’ Committee—the present-day International Ornithologists’ Union—into the stand-alone International Committee for Bird Protection (ICBP) that has evolved into the present-day Birdlife International. With this action, they not only brought into fruition a long-held campaign aspiration, but also consolidated “the first global environmental NGO” and the civic group which “wrote the playbook that guides numerous contemporary international environmental NGOs” insofar as the ICBP “pioneered” modes of transnational environmental activism still “valid” in the campaigns of “today.” (Charnovitz 1998b:338, 341)

Set against the background of these longer term campaign eras, the transnational ecofeminist campaign began in 1868 with an advocacy effort that continued into the 1880s. Over that time the Association for the Protection of Sea Birds and its allies—chiefly the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and a member of the British Ornithologists’ Union (BOU)—prodded the U.K. parliament into passing a series of bills that protected coastal birds within the British Isles. Domestic as this legislative advocacy may have initially been, it set off effects abroad insofar as with the advent of the laws the hunting stage of plumage production simply relocated to (sub)tropical havens not only in U.K. colonies but also in non-U.K. polities. The U.K. territory would only be the location of a campaign milestone again after nearly two decades.
Table 3: Case Timeline (see Doughty 1975:106-108, 118-120, 157-158; RSPB 1913c:98-101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>U.K. British Isles</td>
<td>Association for the Protection of Sea Birds led a campaign to protect seabirds from hunts to supply avian beautification to women’s wear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>American Ornithologists’ Union (AOU) established a Committee for the Protection of North American Birds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>U.K. British Isles</td>
<td>Anti-plumage activists organized into the Plumage League wherein they pledged not to wear plumage from hunted birds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Advocates formed Audubon Society for the Protection of Birds wherein members pledged not to wear hunted birds’ plumage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Audubon Society for the Protection of Birds disintegrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>U.K. British Isles</td>
<td>Anti-plumage activists formed the Society for the Protection of Birds ((R)SPB) wherein they pledged not to wear hunted bird parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Audubon Societies revived as decentralized confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>United Kingdom and elsewhere</td>
<td>(R)SPB expanded into 152 branches reaching such locations as Germany and the United States as well as U.K. Australia, U.K. India, U.K. Shanghai in China and U.K. Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Audubon Societies disseminated White Lists labeling businesses that sold Audubonnets certified to include no hunted plumage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Brazil, U.K. India</td>
<td>Restrictions to exports of hunted plumage advocated and/or enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>First AOU-Audubon agreement with bird-millinery interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circa</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary and Germany</td>
<td>Anti-plumage advocates assembled an International League for the Protection of Birds pledging not to wear any parts of hunted birds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>By this year bird protective advocates had urged 33 U.S. States into passing anti-plumage laws that generally followed an AOU Model Law so much as to include all AOU clauses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>U.K. British Isles</td>
<td>U.K. Parliament first considered a bill aimed at restricting fashion-related imports of hunted birds’ plumage into the British Isles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Worldwide from U.K. Australia and British Isles</td>
<td>U.K.-based (R)SPB and Royal Colonial Institute (RCI) amassed photos of a nest before and after plumage hunters visited the birds; framed them as “The Story of the Egret;” and disseminated them domestically and abroad in such polities as Brazil, France, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>U.S. government banned imports of bird parts for women’s wear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany</td>
<td>Advocacy groups such as the former Plumage League agreed with interest groups in plumage fashion to reconcile into a Committee for the Economic Preservation of Birds to restrict use of hunted species</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>(R)SPB-RCI ally with Ostrich Farmers’ Association of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Government did not attend a world anti-plumage conference, expecting or alleging protest from plumasier labor unions if it had</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>United States and France</td>
<td>Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund began to assist the League for the Protection of Birds (Ligue de Protection des Oiseaux)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>U.K. British Isles</td>
<td>U.K. Parliament passed a restricting Importation of Plumage Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Worldwide from North Atlantic polities</td>
<td>Activists in European and North American polities consolidated a section of the International Ornithologists’ Union into the International Committee for Bird Protection or BirdLife International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Worldwide from the Netherlands</td>
<td>Netherlands Committee for International Nature Protection transnationalized into International Office for the Protection of Nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the United States, during the mid-1880s the American Ornithologists’ Union (AOU) established a Committee for the Protection of North American Birds, and a clique of sport hunters organized an Audubon Society for the Protection of Birds in which membership pledges proscribed the wearing of any hunted birds. The AOU Committee survived its infancy, but the original Audubon association folded by the late 1880s as member subscriptions did not suffice to cover its centralized expenditures.

During the second half of the 1880s in the United Kingdom advocates of bright-colored, (sub)tropical birds founded two activist organizations that went on to spend their first 20 years mainly as self-described “anti-plumage-wearing” groups (RSPB 1913c:98-100). This period lasted until the turn of the 20th century. At that point the two groups would presumably inspire or engage with a parallel mode of transnational activism on the part of a similarly named association that emerged in Germany and eventually expanded into a transboundary organization based in both Austria-Hungary and Germany: the League for Bird Protection (BfV, for Bund für Vogelschutz) founded during 1899 that evolved into the International League for the Protection of Birds approximately in 1904.

The older U.K.-based groups, the Plumage League and the Society for the Protection of Birds (SPB), both largely individualized their cause-oriented action through institutional membership pledges in which to be admitted into the groups each joining consumer was expected to vow abstinence from bird parts in her demand for women’s wear. In an age when nearly all of the modest social mobility and stability that was afforded to Western women hinged on their prospects of attracting men, which in turn depended to varying degrees on such artifices as women’s wear, far from merely expressive this abstinent
commitment was a risky act of high-stakes resistance for females. Virginia Woolf addressed that burden of women’s agency in placing the irresponsibility of feathered fashion onto men whose attraction to bird feathers she associated with bestiality. In her own words, “it is one thing to desire a woman; quite another to desire an egret plume.” (Woolf 1995[1920]:288) In other words, because women were not able to simply disregard men or determine what men perceived to be attractive, men should have been the ones who pledged to “control” or be “protected” “from their passion” so as to spare birds from women’s wear (Woolf 1995[1920]:288; see Walker 2001:154; Birdsall 2002:61-62). The early trend and exceptionally high stakes of women’s pledged commitments is also revealed in the comment of a woman who had campaigned transnationally against the wearing of (sub)tropical plumage since the 1870s and who had lost morale by 1897. She “had largely given up the struggle after twenty years, being ‘forced to the conclusion that where fashion is concerned, the world of women are utterly and entirely callous and blind to every consideration excepting their own selfish vanity.’” (Moore-Colyer 2000:59) A year later, as of 1898, the SPB’s pursuit of consumer recruitment had expanded it into 152 branches throughout the United Kingdom and as far beyond it as Germany.

Over in the United States, during 1896 cause-oriented females in women’s clubs cliques revived the Audubon into decentralized associations that for at least their first five years campaigned through similar modes of transnational activism in close synchrony

---

60 Indeed, various bird parts on women’s “hats were associated with different personalities: …wings would denote sentimental women, full of flights [of fancy]; plumes would be right for extremely delicate women, and so forth.” (my translation of Duarte 2006:5) A similar association pertained to diverse bird species. For example, a woman whose action was not cause-oriented could “impute to herself the fragile beauty of the bird of paradise she wore on her hat.” (Doughty 1972:11) By wearing a bird a non-activist woman could “attribut[e] to herself some of the qualities of the animals she [would] wea[r].” (Doughty 1972:11)
with those of their U.K. counterparts. The organizers of the Audubon Societies spelled out the purpose of their societies from their very earliest meetings: “to discourage buying and wearing for ornamental purposes the feathers of any wild birds and to otherwise further the protection of our native birds.” (quote in Birdsall 2002:34-36; see Mason 2002:1) During their new beginning, the organizations focused on bird hats, directed their advocacy at the women wearers of such hats, and placed greater emphasis on hunted millinery consumption than production. The motto of the Audubon Societies from the late 1890s until at least the 1920s amalgamated this fashion focus, female target and demand side along the bird commodity chain. The organizational byword, which was printed on the cover of every issue of the Audubon newsletter during this period, recast a multicontinental proverb under two nuanced varieties of a reversal on conventional species valuations: ‘a bird in the bush is worth two in the hat’ or ‘a bird in the bush is worth two in the hand.’ (see Blanchan 1904:342-343; Orr 1992:74; Mason 2002:8)

Reflecting back on this period, an Audubon campaign collaborator who edited a sympathetic women’s magazine in effect even echoed his demoralized U.K.-based equivalents. He commented on a tendency for any bodily “ornament of beauty” that attracted men’s attention to consistently subject mothering women to take exception to their usual common cause with the mother bird (quote in Birdsall 2002:65-68).

At their most reevaluative turns these efforts of the U.S.-based Audubon Societies and their U.K.-based counterparts raised a tension with a conventional (feminine) sense of wonder in awe with birds, among other entities; and generated resistance to the Weberian iron cage of (masculine) rationality that disenchants the world of birds and beyond. In 1900 another women’s fashion magazine that collaborated with anti-plumage
activists reprimanded the Audubon Societies for disseminating scientific information that had placed an economic value on birds, and expressed surprise that a newspaper had publicized the species reevaluation:

“Alas! It has come to this—we are instructed in the economic value of birds. The Audubon Society has prepared statistics which such an intellectual medium as the New York Evening Post is circulating, demonstrating that birds render... a profitable service in preventing the undue increase of insects, in devouring small rodents, in destroying the sea of harmful plants—in a word, by acting as scavengers... The time is ripe now for science to demonstrate the economic value of moonbeams and rainbows.” (quote in Scarborough 2009:88-89; see Dominick 1986:268-269)

From the opposite viewpoint, while in the late 1880s and 1890s the campaigning BOU member—who was also a professor of ornithological zoology at the University of Cambridge—collaborated with the activist efforts of the Plumage League and SPB in the United Kingdom, he did so with reservations about their similar resistance to rationalism. He “supported these efforts... even if he did not always appreciate the frantic tone of letters to newspapers about ‘bird murder.’” (Haynes 1983:26)

The advocating editor in the United States went through a change that is representative of the experience of bird protective groups worldwide during the first few years of the 20th century (Birdsall 2002:65-68). He came to see appeals to women as ineffective efforts that targeted structural gender subordinates who had to outshine or at least “match the other women” in a spiraling race “to attract the male.” (quote in Birdsall 2002:65-68) As the campaigning journalist increasingly believed “that attracting male attention was the primary goal of female adornment, and women would do anything to be beautiful,” he became “convinced that appealing to men and the law was the way to achieve real results.” (Birdsall 2002:65-68)
That general trend in transnational activism marks the most fundamental transformation of agency in the evolution of the multicontinental ecofeminist campaign. Women’s political-electoral disenfranchisement had initially steered female activists to carry the brunt of the campaign into the arena of a marketplace where they had some agency to vote with their money. However, women’s socioeconomic subordination gradually guided activists of all genders to hedge the contention underneath the dome of the state and no longer rely almost exclusively on women’s oppressed, objectified agency.

In 1901 the Audubon Societies carried out a business labeling and product certification initiative that marks this major turning point for the campaign not only in the United States but also worldwide. At that point the Audubon disseminated White Lists labeling businesses that supplied hats certified to be ornithologically responsible—without plumage from hunted birds—such as the Audubonnets, which flaunted the legitimacy that the civic group conferred in their very names. Like its U.K. counterparts, the U.S.-based civic group simultaneously broadened its advocacy to become more inclusive of other modes of transnational activism based on the recognition that “they would also have to fight for legislation that prohibited the use of birds in millinery.” (Scarborough 2009:60-61, 78-79) Three examples suffice to show that the new turn in modes of transnational activism did not result in a rupture for the older direction. First, the major event of a photographic essay that the U.K.-based SPB and other bird protective groups disseminated around the world ten years later in 1911 still focused largely on informing women of the production methods used in the making of feathered women’s wear. Second, Audubon activists certified hats with the legitimacy of their
organization imprinted on the products’ names as late as the mid-1910s. Third, Audubon campaigners maintained their organizational motto on their newsletter until at least 1921.

The new center of gravity among modes of transnational activism in the bird hat campaign was immediately visible in the United Kingdom and Brazil. Already in 1902 the government of U.K. India instituted a restriction to exports of hunted plumage that the SPB and collaborating civic groups advocated. In synchrony with the campaining of another expatriate based in Brazil, an honorary member of the BOU who had advocated a similar restriction to a State government in Amazonian Brazil during the mid-1890s publicized his advocacy to non-Brazilian audiences during the same year.

The campaigning trend in the United States was equally noticeable. From 1900 to 1905, Audubon and AOU Committee activists intensified their urging that the U.S. federal and State governments protect birds within the United States from hunts for women’s wear. Whereas in 1900 only seven U.S. States had enacted such avian measures and a federal act was instituted during this year to minimize loopholes related to disparities in the laws of different States, by 1905 bird advocacy had partaken in raising the number of U.S. States to 33 and in better implementing the federal law. As had been the case in the United Kingdom two decades earlier, although initially domestic this legislative advocacy set off transnational effects insofar as with the advent of the laws the hunting stage of plumage production relocated to (sub)tropical havens outside the United States. As would be the case for U.K.-based activists a decade later, in this context during 1903 the AOU Committee and the Audubon Societies of a dozen U.S. States agreed with interest groups of the industry in hunted bird fashions to reconcile into a 3-year truce that was directly transnational. The reconciliation of U.S.-based bird
advocates, which was neither the first attempt nor the last materialization in the campaign,\(^{61}\) bargained a moratorium on fashion-related imports of certain hunted bird species as compensation for demobilization of advocacy that supported federal or State government restrictions to said imports of other species. By 1913, four years after a more localized 3-year renewal of the agreement ended, activists did spur the federal U.S. government to enact a ban on imports of bird parts—from any hunted species—for women’s wear.

A similar ban on imports into the United Kingdom became a central agenda item in the advocacy repertoire of anti-plumage activists based in that polity for over a dozen years, from 1908 to 1921. In the most salient moments within this campaign period at the polity, bird protective groups prodded the U.K. parliament to first deliberate such a bill in 1908; then to nearly enact it between 1913 and 1914; and finally to pass a weaker variant of the legislation during 1921. As had been the case for U.S.-based activists a decade earlier, in this U.K. context between 1913 and 1914 advocacy groups—including the preservationist association into which the Plumage League had merged—agreed with interest groups of the industry in hunted bird fashions to reconcile into a truce that was equally transnational. The reconciliation institutionalized itself as the Committee for the Economic Preservation of Birds (CEPB) in the United Kingdom and extended its operations into Austria-Hungary, France and Germany through the reach of bird commodity chains. However, it did not manage to recruit advocacy groups where it attempted to institutionalize a replica through a similarly named organization in France. In common with earlier U.S.-based counterparts, the CEPB also bargained a moratorium

\(^{61}\) The reconciliation had been attempted three years earlier. It went on to be renewed for another 3-year term in one State and to be repeated later in at least three other variants.
on fashion-related imports of certain hunted bird species as compensation for
demobilization of advocacy that supported governmental restrictions to said imports of
other species. Meanwhile, in the first of two attempts by other advocacy groups—
including the former SPB, which had since 1904 received the status of ‘Royal’ and begun
to append this title as a prefix to its name, thereby becoming the RSPB—they struck their
own reconciliation with interest groups of the ostrich farming industry in U.K. South
Africa. The RSPB and another advocacy group managed to converge with the industry in
their legislative advocacy during the mid-1910s, in synchrony with a similar convergence
that was instrumental in the passage of the 1913 legislation in the United States.
However, by the U.K. parliamentary deliberations of the early 1920s the industry at the
Cape was no longer interested in reconciling with the RSPB and its advocacy
collaborator. Instead, at least one spokesperson of ostrich interest groups at U.K. South
Africa lent the weight of that farming industry to the CEPB reconciliation that was left as
the major influence on the weaker bill that U.K. lawmakers ended up enacting.

When the U.K. parliament nearly instituted restrictions on imports of bird parts
for women’s wear it also came close to convening a world conference devoted to the
international aspects of fashionable bird hunting, but the French government faced a
countervailing pull of domestic plumassier unions that prevailed in the Parisian
government’s decision not to attend—and thereby derail—the meeting in 1914. The
government of France expected or at least rationalized that plumassier unions based in
the polity would protest against their government if French envoys attended the
diplomatic conference. At the prospective international meeting the U.K. government
was expected—based on projections of signals in the conditions stipulated for attendance
in the invitation from U.K. diplomats—to pressure its counterparts to level their regulatory standards for plumage exports and imports respectively with those restrictions in U.K. India and the United States. In synchrony with this period of the ecofeminist campaign, the French-based labor unions of plumassiers based in the polity threatened to protest against their government if the facilities or officials of their state were involved with another transnational meeting. The coincidental occasion was an award ceremony where two bird advocacy groups based in France—including the League for the Protection of Birds (LPO, for *Ligue de Protection des Oiseaux*)—recognized a U.S.-based activist who had recently played a major part in spurring the passage of the U.S. import ban in 1913.

Earlier and more formally than groups based in the United Kingdom, during 1918 U.S.-based groups led by the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund (PWLPF) began to intensify their assistance to bird advocacy groups located in other polities. In that year the PWLPF started to assist the LPO while recognizing that the latter had endured a hostile France-based atmosphere and World War I with sufficient commitment to have been one of the advocacy groups which refused to compromise into a French equivalent to the CEPB. The PWLPF offered substantial support to the LPO for 11 years. In and around this period, the PWLPF and U.S.-based collaborators such as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) went on to assist bird advocacy groups in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

In a final period of the bird hat campaign, anti-plumage activists organized two worldwide advocacy associations, consolidating one in 1923 and transnationalizing another in 1934. The International Committee for Bird Protection (ICBP) and the
International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN) emerged as multicontinental avian associations more than two dozen years after the U.K.-based (R)SPB and Germany-based BfV had expanded into transnational civic groups. The ICBP facilitated the formation of the IOPN through direct influence on an early participant in the former group who went on to transfer lessons he learned from this experience when he formed the latter organization.

It is doubly fitting for the very name of the ICBP—which was more explicit than the IOPN about its avian forte—to have intermittently evolved into that of the present-day BirdLife International (BI). On the one hand, compared to the old name the new designation still echoes one of the earliest advocacy groups in the ecofeminist campaign: the short-lived Association for the Protection of Bird Life (Verein zum Schutz der Vogelwelt) established in Germany during 1875, at most about a dozen years after the emergence of the U.K.-based Association for the Protection of Sea Birds that resonated in the old name. On the other hand, only the current name echoes that of the equally antecedent labor groups known as the First and Second Internationals—respectively, the International Working Men’s Association and the International Association of the Working Man or the International Socialist Bureau (see Chatfield 1997:35; Nimtz 2002). Since labor associations and business interest groups had long been organized transnationally, a leading bird advocate “copied their two-level organizations” and designed the ICBP/BI with a “dual structure” that arranged for the multicontinental activist group “to operate at different levels of governance.” (Charnovitz 1998b:340) The ICBP “consisted of delegates nominated by bird protection societies in various
countries,” and “met in conference every few years.” (Charnovitz 1998b:338) To take only the ICBP’s legal advocacy as a(n) (statist) example of its dual institutional design:

“...The international NGO would lobby intergovernmental organizations and governments collectively...[,] focused on the need for international cooperation and international law. (...) The [ICBP’s] national sections would work at home to push their governments... [toward] better domestic regulations and enforcement. (...) In other words, it was the classic squeeze play.” (Charnovitz 1998b:339, 340, 341)

If the ICBP replicated the repertoire of transnational labor activism, a (societal) specification of its multicontinental conferences shows that it also distinguished itself through an institutional innovation: “Although it was an advocacy organization, the ICBP maintained its links to scientists, often by holding its conferences at the same time and place as an international scientific meeting.” (Charnovitz 1998b:341)

3.3. GLOBAL ISSUE FRAMING

The process of global issue framing captures three episodes in the ecofeminist campaign. The first instance occurred over the first dozen years of the 20th century when U.K.-based campaigners mobilized symbols from tropical and subtropical locations outside the United Kingdom to frame domestic disputes that revolved around both U.K. colonies and imports into the British Isles. As bird advocates globalized their framing from the U.K. to the non-U.K. tropics and sub-tropics during this approximate period, they continued a frame extension that they had previously carried out from an earlier focal point of confrontation restricted to the British Isles toward frontlines spread farther across the U.K. empire. Bird conservationists framed their cause through foreign-based symbols that amounted to ecosystem services stemming from birds toward agriculture and public health. Among the examples which campaigners offered of ecological controls that birds provided through their role as predators in balanced food chains the
conservationists mobilized claims from outside the disputed U.K. turf, “stressing the
dangers of the long-term damage likely to result when the natural predators of insect
pests were destroyed.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:68-69)

Among other illustrations drawn from U.K. colonies and to a lesser extent polities
elsewhere in the tropical and sub-tropical world, bird conservationists in the United
Kingdom framed with the following appeals to the self-interest of agricultural, food
industries:

“Where insectivorous birds were regularly killed or captured, farming was
virtually impossible in many parts of Egypt, while ibises, spoonbills, and cranes
in Australia and locust birds in South Africa maintained populations of ravenous
grasshoppers at tolerable levels. In Jamaica, moreover, so great had been the
destruction of local bird life that the concomitant explosion in grass tick numbers
meant that cattle keeping had been abandoned throughout much of the island. (…) The slaughter of egrets along the Yangtze River by German plumage hunters had
caused widespread resentment among Chinese peasants where paddy fields had
suffered accordingly from greatly increased levels of insect damage.” (Moore-

In an illustrative event, one bird campaigner whose economic framing reached as far into
the non-U.K. subtropics as Russia framed with reference to U.K. Australia: “[T]he work
performed annually by the wild birds in keeping in check the ravages of myriads of
noxious insects was worth many millions of pounds sterling;” “[w]ere the birds
destroyed, Nature would become unbalanced, and successful agriculture become
impossible.” (Buckland as quoted in Pearson 1912:320-322; see Anon. 1914b:485-486)

In another illustrative framing, the RSPB publicized with regard to the southern United
States: “The greatest of all hunting-grounds for the White Egret... was formerly Florida.
The birds existed in millions; they were practically extirpated by the plume-hunters… At
the present time the food-crops of Florida and Georgia, Carolina and Louisiana, and other
States, are suffering every year for want of the insect-eating herons.” (RSPB 1913b:81)
Finally, the association went on to add the universal, all-encompassing claim that
“science with its insecticides and fumigations, expensive and troublesome as these may be, cannot compete with the hungry beak of the sharp-eyed bird.” (RSPB 1915a:92)

In the same vein, U.K.-based bird advocates justified avian conservation in the name of infectious disease prevention, as illustrated by their own allusions to the transmission of malaria and sleeping sickness through vectors such as the tsetse fly at U.K. colonies and to a lesser extent at other tropical or subtropical locations:

“…[T]he effect of killing the birds is… a harvest of pests and disease-carriers for the colonist. [The notable scientist] Sir Harry Johnston has given his warning with regard to insect hosts of Uganda and elsewhere; the President of the French Congo foresees the reign of the insect over the whole Dark [African] Continent.” (RSPB 1913b:81-82; see RSPB 1912a:36, 1912b:49)

“…[I]t can be clearly demonstrated that the appalling human mortality in Uganda, and the havoc which is being wrought among the live stock, are due in great part to the destruction of native birds for their plumage. There is no longer in Uganda a sufficient number of the natural enemies of the venomous tsetse fly, and of parasitic insects, to keep these plagues in check.” (Buckland as quoted in Pearson 1912:320-322)

“The injury done to domestic animals and to man by biting and parasitic insects is great beyond the imagination of those who have no knowledge of tropical climes. One of the first acts of Mr. [Woodrow] Wilson, when he became President of the United States, was to issue an Executive Order prohibiting, under heavy penalties for infraction, the destruction of any wild bird in the Panama Canal Zone. A matter of grave concern for us all is the enormous number of fly catching and parasite-eating birds that are being killed annually for their plumage in Central Africa.” (Buckland as quoted in Pearson 1913:78)

In a second episode, U.S.-based activists who opposed plumage hunts campaigned intensely from 1913 to 1916, shepherding diplomatic processes during World War I (WWI) and drumming up public support for what became the watershed Migratory Bird Treaty between the United States and Canada in 1916 (Dorsey 1995:424-429). The bird treaty was not intended to raise or coordinate regulatory standards in
either country nor was it expected to indirectly raise such standards elsewhere. Instead, activists promoted the international treaty as a strategy to salvage the constitutionality of a domestic U.S. act that had been legislated in 1913, banning the import of bird parts for use in millinery fashion. Moreover, the warfare discourse that activists used to advocate the interstate treaty in the United States was itself international. In other words, activists used international discourse and law to frame a domestic dispute (Dorsey 1995:424-429; see Hornaday 1931).

A third episode occurred when the automotive businessman Henry Ford received a letter with bird advocates’ request for “big business” to support their closely affiliated U.S.-based civic groups, the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund (PWLPF) and the New York Zoological Society that has become the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). He became a philanthropic funder of the PWLPF and took up the cause of a bird import prohibition bill

“with a vengeance. He directed his advertising men in Chicago to ‘Go to Washington and don’t return until that bird bill has been passed.’ According to the May 1913 Zoological Society Bulletin, ‘A thousand newspapers [were] supplied with articles, of at least twenty different kinds, intended to awaken the sleeping American people. Thousands of telegrams [were] sent in all directions, demanding attention for the bill and help in placing the needs of the birds before the people.’” (Goddard 1995:80; see PWLPF 1915:22, 27, 37, 43)

Two critical factors make the advertising spin of this bird hat episode clearly identifiable as one of global issue framing. “The needs of the birds,” “all the birds of the world”—in the words with which a leading PWLPF and WCS activist petitioned Ford—and the universal if unilateral import ban are par excellence transnational symbols (see Goddard 1995:80). Such symbols may have distracted attention away from an industrial domestic dispute that Ford Motors had been engaging in as it struggled to restructure an entire
transportation matrix, a dispute in which market shares in the emergent female consumer base would prove pivotal.

Insofar as conservationist activists collaborated with Ford Motors they translated domestic disputes that revolved around transportation and agriculture into the transnational language of import and migratory flows in birds. If in hindsight historians ascertain that “the increased mobility and speed associated with the automobile” “helped make billowing trimmings [of bird hats] inconvenient,” it may also hold that bird hats made a shift to automobile transport inconvenient (Doughty 1972:11; 1973:145; 1975:155; see Riley 1998; Price 2004; Stein 2008:24). To fit in cars that had top coverings, the larger bird hats had to be taken off, requiring hair styling. In cars that did not have top covering, the delicate hats could be damaged by the wind even if they were held down on the head or the lap so as not to fly out. Thus, substantial investment in bird conservation by an automobile entrepreneur is rendered more intelligible in light of a surprising pre-existing material incentive. In addition, Henry Ford also faced structural incentives of a muck-rack-philanthropic era and of his long-lived commitment to the rural United States (see Wik 1962). That commitment also suggests that Ford may have been motivated by potential damages to farmers through pests that activists predicted to proliferate with the reduction of pest-preying bird populations (see e.g., Price 1999:83-84, 88).

3.4. INTERNALIZATION

In the long ecofeminist campaign, Tarrow’s (2005) internalization process, broadly understood, could trace three episodes. In the historical record of the bird hat
campaign, these three are the only sets of documented events that can be traced through an internalization sequence.

First, internalization can trace a known series of campaign events that revolved around Paris, France, as the global hub for designing, processing and finishing feather millinery (Doughty 1975:27). As was true of Berlin and the German empire or London and the British empire, the city drew much of its raw materials for bird fashion products from other regions of France, French colonies such as present-day Niger and Senegal, and parts of Eastern and Southern Europe.

In this episode the U.K. government made at least two attempts—in 1909 and 1912—to meet with French, German, Italian and other states’ high level officials prior to WWI, but they refused, viewing such a meeting to discuss millinery policies as an international pressure upon their domestic industries (Doughty 1975:118-119, 124-125). Labor union activists within the millinery industry in France were vigorous in their defenses against what they framed to be unjustified attacks by anti-millinery advocates; they were influential in French public opinion; and they were well organized into at least ten unions or industry associations led by the longstanding Mutual Assistance Society of Florists and Feather-Workers (Société de Secours Mutuels des Fleuristes et Plumassiers) and the Association of Feather Merchants and Manufacturers of Paris (Doughty 1975:55, 57, 122).

The transnational campaigning of French activists against alleged international pressure from multilateral or unilateral policies was impressive even if evaluated according to the higher expectations of today (Doughty 1975:122; see Anon. 1914a). In June of 1914 the Parisian association hosted an International Congress of Plume Dealers
lasting several days, during which labor union activists from Germany, England, Austria, Belgium, Holland and Spain met with their French hosts. The French are reported to have told their counterparts something to the effect of the following opposition to recent laws in the United States and U.K. Canada as well as to impending legislation throughout the United Kingdom: “[W]hat must be obtained [is] the repeal of that section of the [U.S.] tariff act [signed into law in October of 1913] prohibiting the importation of plumes, the nullification of the decree recently promulgated in Canada, and also the prevention of proposed legislation in [the United Kingdom].” (Doughty 1975:122, 131; Anon. 1914a) Archival records suggest that a plumage union that claimed to speak on behalf of a multitude of French millinery unions went so far as to combine multiple unions’ threats of protest toward their domestic government with its advocacy toward the pressuring foreign government. During 1913-1914 the French plumage union Syndical Chamber of the Feather Manufacturers (Chambre Syndicale des Fabricants de Plumes) advocated directly to the U.K. parliament, sending every parliamentarian in the House of Commons a request that asked for opposition to a bill which would ban feather imports. The president of the same representing union publicly accused the legislation of containing potentially vicious pressures that marketed material protectionism in the name of legitimate bird protection:

“The public may think that the English and the American are right to protect the birds. That is false. It is not a question of humanity in the least, it is merely a question of money… The… [U.K.] Bill is designed to protect the ostrich-feather industry of the [U.K. colony at the South African] Cape. The association of ostrich-farmers, numbering 1,700 welcomes with both hands the proposed law which will give the final blow to our industry. (…) If England follows the example of America, what will be [the workers’] misery! For us, it is a cataclysm.” (RSPB 1914a:10, 21-22; see Doughty 1975:55)
The mobilization of millinery union activists probably squeezed more than one concession out of the French government. In one probable concession, the government refused to convene at an intergovernmental conference because it “was apparently afraid to face the opposition of the 50,000 people engaged in the feather trade” in France (RSPB 1914a:5). The French government was under countervailing pressure from the governments of the United Kingdom and other nation-states which had accepted an invitation to convene at the international summit. At approximately the same time, in early 1914, a similar concession nearly duplicated the governmental outcome of protest threats from plumage labor unions. After receiving a threat of protest from a millinery union, the French president and colonial minister reportedly cancelled their plans to attend an anti-plumage event that was also relocated from its original governmental venue. Two French-based bird advocacy groups prepared the event to award a medal to a U.S.-based activist who had spurred the U.S. law banning plumage imports in 1913. The union “strenuously objected to the presence of [the] President… at the presentation” and threatened “the Government that if the medal was delivered at the public meeting, ‘it was to be expected that the workmen of the plume trade would in some violent manner publicly manifest their disapprobation.’” (Grant 1915[1913]:89-90) The two bird associations “reluctantly decided to alter their program,” hosting the award at the U.S. embassy where the ambassador reportedly had said that “he would attend the meeting, and if any stones were to be thrown he wished to take his share.” (Grant 1915[1913]:89-90) In another concession soon thereafter, a singular U.K.-French agreement would allow imports of some ornamental plumage from France to continue to flow into the United Kingdom during WWI despite wartime bans placed upon U.K. imports of wild
bird plumage from such major exporting regions as Austria-Hungary and Germany (Doughty 1975:25, 119, 134, 158; Moore-Colyer 2000:63).

On the other hand, pressures from the U.K. government seem to have squeezed the French and German governments into domestic implementation of those international pressures by early 1914. A legislator who opposed imports of bird parts for millinery use in the United Kingdom suggested that international pressures from the U.K. government shaped steps that France and Germany took toward stopping hunts of fashionable birds in their colonies—in present-day Madagascar and Papua New Guinea, respectively (RSPB 1914a:2-3, 5, 8).

Second, also in keeping with a loose definition, internalization can sketch another episode that is minimally documented in the existing historiography of the campaign in Brazil and to a lesser extent elsewhere. In the early 1890s, activists in the State of Rio de Janeiro formed a Fish and Game Club “to prevent the killing of vultures, songbirds, and other useful species.” (Dean 1995:231, 412) The passage of one of their policy proposals into a State law that prohibited the hunting of any bird during mating season had clear consequences for the transnational campaign against bird hunting for fashion products. Moreover, their advocacy also acted on a concern that campaigners who were directly involved with the ecofeminist struggle frequently expressed, when they emphasized that “Italian settlers in Brazil took on a predatory behavior toward birds.” (my translation of Duarte 2006:16) The broad policy effects and campaigner sympathies of the Fish and Game Club’s advocacy make it fitting to include it as a part of the bird hat campaign, but the activism targeted bird hunting for food. The proposal masked its response to a socioeconomic migratory flow, as it was “apparently directed covertly at Italian
immigrants—whose custom of hunting birds for food was one of many that the native middle class despised.” (Dean 1995:231, 412) Three leading bird hat activists who chaired the U.S.-based PWLPF, the Audubon Society at the U.S. State of Connecticut, and the U.K.-based RSPB voiced similar protests toward transnational hunting pressure on birds from Italian immigrants into the United States and Argentina (see Doughty 1975:59; Mason 2002:12).

Finally, there was a third episode that can be traced through the process of internalization. It occurred when two distinct social movements targeted Jewish plume traders of East European origin as surrogates within the United Kingdom for foreign threats that peaked once the global market in feathers from ostriches crashed in 1914 (Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 70-72; Stein 2008:xi, 16-18, 25, 52-53, 72-75, 82, 151, 160-161, 163, 208, 234; see RSPB 1911:35-36; 1914a:5). Afrikaners and to a lesser extent bird preservationists in the British Isles singled out nearby Jews—mostly those whom had immigrated into U.K. South Africa from Russian-controlled Lithuania—as proxies for a “complex web of trans-hemispheric supply” along which Jewish “importers, wholesalers, large- and small-scale feather merchants, manufacturers, and feather handlers” of ostrich plumes had become disproportionately well-represented (Stein 2008:xi, 82, 151).

In particular, an Afrikaner nationalist agricultural movement in the U.K. colony of South Africa recast Jewish ostrich plumassiers into a frame that “disparaged their cosmopolitanism” “as the crash was unfolding” over the global “ostrich feather commodity chain” in 1914 (Stein 2008:25, 52-53, 82). In response to the global pressure of the plume crash that aviculturalists in South Africa were undergoing, “some ostrich farmers in the Western Cape… formed a cooperative movement that aimed to encourage
the government to oversee and protect the feather industry.” (Stein 2008:160) In other words, the movement targeted the U.K. government at South Africa with the intent to squeeze out of the government the concessions of oversight and protection from the state as a broker relative to the global market institutions that exerted pressure upon South African society and thereby upon governmental tax revenues. This cooperative movement “sought an exclusively Afrikaner dominance of agriculture,” having been “born of socialist and volkish nationalist sentiment and influenced by the anti-Semitic and Nazi-inspired Greyshirts.” (Stein 2008:52-53) These “nationalist-minded Boer farmers” blamed cosmopolitan Jews—implicitly described as “middlemen with contacts abroad, speculators, buyers, foreigners”—for “the implosion” in the global ostrich feather market (Stein 2008:52-53). The social movement construed Jews as the institutional embodiment of the pressure from the global crash, accusing them of “starting the feather slump and… benefiting from it at farmers’ expense.” (Stein 2008:52-53) Boer ostrich farmers framed Jews in the feather trade as conspiratorial monopolists whose speculation drove non-Jews out of business and ruthlessly “preyed on economically vulnerable farmers.” (Stein 2008:16-18, 25) The frame glossed over the numerous primarily socioeconomic factors62 that made these traders with global, “extra-regional contacts” “uniquely well suited to pursue feather commerce.” (Stein 2008:16-18, 25, 52-53, 151)

The protests of the nationalist cooperative movement ultimately squeezed out of the brokering U.K. government at South Africa an oscillation from initial implementation of the crash that global market pressures instituted to an eventual concession toward the

62 Among these historical contingencies, the literature specifies: “background in like industries, contacts of kith and kin within and across sub-ethnic diasporas and political and oceanic boundaries, copacetic relations with the reigning authorities, geographic mobility, and, no less important, economic need.” (Stein 2008:16-18, 151)
grievances of mobilized Afrikaners. The protesters had crafted a South African policy that the Jewry “should be barred from the [ostrich feather] industry in the future” as the state oversight and protection that they claimed (Stein 2008:52). “In the wake of the [1914] feather crash in South Africa, the state ceded to the demands of an Afrikaner nationalist agricultural movement eager to edge… Jews… out of the feather industry.” (Stein 2008:25, 52-53, 160) After implementing an ostrich plume crash, the government at South Africa allocated a concession of Afrikaner control over the industry through the further and severe displacement of Jews from the feather trade. Thus, the protests of the cooperative movement “succeeded in squeezing most remaining Jews out of the ostrich industry” in U.K. South Africa (Stein 2008:52-53, 160).

More implicitly, even activist debates about hunted plumage at the British Isles, where Jews did not stand as far off from non-ostrich plumes as they did in the U.S. branch of global feather commodity chains, “were imbued with the faintest tinge of anti-Semitism.” (Stein 2008:25, 75, 82, 123-125, 163; see Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 70-72; see also RSPB 1911:35-36; 1912b:49-50; 1913c:102-103; 1914a:5) Whereas market conditions and a movement against hunted plumage motivated Jews to stand apart from global commodity chains for hunted feathers in the United States, an equivalent rift did not take place in the United Kingdom (Stein 2008:82, 123-125). In that context, activism against the use of hunted plumage at the British Isles spilled over into activism that resorted to framing which evoked Jews of Eastern European origin, who symbolized the overall feather—ostrich or not—industry, for resonance with an “anti-alien and anti-Semitic sentiment surg[ing] in Britain.” (Stein 2008:72-75). The ‘alien’-making construction of Jewish feather traders into foreign sources of pressure upon the U.K. state
and society; the protests of bird activists; and the brokering implementation and concession of the U.K. government are discussed elsewhere in this campaign case study as traced under the processes of internalization, scale alteration and diversion.

3.5. DIFFUSION

Diffusion can sketch several episodes during the bird hat campaign. First, beginning in 1913, the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund (PWLPF) and the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) in the United States began to correspond, in relational diffusion, with Dutch equivalent groups as part of support offered to the present-day Zoological Museum Amsterdam (ZMA) in the Netherlands (PWLPF 1920:99-102; Hornaday 1931:187, 203-206; see Dalton 1993:45; Boardman 2006:44). The diffusion was instrumental in advocacy work of the ZMA spin-off Committee for the Advancement of a Prohibition of Export of Birds and Parts of Birds from Dutch Colonies. The latter advocacy reportedly resulted in almost complete suppression of the export industry in wild bird plumage from present-day Indonesia (Hornaday 1931:187, 203-206).

Second, the historical scholarship and the available archives suggest an episode that may have combined multiple instances in which the advocacy of bird conservationists diffused across borders. Soon after the U.S. government instituted a law including a ban on hunted feather imports that U.S. bird advocates drafted in 1913, the legislation advocated received praise from U.K.-based bird advocates and duplicates of the prohibition were enacted in two U.K. territories—Canada and the British Crown.

---

63 The WCS was named New York Zoological Society. In 1937 the PWLPF was reabsorbed under the WCS, which had facilitated its formation (Osborn 1937:6). It is possible that the PWLPF—particularly through the support it offered to the present-day Fauna & Flora International (FFI) in the United Kingdom during the 1930s—eventually inspired the formation of the similarly named and endowed World Wildlife Fund (WWF) by the 1960s. The Dutch organization was named Natura Artis Magistra.
Colonies of the Straits Settlements, presently Singapore and parts of Malaysia adjacent to Indonesia. The U.S. ban drafted by U.S.-based conservationists in turn resembled the measures of export-restricting legislation that the same activists had praised U.K. governments for having instituted, with RSPB advocacy, at present-day Australia in 1912 and present-day India in 1902 (Doughty 1975:104; Moore-Colyer 2000:65; see e.g., Palmer 1903a:37-38; Hornaday 1931:199-201, 248-249).

Third, much other U.S. bird hat activism diffused to the United Kingdom and vice-versa (see e.g., Wright 1903b:105; Palmer 1903b:105-106; Dutcher 1904:106-108; RSPB 1911:54-58; Hornaday 1913a:127-128, 135-136; see also Doughty 1972; 1975; Boardman 1981:30; 2006:42-44; Clarke 2004:5; Merchant 2010:9, 16). The similarities in the claims and repertoires of anti-plumage activists in the United Kingdom and the United States are remarkable. They are as notable as the nearly equal names and founding times of the main civic groups on each transatlantic side of the campaign: the Association for the Protection of Sea Birds organized at the turn of 1860 and later the (eventually Royal) Society for the Protection of Birds assembled in 1889 on the U.K. side as parallels to the Audubon Society for the Protection of Birds established in 1886 on U.S. shores. Moreover, there are other indications of two-way communication and emulation (e.g., see Doughty 1975:65, 79, 132; Moore-Colyer 2000:65; Boardman 2006:38; D’Elia 2010:193-194).64

Fourth, similarly episodes of two-way diffusion are probable from bird conservationists based in the United States and Europe toward activists in Brazil. The latter campaigners include the present-day Emilio Goeldi Museum of Pará, the Animal

64 The similarity, communication and emulation hold even prior to an upward scale alteration—discussed below—and apart from the aforementioned episodes of internalization and global issue framing.
Protective Society of Brazil (Sociedade Brasileira Protetora dos Animais) and the Brazilian Zoological Club (Clube Zoológico do Brasil) (see Goeldi 1902:6; RSPB 1911; Hornaday 1913a; Doughty 1975:70-71; Franco 2002; Franco & Drummond 2005:149-155; 2009:91; Duarte 2006:12, 15, 17, 18-19, 23).

Fifth, in 1925 an activist in the Netherlands attempted to emulate his direct experience in an upward scale alteration that had ultimately formed a transnational coalition between bird protective groups in multiple European and North American polities during 1922-1923. The advocate tried to replicate on a broader basis, onto nature writ large, the institutionalization of a transnational civic group: the International Committee for Bird Protection (ICBP) that has since intermittently evolved into the present-day BirdLife International (BI). In 1925, the Dutch national—who had hoped to salvage a failed attempt at instituting an intergovernmental Consultative Commission for the International Protection of Nature in the early 1910s, “had a scientific interest in bird conservation, and who had been a participant in the events of the early 1920s leading to the establishment of the ICBP”—founded the Netherlands Committee for International Nature Protection (Boardman 2006:42-43). The domestic civic group he established eventually did emulate the present-day BI’s transnational advocacy through further diffusion that was deliberately coordinated toward “more uniform bird laws in widely separated countries.” (see Stone 1899:56) By 1934 the Dutch association too transnationalized into a major transatlantic organization—under its own new name of International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN)—and reinforced transnational advocacy of bird protection to a greater extent than that of other nature protection across

3.6. SCALE ALTERATION

Based on the existing historiography and readily accessible archives, it is possible to represent two episodes during the ecofeminist campaign according to the process of scale alteration. The first episode occurred in 1902-1903 when bird advocates based in the United States upwardly altered the scale of their advocacy to U.S. government officials in the present-day Philippines through the coordination of their policy proposals with policies that they knew U.K.-based bird advocates to have recently proposed in the British Indian Empire and elsewhere. U.S.-based activists stressed that “the enforcement” of new laws in British colonies including Australia, India and New Guinea “will inevitably drive the plume hunter to new fields, including the Philippine Islands.” (Dutcher 1904:106-108; see Wright 1903a:36-37; Dutcher 1903:109-112; Palmer 1903a:37-38) In 1903 they highlighted that “within the past year [in 1902] the export of birds and plumage from India had been absolutely prohibited” and went on to advocate to U.S. government officials at Manilla measures “to prohibit such export before the plume trade has gained a foothold in the [Philippine] islands.” (Dutcher 1904:106-108)

These U.S.-based activists of the Audubon Society and a Committee on the Protection of North American Birds within the American Ornithologists’ Union (AOU) had acknowledged familiarity with the role of U.K.-based activist groups—including the Australian Ornithologists’ Union and the present-day RSPB—as their counterpart sparks for a transnationally coordinated campaign or, phrased in their own words, “a systematic effort… for the preservation of wild bird life in this country [the United States] as well as

These U.S.-based activists had deliberately prepared for the upward scale alteration and had aspired to further alter the scale of their activism upwardly. Overall, they had asked themselves whether to alter their scale: “While the Audubon Societies and the American Ornithologists’ Union are struggling to preserve the bird life of our own country, is there not a broader view to take of bird protection? Should we not take some steps to prevent the loss of bird life in other countries; in other words, should this movement not be an international one?” (Dutcher 1903:109-112; see Wright 1903a:36-37) The same activists had answered in the affirmative, calling for an upward scale alteration that would coordinate activism across the U.S. and U.K. colonies of the Philippines and India:

“It is reported that the [British] Government of India, in September of this year [1902], issued an official order prohibiting the export of wild bird skins and feathers. This will take from the market a great many parroquets, impeyas and nicobars. As the United States has recently come in possession of a vast insular province in the East, we should also urge the Executive of the United States to instruct the Civil Government of the Philippines not to permit any wild birds to be killed or shipped from those islands for millinery purposes.” (Dutcher 1903:109-112; see Wright 1903a:36-37)

Moreover, AOU Committee and Audubon activists had called for comprehensive transnational coordination that would, in their own words, “keep in touch with similar work in other countries.” (Wright 1903a:36-37) They had aspired to coordinate across a scale of transnational advocacy as extensive as millinery commodity chains themselves:

“The question of bird protection is important enough for the American [AOU and Audubon] societies to agitate and recommend an International Congress for the purpose of devising means of preserving the wild birds of the world. We should
at this Congress of bird students and bird protectors send words of greeting and warning to like bodies in other portions of the world, and to that end… prepare and forward memorials to all bird protective societies in England, Germany, Holland, Japan and Australia, or to any other foreign country from which wild bird skins are exported.” (Dutcher 1903:109-112; see Wright 1903a:36-37)

There was a second episode over the course of 1922-1923 as activists focused their attention on a transnational surge in the illegal trade of bird plumage after an act restricting feather imports into the United Kingdom came into effect in April of 1922 (Doughty 1975:134-145, 150). Building on occasional prior collaboration and led by a president of the U.S.-based Audubon Society who was visiting London, activists experienced an upward scale shift. These avian advocates were based in France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom—including Australia, Canada and England—and United States (Doughty 1975:154; Sheail 1976:19-20; Boardman 1981:30-34; 2006:42-44). They established a transnational social movement organization the purpose and effect of which was “co-ordinating and encouraging the preservation of birds”: the present-day BirdLife International (BI) (Boardman 1981:30-34; 2006:42-44; see also Adams 2004:44-45, 63). Subsequently to the formation of the present-day BI, a National Section was created in every country hosting a member activist group in order to “act as a focal point for national opinion and information, and as a channel for international cooperation.” (Sheail 1976:19-20)

---

65 See other narratives regarding the episodes of scale alteration and diffusion above as well as other episodes of coalition formation and diversion below.
66 BI was initially named International Committee for Bird Protection. With some discontinuity in the decades from the mid-1940s to the early 1980s, “the group was renamed International Committee for Bird Preservation in 1928, International Council for Bird Preservation in 1960, and BirdLife International in 1994.” (Anon. 2011a)
3.7. EXTERNALIZATION

Two episodes associated with bird hat activism can be traced through the process of externalization. The first occurrence culminated in 1911 when the U.K. parliament was debating a bill that had been initially drafted by the RSPB with the support of other U.K.-based bird preservationists including the Zoological Society of London (Doughty 1975:52-53, 118-120, 157-158; Haynes 1983:27, 29; see RSPB 1913c:97-101). The advocated legislation would have prohibited the importing, possession and sale of bird plumage in the said polity. At that point the RSPB publicized support for the prohibitionist bill from immigrants based in the Brazilian Amazon and to a lesser extent in the Venezuelan Amazon. The association publicized two similar letters that a longtime junior curator with the Pará Museum of Natural History and Ethnography (the present-day Emilio Goeldi Museum of Pará) in the Brazilian Amazon had sent in 1908 to a leading member of the Zoological Society of London who was in turn experienced in the Venezuelan Amazon. Moreover, by the early 1910s the RSPB still referred copiously to advocacy that the museum’s former director who was also an affiliate of the British Ornithologists’ Union (BOU)—a partner organization to the RSPB—had carried out in the mid-1890s (see RSPB 1911:49-53). While the United Kingdom held enough of a market share of Brazilian feather exports to have exerted considerable impact in Brazil if the bill had passed, the U.K. import restrictions did not become law at that point and a process of access externalization fell apart.

As historical archives document, the informational politics of the letters that this curator sent from Brazil included testimonials that challenged industrial groups and supported the plumage import restrictions advocated by activists in the United Kingdom:
“It is a worthless contention on the part of importers that the Egrets are not killed for the purpose of obtaining the feathers. (...) The Egrets are shot in Brazil, and in the whole of the rest of South America, for obtaining their feathers. (...) [T]he birds are being more than decimated, and will soon be exterminated. It would, therefore, be a greatly desirable achievement if the English Parliament could take steps to prevent the slaughter in such huge quantities of these Egrets.” (Hagmann as quoted in RSPB 1911:46-47, 52)

Although the existing historical record does not provide sufficient empirical depth to trace in full this “boomerang” pattern of externalization, it is plausible to assume the letter to have evolved from advocacy that the director of the same Pará Museum had begun in 1895 and 1896. At that time the director, Émil August Göldi or Emílio Augusto Goeldi, had repeatedly risked his Museum position with a State government impervious to his advocacy against plumage hunting—particularly millinery hunts of white herons and red ibises in the Brazilian Amazon. He had elevated his bird advocacy role above his Museum directorship, declaring that he “would rather resign his position than fail to cry out most emphatically against one of the most scandalous crimes that is perpetrated against nature in this beautiful region.” (Goeldi 1902:5, 8, 16-18; see RSPB 1911:49-50; Doughty 1975:70-71) In the 1895-1896 period Goeldi had already leveraged external support in importing countries to break through a policymaking block by the governor of Pará. He had openly flaunted that he had allies in the United States and Europe; and that he was an Honorary Member of the BOU, whose founding members had carried out anti-plumage advocacy as early as the 1860s and which would support the U.K. plumage import ban by 1914 at the latest (Goeldi 1902:5, 8, 16-18; see RSPB 1911:49-50; Hornaday 1913a:20; see also Doughty 1975:70-71). Goeldi had also gone so far as to evoke some external leverage from international society onto his State government, capitalizing on the dependent State’s sensitivity to demeaning publicity abroad in order to
incite the government into action against the hunters.67 He had warned: “Let the
Government take into account that, perhaps, the very men, who here at the mouth of the
Amazon are directly culpable of the barbarous persecution of the elegant herons, may be
the foremost to sow and cultivate the bad opinion which is entertained abroad in regard to
our state of civilization.” (Goeldi 1902:1, 6, 7-8; see Doughty 1975:52-53)

In the interim period between the mid-1890s and the early 1910s, white herons
had been among the bird species that the advocacy of the RSPB and other U.K.-based
activist groups did persuade U.K. government officials to spare in their procurement of
military uniforms and regalia. Under pressure from the RSPB and other organized
consituents, in 1899 the U.K. government ordered officers of all its regiments that
hitherto wore feathers from “various species of white Egrets and Herons” to henceforth
wear ostrich plumes, repeating an advocacy pattern that had brought in turbans as
replacements to “plumed caps in the dress of the [U.K.] Viceroy of India’s Bodyguard.”
(RSPB 1911:13; see Doughty 1975:12, 115-116; Clarke 2004:25)

The second episode unfolded from 1905 to 1907. U.S. president Theodore
Roosevelt, capitalized on favorable public opinion and policy proposals against buffalo
hunting that the campaign against bird hunting for fashion initially facilitated and from
which the avian campaign eventually benefited (Trefethen 1961:15-22; Coder 1975:chs.
Adams 2004:ix; Boardman 2006:ch. 3; Merchant 2010:11, 13, 19, 29).68 A longtime

68 Such facilitation included advocates who worked for both bird and buffalo causes (such as George
Grinnell, William Hornaday, and Theodore Roosevelt). It also included the broader acceleration of
organizational founding rates that follows density increases in organizational population (such as that of the
honorary vice-president of the Audubon Society in the State of New York, Roosevelt was sympathetic to two suggestions that buffalo and bird advocates made to him in the context of a campaign to have the U.S. government provide public land for and cover custody costs of previously privately held animals (Coder 1975:176-180; Price 2004; Scarborough 2009:68). He was told to turn part of an indigenous reservation into a buffalo preserve, and to buy the buffalo of a resident whom the land transfer would displace (Coder 1975:176-180). Residing 60 miles from Yellowstone National Park, Michel Pablo was the owner of what constituted nearly thirty percent of the buffalo population worldwide and the largest private buffalo herd in existence (Coder 1975: ps. iii, 176-180, 230, ch. 1). Influential advocates who grouped to prod the then improbable appropriations out of the U.S. Congress suggested, in a magazine which was central in the bird activist network (Coder 1975: p. 176-180, ch. 5; Doughty 1975: 181; Mason 2002:4-6):

“When the reservation is thrown open Pablo will no longer have any land on which to range his buffalo, and so will be obliged to get rid of them… to sell them alive or dead. This herd, therefore, will be soon thrown on the market and can be bought for a very moderate price. They should be bought by the United States and places provided in which to keep them.” (Coder 1975:176-177 quoting Forest and Stream 1905)

It seems that shortly after Pablo refused to continue to negotiate buffalo with a U.S. official whose offers ranged from nearly one tenth to nearly one third of his asking price, he received notice from the U.S. government that the reservation land on which his buffalo were located would be opened for settlement (at his loss) as soon as possible (Coder 1975:178-180).

Boone and Crockett Club and the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society following the prior spread of Audubon and other bird activist groups). Such acceleration is due to earlier groups’ legitimizing of issue domain, support in establishing viable resource niches, provision of templates for organizational structure and action, and provision of resources and staff for start-ups (see Johnson & McCarthy 2005:72-75).
Pablo perceived retaliation as a link between the two U.S. government actions, and in an activist process of externalization—mixing access and information pathways—made secretive arrangements with a local Canadian emigration officer to sell his buffalo to the Canadian government and emigrate to Canada. Once revealed in the press, the plans to move 716 buffalo to Canada caused a public controversy in the U.S. that reinforced the original concerns that Pablo and the Canadian officer held about U.S. government interference, which ultimately did not materialize (Coder 1975:iii-iv, 176-180, 185, 230, 257-261, 265; Lueck 2002).

In subsequent events probably not foreseen or intended by any actor,69 the Canadian intervention put pressure on a (partially)70 unresponsive U.S. government that in turn began to appropriate dramatically larger funding sums to nature protection areas and to the prevention of extinction for species including but not limited to the highly visible buffalo (Coder 1975:iii-iv, 176-180, 185, 230, 257-261, 265). Such a policy change led both to exponentially larger public funding for bird guarding personnel in

---

69 The advocacy conceptual tradition of research on activist processes of externalization is uniquely accommodating to non-purposive activism (see Tarrow 2005:163-164). Pablo and the Canadian government were oriented by both self-regarding interest and the buffalo cause (Coder 1975:iii, 321). Pablo in particular intended threat evasion and retaliation in relation to the U.S. government. He supported the immediate ends but not the means of bird and buffalo advocates. Over the medium term, such advocates benefited the most from the externalization process which they triggered, and lost only proximity to a record buffalo herd the removal of which has been described as the single most important act to ensure that the buffalo would not go extinct (Coder 1975).

70 For the buffalo-bird advocacy network, the legislative branch would be the inaccessible part of the U.S. government (via congressional budget appropriations). For Pablo, the U.S. executive was rather clearly an inaccessible branch of government. However, Pablo may have also perceived the U.S. government in full as such due to the recent state-sponsored killing of buffalo—most intense, up to five million a year, between 1865 and 1880—aiming “to deprive the native American tribes of their livelihood and feed the railroaders, ranchers, farmers, and others involved in the westward expansion.” (Goddard 1995:50; see also Robert L. Smith 1976:38; Coder 1975:176-180) The “spiral model” that Risse and Sikkink (1999) offer fills an important gap in knowledge of state long-term responses to transnational activism proceeding along the lines of externalization through five phases of repression, denial, tactical change, policy and regime changes and acceptance, and acceptance of international norm. However, this instance of unforeseen and unintended long term events is not entirely captured by such leading theory. Even the spiral model explains the long-term impacts of activist externalization on state issue-based responses but not on broader state, society and activist responses in the nation-state from which claims are externalized (for a start in addressing this gap, see Hochstetler 2002; Hertel 2006; Rodrigues 2003).
U.S. feather supplying areas such as Florida; and to the transfer of the buffalo, which epitomized the consequences of hunting, from private to public land and custody (Coder 1975:iii-iv, 176-180, 185, 230, 257-261, 265; Ossa 1973:46-47, 49-52; see Prendergast & Adams 2003:251-252; Price 2004). Only a few years before this episode the same network of U.S.-based conservationists who advocated the buffalo reserves traced here not only had purchased and guarded private bird conservation areas where poaching confrontations remained, but had also prompted U.S. State and federal governments to outlaw domestic bird hunting for fashion products (see e.g., Doughty 1975:104-112, 116, 154).

3.8. COALITION FORMATION

There are six sets of events in the ecofeminist campaign which conform to the process of coalition formation. In the first episode series, the RSPB and the International Council of Women (ICW) spearheaded the formation of a transnational coalition that involved an undocumented degree of collaboration over an undocumented duration of the time between the 1899 and the 1938 International Congress of Women. The historical scholarship does briefly describe this transnational coalition among bird and women’s activists: A historian mentions that the coalition involved at least a request of help for the anti-plumage “cause” from an RSPB preservationist at the ICW’s 1899 world conference in London and the release of an RSPB brochure “to bolster a resolution against feather millinery at the” 1938 Edinburgh conference (Doughty 1975:56, 64).

A second episode is only documented in archives such as sparse reports from bird advocacy groups in the United Kingdom and United States (Stone 1899:56; Boulger 1905:5-6; RSPB 1913c:99, 101). After efforts that dated back to the late 1890s, anti-
plumage advocates based in Austria-Hungary, Germany and prospectively the United States formed a transnational coalition as they organized an International League for the Protection of Birds, which lasted some length of time between 1904 and the early 1910s. The League is said to have held central offices in Vienna and Berlin, and to have been promised the adhesion of the U.S.-based Audubon Societies. Reportedly, a Princess in Vienna and a Countess in Berlin organized the League, whose members also included other parties to “the highest aristocratic and diplomatic world of Germany and Austria[-Hungary].” (Boulger 1905:5) As such, the profile of the transnational coalition was at the very least in keeping with that of the civic group on its German base. The “core supporters” of the League for Bird Protection (BfV)—which had been founded during 1899 and had “quickly emerged as Germany’s largest, most influential bird protection organization”—were “birdwatchers, teachers, ornithologists, government officials and aristocrats; few were working class.” (Markham 2007:90; 2008:62-63; see Dominick 1986:262-263, 270)

Third, the PWLPF funded the League for the Protection of Birds (LPO) with money that the latter “desperately needed” for eleven years begun in 1918, shortly before the end of WWI (PWLPF 1920:28-30, 93-98; Hornaday 1931:189; see Claeys-Mekdade & Jacqué 2007:64-67). Historical evidence documenting the intensity of the 11-year involvement, which would distinguish among the federation and campaign sub-types of the coalition formation process, has not been produced among the contributions of either historians or archival sources that are readily accessible.

Fourth, in an instrumental sub-type of the coalition formation process, the U.K.-based Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and the U.S.-based Permanent
Wild Life Protection Fund (PWLPF) jointly employed an investigator to gather and report first hand information on the conditions of the transnational feather trade at Venezuelan bird rookeries in 1921 (Anon. 1921; Anon. 1922). Specifically, the two activist organizations wanted to find out whether heron (aigrettes or egrets) were hunted for their feathers to be exported out of Venezuela.

Fifth, BirdLife International (BI) became an association “based on bird protection groups in national sections” over the course of the decades subsequent to its 1922-1923 founding (Boardman 1981:30-32, 2006:42-43). BI activists met biannually until the late 1920s and the transnational relations between their national sections in the 1920s and 1930s remained largely informal and personalized (Boardman 1981:30-32, 2006:42-43). The first BI conference “took place in 1923 alongside the International Congress for the Protection of Nature Sites and Natural Monuments;” the second was held in 1925 as a parallel forum to the International Congress for the Study and Protection of Birds; the third occurred in 1928; and the fourth and fifth were hosted in 1930 and 1934 along with two respective editions of the International Ornithological Congress (Charnovitz 1998b:338-340). As of 1924 the BI included both male and female delegates from activist groups in multicontinental polities such as Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. By 1938 the BI’s multicontinental scope had broadened beyond the North Atlantic, Japan and the colonial world as the worldwide association came to include civic groups in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico (Charnovitz 1998b:338, 340; Duarte 2006:9, 23). The transnational activism of the BI fell into a pattern that can be neatly modeled through a federation sub-type of the coalition formation process. The
gap left by the intergovernmental 1913 Consultative Commission for the International Protection of Nature, which failed due to WWI before it could begin its activities, left a legacy of tasks and structure—akin to the international technical unions of the nineteenth century—that laid the groundwork for the transnational activities of social movement organizations in the 1920s. Seventeen European governments had founded the intergovernmental organization and fourteen had nominated delegates for it despite the war. The first assembly was scheduled to discuss “international regulation of the trade in skins and feathers,” among other agenda items (Boardman 1981:29-30; see McCormick 1989:22-23).

Finally, preceding and leading up to the BI founding there was an episode that fit the “event” sub-type of the coalition formation process. In 1922 the president of the U.S. Audubon Society undertook a trip through at least seven European states, “following an invitation from the main bird protection association in the Netherlands.” (Boardman 1981:30-31, 2006:42; see Doughty 1975:124; Sheail 1976:19-20) The trip lasted over a year, during which his German collaborators convinced him to organize a London meeting where the present-day BI ended up being established. As sketched above through the process of scale alteration, the episode realized aspirations that leaders of anti-plumage activist groups in the United States had held for nearly 20 years (Wright 1903a:36-37; Dutcher 1903:109-112). As early as 1903 these advocates had called for U.S.-based “bird protectors” such as their Audubon Societies and AOU Committee to “join hands with the bird protectors of the other world powers to stop the use of the plumage of wild birds…” (Dutcher 1903:109-112) They had declared transnational cooperation among activists to be “the only cement that will hold together the stones of…”
the protective wall against which the shot of plume- and pot-hunter is to rattle in vain…”

(Wright 1903a:36-37) Even earlier, in the mid-1880s, the U.K.-based Selborne Society for the Preservation of Birds, Plants and Pleasant Places had offered its “fullest cooperation with the AOU bird protection committee” of the United States (Doughty 1975:104).

3.9. ‘CAVE! HIC DRAGONES,’ BEYOND STATISM AND TRANSITOLOGY

Thus far, if Tarrow’s (2005) prime explanation were to elucidate the bird hat campaign, the contention could be summarized as a case of internationalist encouragement to the transnational activism of bird protective advocates and a labor movement. As such, both the causal and the processual elements of his explanation would be consistent with behavior observed in the campaign as discussed thus far. However, the explanation would stand on an implicit assumption of spatial transition in transnational activism that would be inconsistent with the observed trajectory of cause-oriented action traced up to this point. Unlike Tarrow’s (2005) premise of neat transitions in transnational activism from local to global proportions, or vice-versa, the spatial evolution of the campaign would be at best unintelligible and at worst chaotic.

The processual observations illustrated thus far are remarkably consistent with Tarrow’s (2005) prevalent mid-level theory. Each of the six processes that he contributes traces an average of three episodes in the campaign. Although these processes oddly only trace one episode of transnational cause-oriented action that involved activist women, the robustness of Tarrow’s (2005) authoritative processes could tempt one to (mis)understand the overall ecofeminist campaign as simply the sum of his six models. One who (mis)read the campaign solely through Tarrow’s (2005) processes would likely
also adopt the implicit premise of spatial transitology that underlies their theoretical framework but appears to be inconsistent with observations in this campaign.

The causal explanations traced above would offer support to the postulate that interstate interactions provide a superior and ample explanation for the empowerment of known modes of transnational activism observed in this case, even if the unexplained women’s transnational activism mentioned above would limit the explanatory power of Tarrow’s (2005) meta-theory. Apart from that anomaly, surely there would be exceptions to the causal relationship, but largely ones that could be said to prove the general rule. In two out of three episodes of internalization, if a nationalist agricultural movement and anti-Italian groups protested and advocated against foreign pressures from transnational markets and societies, respectively, they did target their states. In the two episodes of externalization, if a bird and a buffalo advocate leveraged foreign pressure on their own polities through migration networks, they did target their states and one of them relied on a foreign state. If there were instances where globalist social flows of information, ideas and people empowered episodes traced through Tarrow’s (2005) four other processes—global issue framing, diffusion, scale alteration and coalition formation—it appears that state policies were more often at stake encouraging these multiple modes of cause-oriented action across borders.

Although the best in the available scholarship—as Tarrow (2005) synthesizes—conceives and explains phenomena that do occur in this ecofeminist contention, there are vast and crucial elements of the campaign that do not come through the above process-tracings. It would be limiting to illustrate and possibly erroneous to explain the campaign solely through the prevalent scholarly lens.
In terms of the processual illustrations, the thematic incoherence and spatial randomness of the campaign account thus far owes in no small part to substantial layers that have been unnecessarily left out of the discussion. Two of the most defining among these layers are nearly absent in the available models but present in the models original to this study. These examples are the campaign’s gender dimension as well as its concern with bird (and buffalo) hunting as opposed to bird (and buffalo) farming.

As for the causal explanation, unaccounted modes of cause-oriented action that may be traceable through dual-level, ‘glocal’ processes might not only mostly reveal global causality, but also set the context for the international causality of Tarrow’s (2005) models. If so, the original processes that trace these activist modes would fill gaps for new knowledge that go well beyond the edges of statism and spatial transitology in the scholarship on transnational activism.

3.10. DIVERSION

Two event series in the bird hat campaign conform to the diversion process. Again, diversion refers to cause-oriented activists and industry interest groups that ally in an attempt to divert a regulatory standard newly raised in their state to other polities in competition with theirs via transnational trade, investment, or finance. The following two episode series are traced through the process as diversions toward polities with territory in the (sub)tropics from the United States in the one instance and from the United Kingdom in the other. Regulations that raised the standard of bird hunting for women’s wear in each the United States and the United Kingdom, “simply shifted the [supply chain of] demand for plumage to the tropics where attention was less likely to be focused.” (Haynes 1983:26; see Scarborough 2009)
In particular, tracing these episode sequences through this process sheds light on salient tactics of transnational activism that other causal chains do not explain. More generally, each diversion tracing integrates episodes that other explanatory processes only offer in disconnected parts.

3.10.1. U.S. Process, 1886-1924

3.10.1.I. 1886-98: Activists Confront Industry in U.S.

The first episode begins with a vigorous social movement—where women averaged 80 percent of the membership and 50 percent of the leadership—that led to the revival of U.S.-based Audubon Societies in 1896, after an earlier version of the Audubon Society for the Protection of Birds had proved short-lived in 1886-1889 (Price 1999:62-64, 88-89, 98-101; 2004; Mason 2002; D’Elia 2010; Merchant 2010:10-11, 15-16). Still in 1886, a “humanitarian rather than scientific” Committee on the Protection of North American Birds within the group of self-taught connoisseurs with the American Ornithologists’ Union (AOU), founded in 1883, had facilitated the emergence of the Audubon movement and drafted a model law for Audubon among other activists to use. The AOU model was complemented in 1898 by further legal specification and guidelines for political prioritization and compromise in policy advocacy (Stone 1899:56, 60; Doughty 1975:103, 107-108; see RSPB 1911:7-8). The AOU model law initially “did not explicitly object to the use of plumage taken from domestic [U.S.-based] fowl… nor did [it] address itself to the problem of foreign birds killed for the American millinery industry.” (Doughty 1975:107-108, 149) Distinguishing that many U.S.-based birds used in millinery products had not been “covered under the game or insectivorous provisions of the Model Law,” the AOU Committee revised its legal blueprint to explicitly
determine “that no part of the plumage, skin, or body of any bird protected… will be sold or had in possession for sale.” (Doughty 1975:107-108, 149)

3.10.1.II. 1895-1906: Regulation to Markets to Reconciliation

In response to that advocacy, beginning in 1895, U.S. State governments and the federal union instituted a series of domestic regulations and bird activists in turn complemented their advocacy with the philanthropic implementation of bird law enforcement across public as well as private reserves, preserves or sanctuaries (Wright & Dutcher 1906:34-35; Hornaday 1931:199-201, 248-249; Doughty 1975:107-112; Lasky 1995; Mason 2002; Duarte 2006:7-8). Regulations banning “the possession and sale of all wild birds or their plumage” passed into laws in multiple States in the union, to be exact 7 by 1900 and 33 by 1905, most often following AOU guidelines so closely as to include all the provisions in the model (Doughty 1975:107-109, 149; Mason 2002:11). In keeping with the AOU model law, the State laws only addressed birds that happened to belong to the specified species and to be temporarily or permanently located in the United States, leaving beyond their scope birds killed outside the United States and imported by the U.S. millinery industry. In 1900 the union government passed a U.S. act that reinforced the compatibility of various State policies through a prohibition of federal, “interstate traffic in birds killed in violation of state laws.”71 (Doughty 1975:109-110, 125-126; see Cart 1973) Again in keeping with the AOU model law, the new U.S. law “did not stop the importation of foreign bird [feathers or] skins for millinery purposes.”

---

71 A historian discerns both the supply and the demand sides of the U.S. act: “The shipper of game for the market and the millinery agent could continue his work only where local laws did not prohibit killing. Laws in the state of destination also had to be obeyed or confiscation and fines were imposed.” (Doughty 1975:109)
Within the United States, activists tapped on philanthropic funds to employ wardens with the purpose of strengthening the State policies and also the occasional county measures so as to get policies to actually regulate bird hunters and milliners. The AOU Committee established a guard service that grew from at least four wardens patrolling across six States in the union beginning during 1900 to a much expanded operation with 33 and then 34 wardens policing across eight and then ten States in 1903 and 1904, respectively. During the next year, 1905, the AOU Committee turned over the warden service to the organizations that had come to be known as the Audubon Society, having federated under the umbrella of the National Association of Audubon Societies (Doughty 1975:110-112, 158).

In a typical activist reaction to the earlier State regulations among those in the U.S. union, in 1898-1899 the AOU Committee began an effort to secure its recognition as envoy of U.S. bird-protection activists for transnational matters. The spark for the effort came via committee correspondence with an advocacy organization in Austria-Hungary. The European group had “undertaken to establish an International League for the protection of birds, to be represented in each country by some organized body or society,” which the AOU Committee deemed worthwhile for its service toward “more uniform bird laws in widely separated countries”—as in transnational regime formation (Stone 1899:56; see Conca 2006). As of 1900 the Audubon Societies were also working to institute transnational laws that would protect birds in polities beyond the United States; and a leading Audubon activist was calling for organizations such as hers to face the difficult passage of said laws with resilience and a collaborative transnationalism (Wright 1900b:130). By 1906, upon the end of this period, the Audubon Society at the
U.S. State of Michigan would self-recognize U.S. Audubonists for “gradually strengthening the bonds of their labors” with the U.K.-based RSPB; and for “arousing the Mexican and some of the South American countries by convincing them that they [were] losing a most valuable asset in the destruction of their birds…” (Butler 1907:18, 20)

As these decentralized regulations were spreading their governance across the United States, relations between the anti-plumage movement and plumage interests evolved from confrontation to reconciliation. Initially, anti-plumage activists had “denounced the [millinery] industry in vitriolic language” and business groups including the Millinery Merchants’ Protective Association “vigorously defended themselves” through similarly adversarial strike backs (Doughty 1973:143-144; 1975:51, 55, 57, 63; see Wright 1903b:104). At one point during these initial confrontations, when “feelings often ran high between the two factions,” in late-1897 a business supporter had “suggested that an anti-Audubon Society should be formed to counteract the mock sentiment of Audubonists.” (Doughty 1975:55) By the next year, parallel activist and business reactions to a bill in the U.S. Senate in 1898 marked the closest that these groups had come to any precedent for the reconciliation they would begin nearly at the turn of the century once the spread of regulations accelerated across the United States. Each of these groups had opposed the senate bill “to stop the importation, interstate commerce and sale of birds or ornamental feathers in much of the United States.” (Doughty 1975:127; see Anon. 1900:60) This reversed precursor constitutes evidence of the reconciliatory trend insofar as the parallel opposition of activists as well as businesses had hinged precisely on the then premature status of federal U.S. regulations for domestic bird protection. So long as these federal regulations were still not in place, it had been
equally predictable that the bill “angered… millinery firms” and that particularly the bill’s “clause prohibiting the importation of the plumage of foreign birds… aroused the opposition” of bird activist groups frightened about a counterbalancing increase in “demand” for birds located in the United States as a result of the legislation (Doughty 1975:127; Anon. 1900:60; see Scarborough 2009:72). The bill had passed the U.S. Senate with amendments but had eventually failed to become law, ultimately being replaced in 1900 by the aforementioned U.S. act with a purely domestic regulatory scope (see Cart 1973:8-13).

During that same year when the U.S. government harmonized State laws regulating millinery birds, suddenly these ‘Baptists and bootleggers’ turned a well-publicized (anti-)plumage clash of theirs at a Delaware bird frontline into a draft agreement to compromise, carving a ‘pre-nuptial’ for a marriage of convenience. This attempt at reconciliation in 1900 stipulated mutual concessions. Bird advocates would cease their advocacy of new government regulations in the United States while millinery businesses would stop importing body parts of bird species that were either exactly the same as or identical to those that U.S. governments regulated. In other words, the Millinery Merchants’ Protective Association, which represented roughly 90 percent of U.S. millinery industry, would privately transnationalize the existing U.S. laws through an embargo indifferent to the nation-state where the bird parts would be extracted and exported.72 Largely due to a draft agreement that was “badly framed and did not clearly

---

72 The co-founder of all Audubon Societies and president of the Society at the U.S. State of Connecticut asked rhetorical questions that can clarify this clause even as they illustrate her reluctance toward reconciliation: “What is a North American bird? Is a bird taken in Brazil during its winter sojourn an American or a Brazilian bird? Who is to settle this matter of citizenship… that the plume hunter shall respect?” (Wright 1900b:129) For the purposes of the draft agreement, the long-range migratory bird that she described, as a bird with a North American range that includes the United States, would have fallen
set forth... [what] the milliners intended to offer,” Audubon Societies in most U.S. States refused to halt their advocacy of new federal and State government regulations that would conserve additional, non-native bird species—namely, those with ranges not inclusive of the United States and whose feathers were distinguishable from plumes of U.S. birds (Stone 1901:70-71; see Doughty 1975:113-115). The episode sequence evolved in line with the pathway of causal mechanisms along the process of diversion from regulation (mechanism B) to market diversion (mechanism C) to a reconciliation (mechanism D) that would put pressure on foreign nation-states (mechanism G): A leading activist with the Audubon Societies characterized the drafting of the contract on transnational bird sanctions as an effect, “doubtless, owing to the legislative attention given [to] bird protection” in the United States (Wright 1900b:128-129; see Stone 1901:70). Audubon and AOU Committee advocates never did ratify the contract that their spokespersons negotiated in 1900 (Doughty 1975:112-115; see Chapman 1900a:93; 1900b:127; Wright 1900a:98; 1900b:128-130; 1902:170-171; Stone 1901:69-72; Ossa 1973:40-42; see also Scarborough 2009:65).

After three regulatory events there was further reconciliation among “advocates... [for] the cause of bird protection” and industrialists bent on rent-seeking (Chapman 1900b:127; see Wright 1902:168-171; 1903a:36-37; 1903b:104-105; Dutcher 1904:100-103; Wright & Dutcher 1906:37-38; see also Doughty 1975:108, 114-115). The three regulatory events had been the aforementioned ban on feather exports from the British Indian Empire in 1902, various legislative proposals to ban imports of bird parts in the U.S. State of Illinois during 1902, and the strengthening in enforcement of U.S. bird

within the scope of the embargo of U.S. birds or birds whose feathers were indistinguishable from those of U.S. birds (see Chapman 1900b:127).
regulations from 1900 to 1903. With regard to the transnational among these regulatory impacts on activism, reports on the ban in British India were used by a leading bird advocate in the United States to mobilize her fellow members of “the Audubon movement” toward a “spread of bird protection” that would not let earnest anti-plumage efforts “cease at [U.S.] shores.” (Wright 1903a:36-37) The bird advocate made the following case to justify her calls for transnational activism and for careful attention to her newsletter’s coverage of the ban in India. She advocated that the movement “can aid in hastening international protection by refusing to receive at [U.S.] ports of entry birds of other countries allied to our own [U.S.] species;” and claimed that such an import restriction was the only possible cure for “the universal temptation of plume-hunting.” (Wright 1903a:36-37) A few months later some of the same strangely mixed actors not only did enter into a similar agreement, but also delivered on their mutual pledges for at least the three years from 1903 to 1906. The AOU Committee and a dozen Audubon Societies signed a 3-year agreement with the Millinery Merchants’ Protective Association in 1903. This minority of State Audubons is specified in scholarly and archival sources to have included the major chapters at the States of New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin that had all enacted regulations in line with the AOU Model Law. Simultaneously, the National Association of Audubon Societies and the Millinery Jobbers’ Association of Chicago, an Illinois-based business association of wholesale distributors, struck an analogous contract and went on to renew their 3-year truce in 1906.

Compared to the agreement drafted in 1900, the terms of reconciliation in 1903-1906 were more inclusive of animal species and had been updated to reflect the regulatory context from which they stemmed (Doughty 1975:114-115; see Wright
In line with the proposed Illinoisan legislation, this later round of truce contracts encompassed a moratorium on imports of body parts from bird species located outside the United States even if the avian parts were neither exactly the same as nor identical to those of North American birds that U.S. governments regulated. Millinery businesses would stop importing body parts of discretely specified bird species “irrespective of… country of origin.” (Doughty 1975:114) Meanwhile, bird advocates would “prevent all illegal interference on the part of game wardens with the millinery trade” and cease their advocacy of new U.S.-based government regulations that would restrict the use of feathers from foreign-placed bird species “other than those specifically mentioned” in the agreement (Dutcher 1904:100-103; Doughty 1975:114-115). Once again, the contracts fall in line with the pathway of causal mechanisms along the process of diversion. Updated contract clauses concerning wardens and import restrictions upon foreign birds hint at: regulatory enforcement and consideration (mechanism B) as spurs to market diversion (mechanism C) and to reconciliation (mechanism D) that would put pressure on foreign nation-states through an import embargo (mechanism G). As interjected in this study, the words of a leading Audubon activist herself amount to a rewording of this causality through the first three of these mechanisms. According to her, bird activists could find it “mutually advantageous” to collaborate with business groups (D) because the latter recognized “that any false step on

---

73 The contract specified immediate protection for and protectionism through gulls, terns, grebes, hummingbirds and song birds. It also specified a few other bird species as eventually protected, in both senses of the term for bird protecting activists and business rent-seeking protectors: egrets, herons and “American pelicans of any species.” (Wright 1903b:105; Dutcher 1904:100-103; see Doughty 1975:114)

74 The contract did not specify immediate protection for and protectionism through birds of paradise, pheasants, peafowl and kingfishers, doves, paroquets, bee-eaters, bustards or vultures. Therefore, the contract allowed such bird species continued entry into the United States for millinery purposes (Doughty 1975:115).
the part of their less scrupulous associates will simply serve to their own disadvantage, by fanning the flame of the torch of public opinion, which, backed by legislative authority, is now well ablaze [(B)]; thus, by working for themselves they cooperate with us [(C-D)].”

(Wright 1903b:104; see Wright 1902:168-171)

3.10.1.III. 1903-06: U.S. Reconciliation Presses Abroad

The causal mechanism through which moralists and materialists put transnational pressure on nation-states across borders (mechanism G) is reflected in events during the contractual period when the private embargoes were implemented (Dutcher 1903:109-112; Wright 1903b:105; Wright & Dutcher 1906:37-38; Doughty 1975:114-115). It was precisely a few months before the embargoes that U.S.-based conservationist groups had begun an effort to transnationalize the scale of their activism so as to match that of millinery commodity chains, as sketched above under the process of scale alteration. At that time, the said activists had expressed both hesitation about preventing U.S. imports of bird parts as well as a sense of obligation to alert counterpart “bird protective societies” in polities “from which wild bird [feathers and] skins [were] exported”: The activists had declared, “While it may not be possible for this [U.S.] government to legislate to prevent foreign bird skins from being admitted [(through customs)], yet it is… a duty of the A.O.U. and the Audubon Societies to call the attention of the bird-loving citizens of foreign countries to the great numbers of exotic birds that are killed to furnish millinery ornaments for the American trade.” (Dutcher 1903:111-112) Once the embargo began, for the first time the transnationalization of U.S. bird advocacy came to extend well beyond U.K. colonies in present-day Australia, India, New Zealand and Papua New
Guinea. U.S.-based bird advocates accelerated the upward alteration of their scale as they described and prescribed further “bird-protective… regulations adopted in [a] Japan” that they noted having recently become “an important source of supply for certain birds used in the millinery trade.” (Palmer 1904:139-140) Among communities on whom the U.S. millinery embargo imposed losses across borders, there were probably families of cattle ranch workers reported to have been visible hunters for bird millinery and/or collectors of fallen bird feathers in the Brazilian Amazon (Cherrie 1900:50-51; Goeldi 1902:12-15, 17-18; Hornaday 1913a:129-131; Doughty 1972; 1975:70-71; Schindler 2001). Prohibitive measures such as the embargoes likely put transnational pressure on that Amazonian community through forgone earnings from bird parts—including those of white herons or egrets—otherwise sold toward export to the United States, which consumed most of these millinery shipments from the Brazilian Amazon (Goeldi 1902:14-15; Doughty 1975:70-71). The sparse historical scholarship refers to archival sources—newsletters of social movement organizations to their memberships—that suggest the magnitude of transnational pressure from the private embargoes. Upon renewal of the reconciliatory contract between bird activists and the Millinery Jobbers’ Association, a leading

---

75 Whereas U.S.-based activists applauded news that Passamaquoddy and Seminole peoples were not spared from arrest over apparently (in)famous millinery bird hunting in Maine and Florida, respectively, advocates based in Amazonian Brazil (ap)praised indigenous peoples in their region as non-suppliers of bird parts for millinery and as exemplars whose breeding of birds to obtain feathers was worthy of emulation (Goeldi 1902:12-15, 17-18; Wright & Dutcher 1906:38; Hornaday 1913a:133; see Doughty 1975:81). The archival reports of those based outside the Amazon Basin are not consistent regarding indigenous peoples insofar as they as often as not discuss the millinery supplying practices of “natives” not to mean indigenous “Indians” but rather in the orientalist sense that includes all persons not affiliated with the North Atlantic (see e.g., Cherrie 1900:50-51; Wright & Dutcher 1906:38).

76 According to the testimony of a bird advocate based in the Brazilian Amazon, there was no evidence to identify “the needy and indigent” as the vulnerable targets whom export tariffs or “prohibitive measures would directly harm.” (Goeldi 1902:14-15) Reportedly, income earned through supply of bird parts to the millinery commodity chain from the Brazilian Amazon was “not generally applied to the acquisition of the necessary means of subsistence;” did not “form a sensible resource for the poor settler… affording… a little money for the subsistence of himself and family.” (Goeldi 1902:14-15; see Duarte 2006:13)
Auduboner had deemed the millinery group’s “willingness… to uphold the principles of
the Audubon Societies” to be sufficient for public recognition of the business middlemen
as being “guided by a sense of civic duty rather than… a mere greed for money.” (Wright
& Dutcher 1906:38) Indeed, the cooperation of bird conservationists with the Millinery
Jobbers’ Association featured the middlemen asking for the support of the activists in
recruiting “the large retailer” at the end of the commodity chain into “refrain[ing] from
the sale of these [bird hat] articles” lest “the department stores… continually tempt the
jobber to handle the articl[e] and be the… weakling who will yield to their demands.” (as
quoted in Wright & Dutcher 1906:38). While it lasted the collaboration between bird
activists and the Millinery Merchants’ Protective Association was also substantial. It
included the former identifying to which species bird parts belonged upon request from
the latter. Moreover, as the contractual period began, according to activist reports, there
were very few exceptions to compliance among milliners. Activists attributed a notable
refusal to comply at the beginning of the contract to the immune conduct of three
businesses that were not members of the Association and that refused to let the agreement
govern the specific use of egret feathers. By the time the contract expired into a relapse
of confrontation between activist groups and the Millinery Merchants’ Protective
Association in 1906 the compliance rate of millinery businesses seems to have been
lower, particularly for egret feathers, however the future research of historians has much
light to shed on how widespread the private embargo remained at the end of the
contractual period (Doughty 1975:56-57, 114-115; see Wright 1903b:104-105; Dutcher
1904:100-103; 1906:72; Wright & Dutcher 1906:37-38).
Due to the transnational effects of U.S. domestic regulations, the campaigning focus of U.S.-based activists gradually further diverted beyond U.S. borders. The advent of U.S. regulations had turned feather import flows into an enforcement problem. The challenge in turn encouraged bird activists to gravitate toward another, ostrich sort of reconciliation and toward advocacy of another, statist sort of transnational pressure.

Considering that the enforcement of regulatory bird protections of U.S. States continued to falter due to the near impossibility of distinguishing plumage of regulated U.S. birds from those of unregulated imported birds, in 1913 activists influentially “argued their case for” a U.S. federal act that prohibited the import of bird feathers, heads, wings, tails and furs which were not to serve demonstrated scientific or educational ends (Doughty 1973:144; 1975:126-131; see Wright 1903a:36).

In a campaign turning point that also capitalized on collaboration among bird ‘Baptists and bootleggers,’ during 1913 a new U.S. regulation rendered the United States into “the first major importing country in the world to outlaw [inbound] shipments of foreign [hunted] birds’ plumage.” (Doughty 1973:144; 1975:126-131) Even as hunted bird advocates and millinery industry groups clashed in a “tumultuous argument in the national press and the halls of Congress, … some people in the ostrich-plume [farming] business… supported this legislation which did no harm to their business,” except\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{77} Feather merchants retaliated against ostrich farmers through a refusal to continue “to deal in ostrich material which they [had] frequently mixed with wild-bird millinery.” (Doughty 1973:144) Pending further historical scholarship, if a report from an RSPB activist can be tentatively reliable apart from its advocacy, it seems that in spite of the usually lower demand for such luxuries as feathers in wartime, demand for ostrich feathers suddenly rose during World War I after the 1913 U.S. act: “One of the chief London brokers reported in 1915 that, ‘in spite of many difficulties, a large quantity of goods has been dealt with,’ and that there had been ‘a sudden improved demand from America.’ This demand followed the
indirectly through the unforeseen retribution of millinery merchants that retaliated against ostrich farmers whose legislative lobbying was perceived to have “betrayed” the industry (Doughty 1973:144; see Stein 2007a:802-803; 2008:23-24, 125, 196; see also RSPB 1913c:102; Gardiner & Dewar 1920:564; Hornaday 1931). Moreover, even as feather merchants fought the regulatory proposal representatives of the millinery industry in hunted birds attempted to craft their third reconciliation with bird activists. The main advocate of the legislation, who was affiliated with the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and the Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund (PWLPF) in the United States, reportedly was unreceptive to the invitation that he received from a millinery interest group. The industrial interest group proposed reconciliation, pronouncing itself “prepared to join in any movement that will protect birds… or any species of wild-life whatever that has its proper place in the economy of nature.” (RSPB 1913c:102-103; see Hornaday 1913b; Doughty 1975:125)

The 1913 U.S. regulation generated illegal import flows of bird parts hunted outside the United States and these sorts of transnational market effects in turn emboldened bird conservationists and hunted-plumage interest groups to reconcile toward the purpose of maintaining transnational pressures through the U.S. ban. Once the law came into force the very same PWLPF activists who had shown no interest in reconciling themselves to the industry interest groups “who had fought [them] hardest while the feather war was on” reversed their position at the drop of a hat (PWLPF 1920:103-105). “Promptly” after the regulation, when hunted plumage interests invited the PWLPF to reconcile “cordially and without rancor,” the conservationist fund

---

passing of the tariff clause prohibiting the importation into the United States of all ‘fancy’ [i.e. wild or hunted] feathers.” (Gardiner & Dewar 1920:564)
“accepted the novel role” of jointly promoting “the full observance of the law without any unjust or unnecessary hardships to” the millinery industry (PWLPF 1920:103-105). A PWLPF report describes two occasions when these reconciled Baptists and bootleggers, which the fund characterizes under the rubric of “the strangest manifestation of all,” went public (PWLPF 1920:103-105). On both instances the reconciliation pursued confiscated illegal import flows that the U.S. government might have sold back on the underground U.S. market in accepting pretexts that their release would be destined toward export markets (PWLPF 1920:103-105). Reportedly, the reconciliation transpired into “the novel spectacle of the former importers of feathers being joined by the bird defenders in appearing in Washington to argue against certain ‘requested’ sales of seized’ feathers that prospective buyers wished to buy for the alleged purpose of exporting from the United States (PWLPF 1920:103-105). The fund reported that by 1920, several years into the reconciliatory role reversal among activists and industrialists, “the results seem to have been rather satisfactory to both sides;” and the strange bedfellows embodied in millinery chambers of commerce and “bird protectors [were] working together in perfect harmony.” (PWLPF 1920:103-105)

Transnational market effects of U.S. domestic regulations continued to divert the campaigning center of attention for U.S.-based activists beyond the borders of the United States. First, the substantial bird feather smuggling that resulted from the 1913 ban was trafficked into the United States from overseas sources. Second, even after this obstacle to U.S. regulatory effectiveness was addressed, ultimate activist effectiveness in
preventing extinction remained in question as consumption of bird fashion products continued in France, the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

These diverting transnational market effects of the 1913 regulatory ban constitute the formative context that shapes the direct transnational pressures that activist themselves exerted, including two episodes mentioned above and a third mentioned below. The earliest event among the three occurred already in 1913. The PWLPF and the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), both in the United States, offered the present-day Zoological Museum Amsterdam (ZMA), in the Netherlands, policy ideas that evolved into transnational pressures sufficiently powerful to contribute to a regulatory change in a Dutch colonial government (PWLPF 1920:99-102; Hornaday 1931:187, 203-206; Boardman 2006:44). The transnational flow of ideas from U.S. activist groups became instrumental in advocacy pressures on the part of a ZMA offshoot in the Netherlands, the Committee for the Advancement of a Prohibition of Export of Birds and Parts of Birds from Dutch Colonies. The advocacy of the Committee that the ZMA facilitated resulted in the almost complete suppression of the export industry in wild bird plumage out of present-day Indonesia (see Hornaday 1931:187, 203-206).

To offer a second illustration of how transnational market effects encouraged U.S.-based activists to pressure other polities it is necessary to integrate this process-tracing of diversion from the United States with the subsequent tracing of diversion from the United Kingdom. After the 1913 federal law U.S.-based bird conservationists accelerated their offers of informal support to their U.K. counterparts through the reinforcement of pressures that the latter were placing on their government in the British Isles. Briefly previewing events traced in full below under the U.K. diversion, these
pressures would eventually result in the government of the United Kingdom adopting restrictions on imports of hunted plumage long advocated from the United States, in a manner where the two polities’ regulations harmonized quite well. Two concrete examples of these transatlantic pressures during the mid-1910s include transnational advocacy stemming from the U.S.-based PWLPF and National Audubon Society. The Audubon publicized an endorsement of U.K. anti-plumage advocacy that asked readers to mobilize their influential contacts in the United Kingdom to promote passage of a parliamentary bill in London. The PWLPF disseminated an exposé of the confiscation of plumage illegally imported into the United States from U.K. India through the border between Mexico and Texas (see e.g., Pearson 1912:320-322; 1913:76-80; PWLPF 1917:179-184; 1920:104).

As for the third illustration, the same diverting markets apply to the support which the U.S.-based PWLPF also proceeded to offer to the French-based League for the Protection of Birds (LPO) over eleven years circa 1918-1929. The LPO had established itself in 1912 as an outgrowth of the present-day National Society for Nature Protection (SNPN, for Société Nationale de Protection de la Nature), then the National Acclimatization Society (SNA, for Société Nationale d'Acclimatation). During the 1860-1900 decades the facilitating SNPN had “attempted with some success to introduce Chinese and Indian [bird millinery] species to areas in France” that included the then territories at present-day Madagascar, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. Long before the French-based SNPN had joined its affiliate LPO in awarding a gold medal to the PWLPF’s leading activist for his advocacy of bird protection toward the 1913 U.S. act, it had farmed species such as ostriches, pheasants, egrets and other herons in enclosures so
as to lower the risk of extinction in birds hunted for the plumage industry (Doughty 1972:9-10; 1973:143-144; 1975:9, 57, 74-76, 132; see Claeys-Mekdade & Jacqué 2007:64-69; Stein 2008:90; see also RSPB 1914b:29; PWLPF 1920:28-30, 93-98).

Thus, tracing this episode here contextualizes an event which also shows up in the incubation process below as well as in the “coalition formation” process previously discussed: the 11-year financial support of the U.S.-based PWLPF to the French-based LPO. The episode only becomes clear in a complete and dynamic sequence of events as traced through a diversion process. Here, the 11-year involvement constitutes complex regime building that succeeded in consolidating institutions whereas the PWLPF seems to have failed in its similar and simultaneous endeavors “to promote the creation of new bird protecting organizations” within the polities in Belgium and Italy (PWLPF 1920:28-30, 93-98). A diversion process explains how the U.S. PWLPF pooled matching financial resources with the British RSPB in Venezuela even as it simultaneously pooled distinct resources with the French League, accepting French nationalist resources and providing financial resources in return. Such distinct poolings appear odd absent an explanation along the lines of the diversion process. With diversion as a theoretical lens, the PWLPF’s longer-term tactics are identified. In this vein, trade data serves to specify distinctions between the U.S.-U.K.-France resource poolings. These figures show that during the two decades when the feather trade was most legal and thriving, being thereby most measurable, France accounted for over 50 percent of U.S. imports in the 1891-1900 decade, and for over 70 percent in the 1901-1910 decade (Doughty 1975:28).

Illegal import flows of bird parts hunted outside the United States lingered as late as nearly three decades after the 1913 U.S. law and emboldened bird conservationists to
renew their reconciliation and maintain the transnational scale of their campaign. In 1939-1940 Auduboner investigators discovered that 24 millinery firms located at the eastern United States were selling large quantities of feathers from 20 species of birds hunted abroad. Claiming that birdlife was faced with its worst threat in the three preceding decades, the Audubon Society “urged tighter controls on loopholes in plumage laws” such as a lack of restrictions against the sale of millinery feathers imported before 1913 and of feathers ostensibly imported for educational, scientific and fly-fishing use (Doughty 1975:147-150). By early 1941 the Audubon Society struck another reconciliatory accord with an interest group representing the feather industry:

“Feather importers, dealers and jobbers… agreed to make full inventories of eagle, egret and bird of paradise plumage, and to file tallies of plumage in stock with the New York State Department of Conservation. For its part, the Audubon Society agreed to allow six years to elapse for the sale and disposal of such millinery before it could begin to lobby to terminate all traffic in wild bird plumage.” (Doughty 1975:148)

3.10.2. U.K. Process, 1868-1938

3.10.2.I. 1868-69: Activists Confront Industry in U.K.

In a second episode, a similar cluster of transnational activism in the bird hat campaign diverted across borders from the United Kingdom. The process began in 1868 as the Association for the Protection of Sea Birds78 and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)79 successfully campaigned for a nationwide U.K. bill that intended to end “the taking of seabirds for their plumage” to decorate

---

78 The same organization, if not a later revival of largely the same organization, is also known as the Association for the Protection of British Birds.

79 The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals had been formed in 1824. In 1835, it received royal patronage and in 1840 recognition in the form of its Charter… The RSPCA was primarily concerned with cruelty to domestic animals (including horses and cattle) as well as campaigning against sports such as bear baiting and cockfighting. However, by the mid nineteenth century, it had become engaged with the issue of bird protection...” (Clarke 2004:3-5)
women’s hats (Clarke 2004:3-5; see Haynes 1983:26, 30; Ranlett 1983:205-208; Moore-Colyer 2000:59).

A prominent ornithologist who was a founding member of the British Ornithologists’ Union (BOU) and a professor at the University of Cambridge gave a lecture that helped the advocacy association to recruit a broader base of supporters whom the bird organization had not been able to galvanize since its formation in the late 1850s. His moralistic framing of hunts for plumage from birds as barbarism beneath the surface of “a supposedly ‘civilised’ Victorian society” mobilized the public in the United Kingdom (Moore-Colyer 2000:59). For instance, the BOU-Cambridge ornithologist implicitly echoed a local issue framing previously deployed during the U.K. abolitionist campaigns against the slave trade and slavery, in a lecture that attributed immorality and appalling conditions to seabird hunting. The ornithological zoologist thus coined a phrase that would become a popular campaign motto, professing: “Fair and innocent as the snowy plumes may appear in a lady’s hat, … she bears the murderer’s brand on her forehead.” (as quoted in Clarke 2004:4; see Doughty 1975:63; Moore-Colyer 2000:59)

He also influenced the U.K. parliament with utilitarian and ecological arguments such as framing gull extinctions in terms of “an economic bane the fishing industry could ill afford” inasmuch as “fishermen followed gulls in the belief that wheeling flocks indicated schools of fish.” (Doughty 1975:53, 58, 63, 86, 93) Indeed, the ornithologist inspired the legislator who introduced the 1869 bill to claim “that seabirds were useful to farmers in following the plough and devouring harmful insects from the upturned sod.” (Doughty 1975:58; see Moore-Colyer 2000:59)
3.10.2.II. 1869-85: Activists Confront Industry, U.K. Regulates

The Association for the Protection of Sea Birds campaigned tirelessly and effectively for the bill that the U.K. parliament passed into law but did not yet implement in 1869. In the early 1870s the organization either expanded or revived into the Association for the Protection of British Birds. Until members of the association and of the RSPCA spurred the U.K. government to legislate additional acts in the 1870s and 1880s, the 1869 legislation “proved unenforceable and of little consequence to the plumage… hunting… of bird populations in the British Isles.” (Doughty 1975:93-95; see Haynes 1983:26; Ranlett 1983:205-208; Clarke 2004:5) The mid-1880s, 1885 to be exact, mark the historiography’s latest recorded “destruction of seabirds” in the United Kingdom after the advent of multiple U.K. regulations (Doughty 1975:93-95; see Moore-Colyer 2000:59).

Moreover, toward the end of this period, the BOU-Cambridge ornithologist began to publicize that this series of legal enactments “clearly did nothing to reduce the ever increasing pillage of foreign exotic birds…; very brightly coloured birds [which] were now under threat.” (Haynes 1983:26) Through a letter printed in a major U.K. newspaper during 1876, he exposed “enormous sales of birds’ feathers… in London” that no longer dealt with birds hunted within the British Isles (Haynes 1983:26).

3.10.2.III. 1885-1902: Regulation, Markets Divert beyond U.K.

By the same 1885 the head of the two earlier U.K.-based bird associations, alongside other advocates including an aging John Ruskin, facilitated the formation of a
Plumage League in response to an “appeal for an organization to champion the cause of birds of bright plumage” from the (sub)tropical world beyond the British Isles (Doughty 1975:93-95; see Haynes 1983:26; Moore-Colyer 2000:59; Clarke 2004:8; Smith 1993:190-194). At that time a bird advocate called for a “society willing to care for the [avian] beauty of the world” at large, from the United Kingdom to Japan, denouncing plumes sold in London from tropical places including the Caribbean (‘West Indies’), Brazil, and parts of Asia in and around British India (‘East Indies’) (Doughty 1975:95; see Moore-Colyer 2000:60; Clarke 2004:5). The anti-plumage league organized women into a loose association for the single purpose of curbing the use of bird feathers on hats and other products in women’s wear. The advocate who had issued the appeal himself organized the Selborne League with the aims of preserving birds, wildflowers and popular sites (Doughty 1975:95-96; Ranlett 1983:205-208; Clarke 2004:3-4). The Plumage League and the Selborne League only remained distinct momentarily, until early 1886. Within a few weeks they merged into a Selborne Society for the Preservation of Birds, Plants and Pleasant Places while initially retaining the identity of a Plumage Section with a distinct logo within the consolidated association. Among the Selborne Society’s broader purposes it listed the objective “to discourage the wearing and use for ornament of birds and their plumage, except when the birds are killed for food or reared for their plumage.” (Selborne Society as quoted in Clarke 2004:8-9, 11-12, 15-17)

A few years later, in 1889, two local associations bearing a remarkable resemblance to the former Plumage League emerged in the metropolitan suburbs of the two cities where feathered millinery workers were almost exclusively harbored within the British Isles. During that year, “a group of women in Manchester who had been unable
to join the all-male British Ornithological (sic) Union [(BOU)] established the Society for the Protection of Birds” in their city (Dalton 1993:44). Meanwhile, the Fur, Fin and Feather Folk instituted itself in London. Both groups “were for women only, closely focused on bird protection, and were opposed to the wearing of plumage and to the plumage” industry (Clarke 2004:10, 12; see Moore-Colyer 2000:62-63). The woman who founded the former association called the group into existence as a response to “the ruthless destruction of birds, especially those with ornamental plumage, which has been carried on for years all over the world in order to satisfy the demands of a barbarous fashion in millinery.” (quote in Haynes 1983:26) In 1891 the two associations formally merged, forming a much reinforced Society for the Protection of Birds (SPB)\textsuperscript{80} that relocated its base to London. Once at the Londonian U.K. capitol and clearinghouse for plumage, the SPB held its first meetings in the offices and with activists of the RSPCA. The advocate who had formerly headed the Association for the Protection of Sea Birds and who was then a member of the Plumage Section of the Selborne Society also facilitated the consolidation of the SPB in 1891, prompting the support that the Selborne Society offered to the SPB’s initial membership recruitment. The consolidated organization soon included males among its members, sympathizers and supporters. The first chair of the merged SPB and the author of at least six of the group’s major pamphlets was a man who had nationalized himself British after being raised, by parents who were U.S. nationals, in Argentina—the place of an “early life… [that] remained… vivid to him” and “reverberate[d] throughout [his] writing.” (Gillespie 2011:133; see Doughty 1975:53; Moore-Colyer 2000:59-60) By 1892 men occupied several of the

\textsuperscript{80} As traced below under the radiation process, the Society for the Protection of Birds (SPB) would become the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in 1904, later along this episode series.

As of 1898 the SPB had already grown into a major national, imperial and increasingly transnational organization that reported counting “over 20,000 ordinary members, in 152 branches… including one in the United States (in Washington) and another in Germany.” (Clarke 2004:13-14) By that time the association, which had relocated its headquarters to premises rented from the Zoological Society of London, had been establishing branches in U.K. territories such as present-day Australia, Shanghai in China, Sri Lanka and India (Doughty 1975:61, 75, 154; Haynes 1983:26-28; Moore-Colyer 2000:65; see Palmer 1903a:37-38; 1903b:105-106; Dutcher 1904:106-108; RSPB 1911:13, 28, 61-64; Pearson 1912:320-322). In southern Australia, during 1894 the SPB established a branch that soon joined the South Australian Ornithological Association in successfully advocating for a bird protection bill that the subnational government of South Australia passed into legislation in 1900. By 1899 the SPB had also established a branch at the Chinese feather-exporting center in present-day Shanghai (China)—presumably within the British extraterritorial zone of the Shanghai International Settlement—from where it advocated that “the Government” protect pheasant species which millinery exports allegedly threatened with extinction (RSPB 1911:28; see Doughty 1975:75; Moore-Colyer 2000:69). As for India and Sri Lanka, from 1895 to 1900 the SPB established four branches “to promote bird protection and arouse more general interest in the subject” within the colonies (Palmer 1903a:37-38). Once in South Asia, these organizations soon joined the London-based East India Association in persuasively advocating for the ban on commercial exports of feathers and skins of nearly
all birds—i.e. all species other than ostriches—that the U.K. government of India instituted over the 1900-1902 period. In response to that sort of campaign advocacy, “[s]imilar laws, more or less drastic, followed” over the next several years in what were then the U.K. colonies of British New Guinea, British Guiana, Egypt and Australia (Haynes 1983:28-29; see RSPB 1915b:101).

3.10.2. IV. 1902-08: Activists Confront Industry in U.K.

As these bird campaigners extended their confrontation with the hunted plumage industry onto and beyond British colonies including India their advocacy reproduced the same framing that the anti-plumage movement had put forth in the British Isles during the late 1860s, albeit rephrased in testimonies drawn from more tropical contexts such as India itself. While editorializing in early 1900, a resonating commentator in British India best expressed activists’ utilitarian and ecological framing according to which India “was paying for women’s feathers by a sacrifice of human food” (RSPB 1913b:81-82): “The ruthless destruction of insectivorous birds with gay plumage causes such waste, since it deprives growing food-crops of the protection afforded by a watchful and efficient bird-police against multitudinous insect thieves.” (quote in RSPB 1911:62; see Doughty 1975:58-63, 90-91; Moore-Colyer 2000:68-69; see also Pearson 1913:76-80) As discussed above under the process of global issue framing, over the next dozen years this continuity would intensify. Bird conservationists eventually framed their avian cause in terms that amounted to ecosystem services which birds offered agriculture and public health across the U.K. and to a lesser extent the non-U.K. tropics or subtropics.
Industrial interest groups of the fashion in hunted plumage confronted these
“claims that they were killing ecologically as well as economically beneficial creatures.”
(Doughty 1975:58-63, 90-91) At a minimum industry spokespersons repeatedly
expressed the defense that they took precautions “against damage to agricultural
interests” by seldom using insectivorous species for plumage, instead sourcing pest or
‘useless’ bird species (Doughty 1975:60). At the bolder end of the spectrum in industrial
counter-offensives, a feather industrialist who would play “a pivotal role in orchestrating”
a “well-coordinated opposition organised by the London Chamber of Commerce” from
1908 to 1921 “insisted that farming itself was inimical to bird life.” (Doughty 1975:60-61; Moore-Colyer 2000:66-67) He “challenged” bird advocates “to present clear and
unequivocal evidence to support their case… that if stocks of exotic [(i.e. tropical)] birds
were declining (which he doubted), the plumage trade rather than the general advance of
colonisation and agriculture was responsible.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:66-67) The industry
spokesperson alleged that “the spread of urban places and agriculture,” rather than
plumage hunters, depleted and brought to extinction many ‘wild’ bird species (Doughty
1975:61).

Confrontation between the millinery industry and the anti-plumage movement in
the United Kingdom prevailed throughout the three decades from the late 1860s to the
early 1900s, while they were respectively opposing and proposing domestic regulations
of bird millinery. Anti-plumage activists combatively denounced the millinery industry
while in turn industrial actors including the Textile Section of the London Chamber of
Commerce and multiple French-based unions named as variants of Syndical Chambers
(or Chambres Syndicales) cruelly slapped back in kind—branding conservationist
advocacy with such derogatory terms as hypocritically self-righteous, “constant dropping[s]… and reiterated misstatements.” (Doughty 1973:143-144; 1975:51-53, 55-57, 63, 65-66, 93; Moore-Colyer 2000:67-69; see Pearson 1913:76-80) In an illustrative confrontation, during a time when plumage “dealers at Indian ports… and certain merchants and brokers in Europe or elsewhere… indulge[d] in vituperative language” against the policy proposal of the millinery export ban in British India, a millinery spokesperson declared that “the action of the [SPB] in ‘obtaining’ the Notification issued by the Government of India in 1902… ‘can hardly be criticized too severely’” for the stimulus the SPB advocacy gave to smuggling (RSPB 1911:61). Anti-plumage activists counter-attacked the millinery industry, publishing their responses to this criticism among countless others. In this instance that is illustrative of countless others, the SPB and its collaborators exposed the “vile business” of milliners in London for failure to refuse “to receive, to sell, or to make their profit on [Indian] smuggled goods;” instead killing “what they can, where they can, and when they can, … mak[ing] all the profit they can.” (RSPB 1911:49, 63-64; see Doughty 1975:93)

To be sure, during these early decades, which preceded regulation that would actually be enforced across the U.K. empire, there had been “fundamental differences in [tactical] methods” between the SPB and the Selborne Society; “a fundamental difference of approach” between “confrontation” for the former and “compromise” for the latter (Clarke 2004:18-19, 32-34, 36-39; see Doughty 1975:96). The male-led Selborne Society had repeatedly distanced itself from the tactics of the female-led SPB and of its own partial precursor, the female-only Plumage League: Selbornians kept their association at arms length from “the personal commitments of pledged societies” and the
militant “activism of the women’s suffrage movement.” (Clarke 2004:16, 19, 32-34, 36-39) This gendered distinction between reformist and revolutionary tactics amounts to a more polarized equivalent to the roles of the U.S.-based AOU Committee and Audubon Society, respectively. As traced below, in another parallel to the U.S. episode explained above, these differences would subsequently “become manifest in major conflicts… between the Selborne Society and the” SPB over their evolving relationships with milliners (Clarke 2004:19). These conflicts would follow deliberations of policies that would de facto regulate bird millinery domestic to the U.K. empire.

That said, the prevalence of an initial confrontation between bird conservationists as a whole and industrialists is reflected in the following considerations with regard to these initial decades of the campaign in the United Kingdom. Until approximately 1900, the confrontational approach held most sway in the considerable liaison and occasional coordination between the two societies: the upper hand of the SPB in their collaborative advocacy to discontinue feather use in the U.K. military; substantial overlap in memberships and benefactors except for the SPB’s larger support base; representation of the SPB into the Selborne Society’s governing body; and a Plumage Section that had not yet been entirely absorbed into the Selbornian association (Clarke 2004:24-25). In short, it was this early period that set a tone of “mutual recriminations” in “a conflict between genuine humanitarian sentiment and the interests of freedom of trade and business.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:62)
As a result of continued activism in the United Kingdom, at least seven similar bills to prohibit the import, the possession for sale or the exchange of bird plumage were considered in the said polity every year from 1908 to 1914; and four other such bills would once again be considered from 1920 to 1921 (Doughty 1975:51-53, 116-125, 134-136, 158; see Anon. 1914a; RSPB 1913c:97-101). Only two of these bills, introduced in the 1912-1913 biennium, remained at the domestic scale of the U.K. empire-state. Unlike earlier, simultaneous and later regulatory proposals, these two bills intended “to prohibit the sale, hire, or exchange of the plumage and skins of wild birds from” U.K. colonial territories into the British Isles (Doughty 1975:118-220). The historiography suggests that as early as 1903 an anti-hunting activist group, the Humanitarian League, had drafted and privately introduced into the U.K. parliament at least one bill proscribing the fashion-related possession and sale of bird species contained in a schedule. However, at that point no legislator had reportedly brought this sort of bill into parliamentary consideration (Doughty 1975:118; Tichelar 2006:218). Each of the several regulations that the U.K. parliament considered prior to World War I (WWI) eventually failed despite citizenry, royal and other high-level official support for the activist proponents. These advocacy failures were largely due to the confrontational campaigns of industry interest groups highlighting commercial losses—to offshore competitors—that would presumably follow the potential regulation. From the very first of these regulatory deliberations, in 1908, British industry associations confronted an activist proposal regarding domestic policy with a multilateral policy alternative that their lobbying
presented as necessary internationally. They vilified the activist-supported bill containing provisions to unilaterally prohibit the import and sale of plumage into the United Kingdom as a regulation “the effect [of which] would be to divert” feather production and jobs from the empire-state to other European markets such as France and Germany; and exalted interstate treaties as necessary to save birds from the plumage trade (Haynes 1983:28; see Doughty 1975:51, 57, 120; Charnovitz 1994:496; Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 66-69; see also RSPB 1911:14, 35-36; Pearson 1912:320-323; RSPB 1914a:21-22).

3.10.2. VI. 1909-13: Reconciliation Press U.K. State to Coerce

Two times when such a bill were brought under consideration, a U.K.-style tripartite committee—made up of state, industry and bird advocate members—was assigned the task of suggesting regulatory solutions; and the same international committee recommendation emerged as key. A salient committee recommendation was for international cooperation to spread potential plumage regulation to other nation-states. The recommendations out of the bills led to U.K. governmental efforts, in at least 1909 and 1912, to convene with other states so as “to elicit international co-operation in the traffic of plumage.” (Doughty 1975:118-119; Anon. 1914a)

The efforts of the U.K. government “received unfavorable replies from France, Germany, Italy and elsewhere.” (Doughty 1975:118-119; Anon. 1914a) The government of the United Kingdom did not manage to pressure governments in France, Germany and elsewhere with sufficient persuasive or coercive strength to spread the regulations that it
was considering.\textsuperscript{81} In its later attempt—begun in 1912—the U.K. government reportedly invited its quasi-sovereign colonies and other nation-states “to a conference in London upon the condition that every country attending should do so on the express understanding that it should prohibit the [imported] entry into that country of the skins and plumage of wild birds, and… undertake legislation for the prohibition of their export.” (RSPB 1914a:5, 8) Apart from the U.K.’s so-called ‘self-governing colonies,’ China and the United States accepted the invitation; Denmark, France and Greece refused to convene; and the conference seems to have been cancelled before Austria-Hungary, Holland, Russia and Spain could renew their acceptance of an earlier U.K. invitation—to a similar summit that had also derailed upon French refusal. Then again, according to a U.K. legislator who supported a ban in imports of bird parts for plumage purposes, the steps that Germany and France took by early 1914 to stop hunts of fashionable birds respectively in present-day Papua New Guinea and Madagascar owed to transnational pressures from the U.K. government (RSPB 1914a:2-3, 5, 8; see Doughty 1975:86; Moore-Colyer 2000:63; see also RSPB 1911:65-71).

\textsuperscript{81} Nonetheless, activists in favor of a plumage ban proved compelling enough to trigger a chain of events which amounted to a role reversal in U.K.-France relations. The RSPB played a leading role in the reversal (Doughty 1975:115-117). Not long before this episode, in which the U.K. government endeavored to lead its French counterpart into international cooperation, France provided leadership for an international bird convention initially drafted in 1895, concluded in 1902 and entered into force in 1905. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom “tended to prefer working on specific topics addressed incrementally, without formal intergovernmental agreements.” While the existing historiography does not allow for evaluation (see Boardman 2006:38-40; 1981:27-28), it indicates that such French leadership may have been an effort to set up a vacuous or “decoy” international treaty that would preempt another with more regulatory meaning (see Dimitrov 2005). If so, the French-U.K. role reversal would be merely superficial. On the one hand, not only did the treaty-drafting process lack expertise, but also its provisions were flexible (rather than binding), applied exclusively to birds “useful to agriculture,” and were built into France’s own legislative provisions on birds and agriculture. On the other hand, the treaty was also considered too intrusive in that it regulated not so “clearly identifiable ‘international’ issues.” (see Boardman 2006:38-40; 1981:27-28)
An occasion when the U.K. parliament seriously considered a cabinet-sponsored bill against the import and possession of bird parts for millinery during 1913-1914 synchronized with the reconciliation of a “rather strange assortment of bedfellows” that jumped “in bed with the enemy” activist or business (Doughty 1975:122-125; Clarke 2004:39; see Moore-Colyer 2000:67). At this juncture, bird advocates reconciled into a Committee for the Economic Preservation of Birds (CEPB) that became “a British equivalent of earlier millinery rapprochements undertaken… in the United States.” (Doughty 1975:125) The proposed U.K. plumage legislation would have prohibited the import, possession and sale of plumage from bird species not “named in an official imported-under-license list.” (Doughty 1975:122-125; Moore-Colyer 2000:69-70)

In keeping with the diversion process, the CEPB generally amounted to a transnational contract that restricted the use of some millinery species. Industrialists conceded private embargoes in a venture that “was clearly an attempt to secure voluntary agreement to offset legislation… [under consideration and] to secure a ‘level playing field’ for the international activities of the plumassiers.” (Clarke 2004:42; Moore-Colyer 2000:67) Activists offered their own concessions within the CEPB, reciprocating the signed commitment from milliners to embargo certain bird species. For instance, bird conservationists who joined the CEPB on behalf of U.K.-based advocacy organizations such as the Selborne Society and the Zoological Society of London committed to quit

---

82 In other words, “plumage traders and feather brokers… were desperate to frustrate [U.K.] parliamentary efforts to prohibit the trade and in the end would be prepared to accept any compromise involving internal regulation [(i.e. self-regulation)] which would regulate rather than destroy their businesses.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:67)
their support to U.K. parliamentary efforts intended at prohibiting plumage imports, a support that dated back to at least 1908:

“If as a result of the Committee’s investigation it is found that the species used for trade are neither in danger of extermination nor serious reduction and are not necessary to agriculture, this Committee does not and will not make any objection to the use of plumages of Wild Birds for millinery or decorative purposes, and will not directly or indirectly support any Bill that penalises British trade and leaves Continental trade untouched. The Committee will as far as possible discourage irresponsible attacks upon the trade in feathers and will publicly deny those charges and allegations published in the press which this Committee may find in the course of its investigations to be untrue or unfounded.” (Clarke 2004:41)

Indeed, the now Royal Society for the Preservation of Birds (RSPB) repeatedly requested the support of the Selborne Society in its advocacy to approve the plumage bill in the U.K. parliament, however as a CEPB partner the Selbornians refused take any further action on that confrontation with milliners (Clarke 2004:39-43; see RSPB 1913b:83-84). It is hardly surprising that the synchronized appearance of the CEPB in the wake of the U.K. regulatory bill fades away in the current historical scholarship and accessible archives soon after a small cohort of U.K. legislators stalled the parliamentary agenda long enough for the bill to fail, as concerns about WWI loomed larger than those about the bird protection in the bill (Doughty 1975:52-53, 122-125; Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 67-70, 73; Clarke 2004; see RSPB 1913b:83-84; 1913c:97-103; 1914a:6, 9-10, 16; Massingham 1919; Duerden 1920b).

While the CEPB lasted, its “attempt to bring together” millinery interest groups and the “anti-plumage movement” did reconcile the Textile Section of the London Chamber of Commerce with U.K.-based conservationists including the Selborne Society

---

83 Again, as traced below under the radiation process, the Society for the Protection of Birds (SPB) discussed earlier along this episode series had become the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) by 1904.
and the Zoological Society of London (Doughty 1972:4; 1975:122-125). The joint association reconciling these Baptists and bootleggers applauded the conservationist efforts of groups such as the Bombay Natural History Museum and the present-day National Society for Nature Protection (SNPN) to raise in captivity bird species hitherto hunted for millinery feathers, breeding efforts located largely within the U.K. and French colonial borders of present-day India and South Africa as well as Algeria and Tunisia, respectively (Doughty 1972:9-10; 1975:7, 52, 53, 57, 76-79, 122-125; Haynes 1983:29-30; Moore-Colyer 2000:67-69; Stein 2008:90; see Duerden 1920a; 1920b). The CEPB also labeled as ‘purist’ activist associations—including the U.K.-based RSPB and the U.S.-based PWLPF—that refused to join them; that condemned millinery use of feathers from most bird species; and that continued to confront industry interests while now denouncing the joint bedfellows as a “cheap stalking horse for the London feather trade.” (Doughty 1975:53, 122-125; see Clarke 2004:39-43; see also Hornaday 1913b; RSPB 1913b:83-84; 1913c:101-103; 1913d:114-116; Grant 1915[1913]:89-90) For activist groups such as the male-dominated Selborne Society the cause of bird protection was served “not by confronting the plumage industry but by supporting the millinery trade’s efforts to switch sources from wild to captive bred species.” (Clarke 2004)

3.10.2.VIII. 1913-14: U.K. Reconciliation Presses Abroad

The reconciliation among activists and industrialists also put transnational pressure on polities that exported bird parts for use as millinery. The CEPB networked “consular officials and respected naturalists in a variety of countries [who] advised the Committee on the population dynamics of particular species.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:67-
Among the naturalists that the CEPB attempted to recruit stood two French-based bird advocacy groups, the present-day SNPN and the League for the Protection of Birds (LPO), both of which refused invitations from interest groups of the plumage industry to form a CEPB equivalent organization in France—a Committee for the Economic Study of Birds or a Committee for Scientific Economy (see e.g., RSPB 1913d:115; Grant 1915[1913]:89-90). In any event, wherever the CEPB considered a bird species to be under threat it informed “the Intersyndical Chamber of Paris and equivalent trade bodies in Berlin and Vienna” such that these industry groups in France, Germany and Austria-Hungary had their millinery members halt “trade in that species voluntarily.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:67-69) Through its information and commodity networks, the CEPB “managed to create a Europe-wide web of confidence among plumage traders which, it was widely believed, would evaporate in the event of a unilateral British trade ban.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:67-69) Indeed, the CEPB “operated such that less than six and no more than twelve months notice was given to the trade in respect of scheduled [embargoes in] birds so that traders and brokers could notify clients and dispose of existing stock.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:73) Even activist associations that opposed the CEPB implicitly recognized that the committee’s embargoes put imperial and transnational pressures respectively on the U.K. colonies—reportedly, Australia, Egypt and India—and the nation-states from where bird exports were being abandoned. According to reports from the RSPB, the embargoes included seven bird species, with an estimated half being species which had allegedly been exported illegally, over CEPB operations that lasted for at least a year and a half (RSPB 1913b:83-84; 1913c:101-103; 1914a:6, 9-10, 16).
Meanwhile, during deliberations that intensified consideration of at least four parliamentary bills in the 1912-1914 period, there was additional reconciliation among activists and industrialists in pursuit of transnational pressure (see Doughty 1975:118-119). At least two other reconciliatory trends involved the RSPB and an influential advocate, formerly affiliated with the East India Association, each of which had continuously confronted plumage hunters since 1889 and 1884, respectively.

A key advocate proceeded to reconcile his new institutional affiliation—the Royal Colonial Institute (RCI)—with industrialists such as the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce and entire colonies including the ostrich-farming South Africa in order to prod the government of the United Kingdom to put the transnational pressure of a U.K. import ban on plumage exporting colonies and other polities (Palmer 1903a:37-38; Anon. 1911:81-82; RSPB 1911:14, 34, 36, 61-62; Pearson 1912:320-322; 1913:76-80; RSPB 1912a:36-37; Johnston 1913:428-429; see Doughty 1975:150-151; Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 68, 73; Clarke 2004:40; Stein 2008:i, 196, 242). In a published claim that illustrates this reconciliation, the RCI campaigner countered: “The argument that the prohibition of the importation of feathers will throw many hands out of employment [in the United Kingdom] is fallacious; on the contrary, there will be an increased demand for labor for the making of ornaments for hat-

---

84 The Royal Colonial Institute was later renamed as the Royal Empire Society before arriving at its present-day name of Royal Commonwealth Society.
85 Alongside Australia and New Zealand, the advocate included South Africa—by far the world’s leading producer of ostrich feathers at the time—among the three ‘self-governing colonies’ for which he submitted a petition asking the U.K. government to ban the entry of illegally exported plumage from the colonies into ports at the British Isles.
trimmings as substitutes for the excluded feathers, and for the making up of the feathers that are not excluded.” (Buckland as quoted in Pearson 1913:76-80) The advocate went on to challenge U.K. bill opponents who claimed that if the legislative project were to be instituted no other European polity would follow the “lead” of the United Kingdom. Instead, he contended that British moral pressure would compel other polities to follow suit:

“Let Great Britain give the lead to the other European powers in this great civic and economic movement, and the wild bird life of India and elsewhere will be saved.” (Buckland as quoted in RSPB 1912a:37)

“The people of the United States gave their answer yesterday [through the U.S. act in 1913]; Great Britain must put the question tomorrow. The salvation of the birds of the world has become the Englishman’s new burden, and it is a burden that no Englishman can any longer ignore. The duty of the hour is for Great Britain to lead the way in Europe now as she had led the way in the past in every great moral step… Let her do this, and the rest is assured. She did a noble deed when she freed the slave from his chains. She can do a noble deed now by freeing the bird from the clutches of greed.” (Buckland as quoted in Pearson 1913:76-80)

In other words, during 1913 the RCI advocate epitomized the “prohibitionists” who promoted a ban on plumage hunts through the claim that once the United Kingdom “bestrrove the moral high ground” transnational “pressure would inevitably be brought upon other governments.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:68)

As for the remaining instance of reconciliation and pressure, the RSPB issued advocacy to the U.K. prime minister that justified its support for the regulation expressed in the bill precisely on grounds that revolved around industrialist bedfellows and prospective pressures. In terms of reconciliation, as the association went well beyond merely exempting ostrich milliners from its advocacy it deepened a trend that had begun among plumage bill supporters from the 1908 deliberations onwards. The RSPB now leaned on a rationale of resource substitutability to pro-actively claim that the regulation
“would benefit the trade of Great Britain and the Colonies [e.g., South Africa] by stimulating the sale of ostrich feathers and of manufactured ribbons… and other ornaments.” (RSPB 1912a:36; see Doughty 1975:62; Moore-Colyer 2000:63; see also RSPB 1914a:21-22) Conversely, from the side of industrial actors, in late 1913 the Ostrich Farmers’ Association of South Africa assured RSPB activists that London feather traders could no longer include ostrich farmers in South Africa within the ranks of the plumage dealers’ continued confrontation with the anti-plumage movement over the plumage bill (Gardiner & Dewar 1920:564). With regard to transnational pressure, advocating shortly before the U.S. enactment, the association contended that the U.K. regulation “would be a signal encouragement to the United States of America, where similar efforts [were] being made” and “would have a powerful influence on other European countries, which await[ed] Great Britain’s lead in this matter.” (RSPB 1911:35-36; 1912a:36)

Interest groups for the hunted plumage industry, including the London Chamber of Commerce which eventually reconciled itself into the reformist CEPB, remained irreconcilable toward this revolutionary sort of bird-protective advocacy, and worked to undermine these activist predictions that other polities once pressured would follow the lead of an U.K. plumage import ban. In 1911 one such industry spokesperson had challenged these claims by equating bird-advocates’ forecasts to problems of collective action such as spirals of escalation in international insecurity: “Cease building Dreadnoughts [(military ships then newly superior in technology)], say some of the Admiralty’s critics, and every other [foreign] power will do the same. You do not hesitate to denounce this foolish observation in one place, but is it less foolish in
another?” (Downham as quoted in Moore-Colyer 2000:68) Clearly, the different expectations of plumage interest groups in the ostrich and in the hunted bird industries—as to the market effects that the regulation under consideration would entail for each trade—led the two actors into incompatible reconciliations, with distinct bird protective groups.

3.10.2.X. 1912-14: U.K. Reconciliation Presses Abroad

The RSPB simultaneously applied other transnational pressure through its activist collaborators across borders. Not only did the association publicize an overview of plumage regulatory trends in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland that encouraged these polities in their alleged following of U.K. leadership, but it also devoted “considerable publicity to… conditions in Dutch New Guinea” and to advocacy of policy change in the plumage-hunting permits that the imperial government of the Netherlands issued for its colony (Doughty 1975:86; see RSPB 1911:65-71; 1913c:97-101; 1913d:114-116). It was at this juncture that the RSPB echoed the disputing reply of the present-day SNPN in France to claims which alleged that the U.K. bill would discourage industry in the vicinity of Paris: “The interests of workpeople will not be affected. … They have many other openings for their activity. It is only a very small batch of speculators… that can have [(sic)] to suffer. They are very rich.” (RSPB 1914a:21-22; Gardiner & Dewar 1920:564)

The campaigner of the RCI who had proved influential for the protection of birds in the colonial United Kingdom also went on to increasingly transnationalize his own advocacy and affiliation so as to put direct activist pressure upon numerous other polities
worldwide (Stone 1899:56; Palmer 1903a:37-38; Anon. 1911:81-82; RSPB 1911:14, 36, 61-62; 1912a:37; Pearson 1912:320-322; 1913:76-80; Manners-Smith & Johnston 1914:351; see Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 65-66, 71-73; Robin 2002:5). In collaboration with a leading activist of the U.S.-based Audubon Societies, during 1910 he had organized the formation of an International Committee for Bird Protection as an appendage to the present-day International Ornithologists’ Union (IOU), in Germany at the latter’s fifth International Ornithological Congress. This transatlantic committee, amounting to a transnationalization of the AOU Committee in the United States, had been an aspiration dating back to the late 1890s but only formed precisely at the earliest transnational congress that ornithologists held in the aftermath of the 1908 regulatory deliberations in the United Kingdom. The IOU Congress “had passed a resolution affirming the need for laws prohibiting the importation of plumage into European countries.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:72; see RSPB 1913c:97-101) The IOU-offshoot committee had been formed with the purpose “to consider the means for obtaining international laws for the protection of birds killed for the plume-market.” (RSPB 1911:36) Reportedly, “those who [were] doing… voluntary work” in transnational advocacy entities such as the IOU’s spinoff were located in Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (Pearson 1912:320-322; see RSPB 1911:36).

86 The committee has also been known as the International Committee of Bird Protection, which is not to be confused with a descendant transnational organization that would later emerge as a standalone group with this variation of the name. During the campaign the present-day International Ornithologists’ Union was named the International Ornithologists’ Committee.
By 1912, the campaigner who now advocated on behalf of the RCI and the IOU’s International Committee for Bird Protection mobilized the direct transnational pressures of activists themselves to promote a second attempt at the U.K. legislation. He now advocated for the U.K. bill through the forecast that the regulation would strengthen the direct transnational pressures that his advocacy network was applying on other polities. In the words of the advocate, “if a Plumage Bill were passed in [the United Kingdom], it would make it easy for those who are doing a voluntary work of inestimable value to the [U.K.] Empire to procure the passage of similar Bills in other European Parliaments. As it is, the vicious example set by Great Britain paralyzes every effort in that direction.” (Buckland as quoted in Pearson 1912:320-322)

From the advent of the IOU-spinoff committee in 1910 onwards the campaigner affiliated with both the committee itself and the RCI intensified the extension of his advocacy beyond U.K. borders, applying direct transnational pressure on other polities including France, Germany, Nepal, the Netherlands and Venezuela (Anon. 1911:81-82; RSPB 1911:36; 1912a:37; Pearson 1912:320-322; 1913:76-80; Manners-Smith & Johnston 1914:351; Gardiner & Dewar 1920:564; see Moore-Colyer 2000:65).

Correspondents of his within the U.S.-based Audubon Societies recognized this personal-institutional trend in a thorough chronicle that is worth quoting at length:

“Largely as a result of his personal visits to Germany and his constant communications with bird students there, that country [in 1912 had] one of the most wide-awake national bird-protective organizations… in the Eastern Hemisphere. His work is well known in France and at the present time he is assisting in carrying forward a very important bird-protective movement in Holland. He is equally interested in the protection of American bird life, and the information that he has gathered and made public relative to the destruction of
As of the mid 1910s the RCI and IOU campaigner flaunted the bird advocacy of his network collaborators at Dutch and German colonies respectively in present-day Indonesia and Papua New Guinea as substantiation for pronouncing himself best informed about current trends in the plumage policymaking of continental Europe. By that point he also himself attempted to submit bird advocacy to a prime minister of Nepal who was visiting the British Isles.

3.10.2.XI. 1916-19: U.K. State Coerces Other Polities

In 1916 more than 200 U.K. legislators signed a petition that requested the polity’s wartime government officials to prohibit the import of plumage from hunted birds considered to be “space-consuming cargo” that was “a luxury unbecoming a wartime economy.” (Doughty 1972:11; 1975:25, 119, 134, 155, 158) The U.K. planners of the war effort included limitations upon ornamental plumage in an import prohibition that they issued during the following year. The wartime officials at the U.K. Board of Trade lifted the restrictions in late 1919, upon the end of the war.

3.10.2.XII. Mid-1919 - 1921: Reconciled Induce U.K. to Coerce

Anti-plumage advocacy remobilized in the United Kingdom after imports of feathers and skins from hunted birds resumed their flow into the polity. The renewed

---

87 To be sure, this study can suggestively specify the German-based organization that the Audubon activist implicitly recognized here. One can safely presume it to have been the League for Bird Protection (BfV), although several other bird advocacy groups had been organized in Germany at the end of the 19th century after the pioneering emergence of the shorter-lived Association for the Protection of Bird Life (Verein zum Schutz der Vogelwelt) in 1875 with a membership that included leading ornithologists (Dominick 1986:262-263, 270; Markham 2008:62).
imports brought along reminders of the U.K. movement’s failure to enact “prohibitionist” bills during the pre-WWI years. Interpreted through that memory, the revival of the global economic flow “prompted the formation of a full-blown extra-Parliamentary lobbying organization, the Plumage Bill Group” (PBG) (Moore-Colyer 2000:66, 70). This public-private network of parliamentarians and citizens advocated the enactment of a plumage bill as much through governmental efforts among politicians as via promotion of societal support for “the cause” of the legislative proposal alongside constituents (Moore-Colyer 2000:66, 70; see Massingham 1919). Moreover, a semester after the end of WWI the RSPB even anticipated the plumage import policy that the U.K. wartime officials eventually relapsed another semester later. In mid-1919 the association advocated that the U.K. government continue “wartime limitations upon imports of wild bird plumage.” (Doughty 1975:119, 134-136) The RSPB not only met with the chief official at the U.K. Board of Trade “to seek prompt support for legislation to end all wild-bird feather imports.” (Doughty 1975:119, 134-136) It also addressed a petition to the U.K. prime minister signed by “campaigners in the bird movement” who expressed a desire to prevent hunting of all birds for plumage use through the request of an import prohibition bill similar to the one nearly enacted in 1914 (Doughty 1975:119, 134-136).

As four versions of the potential plumage regulations came under the consideration of the U.K. parliament from 1920 to 1921, two earlier variants of reconciliation became competing regulatory models. The reformist reconciliation led by the Selborne Society and the London Chamber of Commerce competed against the revolutionary reconciliation headed by the RSPB and the Ostrich Farmers’ Association, over regulatory tools that the U.K. government considered enacting into its own policy
instruments. In the interim period from the 1913-1914 to the 1920-1921 bill deliberations, U.K. ostrich farmers and the Royal Colonial Institute (RCI) had gravitated from the regulatory framework of the latter toward that of the former. Whereas earlier on interest groups representing the ostrich industry in U.K. South Africa had expected that bird-protective legislation would prove to offer an industry-protectionist boost to the demand for ostrich plumes, they no longer anticipated the same scenario. A crisis in the South African ostrich feather industry had emerged in the aftermath of the 1913-1914 U.K. bill and the 1913 U.S. act—which had banned U.S. imports of feathers from hunted birds. Industry actors had come to attribute a plummeting demand for ostrich feathers to their having suffered collateral damage in the conflict between anti-plumage activists and the plumage industry from hunted or ‘wild’ birds. In other words, once the U.S. had instituted a regulatory ban and the U.K. considered banning imports of feathers from hunted birds, plumage “buyers were inclined to make no distinction between types of plumes or birds,” hunted or otherwise (Stein 2008:23-24, 51, 80, 138-139; see Stein 2007a:802-803; Duerden 1920a; Gardiner & Dewar 1920). As a result, by 1920-1921 U.K. ostrich farmers and the RCI gravitated from their earlier reconciliation with the RSPB on the basis of a statist regulatory ban toward another with the Selborne anchored on adjustable and multi-stakeholder regulations along the lines of the CEPB. U.K. parliamentarians and constituents followed this trend, drifting toward a bill that for all intents and purposes incorporated the CEPB into a governmental corporatist committe.

During deliberations that culminated in the 1921 U.K. act, the RSPB and the Plumage Bill Group (PBG) did attempt to reiterate an alliance with ostrich farmers in U.K. South Africa. To no avail, the activist entities arched back to the pre-WWI years to
reassert the common ground that their advocacy had found with the Ostrich Farmers’ Association of South Africa.

In 1920 spokespersons for the RSPB and the PBG disputed a caution from an ostrich researcher who was affiliated with the RCI and had collaborated with the association in South Africa. The world’s only scholar who held an academic position in ostrich research warned that renewed plumage bills “would be viewed with alarm” in the U.K. colony where he claimed the ostrich industry had suffered a “serious slump” partly as a result of regulatory risks that the 1913-1914 U.K. bill “engendered.” (Duerden 1920a; see Stein 2008:2-5, 48, 51, 138-139, 157) In response, the advocates from the RSPB and PBG distanced the conditions in the feather industries of hunted birds from those of ostriches as “totally different,” contended that legislated decreases in the use of hunted feathers would continue to actually increase demand for ostrich plumes, and publicized a reconciliatory letter that the Ostrich Farmers’ Association of South Africa had sent to the preservationist group back in 1913 (Gardiner & Dewar 1920).

The PBG and RSPB also discussed new policy alternatives that ostrich industry actors proposed, but the activists’ exchange ultimately turned out to be equally in vain for their industrial reconciliation, illustrating how by 1920 the CEPB evolved into the preferred regulatory and reconciliatory option for both the RCI and ostrich interest groups. The RCI ostrich researcher suggested that bird-protective groups would “better” serve their cause not through the pursuit of “a repressive policy,” but rather through support for efforts similar to his own experiments on “conditions under which [hunted] plumage-birds could be reared on an industrial basis”—avoiding extinction in the same way that ostriches bred in captivity had allegedly been spared from hunters (Duerden
The RSPB advocate dismissed the suggestion in a manner characteristic of the association’s disdain for accomplishments that the present-day SNPN and the Bombay Natural History Society had supported in breeding bird species hunted for their feathers in Africa and South Asia, respectively (see Doughty 1975:74-80; Haynes 1983:29-30). He deemed avicultural experiments to be too preliminary to be relevant as a basis for immediate action on urgent concerns. The PBG coordinator contended that his network considered the suggestion “unacceptable” “for several reasons,” specifying the most “conclusive” one to be the group’s expectation that—in the words of its leading activist—“it would be impossible for the [U.K.] Customs to differentiate between the feathers of those birds which had been ‘farmed’ and of those which had fallen victims to the ruthless plume-hunter.” (Gardiner & Dewar 1920) The PBG advocate went on to relate the captive breeding proposal of the RCI affiliate based in U.K. South Africa to operations that the CEPB carried out in 1914 but that allegedly the U.K. government at the time “considered… to be unworkable.” (Gardiner & Dewar 1920; see Moore-Colyer 2000:63-64, 66)

A response that the RCI avicultural researcher offered as a rejoinder to bird activists concludes this illustration of how U.K. industrialists in and beyond South Africa replaced their regulatory and reconciliatory preferences—evolving from the revolutionary (i.e. preservationist) regulations that the RSPB advocated to the reformist (i.e. conservationist) laws that the Selborne Society promoted. The ostrich scholar affiliated with the RCI implicitly referred to the work of the Selbornian CEPB to validate his regulatory proposal of a modification to the U.K. plumage bill that he claimed “would be a simple matter” to carry out and “would meet the needs of all”—both the hunted
plumage industry and bird advocates (Duerden 1920b; see Gardiner & Dewar 1920). In support of his suggestion to bird advocates, the experimental aviculturalist commended the CEPB’s “list of prohibited plumage [that] had been agreed upon by the trade [(i.e. industry)] representatives in the leading European capitals.” (Duerden 1920b) He advised bird protectors that “instead of asking for a prohibition of import of every kind of plumage (except ostrich and eider-down)” they “agree upon a list of birds… and then have the list appended to the Bill as a schedule of prohibitions… [that]… could be [adjusted] as circumstances demanded.” (Duerden 1920b) The RCI ostrich researcher claimed that such a bill amendment would reconcile the support of both bird advocates—for whose “activities” it would provide “a real stimulus”—and a future industry in newly “domesticated plumage”—for whose experimental prospects in U.K. India, U.K. South Africa and other “parts of Africa” the amendment would hold open “the door” of imports into the British Isles (Duerden 1920b; see Doughty 1975:136-138).

In the context of a favorable empowerment from transnational consumer markets that deflated some of the clout of industrial opposition to regulation, there were two major differences between the bill that the U.K. parliament approved in 1921 and the one that it had first considered in 1908 and then reconsidered in more detail during 1913-1914. In terms of context, the disuse of unbecoming feathers during WWI and activism traceable through the process of radiation below generated transnational consumer markets that consisted of more opportune conditions for regulation. In other words, “the plumage trade had been virtually eliminated by 1921 as changing tastes in millinery reduced demand for feathers. The importation of a mere 35,877 pounds weight of fancy feathers [into the British Isles] in 1920 reflected the predilections of a liberated post-war
younger generation who reacted against the ludicrous and tasteless plumes and feathers of their parents.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:71; see Haynes 1983:30; Stein 2008:24) Under these changed conditions, the legislation both broadened and narrowed while being updated in line with the regulation of the Committee for the Economic Preservation of Birds (CEPB), which had operated during some of the interim period (Doughty 1975:117, 135-138; Moore-Colyer 2000:62-63, 66-67, 69-72). Broadening, the act that emerged from a later bill added precisely one such scheduled list and multi-stakeholder Plumage Committee.\(^8\) Narrowing, the act removed plumage possession and sale from the prohibition which in the end merely applied to the importing flow itself.

At the outset of the 1920-1921 biennium the PBG, alongside other bird and women’s advocacy groups, suffered a disappointment upon the defeat of the earliest and most lengthily deliberated among the four different plumage bills considered over these two years (Doughty 1975:117, 120, 135-138; Moore-Colyer 2000:62-63, 66-67, 69-72). While the parliament was considering this earlier bill it received a petition from at least half of the directly concerned U.K.-based workforce, of which historically 90 percent was female. The petition was signed by “2,286 plumage workers who urged that no legislation be passed until a Bill were drafted which protected both the birds and their livelihood.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:62-63, 72) Associations of hunted plumage businesses also opposed the recommencing bill through justifications phrased in the name of the conservationist cause. These industrial actors not only cautioned against bans that “would do little to conserve stocks of wild birds throughout the world as a whole,” but also went on to propose as an alternative a regulatory committee that “originated” in the

---

\(^8\) The title of the advisory Plumage Committee echoes that of the Selbornian Committee for the Economic Preservation of Birds (CEPB) and to a lesser extent perhaps that of the RSPB-linked International Committee for Bird Protection.
CEPB—“a forum… wherein both merchants and naturalists could meet, and with the support of traders in every European capital, organize the plumage business in such a way that no serious reductions in the population of individual species occurred.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:66-67)

The latest bill finally cleared the U.K. parliament in 1921 once amendments rendered it acceptable to both plumage-interest and bird-protective groups (Doughty 1975:51, 117, 135-138; Moore-Colyer 2000:62-63, 66-67, 69-72). This legislation had already been introduced into the U.K. parliament with the narrowing omission that it would not regulate plumage sale or possession domestically, which probably reinforced the foreign composition of the bill’s most serious “opposition [that] arose among the ‘chiefly alien’ moneyed interest.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:63, 70-72; see Stein 2008:72-75, 82; see also RSPB 1911:35-36; Gardiner & Dewar 1920:565) The bill breached an impasse to legislation through compromise amendments forming a committee—under the governmental Board of Trade—to schedule the list of which bird species the act would regulate. These amendments dissuaded hunted-plumage interest groups and at least the RSPB from raising further objections. Thus, when U.K. lawmakers passed the compromise legislation interest groups expressed that the act justified them in a “long struggle against complete prohibition;” and—only disagreeing in orientation—activists such as the RSPB deemed the law insufficiently “prohibitive.” (Doughty 1975:51, 136-138; Moore-Colyer 2000:71)
Although the RSPB at first “expressed concern about the composition of the committee,” the membership of ten in the multi-stakeholder assemblage “was evenly weighted.” (Doughty 1975:137-138; see Moore-Colyer 2000:71) The Plumage Committee was composed of a politician and diplomat chairman who simultaneously held the position of U.K. Ambassador to France (1922-1928), two “expert ornithologists,” three representatives of plumage interests, and four representatives of bird-protective activists—namely, two members from the PBG, one from the RSPB, and one from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA).

From 1921 to 1925 the Plumage Committee carried out intense discussions and negotiations pertaining to regulatory implementation in the United Kingdom (Doughty 1975:138-145, 150; Moore-Colyer 2000:71). An illustrative example of the topics on which the committee included “a broad range of opinions” involves the aforementioned prospects for ‘domesticating,’ aviculturally rearing and training customs officials to discern birds hitherto hunted for millinery feathers and skins (Doughty 1975:138-142). During this period the forum held seventeen meetings in which it only exempted from the import prohibition ten bird species, a fraction of those that the London Chamber of Commerce sought to add to the schedule listing exceptions. The committee would later hold its final session in 1937, at which point the number of bird species the 1921 act allowed to be imported into the United Kingdom for millinery purposes still remained the same as the total that the committee had recommended.
U.K. regulatory events continued to impact transnational markets and thereby divert the campaigning attention of U.K.-based activists beyond the borders of the United Kingdom. In this vein, even as the parliament had merely prepared to consider the regulation during the 1920-1921 biennium a PBG spokesperson had declared, alongside a publicized assertion from the RSPB: “Naturally the French plumasserie is hostile to us. That… is more than counterbalanced by the sympathy of distinguished and disinterested Frenchmen… and of various French and Italian societies for the preservation and protection of birds and animals.” (Gardiner & Dewar 1920:565, emphasis in original)

Once the 1921 act was instituted millinery smuggling evaded the enforcement of U.K. regulations on imports of bird parts (Doughty 1975:142-145). Advocacy groups such as the PBG and the RSPB collaborated with U.K. customs officers in conducting inspections and seizing considerable quantities of illegal plumage as contraband became rife after the law was passed. Activist groups turned their attention beyond the United Kingdom in efforts to carry out prosecutions and shoulder the burden of proof in the rare judicial prosecutions that seldom took place over the first decade of the regulation.\(^{89}\) In effect, bird conservationists followed millinery merchants of hunted bird parts abroad as the latter “readily explained away” guilt “as a mistake made by a foreign agent, or as a gratuitous, unsolicited consignment sent to the United Kingdom by dealers beyond the arm of British law.” (Doughty 1975:142-143) Moreover, as bird advocates had long promised during the proto-regulatory cycles of earlier bills, after the U.K. regulation was legislated they also continued to direct their own transnational pressures abroad to ensure regulatory emulation elsewhere. As the RSPB had put it, bird advocates remained

\(^{89}\) Out of an estimated 11,912 U.K. seizures of prohibited imports of bird millinery, only fourteen prosecutions were carried out during this decade.
committed to their prior direct transnational pressures so “that foreign legislatures would follow British example and that the birds would be saved” instead of the bird hunting business “flourish[ing] all the same on the [European] continent, …merely be[ing] transferred to a German port.” (RSPB 1911:35-36; see Moore-Colyer 2000:68; Charnovitz 2002:73)

3.10.2.XIV. 1922 - Late 1920s: U.K. Reconciled Press Abroad

It was in response to these illegal feather imports and these offshore relocations of bird millinery production to plumage-hunting havens that the IOU’s committee consolidated itself into a stand-alone transnational social movement organization in 1922-1923, chanelling the transnational pressures of U.K.-based advocates in the wake of the act that had come into effect in April of 1922. As discussed above under episodes of diffusion, scale alteration and coalition formation, bird advocates institutionalized a separate bird-protective group. Bird activists re-established as their own organization the pre-existing International Committee for Bird Protection (ICBP), a civic association that has since intermittently evolved into the present-day BirdLife International (BI). For instance, at the ICBP’s second conference, which “was held in 1925 alongside the International Congress for the Study and Protection of Birds,” the newly autonomous activist association advocated an anti-plumage “resolution to the Congress.” (Charnovitz 1998b:339-340) The ICBP proposed that the ornithological congress, around which the group held its parallel forum, urge “all nations that had not already done so ‘to prohibit

---

90 In light of considerable confusion in the current historiography (see e.g., Moore-Colyer 2000; Rootes 2007:44-45), it bears repeating that despite periods of discontinuous dormancy—particularly in the decades from the mid-1940s to the early 1980s—“the group was renamed International Committee for Bird Preservation in 1928, International Council for Bird Preservation in 1960, and BirdLife International in 1994.” (Anon. 2011a; see Boardman 1981:30-34; Adams 2004:44-45, 63)
the killing, export, import, and sale of the feathers of wild birds.’” (as quoted in Charnovitz 1998b:339) The international congress of avian scientists adopted the resolution that the ICBP advocated. The resolution declared “that killing birds for millinery purposes was ‘not only inhumane’ but had already resulted in the extermination of certain species over parts of their range.” (Charnovitz 1998b:339)

Yet, ultimately other polities did not harmonize their plumage import regulations with those that anti-plumage activism sparked in the United Kingdom; they did not adopt the U.K. regulation.

“[F]or all the efforts of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the International Committee for Bird Preservation [(the modified, preservationist name of the ICBP by 1928)], little progress was made on the international front and, as the sceptics had predicted, the fulcrum of the feather trade shifted quickly to Paris. The trade [(or industry)] may have been decimated in Britain, but …some exotic feathers still found their way to London for the use of those merchants remaining in business.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:71; see Stein 2008:23-24, 51, 80)

The most one could suggest in terms of U.K.-based activists having set a regulatory example for the regulations of other polities is that the earlier consideration of U.K. unilateral trade restrictions in 1908 had been emulated by the trade ban that U.S.-based advocates had urged the U.S. government to institute in 1913 (Charnovitz 1994:496-497).

Probably precisely due to the lingering of U.K. and U.S. import flows that illegality simply drove underground, the industrial flight of the plumage industry from the United Kingdom to France and elsewhere—in search of regulatory havens for plumage-hunting—defied reassuring forecasts long issued by the RSPB and its foreign collaborators and informants. In the early 1910s the RSPB had endorsed the views of a collaborating German bird preservationist: “Prohibition in England will most assuredly not spread the trade to the [European] Continent. The fashion is sure to change, because
France simply cannot do without the American and English [import] markets.” (quote in RSPB 1913d:114-116 with emphasis in original)  The association had simultaneously leveraged information from a German milliner: “We surmise that the fashion for aigrettes [hunted plumage] has reached its end. Paris cannot hold its own unaided by the American and English markets.” (quote in RSPB 1913d:114-116)  In the same period the RSPB had critically contrasted information obtained from a French labor union and from U.K. plumage industry actors to claim that an inconsistency between them supported its own expressed expectation that no industrial relocation of hunted plumage production would follow U.K. restrictions of feather import flows:

“Where a cause is essentially bad, its supporters and defenders are seldom logical or consistent. (...) The [U.K.-based] plume-merchants have taken as their primary bed-rock argument the assurance that if England deports the feather-trade it will merely betake itself to France, that is waiting eagerly to annex so profitable a business. It was surely then bad tactics that a letter from the French [union] ‘Chambre Syndicale des Fabricants de Plumes’ should reach every Member of the House of Commons… appealing for consideration [against a bill that had the intent to restrict U.K. plumage imports from foreign]… of feather-dressers… whose bread [was allegedly] going to be taken out of their mouths… This obviously knocks the bottom out of the one argument, repeated by every speaker opposing the [U.K.] Bill, that the English trade will merely go to France ‘without saving a single bird.’ If the [French] feather-dressers are going to lose all their work it must be because feathers are not going to be used, and consequently birds will not be killed to furnish them. If the trade were only going to France, obviously the French workers would have more, not less, work.” (RSPB 1914a:21-22)

3.10.2.XV. 1922-38: Reconciled Press U.K. to Coerce

During the period between 1922 and 1940 bird protective groups advocated additional U.K. regulation in reaction to plumage interests who hid illegal contraband of hunted bird parts underneath the allegation that smuggled millinery stocks “predated the 1921 Act and therefore could be legally sold” as long after the legislation as 1936
Annually from 1926 to 1929 and then twice a year in 1936 and 1938, bird advocates prompted no less than seven bills that attempted to outlaw possession and sale of hunted plumage throughout the United Kingdom, in addition to restrictions placed solely on import flows of bird parts for millinery use (Doughty 1975:142-145). Their advocacy of additional U.K. regulations to close smuggling loopholes repeated an earlier activist response to a chronic contraband in plumage that had followed the hardly-enforced export bans at U.K. colonies such as India.

3.11. RADIATION

A currently imbalanced status of scholarly history on this ecofeminist case requires a disclaimer with respect to process-tracing campaign episodes through the radiation causal chain. While publications of mostly female scholars since the 1990s have begun to correct a male chauvinism in the historical scholarship, through their research on modes of transnational activism that pertain to “the women of the movement,” “today still” the literature remains mired in gender bias toward masculinity (Birdsall 2002:68). For decades the scholarship, taken as a whole, has posited “the methods of the women” among bird advocates to have been less important precursors of a more significant, masculine “takeover” of the campaign by men with “their laws and regulations.” (Birdsall 2002:68) Although research produced since that review was written has continued to make strides toward balancing the scholarship, the status still stands (Clarke 2004; Price 2004; Duarte 2006; Scarborough 2009; Merchant 2010).

As a lingering reflection of this scholarly legacy, the sparse historiography on the ecofeminist campaign includes only intermittent evidence of transnational activism that can be traced through each mechanism of the radiation process. To date the historical
record does not reach sufficient depth to allow for a continuous process tracing, but does permit an episodic account that traces the empirical events which historians and accessible archives have documented through mechanisms at various cycles of the overall sequential process (Doughty 1972:7-11; 1973:143-144; 1975:55-56, 63, 65-66, 68, 80, 95-97, 115-117, 142, 149; Moore-Colyer 2000:59-60, 70, 71; Robin 2002:5; Clarke 2004:4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 20, 36-37; Duarte 2006:17; see Wright 1899:170-171; RSPB 1911:13, 49, 59-60; Hornaday 1913a:117-120, 128).

Moreover, the literature that scholarly historians provide to date contains indicative data that conform to the modeled primary sites for the overall process of radiation. Whereas the events traced below show transnational activism in which the locus of the action was as global as the feather commodity chains along which activists recruited, the locus of the cause was primarily local: “As American elites made birds meaningful across long distances… the meanings of the birds themselves seem to have gotten lost along the way. The new bird lovers often talked much more about [U.S.] women than birds.” (Price 1999:80, 91, 97)

In episodes traceable through the mechanism at the outset of the process (modeled as mechanism ‘A’) bird activists de-legitimized hunted millinery products as being tainted with bird cruelty and extinction via transnational supply chains that stretched from producing polities largely in the tropics primarily to European and North American markets along the northern Atlantic Ocean. Activist framing of “killing hats” and “baby killer” during the campaign made feathered hats known as “hun headgear” that were thereby infused with the evocative sense of vandalist barbarity (Doughty 1975:82-83, 155; see RSPB 1915a:92; 1915b:97, 100). Similar activist recasting of “feathered
women” branded women who wore these products as unwomanly to the extreme of the “bird of prey” into which one such female was caricatured (see Doughty 1975:82-83; Price 1999:80; 2004; Moore-Colyer 2000:60-61; Birdsall 2002:38).

In an epitome of this mechanism, U.K.-based activists transnationalized the murderous frame that they had deployed since the late 1860s to pressure producers of millinery derived from birds hunted within the British Isles. Advocates went global with their claims that insofar as a “feathered woman” wore bird parts on fashion products “she bears the murderer’s brand on her forehead.” (Doughty 1972:7, 9; 1975:53, 62-63; Haynes 1983; Moore-Colyer 2000:59-60; Clarke 2004:4, 20; see RSPB 1915b:97) By 1896 the RSPB made space in one of its leaflets for a supportive U.K. lawmaker to particularly tarnish the latest fad in hunted bird fashions. This advocacy held women’s wear responsible for “having natives half a world away hunt birds;” and “concluded that rather than wear the wings or heads of owls, in vogue in the 1890s, it would be more flattering if, ‘assuming it to be necessary for ladies to display the spoils of animated nature in their attire, they should adopt the fashion of wearing the carcases of rats, mice and other furred marauders on their heads.’” (Doughty 1975:62, 65)

In the mid-1890s another RSPB campaign brochure warned that “future generations would condemn the wanton destruction” of the hunted birds fashion and also pinned irresponsibility on “the cruelty of the hunters and callousness of the feather brokers.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:59-60) Tarnishing and linking the plumage supply chain from hunting to end use, the RSPB pamphlet de-legitimized bird millinery products: “no man who has given any thought to the subject, who has any love of nature in his soul, can see a woman decorated with dead birds, or their wings, or nuptial plumes, without a
feeling of repugnance for the wearer, however beautiful or charming she may be.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:60; see also RSPB 1915b:100) The historical scholarship establishes that the RSPB pamphlet attracted the attention of the U.K. population. However, it has yet to ascertain whether this particular episode caused recruitment of consumers, in a causal sequence which would conform to the causal chain connecting the first three mechanisms of the radiation process. Historians and accessible archives merely suggest as much in the affirmative: The “pamphlet was widely read and it may be no coincidence that there was something of a hiatus in the demand for feathers for a season or two.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:60)

The mechanism of de-legitimization can also trace transnational activism beyond the United Kingdom. In the late 1890s and the first few years of the 20th century, the Audubon Societies publicized efforts of one of its activists “to remonstrate with every wearer of birds,” describing one such target as “a charnel house of beaks and claws and bones and feathers and glass eyes on her fatuous head.” (quotes in Mason 2002:7-8) In and around 1911, bird advocates based in Brazil confronted what they characterized as a sort of “barbaric ancestry in women” and plume hunters, placing the root or “‘the aviary of evil… in the woman with her bad taste for plumage adornment.’” (my translation of quote and interpretation in Duarte 2006:18, 22)

A multicontinental episode of transnational activism is also traceable through the same de-legitimizing causal mechanism. From 1910 to 1911 the RSPB tapped its collaborators to amass and disseminate a stirring photographic essay that attracted the most transnational attention among bird activists’ “deliberate attempts to make well-to-do ladies recoil in horror from the sight of gleaming bunches of feathers sold by
smoothtalking saleswomen under the pretext that” the products were made from materials other than hunted birds (Doughty 1972:9). The photo series portrayed conditions at a nest of white egrets before and after the birds were “terminated by a visit from plume hunters” who left behind “dead adults and starving, moribund nestlings.” (Doughty 1975:65) The RSPB first learned of the photos and their analysis through articles in a newsletter of the Australian Ornithologists’ Union as well as in Australian and British newspapers. The pictures were taken in the U.K. territory of Australia but their details were typical of hunts that bird advocates had reported in tropical or subtropical sites of places as different as Europe, Pacific islands, South America and the United States. The U.K.-based RSPB and Royal Colonial Institute (RCI) framed the photos as “The Story of the Egret,” mobilized them through various media in England and also circulated them to interested groups abroad in Denmark, France (Paris), Italy, the Netherlands (Amsterdam) and Spain. The activist groups that received and further distributed the photographic story also included at the very least the Animal Protective Society of Brazil (Sociedade Brasileira Protetora dos Animais) as well as the U.S.-based Audubon Societies, present-day Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund (PWLPF). The Portuguese translation of the RSPB booklet that the Brazilian association published by 1912 was probably not the only version of ‘The Story of the Egret’ to plead to mothers and to beg ladies to stop being accomplices of the industry in hunted plumage (Doughty 1972:9; 1975:65-66; Robin 2002:5; Clarke 2004:20; Duarte 2006:17, 19; see Mattingley 1907:65-73; RSPB 1911:59-60; Hornaday 1913a:117-120, 128).

In the United Kingdom alone the RSPB emulated prior activities of the Australian Ornithologists’ Union in disseminating “The Story of the Egret” through multiple media
that generally “brought the cruelty behind [plumage] wearing home to shoppers, businessmen and by-standers.” (Doughty 1975:65; see RSPB 1911:59-60) The RSPB posted the photo essay on “billboards in metropolitan railway stations,” “displayed [it] in windows of shops throughout southern England,” hired men to carry enlargements and hand out leaflets of the story “through the streets of London’s fashionable West End” during the summer and shortly before Christmas, “circulated [it] to wives of mayors of every large town in England,” and prompted press reports on these campaigning activities (Doughty 1972:9; 1975:65; see Clarke 2004:20).

Activists based in the United Kingdom and United States showed considerable self-awareness in targeting global supply chains in episodes such as the one revolving around “The Story of the Egret.” The global scope of the supply chains that the RSPB targeted is evident in the association’s public response to a denial that the plumage industry released in an attempt to discredit the photographic essay on the basis of whether or not the Australian plumage featured in the story itself came directly or indirectly into the London market. The RSPB replied that the question of a supply chain between Australia and England was “of small consequence” considering that “the photographs were taken after a plume-hunters’ raid, and evidence shows that plume-hunters’ methods are much the same the world over.” (RSPB 1911:59-60) A U.S.-based WCS and PWLPF advocate—who publicized the RSPB’s protests featuring large banners with the photographic story—expressed similar views of global commodity chains that supplied hunted plumage:

“the giant octopus of the ‘feather trade’… has reached out its deadly tentacles into the most remote wildernesses of the earth, and steadily is drawing in the ‘skins’ and ‘plumes’ and ‘quills’ of the most beautiful and most interesting unprotected birds of the world. …[T]his cold-blooded industry, supported by vain and hard-
harted women, …the millinery octopus… reach[es] out to the uttermost ends of the earth, and take[s] everything that it can use. From the trackless jungles of New Guinea, round the world both ways to the snow-capped peaks of the Andes, no unprotected bird is safe. The humming-birds of Brazil, the egrets of the world at large, the rare birds of paradise, the toucan, the eagle, the condor and the emu, all are being exterminated to swell the annual profits of the millinery trade. But for the profits the birds would be safe; and no unprotected wild species can long escape the hounds of Commerce.” (Hornaday 1913a:117-120, 128; Hornaday as quoted in Underwood 1913:5314-5315; see Scarborough 2009:75)

In the midst of the same U.S. policy debates about a plumage import ban, a commentator editorialized: “now the public is almost as well instructed as to the… more or less horrible… doings of the feather hunters in New Guinea or Sumatra as it is about those of the Florida swamps.” (as quoted in Doughty 1975:67-68, 80)

During episodes that can be traced through the next mechanism (‘B’) along the process of radiation activists recruited consumers in plumage consuming polities (Doughty 1972:9-11; 1975:55-56, 80, 95-97, 115-117, 149, 155; Moore-Colyer 2000:59; Clarke 2004:5, 12-13, 19-20, 36-37). Cumulatively, over the course of the campaign “many ladies were affected by appeals, articles, endeavors of bird preservation groups” who recruited these female consumers through systematic efforts that were part of a “plan… devised for making a general work of [bird] destruction at least unfashionable.” (Doughty 1972:11; 1975:95; see Clarke 2004:5)

Most explicitly, in and beyond the United Kingdom several thousand females became RSPB members only after pledging “to forego feathers” under the association’s rule “that Lady-Members shall refrain from wearing the feathers of any birds not killed for purposes of food, the ostrich only excepted.” (Doughty 1975:97; see Clarke 2004:10) Members of each the original RSPB and the Fur, Fin and Feather Folk—a group which the former eventually incorporated—“pledged to abstain from wearing plumage, and
hoped that their example would be followed by others.” (Clarke 2004:10) The U.K.-based Plumage League simultaneously instituted a parallel membership requirement to “pledge never to wear feathers” or—as its activists vividly framed the oath—never to partake in “the fashion of turning our dresses, bonnets, and hats, into cages, traps and barn doors.” (Clarke 2004:8) The rules of the RSPB and the Plumage League to recruit “only vowed abstainers from bird wearing” raised recurrent questions about the absence of an equivalent practice within the Selborne Society, whose organizers replied issuing such arrogant snipes as: “To assume such a very ambitious title as ‘The Society for the Protection of Birds’ for a band of ladies who do nothing but abstain from personal iniquity in the matter of bonnets, may give occasion for the unrighteous to scoff.” (quote in Clarke 2004:12, 19) As early as 1874, the U.K.-based Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals had advised its members to never use “for dress or ornament of any kind, birds, butterflies, or sealskins.” (Clarke 2004:5)

In the United States as well “pledges of membership” into the preliminary generation of Audubon Societies, which first emerged in synchrony with its U.K. counterparts in the mid-1880s, “did not permit game bird trim to be worn.” (Doughty 1975:149; see Wright 1899:170-171) As women restarted the Audubon associations, in Massachusetts during the mid-1890s, they “comb[ed] through the Boston society register… and… invited the city’s fashionable ladies to a series of afternoon teas... at which many of the women pledged to boycott the bird hats.” (Price 2004; see Birdsall 2002:33)

Members of the International League for the Protection of Birds belonged to the group through a similar pledge in Austria-Hungary and Germany at the turn of the 20th
They were “pledged to abstain from wearing feathers, wings, or any other portions of birds except ostrich feathers and the plumes of game-birds or poultry.” (Boulger 1905:5) The organization that grounded this transnational coalition in Germany, the League for Bird Protection (BfV), also “organized boycotts of feathered fashions” and “circulated pledges to abstain from such fashions.” (Markham 2008:63; see Markham 2007:90)

More specifically, the RSPB to a greater extent than other bird advocacy groups campaigned under the recruitment rationale “that the only feasible way to stop the slaughter of… [birds] was… by persuading as many people as possible to refuse to wear [hunted] feathers.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:59) With that recruitment tactic, the association combined “lobbying and networking amongst the influential with a populist strategy based on increasing membership, on the premise that the best way to destroy the trade in plumage was by securing large numbers of people who would sign the pledge not to wear it, and thus set an example to others.” (Clarke 2004:13) In a similar recruitment approach, one which the Selborne Society deliberated emulating in a diluted manner, RSPB activists personally “noted the names of women who wore plumed hats” and wrote them letters that “pointed out ‘the cruelty of a practice which meant starvation and death for numberless orphaned fledglings’ whose parents had been killed for their plumage.” (Clarke 2004:20, 36-37) On the other side of the North Atlantic, U.S.-based advocacy groups supported the launch of “Bird Day” in schools with the hope that in the long term children “would remain untainted by feather fever as they grew older” and that in the short term they would help recruit grown ups through unrestrained ostracism such as the famous one of a young boy who reportedly answered the door saying “mamma, there’s a
woman with a dead body on her hat who wants to see you.” (Doughty 1972:10-11; Price 1999; 2004; Birdsall 2002:40-41; see Lasky 1995; Clarke 2004:5; Duarte 2006:18; Armitage 2007)

In the same vein, the RSPB and the Audubon Societies set out to influence fashion catalysts such as royalty and aristocrats with the intent to multiply their recruitment of consumers who would spare hunted plumage in their demand for apparel. The U.K.-based association made “unstinting [efforts] to persuade [aristocratic] ladies… to eschew ornamental feather” and sparked the interest of the U.K. royal family in “the issue of plume wearing.” (Doughty 1972:9-11; 1975:52-53, 115-117; see Haynes 1983:30) Two years after the U.K. monarch entitled the association to add the ‘royal’ prefix to its name, the RSPB presented a memo to its queen in which it attributed to feather wearing a “great barbarity and even extermination [that] threatened white herons and birds of paradise.” (Doughty 1972:9-11; 1975:116-117) Clearly expressing the motivation of the association to galvanize the queen into a consumer recruitment multiplier, the 1906 memo petitioned: “If it were once known that Your Majesty disapproved of a fashion in itself so indefensibly cruel, and involving such bad consequences, that fashion would, we are convinced, speedily die out.” (quote in Doughty 1972:9; 1975:116) RSPB activists and supporters such as the magazine *Vanity Fair* were triumphant when they promptly received and disseminated the following as a response on behalf of a queen whom “fashionable women at home and abroad could scarcely” disregard: “full permission to use her name in any way you think best to conduce to the protection of Birds. You know well how kind and humane the Queen is to all living creatures, and… never wears osprey feathers herself, and will certainly do all in
her power to discourage the cruelty practiced on these beautiful birds.” (quote in Doughty 1972:9; 1975:116; see Moore-Colyer 2000:59) The multiplier tactic was transatlantic. The U.S.-based Audubon Societies deployed it with a deliberate “understanding [of] how a new fashionable style might be adopted… if the [“highly visible”] upper class adopted it first” and then disseminated the practice through media such as the occasionally supportive magazines *Ladies’ Home Journal* and *Harper’s Bazar* (Scarborough 2009:86-103, 110-114; see Birdsall 2002:6-11, 58-60; see also Boulger 1905:5-6) In at least one instance, Audubon and RSPB activists collaborated in multiplying their recruitment across borders, from the United States to the United Kingdom. The RSPB publicized a letter in which an Auduboner at the U.S. south sought to multiply U.K. recruitment:

“[F]ew ladies of rank or position [in London] would be guilty of wearing Heron plumes if they were aware that thousands of farmers in distant lands had to suffer through their act loss of crops with attendant hardships. Women of the best families of South Carolina make it a point of honour not to wear any feathers other than those of the ostrich and of domestic poultry. I have not seen an Egret plume on a Charleston woman’s head in six or seven years. It would strengthen our hands in this great hard [campaign] fight if English women would uniformly set their faces against such a practice.” (RSPB 1913a:68-69; see Scarborough 2009:60; Markham 2008:63)

In a documented episode series that can be explained through the third mechanism (‘C’) along the causal process of radiation, bird activists and their consumer recruits largely in polities alongside the North Atlantic pressured businesses to exclude tarnishing that largely seeped out of polities in the tropics (Doughty 1975:65-70, 142; Moore-Colyer 2000:59, 66-67, 71; Clarke 2004:8, 10; Merchant 2010:14-15; see Wright 1899:170-171; RSPB 1911:16-17). The RSPB led bird activist groups and committed consumers as they “locked horns with” businesses embodying “the twin pillars of interest and fashion.” (Moore-Colyer 2000:59, 66) The marketing practices of plumage businesses implicitly
revealed that they were under the pressure of bird activists and consumers who boycotted millinery products made from hunted bird parts. In their responses businesses invested much more than merely reactive counter-branding and counter-shaming the RSPB or Audubon Societies as hypocritical for considering themselves more conscious than poor plumage hunters in respect to plumage birds but remaining neutral on or even honoring bird hunting for sport. As early as 1891 millinery businesses exported from Paris to London man-made feathers, “with the most unnatural and grotesque appearance,” intended to meet the demand of “ladies with scruples about wearing wild birds.” (Doughty 1975:68-69) At that point a naturalist and merchant of feathers in London publicly opposed disdain toward the wearing of natural plumage in Europe and North America. According to the opposition that he directed especially at European and North American women, wearing artificial plumage would “make very little difference” to birds (quote in Doughty 1975:68).

By the mid-1890s and the 1900s millinery businesses gravitated to a rebuttal equally revealing of their being under activist and consumer pressure. Plumassiers began to allege that—thanks to new technologies which rendered feather imitations identical to genuine feathers—“made-up or artificial feathers provided the bulk” of feather-wearing items (Doughty 1975:52, 67-68, 149). Bird advocates exposed the ostensible artificiality of the bulk of plumage millinery to be fake; in other words, the falsely ‘artificial’ feathers were extracted from natural resources such as hunted birds (Doughty 1975:52, 67-68, 149).

In the late 1900s millinery businesses again gradually moved toward another defense that continued to reveal the pressure that they were receiving through the
“strident criticism” of activists and consumers concerned about the hunting of birds for plumage (Doughty 1975:52, 67-70). At that time although plumage millinery was largely obtained through bird hunting, plumassiers began to emphasize that most ornamental feathers instead stemmed from breeding roosts in South America and U.K. India “where plume birds nested and from which their moulted breeding plumes were collected and shipped to Europe and to the United States.” (Doughty 1972:9-10; 1975:52, 67-70)

The existing historical scholarship documents episodes that can be traced through the next causal mechanism (‘D’); a tracing in which bird protective groups and businesses largely in the United Kingdom and the United States merge their respective legitimacy and material resources (Doughty 1972:9-10; 1973:143; 1975:69-71). One episode in the United Kingdom makes for an illustrative example of the causal chain from activist pressure to merger. The RSPB orchestrated pressure upon plumage businesses during early 1913 as the association lavished recognition on one of its members for having recently written to a London business in “protest against the pictured advertisement” of a hunted bird hat, which had been marketed “on the cover of [a] catalogue.” (RSPB 1913a:67-68) The civic group recognized the perseverance of its member in “trying to dissuade [a firm] from selling this [hunted] species of feather.” (RSPB 1913a:67-68) The RSPB member pressured the business manager to “frankly admit” that “[i]f the public at large could be induced to give up the purchase of [hunted feathers his business staff] should be only too pleased, but whilst our competitors offer these articles for sale we cannot afford to stand out and refuse to sell them ourselves.” (quote in RSPB 1913a:67-68) Gravitating from pressure toward a merger, the
ecofeminist activist replied to the business manager “to suggest a conference of leading
drapers and milliners with a view to joint action in the matter.” (RSPB 1913a:67-68)

Another merger episode continues with the event series about plumage breeding
roosts, commonly known as heronries or *garceros*. In this case, businesses were the ones
that enjoined bird activists with merging suggestions. Spokespersons of the former put
forth the following rationale in support of convergence with the latter, in effect arguing
that business profit and bird preservation or welfare held merger potential:

“The greater the numbers of feathers collected in the *garceros* of Brazil and
Venezuela… the more landowners were able to realize in monetary terms.
Therefore, it was incumbent upon the landowners to protect herons so that bird
populations remained high. Bird protection was good business. Rather than
criticizing dealers and millinery houses for cruelty, … bird groups should
congratulate them and lend them support for their intelligent use of a resource.
[Breeding roosts]… avoided cruelty… to individual birds and… [preserved]
species…” (Doughty 1975:69)

Business spokespersons would leave it to those activists who maintained pressure the
announcements informing recruited plumage consumers that any of the little legal
“protection afforded to the *garceros* was poorly enforced” even in Venezuela where laws
on feather extraction were most strict (Doughty 1975:70-71; see Haynes 1983:27, 29; see
also RSPB 1911:37, 43-49; Hornaday 1913a:129-131).

In a similar merger episode during the early 1910s, leaders of the U.S.-based
Audubon Societies alongside ostrich businesses “reassured women with humanitarian
qualms that ostrich feathers were trimmings proper and fitting to animal lovers.”
Audubon activist bestowed his group’s legitimacy upon the material resources of
businesses in praising ostrich plumes on the basis of animal cruelty: He announced that
the use of ostrich plumes “does not entail the sacrifice of life;” that “taking plumes from
an Ostrich is no more painful to the bird than shearing is to a sheep.” (quote in Doughty 1973:143) Another “leading militant bird-preservationist” of the Audubon Societies also imparted his organization’s legitimacy onto businesses in advertising the material resources of ostrich plumassiers not merely as an exceptional caveat but actually as a purging substitute for tainted feather products: He “wrote a glowing account of… [an ostrich] farm… as a means of saving wild-bird populations from decimation at the hands of plume hunters by supplying the demands of the feather trade with farmed ostrich material.” (Doughty 1973:143) In their marketing, ostrich farmers and feather merchants referred to the Auduboner approval of the use of ostrich feathers (Stein 2008:196).

The historiography includes episodes that can be traced through the subsequent causal mechanism (‘E’) as illustrated by the deliberation of the U.K. government on whether or not to institute itself into the role of a facilitator for a transnational responsibility club during the policy-making process of the aforementioned 1921 plumage import act. Shortly before the legislation was approved in the U.K. parliament, a lawmaker failed to persuade his fellow legislators to support his “proposal that plumage which could be obtained without cruelty from birds certified by British overseas residents to be plentiful in a particular country should be allowed to be imported” into the United Kingdom (Moore-Colyer 2000:70). This and similar episodes are more fully traced above under the process of diversion and below under the subsequent mechanism of transnational certification or labeling clubs.

Overall, ecofeminist advocates only eventually focused the attention of their activism on the U.K. and U.S. states, after continuing to place and maintain hunted bird fashions on the agenda as a transnational problem, and also to mobilize consumers and
put pressure on businesses. Only after U.K.-based bird activists had tarnished supply chains, recruited consumers and pressured businesses did they extend from religiously responsible action into “Parliamentary action on behalf of plume species.” (Doughty 1975:117, 157-158; see Gates 1998:122-124; see also RSPB 1913c:97-101) From 1908 onwards U.K.-based activists also targeted their advocacy at promoting changes in state policies. Long after this extension, as late as the early 1920s, even the Plumage Bill Group (PBG) at a relatively statist orbit continued to mobilize consumers and pressure businesses while exerting legislative pressure. The PBG and Virginia Woolf engaged in a telling polemic that illustrates a dual focus on the ‘plumage bill’ in the senses of both the newfound statist legislation and the longstanding marketized consumption. They publicized their debates over her rhetorical expressions that if she had the time and the money she would wear (hunted) plumeage or that she would donate her publishing fees from her controversy with the PBG to the civic group itself. Hers were critical statements, written with poetic license, on the socially contingent construction of women whose circumstances oppressed them into the position of spending their time and money dealing with relatively unburdened males such as plumeage milliners, bird hunters, enfranchised voters, parliamentarians or bird advocates (Abbott 1995:264; see Gillespie 2011). The PBG confronted Woolf’s abscletion of women from consumptive, “plumage guilt.” (Abbott 1995:264 quoting Woolf) Over in the United States, on the other transatlantic side, the same extending trend toward the statist domain—where women were not yet enfranchised to vote—generally evolved for civic groups such as the collective set of Audubon Societies:

“At its origins this [Audubon] organization was not especially focused on changing government or legislation. It perceived the cruelty and massacre of
birds for consumption to be outrageous and sought to end the outrage by making women want to abandon this fashion. (...) While their [U.S.-based “bird protection societies”] initial efforts were based primarily on education and social pressure to induce women to end their consumption of bird hats, after years of this work and little result, … their attention turn[ed] more to legislation and enforcement.” (Birdsall 2002:34-36, 67-68; see Scarborough 2009:47-53, 60-61, 78-79, 110-114)

The causal mechanism (‘F’) modeled as a certification or labeling club along the transnational process of radiation can trace at least four event series in this campaign. One such episode falls under the club variant of a mixed regime. In the early 1900s “Audubon Hats” and “milliners’ white lists” evolved similarly to current activist-led practices such as product certification and business labelling (Stone 1899:60, 71; Doughty 1975:82-83, 112-115, 149; Price 1999:57-58, 63, 82-83, 98-101; 2004; Scarborough 2009:63-64, 89-90; see Trentmann 2007).

As traced through this radiation mechanism, female members of Audubon Societies and other groups crafted “milliners’ white lists” that formed clubs to restructure the interactions of cause-oriented activists with business and consumer groups. Several female-led consumer leagues had been organized just prior to the time when their “white list” tactic was emulated in plumage activism. The Audubon Societies and the AOU Committee on the Protection of North American Birds drafted a white list of “milliners that either did not use bird trimmings in any of their millinery or at least would promise to be able to create hats at customer’s requests that they did not use birds or feathers.” (Scarborough 2009:63-64) The nationwide newsletter of the Audubon Societies periodically publicized information for millinery businesses that might be interested in being added to the white list. In the newsletter and beyond, national Audubon leaders mobilized their group’s activist associations at different States to compete with each other
on the basis of their capacity to exert pressure on businesses to join the labeling list, “keeping the milliners stirred up”—as a chief Auduboner put it (Scarborough 2009:63-64).

Not only did the ecofeminist activists draw up and publicize the white lists of millinery businesses prepared to exclude bird parts from their products, they also promoted the Audubon Hat with ribbons, lace and plumes of domesticated birds—such as roosters, pheasants, ducks or geese—but no feathers from hunted birds. The bird advocates went so far as to seek out trend-setters and organize fashion shows to display these approved Audubonnets in the most appealing light. The historical record is not clear on whether the Audubon Societies continued to certify this product with their legitimacy for over a dozen years or merely did so again for a special occasion in the mid-1910s. Two days after the 1913 U.S. plumage import ban went into effect, Audubon Save the Birds Hats were already advertised for sale. Hand in hand with the creation, promotion and coordination of such product alternatives, activists degraded and boycotted bird hats, directly and indirectly through the promotion of millinery-related social ostracism. At least one of the women’s clubs—in the literal sense—that lent their support to the Audubon Societies in no less than three U.S. States did so through its reinforcement to the formation of figurative certification clubs. The Civitas Club of Brooklyn, New York, exhibited fashionable millinery free of birds with the intent to pilot sentiment that would exclude women’s fashion products containing hunted birds (Stone 1899:60; Dawson 1921:27, 32; Doughty 1972:10; 1975:149; Merchant 1984:73; Price 1999:57-58, 63, 75-77, 79-80, 82-83, 89-90, 98-101; 2004; Birdsall 2002:57; Scarborough 2009:60, 63-64, 86-90; Patchett 2011).
The historical scholarship includes evidence that such market-based labeling and certification regulations generated disagreement among activist groups about their effectiveness through consumer recruitment and/or state policymaking. For instance, a leading ecofeminist activist informed her fellow club women, in a displeased tone, “about a well-meaning woman who had asked for and received a physician’s certificate stating that the bird on her new hat had died a natural death.” (Price 1999:75)

The millinery white lists and Audubon hats emerged from a merger of cause-oriented activists and industry groups both closer to the consumer-end of the product chain. Consider the common U.S.-ground in the following passage out of an 1898 U.S. AOU journal: “The milliners in many of our large cities have joined gladly with the Audubon Societies in exhibiting ‘birdless hats,’ and some, notably Gimbel Bros. of Milwaukee and Philadelphia, have advocated in circulars and advertisements the abandonment of wild birds, while they made a special department of Audubon millinery in their stores (…).” (Stone 1899:60, 71)

A second, subsequent episode of transnational activism demonstrates that such merged activism is mainly transnationalized through the radius of linkages in the global economic sphere. This mechanism of the radiation process traces an inspection of plumage production in Venezuela that would intersect with another tracing of the same event through Tarrow’s (2005) coalition formation process. While it is relevant to ask how a coalition between the U.K. RSPB and the U.S. PWLPF formed, the question—discussed above—renders invisible a radiation process that is temporally prior and more central to this story than the coalition formation process. Two activist groups based at opposite sides of the North Atlantic Ocean employed an investigator to visit Venezuela in
1921. Their joint employment decision was hastened due to information they received about an investigation that a London feather business association was commissioning. The fact-finding intent of the cause-oriented activists was to obtain their own information to continue to use in countering self-regulation claims of the business groups, who were sending three ornithologists to Venezuela. Activists would then disperse their reports to activist consumers, as they had done since at least 1911 with particular regard to questions of feather collection or extraction in the Amazon basin within and beyond Venezuela—questions such as whether bird plumage was hunted or collected off the ground at breeding roosts (RSPB 1911:37, 46-48, 51-52; Hornaday 1913a:129-131; Anon. 1914b:485-486; Moore-Colyer 2000:64-65). For instance, in the early 1910s the U.K.-based Royal Colonial Institute as well as the U.S.-based PWLPF and National Audubon Society had already obtained and used a similar testimony from an ex-plume-hunter whose past hunts had placed him throughout the Venezuelan and Colombian Amazon over the course of nine years (see Hornaday 1913a:129-131; Anon. 1914b:485-486).

Yet, the variant of this transnational club—i.e. be it a private, mixed or public regime—hinges on whether or not states and international organizations facilitated and/or mediated such activity, as the U.K. government had done through the testimony of its chief diplomat in Venezuela regarding whether plumage was derived from hunted birds or breeding roosts in the polity (RSPB 1911:37; 1913c:99-100; 1914a:6; see Haynes 1983:27, 29). The story of transnational activism in Venezuela is inconclusively documented regarding the relations of the state with external activists, such that in this instance the theoretically open question about host state behavior is empirically unsettled.
A news article and a letter to the editor contradict each other without further
documentation: in the one, the RSPB-PWLPF investigator was arrested and detained in a
Venezuelan prison; in the other, the investigator was welcomed by Venezuelan state
officials and the arrest had been a mistaken report (Anon. 1921; Anon. 1922; see

A third episode sketched here by a radiation club was anticipated as a relatively
statist public regime but came to fruition as a rather marketized private regime. It
includes a State employee and activist who lobbied for his State in the Brazilian Amazon,
Pará, to facilitate the formation of a club. The club would include his dual role in
governmental service and cause-oriented action as well as the activism of civic groups
and their consumer recruits based on both sides of the North Atlantic. From 1895 to
1896, Goeldi, the naturalist and museum director, advocated policies for Pará including
two with directly transnational aspects.

On the one hand, he called for the State to support his preparations “to wage” an
intense transnational campaign to disseminate propaganda through “the ‘Bulletin’ of the
Museum” and “publications made on purpose.” (Goeldi 1902:16) “A vigorous
propagandism against the use of plumes in the importing countries” would inform
consumers of bird hats in the United States and in European states that their goods were
tarnished via commercial import of plumes from producing states in the Amazon and
elsewhere (Goeldi 1902:3, 5, 7-8, 9, 13, 16-18). On the other hand, Goeldi persistently
petitioned that the State impose a high tariff on the feather exports of its plume producers
or traders, eventually specifying the proposal with the fee in cents per gram of wild heron
and ibis feathers.
Several years earlier than bird advocacy of a similar project in U.K. India, where both the private and the public governance scenarios eventually materialized, he claimed that the two measures would pressure businesses to allow a bird farming alternative to exclude “the calamitous slaughter” that tarnished feathers produced in Amazonian nations such as Brazil and Venezuela (Goeldi 1902:18; see RSPB 1911:49-50; Doughty 1975:76-80). In effect, Goeldi proposed that the Pará government facilitate the formation of a public regime that would operate as a club inclusive of non-hunted bird products but exclusive of hunted ones. He advocated that the State raise trade barriers to the exit of hunted feathers onto transnational markets as an interim, phasing measure with the ultimate intent to support the maturation of an infant industry in farmed feathers. Having reported estimates that most of the heron feathers exported from Pará were destined to the United States and that a smaller proportion was shipped to European states such as England and France, he estimated that in the United States his “humanitarian campaign” could “rely on the support of the scientific institutions and of the press,”91 and that in Europe on that of “excellent elements.” (Goeldi 1902:5, 16-17) Although the State government of Pará did not support Goeldi’s tactic, he envisioned promising results all the way toward the end of his anticipated event series. His “cry of alarm” would “resound” as he would find U.S. and European “ladies with good intentions” who, “in the press and in their daily life,” would “become uncompromising supporters” of his “platform” to “put something else on their hats”—in other words, to exclude feather hunting practices in the Amazon Basin from their transnational commerce (Goeldi 1902:5, 16-18; see RSPB 1911; Doughty 1975:70-71).

91 It would be useful for historians to conduct further research to ascertain whether or not Göldi, as a member of the British Ornithologists’ Union, was implicitly referring to campaigning U.S. “scientific institutions” such as the relatively more activist committee of the American Ornithologists’ Union (AOU).
Thus, Goeldi’s episode is traced through the radiation process as a club forecast that came to transpire in a transformed, privatized version not entirely foreseen. The episode materialized with a marketized modification and a historical lag. The realization of this transnational club is sketched above through the externalization and diversion processes as well as the two other instances of the radiation club mechanism. These other explanations sketch the RSPB’s externalizing use of testimony from a transnational advocacy network including Goeldi and another museum professional at the Brazilian Amazon, toward support for a state regulation that would eventually institutionalize a multi-stakeholder committee to restrict supply chains of hunted plumage into the United Kingdom. These complementary explanations also sketch the labeling “milliners’ white lists” and the certifying “Audubon Hats” that extended to consumer recruits the pledges proscribing the consumption of hunted bird fashions on the part of women activists with the original U.S.-based Audubon Societies or U.K.-based groups including the RSPB. These other sketches trace the RSPB-PWLPF investigation to inform consumers about feather production methods along global commodity chains from Amazonian sources in and beyond Venezuela.

The RSPB’s interpretation of the plumage farming alternative that Goeldi advocated in Brazil and the impression that the said association made on the Bombay Natural History Society (BNHS) in U.K. India are suggestive of tensions that emerge among activists once transnational clubs operate, strains often hinging along the edges of supply chains. Whereas from its consumer-side stronghold the RSPB publicized that Goeldi had been “misled by the canard of the Tunisian farm,” from the producer-side of the supply chain the BNHS publicly reserved for “home-keeping sentimentalists” the
RSPB’s skepticism of plumage exports based on bird domestication that was practiced and documented on a regular basis in South Asia (RSPB 1911:49-50; Doughty 1975:76-80).

There was a fourth and final set of behavioral patterns in the bird hat campaign that can be concisely traced through the club mechanism of the radiation process. Ecofeminist episodes traceable through the activist process would be narrow and incomplete if they were to encompass only models or regulatory regimes which are purely private or public. Briefly mentioned above, the chronic feather smuggling that resulted from both the 1913 U.S. act and the 1921 U.K. act did not occur under the sole surveillance of state actors. Legal refinements and law enforcement for such quasi-regulated transnational trade were under the corporatist purview of tripartite bodies mixing cause-oriented advocates, industry groups and state officials in the United Kingdom. In the less mixed model informally at work in the United States, law enforcement and voluntary business initiatives to end similar trafficking sought the expertise of conservationist groups often, relying on advocates’ authority even when their expert testimony created conflicts of interest with their activist cause-orientation (Doughty 1975:115-125, 135-138, 142; Price 1999:99; see PWLPF 1920:103-105; Hornaday 1931:201).

The final mechanism (‘G’) can only tentatively trace one episode in the campaign, pending further scholarship in which historians record other bird conservationists who differentiated flows of transnational commerce into European or North American polities as having been re-legitimated through excluded practices purged within the (sub)tropics. The advent of wholesale trade barriers and fads in millinery fashion combined with other
factors to simply drastically reduce and drive underground the transnational commerce of an entire industry rather than leave activists with any substantial set of (legally) identifiable supply chains from which to purge particular stigmatized practices. The one tentative exception to this was a possible continuation of the preceding event series in which feather businesses that “elected to be good citizens” by ceasing to carry hunted plumage enlisted bird advocacy groups to “help them get everything in line… [to] liv[e] up to both the letter and the spirit of the [U.S. 1913] law.” (PWLPF 1920:103-105)

Conservationists probably differentiated transnational flows of ostrich feather commerce into the United States as having been re-legitimated through excluded hunting practices purged within the (sub)tropics over the several years during which the PWLPF maintained a merger of its legitimacy resources to the material resources of millinery chambers of commerce. From 1913 to at least 1920 the U.S.-based conservationist fund seems to have assisted feather businesses—which they publicly labeled as “legitimate,” “honorable” and “good citizens”—in differentiating illegal trafficking of hunted feathers from transnational commerce in ostrich plumes (PWLPF 1920:103-105). Certainly, the PWLPF reported these businesses to have wished for such product differentiation inasmuch as they expressed the desire “that the sale of forbidden plumage should cease altogether, and no longer bring odium upon honest men.” (PWLPF 1920:103-105) The said business chambers reportedly “recorded very decided protests against the further sale by the trade of banned plumage,” objections opposed “to the odium that [was] being brought upon a respectable trade by a few irreconcilables who [were] determined to sell [hunted feathers] as long as one [could] be obtained.” (PWLPF 1920:103-105) At the very least the PWLPF appears to have given the millinery chambers of commerce
positive publicity in associating a call from one such chamber with “the most drastic course” of action that even as such “could not have brought back to life” birds hunted for their feathers (PWLPF 1920:103-105). The fund reported that even where hunted feathers had remained from “dead birds represented in the storage boxes of the millinery” industry before the U.S. import ban went into effect one such chamber “issued to all its members a circular call, strongly exhorting them to drop the sale of remnant forbidden plumage for the reputation of the trade.” (PWLPF 1920:103-105)

As for Europe, a purging or re-legitimating differentiation of transnational plumage commodity chains might have sprung from the Selborne Society in its role within the Committee for the Economic Preservation of Birds (CEPB)—as suggested above under the U.K. process of diversion. The nexus of the Selborne Society and the CEPB perhaps comprises the most promising line of further research that awaits historians in reference to bird hat episodes that could be traced through this mechanism.

3.12. INCUBATION

In one out of two episodes that can be characterized through an incubation process, the U.S.-based PWLPF offered “aid to bird protection in France.” More specifically, the PWLPF funded the French-based League for the Protection of Birds (LPO) with an annual sum of US$ 500—equivalent to US$ 10,000 in purchasing power as of 2007—for eleven consecutive years begun in 1918, shortly before WWI ended (Hornaday 1931:189).

With resource pooling into a coalition, the LPO received the financial resources it “desperately needed” whereas the PWLPF received political and nationalist resources. The latter resources allowed the U.S. association to have an indirect presence in
European and colonial France despite the sensitive conditions surrounding bird advocacy in the vicinity of Paris, as discussed above under the processes of internalization and diversion. As those discussions mention, both French state and society had blocked efforts to influence the governing of hunted plumage fashion in France from the outside-in. Indeed, the same transnational bird activism—particularly advocacy of a U.S. law banning imports of plumage for fashion—had earned a medal from French-based bird-protective groups for the chief PWLPF activist, but had also made “numerous enemies” for him in France (Grant 1915[1913]:89-90, 92). The Parisian feather industry had fostered negative sentiment against such U.S.-based bird advocacy (Doughty 1975:122; see e.g., Anon. 1914a; Grant 1915[1913]:89-90, 92). The statist and societal blockage of bird preservationism reaching France from outside the polity was such that in awarding the PWLPF activist a medal despite objections and threats from French-based plumage labor unions against the event the LPO and the present-day National Society for Nature Protection (SNPN) had “taken a bold stand against the feather trade of France.” (Grant 1915[1913]:89-92; see Claeys-Mekdade & Jacqué 2007:64-69, 78-79)

These early efforts as well as the later formation of a coalition between preservationist groups inside and outside France seem to have been strategically targeted endeavors that chose, cross-nationally, to focus on the global center of (bird hat) fashion in Paris. A U.S.-based conservationist organization—the present-day Wildlife Conservation Society—and then the PWLPF itself publicized the “courage” of the French-based associations in presenting their award on “the face of the feeling in Paris.” (Grant 1915[1913]:89-92) An interpretation that the U.S.-based conservationists publicized alongside their public recognition suggests that they would later perceive
cross-national promise in long-term funding for the French-national LPO along the
tactics of incubation: “this episode… affords good grounds for the belief that eventually
the [associations’] zoologists of France will bring the French nation up to the highest
level in this cause… [of] all American defenders of birds.” (Grant 1915[1913]:89-92)

By the time the PWLPF decided to extend financial resources to the LPO the fund
did so after weighting cross-national considerations of cost-benefit and risk-opportunity,
which were expressed during deliberations within the U.S.-based organization. In the
urgency of wartime the PWLPF provisionally sent financial resources to the French-
based bird advocacy associations. It sent the ad-hoc, one-time funds toward the cost of
the LPO’s informational campaign materials and of the SNA’s “measures for the
protection and increase of the wildlife of France and her colonies.” (PWLPF 1920:28-30,
93-98) Soon thereafter, PWLPF activists voiced the fund’s cross-national cost-benefit
and risk-opportunity calculations to its members in a letter and a biennial statement that
requested responses to its call for institutionalizing the transnational resource pooling
with the LPO onto a more stable, predictable basis.

In terms of cost-benefit, the resource-pooling mobilization of the U.S.-based fund
to “bestow gifts of money within the campaign funds of French and Belgian and Italian
bird-protecting organizations” stated:

“When the [PWLPF] was founded… all nations with which we had close relations
in the protection of wild life were prosperous, and abundantly able to finance their
own campaign work. It was on that basis that we proposed to make the work of
the Fund national in its scope instead of international… But the war has
overturned and destroyed the peaceful and prosperous conditions abroad which
once rendered financial aid from America unnecessary. Today America stands in
the position of the helper of the world, financially and otherwise. (…) These new
conditions now affect the protection of wild life. (…) A comparatively small
amount of financial help from the [PWLPF], subscribed annually for the next
three years, would greatly assist the League [LPO], not only in the actual payment
of the costs of propaganda but also in encouraging the bird protectionists of France through the helping hand of America. The funds for current expenses now in the… [PWLPF] are ample for the needs of America, and sufficient to justify the giving of some financial aid to our colleagues in France. … [T]he people of France and England now have mighty little money to spend on such causes as the protection and increase of bird life… We have in view those special occasions wherein a comparatively small sum bestowed judicially at a critical moment helps to accomplish a great result. (…) If anywhere on this distracted earth the aid of the crop-protecting birds is sorely needed at this time, it is needed in France and Belgium today.” (PWLPF 1920:28-30, 93-98)

As for risk-opportunity, the PWLPF “carefully considered,” again in the telling words of its own professionals:

“At the present moment our Fund is in a position to render great aid in the organization and promotion, in France, of a great national movement for the increase and protection of the wild bird life of that nation. There never was a time when crop-protecting birds were so much needed in France as now… We are already in close touch with the bird protectors of France… Making the work of the Fund international… has been inaugurated by our participation in the renewal of bird protection in France, through the most important and responsible agency existing there, the [LPO]. (…) While it is not seemly to be unduly complacent over the placing of small sums of money for the promotion of great causes, we can not suppress a feeling of secret satisfaction over our having had sufficient animal intelligence to perceive a great opportunity to render service to the cause of bird protection in a place and time wherein we know that outside aid is needed. … [B]eyond all comparison, the subscriptions made to bird protection in France will be more far-reaching… than any other expenditures that have been made during the war by this Fund save in the promotion of [two initiatives]… In France, bird protection work already is well organized. (…) In Belgium and in Italy it remains for bird protection work to be organized, and the wheels set in motion. (…) We will make no secret of the fact that we are now endeavoring to promote the creation of new bird protecting organizations in those countries…” (PWLPF 1920:28-30, 93-98)

In contrast with the above discussion of this episode under the process of coalition formation, an analysis of the PWLPF-LPO pooling that proceeds through an incubation process has a clear value added. The incubation process explains how and why the U.S. PWLPF simultaneously pooled resources on different bases with the LPO in France—i.e.
financial matched with nationalistic and political resources—and with the U.K. RSPB—i.e. matching financial resources.

The second incubation episode triangulated transnational activism into the relational ties of colonizer-colonizer-colonized—currently equivalent to north-north-south—that show the robust scope of the processual model. Without a comparable “empire of its own, the United States could not be as directly involved as the Europeans in hands-on conservation beyond its own borders,” with some exceptions such as the advocacy of the AOU Committee toward U.S. government officials in the present-day Philippines (Stone 1992:58; see Dutcher 1904:106-108). The pervasiveness of empire-states in Europe, Africa and Asia during the duration of the ecofeminist campaign limited the potential international behavior that would be traceable through the incubation process, as it did those of the externalization process. The patterns of both processes typically work across the “bamboo curtain” dividing the contemporary global south and global north, or post-colonized and post-colonizer (Tarrow 2005; Steinberg 2001). While the incubation process does not characterize much transnational activism from 1868 to 1941, particularly that involving the behavior of bird hat campaigners, it indicates quite starkly that much in Tarrow’s typological categorization hinges on where shifting state, national and territorial borders lie (see Biersteker 2002). Overtime, as empire-states phase into nation-states the categorizations over space that set the scope of what is considered national or international activism drastically change. Voilà, actions and issues that may have been in domestic (intra-imperial) sites become international: “domestic” ecofeminist advocacy between Europe and Asia becomes “international.” For example, the “branches” that the RSPB established in British India and within the British
extraterritorial zone at the Shanghai International Settlement in present-day China, which are mentioned above under the transnational process of diversion, would come to constitute transnational activism traceable through the process of incubation. Yet, the incubation process is robust enough to surface in least-likely conditions. Turning to the triangulated behavior of transnational activists, the episode temporally renewed into the 1930s and spatially restricted to the colonies those coalitions that the PWLPF had struck with French bird conservationists and had attempted to craft with Belgian and Italian bird advocates in the late 1910s and the 1920s.

In 1930 the U.S.-based PWLPF and Boone and Crockett Club (BCC) promised “substantial support” in financial resources to the U.K. Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire (SPWFE)—the present-day Fauna & Flora International (FFI). The financial support was to be matched by U.K. funds, to be kept in a special fund for projects, and “to promote efforts with which American conservationists [were] in sympathy”—which is to say efforts in Africa and Asia (Adams 2004:46 quoting Anon. 1930:6; see Coder 1975:69-70; Boardman 1981:33). In this instance of an incubation process financial resources are pooled with political resources—colonial administrative structures, authority etc. The FFI had already participated in the bird hat campaign through contributions such as its joint sponsorship of a meeting in early 1914 to rally public support for the aforementioned U.K. bill that nearly restricted imports of ornamental plumage at that time (Doughty 1975:52-53; see Prendergast & Adams 2003:252).

92 The SPWFE has gone through more than one name change. It is currently named Fauna & Flora International (FFI).
3.13. LOCAL ISSUE FRAMING

In one out of at least two sets of episodes, local issue framing sketches the behavior of the leading bird activists who advocated for an end to the millinery-related “extermination of birds in Brazil.” (my translation of Duarte 2006:11) Hermann von Ihering (1850-1930), who arrived in Brazil from his native Germany in 1880, and Émil August Göldi (1859-1917), who moved to Brazil from his native Switzerland in 1885, made the earliest and the most characteristic of such efforts.93 The two scientists did not merely make use of their expert authority. In their advocacy, they also relied on political arguments and testimonies, and these toned down their foreign identities and reaffirmed their allegiance to Brazil. While Göldi’s advocacy is traced above, Ihering also took part in the bird hat campaign through at least an episode in 1902 when he “advocated a federal law” on bird hunting and protection in Brazil (my translation of Duarte 2006:7, 12). The measures of the bird law that he advocated included the suppression of all bird “hunting for commerce,” in a polity where a substantial portion of that ‘extractive’ exchange was sold toward fashion export markets abroad (my translation of Duarte 2006:6-7, 12).

Whereas Göldi went out of his way to Brazilianize his name into Emílio Augusto Goeldi and to offer crucial support to Brazil in a territorial dispute with France—over present-day French Guiana—settled by his native Switzerland, Ihering naturalized himself as Brazilian sooner than usual and spoke of Brazilian society always using an inclusive “we.” (Tambs 1973:64-65; Meira 1975; Gomes 1999; Smith 2003:68-81, 163-168; see Fregapani 2000:151) Although they had foreign ties, Ihering and Göldi used nationalist arguments in their millinery advocacy, which was in full force by 1895. Both advocates

---

93 Ihering and Göldi were initially contracted as zoologists by a Brazilian state still under monarchy, lost their positions with the change to a republican regime in 1889, and managed to regain public employment in Brazil as directors of the museums of the States of São Paulo and Pará, respectively.
acted in an even more paradoxical manner than the Brazilian-born next-generation of conservationists in Brazil would behave. The expatriates’ advocacy against Brazilian supply of and demand for foreign feather fashions most pointedly “eschewed the cosmopolitanism of the era and the importing of European models even if, contradictorily, many references of these intellectuals were also foreign, as in the international preservationist movements.” (my translation of Duarte 2006:11-12, 15, 17; see Franco & Drummond 2009:86, 91; Dieguez & Fonseca 2006; Dean 1995:230, 237-238, 244, 261; Doughty 1975:155)

The process of local issue framing explains this otherwise puzzling behavior. It traces the apparently unusual foreign nationalism of transnational conservationists as a patterned result of activist tactics that evolve over a chain of events following the sequence of causal mechanisms along this processual model. In line with transnational activism modeled as local issue framing, bird conservationists based in Brazil framed a transnational dispute through localizing national symbols. Surmounting a block that was prevalently held in Brazil against claims advocated from the outside-in, they communicated, converged and bridged two previously isolated identities for themselves as framers—e.g., foreign, nationalist. The Brazilian experience of most conservationists who belonged to a network including Goeldi as well as Ihering “eclipsed or destroyed” them in events tantamount to a blocking of outside-in activist claims:

“It does not seem coincidental that they were foreigners. These incidents were a sign that the defense of the Brazilian natural patrimony would not be readily entrusted to outsiders, no matter how competent. Clearly, forest conservation could not be implanted by foreigners, even well-intentioned, energetic, and long-resident foreigners.” (Dean 1995:237-238)
As the Brazilian state and society blocked the claims that most of these networked foreign conservationists brought into Brazil, advocates such as Goeldi or Ihering communicated about this sensitivity and adapted their framing around it through convergence and bridging of their identities toward the national. In this vein, as Goeldi and Ihering both used a “tone of complicity regarding affairs pertaining to Brazil” the toning down of their identity as foreigners was “certainly [done] to prevent [their] denunciation from being ruled out as a foreign speech.” (my translation of Duarte 2006:12)

Tentatively based on a sparse historiography, the process of local issue framing may also sketch activist behavior in another set of related events that took place in the United Kingdom, United States, Brazil and Peru during the transnational bird hat campaign. While the ideas and identities in these episodes differ, they all share a key thread of the local issue framing process: International disputes are framed in the language of localization and/or nationalization through the mobilization of local and/or national symbols. First, bird advocates framed the transnational plumage dispute in terms of the U.S. women’s movement and the temperance movement. They consistently downplayed the international components of the issue of hunted bird fashions. A key framing construction went from international millinery to female identity, to female moral authority, to female enfranchisement. Advocates framed the bird hat as an object

---

94 Frame is discussed here only in relation to changes across the scale of activism. A few of the many framing deployments that are not closely tied to changes in the scale of activism in the campaign analyzed here are listed below, guided by the related ideas Keck and Sikkink (1998) put forth. In the U.S., the Audubon Society itself and its campaign failed after two years of an initial cycle begun in 1886 which did not frame bird hats in terms of people and bodily harm to powerless victims, and succeeded in a later cycle revived in 1896 deploying such frames (Mason 2002; Riley 1998). In the U.K., people and bodily harm were framed throughout; however a chain that distanced responsibility may have been less visible given the absence of as much domestic plumage hunting. Some framing phrases include: “bird hat,” “she is wearing a dead bird on her hat,” “she bears the murderer’s brand on her forehead,” “bird murder,” and “a killing hat.” (Doughty 1975:63-4, 82-83 photo; Lasky 1995; Riley 1998; Price 1999)
that ridiculed female identity, degraded women’s moral authority, and demoralized the women’s movement for enfranchisement (Doughty 1975:63-64; Riley 1998; Price 1999, 2004; Birdsall 2002; Mason 2002; Boardman 2006:34-35; Stein 2008). These advocates complemented such framing with an appeal to an equivalent construct that emphasized children, referring to child labor and civic nationalism in place of enfranchisement. Second, in the United Kingdom activists framed the dispute around hunted bird fashions along similar lines, only diluting the female and child focus to make room for more central utilitarian—cost-benefit analysis of colonial exports—and animal cruelty discourses. Third, in Brazil bird advocates framed with little gender or child discourse, but rather with a heavy dose of nationalism, anti-corruption or moral decay, and entrepreneurship. During the campaign women’s advocates in Brazil do not seem to have addressed the fashion of bird millinery, but the reverse did occur to a limited extent as bird protective groups appealed to gender roles (Hahner 1980; Duarte 2006:17). Last but not least, in and out of Peru bird advocates framed millinery and other bird hunting as wasteful resource use and waste of potential development. Bird advocates hailed the post-1909 revitalized Peruvian guano—i.e. bird feces—industry as the greatest among industries based on the conservation of common-pool animals; and sought to extend this system to Chile, Mexico and beyond (Cushman 2005:479-480; see Johnston 1913:429). The consistency of underlying spatial framing patterns despite this superficial diversity of frame manifestations—even within a single campaign—speaks to the robustness of the local issue framing process.
3.14. CONCLUSION

Synthesizing the contribution of this study next to that of Tarrow (2005) produces a more accurate, comprehensive and reflective analysis of the bird hat campaign. There are three key aspects of this synthetic contribution: (1) It correctly shows that both globalism and internationalism empowered transnational activism; (2) it accounts for four modes of transnational activism that are originally conceptualized in this study and would otherwise be excluded from analysis; and (3) it ponders spatial assumptions otherwise implicitly unexamined and underspecified. First, the synthesized results of the causal theory-testing in this struggle show internationalist interactions between states to explain transnational activism to an extent comparable to that of globalist flows between societies or markets. Second, the illustrative, processual findings of the theory-building that synthesizes four into the ten modes of transnational activism evident in this campaign convey a defining understanding of this ecofeminist struggle as such. Only with the addition of the theory built in this study can one explain how most transnational activists in this contention campaigned specifically to protect birds from hunts for women’s wear; hunts viewed particularly as cruelty and extinction threats to common-pool or ‘wild’ birds. Third, the synthesized observations that revisit premises about the spatial evolution of transnational activism suggest a much more complex trajectory than the local-to-global trend conventionally assumed, but a less chaotic evolution than the one that was apparent above on the sole basis of the processes drawn from Tarrow’s (2005) prime scholarship.

The testing of newly theorized modes of transnational activism in this chapter suggests a refutation and replacement of any explanation that singles out international
interactions between states above global flows between markets and societies. In broadbrush, the empirical observations in this case study suggest a synthesis of globalist and internationalist explanations to be a more accurate alternative than either the former thesis or the latter antithesis. Moreover, although the internationalist explanation that Tarrow (2005) provides is consistent with the observations that materialize when process-tracing through his six models themselves, this consistency erodes once observed alongside equivalent causal tests through at least two of the models original to this study. The processes of diversion, radiation and some episode tracings of incubation set the context for Tarrow’s (2005) internationalist opportunity structure, rendering internationalism into a dependent variable of their globalism rather than an independent variable next to globalism.

The addition of these two dual-level, ‘glocal’ processes—through which this chapter traces ecofeminist campaign episodes more closely, mechanism by mechanism—contributes useful specifications to the meta-theoretical question of global causality. The diversion model reveals a thread of ways in which the thickening of global flows between markets and societies encourages transnational activists. First, global market flows are the crucial causal mechanism that encourages industrial and activist groups to reconcile themselves for the purpose of applying direct or indirect pressure on other polities. More global flows of capital or goods increase the frequency with which investment or trade, respectively, generates incentives for industrial groups to attempt to raise regulatory costs imposed upon their foreign competitors. Faced with these incentives, industrial groups become more amenable to strike a truce with activist groups for the purpose of such regulatory competition or pro-active protectionism. Second, more global flows of capital
and goods make the polities that activists pressure transnationally more interdependent or vulnerable and thereby more likely to yield to the activist pressures. Finally, more global flows of ideas, information and people disseminate across borders the legitimacy resources that activists rely on as they apply their transnational pressures.

The model of radiation reveals a similar if longer sequence of causal mechanisms through which the thickening of global flows encourages transnational activists. First, the more capital and goods flow globally, the more transnational supply chains there are for activists to target. Second, the more ideas, information and people flow globally, the better the prospects of activists in recruiting consumers, investors or managers who will pressure businesses abroad to exclude certain production practices. Third, the more ideas, information and people flow globally, the more opportunities they generate for activists to form transnational certification or labeling clubs. Finally, the more capital and goods flow globally, the more they empower activists and market recruits to differentiate transnational commerce in products produced using legitimate and excluded practices.

This case study makes several contributions in terms of the processual theory-building, perhaps the most fundamental one being that in its observations these original processes set the context within which several of Tarrow’s (2005) models can be more coherently understood. The addition of diversion and radiation accounts for the two earliest and most frequent modes of transnational activism in this campaign. The former not only illustrates activist concern with feathers from hunted as opposed to non-hunted birds, but also contextualizes episodes superficially traced through Tarrow’s (2005) processes of internalization and coalition formation. The latter highlights activism of
women in the United Kingdom and United States while also deepening episodes superficially traced through Tarrow’s (2005) processes of externalization and coalition formation. The addition of incubation and local issue framing respectively illustrates the contrast among varieties of coalitions and solves the puzzling nationalism of a foreign conservationist who threatened to invite foreign intervention despite his patriotism.

Finally, examination of conventional assumptions about the spatial evolution of transnational activism on the basis of combined observations suggests that scholars do not stand on useful premises. If there is any discernible spatial trend in the chaotic spatial evolution of transnational activism during the ecofeminist campaign, it is an ambiguous trajectory from a dual-level quadrant of the extended typology to a blank one. The campaign began with simultaneously diverting and radiating activism. These would place it in the dual-level quadrant at the lower-left. The struggle gravitated toward simultaneous activism in the modes of coalition formation and incubation. These would move it toward the mid-right quadrant, a net space between the respective external-external level at the lower right and the dual-level quadrant at the upper right. In other words, with much more complexity than assumptions of transitology, the spatial trajectory of the campaign can easily be mapped empirically and the net result is an ambiguous evolution from local cause and global action to global cause and ‘transitional’ action. The spatial evolution observed on the basis of the extended synthesis of ten processes is less chaotic than the one that was apparent above on the sole basis of the processes drawn from Tarrow’s (2005) prime scholarship.
4. Campaign on the (Inter)National Institute of (the Hylean) Amazon (Research), 1945-1956

In broad-brush the campaign can be seen as an instance of two-level games that evolved as follows. A transnational advocacy network proposed an institute of transnational scientific cooperation for socio-environmental conservation and development. Cooperation for natural resource conservation and development was considered. Nationalist social movements opposed consideration of cooperation for resource development as development for colonial subordination. Finally, a national research institute for agricultural development with limited conservation and transnational cooperation prevailed (see Galey 1977:134-137). At the outward level epitomized in the United Nations, the initially advocated transnational institute was the right project at the right time and place, striking a common ground among the “win sets” of states with the facilitation of a pre-existing international organization. At the inward level in Brazil, the same institute landed as the wrong project, at the wrong place, at the wrong time. The preliminary transnational organization left itself vulnerable to protesting and resisting spillover from a simultaneous nationalist campaign over natural resources, pushing ratification of its foundational treaties out of the “win set” of Brazilian state legislators (see Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993).

In May of 1946, the socioenvironmentalist advocate Paulo Berredo Carneiro submitted a proposal that consolidated a campaign involving activists largely located in Brazil and France. At that point a Brazilian government representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), he proposed an International Institute of the Hylean Amazon (IIHA) to the newly-created UN division.
His proposal consisted of “international support” for the Goeldi Museum in the Brazilian Amazon so as “to save its precious botanical, zoological and ethnological collections, and to develop natural sciences in the Amazon region through the cooperation of all the countries of this geographical zone.” (Domingues & Petitjean 2004:35-36, 38; see Maio & Sá 2000:986; Magalhães 2006:69) UNESCO accepted the proposal and incorporated the IIHA project of science for human and ecological development, a project that would ‘civilize’ under an approach that Carneiro defined in terms of a “human ecology” “concerned with the preservation of the nature and natives in the Amazon.” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001)

UNESCO soon expanded the project into a transnational institute for natural sciences in the Amazon region, a pilot initiative for similar tropical institutes in other world regions. UNESCO personnel came to expect that the IIHA could build on a longstanding Amazonian history of transnational scientific cooperation, draw attention to the incipient UNESCO itself, and go on to become an exemplar of a new, less Eurocentric type of transnational scientific cooperation.95 Therefore, in 1947 the institute became one of UNESCO’s four main initiatives, its main priority in the field of science, and the first major project that UNESCO sponsored (Galey 1977:130; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:265-266, 2004:38, 44-45). During the same year UNESCO—in the person of its conservationist director-general Julian Huxley—took up the efforts of transnational civic groups such as the present-day BirdLife International in designing the public-private transnational organization International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN). The IUPN broadened the membership base of another one of these transatlantic

95 The increasingly transnational online book business that would emerge with the name of Amazon.com fifty years later, in the 1990s, offers a recent analogue that cuts across these expectations, making them more comprehensible today.
civic groups, the International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN). The broader, restructured IUPN hybridized state and society as well as moved from the West to the rest the membership balance of the IOPN, which had been consolidated in the early 1930s. The mixed and global IUPN was founded in 1948 and has since become the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (Princen 1994:137-138; Domingues & Petitjean 2004:34; see McCormick 1989:31-36; Kellow 2000; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:289-290; Adams 2001:29-30; Domingues 2002:4; Boardman 2006:42-43; see also Finnemore 1996:50).

As UNESCO came into its own full establishment in late 1946, Carneiro was elected to its Executive Council, adding this position to his duties as a Brazilian representative (Domingues & Petitjean 2004:31, 36). He went on to lose a candidacy for director-general of UNESCO in 1948 (Domingues & Petitjean 2004:39-41), and to be elected President of the Executive Council of UNESCO in 1952 (Crampton 1972:55). Carneiro was known as a cosmopolitan who favored direct transnational relations between scientists, and who opposed the bipolarization of the Cold War and the politicization of science by the “intrigues” of national interests (Domingues & Petitjean 2004:38-41; see also Finnemore 1996:51; Maio & Sá 2000:994).

In May of 1948, delegates from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Italy, the Netherlands (through the then Dutch Guyana in present-day Suriname), Peru and Venezuela signed an IIHA treaty governing the constitution and operation of the emerging international organization (Crampton 1972; Galey 1977:143).
By 1948-1951, the campaign grew increasingly contentious in Brazil regarding international cooperation versus colonialism—as viewed from the pro-IIHA or the anti-IIHA side, respectively—and environmental conservation versus economic development.

“Since late 1948 when [the IIHA treaty] reached the Brazilian Congress to be ratified, the Hylean Institute turned into a target of a... politicization that lasted until its filing in 1951. (...) From the parliament... the discussions about the IIHA spread to [Brazilian] society, gaining space in national public opinion and mobilizing political and social actors that had until then been removed from the debates. (...) [The ratification of the IIHA] became [politicized] as nationalist theses grew popular in Brazilian society, especially after the outbreak of the campaign ‘The Petroleum is Ours’ [(‘O Petróleo é Nosso’)]. Taking advantage of this context, the opponents of the IIHA began an intense campaign against the institute’s creation...” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:89, 144)

Moreover, as the IIHA was being created, other projects were also being structured in Brazil that involved study of the Amazon for the purposes of developing agriculture and settling people associated with that agriculture. The institute enjoyed a period of acceptance in Brazil when many Brazilians thought “that it would be transformed into an agency of this policy,” “but the IIHA was rejected when human ecology revealed itself contradictory to the exploitation of natural resources and peoples, and to” the transformation of the Amazon into a huge arable field for settler agriculture (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2005; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:291). The

These years and themes marked the tipping point of the campaign. Due to the contentions over cooperation versus colonialism and conservation versus development, the provisional IIHA was dismantled after two committees in the lower house of the Brazilian legislature tabled the institute’s international treaty and protocol, and instead approved legislation creating two national organizational alternatives. As of halfway through 1949, only three nation-states had ratified the IIHA treaty—France (through French Guiana), Ecuador and Colombia (Maio & Sá 2000:1004; Magalhães 2006:118).
As these juridical and political difficulties evolved, UNESCO gradually withdrew from the IIHA and eventually entirely abandoned the idea of the international institute.

Although Carneiro did not officially abandon the IIHA project, he did move toward other UNESCO activities (Domingues & Petitjean 2004:36-37, 45). While the IIHA agreements were going through Brazil’s federal legislature, congressmen did not position themselves merely in relation to the IIHA. Instead,

“as the discussion around the Institute intensified in parliament and society, the House of Representatives came to carry on alternatives to the UNESCO plan, partly echoing claims of various pressure groups. Thus, the IIHA, despite the fact that it was not created, performed an important role in putting the Amazon permanently on the national political and scientific agenda, and in making it urgent to implement a development policy in the region. The creation of the National Institute of Amazon Research (INPA, for Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia) in 1952 and of the Superintendency for the Amazon Economic Valorization Plan (SPVEA, for Superintendência do Plano de Valorização Econômica da Amazônia) in the following year are evidence of the new status that the Amazon acquired in governmental plans.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:141, 144-145; see Crampton 1972:54; Galey 1977:170-172; Braga 2003:9-10; Domingues & Petitjean 2005; Magalhães & Maio 2007:182)

As the subsequent section demonstrates, the IIHA-INPA campaign merits inclusion in this study based on empirical evidence that satisfies a criterion for case selection, the inclusion of biodiversity in activist deed or discourse. This insertion of biodiversity is is not self-evident in this introduction or in the process-tracing sections that follow below the next heading; hence, the subsequent section establishes the satisfaction of the case selection device adopted in this study.

Deductively, the process-tracing sections to follow contribute original analysis for a campaign that has been carefully described or historicized, but hardly explained beyond

96 Another historiographic account discusses earlier relationships between the IIHA and “valorization” efforts, which “aimed to transform the Amazon in a great arable field for agriculture,” and clarifies the latter endeavors: “‘Valorization’ was the term that designated the settlement policies of the interwar period (as in France, for example).” (Petitjean & Domingues 2000:291)
occasional analyses that theorize scientific layers most relevant to their science studies. Conversely, a vast and pre-existing historiography offers an inductive benchmark for the theoretical and conceptual framework that is original to this study. Integrating induction and deduction, *Table 4* below quotes and interjects empirical description that can clearly contrast theoretical explanations of transnational activism between two prevailing processes (internalization and externalization) and two additional processes (incubation and local issue framing).

*Table 4: Inductive Campaign (IIHA-INPA) Case and Deductive Causal Chain*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empirical episodes (my translation of Maio 2005:115; see Maio &amp; Sá 2000:977, 1008-1009)</th>
<th>Theoretical process(es)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“There is a kind of consensus in the literature about the alleged failure of the plan of the IIHA as a function of the political difficulties confronted in Brazil, to the extent that the plan was considered a threat to national sovereignty.”</td>
<td>Externalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“This fact would be an accurate indicator of... the importance of the nationalist forces in Brazil. (...) [However,] the processes of reception and appropriation of the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon, which brought about as one of their consequences the foundation of the INPA, are not to be confused with a parochial vision, dictated by an exalted nationalism. (...)”</td>
<td>(Would be) Internalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“(...) The versions about the “defeat” of the IIHA project lose sight of a much more complex and nuanced trajectory.”</td>
<td>(Overlooked) Incubation and local issue framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The process of formulating and deciding proposals in international forums, and the reception at the national level is marked by dynamics of sharing, conflict and negotiation between the international and the national levels; circulation of policy ideas and conceptions among ruling elites, bureaucrats and intellectuals.”</td>
<td>Local issue framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“This text… present[s] some aspects of the reception of a post-war UNESCO project, observing how the interactions between global request and local answer developed. It is suggested that certain international proposals were central in the formulation of national projects, which, however, are not to be confused with the original conceptions in that they [the national projects] follow, up to a point, a native logic.”</td>
<td>Incubation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The crucial empirical tests in the process-tracing sections of this chapter contribute to a refutation of the causal weights that international interactions and global flows exert upon transnational activism. The empirical test among these two independent variables reveals comparable internationalist and globalist causality in a relatively internationalist case such as the statist IIHA-INPA campaign. The origins of the transnational activist process traced below diverge from the internationalist explanation that Tarrow (2005) puts forth (see also Young 1997; Tarrow & della Porta 2005). The evidence analyzed in the empirical tests offered in this case study does not support that meta-theoretical conclusion. Instead, according to the results of this case study, statist internationalism is only an unprivileged part of the structural conditions that encourage transnational activism.

On the one hand, as is to be expected from the most-likely, easy case analyzed here through a campaign that revolved around interstate organizations, the historical scholarship explicitly documents a clear causality from statist internationalism on to modes of transnational activism process-traced in this chapter:

"the events that led to the politicization of the IIHA... generated an unforeseen effect, to the extent that they offered an opportunity to the debate of an alternative produced by the world of contingencies, in other words, the INPA. Without a doubt, UNESCO was a catalyzing agent, a sort of conducting pivot of the meetings, clashes and mismatches of this process.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:977, 1008-1009; see Maio 2005:115)

On the other hand, although internationalism explains elements of the campaign any analysis of the campaign that attributes it to the sole or primary causality of state interactions would be incomplete or incorrect, respectively.

Such statist causality is analyzed in sufficiently favorable grounds to warrant a reassurance that the campaign behavior explained as transnational activism here does
constitute cause-oriented action as opposed to merely the transnational action of political elites that is often associated with both the state and ecology. Cause-oriented action in the campaign—particularly the experience traced under the respective processes of externalization and internalization below—certainly includes much elitist activism that other observers have generally considered to be a defining feature of transnational advocacy networks (see e.g., Tarrow 2002) and even of social movements to the extent they transnationalize (see e.g., McCarthy 1997).

The transnational elite politicking traced below not only falls under general definitions of cause-oriented action, but is also incorporated in fitting definitions—of “environmental activism in state and society”—that suit the transnational and particularly Brazilian context where most of this campaign takes place. Activism in the campaign, particularly of the sort traced under the processes of incubation and local issue framing below, also incorporates institutional and individual actors committed to environmental causes even as they are positioned in government bureaucracies.

Scholars have long defined transnational activism based on actors’ role orientation rather than non-state position; a definition that happens to be both theoretically and empirically apposite for the purposes of this study (Nye & Keohane 1971; Keck & Sikkink 1998; see Pinto 2010). These definitions are especially apt for an incipient international organization institutionalizing itself under administrators who understood their scientific and advocacy roles in a decidedly transnationalist manner closer to the public-private IUCN outgrowth where their role has prevailed than to the public UNESCO where their positions eventually did. In other words, a definition of transnational activism on the basis of actors’ advocacy role rather than their position in
state bureaucracies is especially timely for this campaign in that it avoids the anachronisms of imposing the UNESCO of the present on that of the post-WWII years or the INPA of today on the short-lived IIHA. As such, the explanations traced through the processes of incubation and local issue framing in the IIHA-INPA campaign are calibrated with this analytical approach, which is not only the correct historical match but also the neutral conceptual option regarding globalism and internationalism.

This study relies on scholars whose analysis of (transnational) ecological activism in Brazil suggests that activism, analyzed free of misplaced ethnocentrism, extends well into the state because “Brazilian politics has a significant component to it that derives from the politicized [rather than institutionalized] nature of public-policy decision making.” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007:17) This statist bureaucratization of activism is due to both “the provisional nature of policy legislation, whose implementation requires a separate mobilization of commitment” for an additional demand of enabling legislation, and to “the regular changes in the structure and personnel of public bureaucracies.” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007:18; see Leftwich 2011:235) Because institutionalization of policy “depends substantially on the voluntarism of committed individuals” and/or agencies, “networks connecting activists in civil society and committed individuals in state agencies facilitate issue advocacy” and thereby play “a central role in promoting activist agendas in Brazil.” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007:18-19) The explanations traced through the processes of incubation and local issue framing below are calibrated with this analytical approach to the transnational advocacy that state-society networks carried out during the IIHA-INPA campaign. Indeed, to analyze Brazil appropriately “[r]ather than look at civil society pressures or at state-society networks as important just in the early
stages of a policy process, we must look at them all the way through, from conception through enforcement, because the completion of one stage does not guarantee progression to the next.” (Hochstetler & Keck 2007:18-19)

In short, statist elite politics and transnational activism overlap, with no need to factor in reinforcement of elitism on account of the select scientists on which ecological activists tend to rely and studies about the IIHA-INPA tend to put emphasis.

As suggested above, the literature also demonstrates a comparable causality from global markets and societies (see e.g., Petitjean & Domingues 2000:266-267; Maio & Sá 2000:978-982; Maio 2005). These political opportunities from global flows that produced transnational activism, even in a case where such causality is least expected, are fully in line with the strict, cautious definition of globalism that Tarrow (2005:5, 8) adapts from Keohane (2002:194). As evident in Table 5 below, the transnational activism in the campaign was clearly propelled to a comparable extent by Keohane’s (2002:194) “flows… that connect actors between countries.”

Table 5: Globalist Flows Causing Transnational Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtypes of causal flows</th>
<th>Subtypes of independent variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Capital and goods”</td>
<td>-Transnational petroleum and film businesses (anti-IIHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-‘Haute finance’ (anti-IIHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Information and ideas”</td>
<td>-Global environmental degradation/deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-‘Advanced techniques in native models’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Fragmentation of nationalist resources—national identity and allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Periphery principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Technical resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Transnationalist universalism of science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“People”</td>
<td>-Migration of students and scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Potential refugees and immigrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1. BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION VERSUS CONQUEST IN THE CAMPAIGN

Besides demonstrating that the IIHA-INPA campaign fulfills the case-selection criteria of this study, this section provides a coherent theme through which to contrast two sides of a bipolar campaign in which activists struggled against each other. There are empirical reasons to consider biodiversity—in all its components of variety in ecosystems, species and genes—to be an issue in the campaign. The pro-IIHA advocacy network and to a lesser extent anti-IIHA activists both relied on biodiversity to promote their causes.

The supporters of the IIHA positioned their campaign for the institute as a means to a broader campaign for the conservation of biodiversity. Historical research to date lists zoology and botany among nine research divisions proposed in a pre-UNESCO version of Carneiro’s project for an institute (Maio & Sá 2000:983). The literature also describes Carneiro’s initial proposal to UNESCO in May of 1946 as including the “indigenous population of the [Amazon] region—threatened with biological and cultural extinction”—in a “dense and complex universe of beings (plants, animals and men) [that], according to Carneiro, required the overcoming of naturalists’ fragmented knowledge.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:986; see Galey 1977:128) Later in 1946, as Carneiro prepared to create the IIHA after obtaining UNESCO’s approval, he predicted and prescribed: the “institute shall (deverá) conduct highly developed research about the Amazonian flora and fauna.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:270) Over the following few years, he “disseminated the IIHA project in Brazil as a human ecology project, alleging that the earth was in total decline.” (Domingues 2002:4) In 1947 and once again in 1951, Carneiro asserted that the creation of the

The positioning of the IIHA as a means to and component of a broader biodiversity campaign went well beyond Carneiro, at a time leading up to the first UN conservation summit in the late 1940s (Dixey 1949; Goodrich 1951). Two contributions in the historiography document such purpose on the part of UNESCO and its IIHA allies:

“One of UNESCO’s concerns was environmental and nature conservation research. (…) The fact [that the IIHA] did not have an effect did not [discourage] UNESCO. (…) In fact, Julian Huxley, the first [Director-General] of UNESCO, has never given IIHA much support, although he was one of the initiators and promoters of IUPN. (…) At the first meeting of IIHA…, in August 1947… the institute objectives were determined… on the premise that nature is universal…” (Domingues 2002:4; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:274-275, 289-290; Domingues & Petitjean 2004:34; see also Finnemore 1996:50)

“For UNESCO, the [IIHA]… would be a center of scientific research, the purpose of which was the protection and increase of knowledge about tropical fauna and flora. … In the [IIHA] project, the issue of geographic diversity, of the uniqueness of the Amazonian tropics and the problem of man seen as part of the physical environment, was at the heart of its justification, as much as was international scientific cooperation.” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2005)

When UNESCO convened an initial IIHA conference in August of 1947 at Belém, in the Brazilian Amazon, it drew the line for the inclusion of states into a future IIHA on the basis of states containing “lands characteristic of the Hylea” ecosystem, regardless of whether these territories were drained by the Amazon River basin (Crampton 1972:44-45, 99-100; Maio & Sá 2000:990-991). The conference set the work plan of the proposed institute, including items such as: “the taking of a wide faunistic and floristic inventory, the creation of natural reserves in the Amazon, the discovery and
exploration of plants that would have economic value,” and research on the ethno-botanic knowledge of indigenous peoples (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:990-991; Maio 2001:58-59; for similar examples, see Crampton 1972:82; Magalhães & Maio 2007:175-176)

Shortly before, during, and soon after the Belém conference, the IIHA supporters repeatedly compared the institute to the U.S.-based Smithsonian Institution (SI) (Crampton 1972:63-65; Maio & Sá 2000:989; Magalhães 2006:69-71). During the previous year (1946), the SI had become the overarching organization in charge of the biological reserve Barro Colorado Island on the Panama Canal, after extended involvement with the reserve as one of several organizations researching and managing the canal island since the 1923 demarcation of the unit. The historical scholarship is suggestive but sparse regarding such relations between the proto-IIHA, the SI and biodiversity conservation units. Thus far, the historiography thinly documents that “after the Second World War” “an off-hand proposal by Julian Huxley that Amazonia should become an international scientific reserve received front-page coverage in the Brazilian press.” (Foresta 1991:145; see also Fearnside 1984:47) Huxley was not only a UNESCO Director-General whom Carneiro tried to succeed and who was involved with the IIHA and the IUCN. He was also a leading U.K. biologist in a transnational advocacy network including transatlantic civic groups such as BI and IOPN, and by the turn of the 1960s a founding member of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). A deputy in the Brazilian federal legislature who attended the 1947 Belém meeting is reported in the press as having compared the proposed IIHA to the SI, a SI staff person was one of two delegates representing the United States at the same meeting, and UNESCO staff members—

Another set of reasons to include this campaign within the selected biodiversity case studies emerge from the claims made on that issue area by activists who opposed the IIHA and eventually proposed the INPA. The historical scholarship includes telling examples of such mobilization on the substantive theme of biodiversity.

The legal scholar J.M. Othon Sidou described his own mobilization as an irate protest against what he called birds of prey prowling around the IIHA and over the rich pasture of the Amazon jungle (Sidou 1999[1950]:7-8, 10, 19, 24, 33-34; see Crampton 1972:55; Braga 2003:9-10; Magalhães & Maio 2007:182). He broadcasted a speech by radio to the westernmost reaches of the Brazilian Amazon, and subsequently published it. Sidou “campaign[ed]” by mentioning that the “heartwood” (cerne) of “the legendary Amazon” contained, among “other riches,” “oilseed plant species in the billions, one of them being the babassu” in addition to “all that man has not yet managed to discover in the deep secrets of the jungle.” (my translation of Sidou 1999[1950]:7-8, 10, 19, 24, 34)

A similar message was printed in a Brazilian newspaper that continuously mobilized public opinion against the IIHA: “scented plant oils unique in the world, medicinal plants, birds, animals, flowers, all of this will be the property of the Institute, which will make use of our treasures as it sees fit, and with full and absolute freedom; and all… ‘for the welfare of humanity.’” (my translation of quote in Magalhães 2006:110, 113-114)
Drawing on the minutes of debates in the Brazilian federal legislature, the literature suggests biodiversity to be a longstanding source of opposition for the main campaigner against the IIHA, deputy Artur Bernardes, within and beyond his roles as a legislator and former president—a president responsible for Brazil’s 1926 exit from the League of Nations. As early as 1924, Bernardes is said to have called for “the greatest vigilance over” scientific expeditions that entered the Brazilian Amazon “under the pretext of studying the flora and fauna.” (Crampton 1972:141-142; see Galey 1977:151-152; Magalhães 2006:97)

Moreover, when anti-IIHA campaigners eventually designed INPA as an alternative institute, the purpose of their proposed organization included the study of flora and fauna in the Amazon (Maio & Sá 2000:1008).

In broader environmental terms, the mobilization of the contending pro- and anti-IIHA sides making claims about biodiversity shared a Malthusian scientific orientation (see Sidou 1999[1950]:9-10, 19, 34-35; Crampton 1972:82, 135; Maio & Sá 2000:981; Magalhães 2006:114). In the aftermath of World War II and the fascist Axis’ quest for ‘vital spaces,’ a surging Malthusianism oriented some scientists to ecological ethics and other scientists to an opposing lifeboat ethics (generally, see Dryzek 2005; Stevis 2006; Carter 2007). The fatalistic latter, “feared the rapid depletion of natural resources in the backdrop of a dizzying growth of world population,” but in a preemptive reaction that made that fear a self-fulfilling prophecy they “aimed at settling the [Amazonian] forest, its waters and its peoples, by extensive agriculture, by cattle raising etc.” (my translation

---

97 Bernardes came back to electoral politics from his retirement in order to advance oil and IIHA activism, and resigned from elected office, returning to his retirement, once both campaigns succeeded. There were reports in Rio that Bernardes wanted to run for president again in late 1950, and that he expected his candidacy “to capitalize on his popularity as a defender of Brazilian independence in key issues such as the IIHA.” (Crampton 1972:56; Galey 1977:152, 170, 171-172; Magalhães 2006)
of Domingues & Petitjean 2005; see also Sidou 1999[1950]:9-10, 19, 34-35; Crampton 1972:135) In contrast, for scientists in the former group “[e]cology came to be seen as a checkmate on settlement.” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2005) That ecological orientation to the Amazon “is how the IIHA was interpreted in the post-War context and was rejected by nationalists of all sorts.” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2005; see also Sidou 1999[1950]:9-10, 19, 34-35) As an example of such an orientation, according to Carneiro, research

“was calling for the study of the soil, flora, fauna, natural resources, climate and man against the problems that societies had been facing with the depletion of the arable soils and the reserves of natural resources; against the accelerating increase in world population. …[H]e said that food shortage was already felt in many places and that this process… was leading to the depletion of natural resources.” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2005)

In a corroborative pattern for this study of longer term campaign sequels, each set of activists in the IIHA-INPA contention knowingly drew on earlier transnational campaigns that addressed biodiversity as they elaborated their claims. On the pro-IIHA side, Carneiro was influenced by advocates such as Humboldt, Goeldi and Cunha. Humboldt had partaken in the 1780s-1888 Luso-Brazilian annihilation campaign, reinforced the campaign’s desiccationist (i.e. “withering” or desertification) advocacy, and coined the term “Hylean Amazon” that labeled Carneiro’s campaign from its very outset (see Maio & Sá 2000:982; Braga 2003:7-10; see also Domingues & Petitjean 2005). Indeed, IIHA critics accused the institute’s Humboldtian legacy of rendering the organizational project outdated by the time of a post-colonial era in Latin America and of a decolonization age in Asia and Africa (Maio & Sá 2000:982). Goeldi and Cunha had participated in the 1868-1941 bird hat campaign, and respectively inspired Carneiro’s initial interest in the Amazon ecosystem and in a proto-IIHA (Maio & Sá 2000:978-981;
see Crampton 1972:111; Hecht 2004). Alberto Torres, who was associated with the
ecofeminist campaign, legitimized his daughter Heloísa Alberto Torres in the IIHA-INPA
campaign (see Galey 1977). On the anti-IIHA side, as accused by their main opponent
Carneiro himself, Bernardes, Catholic archbishop Mota and their associates drew on the
1849-1855 abolitionist Amazon campaign. They either referred back to or reproduced
the advocacy of figures such as Maury, ultramontane bishop Antônio de Macedo Costa,
Tavares Bastos and Cunha (Crampton 1972:53, 89-90, 154-155, 159; Galey 1977:161-
162; Magalhães 2006:115).

4.2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CAMPAIGN

This section chronicles the relatively short, decade-long, IIHA-INPA campaign.
It offers a summary of salient events in the chronological order that they occurred during
the econationalist contention as a whole. The events listed in the timeline on Table 6
below mark major episodes of transnational activism within this case study. They serve
as key moments that combine into an evolving synopsis of the campaign. Generally, the
campaign evolved from (1) transnational ecological advocacy for the IIHA to (2)
nationalist resistance and mobilization in defense against the IIHA toward (3)
transnational econationalist advocacy for the INPA.

Apart from one salient exception, these events are traced in sufficient depth below
for the timeline on the table to suffice as a guide for the extensive explanations that
follow. There is one significant aspect of nationalist and ecologist agency that might
otherwise be overshadowed in this econationalist case study. Implicit in the table and
dispersed in the following process-tracing explanations, there was a split over the IIHA
between communists within Brazil and those between Brazil and its foreign relations.
Communist activists added up to substantial proportions of both the nationalist social movement within Brazil—which claimed to defend sovereignty at the Amazon Basin—and the transnational ecologist network between Brazil and European nation-states—which claimed to protect ecosystems and peoples at the Amazon Basin. Various conditions shaped this patterned split among opponents and proponents of the IIHA, respectively.

Two examples suffice to illustrate that the formative conditions in which these actors took cause-oriented action were domestic as well as transnational; and that the substantial campaigning of communist opponents as well as proponents of the IIHA is among the aspects of the contention that simply do not fall within the purpose and thus remain beyond the scope of the following explanations. Within Brazil, during the campaign the Brazilian government repressed communist parties and activists, who in turn responded by finding cover under a more opportune structure for the nationalist activism that the state tolerated or even encouraged. At the time, a broader nationalist movement targeted the IIHA in Brazil; hence, communist activism became accidentally anti-IIHA. Across borders, at the time of the campaign UNESCO’s staffing had a penchant for communist advocates; hence, communists in turn responded by seeking employment and/or collaboration with this particular United Nations organization, and non-communists seeking to collaborate with the bureaucracy marketed their efforts with communist appeal. UNESCO became a key node in the transnational advocacy network for the institute that was to foster transnational cooperation around common-pool resources at the Amazon Basin, hence communist activism became accidentally pro-IIHA.
Table 6: Case Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1945</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Advocate proposed a bilateral institute to Brazilian state officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1946</td>
<td>Brazil, France</td>
<td>The advocate, Carneiro, simultaneously proposed another institute to the Brazilian government and to the French Institute of Brazilian Graduate Studies (IFHEB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1946</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Carneiro moved his proposal and network to UNESCO, and submitted the project to a group of natural scientists while serving as a Brazilian delegate to a preparatory UNESCO body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1946</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Proposal was approved at a UNESCO multilateral conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1947</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Transnational conference defined the mandate and design of the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon (IIHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1947-early 1948</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>At a UNESCO multilateral conference, an ally in Carneiro’s network acted as an IIHA advocate at the expense of the Brazilian state he represented; India, Portugal, Nationalist Spain and the exiled Spanish Republic in Mexico asked to join the IIHA; Italy soon became an IIHA member state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1948</td>
<td>Peru, Brazil</td>
<td>Transnational conferences appointed president, set the annual work program, and signed Iquitos treaty for the preliminary IIHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Ecologist director-general of UNESCO facilitated the founding of the present-day International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1949</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>The Center of Studies and Defense of the National Petroleum and Economy (CEDPEN) struck its first victory at the Amazon when its protests urged a replacement of a projected petroleum refinery from an original site in the Amazon to a site in southeast Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1949</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Opposition to the IIHA escalated in Brazilian state and society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>CEDPEN mobilized a petroleum protest that denounced the IIHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1949</td>
<td>Brazil, France</td>
<td>A CEDPEN leader accused the France-based Groupe Liotard of being involved in an effort to coerce Brazil through leverage that hinged external, foreign resources against Brazilian sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1949-early 1950</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Pro-IIHA advocacy recast in nationalist motto: “Amazonia is ours and for its progress men of good will can cooperate”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1950</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Most of the states that had signed the Iquitos Convention signed an Additional Protocol in Rio de Janeiro on March 12 of 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Legislators opposed the protocol in a position statement that tabled IIHA; proposed National Institute of Amazon Research (INPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1952</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>CEDPEN activists passed a resolution against the IIHA at their Third National Convention of Petroleum Defense—which evolved into a protest—and turned their nationwide position into one of only two resolutions that subnational CEDPEN chapters reiterated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1953</td>
<td>Brazil, France</td>
<td>Carneiro keenly collaborated in the formation of the INPA, referred to the national institute as “dear” to him “for long years,” and knowingly nominated for an INPA director a scientist who had resisted the IIHA by leaking information to the CEDPEN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3. INTERNALIZATION

The historical scholarship offers sufficient evidence to trace globalist as well as internationalist encouragement to empirical episodes of transnational activism through each causal mechanism along the process of internalization. Internationalist empowerment and the basics of the causal process evolve as Tarrow (2005) theorized, however a broadly understood causal chain incorporates globalist encouragement from domestic society and multinational businesses into its explanation. For this study to salvage the full potential of internalization as a processual model, it needs to discard statism from internalization as a causal model by way of a thorough re-examination of each component mechanism in the explanatory sequence. Relaxing the causal assumptions in Tarrow’s (2005) cyclical process, each mechanism is a step in rounds of struggle where not only states but also societies are squeezed as brokers between their domestic activists and foreign pressures not only from internationalist states but also from globalist markets and societies.

A defining episode series in the IIHA-INPA campaign conforms to the pattern that Tarrow (2005:79-81) theorized as a process of internalization in which “domestic groups employ [activism] against international, state, or nonstate actors on domestic ground.” Particularly in line with Sikkink’s (2005) labeling of this process as “defensive transnationalism,” a “reaction of some sectors” of “Brazilian society” in this episode turned the IIHA into a “symbol of nationalist resistance in defense of non-interference in the region and against the alleged bringing of the region under international control.” (my translation of Braga 2003:9-10)
In the context of the IIHA-INPA and ‘petroleum is ours’ campaigns it was widely and decisively believed in Brazil that the sedimentary basin of the Brazilian Amazon was abundantly endowed with petroleum (Crampton 1972:143, 160-161; Peter S. Smith 1976:viii, 3, 17, 40, 71, 91-92, 99, 106, 114; see e.g., Sidou 1999[1950]:10, 19; Fonseca 1957[1955]:35, 38-39, 42-49, 81-88, 105-108; Miranda 1983:85, 101, 180, 182, 189-190, 222-225, 345, 384-385, 419-421, 435, 473-474, 477, 480, 546). This contextual belief was crucial in rendering this episode series in the Amazonian campaign into a deliberate Brazilian parallel to resource nationalisms and nationalist, independence movements that repeated themselves around the (post)colonial world halfway through the 20th century (see e.g., Peter S. Smith 1976:57-58). If the belief in hindsight and to date has not materialized itself as much as it has over the distances that separate Brazilian borders from the more abundant petroleum in the Bolivian, Colombian, Ecuadorian and Peruvian Amazon, it certainly proved real in its consequences for the IIHA-INPA campaign in Brazil (see Anon. 2008). The premise underlay a decisive spillover from the ‘petroleum is ours’ to the Amazonian campaign:

“The nationalist climate instilled in the country on the occasion of the campaign ‘The petroleum is ours’ ended up also influencing discussions about the creation of the Institute… ‘The petroleum is ours’ campaign was one of the largest popular mobilizations in Brazilian history, having gathered military personnel, workers, intellectuals, politicians and students. It was a watershed in the debate about national development, polarizing and revealing more sharply the differences between nationalist and liberal developmentalists. (...) Between 1947 and 1949... [it] had succeeded in the task of impeding the participation of foreign capital in Brazilian petroleum activities.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:102-103, 104; see Wirth 1970:168-179; Crampton 1972:110, 143, 149, 160-161; Castro Santos 1985:66-67; Magalhães & Maio 2007:178-179)
4.3.1. 1948-55: Advocate and Protest in Rotation with Concede or Implement Repression

Professional and activist segments of the press contributed substantially to the dissemination of IIHA advocacy to social sectors well beyond the Brazilian congress within which it had been restricted until early 1949. They began to report on congressional debates about the IIHA, mobilize public opinion, and exert pressure aimed at pushing congress to take a position on the IIHA proposal. Press coverage has also been analyzed as an indicator that IIHA proponents and opponents alike struck a responsive chord with the Brazilian public. Such resonance grew after the official congressional daily reproduced on January 28th of 1949 a position statement that Bernardes delivered as president of the National Security Commission (Comissão de Segurança Nacional) in the lower Chamber of Deputies, and after one of the main Brazilian newspapers—namely, Jornal do Commercio—published that statement in full the next day. Press and public resonance grew further in March of 1949 when the state legislature of Amazonas—the Brazilian state that was to headquarter the IIHA—approved and sent to the national legislature and chief of armed forces a resolution opposing the creation of the institute and reproducing Bernardes’ critiques. In the oil campaign’s face-off for public opinion between nationalist and liberal developmentalists, the nationalists went so far as to establish their own new alternative media to win the support of Brazilian society. Oil nationalists created newspapers to disseminate their positions, considering that the main existing newspapers favored some role for foreign capital in Brazilian industrial development and did not offer much coverage to petroleum debates. For the most part these new activist newspapers were weekly and staffed by non-journalists such as attorneys, economists, government employees and politicians.
The oil-related split between professional and activist newspapers spilled over into a clear division on the Amazonian campaign, respectively favoring and opposing the IIHA (Magalhães 2006:102, 108-114, 140; see Crampton 1972:159; Galey 1977:151, 159).

With respect to nationalist advocacy through and beyond the press, spillover from opposition targeting transnational oil businesses to opposition aiming at the IIHA came from the far left as much as the far right. Such a bipolar contagion manifested itself mainly through the oil campaign’s nationalist, rainbow coalition. The alliance was led by the Anti-Fascist League of Tijuca and then-illegal Brazilian Communist Party (PCB, for Partido Comunista Brasileiro) on the left as well as a Brazilian Institute of Geopolitics (IBG, for Instituto Brasileiro de Geopolítica) and a Military Club on the right. On the left, the activist media included a “clandestine communist press” that “took up the task of sabotaging the [IIHA] project.” (Crampton 1972:110, 160; see Sidou 1999[1950]:32; Galey 1977:154; Magalhães 2006:95-97) On the right, the societal groups Military Club and IBG respectively publicized (1) a program to “particularly highlight, at [a] time [of IIHA debate], issues related to the Defense of the Amazonian Hylea;” and (2) having come “to the rescue” of Bernardes in alerting Brazilians through “a brilliant campaign that crumbled the whole [IIHA] plot.” (Crampton 1972:158-159; Miranda 1983:101; see Sidou 1999[1950]:32; see also Galey 1977:177; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283-288) To a lesser extent, there were similar instances of this spillover around the center of the political spectrum, as evident in the irate protest that the jurist Othon Sidou broadcasted through the radio and subsequently published into pamphlets (Sidou 1999[1950]:9-10, 32-35; Crampton 1972:54-55; Galey 1977:166; Braga 2003:10).

---

98 In 1947 the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB, for Partido Comunista do Brasil) was banned into illegality again on the grounds of anti-democratic character, after a two-year break from an earlier clandestine existence in 1945 during a redemocratization process (see e.g., Magalhães 2006:95-97).
Nationalist advocacy to defend fuel resources from oil multinationals not only facilitated another, parallel defense of Amazonian resources from the transnational IIHA, but also fused the campaigns revolving around these two sets of natural resources under a single advocacy frame that proved sufficiently compelling for IIHA supporters themselves to link the two. Activist newspapers’ coverage of the IIHA itself “reflected the nationalist wave that the country was going through due to ‘The petroleum is ours’ campaign,” as evident in “the constant association” these newspapers “established between the Institute… and Amazonian petroleum.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:109, 113-114) Even an Amazonian State governor who was supportive of the IIHA but well-aware of military concerns with the basin had felt the need to declare as early as 1947, “the Amazon is ours, … a piece of Brazil at the service of humanity.” (Galey 1977:130-131; see Crampton 1972:67-68; Maio & Sá 2000:992)

Spillover and integration of advocacy from the petroleum to the Amazonian campaign involved authentic linkage of issues and actors. “The main misgiving that haunted the IIHA opponents faced with the possibility of opening the Amazon to studies from other countries seemed to really be the issue of petroleum and additional natural resources in the region.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:109, 113-114; see Galey 1977:160-161) Moreover, the same advocates who mobilized protests to reallocate the oil oligopolies of foreign businesses to a monopolistic state-owned enterprise incorporated the IIHA in these protests and also advocated against the institute. Bernardes and the clandestine communists themselves led petroleum protests along with the National Student Union (UNE, for União Nacional dos Estudantes) and oil campaign organizations such as the Center of Studies and Defense of Petroleum (CEDPE, for
Centro de Estudos e Defesa do Petróleo) and the League of National Emancipation (LEN, for Liga da Emancipação Nacional). “While [the communists] were the most important group in the anti-IIHA movement, they did not dominate the campaign through leadership or exclusive exploitation of the issue.” (Galey 1977:154, 167) Bernardes’ prominent role in the oil campaign coincided with his leadership of the anti-IIHA movement by 1949, and he adroitly used his followers in the first campaign to marshal… public support for [the anti-IIHA nationalistic] cause. (…) [His] liaison between the two movements was facilitated by his role as president, and then as honorary president, of a nationalistic organization, the [CEDPE]. [The latter] had a network of influence extending into federal, state, municipal and private organizations throughout Brazil. (…) Especially in southern Brazilian cities, the campaign against the IIHA… spread into professional, civic, intellectual and political organizations… [that included] religious and middle class professional organizations not generally associated with nationalistic causes.” (Galey 1977:151-152, 166)

The spillover and integration of activists from the petroleum to the IIHA campaign were institutionalized in the broadening of the very identity of the CEDPE, which extended its name to the Center of Studies and Defense of the National Petroleum and Economy (CEDPEN, for Centro de Estudos e Defesa do Petróleo e da Economia Nacional) from 1948 to 1949 (see Miranda 1983:475, 477, 481, 546).

Anti-IIHA activism entailed not only elite-based advocacy, but also actual and potential mass-based protests. Nationalist activists constantly incorporated the IIHA in their petroleum mobilization and referred to the institute explicitly in a number of their ultimate oil protests. These signals rendered potential protests dedicated exclusively against the IIHA into credible possibilities, alongside protests to defend Brazilian oil from foreign businesses.

As civic groups including the UNE, CEDPEN and LEN mobilized petroleum protests, they often addressed the IIHA in rallying their oil activists (Fonseca 1957
[1955]:35, 38-39, 42-49, 81-88, 105-108; Miranda 1983:85, 101, 182, 435, 480; see Peter S. Smith 1976:17, 40, 56-58, 64-65, 71, 83, 99, 106). An illustrative episode occurred at the 1952 meeting of a UNE State chapter in southern Brazil. The convened student members passed a motion for a state monopoly of petroleum and other strategic minerals as well as for a national restriction of industrial oil extraction from the (Amazonian) babassu plant. They also issued a resolution “against any attack on national sovereignty and possible dismemberment that could hurt territorial integrity, especially… the threat of handing over the Amazonian Hylea.” (my translation of Miranda 1983:85) Another telling episode involves a LEN member who proved to be a very influential journalist in the movement for a state-owned oil monopoly and thereby in mobilization against the IIHA (Penna 2003; 2005:143; Barreto 2008; see Fonseca 1957[1955]:9, 14-15). He publicized an illustrative slice of the LEN’s anti-IIHA mobilization, in an advocacy book “about petroleum” that is filled with nationalist calls such as “the petroleum is ours!”:

“The plan on the part of Standard [Oil (the present-day Exxon Mobil Corporation)] to conquer the sedimentary areas of Brazil did not begin now… No! Since the dawn of this [20th] century, the absorption of the Amazon for example, was in its plans… [Standard Oil] considers us its colony, an easy prey that it will seize whenever it wants, with more or less effort according to the circumstances… Once during an apparently careless conversation [with the Brazilian president in 1919], [Woodrow] Wilson [as the president of the United States and thereby “the defacto president (if not de jure)… of Standard”], pointing to the dangers that threatened the Panama Canal and only talking about Humanity, Peace, Right of the Weak Peoples etc., proposed… the internationalization of the Amazon river. (...) Today in Brazil nobody—really, absolutely nobody—seems to remember that already before 1919 the State Department of Uncle Sam devised smoothly, without flaunt, the plan of the ‘International Institute of the Hylean Amazon.’ (...) Today the technicians of Standard breathe in the people of the Amazon the idea of separatism. They highlight the errors of the federal government… Thirty years afterwards… they will spark, if they can, a ‘patriotic’ independence movement in those regions, as they initiated in the past at the Philippines, New Granada and

99 The students advocated a restriction that would make commercial use of plant oil from the babassu, the raw material input toward cosmetics and bioenergy, exclusive to native Brazilians.
various republiquettes in Central America. All the oily area of the Amazon would then move over to Standard. (…) 

The marvelous plan of the ‘International Institute of the Hylean Amazon’ does not date from today… At least three countries—France, England and the United States—wanted to steal this region from us. And now we will have to struggle most vigorously in order for her not to ‘internationalize,’ that is, move under the tranquil domain of Standard Oil or the Washington government, which amount to exactly the same thing.” (my translation of Fonseca 1957[1955]:38-39, 43-49, 84-85, 87-88)

Thus, activists mobilizing protesters for the ‘petroleum is ours’ campaign rallied “the glory of rebelling against… the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon” into a frame in their recruitment and organizing (see Fonseca 1957[1955]:84-85).

Activists referred to the IIHA explicitly in protests that petroleum campaign organizers ultimately mobilized in Brazil (Miranda 1983:85, 180, 182, 189-191, 222-225, 345, 384-385, 419-421, 435, 473-474, 477, 480-481, 546; see e.g., Peter S. Smith 1976:58, 71-73, 86-87, 99, 106; see also Sidou 1999[1950]:10, 19; Fonseca 1957[1955]:81-88, 105-108). The historical scholarship and accessible archives have generated much knowledge of protest in the petroleum campaign. However, because they are only beginning to analyze the intersection of oil and the IIHA in these protests, the frequency with which petroleum protesters addressed the institute remains unknown (see Galey 1977; Magalhães 2006; see also Miranda 1983). Certainly, the two main clusters of the social movement that “awakened—and significantly influenced—the [Brazilian] public” on oil nationalization, and by extension here on the IIHA, included more than merely the institutionalized circle among these two collectives (Peter S. Smith 1976:72). On the one hand, an institutionalized cluster of the movement did restrict its tactics to advocacy in that it largely “sent copies of… speeches under a Military Club letterhead to everyone [it] judged capable of influencing public opinion (military officers,
politicians from all levels of government, media representatives, union members, and teachers at all levels.” (Peter S. Smith 1976:64-65, 72; see Miranda 1983:326-327) On the other hand, a second collective inspired by this first circle included “civilian and military” activists with the CEDPEN, LEN and UNE who deployed “more aggressive tactics” that “brought the campaign into the streets, adding a mass base” to the petroleum contention—and by extension here to the IIHA-INPA confrontation—through “street demonstrations.” (Peter S. Smith 1976:58-59, 72) Indeed, even archival records that purposely document the petroleum campaign in the most strictly bounded of terms—which restrict reports of closely bound contentions such as the IIHA-INPA campaign to several narrow, passing mentions—substantiate that these protests extended from state oil monopoly onto the Amazonian institute (see e.g., Miranda 1983).

An all-embracing indicator, among numerous pieces of evidence under these strict terms, materialized in anti-IIHA resolutions collectively drafted within CEDPEN assemblages that conveyed broad-based positions for all protests expressing demands from the social movement organization (Miranda 1983:326-340, 384-385, 477, 481, 543-546; see Peter S. Smith 1976:58, 86). To all intents and purposes, in one series of such resolutions CEDPEN activists incorporated and then reiterated anti-IIHA mobilization into their countless protests. In mid-1952 CEDPEN activists initially affirmed a resolution “against the [IIHA]” at their Third National Convention of Petroleum Defense—which itself evolved into a protest—and turned their nationwide position statement into one of only two substantive resolutions that their subnational CEDPEN chapters “reaffirmed” at four Regional Congresses, through specific messages addressing the “Amazonian Hylea.” (Miranda 1983:326-340, 477, 481, 543-546) After a threat of
state repression from the police if the CEDPEN did not postpone the national gathering, the civic group refused to alter the date of the assembly and turned the event itself into the culmination of a protest begun with student union campaigning as well as with a CEDPEN-organized “nationwide series of lectures and debates.” (see Peter S. Smith 1976:86-87) Incidentally, the repression threat and protest fall immediately in line with transnational activism that conforms to the internalization model. When the police had threatened prohibiting the convention in a request that asked the CEDPEN to postpone the event until after the departure of a U.S. Secretary of State who coincidentally scheduled a visit to Brazil at the same time as the assemblage, the government agency expressed its brokerage between the Brazilian civic group and the “illustrious [foreign] guest” who was not to be “provoke[d].” (Miranda 1983:477; see Peter S. Smith 1976:86-87)

As for protest directly at the 1952 Regional Congresses that re-incorporated anti-IIHA positions into the CEDPEN’s demands, it is a likely possibility in light of a typical “demonstration” that occurred simultaneously at a counterpart Zonal Convention.100 Once deliberations ended at one of these zonal variants of the decentralized organizing within the CEDPEN, participants carried a symbol of their street protests, a “large petroleum tower,” from the convention site to “a public square” where they demonstrated among laypeople (Miranda 1983:340, 384-385, 477). Indeed, this protest during mid-1952 and the police repression that usually accompanied similar demonstrations also fall immediately in line with transnational activism fitting the pattern of a broadly understood internalization model. A typical version of these symbolic towers was crowned with the

---

100 The CEDPEN decentralized its activism not only to different regions of the polity but also to different zones of the same city within Brazil, probably to calibrate its mobilization to the stark regional and income inequalities in the nation-state.
Brazilian flag at its highest point, the nationalist master frame ‘the petroleum is ours’ written across the flagpole, and the call “down with Standard Oil” falling diagonally right underneath (Miranda 1983:340, 384-385; see Peter S. Smith 1976:86-87). The similar imagery on the poster of the Third National Convention of Petroleum Defense left no doubt about whether the state oil monopoly was the brokerage that the CEDPEN protesters sought to squeeze out of the Brazilian “people” through the government, dropping the figurative axe on display upon transnational pressure from Standard Oil (Miranda 1983:384-385). The society and state would eventually broker between the protesters and the petroleum multinationals exactly as the demonstrators demanded, but only after reversing an earlier brokerage that simply implemented transnational pressure through repression of these mobilizations.

Historical records document at least two occasions in which protests that the CEDPEN ultimately mobilized explicitly addressed the IIHA. The first protest episode occurred in connection with at a minimum one of the public fora that the social movement organization held in 1949; one forum of approximately 1,500 gatherings synchronized “whenever a new phase of the campaign required.” (my translation of Miranda 1983:174-180, 191) State and municipal chapters of the CEDPEN organized these periodic events, which at times were held in the premises of State and municipal legislatures that facilitated the recruitment of local CEDPEN activists among lawmakers, legislative staff and participant citizens. The protest event in particular was also part of one of the innumerable “caravans” that the national CEDPEN usually sent off to States to promote “conferences, electoral rallies and protest ceremonies.” (my translation of Miranda 1983:174-180, 191, 222-225) Campaign records specify that during a long-
distance caravan national CEDPEN activists attended a forum that is suggested to be
closely coordinated with a counterpart protest; a public conference at a State legislature
“about petroleum and denouncing the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon.”
(Miranda 1983:174-180, 191, 222-225, 481)

A second protest episode took place from 1950 to 1952. “Home commands” of a
State CEDPEN that had been defying particularly repressive policing carried out
neighborhood visits to roughly 300 residences including 1,000 people to whom they
distributed “leaflets containing a study… about the problem of petroleum, analysis of the
threat to the Amazonian Hylea etc.” (Miranda 1983:223-225, 344-345) At this stage,
circa 1950, the police repressed the State CEDPEN’s experiment with this underground,
door-to-door form of protest in that it arrested four “members of the visit commission.”
(Miranda 1983:223-225, 344-345) By 1952 the CEDPEN facilitated the formation of an
advocacy group that at the least one of its activists established in response to such
repression of activism that revolved around issues including petroleum and the IIHA.
The CEDPEN activist also began to preside over a Brazilian Association for the Defense
of the Rights of Man (Associação Brasileira de Defesa dos Direitos do Homem) that
released a manifesto for freedom of speech addressing the IIHA as follows: “Today
citizens are arrested and sued because they are partisans of the national exploration of our
petroleum, because they condemn the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon…”
(my translation of quote in Miranda 1983:223-225, 344-345, 473; see Peter S. Smith
1976:86-87)

CEDPEN and LEN protests addressed not only the IIHA itself, but also petroleum
at the Brazilian Amazon in more general terms. One of the CEDPEN’s State chapters in
the basin was among the most active of all Brazilian States, and petroleum activists
nationwide celebrated struggles over an oil refinery and discovery in Amazonian Brazil
as some of their most treasured triumphs during both the petroleum and the IIHA-INPA
campaigns.

The “innumerable” activities that the “prolific” CEDPEN at the State of
Amazonas reportedly carried out included electoral rallies, such as one to honor its
honorary president Bernardes, “conferences, radio lectures, ‘roundtables’ etc.” (Miranda
1983:222-223, 225, 300, 357) The role of this CEDPEN chapter in the campaign(s) is a
promising line of future research that awaits further foundational work from historians.

Moreover, the CEDPEN struck its first victory in 1948-1949 at the Amazon
when—in a turn that the petroleum campaign would relapse in the basin—its protests
squeezed Brazilian public opinion and thereby the government of Brazil into changing
the placement of a projected petroleum refinery from an original site at the Amazonian
Belém to another location at the southeastern State of São Paulo. Regarding protests
aimed at this project as well, the CEDPEN portrayed the government as a broker that
leaned toward either the petroleum nationalization movement and Brazilian society on
the internal side or the multinational petroleum “trusts” and their foreign-owned domestic
“figureheads” on the external facet (my translation of Miranda 1983:189-190, 473-474,
479, 481, 544; see Peter S. Smith 1976:71, 90-91).\footnote{In 1955, the Brazilian government
brokered the other way in that it authorized a domestic importing business to build and

Ironically, by sending the extremely polluting refinery away from the mouth of the Amazon Basin—at
the same Belém location of the IIHA’s collaborator Emilio Goeldi Museum of Pará—within the timeframe
of the campaign itself the nationalists may have unintentionally helped conservation of Amazonian Brazil
more than they possibly hindered environmental sustainability by delaying and turning the IIHA into the
INPA (on environmental activism around Cubatão, see Hochstetler & Keck 2007). Far from
environmentalist, the self-declared motivation of the CEDPEN was simply to place the refinery closest to
petroleum consumers—around Cubatão and/or Santos in São Paulo—rather than to the allegedly pressuring
special interests of the multinational and pseudo-domestic businesses.
operate a smaller petroleum refinery elsewhere in Amazonian Brazil despite protests from the CEDPEN that had amounted to expressions of opposition to such an implementation of transnational pressure. This private refinery would be located in Manaus, the headquarters of the proto-IIHA and INPA, and import its crude oil from a Peruvian field that opened in early 1957 (Peter S. Smith 1976:92, 114; see Miranda 1983:543-546).

As for the struggle over petroleum discovery in the Brazilian Amazon, it hit a high point when the incipient state-owned enterprise “Petrobrás brought in a producing well at Nova Olinda… fifty miles from Manaus” in 1955, only four years after it began drilling in the area (see Peter S. Smith 1976:92, 99, 106, 114). The CEDPEN and the LEN congratulated their campaign for the event as a watershed that flew in the face of opponents who had deemphasized the prospects of such petroleum reserves around the basin within Brazil. Whereas the CEDPEN mobilized the event as “the magnificent victory of our [Brazilian] technicians in Nova Olinda over the suspect defeatism of certain North American technicians,” the LEN went further with incitement to protest along the lines of defensive transnational activism (my translation of Miranda 1983:429, 479). The CEDPEN supported the LEN as the latter convened a National Conference for the Defense of Petroleum in this euphoric climate and in a manner best expressed through a league activist’s own call to arms: “In the surroundings of Nova Olinda… there is [enough] petroleum to drown the directors of Standard [Oil] and the sold-out Brazilian nationals who hand over (entreguistas).” (my translation of Fonseca 1957[1955]:80-83, 104-108; see Miranda 1983:419-421, 429, 435, 479-480)
There is evidence of credible advocacy of anti-IIHA protest apart from the petroleum campaign as well. An example is a speech by an archbishop of São Paulo, cardinal Mota, reproduced in the press and the congressional daily at the request of congress members. Inciting against the IIHA treaty and protocol as they were about to be forwarded to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Mota said, combatively:

“It is incredible that there should be a sole Brazilian… who can remain impassive… before such a serious national problem, aggravated now by the insidious plan of the UN and of UNESCO. The suggestions and requests of the UN with reference to the Amazon Hylea ought to put us on guard. God be praised, in Parliament the clamor of public opinion is being heard… The ‘São Paulo-Amazon axis’ will be a ‘corridor of victory’102…” (Crampton 1972:53, 154-155, 159; see Galey 1977:167)

Similar evidence comes from the radio and printed advocacy of Othon Sidou over the years leading up to 1951, perhaps riding a wave that splashed from the facilitating broadcasts of the State CEDPEN at Amazonas (Magalhães 2006:140). He wrote:

“It is already said that the campaign against the International Institute of the Hylean is oriented by communists and fascists (integralistas103). The conclusion that follows from such a capricious concept is that whoever does not pray by the totalitarian book of the left or the right has two paths to follow: either devotes a disinterested ignorance to affairs of the Institute or applauds the Institute. It is forgotten that those who are instruments of international economic colonialism, with big ties of interest, perform militance (militam) among the latter. The apathetic group thus constitutes their powerful support… Letting the Nation sleep drugged by the opium of indifference is surely a convenient way of obtaining victory without struggle and without startles. (...) There is an appallingly large number of Brazilians who are living on the sidelines of… our foreign policy and who have exerted themselves in knowing [about the IIHA] only in a leisurely and fleeting manner (...) If we remain doped by an unjustifiable and to some extent suspicious passiveness, Brazilians do not be dazzled on the day that they see their representatives in the Chamber and the Senate... [establishing] the [IIHA], consecrating an outrageous transaction... Due to pride and personal dignity, let us not want such an omission to occur with us… Let our ire be worthy as a protest

102 As Crampton (1972:155) has documented, “‘corridor of victory’ was a phrase used in the [second world] war to refer to the air corridor from Brazil to Africa.”
103 To defer a term that is controversial in the Amazonian context to a leading Brazilian dictionary, integralistas belong to integralismo: “Brazilian political movement based in the fascist molds, founded in 1932 and extinct in 1937.” (my translation of Ferreira 2009:483)
to the level of the national high ups (sobranceria).” (my translation of Sidou 1999[1950]:32-34)

4.3.2. 1948-55: Pressure

Advocates and grassroots groups targeted the Brazilian congress in a domestic response against what they claimed to be transnational pressures. While anti-IIHA advocates as well as actual and potential protesters claimed that the creation of the institute would put resource, settlement and security pressures on the Brazilian nation-state, pro-IIHA advocates claimed that “instead a refusal of [IIHA] cooperation is what would make for a threat to the country inasmuch as it would impede [its] economic development.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:114)

The historical scholarship has identified not only a clear division between activist and professional newspapers with regard to their position on the IIHA, but also clear clusters of claims from each side suggesting that the IIHA would either apply or remove outside pressure on Brazil. On the activist side, there was a cluster of news and op-eds opposed to the IIHA. They highlighted the IIHA’s danger to national sovereignty, imperial character, giveaway of strategic natural resources such as petroleum to multinationals, and budget dues for Brazil that were said to be high in relation to the country’s organizational influence.

Archival sources allow this study to further specify these publicized activist claims of transnational pressure, through a few representative examples. During 1949, the CEDPEN publicized in a LEN newsletter:

“…[E]ven the [projected] refinery at Pará is already being a target of the greed of national and foreign capitalists. The approval of the Statute of the Petroleum in pair with that of the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon—both underway in Parliament—would be the consummation of the hand over (entrega) of our petroleum fields, and of the refineries that the Government acquired, to
foreign trusts and their national figureheads (*testas-de-ferro*).” (my translation of quote in Miranda 1983:384-385, 182)

Between 1951 and 1952, the governance program of a new administration within the Military Club set a clear agenda for the editorial team in charge of its magazine, which was particularly influential at the intersection of the petroleum and IIHA campaigns: “Give particular attention, at this moment, to the issues related to the Defense of the Amazonian Hylea…” (my translation of quote in Miranda 1983:101) The advocacy claims of military professionals were closely connected with their rebellious response to alleged transnational lobbying pressures. Throughout the campaign military advocates defended against one such external pressure that had been epitomized in a confidential memorandum from a foreign multinational negotiating “a sound and stable” regulatory framework for petroleum exploration with the Brazilian government; a leaked 1940 memo that military advocates had termed “colonial” and attributed to “Standard Oil of New Jersey through its subsidiary, Standard Oil of Brazil.” (Peter S. Smith 1976:40-41, 58) The transnational pressure that military advocates claimed a need to defend against also included a set associated with their “security reasons and… corporatist-inspired urge to maintain national sovereignty over natural resources.” (Peter S. Smith 1976:40-41, 58)

Finally, in 1952 the CEDPEN again publicized the following claim of transnational pressure, now one that the organization’s membership base contended collectively: “As the [petroleum] campaign proceeds, broaden it conveniently in a manner that encompasses other sectors of the national economy which are dominated or threatened by [multinational] trusts; sectors such as … rubber, babassu, … Amazonian Hylea, harmful treaties to the national economy and sovereignty...” (my translation of quote in Miranda 1983:384-385, 546; see Fonseca 1957[1955]:80-83, 104-108)
On the side of professional newspapers in which prominent journalists addressed the IIHA, there was a cluster of claims in favor of the institute. They stressed that the IIHA offered a timely opportunity in a context of scarce funding to boost development in the Amazon and elsewhere in the country; such that “not only was foreign capital welcome, but so was any other form of international cooperation, including scientific.” (Magalhães 2006:109, 113-114; see Galey 1977:158-159)

Bernardes orchestrated a nationalist response against the IIHA’s alleged foreign pressures that in turn recruited unlikely additions into his ranks: “Renowned sociologist Fernando de Azevedo signed a testimonial along with other local [São Paulo] professionals, educators and politicians,” helping to “draw support from the city’s academic and intellectual elite. (…) Azevedo spoke for a substantial portion of the Brazilian intelligentsia when he recalled, ‘We members of the intellectual community disliked Bernardes for his past autocratic and authoritarian rule [formerly as Brazilian president], but on a critical national problem like the Hylean Institute, we stood solidly by him.’” (Galey 1977:166)

Indeed, from the very outset, “Brazilian nationalism gave a loud shout of protest against [the IIHA’s] internationalism,” particularly with Bernardes and with an emphasis on international pressures associated with science-intense prospecting of natural resources and territories (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283-288). As president of the National Security Commission, “Bernardes’ strongest argument cautioned of possible imperial domination over the Amazon, behind a façade of scientific and economic objectives.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283-288)

Specifically,
“Bernardes asserted that Brazil risked much in relying on foreign aid through the IIHA. He dwelled on the naiveté of those Brazilians who failed to perceive that the great powers controlled the UN as well as UNESCO, which in turn dominated the IIHA. The [campaigner] also maintained that since the project’s scientists worked for the major powers, these nations could exploit Amazonia’s resources under cover of internationalism or by direct partition of the region among themselves.” (Galey 1977:160-161)

“Bernardes concluded that [IIHA] approval meant the loss of control over the Amazon region on the part of Brazil, to the extent that decisions regarding the work of the future Institute would be made by simple majority. Given that each member-state had the right to a vote, the interests and positions of the country could be dismissed, which opened to the governments ‘interested in the peopling and exploitation of the Amazon (…) the widest prospects for foreign settlement. (…) The ends of the Institute… appear to be good, but under the surface they aim at possession of the Amazon for the exploitation of its riches, beginning with that of Petroleum, without need for license from the Brazilian Government, without paying taxes to it and without offering it any compensation.’” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:106-107 including quotes from Bernardes)

In the same vein, the Brazilian Institute of Geopolitics (IBG) opposed the advent of the IIHA by presenting the institute as a pseudo-epistemic effort “to conquer” the Amazon region; as a scheme that tried “to hide” “the desire for total possession of Amazonia” “under the golden cape of scientific interest.” (Crampton 1972:158-159) With regard to petroleum and other mineral resources, the IBG also criticized “the possible power that the IIHA would have over the subsoil of the Amazon.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283-288)

Two stark items offer evidence of how far IIHA opponents took their social construction of the institute as a transnational pressure associated with colonial conquest of natural resources. First, at least one other anti-IIHA and oil nationalization activist, the galvanizing LEN journalist, reproduced a congressional testimony that Bernardes gave at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Bernardes and his campaigning collaborator spread “fear” of “a scientific expedition to the Amazon that would bring a special ship,
helicopters, airplanes etc.; being partially financed by Standard Oil, R.K.O. Radio
Pictures Technicolor [(a powerful Hollywood business at the time)], and by the Navy and
Air Force of the United States.” (my translation of Bernardes 1954 as quoted in Fonseca
1957[1955]:87; Pinho Filho 1979:88; see Crampton 1972:125, 132, 147; Maio & Sá
2000:982, 1009). Second, they often resorted to quoting the juvenile novel Amazon
Adventure (1949)\textsuperscript{104} and the travel book The Amazing Amazon (1952)\textsuperscript{105} of the
Canadian-born U.S. author Willard Price in order “to show that foreign powers wished to
dominate the [v]alley.” (Crampton 1972:174)

Anti-IIHA advocates who mobilized domestically against foreign pressure
pertaining to petroleum were neither the original nor the only actors to associate the IIHA
with that natural resource. Carneiro’s 1945 proposal of an initial version of the institute
to the Brazilian government had called for research on petroleum as well as on plants
More generally, there was ambiguity about the boundary between research and industrial
applications throughout the IIHA-INPA campaign (Crampton 1972:81-83; Galey
establish the IIHA at Belém (Brazil) in 1947, national

“delegates felt that a complete survey of the region would require maps suitable
for detailed mineralogical research. Though they probably did not equate this
mapping directly with the exploitation of petroleum and mineral deposits, others
soon did. The Belém conference left open the question of whether Brazil and the
other Amazon nations would ultimately control geological research within their
boundaries, or whether the institute would simply distribute its discoveries for the
benefit of all member countries.” (Galey 1977:133, 135-136)

\footnote{104}{In the booklet, a 19- and a 13-year old from the United States go on a year-long expedition “to help
capture animals for their father's [wildlife] collection [business] on Long Island, after which the captive
specimens are sold to zoos, circuses and nature parks.” (Anon. 2011; see Anon. 2011b)}

\footnote{105}{According to a reviewer, Price claimed that the minerals of the Amazon region were essential for the
West to win the Cold War (Anon. 2009)}
Moreover, in a newspaper column published during July of 1947, the prominent journalist-politician Carlos Lacerda had suggested that the IIHA “devote itself to the exploration of animal and plant resources of the Amazon region, therefore contributing to overcome three problems that impeded the economic development of the country: settlement of Brazilian regions with low demographic density, the exploration of petroleum and the opening of roadways.” (my translation of Magalhães & Maio 2007:176)

Domestic mobilization by anti-IIHA advocates targeting their national legislature in response to foreign pressure was also a defense against an alleged transnational threat associated with immigrant populations. In the post-WWII aftermath of mass exile following the fascist governments’ “unilateral solutions to overpopulation and living space needs” (Galey 1977:129, 137), such mobilization claimed that people in overpopulated foreign powers “would threaten to take over… less populated areas” such as the Amazon region (Crampton 1972:82-83, 174; see Sidou 1999[1950]:9-11, 34-35; Rosenbaum & Tyler 1971:427; Sternberg 1987:4-5; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:274-276; Magalhães 2006:16; see also Desrochers & Hoffbauer 2009:89-90). It was in this context that the U.S. scientist and population campaigner “Harrison Brown’s passing suggestion that India’s surplus populations might best be shipped to Amazonia” “received front-page coverage in the Brazilian press.” (Foresta 1991:145; see Fearnside 1986:17; Lewis 2004; see also Hertzler 1956:220-224, 230-232) Anti-IIHA advocates in Brazil deployed similar quotes from the writing of foreigners on Amazonian population(s) and/or settlement in order to claim that the institute would impose international pressure on the polity (Crampton 1972:174-175; Holanda 1968:18).
Historical research includes the renowned French geographer Pierre Gourou and French demographer-historian Alfred Sauvy as two other examples of such claims regarding foreign ideas. The former is said to have suggested, in a 1950 volume, that a concession of a thousand square kilometers in the Amazon for scientifically rigorous settlement experiments would be politically impossible at the national level, but could be carried out by an organization of the United Nations (Crampton 1972:174; see Domingues & Petitjean 2005:277-281). These (mis)uses of foreign information by anti-IIHA advocates gained popular credence by the 1950s. In response to another demographer who had been employed with UNESCO during the campaign and to a nutritionist who considered the IIHA a useful model, “Brazilians also associated the Hylean project with foreign demographers and nutritionists who claimed that national sovereignty and boundaries in Amazonia might have to be ignored to solve the world’s [overpopulation and famine] problems.” (Galey 1977:169, 184, 195)

Indeed, as was the case with the threat of natural resource exploitation, overpopulation and Amazonian settlement were initially articulated into transnational pressures apart from the IIHA, but the institute was eventually turned into their organizational embodiment. Advocates certainly drew on longstanding history to construct the IIHA as a source of foreign population-settlement pressures.

While dealing with the IIHA, Bernardes told a fellow deputy that the United States might revive Maury’s abolitionist Amazon plans—to relieve an ante-bellum slavery crisis in the 1850s by sending enslaved blacks from the United States deeper south to the Amazon (Galey 1977:155, 161-162). The literature on the IIHA-INPA campaign has not analyzed the extent to which black rebellion and insurgency at the
dawn of the U.S. civil rights movement informed Bernardes’ suggesting and Brazilians’ accepting that the United States might revive the plans, now to relieve racial tension at the turn of the 1950s (on Brazil, see Holanda 1968:15; Luz 1968; Galey 1977:161-162; on the U.S., see McAdam 1982; Marable 1984; on Brazil and the U.S., see Meade & Pirio 1988; Gomes 2003:314, 329).

Such pre-IIHA construction of a transnational pressure also had another source. From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, some ecological and nationalist activists had opposed the settlement of Japanese immigrants in the Brazilian Amazon, especially in the state of Pará. In so doing, eco-nationalist advocacy groups such as the Friends of Alberto Torres Society (SAAT, for Sociedade Amigos de Alberto Torres) deployed a frame of denationalization that was later applied in the IIHA-INPA campaign (see Vieira 1942; Bernardes 1954; Rosenbaum & Tyler 1971:427; Geraldo 2007:24, 77-79, 83, 90-94, 98, 101, 114, 124, 137-138, 218; Ishizu 2007:23-24). Particularly for the Amazonian part of Brazil, WWII intensified a pre-existing frame of “denationalized zone” or “ethnic cyst” that activists had defined to label as a “national threat” any site where non-assimilating immigrants who shared the same national origins were clustered. As such, “denationalization” occurred in homes, schools, community gatherings, associations, media and daily language use whenever Brazil as the nation of residence lost to the (im)migrant’s nation of origin in a dispute for her or his allegiance (Geraldo 2007:78, 114, 124, 137-138, 218). In spite of the fact that Japanese (im)migrants were massively concentrated in the southeastern Brazilian state of São Paulo, nationalists focused on two Amazonian concessions to Japanese settlers reaching two million hectares, and
“tirelessly” compared “a Japanese invasion” into the Brazilian Amazon to that into Chinese Manchuria during WWII (Geraldo 2007:79, 83, 98, 137).

By the mid 1940s, deputy Alvaro Adolfo from the same Amazonian state of Pará took a stand, one recorded in the minutes of the Brazilian congress, that illustrates how framing of transnational population-migration pressures predated their dissemination and consolidation through the IIHA. The post-WWII context, the 1920s-1940s’ anti-Japanese campaign in the Amazon, and the abolitionist Amazon campaign a century earlier set the scene for Adolfo’s original framing of a defensive motto that anti-IIHA advocacy later consolidated with renewed and resonating cautions against foreign pressures. Coining a popular slogan, Adolfo advocated that Brazilians “settle in order not to hand over” (integrar para não entegrar) the Amazon: “Either we populate [the Amazon] or run the risk of losing it. (…) Either we recover it…, or we admit that we are incapable of keeping it in our power, in a world eager for space to hold the excess of population.” (quoted in Crampton 1972:84, 86, 89-90) In addition to his quoted references, Adolfo pays homage to the Tavares Bastos and Cunha who had respectively inspired victories in the abolitionist and Japanese Amazon campaigns; and calls for heeding the Cunha’s caution about population and sovereignty in the Brazilian Amazon (Crampton 1972:84, 86, 89-90; see Galey 1977:161-162, 184-188, 192-194; Ishizu 2007:23-24; see also Fonseca 1957[1955]:45).

Anti-IIHA activists constructed population-migration threats with timeliness, specificity and originality that polished these broadly contextual and long-standing transnational pressures. At a general UNESCO conference in late 1947, “the exiled Spanish Republic in Mexico asked to join the IIHA” and so did Nationalist Spain,
Portugal and newly-independent India (Galey 1977:140-141). IIHA opponents used these membership bids to raise at least two “troublesome” “suspicions” for Brazilian national interests: “Did this mean the [Spanish] Republicans wanted to settle refugees in the Amazon? (…) Why India?” (Galey 1977:140-141) By May of 1948 at an IIHA conference, “already Italy had become a member, although it had no Amazon territory and was probably interested in the IIHA solely as a vehicle for relocating some of its postwar excess population.” (Galey 1977:141-142) As of early 1950, based on Italy’s membership and probable interest, activists campaigning against the IIHA “conjured up visions of other foreign invasions in Amazonia. The aged deputy [Bernardes] reported he had received a letter (source undisclosed) describing an Italian-UNESCO expedition of technologists, scientists and troops who were preparing to descend on Amazonia by parachute.” (Galey 1977:161) Bernardes made that vision as concrete as “a force of about 400” people in an expedition “to settle in an area of the Amazon belonging to Italy.” (Crampton 1972:144) “The expedition would research the region and serve as the vanguard of outright conquest. Bernardes’ adherents in the Chamber of Deputies backed him with reports of additional letters they had received from ‘authoritative sources,’ one of which was a Brazilian military attaché in Paris who approved Bernardes’ stand on Amazonia.” (Galey 1977:161) Sidou used his broadcasts and pamphlets to associate the IIHA with colonial powers’ maintenance of present-day Australia, Tanzania and other regions under protectorate mandates from a disbanded League of Nations; and to endorse Bernardes’ claim that Italy, faced with a daunting overpopulation, “was interested in the ‘forthcoming internationalization of the Amazon as a mandate of the UN.’” (my translation of Sidou 1999[1950]:11-12, 17, 19; see Crampton 1972:144) As late as June
of 1951, Bernardes would continue to coin and raise concern about “the internationalization of the Amazon”: He claimed that “by its deceptive drafting,” the IIHA “treaty permitted UNESCO to become the possessor of Amazônia without Brazil’s negotiators having perceived it.” (Crampton 1972:155-158)

From late 1948 to early 1949, a protectionist Brazilian career diplomat, Jorge Latour, used his direction of the National Council of Immigration and Settlement (CNIC, for Conselho Nacional de Imigração e Colonização) to “advocat[e] highly selective policies to exclude” influences that his mobilization deemed to be foreign pressures on Brazil, “including the IIHA’s alleged (but non-existent) plans for bringing European refugees to Amazonia.” (Galey 1977:154-156) Slightly earlier than Bernardes’ first opposition to the IIHA, Latour asserted in the Brazilian diplomatic service “that extensive foreign immigration under the IIHA’s auspices might eventually lead to international jurisdiction over Amazonia.” (Galey 1977:154-156) He later mobilized the adherence of a national conference on immigration and of convened organizations that likely included labor unions. The activist diplomat recruited them in favor of Bernardes’ stand on the IIHA, and in opposition to “overwhelming foreign influence through immigration” into western Brazilian regions that Latour and his adherents claimed to be “culturally and economically vulnerable.” (Galey 1977:154-156) Indeed, “this claim had a pragmatic rationale for nationalists who sought a continuation of the former… government’s restrictive immigration policies favoring the national worker.” (Galey 1977:154-156; see Geraldo 2007:5, 98)

In addition to labor protectionism and militarist security, there was at least another sense in which migration-related
“solidarity with the campaign also derived from special interests. For example, Catholic church officials censured the IIHA because they believed UNESCO embraced Protestant, atheistic, Communist and other ‘alien’ influences. Cardinal… Mota… praised Bernardes for fighting the IIHA and thus avoiding ‘the rending of the cloak of the largest Latin American nation and the largest Catholic nation in the world.’” (Galey 1977:166-167)

There were echoes of behavior from the abolitionist Amazon contention nearly a century earlier in that during “the anti-IIHA campaign, Roman Catholic church officials joined the nationalists in trying to exclude foreign, non-Catholic religious influence from the [Amazon].” (Galey 1977:187) While Catholic officials had resisted Protestant migration halfway through the 1800s, their successors resisted Jewish and non-religious migration in the post-WWII years. Along these lines, in late 1949 Bernardes “recklessly claimed that a ‘Syrian priest’ approached him with a proposal to send 9,000,000 Syrians to Amazonia.” (Galey 1977:161) Historical scholarship has not identified Bernardes’ inspiration here, but further research might consider whether his claims were related to Israel’s emerging conflict with Syria or to India’s involvement in Syria during WWII.

Catholics were not alone in constructing communist immigration into the Amazon as a threat. By 1948 the U.S. State Department had responded in a similar manner to UNESCO’s dispatch of an assistant who was a national from a Communist polity to work on the IIHA in Peru. The U.S. diplomatic agency had denounced him as “a Communist labor agitator,” concluded “that UNESCO intended to infiltrate Amazonia with Communists,” and withdrawn its “tacit approval of the Hylean Institute.” (Galey 1977:143-144; see Crampton 1972:73, 76, 113-114; Domingues & Petitjean 2001) Later in the campaign, Bernardes “claimed the IIHA might foster Soviet influence in Amazonia if the USSR or its satellites decided to join the Amazon project. In effect, the same argument that had impressed U.S. State Department officials effectively served the
nationalists in their campaign.” (Galey 1977:168) Sidou (1999[1950]:16) also used that prescient\textsuperscript{106} discourse in his campaigning. Showing remarkable similarity to Tarrow’s (2005) scholarship, Sidou’s advocacy in effect elevates the facilitating institutional structure of IIHA’s diplomatic internationalism above that of IIHA’s immigrant globalism: “Communist espionage currents… will fatefully encrust themselves upon the flanks of the Institute of the Hylea. (…) If [the IIHA is] consummated… we will receive the Soviet delegation and that of its satellites from the iron curtain, which will stroll casually through the streets of Manaus… and will rush to… bury a dagger in the heart of Brazil.” (my translation of Sidou 1999[1950]:16)

As was the case with foreign threats attributed to natural resource pressures, IIHA opponents were neither the original nor the only actors to associate the institute with transnational migration of large populations. In securing UNESCO’s initial approval of the IIHA, Carneiro had “stressed the applicability of Amazon research to the solution of world-wide problems,” displaying his tendency to frame different aspects of the institute to match the support he sought (Galey 1977:128-129).\textsuperscript{107} A growing consensus in the historical literature further specifies that UNESCO’s rapid acceptance of the IIHA project had been due to an “attempt to transform the Amazon into a solution to some problems typical of the post-IllIIHA international context; problems such as hunger, overpopulation

\textsuperscript{106} Incidentally, he did so eight years before the activist who would later establish the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, \textit{for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia}) first organized a labor union in the Colombian Amazon during 1958, and one year before the young medical student later to become known as Ernesto “Che” Guevara would gravitate toward revolutionary communism as a travelling volunteer on the Amazon River in Peru during 1951.

\textsuperscript{107} The historical scholarship to date does not provide sufficient empirical evidence to warrant sketching this episode through the process of global issue framing. Such a sketch would not demonstrate that Carneiro acted as an activist—particularly one who belonged to the transnational advocacy network on the pro-IIHA side—if removed from a broader empirical context traced in this chapter and pending additional information about his UNESCO outreach in the historiography. It would not be clear that this behavior of his constituted action with the cause-oriented role that this study explains, more so than with governmental or epistemic roles (for definitions of activism based on role/orientation rather than non-state position, see Nye & Keohane 1971; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Pinto 2010).
and refugees” not to mention desertification and the conflict around Israel and Palestine\(^1\) (my translation of Magalhães 2006:68 citing Maio 2001:52; see Galey 1977:129; Domingues & Petitjean 2001). In this vein, in September of 1947, the Latin American division within the U.K. Foreign Office had maintained that it “defended the idea that the Amazon should be open to new populations, including a surplus of Europeans.” (my translation of quote from the U.K. Foreign Office in Petitjean & Domingues 2000:275-276) Following the aforementioned 1947 meeting in Brazil, in preparation for the establishment of the IIHA, major newspapers such as Jornal do Commercio had reported on a controversial disagreement involving UNESCO bureaucrats and national representatives. They had debated the role of UNESCO and the institute regarding immigration and settlement into the Amazon; whether such initiatives should be undertaken at the national and/or international realms (Crampton 1972:63-68; Galey 1977:132-133, 137; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:273-276).

Pro-IIHA actors themselves had first associated the institute not only with transnational immigration generally, but also specifically with foreign labor, non-Catholicism and communism. A 1946 immigration plan for massive foreign immigration to Brazil after WWII floundered in its attempt to reverse a restrictive immigration policy of the Brazilian government that had favored the national worker (Galey 1977:154; see Andrade 2005:14; Geraldo 2007). However, the plan did not fail to taint IIHA proponents, who had discussed immigration as early as 1947, through ill timing and association that suggested support of foreign labor (Galey 1977:154-155; Crampton

\(^1\) The national officials at the UNESCO conference that approved the IIHA welcomed the Hylean project for its “experimental work that might later be applied elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East. (...) In 1947 UNESCO officials planned an International Institute of the Arid Zone (IIAZ) based on the IIHA. The IIAZ was intended to benefit the population of the Middle East in regions ‘harassed by internal strife and hatred of peoples.’” (Galey 1977:130, 149; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283)
Similarly, months before beginning to lobby for the IIHA, a Brazilian government official—in an interview to *Time* magazine that resonated back to Brazil—contrasted the institute with his alternative proposal to settle Asian laborers into massive rubber plantations across the Amazon Basin (Petitjean & Domingues 2000). As for non-Catholicism, an early meeting to establish the IIHA raised and did not resolve a controversy that a Brazilian delegate generated by commenting on the value of non-denominational basic education for Amazonian native peoples, and by being (mis)interpreted as devaluing Roman Catholic missionary work (Galey 1977:131-132). Between non-Catholicism and communism, at the turn of the 1940s a Carneiro on voluntary exile from counter-communist repression in Brazil had been in close contact both with a Brazilian ambassador who opposed fascist Nazism during WWII by conceding visas for the entry of Jews in Brazil, and with members of the French Resistance whom Carneiro harbored in his home (Maio & Sá 2000:980). In terms of ideology, despite the opposition of Brazilian communists involved with the PCB, at the dawn of a “Cold War context, European offices of UNESCO and the UN were identified as ‘bolchevik’ agents, and there were rumors that if Brazil [ratified] the IIHA treaty it would… open the doors of the Amazon to the communists.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283-288; see Sidou 1999[1950]:16; Galey 1977:143-144).

**4.3.3. 1948-49: Implementation**

The Brazilian government tried to salvage but inadvertently deepened its initial failure to implement an international agreement that it had signed with other members of the IIHA as a would-be transnational institution. In September of 1948, the Brazilian president sent a request to congress for ratification of the Iquitos Convention. However,
far from sealing ratification the request radicalized positions in both the legislature and public opinion, and mobilized military officials, scientists, journalists, intellectuals and civil society organizations against ratification (Maio & Sá 2000:1005). By late January of 1949, the position statement that Bernardes delivered in congress as president of the National Security Commission (Comissão de Segurança Nacional) in the Chamber of Deputies began to deal a series of heavy blows to the ratification prospects.

UNESCO and Brazilian government officials as well as advocates who were closely networked with them did persevere toward implementation, and did counter anti-IIHA protest, advocacy and framing of foreign pressures. They tried to dissuade congressional and public opinion away from Bernardes’ and cardinal Mota’s grievance that the IIHA would threaten Brazilian sovereignty in the Amazon and national security (Magalhães 2006:114).

More specifically, Carneiro campaigned to allay fears of foreign pressure from global markets and societies. He reassured that if and when the IIHA were established all cartographic and geographic information in the Amazon would be forwarded to every member state, and emphasized that the Iquitos treaty only authorized the institute to conduct pure research and study:

“Hence, the IIHA will not be an explorer/exploiter (explorador) of gold mines or petroleum wells; or an agent of immigration or settlement… despite the hints that are made against it in this sense. (...) The discoveries of economic interest made by the staff in service with the Institute will be communicated to the government in the territory of which these discoveries have been made.” (my translation of Carneiro as quoted in Magalhães 2006:117)
In response to Catholics such as the cardinal, Carneiro referred to a newspaper article supporting the IIHA that was published in the *L’Osservatore Romano (The Roman Observer)* of the Papal Holy See (Vatican) (Magalhães 2006:116-117, 118).\(^{109}\)

These IIHA loyalists included a Brazilian professor, Lineu de Albuquerque Melo, who was an expert in international law with the present-day Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and a participant in treaty drafting at the IIHA conference of Iquitos (Magalhães 2006:119-121, 131-132). Along with Carneiro, Albuquerque Melo rebutted that Brazil faced a stark choice between reclusive isolation from the world and complete participation in international organizations, between resignation of its membership in all international organizations (e.g., United Nations, Red Cross) and implementation of the IIHA (Galey 1977:162; Magalhães 2006:119-120). Albuquerque Melo argued that Brazilian negotiators had been flawless, and that Brazilian ratification “did not imply perpetual commitment of unconditional consent to all and any attitude of the international organization that the treaty would create.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:131-132)

In response to the testimonies of IIHA opponents in the Brazilian congress, Heloísa Alberto Torres, an anthropologist and the president of the Interim Commission of the institute, testified in July of 1949 to clarify the would-be transnational organization to legislators. She reassured them that the mandates of the IIHA were not only clearly defined, but had to abide by Brazilian legislation every time that these were carried out in Brazilian territory. Torres asserted that the Brazilian legislation that regulated artistic and

\(^{109}\) The historical scholarship to date does not provide sufficient empirical evidence to warrant sketching this episode through the process of global issue framing. Such a sketch would not demonstrate that Carneiro acted as an activist—particularly one who belonged to the transnational advocacy network on the pro-IIHA side—if removed from a broader empirical context traced here and pending additional information about his Roman outreach in the historiography. It would not be clear that this behavior of his constituted action with the cause-oriented role that this study explains, more so than with governmental or epistemic roles (for definitions of activism based on role/orientation rather than non-state position, see Nye & Keohane 1971; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Pinto 2010).
scientific expeditions with detailed inspections and licensing would trump any IIHA measures, and would inherently protect national sovereignty regardless of the institute (Magalhães 2006:125-126).

Anti-IIHA campaigners also relied on typical congressional stalling strategies to keep the IIHA bill from being voted on full floors of either legislative chamber before the anti-IIHA movement had persuaded these lawmaking divisions against ratification. With his position statement, Bernardes delayed vote in his commission. After the commission voted in approval of his position statement, he proceeded to delay vote beyond the commission by submitting the treaty and related documents for review within the General Staff of the Brazilian armed forces (EMFA, for Estado Maior das Forças Armadas) (Magalhães 2006:144).

IIHA supporters turned the stalling strategy against their opponents by addressing the moderate concerns that the EMFA expressed about the treaty and bypassing their refusal to release the IIHA bill for a vote on the congressional floor (Magalhães 2006:134, 144). In March of 1949, a compromise report from the General Staff tacitly acknowledged an Amazonian security problem, but only required a minor amendment in one article of the Iquitos treaty—which limited the power of Brazil in the IIHA—to recommend the convention for ratification (Galey 1977:164; Magalhães 2006:121-124).

4.3.4. 1949-50: Brokerage

The report led to the main strategy that the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations adopted, namely brokerage, in its effort to ratify and implement the Iquitos treaty. Brazilian diplomats drafted a protocol incorporating the amendment which the EMFA had suggested, invited other original signatory states to sign it, and resubmitted
the treaty with the protocol to the Brazilian congress (Magalhães 2006:134, 144; Crampton 1972:152-153, 171-173). In this sense, the Brazilian government brokered between international institutions such as UNESCO and the IIHA regime externally, and domestic entities such as its congress and society internally. Most of the states that had signed the Iquitos Convention signed the Additional Protocol in Rio de Janeiro on March 12 of 1950. The Brazilian president resent congress the protocol that his executive officials had galvanized, and thereby restarted a whole new round toward ratification of both IIHA agreements through the legislative commissions (Magalhães 2006:134).

4.3.5. 1950-51: Concession

In the second round, the Brazilian congress ultimately conceded to the claims of anti-IIHA campaigners. It did so by refusing to ratify international agreements to establish an IIHA alleged to channel pressures from UNESCO, multinational oil businesses and immigrant populations among other perceived foreign pressures (see Crampton 1972:53-55, 68, 90, 110, 154-156, 159-161; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283-288).

IIHA supporters such as Carneiro and the congressional Commission of Diplomacy deliberately stalled ratification of the international agreements, hoping to recover a more favorable public opinion and congressional composition. Carneiro continued to rebut Bernardes’ alarms concerning “internationalization” by saying that the IIHA was as international as were functionalist, technical international organizations such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN), the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, or the Telecommunications Union (Petitjean & Domingues 2000). Quite unlike its immediate approval of the earlier
treaty, the Commission of Diplomacy postponed its position statement on the treaty with protocol as long as possible. The commission intended to hold off IIHA debate until the next legislative session, when the profile of congress was expected to shift back in favor of ratification (Magalhães 2006:144).

Instead, congressional elections in 1950 selected a majority of legislators like Bernardes: who identified themselves with a nationalism that had been spreading across Brazilian society. One of these legislators, the writer Menotti Del Picchia whose parents were Italian immigrants, opposed the protocol during 1951 in a position statement that tabled the IIHA, which never went up for a vote on the full congressional floor (Magalhães 2006:140-141, 144, 146; see Galey 1977:171-172).

4.3.6. 1967-90 Epilogue: Advocacy and Protest to Repression, and vice-versa

It would be in the aftermath of this anti-IIHA mobilization within and beyond the CEDPEN that in 1967 the group went on to facilitate the formation of a separate civic organization under the similar name of National Campaign for the Defense and Development of the Amazon (CNDDA, for Campanha Nacional de Defesa e pelo Desenvolvimento da Amazônia). The CNDDA would continue to identify with entities such as CEDPEN and INPA as late as 1990, particularly through the advocacy commitments of the former to the following goals: to defend “the Amazon against ‘international greed’” as well as “to promote… ‘sovereign and emancipated’ [socioeconomic] development… of the Amazon with minimum impact on the environment… [and] local cultures.” (my translation of Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:131, 319-323; see Keck 2001:36; Hochstetler & Keck 2007:69-70, 111, 245). Like Bernardes at the CEDPEN, the general who founded and first presided over the CNDDA had
“participated in the campaigns for the state-owned monopoly of petroleum (1948-1953) and against the International Institute of the Hylean Amazon (1950s).” (my translation of Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:319-320) Moreover, the CNDDA has been singled out as the environmental activist group in recent Brazil that most continues a past as longstanding as the mid-1920s, which mark the emergence of an eco-nationalist movement that lingered during the IIHA-INPA campaign through the everyday resistance of at least two covert anti-IIHA whistleblowers who leaked confidential information to the CEDPEN from a pro-IIHA state agency (see Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:131, 319-323; Hochstetler & Keck 2007:70).

Insofar as state repression would allow, the CNDDA built on its ideological and protesting legacies from the CEDPEN in that the former went on to mobilize environmental campaigns for “nationalism without xenophobia” which “united the ‘left’ and the ‘right’” from the 1960s to the 1980s (my translation of Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:131, 319-323; see Keck 2001:36). In spite of arrests, police raids and threats, the CNDDA went on to organize protests against perceived transnational pressures (1) from a 1960s’ U.S.-drafted project that would have built dams in the Amazon and a continental waterway between the Orinoco, Amazon and Parana-Paraguay basins; (2) from a 1970s’ multinational forestry project that would consign large forest areas to foreign investors for timber extraction; and (3) from a 1980s’ mining and bioenergy project that would use charcoal in the multinational production of pig iron for export. A nationwide and continuous “Movement in Defense of the Amazon,” organizing autonomous cells of the CNDDA at 32 Brazilian cities in 19 federal units, would emerge out of the periodic protests over these perceived transnational pressures (Keck 2001:36; see Arnt &
Schwartzman 1992:131, 319-323). Reflecting the CEDPEN’s earlier anti-IIHA activism, “[t]he movement’s appeal went well beyond environmentalists”; “In campaigning against the internationalization of the Amazon, the opposition appropriated for itself the nationalist appeal that the [Brazilian] military [government] had tried to wield with its developmentalist project in the early 1970s.” (Keck 2001:36)

For the post-IIHA CNDDA more so than the anti-IIHA CEDPEN, the “struggle over the nationalist mantle between the Brazilian government and the Movement in Defense of the Amazon… was essentially a domestic struggle that did not spill over into international institutions.” (Keck 2001:36) Yet, a broadly understood process of internalization that is free of selection bias for statist causality clearly traces multinational contentions in which CEDPEN and later CNDDA activists each squeezed their Brazilian state between themselves and market institutions abroad.

4.4. EXTERNALIZATION

The historical scholarship, which has only begun to situate the IIHA campaign outside of Brazil and beyond UNESCO, holds the potential to document much more evidence of transnational activism along the lines of externalization than the satisfactory empirical record that is available thus far. In particular, the literature is only beginning to reveal transnational advocacy networks that revolved around the IIHA as well as other campaigning private or public-private actors including but not limited to the IUCN, Smithsonian Institution, Groupe Liotard, and individual advocates such as Harrison Brown and Julian Huxley (e.g., see Galey 1977:161; Foresta 1991:145; Bierregaard & Gascon 2001; Domingues 2002; Domingues & Petitjean 2001; 2005). In watershed rebuttals to audiences of nationalist scientists and military IIHA opponents whom the
Military Club and Brazilian Institute of Geopolitics eventually mobilized, Carneiro would declare the creation of the institute to be oriented toward the cause of a network of concerned scientists mobilized into a transnational campaign advocating ecological protection. Presumably informed through his “close relationships with several French scientists, and international scientific organizations” already by 1946 when he first advocated the IIHA project (Domingues 2002:2), he would declare in 1947 and once again in 1951

“that the soil exhaustion [(exaustão)] caused by constant rains and by the shortsighted felling of forests by man was transforming large parts of the Amazonian land into arid zones. ‘The expanse and the graveness of this withering of the land [(deperecimento)], in an irreversible process, has awakened worldwide alarm and, today, a legion of scientists is mobilized in an international campaign for the protection of nature and its mineral, plant and animal resources.’ He affirmed… that the creation of the UN, UNESCO and the very [IIHA] had the same purpose of protecting nature and establishing the relations of men with the environment such that neither one nor the other would be a ‘victim of violence’ [(‘violentado’)].” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:289-290; Domingues & Petitjean 2001; see Galey 1977:128)

In short, thus far there is sufficient evidence to trace one event series as an episode that conforms to the process of externalization.

Prior to the transnational IIHA-INPA campaign that Carneiro initiated, he had migrated for decades and partaken in transnational advocacy for several years. Before returning to Brazil in 1944 after being released from the second German concentration camp where he was imprisoned, Carneiro had contributed to the WWII resistance in Paris where he had been working as a researcher at the Pasteur Institute and later also as a representative in the commercial office of the Brazilian government in France. He had last migrated to Paris in 1936 on voluntary exile from Brazil’s nationwide counter-communist repression as well as from elite reactions to his redistributive policies while
he had been a Secretary of Agriculture in the State of Pernambuco. Carneiro had
returned to Brazil from Paris earlier, in 1931, upon the completion of his Ph.D. abroad at
the Sorbonne, with an academic advisor who later supported his placement in the Pasteur
Institute (Maio & Sá 2000:978-981; see Crampton 1972:41-42). Still in 1944, a year
prior to initiating the campaign, he began to represent Brazil abroad in intergovernmental
conferences on intellectual cooperation. Carneiro also represented Brazil while designing
and negotiating the formation of an international organization that came to be UNESCO.
In this capacity, at a 1945 conference of the International Institute of Intellectual
Cooperation (in Lyon) and at the first, 1946 session of the U.N. General Assembly (in
London), Carneiro accompanied a Brazilian diplomat but took anti-colonial positions that
diverged from the U.S. alignment of Brazilian foreign policy (Maio & Sá 2000:980).

From 1945 on, Carneiro started simultaneous advocacy to create an international
scientific institute in the Amazon (Maio & Sá 2000:980, 983; see Crampton 1972:41-42).
In the second half of 1945 he advocated for his initial project of a research center
between Brazil and France by making synchronized claims both to the Brazilian
government and to the French Institute of Brazilian Graduate Studies (IFHEB, for *Institut
Français des Hautes Études Brésiliennes*) (Maio & Sá 2000:976, 981, 983, 1009). The
IFHEB was a newly-created civic association with headquarters in Paris and bases in the
Brazilian cities of Belém and Rio. The transnational civic group was not only scientific
but also cause-oriented, toward transnational advocacy of overt Franco-Brazilian
relations likely to have channelled covert socialism (Maio & Sá 2000:976, 983; see
Domingues & Petitjean 2001). Carneiro’s proposed research center would be based in
Brazil (Rio and Belém) and France (Paris), and would involve virtually all countries or
colonies with territory in the Amazon: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, British Guyana (United Kingdom), French Guiana (France), and Dutch Guyana (Netherlands, via present-day Suriname).

The Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture harshly refused Carneiro’s independent proposal. It included ironic reviews such as “the proposal… would only make sense had it been made still in the colonial era, in which Humboldt and [his fellow expeditioner] Bonpland got themselves in ecstasy and awe with the hylea.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:982)

Six months later, in early 1946, the IFHEB submitted a proposal to collaborate with the Brazilian government on an “international scientific network.” (Maio & Sá 2000:980, 983) The project was based on Carneiro’s failed proposal to the Ministry of Agriculture, except for the IFHEB collaborator itself and for the elimination of all applied research with economic ends. Over the six months between the two proposals, the French government and the IFHEB’s director agreed in principle to collaborate on Carneiro’s project. Paul Rivet had added the directorship of the IFHEB to his long-standing directorship of the Museum of Man, where French resistance to the German occupation had been orchestrated during WWII. He also shared Carneiro’s ideology and social flows. Rivet “had strong ties that linked him to Brazil”: “He had lived in Brazil for a long time until 1936-1937 when he signed a petition in favor of communist prisoners, among whom was” the transnationally networked leader Luís Carlos Prestes, and “was excluded from the Brazilian Academy of Sciences (Academia de Ciências do Brasil)” due to his socialist ideology (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001). The Brazilian government refused again, and the second Brazilian refusal left the IFHEB with
insufficient political and financial resources to undertake the project in the midst of post-WWII reconstruction in France (Maio & Sá 2000:976, 982-983, 1009).

After failing to bypass the Brazilian block by forming a transnational coalition and coordinating information with the IFHEB, Carneiro “dislocated his proposal and his network to UNESCO” and submitted the project to a group of natural scientists while serving as a Brazilian delegate to the Preparatory Commission for UNESCO that met in London in May of 1946 (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:983; see Galey 1977:128-129). A few years later Bernardes would charge Carneiro with an accusation that falls in line with the externalization process, in which advocates invite external leverage to boomerang back upon divergent internal institutions.

The nationalist mobilizer would accuse the cosmopolitan advocate of going “against the decision of the [Brazilian] head of state in calling for UNESCO’s patronage” for the IIHA “without the knowledge of” the Brazilian foreign ministry even while Carneiro represented Brazil at UNESCO, and after the Brazilian government had been unresponsive to Carneiro within “the national scene.” (Crampton 1972:133) Certainly, the advocating Carneiro and his fellow Brazilian officials, for instance an ambassador in London who fully supported the IIHA proposal, did diverge once again. The advocate and the ambassador “understood the project in a completely different manner,” the former as an advocate and the latter merely as a state official (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:269/5, 289-290/25-26)\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, while a Brazilian scientist—namely, Carlos Chagas Filho—who informally collaborated with the IIHA was

\textsuperscript{110} While Carneiro advocated a mode of development that was concerned with nature conservation and native peoples in the Amazon, the ‘supportive’ Brazilian ambassador in London expected Brazil to “benefit enormously from this [IIHA] initiative, which [would] transform the largest virgin forests in the world into an agricultural zone.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:269, 289-290).
representing the Brazilian government at a UNESCO conference of member states in Mexico during 1947, he acted on “his own enthusiasm for the [institute’s] project” at the expense of his position as a state official (Galey 1977:140). A “reckless assertion [of his] caused consternation at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry,” which was not informed as to what its ‘delegate’ said or did about the IIHA (Galey 1977:140). The collaborator in Carneiro’s transnational advocacy network reassured his fellow delegates that his state had already allocated funds to meet UNESCO’s funding, when instead Brazilian state officials had only begun to consider appropriating funds for the IIHA and Brazilian diplomats doubted the budgeting prospects in the polity. In the wake of these sorts of accidentally supportive agency that mixed state position with advocacy role, UNESCO approved the IIHA proposal at its first general conference and later maintained its funding commitment for the institute at the aforementioned conference.

A change in the position of an official in the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture is particularly indicative of a full cycle of the externalization process. The official first opposed the project quite harshly. However, after UNESCO approved the IIHA and leveraged its resources in negotiations with Brazilian politicians and publics to facilitate the formation of the institute, he came to lobby the Brazilian congress for ratification of the treaty establishing the organization (Crampton 1972:44, 155-156; Maio & Sá 2000:976, 982-983; Galey 1977; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:269).

Two clues suggest that channels moved and were expected to move information between pro-IIHA advocates located inside and outside of Brazil; and based in and out of (inter)governmental agencies. Such information sharing offers further evidence of a boomerang pattern along the process of externalization.
Regarding a clue of an expected informational channel across public-private boundaries, a provision in the treaty to establish the IIHA would allow participation of transnational private organizations in the institute. An article stipulated that the IIHA’s “Director could arrange collaboration with international organizations, public and private, and with individuals.” (Crampton 1972:171-173)

The other clue suggests a channel that moved information across Brazilian borders and public-private boundaries. In early October of 1949, the public-private Council for Inspection of Artistic and Scientific Expeditions in Brazil received a request from a public-private group in France for a license. The French group petitioned to carry out a transboundary research expedition, from the Brazilian to the Venezuelan Amazon, that it intended to place under the auspices of the would-be IIHA (Petitjean & Domingues 2000:85-86; Nunes 2009:176). The Groupe Liotard was then-gravitating from a public affiliation—with the Museum of Man—to a private one—with the Society of French Explorers (SEF, for Société des Explorateurs Français), also known as Club of the Explorers (Club des Explorateurs). Certainly, the Museum of Man was well informed about events in Brazil, given its participation in the design of the IIHA and its longtime expeditionary collaboration with Torres at the state agency she directed, the National Museum in Rio.

A treaty provision and the Groupe Liotard combined into one of the major episodes in which the backlash of IIHA opponents weakened IIHA proponents. Indeed, the episode can be traced as a “backlash” phase in spirals of the externalization process (Risse et al. 1999; Hochstetler 2002). Anti-IIHA activists reacted in line with their response to other foreign private organizations that proposed to explore the Brazilian
Amazon in the late 1940s (Galey 1977:161). They tied the expedition to the institute and construed their linkage as an external exercise of material leverage that hinged financial and technical-scientific resources against Brazilian sovereignty (Crampton 1972:171-173; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:85-86; Nunes 2009:176; see Galey 1977:161). Bernardes capitalized on the request from the Groupe Liotard. He used it to enhance the nationalist appeal of his campaign in Brazil through a hint that associated two simultaneous press reports from France. He hinted that international public finance for the IIHA would be conditional on multilateral policies superseding Brazilian policies. As a concrete example, Bernardes pinned on the IIHA an ostensible violation of entry-permitting policies in Brazil by the Groupe Liotard, mentioning the group’s large scientific and technical endowments. Three months earlier, in July of 1949, Torres had reassured congress that if legislators ratified the IIHA treaty, the licensing and inspections of the Brazilian regulatory council would continue to trump any IIHA measures, and would inherently protect national sovereignty regardless of the institute. In October of 1949, Bernardes connected two dots between press reports on (1) Torres’ discussions at UNESCO of a budget that allegedly UNESCO was to approve for the IIHA; and (2) a Groupe Liotard that to date had not obtained a license from the council for a large and imminent IIHA expedition to explore the Amazon after two years of preparations (Crampton 1972:171-173; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:85-86; Nunes 2009:176). After UNESCO’s general conference, where Torres had spoken as the president of the interim IIHA, a controversy in the Brazilian press forced Carneiro to clarify in person to the diplomatic minister of Brazil that it was not Torres or any entity networked with the
Groupe Liotard but rather he “who got UNESCO to remove any financial engagement with the IIHA for 1950.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:85-86)

Historical scholarship and accessible archives that pertain to post-campaign epilogues are also retroactively suggestive of boomerang campaign events being traceable through the process of externalization. By the early 1970s, when the presidents of two transnational environmental organizations—the blended IUCN and the civic World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)—would advocate to the Brazilian president that his government observe “the need for careful consideration of the environmental problems involved” in a plan of his administration to intensify development through resettlement into the Amazon, UNESCO eventually followed suit in spite of the IIHA’s failure two decades earlier (as quoted in Keck 2001:35-36). Indeed, UNESCO would pick “up IUCN’s concern and make conservation of the Amazon rainforest the first project of its Program on Man and the Biosphere in 1971,” once again braving the Amazon for any trial and error with new programs (see Keck 2001:35-36). By the early 1970s, after effects of the defensive counter-mobilization that the IIHA ignited during the campaign would “accelerate” a Brazilian settlement policy that eventually changed Amazonian land use from forests to roads or clearings (e.g., my translation of Magalhães 2006:146). Meanwhile, “organizations like IUCN and WWF [would] encourag[e] Brazil’s Environment Secretary… to create conservation areas where possible” given the deforestation apace and the geopolitical blocks that policymakers continued to hold against environmental activists (Keck 2001:35-36). Thus, pending any further research by historians, the activism of a transnational advocacy network that the historical scholarship suggests to be the IIHA network’s successor and traceable through the
externalization process mitigates historiographical gaps that hold the tracing of the same process minimal during the antecedent IIHA campaign itself.

4.5. ‘CAVE! HIC DRAGONES,’ BEYOND STATISM AND TRANSITOLOGY

Thus, if Tarrow’s (2005) explanation was satisfactory to clarify the IIHA-INPA campaign, the contention could be summarized as a case of internationalist and globalist encouragements to the triumph of nationalist movements over a transnational advocacy network of socioenvironmentalists. As such, these causal and processual elements of his explanation would be respectively inconsistent and consistent with behavior observed in the campaign as discussed up to this point. Moreover, the explanation would stand on an implicit assumption of a spatial transition of transnational activism that would be consistent with the observed trajectory of cause-oriented action traced thus far. The campaign would transition from the global proportions of advocacy sketched through the process of externalization to the local proportions of mobilization traced through the internalization process.

The processual observations illustrated thus far are remarkably consistent with Tarrow’s (2005) prevalent mid-level theory. The processes of internalization and externalization trace episodes that are salient in the campaign. Although these processes do not trace transnational activism that somehow culminated in the creation of the INPA, the robustness of Tarrow’s (2005) authoritative processes could tempt one to (mis)interpret the overall IIHA-INPA campaign as simply the sum of his two models.

One who (mis)read the campaign solely through Tarrow’s (2005) processes would likely also adopt an implicit premise that underlies their theoretical framework: spatial transitology in transnational activism. The assumption would appear to be consistent
with the spatial trajectory of a campaign observed through these processes to transition from the global externalization to the local internalization.

However, the causal accounts above alone would render as erroneous the postulate that interstate interactions provide a superior and ample explanation for the empowerment of known modes of transnational activism observed in this case, and the unexplained transnational activism mentioned above would limit any explanatory power remaining with Tarrow’s (2005) meta-theory. A nationalist movement targeted not only public opinion and foreign-owned subsidiaries respectively in the domestic society and market, but also the global socioeconomic flows of transnational immigrants and refugees, and multinational businesses. As such, the result of that thorough empirical test would redistribute the causal process of internalization beyond an exclusive empowerment from statist internationalism. A transnational socioenvironmentalist network revolved around the migratory flows of advocates engaged in expeditions and/or graduate research even if external leverage was debated through an interstate organization—in terms of position if not necessarily role. Accordingly, that empirical finding would to some extent loosen the process of externalization from the possessive hold of statist internationalism. As for unknown modes of transnational activism, if they prove to be traceable through dual-level, ‘glocal’ processes that mostly explain global causality—as they do below—they pack into available explanations even more gaps for new knowledge beyond the edges of statism and transitology in the spatial evolution of cause-oriented action.
4.6. INCUBATION

The historiography offers ample evidence that one string of events can be process-traced as episodes of incubation. The evidence includes an abundance of detail that allows this study to consider the incubation process closely, mechanism by mechanism along the causal chain modeled above.

The overall process offers an analogue to the evolution of a “Petroleum is Ours” campaign as it ultimately nationalized petroleum extraction into a state-owned oil monopoly under a Petrobrás which promptly became multinational. The series of IIHA-INPA campaign episodes process-traced here under the incubation model explain how committed advocates—largely in positions within Brazilian and transnational state agencies—created an INPA that meant a Brazilianization or “nationalization of the scientific project of the IIHA, but not an opposition” to transnational science (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001).

As the following process-tracing shows, the incubation model is similar to Tarrow’s (2005) model of internalization insofar as both models conceptualize causal processes that are initially cyclical. However, unlike internalization, incubation can eventually reach a phase in which its sequence no longer spirals as it does at first over a number of rounds through steps abstracted into the three initial mechanisms (i.e. ‘A’ to ‘C’). The process-tracing that follows bears out three cycles through these initial mechanistic spirals (i.e. three rounds through ‘A’).
4.6.1. Mid-1945: Comparison of Potential

The historical scholarship provides less in-depth evidence relevant to an episode of this first mechanism than it offers on other empirical events below, but the data suffices to match the episode as traceable here. In 1945, Carneiro came to assess the potential influence he might have on his activist cause in Europe as compared to Brazil or elsewhere.

After the advocate weighted his options in advancing his cause in post-WWII 1945, he began to design a project to create a scientific institution of international character dedicated to the Amazon ecosystem. As Carneiro compared where his contribution offered the most potential, he relied on his research experience and orientation. His background was in line with a scientific orientation that can accurately be labeled “rooted-cosmopolitan,” “bilateral” or “hybrid” (see respectively, Tarrow 2005; Steinberg 2001; Alonso 2009). Carneiro believed scientists from ‘backward’ polities were most useful when they employed “advanced techniques in native models” (técnicas avançadas em modelos autóctones); worked at the cutting-edge frontier of knowledge in exchange with the international scientific community, and yet at the same time affirmed local knowledge through themes and objects of national relevance (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:980-981, 995; Domingues & Petitjean 2001). Carneiro drew on his scientific experience and orientation to arrive at the “conviction” that the “Amazon emerged” “as a possible solution” to face such “misfortunes” as WWII “deaths, destruction, refugees, hunger, perplexity and anxiety for intelligibility of the reasons that led to the world conflict,” and Malthusian concerns such as desertification and
overpopulation (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:980-981; see Domingues & Petitjean 2001; Geraldo 2007). Carneiro’s encounter with WWII, including his sheltering of the French resistance and his internment in Nazi Germany, reinforced his views on the socially relevant potential of science as a means to economic development and the civilization of humanity.\footnote{Particularly in the wake of Carneiro’s experience with indigenous peoples in the Amazon and Nazi concentration camps, his efforts to civilize could potentially apply to humanity at large. His anti-colonial and anti-Nazi views were in line with Gandhi’s famous answer when asked what he thought of Western civilization—“I think it would be a good idea.”}

A challenge that Carneiro had sought to overcome over decades due to its national relevance emerged anew at that point as especially opportune and beneficial due to a novel international significance: To “throw the lights of science” on the Amazon through “universal,” cosmopolitan scientists (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:980-981). More than ever, he pursued the integration of fragmented Amazonist studies, building on centuries of contributions by leading foreign naturalists—such as Humboldt, Wallace, Agassiz and Goeldi—whose cooperation had long included study abroad in the basin (Maio & Sá 2000:978). “The next step was to be the construction of scientific and political alliances to make [Carneiro’s] Amazonian utopia viable.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:980-981; see Crampton 1972:41-42)

4.6.2. Mid-1945 - Mid-1946: Outside-In Influence Fails

Complementary aspects of this episode in the series are traced both here and above through the process of externalization. From 1945 on, Carneiro started networking to create an international scientific institution in the Amazon, simultaneously pursuing
collaborations with the Brazilian government and with a larger set of allies (Maio & Sá 2000:980; see Crampton 1972:41-42).

The profile of the organization that Carneiro proposed in the project to the Brazilian government revolved around transnational “Brazil-France relations, which were in keeping with [his] intellectual, scientific and personal ties to French society.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:981-982) Although Carneiro’s proposed research center would involve collaborators in virtually all other countries or colonies with territory in the Amazon, it would be based in France—Paris (headquarters) and Cayenne in French Guiana—and Brazil—Rio and Belém. Such bases and collaborators emerged out of Carneiro’s views that the challenging magnitude and multiplicity of the Amazon “required not only the cooperation of a high number of scientists, but also the fundraising of material resources in great volume.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:981)

The Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture refused Carneiro’s proposal on the basis of harsh reviews that recasted the domestic proposal as an outside-in project. The director of the Agronomy Institute of the North (IAN, Instituto Agronômico do Norte)—Felisberto Camargo—had perceived that the organization Carneiro proposed might encroach on IAN’s already moribund work in the post-WWII Brazilian Amazon, which no longer supplied rubber to the allied war effort through U.S. collaboration with the institute. Therefore, Camargo “found pretexts to oppose” the project of the institute, in lobbying the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture:

“Camargo advised him that Carneiro was so ‘internationalized’ by long residence abroad that he failed to realize the political problems raised by involving alien nations in Amazonian research. Camargo claimed that in order to safeguard national sovereignty, only Brazilians should carry out research, as in the IAN. Swayed by Camargo’s negative comments, the Minister recommended that [the
Brazilian president] Dutra reject the project.” (Galey 1977:136; see Maio & Sá 2000:982)

The bitter “tone” of the rejection “revealed” Camargo’s own “reaction” to the omission of the IAN in Carneiro’s proposal: “the proposal… would only make sense had it been made still in the colonial era, in which Humboldt and [his fellow expeditioner] Bonpland worked themselves into ecstasy and awe with the hylea.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:982)

As mentioned above, Carneiro then attempted to influence policies for the Amazon by having the French Institute of Brazilian Graduate Studies (IFHEB) propose an alliance to the Brazilian government on the basis of the proposal that Carneiro had separately submitted to both entities. The project would ally the institute, the Brazilian government and possibly the French government. The IFHEB was not only a scientific but also an advocacy group overtly in favor of Franco-Brazilian relations that likely included covert socialist ideology: “One of the central objectives of the IFHEB, faced with a growing U.S. influence in post-war Brazil, was to maintain the French ascendance over Brazilian society in the realms of science and culture.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:976, 983; see Domingues & Petitjean 2001) A second Brazilian refusal left the IFHEB with insufficient political and financial resources to launch the project (Maio & Sá 2000:976, 982-983, 1009).

4.6.3. Mid-1946: Fail, Reassess Potential

After failing to bypass the Brazilian block to the building of a transnational regime from the outside-in, Carneiro “dislocated his proposal and his network to UNESCO.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:983; see Galey 1977:128-129) He
submitted the project to a group of natural scientists while serving as a Brazilian delegate to the Preparatory Commission for UNESCO that met in London in May of 1946.

The historical scholarship does not currently detail how Carneiro potentially evolved from that failure to his own comparisons of risk-opportunity and cost-benefit. However, based on the available historical scholarship and accessible archives, such an evolution is a plausible pathway through which his transnational socioenvironmentalist advocacy came to favor the Amazon Basin over other tropical forests and the multilateral UNESCO over institutions situated elsewhere on the domestic-foreign frontier. The historical record is incomplete but potentially consistent with the model used to process-trace here.112

4.6.4. Mid – Late 1946: Comparison of Potential

At UNESCO the IIHA project conformed to the “periphery principle” developed by the founding director of the organization’s Division of Natural Sciences, Joseph Needham, drawing on his prior professional experience in China (Domingues & Petitjean 2005). The principle reflected a late sort of enlightenment thinking and an early prototype of the Third Worldist movement (see Horkheimer 1947; Berger 2004; see also Rist 1997). It held the cognitive and normative beliefs that science irradiated light across the world from a “bright” “center” to a “dark” “periphery,” and that the scientific development of non-industrialized nations should be promoted accordingly (Maio & Sá

112 It is fair to tentatively assume that future work of historians may draw on remote archival records to document that Carneiro’s response to the failure was to compare the potential influence he would exert by acting on nation-states in the Amazonian Basin or elsewhere (e.g., Congo Basin, Mekong Basin), and by acting within Brazil or between the nation-state and others (e.g., France and United Kingdom, U.N.) (see Carneiro 1951). In the interim, this study deliberately supplements this gap by process-tracing events in line with this mechanism more carefully in the campaigns that other chapters explain here.
No less than Needham’s vision of international cooperation to promote science as modeled after an advocacy tradition begun with the International Working Men’s Association (the First International), the trend “toward the periphery identified itself with the socialist beliefs that oriented [his] militancy.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:984; Maio 2005:117; see Nimtz 2002)

The IIHA project’s “Amazon appeared, at that initial moment, in the eyes of Needham,” as “the other China to be unveiled by the ‘periphery principle.’” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:984-986; Maio 2005:117) According to the scientific director of UNESCO, himself a U.K. national, “only a course of action that de-centered scientific activities through international cooperation could advance science in the underdeveloped countries.” (my translation of Magalhães & Maio 2007:172) The same course of action was also “the most opportune alternative for the strengthening of the international scientific community,” which was one of UNESCO’s objectives and Needham’s vision of “an International for scientific cooperation.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:984-986) In these pursuits, UNESCO faced the need to create a wide network of scientific cooperation offices. “It was in this context that Paulo Carneiro presented his project of an international scientific institution in the North of Brazil.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:984-986)

Although the IIHA converged with the causes that Needham advanced at UNESCO and fared well in risk-opportunity assessments, that convergence alone did not suffice for it to stand out next to other projects. At the time, proposals to create international research institutes—including applied mathematics and observatories—were increasingly competing for UNESCO’s attention in a number of different nation-states
(Petitjean & Domingues 2000). Besides the other global benefits that Carneiro promised “in order to secure official support,” at the 1946 conference of member-states that formed UNESCO, in London, “the delegates welcomed the project for its uses in resource development and experimental work that might later be applied elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East.” (Galey 1977:128-130, 149) As a reflection of the outstanding and time-tested Amazonian tradition of international scientific cooperation, the prospects of the IIHA compared well to—separately and sequentially—those of establishing a similar institute in the arid region as Israel was being created (Petitjean & Domingues 2000:265-266; Domingues & Petitjean 2004:38; see Nunes 2009:178).\footnote{UNESCO officials and delegates did eventually bring the IIHA experience to bear on the Middle East. In 1947, UNESCO “planned an International Institute of the Arid Zone (IIAZ) based on the IIHA” with the intent “to benefit the population of the Middle East in regions ‘harassed by internal strife and hatred of peoples.’” (Galey 1977:128-130, 149) At the UNESCO annual conference with member-state delegates in November-December of 1948, in Beirut, the IIHA served as a model for the project of an IIAZ (see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:283).}

All told, “for UNESCO... Carneiro’s project was the right project presented at the right time.” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000) The IIHA project was approved in December of 1946 at the first UNESCO conference of member states in Paris (Maio & Sá 2000:987).

4.6.5. Late 1946: Comparison of Potential, Outside-In Influence

The periphery principle oriented the IIHA project once it became affiliated with Needham’s division (Domingues & Petitjean 2005). On the one hand, “Needham as much as Julian Huxley or Paulo Carneiro caught glimpse of the development of science in the periphery as the ultimate end of the IIHA project.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:995) On the other hand, Brazilians associated with the IIHA and their English
counterparts also diverged in their transnational core-periphery perspectives regarding “the principles that should orient the creation of a scientific institution in the Amazon.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:995)

Once the IIHA was incorporated under the auspices of Needham’s Department of Natural Sciences at UNESCO, it lost its nesting of advanced techniques within native models—its embedding of cosmopolitanism as a component of rootedness—and thus deviated from the orientation of Carneiro and his Brazilian collaborators (see Maio & Sá 2000:980-981, 995). The project acquired an outside-in, core-to-periphery foretaste of reheated “expeditions of the naturalists-travelers on ‘exotic land.’” Carneiro saw a colonial coloring in the English connection (Huxley, Needham...), which hardly knew Latin America and its community of scientists, and intended to merely incorporate [local] ‘young scientists’ into the project, in a supposed dark zone.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:988) In late 1946, at the UNESCO conference in Paris, Needham highlighted that his division of the world among “bright zones” and “dark zones” (Asia, Africa and parts of South America) owed merely to historical circumstances in the overcoming of which it was fitting for scientists from the industrialized world to cooperate (Maio & Sá 2000:986-987). The three Brazilian scientists among the polity’s delegates at the conference maintained close ties with the then Oswaldo Cruz Institute (IOC, for Instituto Oswaldo Cruz) in Brazil, and more informal collaboration with the IIHA project: Miguel Osório de Almeida, Carlos Chagas Filho e Olympio da Fonseca. Because these Brazilian scientists came from the IOC’s tradition of scientific excellence they found it difficult to understand Needham’s configuration of the scientific world, which from their perspective overlooked “isolated foci of light that sometimes arise… in the dark zones.” (my
translation of Almeida as quoted in Maio 2005:124; see Maio & Sá 2000:986-987)

Almeida would soon ridicule while recalling Needham’s estimates of brightness: “there are no… rigorous methods of photometry in questions of this nature.” (my translation of quote reproduced in Maio 2005:124) Carneiro was not alone in associating colonialism with efforts to influence the governing of science from the outside to the inside of the supposed “dark zones.” In a prevalent diagnosis during the early days of the IIHA, Almeida considered Needham’s vision to be a type of “scientific imperialism” practiced in ‘bright-zone’ nations that only valued that knowledge which was produced inside their own limits (my translation of quote reproduced in Maio & Sá 2000:986-987).

Public and private actors outside of Amazonian polities tried to influence the governing of these rainforest territories from the outside-in by means of a proto-IIHA that itself had thus far maintained its original design as a transnational, public-private organization. Already as of 1946,

“Research organized or supported by the Institute [was] to be carried out, if possible, in cooperation with existing national or international scientific institutions. …[T]his facilitated establishment of IIHA regional centers to work in cooperation with country organizations. Some centers were already… [in] contact to participate in this Amazonian ’network,’ like the Centro de Estudios Indígenas de Puerto Asis, in Colombia; the Museu Amazónico, … in… Peru; Instituto Pasteur, in French Guiana; and, in Brazil, the Instituto Agronômico do Norte, [(IAN)], the Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi [(Emilio Goeldi Museum of Pará)]… and… Mato Grosso… State…” (Domingues 2002:2)

4.6.6. Early – Mid 1947: Outside-In Influence

By the following year, projects that were to be developed jointly between the IIHA, the Brazilian government, and the Agronomy Institute of the North (IAN) but no longer the Goeldi Museum—which had originally inspired Carneiro—became
particularly symptomatic of outside-in governance. By August of 1947, IIHA’s initial transnational conference at Belém focused on the research agenda of the UNESCO institutional outgrowth. Conference participants “endowed the nascent institute with a vast program of scientific studies” and of community outreach such as incentives for the revival of threatened indigenous medicine, ethnobotany and ethnozoology (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:265-266; see Domingues & Petitjean 2001). The conference included two U.S.-based public-private groups: the Smithsonian Institution and the New York Botanical Garden. An epidemiologist who headed it as a representative of four intergovernmental organizations had recently completed over a dozen years controlling yellow fever and malaria in Brazil while employed by a transnational civic group—the Rockefeller Foundation. It was symptomatic of “a mismatch between the IIHA project and the lack of a broader discussion with the Brazilian scientific community” that the conference included no socioenvironmentalist advocate from the Belém-based Goeldi Museum, which UNESCO recurrently considered to be the most distinguished scientific institution in the Amazon (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:990-991, 1010; see Domingues & Petitjean 2001).114 As planned at the conference, the Brazilian government would place certain laboratories, installations, funds, personnel and its network of experimental stations at the disposal of the IIHA. However, the government would only “admit a limited number of specialists” from the

114 There were no direct representatives from those scientists of an advocacy orientation that arched back to Goeldi himself, as evident above in the bird hat campaign. Carneiro had described them as a “small nucleus of biologists and anthropologists working in the Goeldi Museum with branches worldwide, thanks to international collaborations.” (my translation of Carneiro as quoted in Domingues & Petitjean 2001) The IIHA did convene and strike an accord with the Governor of the State of Pará under the auspices of which the museum has long been positioned. However, the only evidence of either “close relations between the [IIHA and Goeldi Museum] institutions” or IIHA “acceptance” in Belém is still channeled from the outside-in through a Governor whose military background was unlikely to serve him well as a spokesperson of (dissenting) internal actors at the museum in relation to an external IIHA (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001; see Crampton 1972:67-68; Galey 1977:130-131; Maio & Sá 2000:992).
IIHA (Crampton 1972:81). The limit reflected a “basic problem of international control over the internal affairs of basin nations. [At the Belém conference.] Brazilians and others raised the possibility that the IIHA might take on a domineering or an imperialistic role unless it worked through the existing scientific institutions of each Amazon nation.” (Galey 1977:132)

Subsequently, the meeting’s official rapporteur, Heloísa Alberto Torres, reported to the Brazilian government that “the financial and cultural resources of the great world centers of research would converge spontaneously on the [Amazon] region.” (Crampton 1972:74, 82-83) She professed to believe “that economic support of scientific ventures would come readily” from outside Brazil, and that such outside-in support would influence but not dictate governance in Brazil—attaining “practical results” “without concomitant demands for control over the knowledge acquired through research.” (Crampton 1972:82-83)

4.6.7. Mid-1947: Institutionalization Fails

Expectations for the IIHA were remarkably grimmer in a simultaneous 1947 review by another rapporteur, the Brazilian deputy João Botelho, reporting on behalf of Brazil’s congressional Special Commission for the Plan of Economic Valorization of the Amazon (PVEA). Considering the same Belém conference in a report on a mid-1947 tour of the Amazon by the legislative commission, rapporteur Botelho warned:

“Without nationalistic overtones…, we absolutely do not agree… with the motives that dictate the organization of such an entity. … The name could better have been Institute of the Amazon Hylea, section of UNESCO, avoiding… nationalist sentiment, which the other name will … evoke. (…) Brazilians… [are receptive to] organizations of cultural or economic assistance which do not reach
the very damaging international aspect, although only in name.” (Crampton 1972:94-101)

In a report that amounts to the earliest indication of nationalist opposition to the IIHA, Botelho “further suggested that each country could have its own [Amazon] institution, thereby avoiding the international character.” (Crampton 1972:97, 101)

4.6.8. Mid-1947 - Early 1948: Fail, Reassess, Broker

Meanwhile, communications among UNESCO staff and delegates had begun to combine these divergent perceptions of IIHA’s prospects into coherence: They perceived the difference between the institute’s potential formation or failure to hinge on the national and governmental status of its personnel composition and juridical arrangement, respectively.

In a forceful letter to Julian Huxley in April of 1947, Carneiro had reevaluated how much influence the IIHA could have if operated by non-Amazonian polities from the outside-in rather than by Amazonian nation-states or colonies (U.K., Dutch and French) from within the basin. Carneiro revealed a series of prescient preoccupations about the degree to which the IIHA project would broker between advocates inside and those outside of South American nation-states.

Anticipating problems that would spread beyond the Brazilian congress into society by early 1949, Carneiro’s correspondence urged Huxley to strengthen the South American presence among the proto-IIHA’s staff and representatives as well as to lower the profile of organizational transnationalism. Carneiro alerted Huxley against the selection of two scientists lacking “familiarity with the [Amazon] region, its culture and its political life” to head work on the IIHA; and against the idea of a

Carneiro cautioned—in his own words on April 16, 1947:

“Brazil and the South American countries that I associated into this project certainly will not accept executing it and participating in the first conference planned on UNESCO’s programs in this regard if the recommendation presented by Mr. Parra-Perez (representative of Venezuela) and myself to the executive council is not followed. (…) Mr. Corner [(an U.K. national whom the U.N. division made its top appointee to establish the IIHA and the UNESCO mission in Brazil)] will be able to do nothing without the support of a South American man of science as a ‘special consultant’ of UNESCO. Do not forget, Mr. director-general, that the South American countries are quite demanding and do not appreciate having the impression of being treated like colonies where study missions in which they are not included from the beginning are sent. In addition, I believe that the sentiments of China, the Far East and the Near East will be the same faced with the scientific stations that UNESCO has the intention of founding in these places.” (my translation of letter quoted in Maio & Sá 2000:988)

Huxley temporarily heeded the first of Carneiro’s two cautions. He conceded in response to pressures from Carneiro and Parra-Perez for a Latin American ‘special consultant,’ yet Huxley limited the new position to a four-month period—beginning in April-May of 1947 (Maio & Sá 2000:989). “Paulo Carneiro himself was appointed to establish the links between, on one side, UNESCO and, on the other, the Brazilian scientific community and state; and returned to the center of the IIHA gestation process.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:989)

In contrast, the historical scholarship recovers another internal UNESCO correspondence—written to Corner by Huxley with the support of Needham—that suggests Carneiro’s second admonition was deemed insufficiently perilous not to be ignored. A memo delivered to Corner a few days before the Belém conference began, in August of 1947, delimited “that the ruling body of the IIHA be predominantly composed of scientists and not of official representatives of member-states. Huxley and Needham
reiterated their transnationalist vision of the scientific tasks: UNESCO should serve science and scientists more than states.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:990) In the transnational ruling body for the IIHA, the interest of science would trump that of states—in spite of Carneiro’s caution to lower the profile of its organizational transnationalism so as to minimize the risk of South American states rejecting the institute under the impression that the UNESCO-outgrowth would govern them from the outside-in. The Belém conference in effect maintained an outside-in IIHA: It gave little attention to state actors and recognized but did not actually address “the necessity for effective liaison and public relations with the scientists of each member nation.” (Galey 1977:132; see Crampton 1972:63)

A transnationalist orientation, which has been characterized elsewhere as a “principle of nongovernmentalism,” was indeed “enshrined in the composition of” UNESCO’s leading officials until 1954 (Finnemore 1996:49-51; see Maio & Sá 2000:994, 1008-1009). The orientation sought to maintain a public-private, hybridized tension between an intergovernmental organization of states and a non-governmental organization of scientists hovering above state control; a balance that the IUCN would manage to maintain (Finnemore 1996:49-51; Maio & Sá 2000:994, 1008-1009). To serve these aims UNESCO extended financial support to nongovernmental organizations—as in the public-private IUCN—and established research institutes, as in the IIHA (Finnemore 1996:49-51). For Huxley and other officials in charge of UNESCO, “apart from the dangers of states exploiting scientific discoveries for military gain”—as the Nazis and the U.S. nuclear bombs dropped on Japan had recently demonstrated—“state interference in science had long been understood to stifle scientific progress.” (Finnemore
Huxley’s transnationalist principle for UNESCO was to come under one of its earliest attacks through the IIHA, which he charged Latin American nation-states with having distorted into “a very great store” as a result of their particularistic interests (Maio & Sá 2000:993-994, 1008-1009; see Finnemore 1996:50-51). Under the nongovernmentalist direction of Huxley, during 1946-1948, even the overarching UNESCO executive council in theory was to, as he put it: “be composed of outstanding men in the fields of education, sciences and arts, from various regions, voting as individuals, and not as representatives of their own countries. This… ended up not working. Although the executive council was almost always composed of enlightened men, they followed… the directions of their rulers.” (my translation of quote in Maio & Sá 2000:994)

Another internal UNESCO report, written in September of 1947 by a Greek UNESCO staff person ranked second from the top with regard to the IIHA, Basile C. Malamos, makes it clear that Carneiro’s four-month term did not suffice to cease the exertion of outside-in influence nor to broker the resources of advocates inside and outside of Brazil. As Malamos approached educators in Southeast Brazil after the Belém conference, he “found hints of unease over potential foreign control of Brazilian science. [A] dean of the… University of São Paulo approved the [IIHA] project himself, but he warned that the younger generation of Brazilian scientists would suspect that through UNESCO, foreign scientists wanted to dominate Brazilian research.” (Galey 1977:133-134, 149; see Maio & Sá 2000:989)

A third internal UNESCO letter, written in February of 1948 by the organization’s staff person in charge of the IIHA, Edred John Henry Corner, can be traced as another
reevaluation. His correspondence warned that only if Amazonian, South American researchers—who were regional nationals—were included in the work of the IIHA could the institute “legitimize itself before the Amazonian countries.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1001) Moreover, the letter reinvigorated Carneiro’s earlier unheeded caution against “nongovernmentalism;” and compared anew the potential influence of working internationally between non-Amazonian and Amazonian states with that of working exclusively within Amazonian states. According to Corner, post-colonial states tended to perceive such “transnationalism” as colonialism and/or partial supranationalism, and to be less responsive to outside-in influence on governing than to merging the resources of internal and external advocates.

In his correspondence, sent to the UNESCO headquarters, Corner continued Carneiro’s brokerage. Corner offered severe comments on a draft of the international treaty that would officially establish the IIHA. He was preoccupied with criticisms and other reactions that UNESCO might provoke due to the transnationalist manner in which relations between the IIHA and Amazonian states were being designed.

“Despite Carneiro’s past misgivings about Corner as UNESCO’s representative in Latin America, the latter showed signs of having quickly understood that an international organization in Latin America would inevitably bring up a face-off with local nationalisms. After all, the countries in the region were former colonies, and that condition would not soon cease to be, concomitantly, a collective trauma and a shield for the establishment of political relations. (...) Corner said that the creation of an international institute, above the borders of the countries involved and directed by an international organization, was quite a delicate issue and required further clarification in the document. He also said that very few individuals in Latin America understood the idea of the ‘internationalism’ [(i.e. transnationalism)] of the institute. According to him, some could see [the IIHA] as a foreign intrusion in their countries, and others still, as ‘foreign domination of science in the Amazon.’” (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:278; see Galey 1977:134-135)
Corner deemed the draft IIHA treaty to have language problems that might make the institute appear to be imperialist in its relations with Amazonian institutions. Among the clauses that he considered in need of such clarification stood those that left room to doubt the legislation’s intent for the IIHA “to work through and with the organizations of the Amazonian” polities (my translation of Petitjean & Domingues 2000:278). Corner in effect echoed a consensus developed at the 1947 Belém conference that prescribed the IIHA to work through the existing scientific institutions of each Amazonian nation (see Galey 1977:132). His letter admonished:

“It is necessary to make it clear that an International Institute does not intend to ‘override’ [(‘passar por cima’)]; it needs to proceed through collaboration and invitations, respecting the existing institutions, for these will be its local guides. As much as possible… the local institutes must be considered and designated Associate Institutes, and their national body of researchers recognized as ‘collaborators’ in the work of the IIHA. [Obviously.] the IIHA cannot be an exotic institute operating in the Amazon.” (my translation of Corner as quoted in Petitjean & Domingues 2000:278)

4.6.9. Early 1948 - Early 1949: Fail, Broker, Pool

In order to overcome a state-society block to the building of institutions from the outside in, pro-IIHA advocates sought to address earlier deficiencies in brokerage and resource-pooling between actors inside as well as outside of Brazil. A rise in brokerage and resource-pooling emerged with two early-1948 transnational conferences—at Iquitos (Peru) in April and at Manaus (Brazil) in May—to establish the IIHA. In 1947, Huxley had mentioned a role for UNESCO not only in contributing financial resources to form the IIHA, but also in helping the IIHA to attract funding allies such as transnational scientific foundations (Maio & Sá 2000:990, 996). By the first 1948 conference, U.S. representatives speculated that U.S.-based foundations such as the Rockefeller
Foundation and Carnegie Endowment might extend financial resources to the IIHA (Maio & Sá 2000:999). The Brazilian Heloísa Alberto Torres came out of the two conferences elected as the president of the institute’s interim commission, and Corner as her assisting executive-secretary (Maio & Sá 2000:1000; see Maio 2005). The historical scholarship identifies Torres’ personified pooling of technical resources from outside Brazil as well as national and political resources inside the polity. As an anthropologist, she directed the National Museum in Rio de Janeiro, was very prestigious in the Brazilian scientific community, and was a friend of the IFHEB’s and Museum of Man’s Paul Rivet—who had maintained close relations with the Brazilian museum since the late 1920s (Galey 1977:145-146; Maio & Sá 2000:998, 1000, 1003). In addition to her technical resources pertaining to the IIHA’s very disciplinary and advocacy stronghold, the profession of Anthropology, Torres personified political and nationalist resources similarly well (see Domingues & Petitjean 2001). Politically, she was the museum’s representative in a Brazilian regulatory council—the public-private Council for Inspection of Artistic and Scientific Expeditions—that authorized the field research of foreign scientists, whose presence and expeditions she had dealt with since the 1930s (Maio & Sá 2000:1003). As for nationalist resources, “as the daughter of Brazil’s nationalist theoretician, she was respected in Rio’s political circles. …[T]he choice of Torres… demonstrated that Brazilians would assume more active leadership in the institute.” (Galey 1977:145-146)

However, UNESCO soon reversed the rising trend. It accumulated a deficit of nationalist resources to Torres in mid-1948 when it appointed Célia Neves to assist Corner without prior consent from president Torres, and another in late 1948 when it
invited Neves to replace Corner as executive-secretary of IIHA’s interim commission—again without Torres’ presidential permission (see Maio & Sá 2000:1002-1005). A tension arose in UNESCO-IIHA relations, respectively personified in interactions between Neves and Torres. Torres interpreted the selection of Neves without her consent as undue UNESCO meddling that hurt the autonomy of the IIHA. Neves arrived in Brazil on a “hardly modest mission” that among other aims attempted “to stimulate a press campaign about the IIHA to sensitize the National Congress,” and indeed became “a lobbyist vis-à-vis legislators, journalists, intellectuals and the government.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1002) Torres was also so unsatisfied with the intervention by UNESCO upon Corner’s resignation that she never recognized Neves as executive-secretary and instead added the secretarial position to her own presidential duties to ensure programmatic continuity at the IIHA helm (Maio & Sá 2000:1002-1004; see Galey 1977:145-146; Petitjean & Domingues 2000).

By early 1949 resistance against the IIHA had intensified in both the Brazilian state and society, reinforcing a block to the formation of the institute across borders. Bernardes was mentioned above as the main anti-IIHA activist, and is a paramount figure in episodes traced through the process of internalization. The incubation process here complements that of internalization. Only the former explains how “Bernardes’ protests” by that point were “a very strong manifestation of sovereign nationalism,” yet

“[s]cientific nationalism was hidden behind this manifestation. That nationalism started with the most important natural science institute in the country, the National Museum… whose director, … Torres, was… president of the IIHA Interim Commission. In fact, two naturalists of the Museum headed the movement and informed… Bernardes… They alleged that UNESCO’s scientific goals for the Amazon could be achieved by Brazilians, whose only obstacle was the lack of material supplies. They alleged that the UNESCO project would turn into a research institution led by foreigners, and that Brazilian scientists would
end up as mere natural object collectors. Scientific credit would be kept in the hands of foreigners, as had already happened in the past.” (Domingues 2002:5; see Maio & Sá 2000:986-987, 1006-1007, 1013-1014; Maio 2005)\(^\text{115}\)

This everyday resistance through information leaks stemmed from two naturalists within a state agency that had been committed to a “militant biology,” or a nationalist and environmental movement embodied in national parks, over the two decades preceding the campaign—between the mid-1920s and mid-1940s (my translation of Duarte 2010; see Franco & Drummond 2005; 2009:82-84, 86, 89, 91-92, 97-99; see also Scott 1985; Grove 1990; Pinto 2010). State-society networks of nationalists and environmentalists—i.e. eco-nationalists—committed “to protect[ing] Brazil’s natural endowment as a means to provide a basis for the construction of a new, modern Brazilian national identity” had tied the National Museum to several movements or civic groups (Franco & Drummond 2009:82). These ties had connected activists in the National Museum to “authoritarian movements… from the right to the left, … the Brazilian Outdoor Recreation Center (Centro Excursionista Brasileiro), the Brazilian Federation for the Progress of Women (Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino), the Alberto Torres’ Friends Society (Sociedade de Amigos de Alberto Torres), the Geographical Society of Rio the Janeiro (Sociedade Geográfica do Rio de Janeiro), the Arbor Society (Sociedade de Amigos das Árvores), and the Society of Friends of the National Museum (Sociedade de Amigos do Museu Nacional).” (Franco & Drummond 2009:82-84, 86, 89, 91-92, 97-99)

Precisely the single social movement organization among these that the two committed staffers at their networked museum would deem most memorable by the time of the

\(^{115}\) The second allegation, regarding the role of Brazilian scientists in the IIHA, is a narrower expectation that scholarship on the campaign does not elaborate on and that lends itself to brief consideration. The historiography on the subject offers an ambiguous record on that allegation. “[B]y the beginning of 1949… the IIHA… had… accomplished two research projects in the basin: a scientific expedition was completed in the Peruvian Amazon, and the North American anthropologist, Charles Wagley, had gathered data for a monograph on an Amazon town. (...) Wagley used this information to write *Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics*… [which] was especially significant as a refutation of Amazonia’s “Green Hell” legend, and an affirmation of man’s ability to adjust to life in the tropical forest.” (Galey 1977:146-147, 150; see Maio & Sá 2000:1001) Wagley’s work [(1953)] became seminal based on data gathered in Brazil not only by the U.S. anthropologist, but also by his Brazilian “advisee in the Ph.D. program in anthropology at Columbia University.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1001)
IIHA-INPA campaign had led mobilization of eco-nationalist activism against settlement of Japanese immigrants into the Brazilian Amazon from the late 1920s to the early 1940s. The Friends of Alberto Torres Society (SAAT) that the Torres heir directing the National Museum by the turn of the 1950s inevitably called to mind had been the advocacy group which mobilized this earlier opposition, as traced above in the internalization process.

Paradoxically, the same eco-nationalist movement that eventually facilitated the two whistleblowers’ leaked resistance to the transnational activism networked around the IIHA had partaken in other sorts of cause-oriented action across borders (Franco & Drummond 2005:154; 2009:82-84, 86, 89, 91-92, 97-99). However, the bulk of this earlier transnational mobilization had consisted in diffusion largely received from the International Office for Nature Protection (IOPN) with its decentralized coordination—along the lines of the present-day BirdLife International—over the years preceding the emergence of UNESCO, IUCN and IIHA. This legacy of transnational activism had left to eco-nationalist activists based in Brazil margin for their discretion to applaud an IOPN-led “transnational nature protection movement” or to advocate “the establishment of universal norms without imposing any disadvantage on adaptations to the conditions of each country.” (my translation of Franco 2002; Franco & Drummond 2005:154; see Duarte 2006:4, 9-11)

The historical literature has increasingly confirmed that “when certain social movements headed by the nationalists” resisted the IIHA, their blocking action was also a consequence of “apprehensiveness about the decisions of the institute being concentrated in the hands of foreign scientists.” (my translation of Pureza 2005 citing Andrade 2001; Faria 2001; Maio 2001) Indeed, “the confirmation comes from reports of many
scientists” including one for whom the institute seemed to “invite the foreigners to a consented spoliation, given that the emphasis of IIHA’s proposals fell on the dispatch of faunistic and floristic material to France, where it would be analyzed and catalogued without the participation of Brazilian scientists in these studies.” (my translation of Pureza 2005 citing Andrade 2001; Faria 2001; Maio 2001; see Crampton 1972:80)

After UNESCO relapsed on its earlier boosts to brokerage and resource pooling, it reversed its contributions back toward a rising trend in these sorts of events, by January of 1949. A brokering visit by the director of the UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences, based at the Parisian headquarters in France, took aim at overcoming bureaucratic and congressional blocks in Brazil: holds on a secretarial position in the IIHA interim commission occupied by both Neves and Torres, and on a ratification of an IIHA treaty faced with expanding opposition. With regard to the former aim, the contacts of the visiting UNESCO director with Torres ultimately did not overcome the impasse within the IIHA’s interim commission, which continued until February of 1949 when Neves finished her post ‘as executive-secretary’ in keeping with the contract she had with UNESCO. However, UNESCO held a preference for a scientist from Brazil while it attempted to find a replacement executive-secretary to whom Torres would consent. UNESCO’s preference for a Brazilian national was a tactic to “weaken the strong critiques from South American leaders concerning the supposed ‘imperialist’ character of UNESCO,” and “to demonstrate the importance of the country and sensitize Brazilian authorities to the need of ratifying the convention.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1004) One of the names UNESCO floated, probably following Carneiro’s suggestion, was that of a Brazilian agricultural engineer with a Ph.D. from Rutgers
University (United States). Torres opposed that choice, “perhaps for fear that UNESCO’s intervention would be perpetuated.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1004) In short, UNESCO tried to pool the technical resources of a scientist with the nationalist resources of a Brazilian native.

4.6.10. Early 1949 - Early 1950: Pooling

Others attempted to pool resources in a similarly deliberate and selective manner. One effort to pool resources was that of Professor Lineu de Albuquerque Melo, who distinguished between the technical and the financial resources that IIHA pooled from outside Brazil. In common with UNESCO, Albuquerque Melo also sought to tailor the pooling of resources as a means to defend the IIHA against the accusations of Artur Bernardes (see Magalhães 2006:119-120). Through a newspaper op-ed published in April of 1949, he argued that “only scientists, professors, the most intimate representatives of great culture” were among those present in Iquitos, where there were no “representatives of international haute finance” or “handlers of economic interests.” (my translation of quote as reproduced in Magalhães 2006:119-120) The prominent journalist-politician Lacerda endorsed Albuquerque Melo’s argument the next day with an editorial that attempted to influence public opinion toward a resource pooling in which “the Amazon should continue to be researched by ‘Brazilians fraternized with foreign scientists,’ who have long contributed various discoveries to the region.” (my translation of Lacerda as quoted and paraphrased in Magalhães 2006:119-120)

In October of 1949, Carneiro brought about another event of inside-outside resource pooling so as to overturn opposition to the IIHA. To that end, he sought to “win
the support of” and “craft alliances with other Brazilian scientists” in IIHA’s defense, through organizations including the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC, for *Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência*) and the Brazilian Botanical Society (*Sociedade Botânica Brasileira*) (my translation of Magalhães 2006:119-120, 126-127; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:282-283). In a lecture to the SBPC, after surveying UNESCO’s projects, Carneiro focused on the project to form the IIHA.

“He argued that this project could not be done through national spheres due to the grandiosity of the Amazonian territory, and the interests of hundreds of experts and laboratories that would be involved and giving their contribution. His recital, however, seems not to have sufficed to undo the misgivings of the scientists with regard to the project. After his lecture, the subject most debated at the SBPC was the issue of the ‘drainage of Brazilian native material out of the country’ through foreign missions. On this point, Carneiro affirmed that UNESCO would coordinate the scientific explorations always respecting the interests of science and of nations at the same time.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:126-127; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:282-283)

In other words, Carneiro pooled national and political resources from inside Brazil next to the technical resources mainly though not exclusively outside the said polity.

Meanwhile—between mid-1949 and early 1950—Bernardes, the Brazilian Institute of Geopolitics (IBG) and their supporters mobilized against such resource pooling by questioning the technical arrogance, financial susceptibility, political trustworthiness and national allegiance of scientists. As far as technical resources, the staple of professional experts, “Bernardes suggested that scientists suffered from a complex of superiority, and that each believes that his science is above all others.” (Crampton 1972:134; see Galey 1977:162-164) In terms of financial and political resources, hinting at the polarized ‘Cold’ War politics, the IBG “asked, could one trust a professional who has no allegiances and would sell his services and discoveries to any nation regardless of political orientation?” (Galey 1977:162-164) Regarding nationalist
resources, Bernardes “charged that the ‘law which organizes society and rules the relations of men and States… does not exist for [scientists].’ To them… it doesn’t matter whether Amazônia remains Brazilian, just so long as the Institute becomes a reality.” (Crampton 1972:134, including quotes of Bernardes) While Bernardes accused scientists of “placing their profession above the law and national security,” the IBG ranked its own “national consciousness” or allegiance above that of “apolitical” scientists (Galey 1977:162-164).

“The nationalists further affirmed that Brazil had no reason to alienate [the Amazon] during the Cold War, a time, they argued, when few concessions were being made to disinterested science. (…) As one nationalistic Rio tabloid expressed it, ‘If Brazil is going to deliver up half the nation for the love of science, why doesn’t the United States give the atomic bomb secret to Russia and all the other countries?’” (Galey 1977:162-164)

As for solely political resources, Bernardes questioned those personified—and perhaps engendered—in Torres by stating that Brazilians were negligent and the Brazilian diplomatic service was carelessness in “trusting the lead of a mission [interim IIHA] of this sort to a lady whose political know-how amounts to none (cujos conhecimentos políticos são nenhum) and [who] lacked juridical know-how as well.” (my translation of quote in Magalhães 2006:137)

All told, Bernardes voiced his confrontation with the resource pooling of the IIHA to his congressional colleagues, and disseminated it through the press to his collaborating social movements:

“Evidently, we have no desire to damage the progress of science or isolate Brazil from the planet. Neither [do we desire to] block the association of great resources of science and technique in favor of our development, if done in a convenient manner. However, the right to not permit the free practice of internationalism at the expense of our sovereignty and our formative rearing (formação) is appropriately ours (cabe-nos).” (my translation of quote in Petitjean & Domingues 2000:86-87)
In these claims from anti-IIHA advocates, ‘resource division’ seems to have been used in order to resist the pooling of financial and technical resources—mainly from outside Brazil—next to political and nationalist resources—mostly from inside the said polity. A gap remains in the historical scholarship with regard to the intentionality of that potentially deliberate resistance to resource pooling. However, the current literature leans toward imputing intentional behavior, as evident in the following example and in the debates featured in the next paragraph. For instance, as briefly mentioned above, a federal deputy who supported Bernardes relayed in early 1950 that in the 1920s the latter had prescribed to him “the necessity of having Brazilians accompany” in “the greatest vigilance” any foreign scientific expeditions that were permitted to enter the Brazilian Amazon (Crampton 1972:140-142; see Galey 1977:151-152; Magalhães 2006:97).

Based on such an example of conditional permitting, at the time of their resistance to resource pooling both Bernardes and his supporter had long been aware of the opportunities that can be opened by resource pooling, as in the joining of foreign scientists and Brazilian nationals.

The struggle for and against resource pooling between pro- and anti-IIHA advocates continued in early 1950 with an admission from Carneiro and a rejoinder to Bernardes. The former signals the difficulty his pro-IIHA side encountered in its attempts to converge nationalist resources mainly inside Brazil to the financial and technical resources mostly outside the nation-state. Carneiro has been quoted as saying: “In the present period it appears difficult to hold on to former concerns about strict nationalism. If we do not have the technical and financial resources to explore Amazônia, nothing prevents our accepting the cooperation of the United Nations…”
(quote reproduced as in Crampton 1972:134). As for the rejoinder to Bernardes, a federal deputy, Carlos de Lima Cavalcanti, defended Torres’ national, technical and political resources while speaking at the Chamber of Deputies on March 6, 1950. Where Bernardes had included Torres prominently as one of the scientists whom he verbally attacked, Lima Cavalcanti remarked that “Bernardes, if better informed, would not have made his unjust reference to a lady who by the illustrious name she bore, the scientific titles she held and the responsibility she exercised with respect to the National Museum merited the highest respect.” (Crampton 1972:146-148; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:86-87; Magalhães 2006:137)

4.6.11. Early 1949 - Mid-1951: Pool, Downscale

While the pooling of resources continued to stall when it was bound toward the formation of a cell through the IIHA, as an outgrowth of UNESCO and/or IUCN, resource pooling became steady when redirected toward an alternative formation of a startup that emerged through the INPA. Earlier, Carneiro’s initial transnational “scientific network” clearly had not made sufficient progress to eventually alter its scale into Brazil through the formation of a transnational coalition between the IFHEB and the Goeldi Museum. As the transnational institute that he advocated next struggled to alter its scale into Brazil—among other Amazonian polities—through the formation of the IIHA as a cell of UNESCO and/or IUCN, a national institute alternative did alter the scale of his project into the polity when a start-up was formed.

The sequencing in these two mechanisms along the process, from resource pooling to downward scale alteration, explains a salient turn of events in this episode
series. As described in the historical literature, “the IIHA issue faded away in the creation of the… INPA.” (Crampton 1972:16, 57) Viewing the turn in the reverse direction, “among the antecedents of the foundation of the INPA, there is the paramount reinterpretation of a project ‘having arrived from abroad’ (‘vindo de fora’), the utopian project of the creation of the… IIHA.” (my translation of Faulhaber 2005:243; see Gama & Velho 2005:218)

At the turn of the 1940s-1950s, during contentious debates over the IIHA, members of the Brazilian congress developed the INPA into existence as an organizational and resource-pooling replacement (Galey 1977:172). Deputy Abelardo Mata from the State of Amazonas “had proposed a National Institute of Amazônia in 1946,” and “revived his request in 1949” through a bill printed on December 10, 1949 (Crampton 1972:54, 123, 126). In May of 1950, Augusto Meira, a federal senator from the State of Pará, opposed the IIHA in the senate and proposed the creation of Brazilians’ “own” institute (Crampton 1972:54). The senator was not only embodying into a single organization more generic claims from a congressional speech he delivered against the IIHA in mid-1949, but also pooling into that institute technical resources mostly from outside Brazil as well as national and political resources mostly inside the polity:

“On [June 10, 1949] Meira argued that Brazil should not permit the creation of an institute with an imprint [such as IIHA’s] in the Amazon, because it could conduct research in the region on its own account: ‘It is not about isolationism. (…) Brazil can, on its own, promote efficient studies, with its people or even assisted by foreign technical elements, friendly and loyal, who work under its auspices and under national determination.’” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:124-125)

Whether or not “studies” could indeed be so “efficient” as to forfeit financial resources from the outside, the historical scholarship unambiguously recognizes that arguments
such as Meira’s “obscured the practical problems of finding sufficient funding and government support for… Brazilian scientific projects.” (Galey 1977:162-163)

Meanwhile, campaigners who were occupying positions not as amenable to negotiation continued to advocate for their favored versions of organizational formation—into either the IIHA or INPA—and of either resource pooling or division.

Pro-IIHA advocates maintained their emphasis on the necessity of an international entity to achieve the institute’s purpose, as in Carneiro’s aforementioned insistence on international coordination by UNESCO at the SBPC in October of 1949 (Petitjean & Domingues 2000:282-283; Magalhães 2006:126-127). As of early 1949, Carneiro argued that scientific inquiry was an intrinsically international activity and that in Brazil institutions always received the technical resources of foreign scientists (Magalhães 2006:115-116). The resource pooling he proposed continued to combine technical resources from the outside and nationalist resources from the inside of Brazil:

“international by the area that it covers, the Institute… could not stop being international in its scientific staff. How can valuable naturalists able to carry out [research] be obtained if not by resorting to all the scientific centers capable of providing them? In the future institute, experts arising from its various Member States—Brazilians, Peruvians, Colombians, Ecuadorians etc.—will cooperate… for the study of… the Amazonian Hylea. They will be next to scientists of other countries every time that the concurrence of the latter becomes necessary; and that it is of the liking of each Government, evidently with the due respect for the laws that regulate, in each case the admission of foreigners in the various national territories.” (my translation of Carneiro as quoted in Magalhães 2006:115-116)

In sharp contrast to such resource pooling, anti-IIHA advocates promoted dividing resources as far apart as the distance at which they proposed to keep out of Brazil foreign technical as well as financial resources. Brazilian nationalist campaigners at the IBG ‘returned to Bernardes’ theme of national capacity by asserting that Brazilians had already demonstrated their scientific expertise in botany, mineralogy, zoology and
tropical medicine. Brazil could carry on alone at its own discretion and at its own speed. This argument clearly had nationalistic appeal…” (Galey 1977:162-163) By August of 1951, IBG advocates went further in dividing technical and nationalist resources: As traced above within the process of internalization, the IBG opposed the formation of the IIHA by presenting the latter as an effort “to conquer” the Amazon region by “trying to hide” “the desire for total possession of Amazonia” “under the golden cape of scientific interest.” (Crampton 1972:158-159) However, the nationalists did not oppose the use of technical resources to raise financial resources if science were to serve commercial application under the inside resources of a national direction: “many of the arguments about the amorality and dangerous politicizing of scientists dissipated when national direction of their research was assured.” (Galey 1977:172-173)

4.6.12. 1951 - 1954: Downward Scale Alteration

As a new federal government agency—the National Council of Research (CNPq, Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa)—emerged out of the same nationalist context in 1951, one of the items on its agenda was a proposal, similar to deputy Mata’s earlier bill, to form a National Institute of Amazon Research (INPA). “National security” was one of four explicit criteria considered to orient the purpose of the proposal (my translation of quote in Maio & Sá 2000:1008; see Petitjean & Domingues 2000:289; Maio 2005:123).

116 Although scale alteration is traceable as a mechanism along the process of incubation, it is not traceable as a standalone process in the IIHA-INPA campaign. Out of a broader empirical context here, scale alteration does not demonstrate that the activists—particularly the advocacy network on the pro-IIHA side—whose behavior this study explains are indeed acting with such a cause-orientation, more so than in governmental or epistemic roles (for definitions of activism based on role/orientation rather than non-state position, see Nye & Keohane 1971; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler & Keck 2007; Pinto 2010).
Even the “concern with national sovereignty” orienting INPA is symptomatic of how its proposal “largely mirrored” that of the IIHA (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1008; see Crampton 1972:123; Maio 2005:123). Indeed, INPA’s formation relied on the support of several advocates who had previously proposed forming the IIHA, and most of the leading IIHA proponents helped to form the INPA: Paulo Carneiro, Heloísa Alberto Torres, Felisberto Camargo, Carlos Chagas Filho and Olympio da Fonseca (Galey 1977:172-173; Maio & Sá 2000:1008; see Crampton 1972:123; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:289; Maio 2005:123). Their participation signaled a circumstantial adjustment rather than a fundamental change with regard to their position on how to pool financial and technical resources outside of Brazil together with nationalist resources inside the said nation-state. For instance, while communicating with the CNPq director in early 1953 Carneiro expressed appreciation for being invited to collaborate in the formation of the INPA, referred to the national institute as a project that had been “dear” to him “for long years,” and knowingly suggested among his nominees for the INPA’s directors “one of the scientists who had combated the IIHA project” by leaking information to Bernardes in the nationalist anti-IIHA campaign (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001). The concessions of pro-IIHA proponents to the nationalist movement accommodated INPA as a temporary substitute that would give national continuity to IIHA’s international project, and that would ultimately gravitate back toward the IIHA model: “Despite their cooperation, the former IIHA adherents remained unconvinced that Brazil would carry on Amazon research alone, and they correctly surmised that INPA would eventually rely partly on foreign aid after the furor over the IIHA abated.” (Galey 1977:172-173; see Domingues & Petitjean 2005:283-285)
A presidential decree of the Brazilian government in 1952 instituted the INPA, which officially began its operations in Manaus under the CNPq in 1954 (Petitjean & Domingues 2000:289; Maio 2005:123). In contrast to the IIHA’s public-private role and collaboration with private foreign organizations, modeled after UNESCO (theretofore) and the Smithsonian Institute (SI), CNPq “retained juridical control over INPA to assure that the organization’s work would remain under government supervision.” (Galey 1977:161, 172; see Crampton 1972:171-173; Maio & Sá 2000:1008) Compared to the international IIHA, the INPA was a national institute (Petitjean & Domingues 2000:266). Nationalists were strongly, but not overwhelmingly, represented at INPA’s helm. The institute’s initial directors included both the scientist who had offered the anti-IIHA nationalists the everyday resistance of his leaks and a prominent nationalist campaigner against foreign influence in the Brazilian Amazon, Artur Cézar Ferreira Reis. However, Torres was in the INPA council and Fonseca was the organization’s executive leader when it began its work in 1954 (Galey 1977:172-173; Petitjean & Domingues 2000:289; Domingues & Petitjean 2001).

4.6.13. 1954 - 1980s: Inside-Out Advocacy or Implementation

After its formation, the INPA advocated and implemented the governing of Amazonian research mainly, but not solely, within a domestic scale. The INPA pursued such governing from the inside-out, created as it was “in contraposition to the” IIHA (Gama & Velho 2005:218; see Domingues & Petitjean 2001).

INPA’s inside-out operation has continued to pool its national and political resources domestically with technical and financial resources across borders. Partial
reliance on foreign aid “seemed necessary in the 1960s and early 1970s when recruitment of Brazilian scientists and technicians for Amazon research proved particularly difficult.” (Galey 1977:173) In terms of technical resources, by the early 1960s, INPA made “some agreements… for forestry research with the [(U.N.)] Food and Agricultural Organization” (Crampton 1972:57), and “over the years, foreign scientists were welcomed in the Amazon research program under Brazilian authority.” (Galey 1977:173) As for financial resources, “since its inception, INPA’s financial problems [beginning in the mid-1950s] bore out some of the early warnings by Paulo Carneiro and other IIHA advocates that the Brazilian government would provide insufficient funds to carry on unilateral research.” (Galey 1977:173-174, 179) The financial problems “occasionally” brought back into consideration the IIHA’s alleged financially-motivated conquest and its model of foreign funding. As the director of INPA in 1956, the historian and nationalist campaigner Reis resurrected “foreign ‘greed’ (cobiça) for Amazonia… as an explanation for INPA’s difficulties,” and “blamed some of the financial shortages on foreign attempts to frustrate the organization’s work in order to revive the IIHA concept.” (Galey 1977:174, 179; see Gama 2004:151-155) The same Reis would become the governor of the State of Amazonas from 1964 to 1967 and thereafter an honorary president of the National Campaign for the Defense and Development of the Amazon (CNDDA), the outgrowth of anti-IIHA mobilization at the Center of Studies and Defense of the National Petroleum and Economy (CEDPEN) (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:131, 319-323; see Hochstetler & Keck 2007:69-70, 111, 245).

By 1979 INPA would join the U.S.-based World Wildlife Fund (WWF-US) in a research project that to date continues to maintain a long-running and large-scale
transnational cooperation: the originally named Minimum Critical Size of Ecosystems Project. After the conservationist advocate who would lead the research project eventually took his professional affiliation into the state-society revolving door from the WWF-US to the public-private SI, the U.S.-based institution in coalition with INPA through the now renamed Biological Dynamics of Forest Fragments Project moved after him in 1989. In other words, INPA’s institutional collaborator moved from the transnational civic group most closely networked with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and thereby with IUCN’s associated IIHA on to the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, the same Panama-based SI division that IIHA proponents and opponents alike had mobilized (see Bierregaard & Gascon 2001; Gama 2004:156-168).

4.7. LOCAL ISSUE FRAMING

The historiography offers evidence that one string of events in the IIHA-INPA campaign can be process-traced as episodes of local issue framing. The evidence includes sufficient detail to trace the process closely, considering the causal chain mechanism by mechanism.

Only the process-tracing through the model of local issue framing would illustrate at least four episodes that highlight the evolution of how transnational activists portrayed themselves and their cause in the guarded contexts which faced them in Brazil and other Amazonian polities during this campaign. First, the prevalent scholarship would not predict activists making claims upon a given polity from the outside, unless such claims could be construed as either foreign pressure or leverage. On this outside-in mechanism where local issue framing appears to resemble incubation, the two models stand in some
contrast with each other. Whereas the former traces the constructed ideas and identities that transnational activists use to articulate their grievances or demands across borders, the latter characterizes the same actors bringing to bear on a polity that they enter resources both concrete (funds, allies, logistics) and constructed (e.g., ideas and allegiances). Second, even the best academic compendium of available studies would not predict cause-oriented actors themselves being construed by other activists as the foreign pressures against which to block—or defend if the point were to be put in terms of the internalization process. Regarding this blocking mechanism, again local issue framing superficially resembles incubation, but under a closer examination the former is a thoroughly constructed block whereas the latter is much more materially concrete. Third, leading scholarship would not predict that activist communications counter the foreign-pressure constructs of accusing cause-oriented actors—e.g., not even internalization—by means of convergence to find local rather than global resonance—e.g., not even global issue framing or externalization. A sharper contrast between local issue framing and incubation applies at this mechanism of communications and convergence in relation to that of brokerage. In these mechanisms, respectively, the disparity between constructed and concrete is reinforced by the contrast between the extra-organizational ‘marketing’ and the intra-organizational ‘management’ of activist groups. Finally, the leading scholarship available would not predict that in crafting their rebuttal to charges of unpatriotism activists flaunt their national allegiances and nationalist elements of their causes. As for the contrast between the mechanism of frame(r) bridging or transformation in the incubation process and the mechanisms of resource pooling or downward scale alteration, it is the same sharper disparity between
concrete and managerial as opposed to constructed and propagandizing. In short, the
IIHA-INPA campaign could not be fully process-traced without the model of local issue
framing that follows.

4.7.1. Mid-1947 – Mid-1948: Outside-In Claim, Blocking

In a report on a mid-1947 tour of the Amazon with a Brazilian legislative
commission, rapporteur Botelho warned that a claim for the IIHA that arrived in Brazil
from the outside would run into a blockade by the Brazilian state and society. As
mentioned above, Botelho cautioned against the “international” label in the name of the
IIHA: “The name could better have been Institute of the Amazon Hylea, section of
UNESCO, avoiding… nationalist sentiment, which the other name will … evoke. (…) Brazilians… [are receptive to] organizations of cultural or economic assistance which do
not reach the very damaging international aspect, although only in name.” (quoted in
Crampton 1972:94, 96-98, 101). His report advised against framing the IIHA under an
“international” name that would associate the institute with foreign or outsider proposals:
It “recognized the possibility of… nationalist reaction to the Institute because of its
name.” (Crampton 1972:94, 96-98, 101; see also Petitjean & Domingues 2000:278)

The historical scholarship includes evidence of a similar sequence of events from
an outside-in claim to a blocking, between early and mid-1948. A turning point of these
events occurred during an IIHA conference hosted in Iquitos, at the Peruvian Amazon,
over the course of deliberations to design the program of activities for the first year of the
transnational institute. As it turned out, Rivet—the socioenvironmentalist advocate—
served as a replacement for a French representative who did not make it to Iquitos at the
last minute. Moreover, “Rivet ended up presiding over the polemic meeting at Iquitos with the assistance of his friend Torres.” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001) While conference participants discussed a program of IIHA activities for 1948-1949, they noticed that the programmatic agenda that they were considering had come prepared from UNESCO without their input. Moreover, it surfaced during the talks that UNESCO had also contracted scientists ahead of time to carry out a specific IIHA study suggested to the conference participants in the hidden agenda. “The news about the prior contracting of scientists seems to have sounded like a bomb in Iquitos, especially for the Peruvian delegation, which hosted the meeting, and expressed strong desire to have priority in the completion of IIHA activities…” (my translation of Domingues & Petitjean 2001) As a result, program discussions for the first year of the interim IIHA became contested and difficult.

4.7.2. Early 1949: Blocking, Claim Communication and Convergence

Between February and July of 1949, campaigners inside and outside of Brazil gradually began to communicate and converge their claims with their overseas counterparts. Over the first half of 1949 Carneiro sent a memo from Paris to the Brazilian Minister of External Relations in Rio, journalists eventually debated portions of the memo in activist or professional newspapers, and the congressional bulletin printed the memo in full.

Dismissing the alleged threats that the internationality of the IIHA was accused of imposing on the security and sovereignty of Brazil, Carneiro compared the stonewalling directed at the institute with those that had been raised almost a century earlier against the
opening of the Amazon River (Magalhães 2006:115-116, 118). He also dispelled accusations against the IIHA by asserting that the region to which the IIHA was directed encompasses extensive lands in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and “the three Guyanas” in addition to a large portion of the Brazilian Amazon (Magalhães 2006:115-116, 118). Thus, Carneiro claimed that the international disposition of the IIHA had no unpatriotic character nor represented any threat to the sovereignty and security of Brazil (Magalhães 2006:115-116, 118).

Brazil-based journalists and IIHA campaigners communicated replies to Carneiro that converged with the concern in his messages. For example, Albuquerque Melo also set out to defend the IIHA from Bernardes’ blocking. He published an op-ed in April of 1949 contesting the accusation that the IIHA would have been “engineered in a Machiavellian manner by imperialist countries for the domination of the Amazon.” (my translation of quote in Magalhães 2006:119-120) Albuquerque Melo dismissed Bernardes’ rationale as one implying that most treaties among nations were threats and forms of domination, even those instituting international organizations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations (Magalhães 2006:119-120). In particular convergence with Carneiro, Albuquerque Melo also questioned any manipulative interests from imperialist nation-states by highlighting that the IIHA grew out of a Brazilian proposal, and that the Brazilian proponent struggled to secure support for his proposal because many polities considered the institute to be “of strictly regional interest.” (my translation of Magalhães 2006:119-120) The law professor ended his op-ed by rebutting the accusation of “national traitors” that Bernardes pinned on those who designed and signed the treaty of Iquitos (my translation of Magalhães 2006:120).
4.7.3. Early 1949 - Early 1950: Frame(r) Bridging

Already in the memo turned op-ed that Carneiro wrote in early 1949, he bridged the framers of the issue in the IIHA campaign. For the activist to carry out such frame bridging would mean that he linked two or more framers of a particular issue who were congruent but structurally unconnected in identity (Snow et al. 1986:467 as cited in Tarrow 2005:62). Indeed, he fostered congruence through the framer identity of Brazilian patriots for IIHA supporters.

Going beyond simple denials of un-patriotism or treason, Carneiro bridged between framers’ treason and allegiance toward Brazil. Put simply, he did that in two ways. First, he contended that in his time there was no longer a parochial alternative to transnational science, such that what had been a treasonous choice in the past had become an allegiance necessity. Second, Carneiro went on to associate support for the IIHA with the position of those truly from Brazil, and with individuals he had deliberately recruited who were themselves or descended from famously nationalist and politically savvy persons. In the campaigner’s own words,

“in modern times, nothing great and long-lasting can be undertaken in other formats. And it was for thus comprehending it that the true scientists from Brazil immediately mortgaged their support to the project of the Institute of the Amazonian Hylea. Miguel Ozório de Almeida, Henrique Aragão, Costa Lima, Olímpio da Fonseca, D. Heloísa Alberto Torres, Carlos Chagas Filho, Heitor Fróes, Melo Leitão (...) among dozens of others have been the defenders (propugnadores) of this new center of research. Who would deny their patriotism or knowledge; or would suppose them ingenuous puppets of Machiavellian conspiracies?” (my translation of Carneiro as quoted in Magalhães 2006:116, 118, 119)

Among such name dropping, “in clashes for the creation of a scientific institution in the Amazon, Paulo Carneiro mobilized against [his] opponents the [deceased] writer
Euclides da Cunha.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:978) In perhaps the single most legitimizing of all his framer bridging, he also mentioned that the then-general Cândido Rondon supported the project. Carneiro highlighted that Rondon “knows better than anyone his duties as a Brazilian and the problems of the Amazon, setting of his feats and studies during so many years.” (my translation of quote in Magalhães 2006:116-117, 118; see Maio & Sá 2000:978) That Rondon was singled out for his patriotism and Amazonian expertise vis-à-vis the IIHA becomes especially significant in light of that famous explorer’s earlier role. Rondon had been entrusted with leading the conservationist and former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt through the basin decades earlier, during an expedition that had occurred a few years after a scramble over rubber-tapping territory in the Amazon among Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, France, Peru, the United Kingdom and the United States at the turn of the 20th century (see Medeiros 1938:227, 230-232; Hecht & Cockburn 1990:85; Hecht 2011; see also Roosevelt 1914).

By October of 1949, Albuquerque Melo continued the framer bridging trend. He highlighted the comprehensive support that well regarded “Brazilian jurists” gave him (my translation of Magalhães 2006:131-132).

Carneiro and his colleagues bridged the frames of the issue in the IIHA campaign as well. They linked two ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue (see Snow et al. 1986:467 as cited in Tarrow 2005:62). An initial linkage had occurred in January of 1949 as UNESCO sent its director of the Department of Natural Sciences on a visit to Brazil, aiming to resolve the immediate pending business of the IIHA’s interim commission and treaty ratification process. The UNESCO director connected a pre-existing common ground of congruent frames
between IIHA opponents and proponents. In his meetings with the Brazilian diplomatic minister, (resisting) scientists and (activist) journalists, the pro-IIHA official reconciled the anti-IIHA frame of exceptional Brazilian power in the Amazon basin with the pro-IIHA framing of the institute’s scientific potential. He “spoke of the scientific importance of the IIHA” and “reiterated the significance of the city of Manaus,” in the Brazilian Amazon, “as the future scientific center of the IIHA.” (my translation of Maio & Sá 2000:1004) At the turn of 1950, Carneiro connected a pre-existing common ground of congruent frames between IIHA opponents and proponents. The pro-IIHA advocate reconciled the anti-IIHA slogan that claimed the Amazon like the oil “is ours” with the pro-IIHA catchphrase that international cooperation would develop the basin. Carneiro claimed: “Amazonia is ours and for its progress men of good will can cooperate.” (quote in Crampton 1972:134)

4.7.4. 1951: Frame(r) Transformation

The frame bridging of IIHA advocates was sufficiently far-reaching to go on to attain a more ambitious “frame transformation.” For their framing to reach that higher intensity would involve “the planting and nurturing of new values, jettisoning old ones, and reframing erroneous beliefs and ‘misframings.’” (Snow & Benford 1988:188 as cited in Tarrow 2005:62) At least two such frame transformations are documented in the current historiography, and each straddles all three sorts of transformation—novel, abandoning and corrective.

While IIHA supporters had spun their institute as one that would prevent rather than produce foreign threats (Magalhães 2006:114), by 1951 Carneiro went further in
claiming that the institute would strengthen rather than weaken the very nationalist
causes: security and sovereignty. He linked two ideologically congruent but structurally
unconnected frames, reconciling the anti-IIHA charges of insecurity and colonial
subordination with the pro-IIHA calls for transnational cooperation. In a speech
defending the IIHA at the War College (ESG, for *Escola Superior de Guerra*) in Brazil,
Carneiro framed:

“The predominance of international life in the contemporary world comes from
inexorable imperatives. (...) It is an inseparable manifestation of the level of
civilization that we have reached. It does not imply, in any way, a threat to the
integrity or the sovereignty of the peoples. On the contrary, this permanent
reaction of the whole over the parts is the best guarantee of the independence and
the liberty of each country. The danger is not in the intensification of cooperation
and intercommunication that democratic regimes develop, but rather in the
isolationism in which totalitarian States retract, converting themselves in shut jars
disposed to all sorts of virulent cultures. Italian fascism, German nazism and
Russian bolshevism are manifestations of social pathology conditioned by the
rupture of international ties.” (my translation of quote in Petitjean & Domingues
2000:272-273)

In other words, Carneiro framed transnational cooperation as an endeavor that would
strengthen the security and sovereignty of Brazil in the Amazon just as it would have
safeguarded those of the fascist Italy and Nazi Germany recently defeated in WWII.

In the same year, 1951, Carneiro adjusted a similar nationalist framing to resonate
with a diplomatic audience. In an appeal for the Brazilian foreign minister to support the
ratification of the IIHA agreements, he framed the institute as the most authentic
champion of the nationalist cause. He claimed that “the opponents of the IIHA were
actually anti-nationalistic because they lacked confidence in Brazil’s capability,” and “to
support this contention” he relayed the alleged amazement that various ambassadors of
less powerful Latin American nation-states expressed to him over Brazil’s fears of the
IIHA (Galey 1977:171). Carneiro said he had heard such comments in 1950 from Latin American ambassadors stationed in Rio.

4.7.5. 1951 – Mid-1950s: Internal Societal and State Support

Toward the end of this episode series, the local issue framing of Carneiro and his collaborators failed to gain support from Brazilian citizens and congressmen. To detail only the preceding episode, the Brazilian foreign minister “refused to back the [IIHA] project because he realized a large part of the Brazilian public now [in 1951] opposed it.” (Galey 1977:171) Other aforementioned attempts to redefine international disputes (e.g., security, cooperation) in local, national and/or regional language by mobilizing local, national and/or regional symbols (e.g., Rondon, Manaus, “…is ours”) to transform international conflicts failed to sway the Brazilian population and politicians. Indeed, rejection of the IIHA had grown so intense among the public that in late 1950 there had been reports that Bernardes wanted to run for president as a nationalistic candidate in spite of his aged condition, capitalizing “on his popularity as a defender of Brazilian independence in key issues such as the IIHA.” (Galey 1977:160) The candidate who had pursued and won the presidency in late 1950, Getúlio Vargas, himself had done so while exploiting anti-IIHA nationalism even though he had shown “only mild interest in the anti-IIHA movement.” (Galey 1977:160)

4.8. CONCLUSION

Combining the contribution of this study with that of Tarrow (2005) yields a more accurate, comprehensive and reflective examination of the IIHA-INPA campaign. There are three key aspects of this synthesizing contribution: (1) It correctly shows that both
globalism and internationalism empowered transnational activism; (2) it accounts for two modes of transnational activism that are originally conceptualized in this study and would otherwise be excluded from analysis; and (3) it ponders spatial assumptions otherwise implicitly unexamined and underspecified. First, the combined results of the explanatory, causal theory-testing in this struggle show that internationalist interactions between states empower transnational activism to an extent comparable to that of globalist flows between societies or markets. Second, the findings of the illustrative, processual theory-building that combines into the four modes of transnational activism evident in this campaign convey a crucial understanding of the outcome of this IIHA-INPA struggle. Only with the addition of the theory built in this study can one explain how transnational activism turned the IIHA into a transnational institute that simply failed to avoid being replaced by the INPA; that was not inevitably and merely rejected as the wrong project, at the wrong place, at the wrong time in post-WWII Brazil. Third, the combined observations that revisit unexamined premises about the spatial evolution of transnational activism suggest a much more complex trajectory than either the local-to-global trend conventionally assumed or the global-to-local reversal that was apparent above on the sole basis of the processes drawn from Tarrow (2005).

As mentioned halfway through this chapter, the results from testing Tarrow’s (2005) theory alone here—even without testing of extended theory original to this study—rendered as erroneous the postulate that interstate interactions provide a superior and ample explanation for the empowerment of activists. His theory failed to explain observations even in an easy, most-likely case where one would most expect it to hold, if anywhere. Moreover, the testing of newly theorized modes of transnational activism also
suggests a refutation and replacement of any explanation that singles out international interactions between states above global flows between markets and societies. In broadbrush, this chapter suggests a synthesis of globalist and internationalist explanations to be a better alternative than either the former thesis or the latter antithesis.

The addition of the two dual-level, ‘glocal’ process-tracings contributes useful specifications to this meta-theoretical question of global causality. The incubation model reveals a string of ways in which the thickening of global flows between markets and societies encourages transnational activists. First, globalization impacts activists’ cost-benefit and risk-opportunity considerations regarding whether to enter one polity or another, and whether to enter or operate from outside a given polity. The more globalism flows through a given polity, the more it will the lower cost and risk of transnational activism. Therefore, globalization attracts activists to transnational cause-oriented action through this weighing of costs and risks. Second, global openness affects the degree to which polities will resentfully block transnational intervention. Generally, the more flows between markets and societies, the less resentment and thereby the lower the blocks to the institutionalization of transnational activism entering a polity from the outside. Third, globalization generates more opportunities for well-networked, gate-keeping actors to act as brokers who bring together activists inside and outside a given polity. Especially empowering among these global flows are the migrations or shorter-term travels of people connected or mobilized (in)to activism, and the circulation of information relevant to activists through media or other communication technologies. Finally, globalization empowers the transnational pooling of resources that activists mobilize separately in two or more polities. Flows of capital and goods between markets
encourage activists to pool their financial resources. Flows of ideas and information between societies empower them to pool technical resources. Global social flows of people fragment national allegiances and thereby generate opportunities for activists to pool nationalist resources. Flows of people and information facilitate sharing institutional contacts and logistics and thereby encourage activists to pool political resources across borders.

The model of local issue framing reveals a similar if shorter and more qualified causal string through which the thickening of global flows encourages transnational activists. Social globalization is much more empowering than economic globalization for this mode of transnational activism. One set of opportunities is in keeping with the first two globalization impacts considered in the preceding paragraph. Flows of capital and goods between markets do increase the probability that activists will send a claim into a polity from the outside in as well as the likelihood that the said polity will resentfully block the same claim. This encouragement also applies to flows of ideas, information and people between societies. These global social flows generate another set of opportunities for transnational activists. They encourage transnational activism through overseas communications that facilitate convergence, bridging and transformations in localizing frames and framer identities. These localized frame(r)s are more likely to resonate with the polity out of which inbound activism is previously blocked.

As for the processual theory-building in this campaign, the addition of the processes of incubation and local issue framing illustrates how transnational pro-IIHA advocates allowed themselves to be vulnerable and then supportive to spillover mobilization and resistance from other nationalist campaigns over natural resources.
Whereas the processes of externalization and internalization illustrate that the IIHA landed at the wrong place, at the wrong time in post-WWII Brazil, the two processes theorized in this study illustrate that landing misfortunate alone did not determine a campaign outcome in which the INPA emerged and prevailed as a replacement institute. Episodes process-traced through incubation and local issue framing account for activist behavior that knowingly failed to adjust the IIHA to make the institute so much ‘the right project’ as to overcome misfortune in contextual timing and placement. The same process-tracings solve any puzzle over the eventual support that pro-IIHA advocates offered to the creation of the nationalist INPA as a substitute institute, and to the staffing of that organization by defiant scientists whose nationalist and intra-organizational resistance to the IIHA the incubation illustration incorporates into the proper dissenting time and place. Local issue framing highlights that the IIHA’s socioenvironmentalist advocates eventually framed themselves and their causes through the nationalist identities and ideas of their opponents. Incubation illustrates how these socioenvironmentalists gradually propagandized their pro-IIHA communications under nationalist terms, attempted to pool nationalist resources in their pro-IIHA efforts, and ultimately redirected these actions toward advocacy on behalf of the INPA.

Finally, examination of conventional assumptions about the spatial evolution of transnational activism on the basis of combined observations suggests that scholars do not stand on useful premises. If there is any discernible spatial trend in the chaotic spatial evolution of transnational activism during the IIHA-INPA campaign, it is an ambiguous trajectory from one blank quadrant of the extended typology to another. The campaign began with simultaneously externalizing and incubating activism. These would balance
out to place it in the mid-right quadrant, a net space between the respective external-external level at the lower right and the dual-level quadrant at the upper right. The struggle gravitated toward simultaneous activism in the modes of internalization and local issue framing. These would move it toward the upper-center quadrant, a net space between the respective internal-internal level at the upper left and the dual-level quadrant at the upper right. In other words, contrary to assumptions of transitology, the spatial trajectory of the campaign can easily be mapped empirically and the net result is an ambiguous evolution from global cause and ‘transitional’ action to ‘transitional’ cause and local action. The spatial evolution is more complex than the global-to-local reversal that was apparent above on the sole basis of the processes drawn from Tarrow’s (2005) prime scholarship.
5. Case Comparison

The synthesis of theory built in this study and tested from Tarrow (2005) contributes a more accurate, comprehensive and reflective examination of both campaign cases compared here. The comparison of cases in this chapter contrasts observations from the two campaigns on the basis of the degree and kind of support the two cases provide for these three main contributions, each viewed in turn: (1) causal accuracy of explanations in which both globalism and internationalism empower transnational activism; (2) processual completeness and robustness of illustrations in which ten models summarize modes of transnational activism; (3) pre-analytic, or ontological, reflectivity in terms of spatial assumptions regarding the evolution of transnational activism.

First, despite stark differences among the cases, the results of the explanatory, causal theory-tests observed in both campaigns show that internationalist interactions between states and global flows between markets or societies provide comparable opportunities for transnational activism. There is a sharp contrast in terms of the causal evidence that the two cases offer. Whereas the earlier campaign (1868-1941) provides more breadth than depth, the later campaign (1945-1956) offers more depth than breadth. The former mostly examines numerous distinct evolutions of transnational activism through each of the full set of ten explanatory processes in this study; and concentrates on two such chains of causal mechanisms. In contrast, the latter mainly scrutinizes the full set of causal mechanisms along three such explanations; and analyzes single evolutions of transnational activism through four of the ten explanatory processes examined in this study. There is also some contradictory evidence insofar as approximately half of the earlier case provides evidence that relative to internationalism globalism would structure
more opportunities for transnational activism. Taken together, the cases do suggest a comparable causality among globalism and internationalism insofar as the other half of the first case study and the entire second case do point in that syncretic direction.

Second, again despite substantial disparities from one case to the other, the findings of the illustrative, processual theory-building convey that both activist struggles can only be adequately observed after incorporating conceptualization original to this study. There is a similarly sharp contrast in terms of the processual evidence that the two cases offer. Whereas the earlier campaign (1868-1941) provides more breadth than depth, the later contention (1945-1956) offers more depth than breadth. The former case tends to summarize numerous, distinct episode sequences for each of the ten modes of transnational activism traced in this study; and to illustrate numerous, distinct iterations of two such relational dynamics. In contrast, the latter case tends to illustrate the full set of mechanisms along three dynamic interactions; and to illustrate a single iteration of four of the ten transnational modes of cause-oriented action probed in this study. The cases converge in the support that their evidence provides for the processual hypotheses of each of the four processes that this study conceptualizes and for the tentative plausibility of the component series of mechanisms hypothesized along these processes.

Third, despite differences among the two cases, in each campaign the observed spatial evolution of cause-oriented action in transnational relations changes with the addition of activist modes originally traced in this study to those drawn from Tarrow (2005); and follows a much more complex trajectory than the conventionally assumed trend of transitions from local to global proportions or vice-versa. The two cases stand in marked contrast to one another in terms of the spatial evidence of transnationalization
that they provide. Whereas in the earlier campaign (1868-1941) the spatial evolution changes through the addition of four modes of transnational activism to the six that Tarrow (2005) offers, in the later campaign (1945-1956) it changes through the inclusion of two transnational modes of cause-oriented action to two of those that Tarrow (2005) provides. Moreover, whereas the former contributes evidence of a change in the transnationality of these modes of activism from three to five spaces; the latter supplies evidence of an equivalent change from two to three spaces. Finally, whereas in the earlier case a change in the transnationalization of activism with the expansion from six to ten modes decreases spatial chaos, in the later case an equivalent change increases spatial chaos.

5.1. Causal Accuracy

Causally, the empirical observations conducted in two opposite types of crucial case studies form a pattern in that they both support a synthesis of globalist and internationalist explanations as a more accurate alternative than either the former thesis or the latter antithesis. Whereas the bird hat campaign is a hard case for Tarrow’s (2005) prevalent theory, the IIHA-INPA struggle is an easy case: While the ecofeminist campaign revolved around a global (plumage millinery) flow during a wave of globalism, the econationalist struggle centered on international (UNESCO, IIHA) interactions in synchrony with a rise in internationalism.

Where Tarrow’s (2005) theory is tested in the former campaign, the empirical evidence is only consistent with it when observed in isolation from additional evidence that tested the theory conceptualized in this study. In other words, in the bird hat campaign, Tarrow’s (2005) internationalist explanation is consistent with the
observations that materialize when process-traced through his six models themselves; however, this consistency erodes once the same process-tracings are observed alongside equivalent causal tests through two of the models original to this study. Specifically, in the ecofeminist campaign half of the causal processes conceptualized in this study—diversion, radiation and in part incubation (in some episodes)—set the context for Tarrow’s (2005) internationalist opportunity structure, rendering internationalism into a dependent variable of their globalism rather than an independent variable next to globalism. To be sure, this reversing discrepancy between the internationalist antithesis and the evidence from this bird hat case is not as problematic as it might be, given that the campaign amounts to a hard, least-likely test of Tarrow’s (2005) theory. The campaign did revolve around a global (feathered) market between polities including a large share of relatively thin, inconsequential state structures in colonial Africa, Arabia, Asia, Caribbean and Oceania as well as in the postcolonial Americas.

In contrast, where observed in the IIHA-INPA campaign, the internationalist antithesis was in and of itself inconsistent with the empirical evidence of even an easy, most-likely case where one would have most expected it to hold, if anywhere. The results from testing Tarrow’s (2005) theory in the econationalist case rendered as erroneous the postulate that interstate interactions provide a superior and ample explanation for the empowerment of activists in transnational relations.

There was more convergence across the two cases in terms of their evidence in testing the modes of transnational activism that were originally conceptualized in this study. In a partial divergence mentioned above, findings from half of the theory-building tested in the bird hat campaign may elevate globalism above internationalism as a cause
of transnational activist effects. However, findings from the other half of the theory-building tested in the bird hat case converge with the consistent findings from all the theory-building tested in the IIHA-INPA campaign. On balance, campaign empirical observations traced through these causal processes suggest a refutation and replacement of any explanation that singles out internationalism above globalism. On the whole, evidence from the two cases supports a synthetic explanation that includes both globalist and internationalist causalities.

5.2. Processual Scope

Processually, two very different campaigns combine into a pattern insofar as empirical observations conducted in their case studies become more complete after the addition of the illustrative modes of transnational activism that were originally conceptualized here. Whereas the worldwide bird hat campaign at the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century lasted for approximately 70 years and included episodes that can be traced through all ten processes in the extended typology, the more Latin American and European IIHA-INPA struggle lasted a decade and contained episodes traceable through four process types. In the ecofeminist case the most vital contribution that the processual theory-building offers is that in its observations most processes original to this study set the context within which Tarrow’s (2005) models can be more coherently understood. In sharp contrast, the equivalently central contribution of the conceptualized processes used to observe the econationalist campaign is a reverse illustration that shows (un)fortunate circumstances set along the lines of Tarrow’s (2005) processes not to have decisively determined campaign closure. The cases converge in that the insertion of the original processes conceptualized and probed here dramatically enhances scope in the
observations of both campaigns. The enhancement does not simply make the observations more comprehensive. The broader scope is also pivotal in that it infuses theoretical illustrations into analyses that would have otherwise been overshadowed along with defining features of the struggles: gender relations in the ecofeminist campaign and nationalist institutionalization in the econationalist contention. With some complementarity, the cases also converge in the more tentative support that their evidence provides for the plausibility of the component series of mechanisms hypothesized along the four processes which are originally conceptualized here. Observations probed from the earlier and the later campaigns render plausible the sequences of mechanisms that compose the economically and the socially global among these four processes, respectively. In other words, the mechanistic plausibility probes of diversion and radiation in the earlier case complement those of incubation and local issue framing in the later case.

5.3. Accuracy and Scope of Causal Mechanisms

Processually and mechanismically, these two very distinct campaigns instantly highlight the robustness of processes that trace episodes in both cases through consistent pathways of causal mechanisms. Two of Tarrow’s (2005) six processes and two of this study’s four processes trace event series in both campaigns. This case comparison now turns to brief contrasts of how each of these models either drawn from Tarrow (2005) or conceptualized in this study traced events through the causal mechanisms that are observed in both struggles.

Mobilizations observed through the process of internalization are marked by a pair of contrasts within and between the two campaigns. First, there is dissimilarity in
the breadth and depth of internalization accounts. This basic contrast merely reflects differences in the availability of existing data. While the process of internalization sketched three episode series with a varying degree of depth in the bird hat campaign, it fully traced an episode series in the IIHA-INPA struggle. Second, because the theorization of the process (e.g., Tarrow 2005) leaves conceptual scope underspecified, there might be a more fundamental contrast in the degree to which the ecofeminist and econationalist accounts of internalization are consistent with the model and thereby with each other. As mentioned above, in two out of three episodes of internalization in the bird hat case, a nationalist agricultural movement and anti-Italian groups targeted foreign pressures from transnational markets and societies. In the remaining observation from the ecofeminist campaign as well as in the full process-tracing in the IIHA-INPA struggle, groups including labor unions targeted transnational pressures from foreign sources that blended markets, societies and states. These different observations across the two campaigns render internalization into a process that remains even more underspecified than Tarrow (2005) himself acknowledged in theorizing his “scaffolding” and “skeletal” model. With clear implications for the meta-theoretical question of causality, the explanatory consistency between the processes observed in the two cases hinges on the breadth of internalization in relation to foreign or transnational nonstate actors or institutions. Tarrow (2005:79-80) seemingly includes “nonstate actors” as targets of internalization and certainly positions internalization as a loose elaboration. Hence, this research is premised on a conceptual scope that would allow the process to impartially accommodate transnational markets, multinational businesses and
Transnational immigration as transnational institutions or actors from which pressure on domestic actors can emanate.\textsuperscript{117}

Transnational activism observed through the process of externalization consists of much more consistent evidence across the two cases. It is an effect of globalism as well as of internationalism in both campaigns. In the two episodes of the ecofeminist campaign, on the one hand two separate advocates recruited foreign leverage on their own polities through the social flows of migration networks, but on the other they did target that leverage on their states and one of them relied on a foreign state. In the econationalist campaign, a set of advocates also relied on global flows of people to recruit a foreign state into applying transnational leverage on their state. This two-pronged causality that impacts these struggles in a similar manner is evident even when historical records are missing data with regard to global information flows that likely created opportunities for a mode of transnational activism originally described as “information politics.” (see Keck & Sikkink 1998)

Transnational activism that can be traced through the process of incubation was evident in the bird hat and the IIHA-INPA campaign, and shared multiple other patterns associated with their common inclusion. Whereas the process sketched two brief episodes in the former campaign, it fully traced an episode series in the latter struggle. In

\textsuperscript{117} For the theoretical purposes of this study and Tarrow’s (2005), inclusion of nonstate actors into the process of internalization loosens any state-centric connection and attendant selection bias from internationalism to internalization; and opens the process to the possibility of a comparable tie with globalism. Tarrow (2005:79-80) claims that “international pressures can take a variety of forms” and that there is a case of internalization whenever “domestic groups employ contentious politics against international, state, or nonstate actors on domestic ground.” Tarrow also offers a disclaimer in stating that his model of internalization “is intended as a scaffolding on which to develop evidence about the reciprocal interactions among international institutions, national governments, and their citizens,” and that “it offers no specific hypotheses about how different combinations of mechanisms intersect.” In earlier and parallel work, Nelson (2002a:389; see Nelson 2002b; Sikkink 2005) outlines a tie between globalism and a similar pattern of transnational advocacy “in which NGOs protect governmental prerogatives and oppose stronger international authority,” regardless of whether the latter is public or private.
the ecofeminist case incubation was sufficiently robust to occur during a colonial era in which state borders minimized the universe of potential observations. In the econationalist struggle the same process was equally robust to have traced the cause-oriented action of committed activists whose role balanced their position within state agencies. Observations of this longer term mode of transnational activism lasted approximately 11 years in both campaigns despite the duration of one struggle being seven times longer than that of the other. The illustrative process applies to a broad range of circumstances. The sequential mechanisms of the conceptualized model traced an observation of activists incubating from the United States into France in line with the same conceptualized pathway as another observation of activists incubating largely from France into Brazil. The two tracings through these sequences can even be seen as complementary to the extent that where data is missing in one case—i.e. initial mechanisms to trace IIHA-INPA—it is abundantly available in the other—i.e. initial mechanisms to trace the 11-year episode of the bird hat into France.

Lastly, the process of local issue framing also traced parallel transnational activism in the ecofeminist and econationalist campaigns. Whereas the process sketched two brief sets of episodes in the earlier campaign, it traced an event series in the later struggle. The main bird hat activist involved in this mode of transnational activism had much in common with his counterpart in the IIHA-INPA struggle: Above all, their behavior evolved identically as their activism was traced through the process of local issue framing. To specify one result of the pattern, the process-tracing clarifies in the case of each activist his otherwise puzzling nationalism as a foreign-born or -based conservationist who was associated with foreign intervention despite his patriotism. One
of these framers campaigned to continue the tradition of the other, and their episodes stand approximately half a century later.

5.4. Reflectivity of Pre-Analytic Transnationalization

It remains for this case comparison to contrast the two campaigns on the basis of pre-analytic, or ontological, reflectivity in examining spatial assumptions about the evolution of transnational activism. Whereas the observed spatial evolution of activism in one campaign ultimately differed from that of the other, both observations were identical inasmuch as after the causal processes conceptualized in this study were added to Tarrow’s (2005) the observations were no longer the same and were certainly no longer transitological.

On the one hand, the evidence from these campaign cases does not support an underspecified notion of activist globalization in a spatial sense. Transnational cause-oriented action does not simply globalize from local proportions. The spatial globalization of activism evolves with much more complexity and warrants the closer examination undertaken here. In keeping with an implicit premise that pervades studies of transnational activism, particularly those written from the domestic tradition of social movement studies, the assumption is elusive in no small part because of its underspecification. This study has observed that entire campaigns themselves did not evolve from the local to the global level, or even in a reverse trajectory.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the analysis provided in the present study that refutes spatial evolutions alternatively specified—in terms of individual actors, longer term sequels between campaigns, universal trends etc. It would require a larger inquiry that this study recommends in the next chapter to challenge alternative
specifications of this spatial assumption in terms that are more extreme than the moderate trajectories of entire campaigns.

On the whole, the more complex transnationality of transnational activism that both case studies highlight substantiates this dissertation in questioning implicit spatial assumptions of teleological transnationalization that remain conventional in most scholarship. The evidence from both cases does not support a first premise. Activism that moves away from the intranational level cannot be considered activism in transition toward the international level. The assumption is unreliable in these two case studies where common patterns among the dual-level, glocal processes of transnational activism include elements of the international level but should be understood as alternative directions, not way stations to international activism. Observations from both campaigns do not support a second scholarly premise. Different modes of transnational activism generally do not unfold in a standard sequence of stages that are hierarchically stratified from low to high transnationality—from global issue framing, to internalization, to diffusion, to scale shift, to externalization, to coalition formation—nor do their backward or stagnant deviations from this assumed transnationalization conform with that pathway. The premise is unfounded in these two campaign cases where a diverse mosaic of processes through which activism transnationalizes form a chaotic patchwork of spatial change that moves back to the local and sideways to the glocal as much as ahead toward the global, without any consistent trend. The evidence from both cases does not support a third assumption. Contrary to the premise, territorial border crossings are not uniquely determinative and generative of further transnational activism and transformations such as the rise of a global civil society or a rooted cosmopolitanism. The premise is not
useful in these two case studies containing many dual-level modes of activism where reasonably regular, genuine border crossings are held but the transnationality of activism beyond that associated with such modes remains low and with so-called transformations remain shallow. Finally, complementary observations from the two campaigns do not support a fourth scholarly premise, which is the most reflective assumption. Contrary to this relatively explicit premise, underlying structural conditions in and between activists’ polities—e.g., societal globalism, statist internationalism—are formative influences on the timing and type of activist transnationalization. The case studies of the earlier and later campaigns show that globalism and internationalism structured the timing and type of activist transnationalization, respectively—e.g., when activists founded the present-day BirdLife International or the absence of IIHA-INPA activism situated in two of the three dual-level spaces of the typology, at the center and lower-left quadrants.
6. Conclusion

This study coins the phrase ‘activist globalization’ to convey two ideas. First, globalization encourages transnational cause-oriented action. Hence, globalism is activist in that it empowers transnational activism through a directly proportional causal relationship. This dissertation incorporates globalism into a synthetic hypothesis that includes both the globalist thesis and the internationalist antithesis. Second, transnational cause-oriented action does not simply globalize from local proportions. Because each of the four causal processes that this study contributes are at a dual-level or ‘glocal’ frontier, combining the external or global with the internal or local, their mixed attribute types complicate the conventional wisdom that activism globalizes in a simple downstream trend from local to global. The spatial globalization of activism evolves with much more complexity and warrants the closer examination undertaken here.

This study tests meta-theory and builds alternate mid-range theory on the origins and processes of transnational activism, defined as cause-oriented action that connects actors located in two or more nation-states. The international relations (IR) research conducted in this study develops on a typology that most promises to explain cause-oriented action across borders, and that is the leading attempt to answer the main question regarding activism in IR studies today. Tarrow (2005) uses two elements to explain the activism of civic groups, advocacy networks, social movements, and every-day resisters in world politics. Processually, transnational activism is said to consist of six key processes. Causally, these processes are said to occur in direct proportion to internationalism, which Tarrow (2005) defines as “interstate ties” and “multilateral interaction” through inter/trans-governmental “institutions, regimes, and practices.”
Meta-theoretically, he maintains that internationalism offers a superior explanation for the accelerating growth of transnational activism in recent decades, in comparison with globalism as an alternative independent variable. Tarrow (2005:5-8) further restricts Keohane’s (2002:194) rigorous definition of globalism as flows of capital (finance), goods (trade), information, ideas and people. Tarrow posits that internationalist interactions between states enable transnational activism to a greater extent than do globalist flows between societies or markets. The mid-range theoretical component consists of six processes in Tarrow’s explanatory typology. He posits these dynamic and relational sequences of causal mechanisms to be recurrent in transnational activism. Combining mid-range and meta-theory, Tarrow (2005) takes the frequency with which empirical episodes can be traced through the processes as a proxy measure for the dependent variable of transnational activism.

This study argues that Tarrow’s prime IR explanation has not advanced far enough in assembling mid-range theory, which conceptualizes the causal mechanisms of activist processes, and thereby has gone too far in drawing meta-theoretical conclusions about the causal origins of transnational activism. The study conceptualizes four additional processes that further distinguish the typology’s two dimensions: the primary site—international or intranational—of activists’ orienting cause and the primary site of their oriented action. The additional processes mix site attributes into dual-level (external-internal), ‘glocal’ (global-local) quadrants. Moreover, the broader set of processes—which generate the proxy dependent variable—raises anew the relative causal weights of internationalism and globalism. Hence, this study uses the broader set of processes to test the origins of transnational activism. Based on qualitative case-study and
process-tracing methods, it compares and generalizes beyond biodiversity activism in two transnational campaigns that are situated temporally from the 1860s to the 1950s and spatially through inclusion of Brazil-based actors. Data is collected through semi-structured interviews, primary literature, archives, press reports and participant observation.

This study examines the causal impacts of international organizational regimes and of global interdependence ties on transnational activism. The dissertation studies the relationship between transnational state-society conditions—specifically institutionalization of state interactions and globalization of societal flows—and growth in activism across borders. It conceptualizes and traces processes that originate in public and private settings, respectively visible in multilateral treaties or organizations and in multinational persons or businesses. These explanatory processes encourage the cause-oriented action of civic groups, social movements, advocacy networks and everyday resisters in world politics. Leading theory posits that cooperative state regimes create more favorable conditions for transnational activism than do global social and economic flows. This study builds on such theory, moderating short-range imbalances in conventional international relations and comparative social science research on the consequences of regimes and political opportunity structures, respectively. It proceeds to challenge the theory in three ways. Examining a longer history that predates 1945, the dissertation elevates socioeconomic globalism as equally consequential to governmental internationalism. It conceptualizes four processes with causal mechanisms that link activism to globalization—diversion, radiation, incubation and local issue framing. Finally, this study extends an explanatory typology to distinguish the main scale of
activist actions from the locus of activist causes, along a domestic-foreign frontier. The evidence analyzed here refutes the prevalent thesis that interactions between states create more opportunities for transnational activism than do flows between socioeconomic entities. Rather, it supports the syncretic hypothesis of this dissertation that the more national societies globalize and the more states institutionalize their cooperation, the more transnational activism occurs.

Two converse puzzles led this study to two corresponding research questions. Inductively, it is puzzling that transnational activism in issue areas such as biodiversity (i.e. species or ecosystems) cannot be explained through the processes prevailing in theoretical scholarship. Deductively, it is also puzzling that a scholarly typology that has demarcated and explained transnational activism appears remarkably incomplete as seen through such empirical issue areas—failing to note, let alone explain widely documented modes of activism. These two puzzles led to two questions. In what ways, if any, can existing theory be complemented deductively to identify and explain the processes that transnational activists initiate while pursuing their causes around issue areas such as biodiversity? How has a growing wave of transnational activism originated and proceeded, as observed through such issue areas? In answering these questions, the study completed two inseparable efforts. First, it extended the prevailing typology by conceptualizing four processes of transnational activism and two clusters containing these types. Second, it then used the broader set of ten processes to revisit a ranking of two factors considered to cause post-WWII growth in transnational activism—measured in volume of episodes traceable through processes as proxy dependent variables. In recognizing additional modes of activism through these added processes, the causes of
transnational activism may no longer rank as governmental, complex internationalism above socioeconomic globalism. In other words, the first effort begs for the second. Broadening the dependent variable of a transnational activism that is to be explained while adding four processes into its proxy may reshuffle the independent variable(s) that do(es) the explaining. Counter to prevailing explanations that emphasize variation in inter-/trans-governmental internationalism (e.g., Krasner 1995; Young 1997; Tarrow 2005; van der Heijden 2006) or in global environmental degradation (e.g., Mandel 1980; Lipschutz 1992; Princen & Finger 1994), variation in socioeconomic globalism may be a comparable cause of directly proportional change in transnational activism. The study reviewed what causes have an effect on transnational (environmental) activism, and specifically process traced any such impact by a potential cause that has been suggested but not directly considered (e.g., Wapner 1991/1996a; Korzeniewicz & Smith 2001; Newell 2001b; Broad 2002; Conca 2002a; Haufler 2003): socioeconomic globalization—growth in flows of information, people and commerce across continents. The empirical analysis considered transnational biodiversity campaigns involving Brazil-based activists.

6.1. Generalization

This section offers a preliminary analysis of additional evidence to generalize beyond the two cases compared thus far in this study. Due to space constraints, that preview focuses on the theory-building component of this study rather than the theory testing element. However, it is worth including a brief disclaimer that generalizes the results of global causalities observed above while Tarrow’s (2005) models of international causality were tested.
6.1.1. Theory-testing

It is not clear how even those six processes are necessarily more internationalist than globalist. Global issue framing is inspired by an analysis of the “marketing of rebellion” in which global information flows through the media are a decisive encouragement for transnational activism (Bob 2005). Internalization, as scrutinized in chapter 5, is a particularly explicit process in terms of its unnecessary penchant for internationalism. For example, the campaign on rural labor and peasantry listed above in the discussion of case selection in chapter 1 would include a test of Tarrow’s (2005) causal explanation for internalization the results of which seem to be at least as challenging as were those of the two campaigns analyzed in this study. A process of diffusion that is empowered by global flows between societies is no longer an academic abstraction and might even itself dispense with the internationalist antithesis in light of current trends with global communications that have been diffusing protest across the Arab world. Scale alteration is much more responsive to globalism than internationalism when it occurs along the mechanisms of incubation, as was shown above and is shown again at the end of this chapter. Externalization was originally theorized with more attention to the social flows of not only information but also people, and the campaign on the abolitionist Amazon that is also listed above in the case selection discussion includes a telling occasion when immigrant abolitionists used the non-state, social leverage of immigration itself as opposed to intergovernmental organizations or foreign governments. Finally, the group of scholars who originally inspired Tarrow (2005) to attribute coalition formation to internationalist causality have since revisited their earlier research and admitted to having grossly underestimated global economic flows (O’Brien 2008).
In turning to the four processes conceptualized in this dissertation, this study can briefly generalize the answer to its question of causality—in all the ten modes of cause-oriented action examined here—through network-situated interview data from contemporary transnational activists. The observations of staff with four representative conservationist groups, which figure among those most central in a comprehensive network, offer an illustration of the data that this study collected in more than 30 interviews. As described in more detail at the introduction of this study, the preliminary network map despects collaborative relations among conservation groups inside Brazil and counterparts across borders.

The separate impressions of these activists themselves contrast the transnational relations that empower them: interactions between states and/or flows between markets or societies. According to two interview subjects, compared to international interactions, global flows offer “even more” or “much more encouragement”—in the words of each in turn. Two other interviewees offered more qualitative contrasts of the internationalist and global causality that they have observed. One interview subject ascertains state relations to “offer devices that are important to legitimate” activism. The same person reflects on market flows: “Business exporters become more vulnerable to external consumers; and transnational businesses also help” transnational activism. This interviewee put emphasis on social flows of people and information: “It would be impossible to operate a [transnational] NGO without these relations. It is indispensable.”

Another interview subject weighs how states, markets and societies empower cause-oriented action in transnational relations: State conditions

“helped to set the agenda initially. However, [encouragement] increasingly [comes] mainly from the market, as in responsible products. To certify... Cargill
or McDonalds..., inbound foreign groups like Greenpeace and WWF seek Brazilian domestic groups like the Amazon Environmental Research Institute ([IPAM, for Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia]) etc. Social conditions are important. Even the secretarial staff [in Brazilian NGOs] took accounting courses [abroad]. The social, economic and governmental [encouragements] vary from case to case, however governments are running a bit late in the case of biodiversity.”

According to the reflections of the average subjects interviewed to generalize this study, both international and global relations create opportunities for their transnational activism, and if they were forced to boil their encouragements down to one sort of relation most would actually lean on the side of globalism.

6.1.2. Theory-building: Diversion

Two abolitionist campaigns listed above in the case selection discussion of chapter 1 include telling examples of how well diversion generalizes. First, in the mid-19th century a confrontation between U.K. abolitionists and slave traders over transnational slave trafficking diverted after the suppression of trafficking into the United Kingdom, but not as yet in Brazil or Cuba where sugar producers competed with their counterparts in the then U.K. Caribbean. The following historiography describes the height of reconciliation between abolitionist activists and protectionist interest groups:

“Thus the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society… in spite of their earlier hostility to the West Indian planters, showed themselves consistently willing to make common cause with them whenever planter interests happened to coincide with those of Negroes still held in slavery outside the [U.K.] Empire. (…) But in spite of the incongruity of having two groups of this sort working together, … [t]he sheer grotesqueness of this alliance[,]… the alliance was formed in practical politics… The interest of abolitionists in protecting the Cuban and Brazilian Negroes, even at the cost of aligning themselves with their late enemies, is illustrated by the origin of the petitions opposing free trade.” (Rice 1970:410-411)

“Their [abolitionists’] response to proposed [lowering] equalization of the sugar duties [on Brazilian and Cuban enslaved produce] was to move into alliance with their old West Indian enemies, on the grounds that sugar was a special commodity set outside the normal operation of the laws of international trade by its
importance for the Latin-American slave systems. (...) In the years before equalization, however, the anti-slavery societies had lent the West Indians a high moral argument in favour of protection. This was undoubtedly a factor in enabling the West Indians to retain their differential as long as they did. (...) Because of interest in the Negro slave... the abolitionist response to the Sugar Acts was to exchange their usual free-trade alliance for friendship with their traditional enemies in the West India interest.” (Rice 1970:418)

Second, a subsequent confrontation between U.S. activists and industry regarding U.S. regulation to abolish slavery itself diverted into an alliance of the two groups to pressure—both directly and through the U.S., Peruvian, Bolivian and neighboring governments—the Brazilian government to change its regulation of the Amazon. Activists anticipated that the U.S. abolition regulation would have transnational market effects on the competitiveness of U.S. trade and investment in the Amazon; and mainly due to these market effects they joined their legitimacy resources with the material resources of industry to pressure the Brazilian government to open the Amazon River and its tributaries to foreign settlement, commerce and navigation.

6.1.3. Theory-building: Radiation

Two of the campaigns listed above in the case selection discussion of chapter 1 include equally telling illustrations of how well the process of radiation generalizes to trace other cases of transnational activism. Whereas a contemporary case includes well-known contemporary efforts of activists to certify or label Brazilian fuel ethanol exports or investments on the bases of criteria such as labor standards in sugarcane production (van Dam et al. 2008), a much earlier counterpart of this pattern is evident in historical data from an abolitionist campaign:

“The [1840s’] plan of installing British inspectors on each plantation in Cuba and Brazil, stamping each hogshead of sugar as free or slave produce, worked out by John Murray of the Glasgow Emancipation Society, was not as workable as its author imagined.” (Rice 1970:411-412)
6.1.4. Theory-building: Local Issue Framing

A contemporary set of biodiversity campaigns listed above in the case selection discussion of chapter 1 includes three telling examples of how well the process of local issue framing generalizes beyond the cases analyzed in this study. First, while Chico Mendes and other rubber tappers in Amazonian Brazil faced a domestic block in response to the foreign leverage that their claims collaborated to bring into Brazil from the outside, they emphasized their role as nationalist defenders of the Amazon. They framed in line with the econationalist CEDPEN and CNDDA, which emerged with the facilitation of the IIHA-INPA campaign. Mendes used the newsletter of the econationalist CNDDA itself to confront and transform charges that he had committed treason against Brazil as a leader of the well-known transnational advocacy network that externalized his claims to multilateral development banks. He framed his activism as part of the CNDDA’s campaign to defend the Brazilian Amazon, in both the environmentalist and nationalist senses. Mendes went further than simply claiming not to have betrayed the nationalist cause. No earlier than posthumously as it turned out, he transformed his response to the accusation of and threats for treason into a claim of his long-standing commitment to Brazilian nationalism in the Amazon. Mendes appropriated for himself and for his activist group not only direct nationalist credentials through their participation in the CNDDA’s aforementioned campaign “in Defense of the Amazon” over the preceding decades, but also intergenerational nationalism through the pro-Brazil role of his rubber-tapping predecessors at the turn of the 20th century during the aforementioned scramble over rubber territory in the Amazon among Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, France, Peru, the
Second, while indigenist activists faced a domestic block in response to the similar claims they externalized and then brought back into Brazil from the outside, they emphasized the role of indigenous peoples as defenders of Amazonian species from foreign biopirates. After the Brazilian government arrested indigenous leaders and anthropologist under charges of foreign interference, indigenist activists framed in line with the resisting scientists during the IIHA-INPA’s campaign (see Conklin 2002; see also Conklin & Graham 1995; Conklin 1997).

Finally, countless foreign environmentalist groups have promoted images of both sets of such ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ peoples as a shields against outside-in blocks that they would otherwise encounter in the postcolonial world (see e.g., Chapin 2004). Rubber tappers and indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon are only some of the best known among other localizing framer identities that European, North American and Japanese environmentalist activists have deployed elsewhere in the tropics.

6.1.5. Theory-building, Theory-Testing, Conceptualization, Plausibility Probe: Incubation

The same contemporary set of biodiversity campaigns listed above in the case selection discussion of chapter 1 also includes episodes that illustrate at once how well the theory-building, theory-testing, conceptualization and plausibility probe reported above for the process of incubation generalize beyond the two cases examined in this study. Hence, this section reports these episodes as illustrative evidence that the overall processes theorized in this dissertation can trace the causality of episodes and impact tests of the alternative internationalist hypothesis (externalization in this example) in other
campaigns even as their conceptualized sequence of mechanisms tentatively conforms to relational dynamics probed in campaigns well beyond those of the case studies analyzed here. Fortuitously, the same familiar features of this particular illustration that facilitate the comprehension of a concise overview also give a sense of some of the legacies through which the two historical campaigns fully examined in this study shape transnational activism at the present time.

In mechanism ‘A’, one of the comparisons that activists make is whether to advance their cause through one polity or another, for example Brazil or Bolivia. They also compare whether to address their issue between or within polities; in other words, from outside or inside the polity that they compare favorably: for instance between the United States and Brazil or mostly within Brazil.

To generalize as well as improve on the illustration of this mechanism afforded through historical records, there is room within the bounds of space constraints to briefly process trace contemporary events that involve transnational activism specifically analyzed in the two earlier campaigns explained above. That cause-oriented action across borders involves BirdLife International (BI) and advocacy networks revolving around the National Institute of Amazon Research (INPA).

At the turn of the 21st century, BI decided to enter Brazil in an activist episode that conforms to a cycle of this mechanism in which activists make both comparisons, according to interviews conducted as part of this study. The civic group ranked the polity as key in comparison with all other polities—first worldwide in terms of threatened biodiversity and second in biodiverse endowment. Among other transnational NGOs “BirdLife International and Conservation International identified priority areas in
Northeast Brazil and asked themselves how they would get their feet in that area given that they were not from Brazil or northeast Brazil,” eventually concluding that given a higher risk and a difficult cost-benefit it made more sense to invest together through an unusually unified collaboration that became the “Murici Pact.” In addition to its conservationism in the Murici area, which the American Bird Conservancy estimated to be the highest priority for bird conservation in the Western Hemisphere, BI planned to carry out conservation in another Brazilian location to hedge its risks in entering Brazil.

A few decades earlier, in the late 1970s, WWF-US reconsidered an initial request it had made to the Brazilian government for authorization to conduct a project in Amazonian Brazil from outside the polity. In effect, the civic group recalculated its comparison of whether to advance its cause from outside or inside Brazil after receiving and heeding a broker’s “sage advice to reformulate the proposal as a joint effort between INPA and WWF-US” rather than as the initially-characterized “foreign expedition.” (Bierregaard & Gascon 2001:7-8; see Gama 2004:156-168) Despite this subtle institutional attempt to avoid outside-in conservationism through the WWF-US collaboration with INPA, the change accelerated approval of the ‘joint effort’ but would not suffice to pool an external packet of financial and technical resources with an internal set of national and political resources. To the extent that the project was eventually perceived as “a North American scientific base in the Brazilian Amazon” (Gama 1997), it still moved along to a phase that can be traced through the next mechanism (‘B’) of transnational activism from the outside in:

“[The project’s] absence from the INPA campus was seen by some as symptomatic of [its] lack of integration with the scientific community at INPA, and more broadly in Brazil itself. This image problem has plagued [the project] almost continuously, but it eased somewhat in recent years when [it] moved to
headquarters on INPA’s campus.” (Bierregaard & Gascon 2001:7-8; see Gama 1997; 2004:156-168)

In mechanism ‘A,’ the impacts of global market and societal flows on cost and risk favor entering a globally interdependent polity compared to another polity that is less globalized, and favor entering that more globalized polity rather than working from the outside. It is no wonder that contemporary transnational activists interviewed in this study voiced such statements as: Global “communications have revolutionized our work” and to a lesser extent so has transnational transportation.

A similar causality occurs at mechanism ‘B’ to the extent that more global market or social flows also empower activists to work from the outside of a given polity as opposed to not at all. For instance, in the wake of 1849 during the abolitionist Amazon campaign, the forty-niner mass migration route from the U.S. east to west coasts along the Brazilian coastline and around the southern tip of South America consolidated operations in Brazil that had long faltered in earlier attempts of an inbound U.S. civic group. An example of the same encouragement a hundred years later was traced above: the graduate studies of the main activist in the transnational advocacy network that attempted to establish a pan-Amazonian institute in the post-WWII years.

Contemporary transnational activists interviewed in this study described the impact of globalism on mechanism ‘C,’ the backlash or blockage mechanism. One interviewee said that halfway through the 20th century a reduction in economic globalism through “import substitution industrialization created a nationalist mentality” in Brazil, and another offered more recent illustrations of how global flows affect “xenophobia.” As traced through the post-WWII campaign, the foreign direct investment and transnational production of (petroleum) multinationals generated nationalism around
natural resources that proved sufficiently long-lasting for a transnational activist to reflect as follows in an interview for this study. More than two decades later when WWF began to work in Brazil as a foreign entity it faced a permanent campaign opposing the violation of sovereign autonomy in the Brazilian Amazon. In order to gain trust and overcome a backlash or blockage, WWF decided not to own any property of its own in the Amazon basin. To quote the activist about a tactic that continued until at least the eve of 2010, WWF “do[es] not own any square foot of land [in Brazil], insisting on this for a very simple reason, a fundamental issue of sovereignty, in order not to let it be said that [it] ha[s] any special interest.”

One transnational activist interviewed for this study illustrates the shorter causal pathway that skips from mechanism ‘A’ to ‘D,’ considering how the earlier assessment of cost-benefit and risk-opportunity shapes the later brokerage: A larger transnational NGO “only goes to intergovernmental conferences to pursue pre-defined, certain positions and with little space for chance or surprising encounters. It is a high cost to participate in these conferences to pursue a 10 percent chance of an [overseas] partnership emerging.”

By mechanism ‘D,’ the brokerage mechanism, a wide range of transnational activists interviewed for this study deemed internationalism less encouraging than globalism. They did voice that intergovernmental summits or conferences offer opportunities for NGOs from different countries to meet each other in parallel forums. However, to quote again: “These opportunities encourage smaller NGOs to meet without the mediation of the big international NGOs or BINGOs. These opportunities also tend to be more encouraging for NGOs that collaborate with charities or foundations.
Intergovernmental organizations encourage circumstantial and momentary opportunities.”

Another interviewee considered the empowerment that globalism offers to a phase of cause-oriented action across borders that is traceable through mechanism ‘D’:

“The impact of economic globalism on this sort of [transnational activism] varies. In one example, the activities of an English business in Brazil favored joint work between [a Brazilian NGO] and [an U.K. NGO]. These market conditions encouraged a convergence [of the Brazilian and U.K. activist group] that would not happen without them. The social component of globalism also encourages or strengthens transnational activism through the transnationalization of personal contacts.”

Transnational activists interviewed for this study also voiced reflections that amount to observations of how globalism empowers mechanism ‘E,’ resource pooling such as the joint mobilization of financial and national between actors respectively outside and inside a polity hosting incubation. One interviewee who spoke about the pooling of financial resources considered economic globalism “extremely healthy... as seen through [a Brazilian multinational] that changed its demeanor to move beyond mere donations in part due to its transnational economic insertion.” Other activists expressed a similar view of global economic empowerment to joint financial mobilization when discussing resource pooling between a Brazilian NGO and a foreign NGO through a project with another multinational business. As for the pooling of nationalist resources, it can be illustrated through the experience of the NGO Aliança da Terra based in the Brazilian Amazon. A ranch manager and U.S. military veteran from Texas established the NGO Aliança in the Brazilian Amazon after moving to Brazil with a Brazilian woman he had met while they were both students in Texas. The very name Aliança da Terra is a pun that emphasizes not only an “alliance of the land” between land owners and
environmentalists, but also the wedding band that is highlighted in the logo of the civic group. Aliança might have been a target of the same suspicions that have been directed at other incoming foreign NGOs in Amazonian Brazil. However, the NGO has been able to avoid suspicion in large part due to the Brazilian governmental, producer and NGO networks in which it managed to connect itself with the encouragement of the transnational spouses’ South American relatives, who have long been influential cattle breeders and ranchers in Brazil. The Aliança allied itself to the government of the State of Mato Grosso in the Brazilian Amazon, to Brazilian NGOs, and to Amazonian producers. The yellow and green colors on the logo of the Aliança allude to the association’s Brazilian nationality through marriage as well as to reconciliation between gold production and green conservation. The example of Aliança da Terra, the wedding band of the land, illustrates that the more social globalism, the more dual nationals and multinationals there are through birth, marriage or other interactions that fragment personal identities or allegiances and thereby empower pooling of nationalist resources.

The interview data collected for this study includes similar remarks from transnational activists on the encouragement that globalism offers to the pooling of technical and political resources between actors respectively outside and inside a given polity experiencing incubation. Potential activists who travel overseas from the shores of the North Atlantic Ocean to do their graduate fieldwork in polities like Brazil facilitate pooling the technical resources they bring to the field with the political resources they acquire while on the ground of inbound incubation. Potential activists who make the reverse trip to the (Northern) West as international students from polities such as Brazil create opportunities to pool the political resources they bring from their place of origin.
with the technical resources they acquire while abroad. It is little wonder that an activist said: “Social flows of people are the most consequential” for this mode of activism. In this vein, another activist specified further: “Migration for study is where most of this flow occurs.”

Another illustration of how global relations empower the pooling of external financial and technical resources with internal national and political resources incidentally also updates two episodes traced above. This illustrative event continues a series from the IIHA-INPA campaign explained in chapter 4 as well as the attempt to avoid outside-in conservationism through the INPA - WWF-US collaboration exemplified above. Under the national and political auspices of the INPA, WWF-US and eventually the Smithsonian Institution managed to enlist Amazonian visits by such otherwise-suspect figures as worldwide media icons and approximately one fourth of U.S. legislators into the project’s technical expeditions and fundraising ventures. Over the two-year period from 1987 to 1989 alone the project “brought more than 7 percent of the U.S. Senate, including Al Gore, for an overnight stay in the rainforest” that showcased tropical rainforest conservation in a first-hand way that moved such efforts “from the distant and theoretical to the real world for these policy makers.” (Bierregaard & Gascon 2001:6, 10-11; see Gama 2004:165-166) The project pooled “dozens of Brazilian and foreign legislators and government officials” into its transgovernmental camps within the societal context of an outreach through the media that irreversibly inscribed deforestation images of rainforest fragments or ‘islands’ in the minds of millions of U.S. residents (Bierregaard & Gascon 2001:6; see Gama 2004:165-166). These global flows between societies included media coverage of the project in major
newspapers, magazines and television networks in the United States and elsewhere as well as project visits by television, cinema and music celebrities such as Walter Cronkite, Tom Cruise and Bianca Jagger (Gama 2004:165-166).

The same U.S.-Brazilian collaborative project also offers a contemporary illustration of how the incubation that global relations empower complements existing analyses of the internationally-encouraged externalization. Global flows along the project’s societal lines encouraged not only the resource pooling in this incubation mode of transnational activism, but also an externalization mode of transnational advocacy in which activist networks managed to recruit donor state officials into applying leverage on states receiving multilateral development assistance precisely in the late 1980s. Certainly, millions of concerned constituents in U.S. society were a source of encouragement for those U.S. legislative and executive elected officials whose leverage proved decisive in the well-known transnational advocacy network that revolved around environmentalist groups in Washington as well as rubber tappers and indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon. Moreover, one of the original scholars who first conceptualized this externalization—as a boomerang pattern—that transnational advocacy networks leveraged against such issues as Amazonian deforestation has since implied a similarly global empowerment at the Brazilian side of such networks. As Margaret Keck has recently clarified, relatively more domestic modes of environmentalism that include partly transnationalized activism tantamount to incubation have been more consequential in empowering environmentalism in (Amazonian) Brazil than the foreign leverage of transnational advocacy networks.\textsuperscript{118} Keck and colleague also conclude that continuous

\textsuperscript{118} Keck and Hochstetler (2007:30, 58) specify global flows of people connected to INPA’s collaboration with U.S. environmentalists.
modes of activism not unlike incubation, with its capacity-building inclination, have prepared environmentalists to be able to take advantage of occasional opportunities for externalization (see Keck & Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler & Keck 2007:30, 58; see also Hochstetler 2002; Steinberg 2003). In short, once again global impacts on transnational activism through the causal process of incubation were no less substantively significant and were perhaps more direct than international impacts through the externalization process.

A contemporary interviewee consciously echoed fellow transnational activists while describing the impact of globalism on a campaigning phase that mechanism ‘F’ could process-trace with its conceptualization of a downward scale alteration in which activism becomes nationally assimilated or naturalized. With respect to a Brazilianization of biodiversity conservationist groups, these activists ascertained: “the principle is the same as the one that leads transnational businesses to establish their multinational branches in different countries, but the purposes are different.”

Another interviewee described a contemporary change in the relational dynamics of transnational activism that is traceable as mechanism ‘G,’ which conceptualizes a turn when cause-oriented action evolves to advocate or implement domestic governing in polities such as Brazil from the inside-out. The person used the experiences of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to express a trend that conforms to this pattern of domestic consolidation and role reversal in foreign relations. According to this contemporary conservationist activist, at one point while the transnational character of the civic group survived such that the TNC headquarters in the United States, the TNC in Central America, the TNC in South America and TNC offices elsewhere all still operated under
the motto that there is “only one TNC in the whole world,” there was a substantial Brazilianization of operations in and beyond Brazil. In the words of this interview subject: Initially “the U.S. model applied in the Brazil Program did not work, adapted itself and later spread itself to other countries. The exchange is increasingly two-way as in the case of the Working Landscapes program [that transnationalized from Brazil]. (...) TNC and other [foreign groups] have realized that they have to do more work from the inside [in Brazil], due to the existence of mature interlocutors.”

In short, a contemporary set of biodiversity campaigns listed above in the case selection discussion of chapter 1 includes episodes along the lines of activist incubation that illustrate at once how the theory-building, theory-testing, conceptualization and plausibility probe provided in the two case studies in this dissertation hold the potential to generalize well beyond these two contentions.

6.2. Implications: Theoretical, Methodological, Substantive and Practical

The research problem examined in this study carries a theoretical implication for three classic variables that have debated each other for at least a half century as units of analysis across all sorts of questions in the study of international politics: market, society and state. Social scientists have begun to apply these three variables to the new question about what conditions encourage transnational activism. The answer to this particular question will tilt the equilibrium among the market, society and state variables in that larger debate about what unit of analysis causes most other changes in transnational relations. In response to unexamined theses that simply asserted a decisive encouragement from globalization to “global activism,” the statist side began this new round of the debate and has prevailed until now. Leading theory argues that international
interactions between states create more favorable conditions for transnational activism than do global flows between markets or societies. This study contributes a synthesis to this polarized exchange, a long-needed contribution in which the statist explanation is only part of the story (Pinto 2010; contrast e.g., Krasner 1995; Wapner 1996; Young 1997; Tarrow 2005).

This dissertation also carries a theoretical implication for students of environmental studies and geopolitics who may be predisposed to deem biophysical environments or resources to be comparable to markets, societies and states in their impact on transnational environmentalist activism. Although this study did not consider territory as a fourth possible explanatory unit of analysis, it did not dismissively neglect it as entirely inconsequential. Whereas the dissertation did not dismiss biophysical causality out of hand, it merely incorporated biophysical components that fit under the umbrella of socioeconomic globalism. This treatment followed two key lessons learned at the intersection of environmental studies and the social sciences over the last three decades, and now returns its own lesson for each of these two research junctions.

First, a consensus in comparative, crossnational social science research on ‘relative deprivation’ points out that while environmental degradation is everywhere, activism is not. Scholars in environmental studies tend to recognize environmental degradation as more abundant than the activism that one might casually expect to follow it. Hence, this alternative biophysical hypothesis was by and large respectfully ignored in this study despite case studies that revolved around transnational environmentalist activism. This premise transposed from comparative studies became an implication of
this study for the transnational scholarship on environmental activism. The transposed lesson is to question assumptions with respect to the effects of deprivation on activism.

Second, the order of research has tended to matter more than the usual with a recent acceleration of growth in social movement studies that focus on transnational activism. Lumping together an exceptional biophysical interdependence with a socioeconomic interdependence under globalization has already led social movement theorists to dismiss findings associated with both as tainted by biophysical ‘anomalies’ that owe to the uniqueness of ecological flows that are not present in non-environmental activism. This was precisely the fate that recent studies of ‘global civil society’ and ‘world civic politics’ suffered. At this point, biophysical and socioeconomic arguments will both be more compelling if they are split apart from each other. This is especially wise for studies—such as the present one—that aim to understand a spatial globality or transnationality of activism that is already sufficiently complex even without unearthing how the territoriality of environmental degradation (or international borders themselves) relate to that space. This premise became an implication of this study for that scholarship on transnational (environmental) activism. The lesson is to question assumptions regarding the effects of environmental issues on transnational (environmentalist) activism.

In light of both considerations, the definition of globalism that this study adopted from Tarrow is actually stricter than Keohane’s (2002:194)—who blends biophysical interdependence into it—and one general lesson this holds for environmental studies is that whether or not one attributes causality to environmental deprivation needs not be a binary, all or nothing, question. As mentioned above, this stricter definition of
socioeconomic globalism does include biophysical elements that are not themselves transboundary. For example, in the first mechanism of incubation activists compare biophysical degradation within one country to degradation within others. When BI began to work in Brazil at the turn of the 21st century it seems to have done so to conserve habitats that are not near borders for endemic birds that do not migrate abroad. The closest thing to transnational biophysics here comes from either the global information flows of environmentalists who compare the risks of extinction within one country to those within others, or from the global economic flows of birds that humans smuggle abroad for sale as pets. Neither episode is quite a transboundary flow or influence of an environmental substance—as would be a transboundary migratory species. Nonetheless, both causalities are observed under socioeconomic globalism.

This study carries implications for scholarly knowledge of transnational regimes, global governance and global governors—the broader, public and private, line of inquiry that the research program on international regimes eventually evolved into (see Haufler 1993; 2003; 2010; Rosenau 1997). The present dissertation offers two lessons to the disproportionately large literature on international regime effectiveness: to draw the boundary of actors that regimes affect with more inclusiveness so as to capture regime effects through non-state or state-networked entities; and to trace causality through consistent pathways of “thick explanation” that strike a better empirical-theoretical balance than either ‘thick description’ or ad hoc explanation. The same lessons apply to the scholarship on ‘epistemic communities’ that emerged out of the research on largely interstate regimes, albeit here societal flows apart from interstate interactions demarcate the ‘impact assessment’ of transnational expert networks including ‘militant’
ornithologists, other ecologists and graduate students. This study also informs underspecified claims that globalization generates decentralized governance, mapping with more temporal and spatial precision how global ‘neo’-medievalism ‘blurs’ the boundary of the domestic-foreign frontier.

This study extends a critique of the narrowly-defined analysis of international regimes. Although it does redirect that critique toward Tarrow’s (2005) transposition of such analysis into the examination of transnational activism, none of this dissertation implies any intent to set up a straw argument for easy dismissal—particularly when that alternative hypothesis crowns an admirable career full of similarly seminal contributions. The case chapters did allude to the “dragons” that Susan Strange (1982) warned scholars against in her own seminal critique of international regime analysis. Joining her tradition, the two case studies examined here show that Tarrow (2005) transposes at least two “dragons” from international regime analysis. Strange (1982) has long recognized inquiry on international regimes as being “rooted in a limiting, state-centric paradigm,” and compressing a “kaleidoscopic reality” into too “tidy [a] general theory encompassing all the variety of forces shaping world politics.” This study extends the lessons of the alternative analytical approach that she suggests, beyond international regime analysis. Strange (1982) calls for analysts of transnational relations “to pay attention to… overlapping bargaining processes, economic and political, domestic as well as international.” This study echoes that call in the context of transnational activism.

Evidently, this study cross-fertilizes distinct theoretical traditions of research on transnational relations in a manner that can inform similar efforts. In brief, the dissertation draws on Strange’s “new realism” as well as on neoliberal institutionalism,
given its concern with transnational (em)power(ment) and global market causality as well as with multilateral causality and global social causality. The same can be briefly said of the integration of rationalism and constructivism in this study, given the logics of consequences and appropriateness that lie along each of the four causal models conceptualized and probed in this study.

An implication from a historical contingency of transnational activism—which emerged inductively in this study—is relevant for another eclectic combination of distinct theoretical traditions in comparative or cross-national research. In terms of social movement theory, the recurrence of modes of transnational activism that not only reemerge along predictable processual patterns, but also often grapple with formative legacies from precursor campaigns implies that activist repertoires and performances are not necessarily more common domestically than transnationally (see Tilly 2008). Rephrased in terms of new institutionalist perspectives, this historical contingency of transnational activism offers the lesson that the sophisticated analytical tools polished in the theoretical traditions of new institutionalism can be as useful in the examination of such cause-oriented action as they increasingly are in highlighting informal politics at the global south. Whichever theoretical language one might use to describe this weight and habituation of history, the various elements of centennial continuity from one or two campaigns to the next reach far past specific scripts such as the BirdLife International, Goeldi Museum or sovereignty in the Brazilian Amazon. The most general analogue of this same patterned history safeguards this study from being misunderstood to imply that any activist empowerment automatically slips into ahistorical, epochal ‘shifts’ in power; or that any global-local activism automatically slips into an ahistorical, epochal ‘fusion’
of the domestic-foreign frontier. Hence, this study has implications that validate social movement theory on repertoires or performances and new institutionalist theories on path dependence.

This study carries one final set of theoretical implications for broader research that examines whether transnational activism is anti-systemic in at least three senses. The first strand of this broader research situates transnational activism in relation to an international order built on the bedrock of state sovereignty; the second to a transnational civil society based on national identity and allegiance; and the third to a global capitalism that revolves around market economies (see e.g., Pinto 2010).

In terms of research on state sovereignty in international relations, an exploration of this dissertation implies that the empowerment from states to activism highlighted here in turn has its own distributive impacts on the transnational balance of power among nation-states. An exploration of this study that aimed at such a distinct purpose of understanding how activist effects in turn impact state sovereignty would glean a proposition with an ambiguous combination of accommodation and challenge (in)to state sovereignty. Only a third of the modes of transnational activism that this study incorporates from Tarrow’s (2005) processual synthesis have immediately obvious if opposite implications for state sovereignty (see Sikkink 2005). Moreover, unlike Tarrow’s externalization and internalization dynamics, the modes of cause-oriented action between nations synthesized in this study have more complicated implications for the transnational balance of power than any dichotomous weakening or strengthening of the prescriptive and descriptive power of a state to serve as the paramount internal and external authority at its polity.
By the same token, an exploration of this dissertation in relation to research on transnational civil society implies that the empowerment from societies to activism as analyzed here itself generates distributive impacts on the cosmopolitan or patriotic balance of (supra)national identity and allegiance. An exploration of this study that aimed at such a distinct purpose of understanding how activist effects in turn impact national identity and allegiance would distill a proposition with as much accommodation as challenge (in)to nationality and nationalism. Although five out of the six modes of transnational activism that this study incorporates from Tarrow’s (2005) processual synthesis have self-evident implications for transnational civil society, only one of these five reinforces patriotism. In other words, a patriotic internalization mode is at odds with the cosmopolitan activist modes of global issue framing, diffusion, externalization and coalition formation. If that countervailing internalization and an ambiguous counterpart mode of scale ‘shift’ sufficed for Tarrow (2005) to emphasize a technical tie and fusion between patriotism and cosmopolitanism embodied in his “rooted cosmopolitan,” then the four modes of transnational activism that this study synthesizes would either break the tie toward patriotism or at least substantiate Tarrow’s uneven tie. Activist modes that conform to the processes of diversion, incubation and local issue framing tend to be either actively or passively patriotic whereas only radiation tends to be cosmopolitan. Analytically, while exploratory, the implication cautions against slipping from the impact of globalization on transnational activism to ‘global civil society’ or cosmopolitans. Hence, at present the most adequate transnationalization of Albert Camus’ old theory that “I rebel, therefore we exist” would be some new notion such as the one conveyed in the concept of a transnation-building rebel (see Camus 1953; see Pinto 2010). Because the
notion of a transnation-building rebel evokes rebellion and nation-building openly, it would better convey the contestation and fragmented allegiances involved both in multi-ethnic efforts to balance ethnic group and nation into one domestic identity, and in pluri-national efforts to balance activist group and nation into one transnational identity.

With respect to research at the intersection of transnational activism and global market institutions, an exploration of this dissertation implies that the empowerment from markets to activism examined here in turn generates distributive impacts on the socio-environmental and political embeddedness of markets (see Polanyi 2008[1944]; Daly 1996). An exploration of this study that aimed at such a distinct purpose of understanding how activist effects in turn impact market embeddedness would contribute a proposition with an ambiguous combination of accommodation and challenge (in)to self-regulating markets. Whereas only one of the activist modes that this study incorporated from Tarrow’s scholarly consolidation tends to impact market self-regulation, three of the modes originally consolidated here do. Whereas Tarrow’s internalization dynamic and the original diversion mode tend to challenge self-regulating markets, the original radiation and incubation types of transnational activism tend to accommodate themselves into self-regulating markets. Moreover, even the modes of transnational activism that challenge self-regulating markets do not resemble each other in their global conceptions of socio-environmental and political embeddedness. If internalization tends to maintain market embeddedness along purely anti-globalization and protectionist lines, diversion tends to further embed markets along the lines of global competition and regulatory rent-seeking. Hence, an implication from this study is that it is as misleading to refer to transnational activism as generally anti-globalization—usually
pertaining to global economic markets—as it is to generalize that activists who seek to change global markets are equally protectionist.

An implication the study offers to social science methodology is the balance it strikes between the pace of micro theory and the pace of macro theory. Before this study social scientists had not advanced far enough in assembling the causal mechanisms of activist processes, and thereby had gone too far in drawing conclusions about the causal origins of transnational activism. This study has major implications for how social scientists theorize and conduct empirical research. The efforts of this study to correct an outpaced scholarship, strike an appropriate balance in its own allocation between micro and macro theory, and to cross-check theory alongside empirical evidence are discussed throughout this dissertation. In this passage, there is only room to note that lessons learned here transfer directly to these cutting-edge methodological debates in the social sciences at large (see e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001; 2008; Falleti & Lynch 2008; Earl 2008; Lichbach 2008; McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow 2008).

With less normative bias from ideological blinders than the usual in transnational studies, this dissertation also carries an implication for the intersection between IR research on norm dynamics and cross-national inquiry on either activism or norm entrepreneurs. If one learns about what transnational conditions favor activists, there is a high probability that one will also learn about what conditions indirectly favor the normative changes which these activists promote. Whereas research on cause-oriented action in IR has been known to express an inclination to only examine leftist causes, this study analyzes both ideological wings, on the left and the right, evenly as they manifest themselves in the campaigns explained here. For instance, the case studies on the later
and earlier campaigns examined fascist activism in Brazil and U.K. South Africa, respectively, as two countervailing examples on the far right. Apart from normative implications, scholars have reviewed this imbalance in the literature as a possible overshadowing source of unexplained patterns of activism and by extension of unexplained patterns of normative change (Price 2003). For example, learning lessons about whether and how markets, societies and states can be favorable transnational conditions for activism begs to be considered as part of the broader question as to whether and how the same trio are equally favorable for norms associated with activist causes. In other words, the finding that globalization empowers transnational environmentalist activism is highly relevant for research on whether and how globalization (dis)empowers environmental degradation. Hence, this study carries a contribution for scholarly efforts to stop casting these sorts of explanatory shadows.

Other substantive implications are associated with the historical timing of transnational activism in social science publications that focus on the subject. In a sense this study validates the handful of extremely rare social science publications that deem transnational activism prior to 1945 not only to have existed, but also to merit and lend itself to analysis (see Chatfield 1997:35; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Nimtz 2002). Moreover, the dissertation extends the shadow of the past even further in terms of pre-1970 transnational environmental activism, which is only beginning to receive theoretically-informed treatment (see Grove 1990; van Koppen & Markham 2007; Pinto 2010). Similarly, the contagion from African, Arab and Asian decolonization movements that UNESCO and the oil multinationals carried into Brazil in the mid 20th century case study examined here dates third worldist activism in Latin America to earlier precursors than
the rural mobilizations of the late 1950s in the region. More specifically, the two case studies lengthen the historical background of a scholarship that analyzes the intersection of activism in the environmental and the decolonization issue areas. During the earlier campaign, activists in the United Kingdom and U.K. India used transnational bird conservation as a means to decolonize the colony, advocating a policy status and treatment equal to those of the seat of the empire at the British Isles. By the later campaign, independence activists in Brazil clashed with foreign environmentalist activists. The former cross-issue synergy puts in historical perspective and the later cross-issue clash helps to situate the otherwise shockingly prescient ‘econationalist’ response of a Brazilian policymaker as soon as the third worldist, independence movements from the 1960s ran into anti-sovereignty varieties of the ecological movements from the early 1970s (see Castro 1972). The earlier case study in this dissertation carries similar repercussions for the timing of a transnational ‘eco-feminist’ intersection of environmental and feminist activism, at a time when women’s cause-oriented action was only beginning to evolve into strictly-defined ‘feminist’ activism.

The questions directly examined here are themselves of interest to not only scholars, but also students and practitioners. This study shows that whatever the net environmental or social impacts of globalism and multilateralism may be, thickening in each institution creates opportunities for environmentalist and social activism. In this vein, the dissertation may help scholars, graduate students and advanced undergraduates to become less vulnerable to getting stuck in ‘thought-stopping’ or reified concepts as they analyze transnational activism. The study may also serve practitioners in helping
them to identify a broader range of opportunities for more varieties of transnational activism.

6.3. Future Research

This section identifies a few directions for future research that shares the purpose of this study to advance knowledge on the origins and modes of transnational activism. The following paragraphs justify both the analytical logic and the operational method of each such research call for more processual microtheorizing, qualitative evidence, quantitative evidence and processual integration.

While this study has identified and begun to address the analytical shortcomings of a meta-theory that has outpaced its required mid-range theoretical bases, more research needs to be done in this processual, mid-range vein. On the one hand, the four explanatory processes originally conceptualized here expose prime scholarship not to have gone far enough in assembling the causal processes of cause-oriented action, and thereby to have gone too far in drawing conclusions about the causal origins of transnational activism. On the other hand, the mechanisms that this study merely conceptualized along each of these four processes expose the dissertation itself to have been left standing on tentative foundations at the length of the mechanistic models used to process-trace or even ‘process-sketch’ causality. As would apply to the six processes that Tarrow (2005) consolidates, future research would make a major contribution by incorporating the mechanistic theorizing that this dissertation merely consolidates from elsewhere without itself microtheorizing in a self-contained study. To be sure, this research priority on scrutinizing the mechanisms along these four and indeed ten processes assumes that they are sufficiently representative of all modes of transnational
activism to be worth the opportunity cost of overshadowing potential research which
might conceptualize additional processes beyond these four or ten.

Pending inquiry on further conceptual models, which would process-trace
currently unexplained modes of transnational activism, future research can rely on a
cutting-edge set of scholarly works to fully theorize these four or ten tentative models of
causal processes. There is no room here to capture all the guidance that this rich
collection of publications can offer with respect to operational procedures for how to turn
conceptual models from tentative and ideal types to full-fledged theoretical models. For
the implementation of the microtheorizing research recommended here, perhaps the most
fundamental counsel that can be drawn from these contributions is to distinguish
mechanisms from causal mechanisms. Precariously, this distinction is not one that
Tarrow’s (2005) and this study imply with their generic references to ‘causal
mechanisms’ or simply ‘mechanisms.’ Microtheorizing procedures would do well to
avoid implying that every mechanism along a processual model of causality is equally
causal (Falleti & Lynch 2008; Earl 2008; Lichbach 2008; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly
2001; 2008; McAdam, Tilly, & Tarrow 2008).

A second direction for future research is to contribute further qualitative evidence
for the causal relationships that are hypothesized in this study. As discussed in chapters 1
and 5, the two case studies that form the bulk of this dissertation provided as much
qualitative evidence as possible within the constraints of a single thesis and the collective
state of the art at present. Yet, for reasons that are supported in chapter 1, the “thick
explanation”\textsuperscript{119} in these case studies did crowd out the rest of the evidence that this dissertation itself set out to collect and examine in order to provide a greater degree of empirical support for its hypotheses. This study is only the first to provide qualitative evidence not only for the internationalist antithesis, but also for the globalist thesis. Although this dissertation has begun a collective response to Tarrow’s (2005) call for research to begin to substantiate his internationalist antithesis, there is still a clear need for more qualitative research on how internationalism and globalism empower transnational activism.

Whatever the temporal, geographic and thematic sources of this evidence, for future researchers to maximize their contribution it does matter that they derive the data from a consistent combination of geographical and thematic sample of campaign sequels over time. As discussed in the preceding section, this research design allows the answers to the globalist and internationalist hypotheses to simultaneously inform broader debates. In the social sciences, this particular research procedure has repercussions for questions of path dependence. In contentious and/or social movement studies, it has implications for questions of activist repertoires and even activist performances. Moreover, within the bounds of the hypotheses immediately examined here, a mix of historical and contemporary cases similar to those discussed above under the sections on case selection and generalization in chapters 1 and 6 hedges methodological risks and opportunities associated with the data collection procedures for each type of evidence. Restricted but common geographic and thematic denominators allow for campaign samples to be better situated within the universe of all campaigns and for each process-tracing within

\textsuperscript{119} This author is grateful to Michael Butler for that apt, considerate tag for a case study analyzed in parallel to this dissertation—the Abolitionist Amazon campaign listed in the case selection tables included in chapter 1.
campaigns to be better situated alongside other process-tracings. Using campaigns and episodes as units of analysis allow one to know where to draw the boundaries of eligibility for potential process-tracings over social space and time, respectively. Finally, at the crossroads of these first and second suggestions for future research, one would also prioritize the test of micro over macro evidence in case selection—i.e. whenever there is a tension, let qualitative data give more empirical support to mechanisms than to processes or origins.

A third contribution that future research is increasingly well-positioned to make runs in a quantitative direction that has only begun to be examined in explanations of transnational activism. As discussed in chapter 1, this is a direction in which research will be best prepared to move after the preceding microtheorizing and qualitative inquiry have minimized the process-tracing need that quantitative data are less capable of filling. Nonetheless, with the advent of the alternate theory embodied in the theoretical synthesis in this study and after future progress in these two other directions for further research, the logic of discovery—i.e. theory-building—will tend to increasingly give way to the logic of confirmation—i.e. conceptual plausibility probe and theory-testing. Not only will the process-tracing disadvantage of quantitative research tend to become increasingly less salient, but quantitative advantages will also tend to intensify. In that not too distant future, it will tend to become timely for future research to tap into the relative capacity of quantitative evidence to inform estimates on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases and on the average ‘causal weight’ of variables such as globalism and internationalism.

Pinpointing an outline as to the procedures through which that quantitative
evidence can best be collected and examined also shows this gradual turn away from qualitative research to still be premature at the current state of the collective art on the causal relationships hypothesized in this study. Recent quantitative studies inadvertently show that current knowledge on how globalism and internationalism empower transnational activism is simply not at a point when it can already provide a reliable guide for quantitative measurement let alone weighting (see Smith & Wiest 2005; Wiest & Smith 2007; Lee 2010). The most basic lack of maturity in these studies is a failure to use types of quantitative method and evidence that are most neutral between globalism and internationalism. Unlike statistical applications in network analysis, standard statistical regression assumes independent observations. When scholars regress the number of transnational activist organizations (TAOs) based in distinct polities upon globalism and internationalism they tilt their standard measurement toward internationalism given that TAOs correlated with globalism are precisely those whose socioeconomic flows most violate the assumption of separate data in different polities. A statistical use of network analysis, which can balance individualistic attributes and relational construction, would be more neutral and therefore preferable. Moreover, when the available studies use data on TAOs as their exclusive measure of transnational activism they tilt their measurement toward modes of cause-oriented action—such as coalition formation—that are disproportionately correlated with internationalism. Future quantitative research that builds on the broader processual set conceptualized in this study will be able to draw on more knowledge of how to diversify measures of transnational activism, which are clearly contingent on modes of cause-oriented action. The specific aspects of global economic and social flows that this study shows as empowerments to
activism can also minimize similar current imbalances in coarse, invalid weighting of
decentralized globalism and centralized internationalism.

Finally, while this study has begun to respond to Tarrow’s (2005) call for
integrating distinct modes of transnational activism, it still echoes his recommendation
that much useful work remains to be done in this regard, which includes but is not limited
to the question of spatial trends in the transnationalization of cause-oriented action.
Because the purpose of Tarrow’s (2005) and this study leads to more emphasis on
structure than agency, a careful analysis of this question can make a particular
contribution where future research considers this integration from the perspective of
actors who may often act simultaneously along the lines of more than a single mode of
transnational activism.

Future research can rely on the research design used in this study for guidance
with respect to procedures for how to conduct such integration, particularly in spatial,
themetic, temporal and relative terms. Certainly, this study used campaigns of
transnational activism to specify the temporal and themetic boundaries of the spatial
evolution through which it integrated processes that conform to modes of cause-oriented
action with their respective transnationalities. A promising adaptation of this processual,
modal integration, which is mentioned in chapter 5, would be for an otherwise similar
research project to specify this spatial evolution with more emphasis on agency by
examining the spatial trajectory of actors rather than whole campaigns. In addition,
further research could fruitfully multiply the effort of this study to integrate modes of
transnational activism by weighting the substantive significance of the explanatory
processes associated with them. In other words, there is a clear value-added in additional
weighting of the internationalist next to the globalist processes or modes of transnational activism. Along these lines, this fourth and final recommendation for future research reinforces the second call for qualitative research to be implemented through a similar research design—if different surface appearances—to the one used here.

6.4. Pneumonic, Poetic License to Predict Transnational Activism around Biodiversity

As briefly alluded above, the explanation of transnational activism that holds the most predictive power in IR at present has ironically been phrased in terms of two biodiverse analogies.¹²⁰ Both of these memorable learning devices express the best lessons that scholars have learned prior to this study with regard to the institutional origins of cause-oriented action in transnational relations. One of the analogies discusses a directly proportional causal relationship between international, “state relations” and transnational activism:

“Transnational activists will increasingly find in… international institutions, regimes, and treaties… a ‘coral reef’ where they both lobby and protest, encounter others like themselves, identify friendly states, and, from time to time, put together successful global-national coalitions. (…) [B]oth targets of resistance and fulcrums for social conflict and coalition building, international institutions, regimes, and practices are ‘coral reefs’... around which NGOs, social movements... cluster... in a broader sea…” (Tarrow 2005:27, 219)

¹²⁰ It is an irony in the context of this study that biodiverse analogies obviously also happen to be fitting here in at least substantive and theoretical terms. In substantive terms, while the earlier campaign analyzed species diversity of birds and to a lesser extent bird habitats, the second campaign examined ecosystem diversity of the Amazon and to a lesser extent Amazonian species. In theoretical terms, the cause-and-effect relationship analyzed at the core of this study could be rephrased as an effort to understand whether transnational conditions are to activism across borders as ecological conditions are to species. Evolutionary biologists wondered about “the origins of species.” They came up with ecosystems as the main causal mechanism of natural selection, that is to say the processes of speciation through which ecological conditions shape species. Social scientists now wonder about the origins of transnational activism. These scholars have come up with transnational conditions as the main causal mechanism through which conditions between countries encourage activism across borders. Just as a biologist who nearly doubles the number of known species varieties (e.g., 400,000 additional marine animals) may revisit which ecosystems (e.g., coral or sandstone reefs) generate most species, a social scientist who nearly doubles the number of known modes of activism across borders (i.e. four additional varieties) may revisit which transnational conditions (i.e. internationalism or globalism) encourage most cause-oriented action.
The other analogy speaks of the pace of this prediction: “[T]ransnational activism does not resemble a swelling tide of history but is more like a series of waves that lap on an international beach, retreating repeatedly into domestic seas but leaving incremental changes on the shore.” (Tarrow 2005:219)

While felicitous, these two biodiverse analogies are respectively incomplete and incorrect without mention of global relations between markets and societies. Likewise, global markets, communications, and migration are sandstone reefs around which transnational activists cluster in a wider sea. The extension of this one analogy brings it to a particularly apt completion in light of a contrast between the centralized growth of (internationalist) coral reefs as living organisms that develop and the decentralized accumulation of (globalist) sandstone reefs as minerals that deposit. Ultimately, the more internationalist coral reefs grow and the more globalist sandstone reefs deposit, the more transnational activism one can expect around these structures. As for the other analogy, which specifies the pace of the predicted effect of internationalist growth on schools of transnational activism, it is incorrect absent globalist accumulation. Over the longer term, the main explanation for an expansion of “transnational activism [that] does not resemble a swelling tide of history but is more like a series of waves” is not so much the permanently grown internationalist coral reef as it is the momentarily accumulated globalist sandstone reef.
7. Bibliographical References


Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity


Gomes, Flávio dos Santos, ed. 1999. *Nas Terras do Cabo do Norte: Fronteiras, Colonização e Escravidão na Guiana Brasileira (Séculos XVIII-XIX)*. Belém, Brazil: Editora Universitária, UFPA.


———. 1935. The Confederate Exodus to Latin America, I. *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (October): 100-134.


Johnson, Erik, and John D. McCarthy. 2005. The Sequencing of Transnational and National Social Movement Mobilization: The Organizational Mobilization of the


Kastner, Joseph. 1994. Long Before Furs, it was Feathers that Stirred Reformist Ire. *Smithsonian*, July.


Martin, Percy Alvin. 1918. The Influence of the United States on the Opening of the Amazon to the World's Commerce. *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 1,


Melby, John. 1942. Rubber River: An Account of the Rise and Collapse of the Amazon
Boom. The Hispanic American Historical Review 22, no. 3 (August): 452-469.


Northrup, David. 1976. The Compatibility of the Slave and Palm Oil Trades in the Bight


398


Pereira, Rodrigo Nóbrega Moura. 2007. A Nação Brasileira e o Protestantismo: Religião e Americanismo no Projeto Nacional de Tavares Bastos. Revista Intellectus 6, no. II.


PWLPF (Permanent Wild Life Protection Fund). 1917. The Statement of the Permanent


———. 2003. Understanding Policy Change in Developing Countries: The Spheres of Influence Framework. *Global Environmental Politics* 3, no. 1 (February): 11-32.


