

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: **SUSTAINING PEACE? ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE**

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Over the last decade environmental and natural resources governance has received a growing share of attention on the international peacebuilding agenda. Few studies have scrutinized in detail the role of international peacebuilders or whether reforms and policies help or hinder peacebuilding outcomes. This dissertation examines international efforts to shape the governance of forests in Liberia and diamonds and minerals in Sierra Leone. I find that international peacebuilding organizations frame the challenge in both cases as transforming conflict resources into peace resources for the purpose of reducing the propensity for violence. To accomplish this transformation, international peacebuilders promote and establish governance reforms and policies designed to securitize and marketize the environment and natural resources. I find that, despite producing the potential peace enhancing benefits of increased stability and revenue, rapidly pushing such a transformation strategy comes with significant linked pathologies that run the risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements, provoking societal competition, undermining environmental management and sustainable livelihoods, and creating unrealistic expectations. These effects

can produce contention, foster resistance and increase the likelihood of violence in ways that undermine the conditions essential for achieving a long-term peace. An alternative approach would be to mitigate the effects of securitization and marketization by first addressing issues that have historically led to violence and contention in the environmental and natural resources sector, including land ownership and tenure issues, genuine public participation, government corruption and a lack of sustainable livelihoods.

**SUSTAINING PEACE? ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE**

By

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2011

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Dedication

For Mom and Dad

Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to many people who helped directly or indirectly with this dissertation. First and foremost, my thanks to Ken Conca, who not only served as my dissertation chair but challenged me along the way with helpful criticism and new ideas about how to shape and refine my analysis. I have learned much from my discussions with Ken and I look forward to many more in the years to come. I am also indebted to a number of colleagues at the University of Maryland and elsewhere who have discussed this topic with me, and offered insight and advice. They include Virginia Haufler, Paul Huth, Karol Soltan, Geoffrey Dabelko, Richard Matthew, Erika Weinthal, Rodrigo Pinto, Jennie Wallace, Allison Berland-Kaul, Jacquie Ignatov and Josh Lacey.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance from the US Institute of Peace who granted me a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Dissertation Scholarship in 2008-2009. Without this generous funding, this project would not have been possible. I also want to thank David Jenson at the United Nations Environment Programme for hiring me to take part in a mission to Sierra Leone in May 2009. This trip was an important addition to my field work and had no small part in strengthening the arguments contained in this dissertation. I also want to thank the great people of Liberia and Sierra Leone, who shared their time and perspectives with me. I am forever grateful.

Finally, I want to thank my family. My mother, Joanne Beevers, and father William Beevers, raised me to be curious about the world. Despite apprehensions -- they have always allowed me to follow my own path in life. I dedicate the dissertation to you both. But my greatest thanks go to my wife Karen and son Crosby. Karen has been a source of continuous encouragement and has been there through thick and thin. It is safe to say that without her love and support, this project would not have been impossible. Karen you are an inspiration and thanks for everything. Thanks also go to Crosby. Since his birth two years ago, he has

almost constantly watched "daddy" typing away on this dissertation. I hope this work does you proud.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In October 2008, I made my way to the headquarters of the Forest Development Authority (FDA) in the Sinkor area of the Liberian capital Monrovia. My task was to interview two senior officials. The picture they painted was an optimistic one. While revenues from a mismanaged forest sector had helped to fuel the conflict in Liberia, the tidal wave of new reforms and policies--helped along in large part by international organizations--were making a difference. Forest areas were now under the control of the government and within the year substantial timber would be flowing out of the country. The take away message: revenue from timber exports would rapidly help to rebuild the country, and in particular, benefit forest communities through increased employment and development projects.

The next day, I attended a meeting the city of Buchanan about 100 km southwest of Monrovia. It was organized by a Liberian NGO to discuss forest issues. It was attended by officials from an international organization that was deeply involved in the reform process, a member of parliament and about 75 people assembled from surrounding communities. I was anxious to meet people, see the countryside and better understand how and why forest reforms in Liberia had been so successful. Once the meeting got started--it was interrupted several times by unruly youths who had to be held back by UN peacekeepers--I was stunned. Angry and tense exchanges erupted between the participants throughout. Rather than a extolling the virtues of the new forest reforms and policies, community members protested vociferously that the needs of the people were being ignored in an effort to "fast-track" timber

exports. The complaints centered on a lack of participation in decision making and a perception that the government was repeating history by consolidating its control over forests.

It appeared that efforts to reform Liberia's forests, which have been a central priority of international peacebuilding organizations, may be controversial. The question was why? What is it about the reforms and policies that may be generating disagreement and contention? What is being done about it? Who decides? And most importantly, what does this presage for the future of the forest reform process in Liberia and peacebuilding outcomes in general? Should peacebuilders be concerned about what is happening given that war-torn states like Liberia are vulnerable to resurgent conflict? My motivation for writing this dissertation is to examine the substantial but often overlooked efforts to govern the environment and natural resources in war-torn states like Liberia. The stakes are certainly high.

Peacebuilding and the Evolution of a Concept

Over 90 percent of all armed conflicts in the 1990s were civil conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). The conflicts, which occurred mostly in the developing world, posed a humanitarian disaster and a threat to regional and international stability and security. From a humanitarian viewpoint, the violence was particularly savage and appeared to be disproportionately lethal and cruel to civilians and non-combatants. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, child soldiers, executions and other atrocities were commonplace. Nine out of every ten people killed in civil conflicts during the 1990s were civilians, which was a complete reversal from the early 20th century (Collier et al. 2003, 17). Beyond the death and destruction caused by the conflict, tens of millions had their lives severely upended and livelihoods destroyed. The conflicts had regional repercussions as well by creating refugee crises, sparking arms races and causing collapse and war in neighboring states. The nature of the threat was also viewed in national security terms by powerful international actors. Failed

and war-torn states offered safe havens for terrorist organizations and drug producers, and could act as a vector for AIDS and other pandemics that could threaten international stability. Such situations came to represent the "primary security challenge of the contemporary era" (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 4).

In response to the proliferation of civil conflict and the related humanitarian and security impacts, new norms and practices of multilateral intervention emerged to manage failed states and civil unrest (Finnemore 2003). States emerging from conflict, in particular, were believed to be inherently incapable of rebuilding themselves leading to increased intervention by the United Nations (UN) and other international governmental and non-governmental organizations. While a handful of these "peace operations" sought to deliver humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations, a majority were established in the immediate aftermath of civil war to prevent conflict from reoccurring. Such operations came to be known as *peacebuilding*. Key examples include Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Guatemala, Timor Leste, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire.

Throughout the 1990s peacebuilding practices and strategies evolved. Peacebuilding became a "growth industry" made up of an array of international peacebuilding organizations with a wide variety of responsibilities and tasks (Paris 2004, 13). These included supporting ceasefires and peace processes; organizing elections; assisting the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants; retraining and redeploying police and armed forces; repatriating and resettling refugees and the internally displaced; responding to food insecurities and health concerns; strengthening laws and court system; rebuilding infrastructure; promoting human rights and social reconciliation; drafting constitutions; rebuilding economic systems; providing employment; and provisioning public services--to name just a few. Underscoring these activities, and the peacebuilding policies more generally, has been a standard set of strategies for building peace that include an emphasis on

promoting liberalization and statebuilding. Liberalization refers to efforts to the promotion of market-based democracies and stresses the peace enhancing traits of the liberal peace (Paris 2004). Statebuilding, on the other hand, emphasizes the rebuilding of capable, legitimate and autonomous state institutions because weak governance is increasingly recognized as a threat to sustained peace (Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Brinkerhoff 2007; Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009).

Governing the Environment and Natural Resources for Peace

An issue that has received a growing share of the international peacebuilding agenda and policy in recent years is the environment and natural resources. This attention has been driven by empirical evidence that under certain conditions natural resources can foment, exacerbate or prolong civil conflict. One early strand of research linked environmental degradation and resource scarcity to civil conflict suggesting that competition for renewable resources (i.e. forests, water, crop land, fish soil) caused by elite capture, population growth or a lack of access to livelihoods can spark violence (Homer-Dixon 1991). Other studies concluded that a state's relative abundance of "high-value" natural resources--such as oil, timber, minerals and gemstones--can be a "curse". This is because dependence undermines governance, intensifies poverty, creates economic distress and increases the likelihood of civil conflict (Sachs and Warner 2001; de Soysa 2002; Ross 2003; 2004). Related scholarship also found that once a civil conflict begins, natural resources can be traded regionally and globally and provide combatants such as government forces or rebel groups with the finances to buy weapons and pursue violence (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 1999).

According to Ross (2003), since 1990 at least eighteen different civil conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation and trade of natural resources, including wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the same time, conflicts in Nepal, Darfur and the Middle East have been framed around land and water issues (UNEP

2009). While preliminary evidence suggests that since 1945 at least 40 percent of all civil conflicts have been associated in some way with natural resources, it is by no means believed to be a thing of the past (Binningsbo and Rustad 2008). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2009, 8) suggests that violent conflict associated with the environment and natural resources will only increase in the decades ahead, stating:

As global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, there is significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify in the coming decades. In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, and prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries and population distribution may aggravate already existing tensions and generate new conflicts.

Claims connecting the environment and natural resources to civil war remain controversial among conflict scholars. Nevertheless, widespread attention to the linkages between the environment, natural resources and civil conflict resulted in a range of policy responses by international actors to leverage natural resources as a means of ending and mitigating violence. UN peacekeepers have been deployed to areas affected by violent conflict to secure and control natural resources so that armed groups could not exploit them. Peace settlements have been brokered with varying degrees of success in Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) using the future spoils of natural resources as part of a wealth-sharing strategy (Jarstad 2008). Better known perhaps have been the periodic authorization of UN sanctions established to disrupt and curtail the trade in so-called "conflict resources" to starve belligerents of the funds that fuel violence (Bannon and Collier 2004). In Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC, UN sanctions were imposed on commodities with mixed success to end civil war (Global Witness 2010a).

At the same time, international peacebuilding organizations began to incorporate environmental and natural resource concerns into peace operations, particularly where civil conflicts were deemed by analysts to be resource-related. When "high-value" natural resources are involved, competition over future spoils and resource-rich territory may increase the likelihood of violent conflict and produce tension that can be detrimental to peacebuilding. This is because violent conflict frequently leads to the collapse of state institutions and state authority that undermines governance and allows opportunistic entrepreneurs or corrupt officials to extract valuable resources for profit. For this reason, international peacebuilding has become deeply involved in efforts to govern and manage natural resources so that war will not reignite and have broader security implications. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated in 2008, "natural resources are crucial to consolidating peace in and between war-torn societies."

The international peacebuilding agenda and policy also reflects the understanding that the environment and natural resources are not just an important leverage point for ending or mitigating violent conflict but significantly influence a war-torn state's ability to consolidate a lasting peace. While governing "conflict resources" is viewed as an international priority for provisioning security (domestic and international), peacebuilding strategies also emphasize the significant role the environment and natural resources play in postconflict economic development (UNEP 2009; Biljsma 2005; Conca and Wallace 2009). In the aftermath of conflict, "high-value" natural resources represent a potential windfall that can be rapidly used by war-torn states to rebuild the postwar economy and restore infrastructure, reconstruct state institutions and administer basic services. Furthermore, natural resources represent an obvious starting point for attracting foreign direct investment, gaining export revenue and providing employment opportunities. Exporting valuable natural resources can in theory help to "jump-start" economic growth, alleviate poverty and provide

the state with the revenues to fund basic services in ways that spur development and send a signal to potential spoilers that the benefits of peace outweigh the costs.

A lion's share of international attention has focused on "high-value" natural resources. However, there is a growing awareness that peacebuilding should also address sustainable livelihoods and environmental management. This is because war directly and indirectly damages the ecosystems and natural assets that are essential for human survival. In the aftermath of conflict, people struggle to acquire clean water, sanitation, shelter, food and energy supplies on which they depend for their well being and livelihoods (UNEP 2009; Biljsma 2005; Conca and Wallace 2009). A failure to respond to the environmental needs of the population can deepen poverty, make development more challenging and exacerbate environmental problems. Even worse, a lack of sustainable livelihoods may leave people (or ex-combatants) vulnerable to disease and deprivation that may lead to the grievances and resentments that can complicate peacebuilding. Moreover, civil conflict commonly creates land use and ownership issues because the process of displacement and resettlement can lead to competing and overlapping claims to property and other assets. In short, civil conflict decimates governance institutions designed to protect the environment, which can result in unsustainable and uncontrolled resource use. Therefore, rebuilding state institutions to control or govern land or critical environments is deemed important to ensure the environment and natural resources are protected from unregulated extraction and can support the sustainable livelihoods of the population.

The general assumption is that the environment and natural resources can contribute to peacebuilding if governed effectively. War-torn states rarely, if ever, have the capacity or authority to adequately govern the environment and natural resources, or are too weak or corrupt to do so. Because of this "governance vacuum", international peacebuilding organizations have been quick to intervene in war-torn states in order to design, promote, and establish a variety of environmental and natural resource governance reforms and strategies

(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). If done right, analysts suggest that environmental and natural resource governance may assist in the extraordinarily difficult task of helping to build trust and social cohesion in ways that promote cooperation, reduce tension, overcome political cleavages and create new opportunities for peacebuilding (Conca and Dabelko 2002; UNEP 2009).

The Problem and Research Questions

The peacebuilding literature has expanded considerably in recent years but few studies have scrutinized in any detail environmental and natural resource governance. Although a multiple-volume set focusing on natural resources management and peacebuilding is due out in 2011, and *Global Governance* is dedicating an entire issue to the topic, most studies to date have been too over generalized and theoretical to be helpful to scholars or policy makers (UNEP 2009; Lujala and Rustad 2011). This lack of detailed scholarship is surprising because international peacebuilding operations have integrated environmental and natural resource governance reforms into war-torn states for over a decade. Perhaps the reason is that international relations scholars have tended to view the environment and natural resources as stuff of "low politics" when trying to understand the effectiveness or success of peacebuilding operations (Paris 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Or perhaps, scholars of peacebuilding view other facets of peace operations, from security sector reform to elections and the rule of law, to be a more significant determinant of peacebuilding success. Still another reason for the lack of empirical investigation may simply be that the international peacebuilding agenda and policy targeted at governing the environment and natural resources is out in front of the scholarship. Another possibility, of course, may be a tacit recognition in scholarly circles that despite international attention by peacebuilders there is no relationship between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there is a lot

we do not know about the role of environmental and natural resource governance in war-torn states. This research endeavors to fill a significant gap in the literature.

My objective, then, is to examine how environmental and natural resource governance helps or hinders peacebuilding. The central research questions are:

- How have international peacebuilding organizations conceptualized the linkages between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding?
- Given that conceptualization, what policies and strategies for governing the environment and natural resources have the international peacebuilding organizations promoted, designed and established?
- What have been the effects and consequences of those reforms and policies for peacebuilding?

The "independent variable" is the strategies and policies to reform environmental and natural resource governance. These are promoted, designed and established by what I term international peacebuilding organizations (IPOs). I use the term international peacebuilding organizations throughout to refer to regular peacebuilding agents and actors involved in war-torn states. This includes the United Nations and its agencies, international financial institutions (i.e. World Bank and International Monetary Fund), national governments and their development agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international consultants, corporations with international reach, and vast array international non-governmental organizations. I define environmental and natural resource governance as the sets of rules, institutions and processes that shape human-environment interactions. These rules, institutions and processes are manifest in strategic reforms policies, laws, regulations, and

practices. By "environment", I refer to the physical conditions that affect natural resources and the ecosystem services that sustain and fulfill life.¹ And by "natural resources", I mean "actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in the natural state, such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, stones and hydrocarbons" (UNEP 2009, 7).²

Governance has been subject to a variety of interpretations but at its most basic "concerns the rules, institutions, and processes that form the nexus of state-society relations" (Brinkerhoff 2007, 2). This definition is centered on "governments as governance", and prioritizes state form and integrity, the exercise of state power and authority, state institutions, and the assumption that governments are a neutral arbiter of competing groups in society. A broader vision of governance suggests that state-centered notions of governance have been severely diminished in a globalizing world as the authority of states has been undermined by international institutions, sub-national groups, the spread of the neo-liberal economic order, the emergence of new social movements, novel communication technologies, increasing and other networks of global interdependence (Rosenau 1990). I assume governance to be more than government and relating to both state-based rules and institutions that mediate state-society relations and political, economic and societal institutions as well as informal, non-governmental rules, processes and institutions located on a continuum through society, the state, and the global.

The "dependent variable" is the extent to which environmental and natural resources governance helps or hinders peacebuilding. I use the term peacebuilding in the way articulated by the United Nations and largely accepted as the international norm (Paris 2004).

¹ Ecosystem services include "provisioning services" such as food, water and timber; "regulating services" that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes and water quality; and "cultural services" that provide recreational aesthetic and spiritual benefits; and "supporting services" such as carbon, nutrient and hydrological cycles.

² A renewable resource refers to a resource that is replenished naturally at a rate comparable to its rate of consumption by humans or other users and a non-renewable resource exists in a fixed amount, or an amount that cannot be regenerated on scale comparative to its consumption level.

The goals of peacebuilding, according to former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, are to "identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace" in the aftermath of conflict, with the ultimate objective to prevent conflict relapse (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Boutros-Ghali (1995) restated the purpose, stating that the essential goal of peacebuilding is to "create the structures for the institutionalization of peace". Boutros-Ghali's predecessor, Kofi Annan (1998) further echoed the sentiments by concluding that peacebuilding is "actions undertaken at the end of conflict to consolidate peace to prevent a reoccurrence of armed confrontation." Finally, the Brahimi Report (2000, 3), which was a comprehensive review of UN-led peace operations, defines peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." Based on these statements from the UN, the world's most active participant in peacebuilding, the fundamental purpose of peacebuilding is to establish the conditions for a sustainable and long-term peace in countries emerging from civil conflict (Paris 2004, 56).

The UN and other international peacebuilders employ the term "conflict" and "civil conflict" in relation to peacebuilding. The term "conflict" can be too ambiguous since it can mean anything along a continuum from differing goals or ideas of actors to violent engagement between them. At the same time, "civil conflict" typically denotes large-scale violence on the range of at least 1,000 battle-related deaths annually (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). Peace, then, by definition is largely concerned with the absence of full-scale civil conflict. In my view, however, this definition unduly renders invisible from any analysis numbers of fatalities below this arbitrary benchmark and particular forms of violence outside of the civil conflict, insurgency, rebellion typology that is all too common. Moreover, if peacebuilders are genuinely concerned with the underlying conditions that may engender further civil conflict, we should be concerned with violence broadly understood as "practices or acts that cause direct harm to humans" (Peluso and Watts 2001, 26). To be

more precise, then, if environmental and natural resource governance "helps" peacebuilding, we should be able to detect a related decrease in the propensity of violence. At the same time, if environmental and natural resource governance "hinders" peacebuilding, we should be able to identify a subsequent increase in propensity of violence.

In this study, I employ two distinct approaches to evaluate the extent to which environmental and natural resource governance leads to an increased or decreased propensity for violence. First, I use a "conflict mitigation" framework employed by Paris (2004). This framework suggests that at a minimum, environmental and natural resource governance should: (1) not recreate or "lock-in" conditions that increase the propensity for violence and; (2) "do not harm"--that is not create new conditions that increase the propensity for violence. Any of these outcomes would appear to contradict or at the very least challenge the notion that environmental and natural resource governance helps peacebuilding. I also examine four specific outcomes deduced from the vast peacebuilding literature, which are thought by international peacebuilding organizations --and largely substantiated in the scholarly literature--to decrease the propensity for violence. These outcomes are: (1) security improvements; (2) increased economic development; (3) enhanced social cohesion and trust; and (4) strengthen state institutions. These conditions are important to consider in dealing with environmental and natural resource governance because they can potentially provide insight into historical conditions responsible for violent conflict but also provide peacebuilders--to the extent possible--with levers that can be used to improve outcomes. More specifically, by considering the "upstream" factors it may allow IBOs not just to "do not harm" but, in fact, improve peacebuilding practices in ways that decrease the propensity for violence and help the peacebuilding project.

Research Methods

Between 1989 and 2007 there were 19 UN-led international peacebuilding operations deployed in countries just emerging from civil war. By peacebuilding operations, I refer to operations involving at least several hundred peacekeepers and by "international" I mean that the deployment had the approval of the UN Security Council. By "just emerging from civil war", I denote states in which armed conflict was principally confined to the borders of a single state and where warring parties were more or less inhabitants of that state. This to distinguish international missions launched following political upheaval (e.g., Haiti), operations that never ended (e.g., Somalia), or civil conflicts as the result of an invasion (e.g., Iraq).³ Of the 19 international peacebuilding operations, I estimate that *at least* nine, or almost half, have promoted and established environmental and natural resource governance reforms designed specifically to help establish a stable and lasting peace.

Given this universe of cases and my research questions, I chose to employ a case study approach. This methodological approach is applicable because the total number of representative cases is too small to permit an effective statistical analysis. More importantly, the subject matter requires a detailed or "deep" examination of causal mechanisms. Case studies allow us to look more precisely at environmental and natural resource governance and uncover specific mechanisms and processes. With those provisos in mind, I selected two case studies--Liberia and Sierra Leone--to test my research questions. I selected the specific cases for several reasons. First, the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are overwhelmingly recognized (for better or worse!) to be "environment or resource conflicts". The terms "blood diamonds" and "blood timber", in fact, refer to these conflicts. Because of the perceived environmental or natural resource dimensions of each conflict, both have been the target of substantial international efforts to reform environment and natural resource governance.

³ Here, I follow the methods of Paris (2004).

Liberia and Sierra Leone, therefore, represent "most likely" cases since we can strongly expect to observe how environmental and natural resources governance affects peacebuilding trajectories --either positively or negatively (George and Bennett 2004). The selection of the peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone is also appropriate because environmental and natural resources governance in both countries has been continuing for almost a decade, long enough to judge the effects, allow for longitudinal comparison, and analyze key concepts like timing, sequencing and interactive effects. Another consideration in selecting the cases is that both are still considered "fragile" war-torn states and exhibit no guarantee of a stable and lasting peace. In short, neither case is so violent or harmonious that the future outcome of peacebuilding is determinative.

Both countries also offer the opportunity to examine in detail very different types of "environments" and natural resources. Forests are a renewable resource that has been a dominant priority in Liberia's peacebuilding operations while minerals and diamonds are non-renewable resources that have been dominant in Sierra Leonean peacebuilding policy. Finally, there is a more practical reason that I chose to focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone. I have extensive experience living and working in West Africa and spent almost three years in the region between 1997 and 2000-at the height of both conflicts. This gave me a comparative advantage both in terms of doing fieldwork and being familiar with the region and its problems.

I employ a strategy of process tracing to observe political engagement around environmental and natural resource governance in Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly with regards to forests, mineral and diamonds. Political engagement refers to complex and dynamic political, social and economic processes by which actors, agents and coalitions act, interact or are engaged with each other (Migdal 1988). Although political engagements are carried out in a range of formal and informal settings, I examine primarily formal rule making and institution building processes that form the foundations of environmental and natural

resources governance in Liberia and Sierra Leone to generate data and information to tests the causal hypothesis. I chose this research strategy based on the assumption that rules and institutions fundamentally pattern what is socially and politically acceptable; what is considered "normal" behavior; and even what is deemed possible to discuss (Lipschutz 2004). Since rule-making and institution building processes can be sites of conflict and contention or conversely cooperation and confidence building, it is important not only to understand the character of this political engagement but also how it has changed over time.

To gather data and provide "answers" to my research questions, I spent over two years in West Africa and conducted over six months of in-depth field work in Liberia and Sierra Leone between October 2008 and July 2009. My data collection consisted of two methods. The first was to gather as much data and information as possible from primary sources. To accomplish this task, I conducted semi-structured interviews consisting of open-ended questions with 84 "subjects".⁴ Eighty of the interviews were conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with an additional four conducted in person in Washington DC and New York. One interview was conducted by phone. The interview subjects were selected in a deliberate and largely non-random manner using snow-ball sampling techniques that targeted those with knowledge or familiarity of international peacebuilding efforts to govern environmental and natural resources in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. This included government officials, representatives of international organizations, national civil society groups, activists, academics, business leaders and residents of several communities.⁵ For reasons of confidentiality, I refer to conversations throughout the dissertation but do not quote by name. Through my interview subjects, I was also able to examine a host of documentation that is not publically available including internal memos, files and reports, meeting notes and draft policy documents. I should note that this does not include a two-week visit to Sierra Leone in

⁴ This figure refers to discrete subjects. I met multiple times with some interviewees.

⁵ For a breakdown of interviews, see the Appendix.

May 2009 as part of a United Nations Environment Programme mission, during which I took part in over 30 additional interviews on the subject matter.

While these interviews are the heart and soul of the dissertation by providing several notebooks full of data and information that guided my research and inquiry, I relied heavily on secondary sources as well. The treasure trove of documents, reports, articles and studies that are available in the public domain were essential to painting a comprehensive and accurate picture of ongoing efforts to govern the environment and natural resources in Liberia and Sierra Leone and proved very helpful corroborating or casting doubt on information gathered during interviews.

Research Findings

In Liberia and Sierra Leone, conflict has not resumed and this is certainly the result of a host of factors not least of which is sustained peace operations and intervention by IPOs.

Although peace remains fragile in both countries, this is an impressive accomplishment given the extent of the brutality and violence. Yet, the questions I pose are not about whether conflict resumes or not. Instead, my objective is to examine how environmental and natural resource governance helps or hinders peacebuilding. To accomplish this, I analyze how international peacebuilding organizations define the links between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding, and also examine the policies and reforms that are employed. My key findings are discussed below.

1.) With regard to environmental and natural resource governance, international peacebuilding organizations have conceptualized the key challenge in both cases as transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace. There exists a broad consensus among international peacebuilders about how the environment and natural resources are linked to conflict and

peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Despite ambiguity in the scholarship, international peacebuilders emphasize a "causal narrative" in which the problem centers on "conflict resources". The central fear--based on particular constructions of the conflicts--is that high value natural resources will fund rebel groups or corrupt governments in ways that fuel civil conflict and cause an array of international security problems. The solution to the problem of conflict resources is to transform them into peace resources. Peace resources are those that can be exploited quickly for economic growth, poverty alleviation and the provision of state revenues that in theory can enhance security and development.

2.) To accomplish this transformation, international peacebuilding organizations promote and establish governance reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural resources. By securitization, I mean establishing and consolidating state control and authority over the environment and natural resources. The emphasis on securitization is the result of international interests in maintaining order and putting a lid on conflicts that threaten domestic and international security. By marketization, I mean promoting and establishing the conditions that allow the environment and natural resources to generate revenue including foreign investment, privatization, deregulation and private property rights. Marketization privileges free-market economic reforms and policies to unlock the benefits of international trade to: support economic growth and poverty alleviation, supply the state revenue needed to rebuild infrastructure and provide basic services, and contribute to employment. Given scholarship that dependence on high-value natural resources can exacerbate corruption and weaken governments in ways that make them more likely to fail, securitization and marketization are believed to require "good governance" to ensure governments are accountable, transparent and participatory.

3.) International peacebuilding efforts to transform "conflict resources" into "peace resources" through securitization and marketization come with significant pathologies.

Despite producing the potential peace-enhancing benefits of increased stability and revenue, I find that the reforms and policies give rise to significant contention, conflict and resistance--some of it resulting in violence. The reason is that the reforms and policies give rise to four linked pathologies that have potential negative effects for still vulnerable war-torn states.

- ***Risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements:*** In Liberia and Sierra Leone, I find that environment and natural resource governance reforms fundamentally mirror the arrangements that historically aggrieved the population and led to conflict. There is a myopic focus on reconsolidating state power, and only tokenistic efforts to incorporate genuine inclusiveness and participation of the "people". The widespread perception is that the "old ways of doing business"--which are widely blamed for corruption, underdevelopment and deprivation that led to war--are returning. Improprieties linked to nefarious business agreements raises related questions about whether real transparency and accountability is possible where the political culture is defined by patronage. Efforts to "jump-start" free-market reforms may be resurrecting the patronage-resource nexus, which has always functioned alongside state institutions to the benefit of predatory elites. In both cases, rebuilding rather than restructuring traditional political arrangements may generate new grievances and produce shadow states.
- ***Danger of provoking societal competition:*** Control over the environment and natural resources is a high stake game in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, governance reforms designed to "fast-track" natural resource exports shortens the "shadow of the future", and provokes competition over "rules of the game". This is

because the reform process inherently seeks to impose a governing logic on a valuable national and societal asset over a short time horizon. The overarching perception is that "who is there first" will determine the future of the environment and natural resources. Despite rhetoric of inclusion, transparency and accountability, governance reforms of this kind exacerbate perceptions that: the government and business have too much and that communities have too little. Under appreciated or perhaps ignored is that the environment and natural resource represent very different values, interests and ideas and efforts to promote or establish new rules and institutions is a competitive process.

- ***Inattention to the environment and sustainable livelihoods:*** I find that in Liberia and Sierra Leone vital environmental issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, and energy supplies are by-and-large treated as low stakes issues by international peacebuilding organizations. In addition, sectors outside of the international spotlight, most notably forests in Sierra Leone, minerals in Liberia and gold in both countries--are neglected. This focus overlooks factors that have habitually impeded the ability of communities to meet their sustainable livelihood needs, such as unjust land ownership and tenure rights, environmental degradation, and unfair systems of patronage.
- ***Problem of unrealistic expectations:*** Peacebuilding comes with high expectations. I find that what gets overlooked is the role environmental and natural resource governance plays in forming an "expectation gap" in war-torn states. For instance, Poverty Reduction Strategies, which in war-torn states serve as blueprints for peacebuilding, are often based on unrealistic projections of revenue derived from the export of natural resources. When ordinary citizens do not see perceptible changes

on the level anticipated, or gets wind of "backroom business deals" by government officials, increased tension, a lack of confidence, and perhaps social unrest can be the result. At the same time, elections are usually organized to provide a venue for public discussion that is accompanied by an array of political promises. In both cases, expectations have been created that cannot be met, undermining the legitimacy of the state and opening up new opportunities for spoilers.

4.) Given this approach and these pathologies, efforts by international peacebuilders to govern the environment and natural resources may be counterproductive for peacebuilding. While fighting has not resumed in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the pathologies stress that the reforms and policies are creating new conditions that hinder peacebuilding and are recreating the seeds of conflict. This is not a positive development. Employing a second "peacebuilding" framework, I find more reasons for concern. First, although order and stability have returned to both countries, reforms and policies have failed and may even undermine security of specific people and communities. Second, although Liberia and Sierra Leone have seen increases in GDP growth and state revenue, human development indicators suggest marginal improvement country-wide. If we take development to be concerned about "enlarging people's choices", in terms of equity, sustainability and livelihoods, reforms and policies may be undermining the development potential of some people. Third, contrary to the conventional wisdom that environmental and natural resource governance can deepen social cohesion and build trust, at this point in time it appears to be--in large part at least--fostering tension and mistrust in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Finally, although the reforms and policies have helped to strengthened state capacity and institutions, unrealistic expectations along with a serious lack of attention to inclusiveness and public participation has undermined the state's legitimacy.

Two final caveats about the scope of this research are essential before moving on. First, claims that certain reforms and policies promoted and supported by international peacebuilding organizations had "positive" or "negative" outcomes raise the question: "compared to what"? More specifically, due to the absence of adequate "control" cases in which the independent variable (e.g., environmental and natural resource governance) is absent, how do we know what would have happened in their absence? This methodological challenge should not be dismissed in attempting to establish causal outcomes from the cases and the findings should be regarded with some caution. With that in mind, however, I employ two analytic strategies to address this point. First, I employ process tracing to do the hard work of narrowing the list of potential causal pathways and illuminating the conditions in which they occur. Given the lack of robust theory when it comes to linkages between the environment, natural resources and peace, process tracing is an indispensable tool for understanding mechanisms, posing novel hypotheses and building theory. Second, I examine briefly in Chapter 8 the closest thing we have to control cases--Liberia's mineral and diamond sector and Sierra Leone's forest sector. What distinguishes these sectors is that they have until very recently been devoid of significant intervention by international peacebuilding organizations. While only preliminary, these observations help us to understand the extent to which reforms and policies promoted by peacebuilders were determinative in the outcomes.

Second, this dissertation did not intend to measure by some objective criteria the effectiveness or success of peacebuilding in relation to environmental and natural resource governance. Even if analysts could agree on a definitive marker of peacebuilding "success", I suggest that such a project is difficult at best.⁶ This is because even in cases where civil war

⁶ Peacebuilding success has been the subject of much debate. A common (and measureable) guideline for peacebuilding success--whether peace prevails when peacebuilders leave--is flawed for two reasons. First, this is not the professed end point of peacebuilding according to international peacebuilding organizations themselves. Second, there is unlikely to be a point at which all peacebuilders leave a war-torn state.

has resumed after peace operations started it would be a fool's errand to assign a single cause to conflict relapse given the range of interrelated and cascading factors involved. It gets trickier in situations where civil conflict has not resumed, like Liberia and Sierra Leone. This is because whether a war-torn state sustains peace after civil conflict ends cannot be boiled down to one particular factor but depends on a range of variables that make the likelihood of a stable and lasting peace more or less likely. The evidence is therefore prospective, which limits my ability to make definitive statements about the role of environmental and natural resource governance in securing peace. In some sense, the extent to which environmental and natural resource governance helps or hinders peacebuilding -- or increase the propensity for violence--will not be known for decades after a full retrospective analysis can be carried out. I acknowledge these difficulties but it would be wrong to give up on such research in the search for empirical parsimony or predictive certainty. In fact, given that environmental and natural resources governance reforms designed, promoted and funded by international peacebuilding organizations is commonplace and likely to increase, a provisional assessment is not only possible but necessary.

A Way Forward for Environmental and Natural Resource Governance

In light of these findings our reaction should not be to abandon efforts to govern the environment and natural resources in war-torn states. In fact, international attention and intervention has been critical to securing peace. Nor do I suggest that marketization of natural resources should be abandoned, since there is ample evidence that over the long-term such policies may promote peace and stability (Paris 2004). Indeed, I argue that international peacebuilders need to do three things. First, new strategies and policies need to be devised that can foster trust, build confidence and stress cooperation particularly in the decade or so after a conflict ends. This could be done by slowing down efforts to marketize natural

resources while speeding up efforts to provide sustainable livelihoods to the population. Reorienting such priorities, I believe, would help ensure that issues related to land ownership and tenure get resolved early on, reduce the "expectation gap" and minimize potential windows of opportunity in which spoilers can emerge. At the same time, peacebuilders need to make sure that reforms do not simply rebuild or reassemble pre-war arrangements and structures that had played a role in the conflict. "Slow-tracking" would allow enough time not only to rebuild state institutions in ways that better promote peace but to fully transform them. I certainly envision this "way forward" to be criticized on two grounds. The first is that "slow-tracking" rather than "fast-tracking" environmental and natural resource governance will not only increase the cost and duration of international peacebuilding but deprive war-torn states of revenue that can fund peacebuilding activities shortly after conflict ends. This may appear to be a solid critique but as the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases highlight the promise of such revenue is far from clear. The second potential critique is that a reorienting peacebuilding so that it focuses more on the local livelihoods and ownership needs of the population can undermine peace since it would slowdown statebuilding. However, what really weakens the war-torn state, and its ability to govern, is a lack of legitimacy that could be enhanced by placing an emphasis on local dynamics of peacebuilding *as well as* the national.

Second, IPOs need to go beyond new strategies and policies to interrogate assumptions and constructs. To name just one: viewing the environment and natural resources almost solely in economic terms can lead to reforms and policies that ignore politics and the political-economic linkages inherent in patronage. And third, IPOs need to be attentive to the fact that dealing with the environment and natural resources in war-torn states intrinsically comes with embedded tensions and contradictions that can make decisions difficult. Peacebuilders should ask precisely "whose peace" they are trying to secure and what kind of development genuinely leads to human well-being and security (Pugh, Cooper

and Turner 2008). Should the focus be on assessing the livelihoods needs and development priorities of local communities before state priorities for revenue and foreign direct investment, particularly in the early stages of peacebuilding? Should there be more balance when so much is at stake?

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into three sections. Section I examines the evolution of peacebuilding as well as the theoretical linkages between the environment, natural resources and peace. Chapter 2 places peacebuilding into context by discussing the circumstances that led to its rise as well as the development of the underlying strategies that have informed peacebuilding policies and practices over the last two decades. Chapter 3 highlights an issue that has received a growing share of attention from IPOs--the role of the environment and natural resources. The chapter first reviews the substantial literature connecting the environment and natural resource to conflict. It then details the scholarship linking the environment, natural resources to peace and describes how this is represented in the policies and practices of international peacebuilders.

Section II presents in-depth case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Chapter 4 details Liberia's 14-year conflict that ended in 2003, and briefly describes how it has been understood by international peacebuilders. The chapter then examines the country's forest resources, and discusses the role forests played in the Liberian conflict itself. Chapter 5 reviews the substantial international efforts to change the rules and institutions that govern forests in Liberia. To do so, it traces the development of specific reforms, policies and strategies targeted at the forest sector in the aftermath of the conflict--between 2003 and 2009. Chapter 6 provides an overview of the Sierra Leone conflict and international understanding of it. It then looks at the historical trajectory of Sierra Leone's diamond and mineral sectors, and examines the role this sector played in the decade-long conflict. Chapter

7 turns to a comprehensive examination of IPO efforts to reform diamond and mineral governance in Sierra Leone. In doing so, it traces key postconflict reforms, policies and strategies designed to govern the diamond and mineral sector between 2002 and 2009.

In Section III, I compare and evaluate efforts to govern Liberia's forest resources and Sierra Leone's diamond and mineral resources, respectively. In doing so, I first explore the similarities and differences in how international peacebuilders have gone about the process of transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources". Second, I compare the dominant strategies of "securitization" and "marketization", and analyze the extent to which they vary across cases. I then argue that although these strategies have produced some positive benefits, a close examination at the cases reveals a mixed verdict. Rather than serve as focal points for trust, confidence and cooperation, the reforms and policies have been relatively divisive and wrought with contention, conflict and resistance--some resulting in violence. The reason, I suggest, is that "securitization" and "marketization" a strategic agenda gives rise to a number of linked pathologies that include: the danger of inattention to livelihoods and the environment, the problem of unrealistic expectations, the risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements; and the danger of provoking societal competition. Given the strategies employed by IPOs, and the inherent effects and pathologies, the chapter then considers the extent to which environmental and natural resource reforms and policies actually help or hinder peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Based on these conclusions, Chapter 9 describes the key policy challenges as they relate to the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding and charts a "way forward". It concludes with a call for more research and outlines several fruitful avenues for inquiry.

Chapter 2: The Evolution of Peacebuilding

Despite enormous international investment in peacebuilding over the last two decades it remains very much an experiment in progress (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1). This is because transforming chaotic war-torn states into harmonious peaceful states--to the degree that it can be done at all-- is a complex undertaking and does not come with a dependable blueprint. There can be nothing more complicated than trying to build peace and engineer social, economic and political reform in a diverse set of countries emerging from civil strife---as the mixed record of peacebuilding can attest. A range of factors, including the conditions that led to the onset of war, the characteristics of the conflict and the nature of the peace settlement can complicate the task of sustaining peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002; Werner 1999). But peacebuilding also resembles an experiment because of its constantly expanding agenda and shifting sets of policies and strategies that have developed in response preceding peace operations and scholarship.

This chapter examines the co-evolution of peacebuilding in theory and practice. The first part reviews the origins of peacebuilding and the changing role of the UN and other international organizations in addressing civil conflict. It highlights how the idea of peacebuilding emerged as an international response to the "problem" posed by civil conflicts and failed states in the developing world. The second part of the chapter details an expanding peacebuilding agenda, which developed over time and in response to the shortcomings early peace operations and in the context of growing scholarship on contemporary civil conflict. The number of IPOs has increased dramatically throughout as

has the number of "sectoral" areas identified as significant for peacebuilding success. This includes environment and natural resource governance. The third part of the chapter focuses on shifts in peacebuilding strategy. What is remarkable is that despite an ever-expanding agenda and the emergence of new policies to address civil conflict, the underlying strategies employed by IPOs across cases remained relatively consistent. Despite claims to the contrary, "liberalization" is still promoted as a necessary ingredient for a sustainable and long-term peace in war-torn states. Recently, however, liberalization has been supplemented by a concerted strategy of "statebuilding" (Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009; Chandler 2010). Statebuilding is premised on the assumption that establishing the conditions for peace requires not just elections or "sectoral" reforms but the development of "capable, autonomous and legitimate" state institutions (Paris and Sisk 2009, 2). The purpose: without robust state institutions the ability of governments to govern will be limited and this puts war-torn states at risk.

Why is this important? First, environmental and natural resource governance reflects a merger of the two prominent peacebuilding strategies--liberalization and statebuilding. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, statebuilding is no more benign or neutral in the peacebuilding process than policies intended to democratize or establish free-market conditionalities in war-torn states (Paris 2004). The overriding perception is that states "freely choose" the rules and institutions that govern society in the aftermath of conflict. In reality, however, IPOs distrust--sometimes for good reason--the decisions and policies rendered by governments. As a result, IPOs actively promote and support the establishment of specific "rules of the game" in order to guarantee certain policies and agendas are in-place to protect international security interests. This becomes abundantly clear in efforts by IPOs to govern the environment and natural resources through reforms and policies that stress "securitization" and "marketization" in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Peacebuilding and the Problem of Failed States and New Wars

While the concept of a "failed state" was almost unthinkable a decade earlier, the concept gained widespread currency in the 1990s, and provided the rationale for the concept of peacebuilding (Helman and Ratner 1992/1993). Failed states were those deemed "utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community" and typified "instances in which central state authority collapses for several years" (Esty et al. 1995, 1). Failed states are "paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced"(Zartman 1995, 5). As a symbol of identity, the failed state had lost its power--as a territory it cannot assure security and as an authoritative political institution it has lost its legitimacy. As a system of socioeconomic organization it did not "exercise control over its people, and it's no longer even the target of demands, because people know that it is incapable of providing supplies" (Zartman 1995, 5). In short, failed were considered states are states in name only--internationally recognized--but lacking the capacity, legitimate institutions and the authority required for statebuilding (Fukuyama 2004; Carment 2003).

While failed states pose a range of problems, the most adverse are the conditions it creates from armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Krasner 2004). Many failed states collapse into violence-prone war-torn states because they lack the ability to prevent or overcome rebellion while also exacerbating grievances through ineffective and non-existent governance. John Mueller captures the dynamic, suggesting that "the amount of warfare that persists in the world--virtually all of it civil war--is a function of the degree to which inadequate government exists " (Mueller 2002, 29). The early 1990s saw an extended period of civil conflict, primarily in the developing world. Research at the time concluded that over 90 percent of all violent conflict during this period was internal in scope (Wallenstein and Sollenberg 2001). These conflicts garnered the label "new wars" by scholars to signify a

discontinuity between the "old wars"--in which conventional states or disciplined armies faced each other--and new ones that reflected a post-Cold War restructuring of the international system. New wars were thought to be: different in scope (intrastate as opposed to interstate); employ new fighting strategies and tactics (brutality and guerilla war to capture economically valuable areas as opposed to conventional strategies seeking to take territory and political power); utilize new methods of financing (based on global markets and shadow economies); use different types of combatants (child soldiers, warlords, private armies instead of professional soldiers) (Kaldor 1999; Malesevic 2008).

The new wars were also viewed by the international community as particularly lethal and cruel to civilians and non-combatants. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, child soldiers, hacking off limbs, executions and other atrocities were commonplace and became frequent news items on CNN (Jakobsen 1996). Commentators frequently explained new wars with reference to "new barbarism" in which irrational and uncivilized combatants were motivated by ethnic hatreds or primordial savagery to commit murder and cause mayhem (Kaplan 1994; Richards 1996). According to the UNDP, 90 percent of those killed in the civil conflicts of the 1990s were civilians, which was a complete reversal from the early 20th century when 90 percent of victims were uniformed combatants (UNDP 2002). Put another way, the ratio of civilian deaths to deaths of direct combatants increased three-fold from the 1980s to the 1990s (Kaldor 1999, 9). These civil conflicts certainly imperiled populations and created humanitarian emergencies that put pressure on the UN and the international community to act. These civil conflicts also gained international attention because of the perceived spillover effects that could endanger international security and stability. Simply put, states in the midst of conflict have collapsed and are unable to govern themselves and can provide fertile ground for global threats like terrorism, organized crime, drug, weapons and human trafficking, disease, environmental crises, refugee flows and mass migration. The worry, of course, was that such threats could easily "leap around the world" at a moment's

notice (USAID 2005, v). In response to the "problem" of failed states and new wars, international actors devised new practices and agendas to manage the problem. For a variety of reasons discussed below, this task fell largely at the feet of UN and other international peacebuilding organizations, which have periodically launched "peace operations" to prevent conflict from reoccurring in the aftermath of civil war.

The Origins of Peacebuilding

In the aftermath of World War II, the world was locked in a bi-polar struggle of ideological wills backed by nuclear deterrence. The period was defined by a dramatic reshuffling of international system as the process of decolonization led to an abundance of new sovereign states. The UN Charter with 51 signatories in 1945 ballooned to three times that by the early 1990s. The idea that all "peoples" were part of sovereign states that should be left to govern and administer themselves without the influence of other states or the UN defined the era. Consistent meddling in the affairs of other countries was standard practice in the international system but the UN went out of its way not to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction. Weak states were subject to periodic disruptions such as *coup d'etats* and civil war during the 1960s and 1970s but the suggestion that states could "fail" or be unable to govern themselves was an "anathema to the *raison d'etre* of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self determination" (Helman and Ratner 1992/1993, 4).

If the UN had sought to intervene in weak or newly independent states, it would have been viewed as a sovereign intrusion. Moreover, the US and Soviet Union, both veto members of the UN Security Council, would not have approved such interference in their "spheres of influence". When instability or civil strife did occur, the superpowers competed to control the situation in strategically important places. Even in states that did not pose any real strategic problem, the prospect of reaching agreement on the UN overseeing postconflict reconstruction was virtually impossible due to ideological divides. As such, the UN Charter

combined with the Cold War and decolonization largely restricted UN activities.

Periodically, however, the UN did get involved in traditional peacekeeping functions. These operations typically involved the deployment of lightly armed military observers to monitor ceasefires or patrolling the buffer zones that kept combatants apart. In these instances, the UN was prohibited from using force and instructed not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the target state. The UN Emergency Force positioned in Egypt along the border with Israel in 1956, for instance, was deemed successful precisely because it was able to keep its actions separate from the internal affairs of the Egyptian state (Paris 2004, 14).

Furthermore, while newly independent states were relatively weak, unstable and impoverished, intervention of any kind was considered unnecessary because the power of modernization and development was the recipe for peaceful and prosperous states. For the West in particular, the illustrative model was the Marshall Plan that rebuilt the war-torn states of Europe and Japan after World War II by focusing on technical and economic assistance to establish stable market democracies. The superpowers, along with members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), contributed substantial development and humanitarian aid to Third World states for this purpose. Likewise, the UN, through the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other agencies, contributed substantial sums to foster economic development through technical assistance projects. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs), most notably the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), also administered billions of dollars in grants and loans ostensibly to assist developing states.

The situation changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of so-called failed states. In an instant, the UN was presented with the opportunity to become more engaged in the domestic affairs of states, which altered the prevailing norms of

international intervention revolutionized peace operations.⁷ Since the US and Soviet Union (and later, Russia) were unwilling to get involved in countries not considered vital to their immediate security interests, the demands on the UN to address long-standing conflicts or failed states increased dramatically. In 1989, the UN sent a mission to Namibia to disarm combatants, prepare the country for its first democratic elections and draft a new constitution. In 1991, new peace operations were launched in Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia that involved organizing for elections and human rights monitoring.⁸ The following year, the UN deployed to Bosnia and Somalia in the midst of civil conflict and to Mozambique to lay the groundwork for elections. In every case since 1989, the UN functioned outside of the constraints that had traditionally been imposed. Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Somalia, for example, were authorized by the Security Council to use force for more than self-defense, and in Cambodia the UN took over administration of the state for a short time during the transition.

In short, the conventional prohibitions on UN "meddling" in the sovereign affairs of states was being superseded by new norms of international intervention institutionalized to manage civil conflicts and the problem of failed states (Finnemore 2003). Traditional approaches to addressing failed states and civil conflict were simply inadequate in the milieu of the post-Cold War world. In a broad articulation of the UN's position, *An Agenda for Peace* was prepared by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The report described the evolving mission of the UN and refined the terminology on peace operations.

⁷ This expanded role of the UN also coincided with new list of international security threats including disease, environment and poverty had materialized on the global agenda that no one country was powerful or willing enough to adequately address. Such threats, we were told, would require international cooperation and coordination from the UN and other international organizations.

⁸ In Cambodia, the UN even took over the administration of the country for a short time.

Preventative diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. *Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. *Peacebuilding* is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.⁹

The *Agenda for Peace* also established in the UN lexicon the term peacebuilding, defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 4). What was particularly notable was that by the UN's own definition the objective of peacebuilding was not simply to end conflict but establish the conditions for peace, which is a longer-term agenda. Not surprisingly, then, the objectives of peacebuilding were broadened considerably in comparison to the UN's traditional unwillingness to intervene.

These may include disarming warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 13).

It is not a stretch to say that in the early 1990s, postconflict peacebuilding was the "UN's principal peace and security activity" (Paris and Sisk 2009, 5). At least eight "peace

⁹ Peacekeeping operations are distinct from “peace enforcement” (which is the authorization to impose order without permission of the sovereign).

operations" were deployed between 1989 and 1993 alone. The UN arguably achieved some early "successes" by helping to bring civil conflicts to tenuous peace. In Namibia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Cambodia the UN helped to facilitate a peace treaty, monitor the demobilization of forces, and organize elections. But a majority of the civil conflicts seemed only to fester under uncertain conditions, and at times without clear victors, which caused state institutions to decay, infrastructure to collapse, and economic and social development to deteriorate. Research at the time showed that of states in the midst of postconflict "transition", approximately 44 percent would resume open warfare in the first five years after a provisional settlement and nearly 50 percent of states in the midst of civil war would revert to violence in the first decade of relative peace (Collier et al. 2003; World Bank 2004). The most accurate predictor of future violent conflict appeared to be the occurrence of past violent conflict (Junne and Verkoren 2004). In addition, when the peacebuilding process fails and conflict resumes, more intense violence than in the previous war is often the result and any political progress, economic development and social rehabilitation achieved in the intervening period is undermined (Collier et al. 2003). Rwanda, Bosnia Somalia from 1993-1994 are cases in point. UN efforts in Somalia to support political reconciliation, start economic and social reconstruction, and secure a peace was a disappointment and the country remains one of the most problematic failed states in the world (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). In Bosnia, the UN's Protection Force was unable to establish "zones of safety" that could stop war crimes against the population. And in Rwanda, failed UN efforts to consolidate peace resulted in renewed conflict, and an estimated 800,000 additional deaths the following year. The profound cost of failing to consolidate peace became evident. This soul-searching led not only to a short lull in peace operations but a systematic reexamination of peacebuilding practices.

Country	Operational Start
Namibia	1989
Nicaragua	1989
Angola	1991
Cambodia	1991
El Salvador	1991
Mozambique	1992
Liberia	1993 and 2003
Rwanda	1993
Bosnia	1995
Croatia	1995
Guatemala	1997
Timor Leste	1999
Kosovo	1999
Sierra Leone	1999
Democratic Republic of Congo	2000
Afghanistan	2002
Cote d'Ivoire	2004
Burundi	2004
Sudan	2005 and 2007

Table 1. UN Peacebuilding Operations 1989-2007¹⁰

¹⁰ Adapted from Paris and Sisk 2009; Paris 2004.

Peacebuilding: The Second Generation

By 1995, the *Agenda for Peace* had been supplemented in a position paper by Boutros-Ghali. The *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* recognized the broad international appeal of postconflict peacebuilding but acknowledged certain shortcomings. The paper suggested that peacebuilding needed to be more than simply a “postconflict” activity. Instead, peacebuilding was better conceived of as a practice of controlling and resolving conflicts and consolidating peace at any stage (Boutros-Ghali 1995). This observation was based on a new understanding--exemplified by preceding peacebuilding failures-- that war-torn states go through pulses of violent conflict and habitually relapse into full-scale war after peace agreements have been signed. It challenged the conventional notion that states progress from war to peace in a linear fashion and according to a predictable set of stages. The optimistic but parsimonious peacebuilding agenda promulgated by the UN was relatively successful at negotiating ceasefires and peace settlements but did not "create the structures for the institutionalization of peace" (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

At the same time, complications implementing the Dayton-Peace Accords in 1996 led the UN to reconsider its timelines and benchmarks for success. Although peacebuilding had been defined years earlier in terms of establishing the conditions for peace, many operations--Bosnia included--were scheduled for only one year intervals. This timeframe was wholly inadequate for the task of peacebuilding if, indeed, holding elections, resettling refugees, reforming economic systems and rebuilding government capacity was truly to be achieved. In Bosnia, for example, the mission was eventually extended for a period of 18 months, and subsequently extended for an indefinite period. This problem became the crux of an influential UN evaluation of its peace operations published in 2000. The report, referred to as the Brahimi Report (2000), concluded that UN missions lacked realistic timelines and was devoid of a coordinated strategy (Brahimi 2000). The report stated that UN mandates tended

to focus on the appropriate "exit strategy" rather than a results-based framework for success (Brahimi 2000, viii). Among other things, the report underscored the need for short-term projects that "make a real difference in the lives of people" and a long-term strategy to achieve national reconciliation and support the governance institutions (Brahimi 2000, ix).

This new understanding of peacebuilding, termed by former Secretary-General Kofi-Annan as a policy of "No Exit without Strategy" emerged in parallel with new scholarship in the late 1990s that also had an effect on the practice of peacebuilding. Research by the World Bank concluded that the difficulty in achieving a durable peace in war-torn states in the early 1990s was a failure to address the root causes of conflict, which in the cases studied were widespread poverty and anemic economic growth (World Bank 1997; 2004). As has been pointed out by the World Bank and others, "over one billion of the world's poor were either directly affected or at high risk of being affected by civil war, and 80 percent of the world's 20 poorest countries suffered a major war in the past 15 years" (Avalle 2007). If, indeed, the objective of peacebuilding was to "consolidate peace to prevent a reoccurrence of armed confrontation", then addressing poverty would be essential (Annan 1998). The evidence, in fact, concluded that poverty produced a "conflict trap"--because impoverished countries were not only more vulnerable to conflict but conflict only deepens poverty. In short, a lack of economic development in the aftermath of conflict could quite easily lead to the resumption of violence. Second, the World Bank concluded that a "development gap" existed between the time UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief ended and long-term reconstruction, economic development and political stability commenced (Collier et al. 2003). To address this gap, the World Bank advocated a sustained and long-term form of peacebuilding to ensure that war-torn states proceed with economic development during the transition from war to peace (World Bank 2004). As Mark Duffield (2001) has noted, peacebuilding objectives of security and development became inseparable around this time, and the discourse of peacebuilding merged seamlessly with the discourse of development.

In parallel with the World Bank findings, scholarship in the late 1990s led to an expansion in the number of sub-areas and approaches understood as important for peacebuilding. For instance, emergent literature on the durability of peace after civil war stressed the importance of different types of peacebuilding operations and peace settlements in ending war and building peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2003). Other influential work stressed the economic motivations of combatants. These theories concluded that civil conflict was the result of economic opportunities available to rebels and warlords; rather than political grievances typically associated with the onset of war. Specifically, conventional insurgencies were motivated by "greed" and characterized by the "self-financing" character of new wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Ross 2003). This perspective, in turn, led to increasing attention to the environment and natural resources in peacebuilding circles since abundant or "lootable" commodities were believed to fuel civil conflict.¹¹ Still other scholarship examined the significance of gender, justice or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs on peacebuilding outcomes, to name just a few. In short, peacebuilding policy and practice increasingly sought to address an almost inexhaustible list of issues.

In the early 1990s, peace operations were monopolized by the UN. However, peacebuilding has developed into what Roland Paris (2004, 13) called a "growth industry", characterized by an extensive array of international peacebuilding organizations or IPOs. These IPOs include most prominently the UN and its agencies¹², including UNDP, UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP); the World Bank; IMF; OECD; European Union, national development agencies (e.g. US Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Department of International Development (DFID); regional organizations; and a broad range of international non-

¹¹ See Chapter 3.

¹² The UN is represented by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs and Department of Economic and Social Affairs Also UN Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office.

governmental organizations (INGOs). Funding from these international organizations has also led to the emergence of numerous domestic non-governmental organizations and civil society groups, which largely support the peacebuilding agenda circumscribed by the international community. Depending on the situation, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the militaries of western powers have also become involved in peacebuilding activities. A growing number of private companies have also become an active part of the peacebuilding given the importance of developing the economic sector and attracting foreign direct investment.¹³ On the periphery, there are also a group of academics, consultants, media groups and charities that influence the character and priorities of peacebuilding. While the exact constellation of peacebuilders does vary from one peace operation to the next there is a regular contingent of IPOs that are active in war-torn states.

Operations after 1999, including in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia reflected the lessons of the pre-1997 era. The mandates of the missions were considerably more expansive than earlier operations and arguably more strategic in terms of achieving peacebuilding milestones. UN timelines were not necessarily "open ended" but there was an acknowledgement that building peace would require a long-term commitment on the part of IPOs. Elections, humanitarian issues and security were emphasized along with traditional development goals of poverty alleviation, economic growth, education, health, gender and infrastructure were seen as critical to breaking the "conflict trap" and consolidating peace (World Bank 1997; 2004). In addition, attention began to turn toward to improving governance and state institutions. In Sierra Leone, Liberia and to a lesser extent East Timor, the management of the environment and natural resources played a prominent role in peacebuilding practices. The expanding peacebuilding agenda of the post-1999 peacebuilding is well illustrated by a UN Security Council statement (UNSC 2001a):

¹³ Private companies are also widely used as security contractors and for training police and army forces.

Peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.

The ever-evolving and expanding second-generation of peacebuilding appeared to be moderately successful. Compared to the mid-1990s, few countries had actually reverted back to all-out civil war. This was a good sign but as the Brahimi Report (2000, 3) concluded that peacebuilding is "more than just the absence of war". Recall that the objective instead was to "reassemble the foundations of peace" and this seemed to be in doubt (Brahimi 2000, 3; UN 2004). In 2005 alone, the seven of the nine conflicts that broke were characterized by fighting between previous foes (Call and Cousens 2008, 7). In addition, according to Charles Call and Susan Cook (2003, 240), of the 18 UN led peace operations ongoing between 1998 and 2002, 13 were considered authoritarian regimes after UN intervention. Moreover, in a large majority of war-torn states poverty and deep socio-economic inequalities, which arguably were among the root causes of conflict, still remained intact. While few would argue that operations, on the whole, have done more harm than good, the UN and other IPOs have continued to evaluate peacebuilding outcomes (Brahimi 2000; UN 2004).¹⁴

¹⁴ Jeffrey Herbst (2003) suggests that IBOs should not intervene in African states but to "let them fail". The reason: peacebuilding freezes in-place relations that led to the conflicts in the first place and only through failures will new, more sustainable political arrangements emerge.

Some experts conclude the broadened peacebuilding agenda, and revolving constellation of IPO, has created a confusing mix of goals, activities, timelines and contexts, which are actually slowing the process of peace consolidation (Paris and Sisk 2009; Richmond 2004). As Paris (2004, 19) alludes to, second generation peacebuilding is not "run" by the UN or any other IPO. International peacebuilding organizations have a variety of responsibilities, missions, objectives and interventions - humanitarian relief, conflict mitigation, peacekeeping, poverty alleviation, institutional building and good governance--all carried out in very different temporal dimensions from short, medium and long term. This creates not only a lack of strategic consistency and coherency but also fosters cleavages and competition between IPOs that can have negative consequences for peacebuilding. As Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis (2006, 344) suggest there is a "need for better strategy coordination when several international agencies intervene in the same conflict." Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to this lack of coordination as a "gaping hole" that limited the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding operations. Still others insisted that peacebuilding suffers from a continued lack of investment in time and money. A High Level UN Panel, for instance, stated that a "failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict" (UN 2004). And *In Larger Freedom* (UNGA 2005), a report of the UN Secretary-General, noted that:

Deploying...peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict.

To meet the need for more coordination and investment, the UN created The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Peacebuilding Support Office in 2005 to advise the UN General Assembly and Security Council. The commission acknowledged the need for:

Coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to postconflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace; recognizing that need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict toward recovery, reintegration and reconstruction; and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development (UN 2005).

The main purpose of the PBC was to: (1) bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for postconflict peacebuilding and recovery; (2) focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; (3) and provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations (UNGA 2005b). As of 2007, three focus countries had been selected-- Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. The UN has, more recently, put into place "integrated missions" (for example, in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste) that combine all the dimensions of peacebuilding together under a central UN office. The purpose is to move the UN from "coordination to integration" so that political, security and humanitarian responses are linked.

The concept of peacebuilding has been deeply institutionalized in the international system by international actors concerned in large part that war-torn and failed states pose a serious problem to global security and stability. It is evident that peacebuilding practices and policy will continue to evolve. But what underlying strategies provide the theoretical

guidance to the practices and policies articulated above? How have these changed over time? And does it matter for peacebuilding?

Peacebuilding Frameworks

The evolution of peacebuilding over the course of the last two decades is quite remarkable. In light of the challenges posed by war-torn states, and the various pathologies of peace operations, peacebuilding has changed. New policies, agendas, sub-areas, institutions and practices have frequently emerged in response to the peacebuilding experiment. In addition, the constellation of international peace builders has grown substantially. But the underlying peacebuilding strategies have varied little. The first decade or so IPOs stressed a typical formula of liberalization to end war and build states, which was found to be deeply flawed (Paris 2004). Despite statements to the contrary liberalization still remains central to the peacebuilding experiment. Recently, however, it has been supplemented by a shift toward a strategy of statebuilding (Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009; Chandler 2010).

Liberalization: elections and markets

A majority of peace operations during the 1990s focused on what Roland Paris (2004) termed the “elixir of liberalization”. Peacebuilding, and hence IBOs, pursued a strategy to establish a sustainable and lasting peace by reproducing the tenets of the liberal peace thesis. Liberalization assumes the stability-enhancing traits of both democratization and market-oriented economic policies. The strategy was based on the perception--which was dominant in the years following the Cold War--that democracy and free-market economics had trumped all other ways of organizing society. It was also based on the enduring perception that democracy and international trade had rebuilt a peaceful Europe and Japan after World War II (Bermeo 2003). Larry Diamond (1995) captures well the optimism

surrounding democratization and the "Third Wave" of democracy when suggesting the 20th century offered a particularly valuable lesson:

Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form a more reliable, open and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climate for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, *democracies are the only reliable foundation on which to build a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built* (emphasis added).

Such pronouncements were routine in the 1990s. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1996) all but pronounced democracy the cure-all for the planet's and humanity's ills when he stressed that democracy was "essential to progress on a wide range of human concerns and to the protection of human rights." This human concern included not only war between states but also conflict within them. Democracy was the anecdote for everything: economic development, cultural enrichment, control of crime and corruption, and the protection of the environment (Boutros-Ghali 1996). The optimism with regards to democracy as the dominant peacebuilding strategy was supported by scholarship that sustained the link between liberal forms of government and lower incidences of interstate

conflict, and the notion that market democracies rarely go to war against one another (Chan 1997; Ray 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001). Related studies also concluded that market democracies, especially those that are "well established", are less prone to experience civil conflict (Hegre 2001). RJ Rummel (1997, 85), for instance, found democracies to be less likely than non-democracies to experience "revolutions, bloody *coups d'etat*, political assassinations, anti-government terrorist bombings, guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, civil wars, mutinies and rebellions."

Given the evidence that peace could be secured through democracy and free markets, it is not surprising that liberalization served as the universal strategy of IBOs throughout the 1990s (Paris 2004). In theory, at least, democracy--defined largely by the holding of elections--would serve as the mechanism for postconflict reconciliation and compromise. This explains why most of peace operations focused on political reconciliation, in particular, and was preoccupied with arranging peace settlements, planning for elections, overseeing constitutional reforms, and rebuilding civil society--but little else. Marina Ottaway (2003) refers to this as the "democratic reconstruction model" of peacebuilding, which provided a rationale for limited peace operations since it entailed short-term efforts to maintain security in preparation for elections. As such, democratization--and more specifically the emphasis on holding elections--were convenient endpoints that "provided a built-in exit strategy" for the UN and other reluctant peacebuilders (Kumar 1998).

Democratization was also deemed significant because it was supposed to lay the groundwork for neoliberal economic reforms, which were dominant during the 1990s. These were characterized by eliminating barriers to international trade, attracting foreign investment, stimulating private enterprise and limiting the government's role in the economy. In terms of peacebuilding policy, such reforms might result in: the privatization of state-owned industries, reductions in government subsidies, the loosening of regulations, and reductions in government spending (Paris 2004, 166). In theory, these reforms and policies

would work to revitalize the economy in order to “buy confidence in the peace process...fund specific commitments in the peace agreement... and set the foundations necessary to sustain peace” (Woodward 2002). If democratization was thought to set the foundation for peace, it was through economic reforms that peace would be cemented. Efforts by IBOs to promote and establish free-market economic reforms was reinforced by evidence that, among other things, slow or stagnant economic growth, combined with endemic poverty, correlated to incidences of violent conflict (Collier et al. 2003). It was also reinforced by the realization that reconstruction would require substantial state revenue. While experts largely avoided the question of *what* would “jump-start” economic growth or *what* might mobilize state revenue quickly--natural resources being the most obvious-- it was quite reasonable that IBOs should promote and rapidly implement reforms and policies to spur economic growth and development.

Despite optimism about the power of liberalization to transform war -torn states into peaceful states, the results were somewhat problematic. As noted above, the rate at which civil conflict resumed after peace after the arrival of IBOs raised serious questions about peacebuilding policies. Moreover, evidence that authoritarian regimes were more likely to govern after intervention by IPOs (in spite of elections and “democratization” efforts) suggested that peacebuilding strategies might be defective. The inability of IPOs to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace, particularly in the 1990s, was blamed on a variety of issues, which were discussed in the preceding section; others postulated that the underlying strategy of liberalization was having a deleterious effect on the ability of war-torn states to establish peace (Paris 2004). Research showed, for instance, that conflict reoccurred more often than not in states exposed to UN peace operations (Paris 2004). An illustrative example is Timor Leste, which after a period of intense liberalization (and UN peacekeepers pulled out), collapsed into violence in 2006 (Richmond 2009). Meanwhile, scholarship found that although market democracies may ultimately be more peaceful than non-democracies,

promoting democracy involves profound social transformation that is a very bumpy ride. Carothers (2002) suggested that most transitioning states are stuck in a “gray zone” that resembles democracy in name only. Similarly, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argued that states undergoing transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule are more likely than established democracies or non-democracies to be involved in conflict due to political opportunists and resurgent nationalism. Other scholars have reached comparable conclusions, pointing out that states are particularly war-prone in the earliest phases of democratic transition (Huntington 1968; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Hegre 2001; Snyder 2000). There is also substantial disagreement on the precise relationship between market-oriented economic policies and civil conflict. While well-established market economies certainly seem to enjoy peace and stability, market-based reforms and policies appear to increase not decrease violence and civil unrest in developing countries (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Skogly 1993; Stiglitz 2002; Walton and Seddon 1994).

According to Paris (2004, 156), the fatal flaw in the liberalization-peacebuilding paradigm was that democracy and market-based economic policies “both encourage conflict and competition.” Democracy requires competitive elections and a politically active civil society that can scrutinize state policy and balance state power (Paris 2004, 156). In theory, this tension can act as a safety-valve that reduces conflict but in war-torn states competition for state power or the rules that govern society may lead to renewed instability and violence (Dahl 1986). This paradox extends to the self-interested competition that lies at the heart of liberal economic theory. In such a world, competition for profit in the marketplace works to allocate resources in such a way as to create greater prosperity and peace for society as a whole. The problem, of course, is that social cohesion is not guaranteed since reforms and policies designed to spur economic growth can create disparities in wealth that fosters political instability and disorder (Huntington 1968, 5). Furthermore, the competitive nature

of capitalism creates winners and losers, which can fuel social unrest and undermine the process of democratization.

The apparent pathologies of liberalization resulted very different reactions among IBOs and experts (Paris 2009). While some questioned the merits of the liberalization orthodoxy, a majority emphasized the point that before democracy and market-based economic policies can be sustained, state institutions must have the capacity and legitimacy to govern.

Statebuilding: authority and institutions

Liberalization certainly remains a dominant peacebuilding strategy. However, over the last decade there has been a growing recognition among IBOs and experts alike that successful war to peace transitions requires a strategy of "statebuilding." The emphasis on statebuilding gained momentum after 9/11 when the problem of failed and war-torn states garnered increased visibility among scholars and the international security establishment. Spillover effects were no longer perceived as just humanitarian concerns but were identified as a genuine strategic threat to international security. In the US, failed states suffering from a "sovereignty gap" became the top national security priority (White House 2002). This new security orientation influenced ongoing peace operations by emphasizing almost overnight the importance of building states and the legitimate structures of governance to prevent state failure and conflict relapse (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan 2005). Francis Fukuyama (2004, 103), citing operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Timor Leste, criticized IBOs for not creating "self-sustaining states". He argued that a lack of state institutions was a critical obstacle to achieving political, economic and social development in failed states and a continued cause for alarm in other countries. Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin (2004) argued that UN-led peacebuilding missions had not been effective at statebuilding. Without state institutions and authority they argued public services --the ultimate

precondition for political and economic success--would fail to be realized. Fukuyama and Fearon and Laitin recommended a robust form of peacebuilding that in some situation may warrant "neo-trusteeship" in which international actors take over the administration of fragile and war-torn national governments. Likewise, Steven Krasner (2004, 90) argued that effective government institutions are required to provide lasting results noting that "failed, inadequate and incompetent or abusive national authority structures has sabotaged the economic well-being, violated the basic human rights, and undermined the physical security of the their country's populations." The perception was that IBOs must first build states to build peace (Call and Wyeth 2008).

Statebuilding, then, is the "construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict" (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1).¹⁵ Put another way, statebuilding "is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones" (Fukuyama 2004, ix). At its core, statebuilding is a strategy to both rehabilitate state institutions and restore the authority of war-torn states (Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009). From this perspective, statebuilding draws on Max Weber's concept of the state as a collection of institutions that successfully claim a monopoly on the legitimate authority over a given territory. As Call and Wyeth (2008) suggest, statebuilding places a strategic peacebuilding priority on building institutional capacity, which emphasizes the functionality of formal state agencies; rather than informal or traditional institutions of authority or international authority. In this Weberian view, "stateness" functions in two ways. First, it furnishes institutions that can guarantee a monopoly of the coercive use of force and institutions that can collect revenues and govern expenditures. But beyond the army, police and tax/customs agencies, the institutional

¹⁵ Chandler (2010, 1) argues that statebuilding goes beyond war-torn states and is "seen as a vital package of policy measures designed to prevent states from sliding into political and economic collapse."

understanding of the state extends to all state agencies, including those that formulate policy in the areas of justice, finance, agriculture and trade, among others.

Scholars suggest that to establish a sustainable and long-term peace, state institutions must be legitimate to the population and the outside world. Institutions should, in theory, provide space for society to express their preferences and resolve conflicts nonviolently. If institutions of the state are weak or societal contestation too strong, competition can lead to renewed violence (Paris 2004). Ineffective institutions can also cause a "security dilemma" whereby societal groups that cannot rely on the state for protection may have an incentive to mobilize in self-defense (Paris 2004, 173). In addition, fractured or illegitimate state institutions may not be able to (or want to) balance societal demands into authoritative "rules of the game" thereby inviting individuals and groups to pursue their own interests outside of state institutions (Paris 2004, 173). Paris (2004) argued that IBOs need to devote more attention to institutional prerequisites of peacebuilding since virtually every peacebuilding task--from long-term security, the rule of law, alleviating poverty, managing the environment and natural resources, repairing infrastructure and healing society-- inherently takes place within the constraints of state institutions that are designed to resolve disputes, translate public debate into governmental policy and enforce a system of rules and regulations that govern the polity.

More to the point, statebuilding (and hence state institutions) is perceived as critical to the goal of implementing reforms and policies of good governance, which are desired by IBOs. As noted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997):

Good governance is also a component of our work for peace. It has a strong preventive aspect. It gives societies sound structures for economic and social development. In post-conflict settings, good governance can promote reconciliation and offer a path for consolidating

peace. Good governance demands the consent and the participation of the governed and the full and lasting involvement of all citizens in the future of their nation.

Recall that at its core failed and war-torn states are states with perceptibly weak, corrupt or non-existent governance. In short, legitimate state institutions are deemed essential for transforming bad governance, which causes problems into good governance that rights them. Governance is a process by which rules, institutions and processes through which authority and control are established, political decisions made, state and society structured and social and economic policies administered. Good governance, on the other hand, is a normative concept that stresses:

The capacity of the state, the commitment to the public good, the rule of law, the degree of transparency and accountability, the level of popular participation, and the stock of social capital. Without good governance, it is impossible to foster development. No amount of resources transferred or infrastructure built can compensate for-or survive-bad governance (USAID 2009).

Another overarching premise is also that without a functioning state and good governance, democracy and economic reform would be impossible. In short, analysts believed that the problems with the peacebuilding-liberalization nexus alluded to in the preceding section could be mitigated through statebuilding (Paris 2004). For example, scholars have long argued that successful democratization requires the existence of a functioning state with a functioning bureaucracy (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 23). Democracies are more likely to survive if it has an institutional apparatus necessary to exercise "a monopoly on the legitimate use of force" and "command...regulate and extract tax revenues and coordinate the relations among contending social and economic interests"

(Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 23). Moreover, war-torn states that lack institutional capacity are less likely to successfully manage economic reforms. According to Paris (2004) legitimate state institutions are required to oversee and implement economic policies, which include enforcing property rights, managing public finances, granting and enforcing contracts and concessions, collecting taxes, and regulating banks.

Against this backdrop, IBOs began to adjust peacebuilding strategies toward constructing and strengthening state institutions. This process began post-1999 but accelerated after 2002 more or less in response to 9/11, and the conflict in Iraq (World Bank 2000; OECD 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009). From Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Timor Leste and Burundi--and more recently Afghanistan and Cote d'Ivoire--IBOs have invested in a strategy of statebuilding. This strategy has manifested itself in two-ways in peace operations. First, peacebuilders have invested heavily on improving state capacity and administration in terms of training, funding and reorganizing state ministries and agencies. The rationale is that state capacity--often in decay after conflict-- is needed if the government is to deliver basic services and carry out political, security and economic functions essential for peacebuilding (read: liberalization). Second, peacebuilders "export" the tenets of good governance, including inclusiveness, accountability, transparency and the rule of law into war-torn states (Chandler 2010). Not only are these tenets perceived to be important characteristics of the liberal state imperative for long-term peace and development but serve as an antidote for bad governance (e.g., corruption) that can lead to conflict relapse.

Statebuilding is no more benign or neutral in the peacebuilding process than policies intended to liberalize war-torn states (Paris 2004). For this reason, building peace by first building states will not be without controversy. Although systematic attempts to evaluate statebuilding as a peacebuilding strategy have only just begun several problems emerge (Paris and Sisk 2009; Chandler 2010). Does the substantial level of intervention statebuilding requires run the risk that IBOs will be perceived by local and national actors as an intrusion?

Does enhancing the power and authority of state institutions create insecurity among excluded or alienated groups in society that can ignite conflict? Can statebuilding undermine efforts to form participatory state institutions by strengthening abusive regimes or recreating pre-war arrangements? Can state institutions buffer the effects of liberalization?

Conclusion

After the review of peacebuilding presented, two things are worth noting. First, peacebuilding practices, policies and strategies will continue to evolve along with the "lesson learned" from ongoing operations, new scholarship and as yet to be determined global events. Because the stakes are so high, we can expect efforts to improve upon the peacebuilding experiment to continue. Second, peacebuilding and its "successes" are bound to be controversial and uncertain. This is merely the by-product--for better or worse--of trying to transform something as complex and multifaceted as war-torn states and societies.

On the surface, the importance of this chapter to my research is clear. I am interested in examining how environmental and natural resources governance helps or hinders peacebuilding so we must first understand the evolution of the concept and the milieu within which it materialized. As noted in the chapter, attention to the environment and natural resources by IPOs emerged in the late-1990s, after which it became integrated in peacebuilding policy. This attention was due largely emergent scholarship that linked the environment and natural resources to civil conflict, which I discuss at length in Chapter 3.

This chapter is also important for another reason that will unfold in subsequent chapters. Environmental and natural resource governance in Liberia and Sierra Leone reflects a merger between the two prominent peacebuilding strategies--liberalization and statebuilding. Rather than permitting war-torn states to freely choose the rules and institutions, I argue that IBOs actively promote and support the establishment of specific reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural

resources. For reasons that will become clear, this poses a significant problem for peacebuilding and raises questions about the strategies being employed by peacebuilders.

Chapter 3: The Environment and Natural Resources in Conflict and Peace

The salience of global environmental issues increased in the early 1990s as it became clearer that problems could transcend borders and it would require international cooperation to solve them (UNCED 1992). Problems in one country--a nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl, for example--might swiftly endanger the safety *and* security of another. Jessica Matthews (1989) linked the environment to security concerns by building on heightened public concern about ozone depletion, climate change and rainforest destruction. The result was a period in which the environment was "securitized"--that is, linked to Western geopolitical and national security threats (Dalby 2002). Some scholars argued that militarizing the environment and equating it with a security imperative was methodology unwarranted and a potentially dangerous conflation of issues but it still gained enormous global currency (Deudney and Matthew 1999; Diehl and Gleditsch 2001; Khagram and Ali 2006). At the same time, the perceived increase in fragile states and "new wars", discussed in the preceding chapter, had also grown to dominate the international security agenda. The result: efforts to redefine security after the Cold War did so in combination with the proliferation of "new wars" and global environmental issues, which focused international attention on the linkages between the environment, natural resources and civil conflict.

This chapter starts by examining the extensive scholarship concerning the environment, natural resources and civil conflict. In doing so, I suggest that the idea that the environment and natural resources correspond in some way to civil conflict materialized alongside the "problem" of fragile states and "new wars" discussed in Chapter 2. I argue that

despite the literature, which frames the debate in terms of scarcity or abundance explanations of civil conflict, it suffers from significant intellectual challenges, methodological doubts and empirical complexities that have result in few, if any, definitive findings. These ambiguities aside, these explanations are the dominant framework from which IBOs perceive the environment, natural resource and conflict problematic. The chapter, then, examines the ways in which IBOs have incorporated environmental and natural resources concerns into peace operations over the last decade. I suggest that the environment-resource-conflict literature has had a profound influence on the way international peacebuilding organizations understand how the environment and natural resources relate to peace and has a significant bearing on the reforms and policies that peacebuilders promote in war-torn states. All of this raises serious questions about peacebuilding: given how little we know about the linkages between the environment, natural resources and conflict, how can we trust that the linkages between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding are correct?

The Environment, Natural Resources and Conflict

Resource scarcity

The perception that resource scarcity can cause social problems and even violent conflict is nothing new. Thomas Malthus in 1798 posited that growing populations would eventually outstrip food supplies and lead to disease, social decay and violent conflict. Garrett Hardin (1968) popularized the view that overpopulation would severely tax our environmental resources and have serious societal impacts. A contemporary version of Malthusianism was posited by Robert Kaplan, who wrote in an influential *Atlantic Monthly* article that “surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution and possibly rising sea levels... will prompt mass migrations and in turn incite group conflict” (1994, 58). Suffice to say, Kaplan was appreciably influenced by

the scholarship of Thomas Homer-Dixon, which focused on the links between global environmental change and civil conflict.

Homer-Dixon (1991) used case-based evidence to suggest that under certain conditions scarcities of renewable resources (i.e., cropland, fish, water, forests) exacerbated by environmental degradation and depletion, population growth and inequitable distribution, can trigger violent conflict.¹⁶ He argued that conflicts often appear to have other causes because resource scarcity generates other significant social effects such as poverty, migration, economic decline, ethnic tension and weak institutions that are frequently mistaken for a conflict's "immediate causes" (Homer Dixon and Blitt 1998, 223). Homer-Dixon noted that resources scarcities motivate political and economic elites to capture resources that end up marginalized groups and forcing them to migrate to ecologically vulnerable or unproductive areas. The result: substantial grievances that increase opportunities for "collective action...against the state" (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998, 227). This can lead not only to conflict but undermine the state by increasing demands on institutions, encouraging predation by elites and reducing tax revenues (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998).

Similar correlations between resource scarcity and violent conflict were also found in case study work carried out by the Environmental and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) headed by Günther Baechler (Baechler 1998; Baechler and Spillmann 1996). The findings suggested that environmental degradation induces conflict when social "fault lines are manipulated in struggles over social, ethnic, political and international power" but that conflict is more likely with weak states, societies with environmental discrimination and a history of conflict, among other factors (Baechler and Spillman n 1996, 24). Similar to Homer-Dixon, Baechler and Spillmann (1996) argued that "environmental conflicts manifest themselves as political, social, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts" and as such resource scarcities,

¹⁶ Homer-Dixon cites places like Sierra Leone, Haiti, Chiapas (Mexico), Rwanda and Sudan.

compounded by environmental exploitation and population growth, aggravate already existing social problems that can be traced to a lack of economic development and unequal resource distribution (Baechler and Spillmann 1996, 26). In light of Homer-Dixon's and ENCOP's work, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) conducted a quantitative study to test the causal link between resource scarcity and violent conflict. The findings confirmed that environmental degradation in the form of deforestation, land degradation and scarce freshwater, does increase the risk of "lower level" violent conflict. However, key economic and political factors, such as level of development and political regime, were found to be more significant in predicting the likelihood of civil conflict.¹⁷

Critical analysts inspired by political ecology widely critiqued the resource scarcity findings as a throwback to cultural ecologists who surmised that conflict plays a role in maintaining a population and ecological balance (Peluso and Watts 2001, 13-14). From this perspective conflict is a natural phenomenon devoid of both human agency and structural conditions. Like Kaplan's characterization, critics charged Homer-Dixon's and ENCOP's depiction as either blaming the poor for environmental mismanagement or suggested that such conflicts in the developing world are the result of primitive practices (Hartmann 2001).¹⁸ In addition, the work does not consider that resources are "value mediated", which means that the value of any resource "differs from one social group to another" (Yapa 1996, 714). Put another way, land and resources are context dependent (i.e., they have no inherent meaning or use) although its value is the product not only of the land's characteristics but other circumstances, including land ownership (Yapa 1996, 714). For example, a forest's "value" can be as part of cultural-livelihood systems, international market commodities or as the "lungs of the earth" depending on one's vested interests and prevailing ideas (Conca 2006).

¹⁷ Recent statistical analyses confirm that the links between resource scarcity and conflict are weak (Binningsbø et al. 2007).

¹⁸ Assuming, of course, that the extent of degradation is accurately measured (Leach and Mearns 1996; Fairhead and Leach 1996).

Rather than the cause of violence, Peluso and Watts (2001) suggest that environmental degradation and resource scarcity is the result of it. Conflict is rooted in the *political* since webs of economic and social practices shape how the environment is controlled, defined and managed and in this way, violence is “site specific...rooted in local histories and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation... power relations” (Peluso and Watts 2001, 5). This “political ecology” approach highlights multiple forms of political practice and forms of contention that emerge around environments and resource use along a continuum that include everyday actions of resistance to outright violence. From this view, violence is not caused by environmental change and scarcities but as a “last resort” reaction by excluded or aggrieved groups.¹⁹ Moreover, civil war is connected to “other forms of violence, emerging from racial and ethnic tensions, state forms of violence, and other social tensions that either come to the surface during transitional periods when social and spatial power relations are rearranged or create those transitional periods” (Peluso and Watts 2001, 31).²⁰

In a related critique, Betsey Hartmann (2001, 50) argues that one of the major flaws of Homer-Dixon's work is the “neglect of larger economic and political forces that profoundly affect local environments and conflicts.” In a period of expanding global economic forces, Homer-Dixon's (and Baechler's) posit a closed-system without movement of resources between local, regional, national and global actors and not connected to patterns of international trade. The activities of extractive industries such as oil, timber, minerals, agricultural products and gemstones is largely ignored, even though the natural resources of

¹⁹ What is interesting is that once these groups used violent tactics it virtually ensures (at least for a while and if they “lose”) exclusion from any political process while justifying harsh state-sanctioned violence in response (Richards 2001).

²⁰ For example, state power in Kenya has used the leverage of natural resources to exploit already existing social or ethnic cleavages (Kahl 1998); “international players” such as multinational oil conglomerates in Nigeria hide behind the state to gain access to valuable natural resources (Watts 2001); and political forces in West Kalimantan, Indonesia produced ethnic turmoil and conflict over land access and inequitable distribution of resource benefits (Peluso and Harwell 2001).

the global South have long been exported to the global North.²¹ As James Fairhead (2001) states, international demand for strategic or valuable resources by the global marketplace is a far larger force for environmental degradation and resources scarcity than either poverty or population. The same type of relationship is evident in the state imposition of conservation areas or development projects, which create new land arrangements, human displacement and environmental scarcity that more often than not harms the poorest and most marginalized (Peluso 1992; Neumann 2001).

Resource abundance: rebels, greed and looting

Discussions of resource abundance, however, would not have gotten off the ground were it not for with the rise of economic-centered explanations of civil conflict briefly alluded to in Chapter 2. In contrast to conflicts of the past, which appeared to be generated by political grievances, new wars were apparently fought over the plunder and predations of natural resources that sustained violence and enriched combatants (Kaldor 1999, Duffield 2001, Kalyvas 2001).²² Keen (1998) suggested that although political motives may trigger wars, rebel groups require substantial financing if they are to maintain a fighting force that can challenge a standing army. And Arnson (2005, 3) explained that in the 1990s, the, "control of territory and populations was transformed into economic rather than purely military or strategic objective, and the pursuit of war into a highly rational enterprise aimed at the enrichment of particular elites or factions". As evidence of such a relationship, Le Billon

²¹In the Philippines "slash and burn" farming and population growth has largely been seen as the cause of deforestation although as James Boyce (1993, 238) notes that during the Marco's reign an estimated two-hundred landowners controlled the country's forests and reduced the total by as much as 85 percent. The real "agents of deforestation, according to Boyce (1993, 238), were the "the loggers, government officials... landlords and international firms and institutions" with the farmers among the victims.

²² It should be noted that according to Ross (2004) no quantitative studies have reported changes the significance of natural resources pre-and post-Cold War.

(2003, 215) claimed that natural resources provided a bulk of the revenues that financed wars in developing countries since the end of the Cold War.

Certainly, the most influential work on this topic was that of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998; 1999; 2000; 2004), who used large N-data sets and economic analysis to investigate the extent to which civil wars had economic rather than just political causes. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) found that several factors were significantly correlated with the risk of civil war including per-capita income, natural resource endowments (calculated by share of primary commodity exports in GDP), population size and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.²³ The study was significant for several reasons. First, it placed the spotlight on natural resources and primary commodities as a potential driver of civil war and rejected the notion that conflict is attributable to fractionalized or homogenous societies, which was one of the most "common political explanations for civil war" (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 571). Second, it suggested that poverty (as measured by per capita income) was a significant determiner of civil war onset.

In a follow-up report, Collier and Hoeffler (1999) began to extrapolate the initial findings to the motivations of rebels and causes of civil conflicts.²⁴ Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 15) found that although conflict can be "a blend of an altruistic desire to rectify the grievances of a group", the most significant cause of civil conflict is the "selfish desire to loot the resources of others." A year later, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) published a paper titled "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", which would have "a major impact on both public

²³ Importantly, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 571) found that "increased natural resources" initially leads to more conflict although "at a high level" natural resources reduce the risk of war.

²⁴ They grouped causes into two distinct categories: (1) the quest for "justice" in the form of grievances, real or perceived *or*; (2) the quest for "loot" since "many rebellions...appear to be linked to the capture of resources: diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timber in Cambodia (Collier and Hoeffler 1999, 1).

debate and social science research on contemporary civil wars" (Fearon 2005, 483).²⁵ The key finding: opportunities for rebellion are largely influenced by the "availability of finance" and because primary commodities increase the likelihood of conflict, such commodities make rebellion possible or even desired (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 16).²⁶ In the end, Collier and Hoeffler's research suggested that conflict is linked to predation or "greed" for natural resource wealth; rather than the factors long associated with grievances (or justice seeking), including political repression and economic inequality. Collier elaborated on this by suggesting that contemporary rebellions resemble a "quasi-criminal activity" that is perpetuated by bandits concerned with natural resource predation,--which due to a government military response--often resulted in conflict (Collier 2000). Put differently, the ability to seize natural resource wealth was the central rationale for rebels to engage in civil conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler's influential work, however, has been controversial for several reasons. First, the notion that primary commodity exports increase the risk of civil conflict has not been sustained empirically, even using the same data set (Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003, 87), state bluntly, "neither the share of primary commodity exports in GDP nor its square is remotely significant." Other studies have also found arguably mixed results (de Soysa and Neumayer 2007; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Hegre 2004; Ross 2004). So while the gist of Collier and Hoeffler's argument is plausible--financial opportunities available to rebels increase the likelihood of civil war --there is no

²⁵ Collier and Hoeffler's report has been released in several forms between 2000 and 2004, using updated datasets. According to James Fearon (2005, 483-484), the reports interpretation became the "most widely reported result of any cross-national statistical study of civil war, *ever* (emphasis in original)."

²⁶ Along with the availability of primary commodities, factors such as male school enrollment, income, growth rates (and dispersed populations and population size) also increase the risk of conflict, possibly through a grievance mechanism. While the authors did allow for an association between greed and grievance - that greed produces grievances and narratives of grievances are useful recruiting tool - by and large, "proxies for grievance", including inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, land distribution and religious fractionalization were found not increase the risk of conflict.

evidence that primary commodities finance this potential (Fearon 2005, 486).). In the final analysis, "the claim that primary commodity exports are linked to civil war appears fragile and should be treated with caution" (Ross 2004, 342).

Despite the criticism, Collier and Hoeffler's work did spawn extensive efforts to understand other aspects relating to natural resource wealth and conflict. Michael Ross (2004, 61), for instance, found strong empirical evidence that "resource wealth...made conflict more likely to occur, last longer and produce more casualties when it does occur." Ross also concluded that oil, minerals and other lootable commodities (including diamonds, gemstones, timber and illicit drugs) are linked to violent conflict in some way, although the findings are divergent. Research on how minerals and other lootables (including gemstones like diamonds and timber) are also mixed. Humphreys (2005) and Lujala, Gleditsch, Gilmore (2005) find that the presence of diamonds increase the likelihood of civil conflict while others assert that there is no correlation (Regan and Norton 2005). On the other hand, minerals and diamonds do appear to lengthen on-going wars (Fearon 2004; Humphreys 2005, Ross 2004) and increase the geographic scope of conflicts (Buhaug and Gates 2002), although this is influenced by global trade and consumer demand (Le Billon 2008). Few studies sustain the idea that timber causes conflict even though exports may influence the duration of war (Le Billon 2000; Global Witness 2002; de Jong, Donovan, and Ken-Ichi 2007; Rustad et al. 2008; Thomson and Kanaan 2005).

All this debate has also raised the question as to what specific characteristics of natural resources and how geographic distribution makes them more or less likely to ignite or prolong conflict. Lootable resources tend to be those that "have low economic barriers to entry and can be profitably exploited by small scale artisans" while non-lootable resources have "high barriers to entry" and require large capital and technological inputs (Ross 2003; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, 568). Not surprisingly, lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds and other gemstones, are believed to be linked to conflict due to the ease with

which rebel groups (and other combatants) can extract and trade them for profit. Non-lootable resources, on the other hand, are those such as timber, copper, bauxite, iron ore, oil and Kimberlitic diamonds extracted and controlled primarily by the state.²⁷ Le Billon (2001; 2005), likewise, makes the distinction between resources that are proximate or distant to locations of state power and those that are "point source" or "diffuse" to distinguish different types of conflicts and struggles.

Collier and Hoeffler's rejection of grievances and support for the "greed" hypothesis provoked considerable debate (Humphreys 2005).²⁸ While there is some agreement that economic factors play a part in civil conflicts there remains "little consensus as to how they matter, how much they matter, or in what ways" (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 4-5). Collier and Hoeffler's approach, which relied on single factor explanations derived from econometric models, have been criticized for its one-sided economic and materialist explanations (Zartman 2005, 258). Some insist that the lack of empirical support for the greed thesis is largely technical in nature resulting from problems of data and model specification that can be continually tweaked (Humphreys 2005). However, others assert that the focus on greed is based on a methodology that is simply unable to handle important contextual elements with no "feel" for the subject or its indicators (Zartman 2005). Put another way, the complex ways in which natural resources relate to violence are all but masked by the coarse-grained indicators that Collier and others have utilized in investigating resource abundance.

Methodological debates aside, probably the most critical outcomes of the greed vs. grievance debate is stated simply by James Ron (2005, 443), who noted that "natural resources have powerful effects on civil wars...but...in ways that are profoundly political" and

²⁷ Mac Ginty (2004) asserts that looting is not just motivated by economic rationales but can be a non-material activity, part of a political-military strategy or a very selective endeavor depending on the complex conflict dynamics at play.

²⁸ It is important to note that Ross (2004) finds no evidence to support the contention that rebels loot natural resources to provide funding for neither civil war *nor* that grievances over land expropriation, environmental degradation and inadequate job opportunities correlate with violent conflict.

suggests returning to "political opportunity theories" to understand civil conflict and their relationship to natural resources. This means two things. First, violent conflict has overlapping political, social *and* economic drivers of conflict for both political elites (Reno 1995) and combatants (Weinstein 2007). Grievances and identities remain by-and-large the roots and objectives of conflict although greed and self-enrichment can be a "product or later stage of wars started for other reasons" (Arnson 2005, 11). Second, the focus on greed and natural resources may be too "rebel centric" by ignoring the critical role state's play in setting the conditions for conflict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). Humphreys (2005) posits that failed states explain the impacts of natural resources better than economic explanations because such states cannot meet the demands for basic services of its population or may seek to privatize public revenues for personal gain while repressing political opposition or public protest (Zartman 1995; 2005).²⁹ Reno (1995, 1998) and others (Boas 2001; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Richards 1996) also suggest that state leaders use natural resource revenue in order to sustain political power through patronage networks. Politics is, then, reduced to a "kind of business" that channels scarce state resources into informal relationships that undermine the provision of state services creating "hollowed out" state institutions. The result is the formation of "shadow states" that can lead to state failure and provide opportunities for the emergence of warlords (Reno 1995). In the end, weak and failed states lack not only authority and legitimacy but also the ability to govern, generating grievances and contributing to the opportunity structures that make conflict feasible (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Finally, other critiques of Collier and Hoeffler's work suggest that while it has raised the profile of natural resource-conflict linkages and the focus on the economic opportunities of rebels it has come at an intellectual cost. First, the focus on civil war, which is defined as

²⁹ Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that state responses in the opening stages of a rebellion actually exacerbate grievances or create new ones that can act as tipping points.

at least 1,000 battle deaths per year, renders invisible "multiple forms and scales of violence enacted through resource exploitation and its regulation", and in fact, "war is not the only (or even primary) type of violence associated with resource-extractive industries"(Le Billon 2008, 347). Duffield (2001) also points out that in Collier and Hoeffler's analysis the only grievance that appears to have any relevance is related to economic decline and poverty at the state level. But, as Ron (2005, 447) notes, economic malfeasance is a political product and poverty is a political outcome. The underlying political dynamics and political practices as they relate to natural resources (i.e. property regimes, access issues, and how these may be linked to poverty) are by extension important to understand (Peluso and Watts 2001). Furthermore, much of the debate has remained focused on rebel and state-level dynamics, which overlook regional or international actors that may be culpable in either the social relations of production or the weakening state institutions. For instance, the structural adjustment and development policies of international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF have long been implicated in policies that undermine states (Stiglitz 2002; Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004). There has been comparatively little about how global competition for strategic or valuable natural resources by powerful states and multinational businesses may undermine states or prop up authoritarian rulers, which can lead to both weakened governments and conflict (Dalby 2002; Fairhead 2001; Watts 2001).

Resource abundance: dependence and the state

A preponderance of attention has focused on the effect natural resource abundance has on rebel opportunities for rebellion and the onset and duration of civil conflicts discussed in the preceding section. However, primary commodity exports or natural resource abundance may also contribute to the "paradox of plenty", which is the proposition that abundant natural resources have significant effects on the political economy and economic structure of states. In particular, states heavily dependent on the export of oil, timber,

agricultural products, minerals and gemstones appear to suffer economic decline and political dysfunction--particularly in the developing world.³⁰ Of more concern is the evidence that the level of economic development corresponds with the potential risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; de Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).³¹

A range of studies suggest that resource-dependent economies tend to grow more slowly than resource poor countries for several reasons (Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001). First, resource exports from developing countries suffer from poor terms of trade that exacerbate inequalities between industrialized and developing states (Easterly et al. 1993; Ross 1999). Much of this has also been blamed on a worldwide rise in commodity exports (due in part to the fall of Eastern Bloc) and the structural adjustment and debt policies peddled by the IFIs (Ross 1999; Stiglitz 2002). The World Bank (2002), for example, found that countries with medium to large mining sectors saw their GDP drop significantly in the 1990s. Second, the instability of natural resource markets may harm developing states, since "boom and bust" cycles undermine state economies (Ross 1999).³² And finally, economic growth stagnates in resources-dependent economies because the rents are captured by foreign companies with little revenue actually accruing to state governments. While the explanations remain uncertain (Brunnschweiler 2008), there is evidence that found that countries with negative growth rates are more likely to engage in civil war (Collier 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre 2004).

Evidence also emerged to support the proposition that state's that rely on natural resources for primary exports often have high rates of poverty (Ross 2001). According to Ross (2004), this is partly because resource-endowed states often have poor education

³⁰ The poster child for the resource curse is Nigeria where 70% percent of the population lives on less than \$1 /day while being the 15 largest oil producer in the world.

³¹The irony, of course, is that up until the 1990s, development of natural resources exports was believed to be the panacea for economic growth, democracy and peace (Rostow 1961).

³² This is also known as "Dutch Disease".

systems and underperforming health care for the population, which keeps people in a poverty trap. Moreover, there is evidence to conclude that greater dependence on oil and mineral exports, in particular, are linked to high child mortality rates that are often deemed a proxy for poverty and relative deprivation (Ross 2003). Again, while these figures are disconcerting, the larger concern is that according to an array of studies, the greater a country's poverty rate, the more likely it is to face a civil war (Collier 2007; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). In theory at least, this is because people are more likely rebel against state interests when the government offers few economic opportunities and poverty remains entrenched.

While resource dependence apparently impacts a country's economic development it also may have a perceptible impact on governments and governance, especially in states with overwhelmingly poor populations (Le Billon 2008). Liete and Weidmann (1999), for example, suggest that when governments get substantial revenues from oil, minerals and timber it is more likely to be corrupt. This problem is due, at least in part, to the perception that the sheer volume and value of natural resources encourages rent-seeking behavior; rather than entrepreneurship or investment (Ross 2003). While some country's may not have the institutional capacity to manage revenues in a transparent fashion, high rents encourage corrupt practices and lead governments to weaken accountability mechanisms in order to garner massive profits--especially during boom times. This dynamic can lead unscrupulous leaders, business men or military commanders to seize revenues instead of building institutions and implementing policies for economic development, although this dynamic depends on a range of factors (Dunning 2008; Jones-Luong and Weinthal 2006). Political leaders can grant resources contracts and concessions to wealthy landowners, political elites and foreign investors in exchange for kickbacks, a portion of the revenue, foreign aid or political support (Ross 2003, 25-26). States gain a large percentage of their revenue from natural resources tend to tax the population less and are thereby be less accountable (Fearon

and Laitin 2003). In fact, governments that get their income from natural resources often become less democratic (Ross 2003). One reason for this pattern is that when governments have an abundance of revenue they tend to use it to quell dissent--both by dispensing patronage and by building up their domestic security forces.³³

As Karl (1997, 16) notes, "dependence... produces a distinctive type of institutional setting, which encourages the political distribution of rents" and "substitute public spending for statecraft, thereby weakening state capacity". This is because resource-endowed governments often do not make the necessary investments in state institutions that can effectively intervene in societal conflicts, and thereby are more susceptible to conflict. If a country has resources that are particularly valuable and can be mined with little training or investment, such as alluvial diamonds and other minerals, it is difficult to govern extraction process or provide law and order in the extractive region. This dynamic can provide incentives for criminal elements--gangs, warlords, and rogue military leaders--to acquire the financial resources to challenge the government directly or establish a shadow state (Reno 1998).

To reiterate, the literature concludes that natural resources dependence may not only harmful to a country's overall economic development but also make states more susceptible to civil conflict. A host of studies link government accountability and corruption to civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Le Billon 2003; Reno 1998; Sachs and Warner 2001).

Correspondingly, less accountable states are frequently more authoritarian, and thus less able to resolve grievances. As Ross (2003, 26) notes, "a lack of economic growth can destabilize governments, which can lead to corruption...because corrupt governments cannot manage economies or polities or counteract economic stagnation, the outcome is a downward spiral that may eventually lead to civil war." But the empirical evidence linking the resource

³³ Indeed, Ross (2001) has found that oil and mineral rich governments tend to spend large sums on the military.

dependence to civil war is relatively weak in other quantitative studies and little consensus on the literature's findings has emerged. Brunnschweiler (2008) and others (Lederman and Maloney 2007) find no evidence for resource curse arguing conversely that an abundance of natural resources is a boon for economic performance with no deleterious effects on state institutions.

Lack of agreement on the resource dependence-conflict link may be reducible to different models, poor proxy measures or a lack of data. However, others insist that the resource curse is mediated by a host of other contextual factors including, historical extraction conditions (i.e., conditions under colonialism), resource and conflict characteristics and other complexities that may be best formulated using comparative methods, which integrate complexity over simple relationships (Basedau 2005, 34). Michael Watts (2008, 71), for example, suggests that the "politics of the minorities" long preceded oil in Nigeria and that the oil exacerbated related grievances by bringing with it policies of enclosure and dispossession that produced new narratives and a struggle for resource control. Other scholars stress the need to understand that resource dependence is not just as a factor of state politics but is enmeshed within the context of geopolitical and international forces. For instance, Omeje (2008, 7-8) lists the diverse ways in which external factors undermine state institutions, including the propping up of unpopular, repressive and corrupt regimes, providing of military aid, and supporting multinational businesses.

The Environment, Natural Resources and Peace

The above review, which detailed the current state of the literature linking the environment, natural resources and civil conflict, conveys two points. First, the literature did not emerge in a vacuum but in response to the "problem" of failed states and civil conflicts described in Chapter 2. The dominant approaches, which largely emerge from the international relations scholarship, suggest that *either* resources scarcity *or* resource abundance causes conflict.

Although these approaches are different, both imply that states and societies are confronted with a given environment or natural resource endowment (or a lack thereof) that shapes economic systems and state institutions in ways that make them more or less susceptible to violent conflict. In short, states and societies have either "too much" or "too little" of a good (or bad) thing. Second, despite the very extensive literature, scarcity and abundance explanations of conflict remain tentative and controversial. I argue, however, that despite ambiguous and evolving scholarship on the topic the environment, natural resource conflict problematic in terms of resource abundance, and in particular, related to rebels, greed and looting had insinuated itself into the reforms and policies of IPOs beginning in the late 1990s. This should not be surprising because as such explanations emerged the empirical evidence that greedy rebels fought over valuable natural resources appeared robust and widely accepted. However, as the scholarship has become more refined, the reforms and policies supported by IPOs have not kept pace.

International peacebuilding organizations and environmental and natural resource governance

The idea that the environment and natural resources might play a role in helping to end conflict and rebuild war-torn states began to get attention from IBOs in the late-1990s. This comes as no surprise since it corresponded with the "second generation" of peacebuilding described in Chapter 2. Peacebuilding's second generation emphasized the root causes of conflict, largely perceived as poverty and a lack of sustained development as well as increased attention to sub-areas, including most prominently the environment and natural resources. The Brahimi Report (2000) summed it up well:

[Other] variables that affect the difficulty of peace implementation include, first, sources of the conflict. These can range from economics (e.g. issues of poverty, distribution, discrimination or corruption, politics (an unalloyed contest for power) and resources and other

environmental issues (such as competition for scarce water) to issues of ethnicity, religion or gross violations of human rights.

While work linking resource scarcity to violent conflict was widely discussed in the early 1990s, it failed to make its way into peacebuilding practices (Peluso and Watts 2001; Dalby 2002). Even as Homer-Dixon (1991) and Kaplan (1994) described the civil conflicts in Sierra Leone, Rwanda and the Sudan as linked to environmental degradation and scarce water, land and forest resources, the policies of IBOs did not reflect that concern. Despite a few mostly journalistic accounts documenting the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict, or rubber, minerals and forests in Liberia, it raised few red-flags. This was largely because peacebuilders were preoccupied, particularly on the African continent with negotiating ceasefires, fashioning peace settlements and organizing elections. The notion that the environment and natural resources could help mitigate conflict or consolidate peace in war-torn states simply did not exist within the international peacebuilding universe (Boutros-Ghali 1992; 1995).³⁴

It was not until a convergence of events in the late-1990s that environmental and natural resource governance began to increasingly emerge in the policies and practices of international peacebuilding organizations. While international NGOs began to draw public attention to the role of the natural resource trade in helping to fuel conflict in Cambodia and Angola, the work of Collier and Hoeffler emerged as methodologically robust and largely uncontroversial given the divine status given to statistical analysis (as opposed to the case-based work of Homer-Dixon) and the economic motives of warlords and combatants was an intuitive way to understand complex and puzzling "new wars." In fact, the influential work

³⁴ The UN did employ commodity sanctions on Iraq, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Libya and Haiti in the early 1990s although the character of these sanctions and their targets differ from those that followed (Le Billon 2003).

of Collier and Hoeffler was probably the biggest single factor placing the environment and natural resources onto the peacebuilding agenda.³⁵ The notion that "high-value" natural resources--timber, minerals and diamonds--might fuel civil conflict by providing revenues to "greedy" rebels directly led IBOs to promote and support policy interventions designed to limit revenue from the illicit trade of natural resources. The rationale among IBOs was that by limiting the ability of combatants to acquire natural resource revenue would encourage rebels to either give up or bring them to the negotiating table. Between 1998 and 2000 -- as the work of Collier and Hoeffler was at its apex in terms of scholarly acceptance--controlling "conflict resources" emerged as a top-level concern of international peacebuilders. Again, this should not be surprising because Collier and Hoeffler's interpretation was the "most widely reported result of any cross-national study of civil war, ever" and had a major impact on the intellectual and empirical debate (Fearon 2005, 483-484). This impact was felt not only on the social science research community but figured prominently among international peacebuilding organizations that began to focus attention on natural resources.

One common approach was to use the future spoils from natural resources as part of a wealth-sharing strategy. Such strategies--floated by peace negotiators during negotiations in the late 1990s Angola and Sierra Leone--guaranteed rebel leaders decision-making authority over natural resources in a new government or the ability to control particular regions endowed with resources in exchange for peace. While wealth sharing strategies could be successful at bringing combatants to the negotiating table, they repeatedly failed to consolidate peace.³⁶ The reason: wealth-sharing strategies end up prolonging conflict by

³⁵ It is important to note that at the time of Collier and Hoeffler's findings both were economists at the World Bank, which is a key international peacebuilding organization.

³⁶ Efforts to negotiate an end to the Sierra Leone conflict in 1999 resulted in the Lomé Agreement that installed rebel leader Fonday Sankoh as Head of Mineral Rights Commission, which Gberie (2005, 163) has referred to as the "diamond czar". The arrangement was ultimately a failure and the war continued.

exacerbating inequalities, undermining state institutions and neglecting the underlying causes of the conflict (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007; Jarstad 2008).

When wealth sharing is not feasible, IBOs intervened directly in war-torn states by approving policy instruments or "control regimes" on natural resources thought to be fueling conflict. The most powerful and most publicized have been international sanctions designed and imposed by the UN Security Council.³⁷ While conflicts are never financed by only one revenue source, it was believed that after the Cold War the largest sources of funding, particularly in the developing world, came from natural resources (Le Billon 2003, 215). Sanctions are designed, then, to curtail the trade in "conflict resources" in a bid to starve combatants of the funds that fuel conflict (Le Billon 2003).³⁸ Besides UN sanctions imposed on Iraqi oil exports after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, UN sanctions have predominantly been targeted at natural resources including timber, oil and diamonds.³⁹ UN sanctions have been imposed--in theory at least--in an effort to "maintain or restore international peace and security", according to the UN Charter. Once the decision is made in the Security Council to ban the import or export of a conflict resource, all UN member states are obligated to accept and carry out the mandate (Le Billon 2003, 230). But unless UN sanctions (or domestic laws) ban it, trading "conflict resources" with rebel groups or corrupt governments is not illegal under international law--a fact that has resulted in delays in getting sanctions enacted and failures to get the international support necessary.

As Crossin, Hayman and Taylor (2003) note, although there has been a historical reluctance for the UN or other IBOs to try and control the trade of natural resources globally, increased attention to so-called "conflict resources" has changed that. Investigative research

³⁷ These sanctions are often labeled "smart" sanctions because they are intended to not hurt civilians.

³⁸ Conflict resources have been defined as "natural resources whose control, exploitation, trade, taxation or protection contribute to, or benefit from the context of, armed conflict (Le Billon 2003, 216).

³⁹ In the case of drugs, most notably heroin, the UN has used sanctions to curtail the trade in chemicals used in production.

carried out by international NGOs has significantly influenced the formation of UN expert panels and provided recommendations designed to curtail the trade in conflict resources.⁴⁰ Global Witness, (1998) brought to the world's attention the use of diamonds to fuel war in Angola, and Partnership Africa Canada recommended the UN take action to halt the illicit trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton 2000). Such public campaigns have been important in "naming and shaming" countries and leveraging pressure on international businesses dealing in valuable commodities and countries importing conflict resources. For example, De Beers was the target of a public campaign to stop selling diamonds from conflict areas (Le Billon 2006), and there was widespread political pressure on France and China, Liberia's two biggest importers of timber, to agree to an embargo. Simply put, UN sanctions are not only influenced by member states but also non-governmental organizations and public sentiment.

UN sanctions have been labeled "robust" policy instruments but reducing access to natural resource revenues does not seem to equate with shorter or less intense and deadly civil conflicts (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, 6). Evidence is inconclusive but combatants lacking access to revenues may in fact intensify attacks on civilians (Le Billon 2003, 218). Moreover, an influx of revenues at the right time can allow combatants to win the war outright, thus shortening the duration of conflict and making any subsequent peace more likely to be sustained (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). A large stockpile of diamonds, for example, was reported to have financed the Angolan government offensive between 1999 and 2002 that led to a military victory (Le Billon 2003, 218). In addition, there is ample evidence from Cambodia that the internal competition for revenues can actually undermine group

⁴⁰ While UN sanctions do not, by and large, involve international policing--monitoring and information-gathering is an important component, which is difficult in war-torn states. To some extent, this had been remedied by the creation of UN expert panels that submit periodic reports to the Security Council about instances of sanctions busting, the character of war economies or whether sanctions should be lifted.

cohesion that can lead to the fragmentation and a quicker end to conflict (Le Billon 2003, 218). There is also debate as to how successful multilateral sanctions are (Cortright and Lopez 2000; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997). While an estimated 80 percent of the conflicts in which UN sanctions were imposed since 1990 were resolved a majority of those were ended by military intervention by UN peacekeepers (Le Billon 2003). Mack and Khan (2000) suggest that while sanctions and embargos largely fail to alter target behavior they but should not be discounted because they have the effect of naming, shaming, containing and stigmatizing targets. At the same time, Le Billon and Nicholls (2007) suggest that although sanctions have been ineffective at ending conflict and contributing to peacebuilding, improvements in terms of monitoring and enforcement have been helpful.

A second approach to addressing "conflict resources" and the ability of rebel groups (or other combatants) to use the revenue to wage war, are regimes that track and regulate the illicit trading of legal commodities such as diamonds and timber. The most advancement in this regard has been efforts to regulate the trade in rough diamonds, and specifically the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The Kimberly Process is a voluntary system in which countries agree to certify that diamonds originating in their territory are conflict free. The KPCS, which came into full effect in 2003, was designed to ensure that the production of diamonds can be traced from the "mine to the point of export" (i.e. chain of custody) and exports tracked and accompanied by a "certificate of origin" to guarantee that diamonds do not originate from a conflict area (KPCS 2010).⁴¹ The KPCS came to fruition after several years of joint meetings between governments, international organizations, industry (De Beers being by far the largest) and NGOs (Smillie 2005). While the KPCS had an estimated 49 members, representing 75 states, participating as of 2009, there remains considerable debate as to the system's overall effectiveness (KPCS 2010). Many question the

⁴¹ While the KPCS was officially launched in 2003, the first year the scheme was introduced was 2000.

ability or willingness of governments to monitor diamond production and provide trading statistics (Smillie 2005), others cite high levels of continued smuggling and local grievances generated by the formalization of small-scale diamond mining (Cooper 2008; Maconachie 2008). Despite these challenges, the seizure of non-certified diamonds or even the process by which the Kimberley Agreement came together can be seen as signs of a promising solution to the trade in conflict resources (Smillie 2005).

Year	Country	Natural Resource
1990	Iraq	All commodities
1991	Yugoslavia	All commodities
1992	Cambodia	Log exports; embargo on minerals and gems
1993	Libya	Oil refining equipment
1994	Haiti	All commodities
1998	Angola	All diamonds outside certificate of origin regime and areas outside government control
2000	Sierra Leone	All rough diamonds
2001	Liberia	All rough diamonds
2003	Liberia	Logs and rough timber
2005	Cote d'Ivoire	All rough diamonds

Table 2. UN Sanctions 1990-2005 (Adapted from Le Billon 2003)

By 2003, the UN and IPOs had already imposed UN sanctions on the global trade in oil, gemstones, timber and other resources in an effort to halt conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Moreover, international peacebuilding organizations continued to focus their attention on international regimes like the Kimberly Process or newer initiatives like the Forests Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) regime designed to limit the trade in conflict timber to the European Union. Both of these initiatives focused on the trade in conflict resources-- as UN Resolution 60/223 emphasized the need to:

Address the negative implications of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in all its aspects on peace, security and development in Africa" and "preventing the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources and high-value commodities (UNGA 2006).

At the same time, however, the international peacebuilding agenda reflected the understanding that the environment and natural resources are not just an important leverage point for ending or mitigating conflict but also significantly influence a war-torn state's ability to establish a long-term peace. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated in 2008, "natural resources are crucial to consolidating peace in and between war-torn societies." And Carolyn McAskie, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support stated in 2007:

War-torn countries rich in natural resources face particular challenges in the stabilization and reconstruction of their societies, despite the apparent promise that natural resource wealth holds for peacebuilding and development. Where resources exploitation has driven war, or served to impede peace, improving governance capacity to control natural resources is a critical element of peacebuilding.

While governing and managing so-called "conflict resources" vis-a-vis sanctions or regimes was an international priority and received much of the attention among scholars and public, since 1999 IBOs amplified efforts to tie the success of peacebuilding to the environment and natural resources governance. A report from the UN Environment Programme titled *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment*, stated bluntly, "integrating environmental management and natural resources into peacebuilding...is no longer an option--it is a security imperative" (UNEP 2009, 6). The report went on to lay out three mechanisms through which the environment and natural resource may contribute to peace: promoting economic recovery, supporting sustainable livelihoods and fostering dialogue. This report was published to highlight that the environment and natural resources have a "determining influence" on peace and security, and to advocate for international peacebuilders integrate the environment and natural resources into peacebuilding (UNEP 2009, 5). What goes largely unnoticed is that even as UN sanctions on "conflict resources" were in force, and work on establishing global commodity regimes were ongoing, international peacebuilding organizations have been deeply engaged in reforming environmental and natural resource governance in war-torn states--as the case studies in subsequent chapters makes clear. IPOs have assumed that environment and natural resource governance--if carried out effectively-- can help peacebuilding by supporting and establishing reforms and policies that reduce the propensity for violence.

The peacebuilding literature points us to a handful of outcomes perceived by scholars and practitioners as essential for achieving a long-term and sustainable peace in war-torn states--or to be more precise for reducing the propensity for violence. These outcomes are: (1) security improvements; (2) increased economic development; (3) enhanced social cohesion and trust; and (4) strengthen state institutions. Indeed, if environmental and natural resources governance is going to reduce the propensity for violence --which would by

extension help peacebuilding--then we need to better understand both how IPOs understand this relationship and whether it has any basis in the scholarly literature. This is significant because as we move to the case studies that follow, it will help us to evaluate whether governance reforms supported and established by peacebuilders do, in fact, help or hinder peacebuilding.

The environment, natural resources and security

Peacebuilding is concerned with reducing the propensity of violence -- and in particular large-scale violence on the order of civil conflict. From the perspective of IPOs, security, then, is perceived as an "absolute prerequisite" of peacebuilding concerned with long-term stability and order rather than a more expansive definition like the "freedom from violence and coercion" (Salomons 2005, 19). Given the perceptible fear among IPOs that rebel groups or corrupt governments will use the trade in "high-value" natural resources to fund civil conflict, governing the environment and natural resources is viewed as vitally important. Specifically, peacebuilders stress the importance of controlling and managing natural resource revenue and the trade in "conflict resources" so they are not used to increase the likelihood of violence in ways that undermine security.

As a result, IPOs emphasize "good governance"--and in particular reforms and policies designed to improve revenue transparency and tracking commodities that can be used by combatants to fund civil conflict (Collier 2004). Revenue transparency is believed to reduce the propensity for violence by ensuring that revenues are not being siphoned off by corrupt elites or societal groups in ways that undermine long-term development and security. The focus on revenue transparency is also a measure to help guarantee that insurgents or potential insurgents are not able to acquire revenue from the sale of natural resources that can be used to purchase weapons and resume violent conflict. In short, revenue transparency in the environment and natural resource sector is assumed as vitally important to reduce the

potential that rebel movements can development and holding state leaders accountable (Collier 2004). Since state-led development --and peacebuilding--requires significant revenue, improved transparency makes it more likely that funds will go toward the provisioning of basic services and economic development priorities rather than self-enrichment or patronage. This is important because as noted in the preceding section, corruption is a factor believed to increase the likelihood of violent conflict particularly if the population at-large remains impoverished and excluded hostility (Gurr 1970). According to the World Bank (2004), rebuilding war-torn states all but requires revenue transparency, and is a conditionality for assistance from international peacebuilding organizations. As noted by the UN Security Council (2004), in reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo:

The link between the illicit exploration and trade of natural resources in certain regions and fuelling of armed conflict...exhorts international financial institutions to assist the government in establishing efficient and transparent control of natural resources.

IPOs also placed an emphasis on the environmental and natural resource governance by way of commodity tracking schemes (UNGA 2007). Again, the purpose of such schemes is to make it more difficult for rebel groups to profit from the looting of valuable natural resources by keeping so-called "conflict commodities" off global markets. As Collier (2004, 10) notes these schemes are designed specifically to address the problem that natural resources have "historically been used to finance rebel movements". In fact, by 2005, almost every country containing rough diamonds are voluntary signatories to the Kimberly Process. For commodities where no scheme is in place --for example in tracking timber from the point of harvest to export, they are being created as the implementation of FLEGT in the EU can attest.

Despite ambiguities in the environment, natural resource and conflict literature described in this chapter, transparency and commodity-trading schemes may help to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict. However, a broader examination of the linkages between the environment, natural resources and security highlight others sets of factors that may also be significant. First, the literature suggests that security can be undermined if certain the population or more specifically local communities do not feel as though their claims or interests are being represented in the decision making channels and participatory structures they relate to the environment and natural resources (Chambers 1994). Numerous case studies show that when societal groups and local communities are excluded from participating in decisions, or are subjugated in the participatory process by the government, problems in the form of violent conflict or resistance can occur (Peluso and Watts 2001; Gardner and Lewis 1996; Peet and Watts 1996). Conversely, there is substantial evidence from the environment and development literature that when decision making and participation are relatively decentralized, open and inclusive there is a reduced likelihood of societal contestation and violence (Buckles 1999; Ostrom 1990). While the word "participation" is by now an ever-present buzzword, it suggests that security may be enhanced and the propensity of violence reduced when environmental and natural resource governance comes from the "bottom up" rather than from "top-down" policies that come from governments or external authorities.

The literature also finds that access to natural resources is widely acknowledged as vital for security and reducing the propensity of violence. Access refers primarily to the ability of individuals or groups to use or consume productive natural resources, and is often determined by inequities of power and authority that can exist at many different levels (i.e. community, national and international) and be structured through "ethnicity, caste, social status or economic class" (Gardner and Lewis 1996). While access can be limited between local groups, more often than not, the literature underscores how state power and

government policy can limit the ability of local communities to procure resources need for their well-being (Peluso and Watts 2001). In particular, state policies that limit land ownership or undermine traditional land tenure such as privatization, conservation areas or other exclusionary practices in favor of powerful groups can set the state for violence (Peluso and Watts 2001; Peluso 1992). While Hardin (1968) suggested that private property regimes and coercive state policies should be imposed on traditional common-property systems to avoid conflict and environmental degradation, recent work has suggested that restricting or blocking access to resources is more predictive of violent conflict (Peluso and Watts 2001; Ostrom 1990). In short, if access to natural resources is relatively equitable, and people are adequately meeting their livelihood needs, states and societies are more secure (Gardner and Lewis 1996).

The literature also posits that the provision of benefits--how different actors perceive the provision of future benefits--can have an impact on security. Benefits are most predominantly conceived of as monetary or material in nature--for example having to do with the provision of profits, rents or royalty payments. The acquisition of rents--or more specifically competition for revenues derived from natural resources is what most concerns the international peacebuilders. For instance, work of Collier and Hoeffler strongly suggests that the struggle for revenue by rebel groups and rents by corrupt government officials is the greatest threat to war-torn states. Conversely, there is also substantial evidence derived from case study work that in places where the economic benefits from the extraction and production processes are equitably shared and distributed among the population or local communities security is more likely to persist since perception of equality and relative deprivation are reduced (Peluso and Watts 2001). The literature, however, also points out that benefits are not just material. Local communities benefit from equitable access to the environmental assets such as water, land and forest resources that contribute to physical and mental well-being but as well as cultural sustenance. When benefits are unequally distributed

due to embedded social, political and economic relations and imbalances of power and authority, violent conflict can result (Peet and Watts 1996). Of course, despite the fact that benefits derived from the environment and natural resources are almost universally maldistributed and deprivation is widespread violent conflict can be rare in such situations. As such, the literature suggests that where benefits are disproportionately controlled or accrued by a small group of actors--be it political elites, state authorities, foreign companies or local groups-- or where actors intentionally or unintentionally encumber the benefits owed to others, conflict, the propensity of violence increases (Peluso and Watts 2001).

Finally, literature points out that costs correspond to negative externalities that result from extraction, consumption or production of natural resources. These costs can be both social and environmental, and are often disproportionately borne by those who do not actually benefit (or benefit little) from the processes or activities that cause the harmful effects and impacts. More explicitly, the costs associated with negative externalities are deeply embedded in relations of power and authority. Environmental costs frequently refer to environmental change and degradation from the overuse of renewable resources, abundant wastes or industrial activities (pollution), resource extraction of non-renewable (e.g., mining and timber) or large-scale development projects (e.g., dam construction or oil pipelines) (Peluso and Watts 2001). Environmental costs can also be related to the enclosure of "living space and territory" as well as various forms of resource conservation (Peluso and Watts 2001). On the other hand, the social costs can be the alteration of social institutions (such as the organization of households, land tenure arrangements or local knowledge systems), changes in cultural traditions, and the transformation of embedded power and hierarchical relations (Peet and Watts 1996). Environmental and social costs are usually connected. For instance, the pollution of freshwater, mining activity or the establishment of nature preserves can all create genuine resource scarcities that modify traditional property arrangements, disrupt the division of labor or necessitate resettlement (Gardner and Lewis 1996).

While some negative externalities are inevitable in the consumption or production of natural resources- -what is of most concern is the extent of its effects on the environment and people. While commodification of the environment has always occurred at some level, the trading of "global commodities", from oil and shrimp to forest and diamonds, has transformed and intensified links between human relations and the environment. This is particularly important because if the environmental and social costs are particularly destructive, disruptive, widespread--or unduly endured by certain groups or local communities--it may lead to a higher propensity of violence (Peluso and Watts 2001; Homer-Dixon 1991). Watts (2001), for instance, documents how the extensive environmental and social costs of the petroleum industry in Nigeria have exacerbated violent conflict. While Hardin (1968) has suggested that state authority is vital for mitigating such environmental costs, in many cases the state has been implicated in the destruction or, indeed, has little desire or capacity to mitigate or stop the deleterious impacts of negative externalities.

The environment, natural resources and economic development

Recall that IPOs assume that the environment and natural resources will reduce the propensity of violence through increased transparency and the implementation of commodity-tracking schemes. However, where peacebuilding overlaps with the presence of quick-yielding, "high-value" natural resources, IPOs emphasize the importance of "kick-starting" the extraction and export so as to foster economic recovery. From the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone to Timor Leste, Cote d'Ivoire and Angola, reforming environmental and natural resources governance for the purpose of economic development has been an international priority (Bannon and Collier 2003).. This is because a major legacy of civil conflict is damage to the economy, which reduces a country's GDP by about 15 percent and shifts revenue streams away from basic services (Collier 2007, 104). Conflict also increases poverty and reverses any subsequent development gains (Collier et al. 2003).

For countries that have them, valuable natural resources represent a potential windfall that can be used to rebuild the postwar economy and restore infrastructure, reconstruct state institutions and administer basic services.

Peacebuilding aside, natural resource exploitation has been long-associated with economic growth, democracy and peace (Rostow 1961). As a result, natural resources are an obvious starting point for attracting foreign direct investment, gaining export revenue and providing employment opportunities that form the basis of economic development. Exporting natural resources can, in theory at least, can help to "jump-start" economic growth, alleviate poverty and provide the state with the revenues to fund basic services in ways that spur development and send a signal to potential spoilers that the benefits of peace outweigh the costs. In the aftermath of conflict, one of the first tasks of international peacebuilders-- particularly the World Bank and IMF--is to identify quick-yielding revenue measures that can support economic recovery, and supply state revenue (World Bank 1997; 2004). Since the extraction of natural resources has often been a part of the pre-war economy, especially compared to other potential exports (agriculture or manufactured goods), it is believed that extractive industries can be up and running swiftly with only minimal investment.⁴²

The convention wisdom is that economic growth is fundamental for peacebuilding. First, as Susan Woodward (2002, 183) states, "no international or local action in support of peace can occur without a budget or donor to tap". Peacebuilding requires revenue to "buy confidence in the peace process" and begin provisioning basic services, fixing infrastructure, paying government officials and rebuilding state institutions (Woodward 2002, 185). International aid can provide fiscal resources in near term but eventually states must be able to sustain themselves after external aid diminishes. Second, as noted in the above

⁴² In some cases, the infrastructure for extractive operations is destroyed during war. However, in some instances, companies continue to function in a conflict setting. For example, the Firestone Rubber Company in Liberia continued to operate for a time at a much reduced level by negotiating with various combatants.

section, despite ambiguities in the research, economic growth believed to be vital for sustaining a long-term peace because negative growth and poverty are risk factors for conflict. As Bannon and Collier (2003, 8) argue, economic growth is the "best protection against civil war" since it provides state revenue that can be used to provide basic services while also raising income levels. With incomes rising, so it goes, the population will be less inclined to rebel against the state or be recruited by rebel groups.

The irony, of course, is that countries with an abundance of natural resources, in particular fragile and war-torn states, may be susceptible to violent conflict. While the scholarship is far from conclusive, revenue may fall into the hands of rebel groups and corrupt government officials or dependence on natural resource wealth may weaken governments, intensify poverty and cause economic distress. The predominant cause for such failures is overwhelmingly perceived by scholars to be corruption and bad governance (Collier 2007). For these reasons, the literature suggests that leveraging the environment and natural resources for economic development needs to be accompanied by "good governance" (Bannon and Collier 2003). This includes most prominently revenue transparency to provide improved government accountability and scrutiny into how revenues are being allocated. The rationale is that transparency will change the "rules of the game" by allowing civil society and international peacebuilders to observe what revenues are collected and to some degree how it is spent. In theory, such measures are intended to increase trust and legitimacy in the government by helping to ensure that revenue is used for economic development and the provision of basic services for the population. Disclosure by government and business entities can also remove the legitimacy of potential spoilers by giving state leaders the ability to demonstrate that agreements, contracts and concessions in the natural resource sectors are lawful and equitable.

Paris (2004) has argued forcefully that rapid efforts at economic reform can be disruptive to war-torn states by fostering or intensifying social and political conflicts and

grievances. Accordingly, before economic competition in the form of international markets and foreign direct investment are unleashed, states must first have functioning state institutions to manage the inevitable "conflicts of interest" that will arise. Evidence from the literature also suggests that market-based policies have increased not decreased, violence and unrest in developing countries (Skogly 1993; Stiglitz 2002; Walton and Seddon 1994). In addition, some research has concluded that economic adjustments of the kind promoted by the World Bank and IMF can have destabilizing effects in developing countries by reducing employment opportunities, increasing food prices and fostering inequalities, among other things (Paris 2002; 2004; Woodward 1995; Woodroffe and Ellis-Jones 2001). Similar arguments have been made with reference to the environmental and natural resource sectors in particular. As suggested, a wealth of cases document the impact of resource extraction, and the direct role of state policy, that results in increased poverty, a lack of benefits and considerable social and environment costs that not only create tensions but also increase the propensity for violence (Peluso and Watts 2001; Gardner and Lewis 1996). In addition, rather than impact the human development of the population or local communities, capitalist development is unequal and benefits the privileged few. The overarching point, then, is that government policies in the quest for economic development--propelled by international norms of economic globalization--can actually undermine security and social cohesion.

A lion's share of international attention by peacebuilders is focused on "high-value" natural resources and economic development. However, there is a growing awareness that peacebuilding should also address environmental management for the purpose of supporting sustainable livelihoods (UNEP 2009). Put another way, peacebuilding seeks to secure people's livelihoods by promoting environmentally sustainable resource use and development (Conca and Wallace 2009, 497). For example, the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stated,

Threats to security are interconnected... poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one another in a deadly cycle ...environmental stress, caused by large populations and shortages of land and other natural resources, can contribute to civil violence...Yet rarely are environmental concerns factored into security, development or humanitarian strategies...More legal mechanisms are necessary in the area of natural resources, fights over which have often been an obstacle to peace....A new challenge for the United Nations is to provide support for weak states - especially, but not limited to those recovering from war - in the management of their natural resources to avoid future conflicts (UN 2004).

The fact is civil conflict directly and indirectly damages the ecosystems and natural assets that are essential for human survival. Military campaigns have historically targeted forest areas and water sources and damage results from the movement of combatants and war machinery, human displacement and unexploded ordinance.⁴³ The consequences are often short and long-term impacts on health and local living conditions as well as patterns of resource degradation that can have social and economic repercussions.⁴⁴ Conflict disrupts pre-conflict social and economic practices that can damage ecological systems, diminish natural resources and harm wildlife. For instance, conflict disturbs patterns of land ownership and displaces people that drift around in search of livelihoods and incomes--often to the detriment of the environment and ecological resources (UNEP 2009). The literature tells us that people who struggle acquire clean water, sanitation, shelter, food and energy supplies on which they depend for their well being and livelihoods can trigger violence among groups (Peluso and Watts 2001; Gardner and Lewis 1996; Gurr 1970). A failure to

⁴³ As Conca and Wallace (2009, 490) note, such direct effects vary from case to case and are dependent on both the scope and extent of the conflict and also the depth of environmental assessment.

⁴⁴ Compounding the direct effects of conflict on the environment and ecological systems only aggravate pre-conflict challenges of "pollution, resources degradation and poor environmental management" (Conca and Wallace 2009, 491).

respond to the environmental needs of the population can deepen poverty, make development more challenging and exacerbate environmental problems (Chambers and Leach 1989). Even worse, a lack of sustainable livelihoods may leave people (or ex-combatants) vulnerable to disease and deprivation that may lead to the grievances and resentments that can complicate peacebuilding.

The environment, natural resources and state institutions/authority

As noted in Chapter 2, statebuilding has emerged as a dominant strategy from which to think about building peace in war-torn states. This preoccupation with statebuilding by international peacebuilders is based on the perception that state authority and state institutions are not only necessary for conflict management but indeed promote political, economic and social stability. First, a lack of state authority and power over environments and natural resources by weak or corrupt governments are deemed to be a contributing factor in the emergence of civil conflict. As such, IPOs stress the importance of reestablishing state authority over natural resources and the environment. The rationale is that the state is the most effective manager of the environment due to its sovereign claim on the monopoly over a given territory (including natural resources) and its ability to formulate and enforce policies. Compared to any local or international entity, the state is the institution constructed to equitably and effectively establish the "rules of the game" that govern society and provide the incentives by which individuals and groups pursue interests. There is certainly the perception that a powerful state is important because the inability to coerce and enforce certain behaviors can undermine the provisioning of service and reduce the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. A lack of state authority may also provide insurgents the opportunity to rebel-- which is under most circumstances an obstacle in achieving social, political and economic development.

However, scholars suggest that authority, although related to power, is different in that it denotes an “institutionalized or formal power” (Biersteker 2002, 168). Moreover, authority, in contrast to power, denotes some appearance of legitimacy. That is, a “form of consent or recognition of authority on the part of the regulated or governed” (Biersteker 2002, 168). As Biersteker (2002, 168) notes, this “legitimacy may be earned or generated” by political leaders and “consent is the product of persuasion and trust rather than coercion”. As such one way to think about state authority is as the marriage of material power with legitimacy. Another way to think about state authority is through the language of “social control.” As Migdal (1988, 32) writes, the strength of the state is dependent on the level of social control since it enables the state to achieve its goals. Increasing levels of social control are the function of three indicators – compliance, participation and legitimacy – and the more these three are available as “currency” to the state and its organizations, the more authority and control the state is believed to have. Compliance refers to the ability of the state to compel the population to conform to its demands, which at the most basic level relates to power and the use of force but can also refer to other sanctions. Participation denotes another way in which the state can gain “strength” and authority since it permits the state to “organize the population for specialized tasks in the institutional components of state organizations.” According to Migdal (1988), participation “denotes repeated voluntary use of, and action in, state-run or state authorized institutions.” The most important indicator of state control is legitimacy. Legitimacy “is an acceptance, even approbation” that the state’s rules and social order is “true and right.” Whereas both compliance and participation may result from rational “calculations of the rewards or sanctions” - legitimacy includes the “acceptance of the state’s symbolic configuration within which the rewards and sanctions are packaged.” Simply put, legitimacy indicates a population’s consent to state’s desired social order. Therefore, state authority needs to be accompanied with participation to be legitimate.

There is also the broad perception among IBOs that state institutions must be rebuilt and resurrected in order for democracy to flourish, the justice system to be effectual, economic recovery to be effective and social rehabilitation to be successful. For this reason, peacebuilders have placed an emphasis on rebuilding states institutions responsible for environmental and natural resource management (UNEP 2009). Conflict can have dramatic effects on state institutions responsible for environmental management. Environmental ministries, agricultural research centers, and electricity and water distribution points, for example, are frequently singled out for destruction and looting. This leaves the government with little institutional capacity to deal with land, water, sanitation issues. Conflict weakens environmental governance that can "lead to a culture of impunity and corruption as public officials... ignore norms and structures" intended to manage resources sustainably (UNEP 2009, 17).⁴⁵ The lack of legitimate governance, then, may lead opportunistic conflict entrepreneurs--be they rebels or corrupt government officials--to establish informal commercial networks with which to exploit natural resources outside the institutions of the state. In short, conflict decimates governance institutions designed to protect the environment, which can result in unsustainable and uncontrolled resource use. Therefore, rebuilding state institutions to control or govern land or critical environments is deemed important to ensure the environment and natural resources are protected from unregulated extraction and can support the sustainable livelihoods of the population.

At the same time, there is view that state authority will facilitate the rebuilding of state institutions (environmental and natural resource agencies) and thereby foster opportunities for peace and stability. Hardin (1968), for example, suggest the state management -- is the best way to reduce conflict resulting from overuse of resources and protect the environment. In short, local communities are deemed not only incapable of

⁴⁵ Of course, this assumes that "governance, institutions, authority, accountability and transparency" was functional and effective before the war, which in many cases, it is not.

sustainably management resource use but may in fact lead to violent conflict as self-interested individuals consume the commons. As such state environmental agencies are deemed important to administering use and access to environment and resources have the knowledge and capacity to do so. In war-torn states in particular, there is a pronounced impact on environmental and natural resources institutions - from the inability to control overexploitation of resources use and or address environmental issues such as the provision of clean water. For this reason, state institutions have been viewed as particularly important. The problem is, however, that the state and its leaders often use natural resources to sustain political power through patronage networks. States use their authority as a "kind of business" that channels natural resource revenues into informal relationships that undermine the provision of state services creating "hollowed out" state institutions. The result is the formation of "shadow states" that can lead to state failure and provide opportunities for the emergence of warlords (Reno 1995). In the end, weak and failed states lack not only authority and legitimacy but also the ability to govern, generating grievances and contributing to the opportunity structures that make conflict feasible (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

It should be noted however, that work by Ostrom (1990) and others (Dietz et al. 2002) that local institutions are better equipped to govern the environment and natural resources. While not perfect, evidence suggests that effective institutions--as measured by efficiency, sustainability and equity--may best be left to communities. More specifically, community-owned and managed resources through local institutions may be better suited than state institutions that in many cases made things worse for the resources as well as the users" (Dietz et al. 2002. 13). Therefore, increased levels of participation over time by local communities will increase the perceived degree of authority state organizations have over natural resources. In addition, decreased levels of access and benefits, as well as greater social and environmental costs will decrease the perceived degree of authority state organizations have over the environment and natural resources.

The environment, natural resources and social cohesion/trust

Violent conflict tears societies apart and undermines ability of states to provide services and protect the population. If societal dynamics remain contentious and divisive, it can perpetuate negative attitudes and fears about other groups -- based on class, ethnicity, tribal affiliation or political party - that can leave people vulnerable and disenchanting, and potentially increase the likelihood of violence (Colletta, Kim, and Kelles-Viitanen 2002). At the same time, if people lack trust and confidence in the state and its institutions -- for example, because of patronage, nepotism or corruption -- it can contribute to the exacerbation of societal grievances and even the emergence of spoilers. Both outcomes, in turn, can lead to the return of violent conflict. Peacebuilding, then, requires efforts to understand and make sense of how societal conflict leads to violence as well the consequences of violent behavior. To this end, establishing social cohesion and trust ranks as one of the key pillars of peacebuilding as is evidenced by the proliferation of truth and reconciliation commissions and other strategies designed by IPOs.

Environmental and natural resource governance is assumed to be particularly helpful in efforts to deepen social cohesion and build trust in order to transform divided societies and state institutions so as to help people -- and in fact the country -- heal. If done right, environmental and natural resource governance may assist in the extraordinarily difficult task of helping to build trust and social cohesion in ways that promote cooperation, reduce tension, overcome political cleavages and reduce the propensity of violence (Conca and Dabelko 2002; UNEP 2009). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (2008) has openly stated the UN position by suggesting that that environment and natural resource governance is important for "promoting dialogue around shared resources and enabling opposing groups to focus on common problems".

Despite these pronouncements, however, there appears to be two central ways in which IBOs assume social cohesion and trust can be facilitated. First, there is the assumption that the best recipe for collective action --and hence social cohesion with regards to the environment and resources -- is via a strong state authority that organizes incentives, provides inducements and enforces punishment to those that did not follow the "rules of the game" (Olsen 1965). Hardin (1968, 1244), for example, has suggested that individuals with too much "freedom" brings ruin to all because self-interested behavior results in the destruction of the environment and overuse of resources. In this sense, self-interest subsumes any "social mechanism to control self-interest, such as communication, trust and... agreements" (Dietz et al. 2002, 5). This suggests that coercion to control human behavior is a necessary and effective strategy, and that "rules of the game" for environmental and natural resource governance are best achieved through the state. Second, there is the assumption that free market-oriented policies enhance societal cooperation. This is deeply embedded in the principles of modern capitalism, which suggests that competition between profit-seekers--be they firms or individuals--result in greater prosperity for all. Moreover, markets are believed to temper social conflict by providing a mechanism through which self-interested behavior is manifest and the "natural harmony of interests" can emerge (Smith 1976 [1776]). Pioneering work alluded to above by Elinor Ostrom (1990), however, has suggested that people and local communities do transcend self-interest by devising and adjusting rules and institutions that define user groups, determine who has access and how resources can be used and establish who participates in decision making and how rights and duties to land are transferred. Such local institutions, according to Dietz et al (2002), foster social cohesion and trust that have endured for generations. Research has also showed that where state authority and policy have actually transformed traditional land tenure and ownerships arrangement in ways that accommodate state authority structures and creates divisions among groups, reducing access by communities, increasing poverty and opening up resources to elites and foreign investors.

While the "top-down" approaches and private property have conventionally enjoy significant hegemony, the "bottom-up" approaches to environmental and natural resource governance described by Ostrom are gaining traction through decentralization and community management, which allows for significant amount of participation and inclusion in decision making that improves social cohesion and trust.

Second, although identities do not inevitably lead to conflict, the literature suggests that identities (personal or social) are often in tension. Precisely how identity is related to violent conflict is uncertain but how people identify themselves - ethnicity, social strategy, tribal or racial, nationalism --often intensify during g periods of social, political and economic crisis. The literature suggests that as uncertainty grows and state authority declines practices in-place to protect one group from another loses their credibility. State authority declines due to crises, fears of insecurity can grow as certain groups invest in measures to protect themselves making violence more likely. From this perspective, state weakness is often perceived as the "incapacity to protect one group from another" (Stein 2002, 299).

In terms of the environment and natural resources, then, the consolidation of state authority is perceived as an be important way to protect society's most vulnerable groups but also to balance demands for resources, resolve disputes and translate public debate into government policy. In short, state authority, is thought to be above the fray and able to effectively and equitable mediate societal conflict and ensure that no one group dominates environmental and natural resources governance in ways that may increase the propensity of violence. T he problem is, of course, that states are not always the neutral arbiter of society and state authorities have often used identity to induce conflict over competition for, and the control of, natural resources (Peluso and Watts 2001). Just as spoilers expropriate identities to gain control of natural resources, and exclude people from resources on the basis of identity, so to do corrupt state authorities.

According to the literature, it is here that environmental and natural resources may be particularly helpful. Competing material interests are vital but they may not be sufficient to change the underlying conditions that result in propensity of violence. In short, interests are shaped by images and beliefs - that are part of identity (Stein 2002). Therefore, interactions and communication around the environment and natural resources may be able to "trigger broader forms of peace" (Conca and Dabelko 2002). Specifically, efforts to govern the environment and natural resources can work to emphasize "political or economic interdependencies" that can promote communication and interaction between adversaries or potential adversaries thereby establishing trust and confidence. Second, the environment may be able to foster interdependencies that can strengthen intergroup or societal trust, and create openings for peace. Cooperation at the local level may foster the formation of shared collective identities within societies and between potential adversarial groups that are not based on national, ethnic, class, religious, kinship or other cleavages. In both cases, environmental issues may rejuvenate civil society and facilitate dialogue and confidence building among civil society and between civil society and the state. This can help transform state and political institutions as well as alter societal relations in the direction of peace by focusing on the mutual benefits of the environment and natural resource challenges. The point is, of course, that inclusion and participation need are vitally important in making sure that identity does not exclude certain groups, and that interaction and communication can be a part of the process.

The preceding section has detailed, at least preliminarily, the ways in which international peacebuilding organizations understand the linkages between the environment, natural resources and peace, and how these ideas have been translated into specific peacebuilding practices. The picture that emerges-- prospectively--is that IPOs since the late 1990s been preoccupied with specific explanations about how the environment and natural resources are related to violent conflict that reflect the fear that "high-value" natural resources

will fund rebel groups and corrupt governments. The result has been a range of policies and practices by IBOs to mitigate "conflict resources" and also transform them into "peace resources". For example, peacebuilders have imposed sanctions and implemented commodity certification schemes designed to curtail the trade in diamonds, timber and other commodities. At the same time, however, IBOs have increasingly supported and established reforms and policies in war-torn states designed to reduce the propensity for violence. In short, IBOs assume that environmental and natural resource governance impacts four key peacebuilding pillars--security, economic development, social cohesion and state institutions.⁴⁶ Specific outcomes on these pillars are desired because they are perceived to reduce the propensity for a return to large-scale violence. Table 3 summarizes the key ways in which environment, natural resources and peace believed to be linked to the peacebuilding pillars. Several things are worth noting. First, participation/inclusion, access (e.g., land ownership and tenure) and costs and benefits appear to be significant factors in reducing the propensity of violence. Second, there are important contradictions or embedded tensions in the literature with regards to state authority, institutions and the role of economic growth.

Peacebuilding Pillars	How does the environment and natural resources relate to the peacebuilding pillars?
Social Cohesion and Trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation and inclusion • Land ownership and tenure (access to resources) • Equitable benefits from resource

⁴⁶ It is important to note that the ways in which environmental and natural resource governance may impact the four peacebuilding pillars are not mutually exclusive. The literature points out, for example, that issues of identity or access can undermine security while simultaneously effecting social cohesion or economic development.

	<p>exploitation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic growth • Strong state authority • Interaction and communication
State Institutions and Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation and inclusion in decision making process • Legitimacy of the state • Land ownership and tenure • Equitably distributed benefits • Strong state authority • Effective state agencies
Economic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing state revenue • Decreasing rates of poverty • Increasing GDP • Access to natural resources for adequately meeting livelihood needs • Social and environmental costs • Equitably distributed benefits (material and cultural)
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revenue transparency and commodity tracking schemes • Participation and inclusion in decision making process • Access to natural resources for adequately meeting livelihood needs • Equitably distributed benefits (material and cultural)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social and environmental costs
--	--

Table 3. Linkages between the Environment, Natural Resources and Peace

Conclusion

This chapter has argued two points. First, the idea that the environment and natural resources corresponds in some way to civil conflict materialized as the problem of fragile states and "new wars" discussed in Chapter 2 surfaced as an international security threat. What developed was a significant body of research that linked *either* resource scarcity *or* resource abundance to civil conflict. However, despite the extensive literature, scarcity and abundance explanations suffer from significant intellectual contradictions, methodological doubts and empirical complexities that have result in few, if any, definitive findings. These ambiguities notwithstanding, it is the dominant framework from which IBOs perceive the environment, natural resource and conflict problematic. Second, this has had a profound influence in the way international peacebuilding organizations understand how the environment and natural resources relate to peacebuilding and has a significant bearing on the reforms and policies they promote and establish. This, or course, raises a serious question: given how little we know about the linkages between the environment, natural resources and conflict, how can we trust that the linkages between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding are correct?

IBOs have incorporated and integrated environmental and natural resources concerns into peace operations for almost a decade. While sanctions and regimes get the most attention, IBOs have been deeply engaged in efforts to govern and manage the environment and natural resources--particularly high-value ones-- so that conflict will not reignite and peace can be sustained. But few studies have scrutinized in any detail the impacts of environmental and natural resource governance on peacebuilding. This lack of scholarship is

surprising because the peacebuilding literature has expanded considerably in recent years (Call and Wyeth 2008; Caplan 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Jeong 2005; Kumar 1997; Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002). While there are exceptions--a multiple-volume set focusing on natural resources management and peacebuilding is due out in 2011--most studies have been too over generalized and theoretical to be helpful to scholars or policy makers (UNEP 2009; Lujala and Rustad 2011). Regardless as to why such research has not been forthcoming, it appears that international peacebuilding agenda and policy targeted at governing the environment and natural resources is out in front of the empirical investigation.

This chapter is important in understanding what is to come. In following chapters, I argue that environment and natural resource govern reforms and policies in Liberia (e.g., forests) and Sierra Leone (e.g., minerals and diamonds) are profoundly influenced and shaped by the conflict literature, which help frame how the respective conflicts are understood by IBOs. The dominant construction of both conflicts, for example, center on the problem of "conflict resources" even though both conflicts and their underlying causes go much deeper. The result, however, is that the solution to the problem of "conflict resources"--transforming them into "peace resources"--creates numerous side-effects that may hinder peacebuilding.

Chapter 4: Conflict and Forests in Liberia

The Liberian conflict has been the subject of numerous books, articles and monographs written by a broad array of scholars (Ellis 1999; Kieh 2008; Levitt 2005; Mgbeoji 2003; Omeje 2009; Reno 1998; Sawyer 1992; 2005; TRC 2009). Taken together this collection has improved our understanding of a complex, puzzling, and horrific civil war. Despite this growing body of literature, however, there has been a general inability of analysts to fully understand the conflict, and instead focus on aspects that are easier for academics to study or (Western) audiences and policy makers to digest. Early explanations of the conflict, for example, focused on the region's Hobbesian "state of nature", characterized by "new barbarism" in which irrational and uncivilized warlords--motivated by ethnic hatreds or primordial savagery--committed murder for no reason (Kaplan 1994; Richards 1996). Other explanations blamed globalization and the end of the Cold War for the collapse of the country's institutions and governance for the conflict (Kaldor 1999).

This chapter argues that the dominate explanation for the Liberian conflict--particularly among international peacebuilding organizations--centers on the economic motives of combatants, and the responsibility valuable natural resources played in starting and fueling the 14-year civil war. This emphasis is attributable to the influential scholarship connecting the environment and natural resources to civil conflict, discussed at length in the previous chapter. Such narratives emphasize the role of "greedy" warlords and corrupt government officials, who traded in "blood timber"--among other resources--to amass wealth, buy weapons and perpetuate two wars. Liberia remains to this day the "poster child" of a

greed-driven, natural resource conflict, and *the* prime example of a "new war" fought over forests and their revenues (de Jong, Donovan, and Ken-Ichi 2007). I argue that these explanations have not clarified our understanding but have obscured the conflict's nuanced origins and dynamics, and at the same time misrepresented the deep-seated links between Liberia's forests and conflict. Rather than a novel feature of conventional civil conflicts, Liberia's forests have historically been at the center of political and societal grievances and struggles. If the objective of peacebuilding is genuinely to establish the conditions for a sustainable and long-term peace, then, it seems imperative that IBOs understand these underlying problems. A failure to do so, may lead to new reforms, practices and policies that do not attend to the root causes of the conflict or make things worse off.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of Liberian history from 1822-1989 paying particular attention to the changing social, political and economic dynamics of state formation. I then describe, in detail, Liberia's "Great War", which was fought between 1989 and 2003. A central theme is that the Liberian conflict is best understood as a continuation and manifestation of historical social grievances, political conflict and competition for power and not simply the symptom of a post-Cold War world. I then examine Liberia's forests from a historical perspective to better understand the role of forests in the political, economic and social fabric of the country. In the last part of the chapter, I then examine the links between forests and the conflict, how this relationship has been framed by IBOs, and subsequent efforts to address "blood timber."

Liberia: The Making and Remaking of the State (1822-1989)

From settlement to sovereign

Before the first "settlers" arrived on the "Grain Coast" in 1822, it was inhabited by numerous and diverse ethnic groups, all of which still exist in some form today (Levitt 2005,

17; Liebenow 1969).⁴⁷ According to Levitt (2005, 19-20), these groups, while indigenous to the region, were largely "post-traditional" in the sense that their patterns of thought, belief, and custom had been altered by the trans-Atlantic slave trade and century's worth of trade with Europe.⁴⁸ Settlers arrived at what is now Liberia as part of an experiment by the American Colonization Society (ACS) to resettle freed American slaves to Africa.⁴⁹ The ACS was established in 1816 by aristocratic slave owners to decrease the number of former slaves, who were considered not only inferior but also "vicious and mischievous"-- leading to an organized movement to remove them from the country (Levitt 2005, 32-33). From the beginning it was clear "the ACS intended to establish a paternalistic and authoritarian socio-political order in Liberia" (Levitt 2005, 39).⁵⁰ The ACS drew up the rules governing the distribution, procurement and ownership of land, the character of interactions with indigenous peoples, and the extent of political rights. The ACS also adopted a constitution, which endowed itself with all authority over the settlement and denied the settlers it was resettling the right to establish a government and elect its own leadership.

To secure territory, the ACS (with the help of the US Navy) coerced the native king to sell land by holding a gun to his head (Levitt 2005, 40).⁵¹ Between 1822 and 1847, the settlement endured frequent confrontation with the indigenous population that resisted the

⁴⁷ These groups are as follows: Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Loma, Krahn, Gola, Kissi, Mandingo, Vai, Gbandi, Belle, Dei, and Mende.

⁴⁸ Much of this early trade was in what can be termed "forest products" such as ivory, kola, rubber, wood and gold that was traded for manufactured goods and salt. Slaves were considered forest products.

⁴⁹ The ACS also was tasked with resettling recaptured slaves or those found to be aboard slave ships that were seized by the US Navy.

⁵⁰ Although not officially sanctioned by the US government, the ACS did receive substantial political and financial support, including the use of navy ships to transport the settlers and payment for the ACS agent. This support coincided with the passing of the "Act of Addition to the Acts of Prohibiting the Slave Trade" in March 1819" which was a companion Act to the "Act of Congress Prohibiting the Slave Trade" which was passed in 1808. The objectives of the Act were not to end slavery but to address the problem of more and freer Blacks living in the US.

⁵¹ The land was eventually bought in exchange for a few dozen items (TRC 2009, 75). What the ACS failed to understand was that the concept of land ownership was unknown and even taboo to indigenous groups where land was collectively administered or held in trust by ruling families.

establishment and rapid expansion of the colony.⁵² A quarter of a century after the settlers arrived, delegates adopted a Liberian Declaration of Independence and established the first Liberian Republic. The independence movement was shaped by the authoritarian rule of the ACS, which created deep resentments among the settlers or "Americo-Liberians", as they came to be known. By 1848, the Liberian Constitution had been adopted and Great Britain became the first country to recognize Liberia as an independent state. Nevertheless, the transition from settlement to republic was beset by continuous conflict (Levitt 2005, 99-123). This was partially the result of an indigenous population rebelling against the new state.⁵³ But the persistence of conflict also helped to shape what Levitt terms the "rise of the settler oligarchic state", characterized by subjugation of the indigenous population by a small oligarchy of settlers that sought to impose religion, culture and political and economic arrangements that denied the indigenous people political rights and land ownership (Sawyer 1992; TRC 2009, 71).⁵⁴

The second half of the 19th century and into the early decades of the 20th century can best be characterized by Liberian by attempts to formally extend the Liberian state from the capital Monrovia to the periphery or "hinterland".⁵⁵ This policy of "expansionism" was influenced by British and French encroachment as both powers claimed the need to bring "order" to the "ungoverned" hinterland areas of Liberia that was threatening its colonial

⁵² Indigenous groups that controlled lucrative trade routes viewed the settlers with caution and actively attempted to undermine the settlement in order to continue to profit from slavery and other "commodities" (Levitt 2005). Moreover, the decision of the ACS to carry out a "civilizing" and "Christianizing" program created resentment and triggered conflict (Levitt 2005, 46; TRC 2009, 78-79). Despite almost constant conflict the reluctance of the settlers--who were effectively "stateless" to flee--along with the continued arrival of more settlers, and the formation of military units, gave increased strength to the settlement.

⁵³ The indigenous population enjoyed several military victories against the settlers but still accommodated settler demands based on the perception that the US Navy would come to the support the Republic (Levitt 2005).

⁵⁴ The TRC highlights how even things as seemingly benign as creating the Liberian flag, which portrayed a ship over the motto "The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here", were embedded with the division between settlers and indigenous population.

⁵⁵ After 1869 the interior of Liberia came to be known commonly as the "hinterland".

territory--Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast.⁵⁶ The policy was also justified by the increasing demand for Liberian commodities, such as palm oil, coffee, camwood, ivory, hides and rice in Europe and the US, as well as the growing need for state revenue (Sawyer 1992, 156-160).⁵⁷ The result was an increasingly repressive policy toward the indigenous population, which included use of the government's new Frontier Force.⁵⁸ The Liberian government sought to strengthen its relationship with traditional rulers, however, who controlled access to the hinterland's agricultural land and natural resources (Sawyer 1992). This led to a policy of "indirect rule", the central purpose of which was dividing up rural areas into districts and using civilian administrators to buy, co-opt and coerce traditional rulers into supporting government policies, paying taxes, supplying labor and maintaining law and order.⁵⁹ As a result, Liberia began to develop increasing economic and trade relations with the US and Europe, which is exemplified by Liberia's granting of a 99-year lease (on four percent of the country's land area) to US-based Firestone Rubber Company.

State development and centralization

By the late 1920s, Liberia took its current territorial form. Between 1931 and 1979, Liberia had three presidents (e.g., Barclay, Tubman and Tolbert Jr.) and was essentially a

⁵⁶ Britain and France were emboldened by the Berlin Africa Congress (1884-1885), which mandated that states needed to establish "effective control" over its African lands.

⁵⁷ This also began a pattern of foreign lending for Liberia brought on by the sovereign state's international obligation to maintain order and build the institutions of a state. Because of Liberia's difficulty of administering taxes, Liberia looked to foreign powers as a source of revenue and a continued quest to be able to pay it back.

⁵⁸ The Frontier Force was established between 1904 and 1908 and was responsible for its summary killings, rape and violence (Levitt, 2005, 179).

⁵⁹ Indirect rule not only created new relations between the national government and local chiefs that helped to maintain informal government control of the hinterland but also increased the power and influence of traditional chiefs at local and national levels. Ellis (1999, 210) points out that the practice of indirect rule assumed the existence of political authority at the local level, which often did not exist. As such, district commissioners and other government administrators often searched out potential allies to carry out government directives. This not only had the effect of facilitating the emergence of new strong men at the local level but also influenced how traditional government is carried out and perceived historically. It is also important to point out as well that indirect rule also had the effect of factionalizing local and traditional politics.

one-party state.⁶⁰ During this time, Liberia's development was characterized by increasing investment by foreign business interests and the centralization of political and military authority (Sawyer 1992). William Tubman was the president of Liberia for almost 30 years (1944-1971), and his tenure is distinguished by the widespread penetration of state government control and the consolidation of settler oligarchic power. This chain of events developed as a result of Liberia's "Open Door" economic policy, which increased state revenues and facilitated the emergence of more expansive networks of patronage (Ellis 1999; Levitt 2005; Sawyer 1992).⁶¹ The 'Open Door Policy' was essentially a modernization program, which for a time was believed to have fueled one of the "world's fastest growing economies" in the 1960s (Ellis 1999, xxv; Marinelli 1964). Laws and regulations were adopted that "gave foreign investors full freedom of entry and repatriation of capital and profits" and imposed few if any restrictions on international business behavior or regulations regarding labor or communities (Sawyer 1992, Marinelli 1964).⁶²

As Tubman saw it, the Open Door Policy helped to secure "citizens against the curse of ignorance, poverty and disease" and provided "profitable investments" for the country (Marinelli 1964, 72). However, Sawyer (1992) has argued that the policy brought about foreign domination of the Liberian economy that granted of property rights and concessionary agreements to foreign investors and transformed traditional land ownership and tenure arrangements (Sawyer 1992).⁶³ The longer term consequence being the contested notion that the Liberian state--opposed to traditional rulers or communities--were indeed the

⁶⁰ The True Whig Party ruled for over a century.

⁶¹ It was also enabled by the support of the US who considered Liberia a Cold War client and received US aid.

⁶² Those that complained of such poor trade agreements were routinely sanctioned or jailed (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 17).

⁶³ For example, Tubman's administration negotiated the so-called "Christie concession", which handed an 80-year concession to the Liberia Mining Company in 1945 but at low rate of about five cents per ton of ore (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 17).

authority or "master of the land" (Sawyer 1992, 242).⁶⁴ It also allowed those in government to acquire wealth and power through business relationships and then distribute that wealth through patronage networks. But for the first time Liberia had the resources to build roads, schools and hospitals, and employment opportunities increased as foreign companies and other development brought many Liberians a higher standard of living and greater access to other parts of the country (Marinelli 1964). According to Marinelli (1964, 93-143), by 1948 Liberia's revenue had grown from \$1.5 million to \$12.5 million, and by 1964 Liberia's national budget had increased 50-fold from less than \$1 million to \$50 million. Despite the promise of a "New Liberia" described by Marinelli (1964) others suggested that Liberia had undergone "growth without development" (Clower et al. 1966). Clower et al. (1966, 5) suggested that "because the traditional policies and ruling group remains unchanged in the new economic environment of massive iron ore mines and rubber plantations...Liberia is growing but not developing."⁶⁵

Successful efforts to amend the Constitution to permit unlimited 4-year terms and excessive authoritarianism made Tubman many enemies and caused both settler and indigenous elites to conspire against him.⁶⁶ This led to the use ever more harsh measures to secure power and crush any opposition. As Levitt (2005) notes, although violence was long endemic in Liberia, this was the first time violence was used as an instrument of political competition. By the 1960s, Tubman had establish civilian and military security agencies and created a network of civilian "spies". The growing international demand for rubber, iron ore and timber provided him with the resources to finance his new security apparatus and expand his personal patronage network.

⁶⁴ Sawyer (1992, 244) notes that a strategy of economic development through concessionary agreements to foreign interests has always been contested in Liberia.

⁶⁵ This economic "backwardness", according to Clower et al. (1966, 4) cannot be attributed to a "lack of resources nor domination by foreign financial and political interests" but instead to the "leaders of Liberia [who] have not permitted... changes necessary to develop the society and its economy."

⁶⁶ The result was several assassination attempts on Tubman's life.

Tubman's death in 1971 led to the appointment of his successor William Tolbert Jr. Tolbert continued Tubman's "Open Door" policy, further integrating Liberia's economy into international markets and exporting raw materials. By the mid-1970s, an estimated 20 timber concessions encompassed almost one-fifth the land area of Liberia, 3,000 private rubber estates had been created and over 50 percent of Liberia's government revenues came from Firestone and the Liberian Iron Mining Company (Dunn and Tarr 1988; Reno 1998, 81-86; Sawyer 1992, 252). However, the 1970s also saw international demand for commodities contract with a global recession. Despite massive foreign aid from the US, a reduction in taxes and royalties negatively affected most Liberians, with the "rich and influential losing wealth and access; and the poor becoming poorer" and angrier (Levitt 2005, 191). Despite the rising resentment two events in 1979 helped to bring down the Tolbert regime. First, Tolbert and his administration proposed increasing the price of rice (the staple food of the population), reportedly to assist farmers although the price hike was reportedly to help the government write off its substantial foreign debt and reward political allies who stood to profit from higher prices (Levitt 2005, 195). Response to the price hikes led to "rice riots" that turned violent resulting fatalities and an estimated \$40 million in damage to Monrovia (Liebenow 1987, 172).⁶⁷ Second, a considerable lack of trust in the government led to the formation of rival political parties and activist student groups that contested the one-party state by calling for strikes and protests--all of which were met harshly by security forces.

Before these events could bring down the Tolbert government, in April 1980, 17 non-commissioned officers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and of indigenous origins, led by Sergeant Thomas Quiwonkpa attacked the Executive Mansion killing Tolbert and

⁶⁷ Despite calls for national reconciliation, the government's reaction to the so-called "rice riots" was to seek presidential powers to quell the violence, which resulted was not only the jailing of protesters and protest leaders but the detachment of Guinean troops to the streets of Monrovia (Boley 1983).

overthrowing the regime.⁶⁸ In a matter of hours, the hundred plus years one-party rule was brought down by a "people's revolution."

The Doe decade

Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, the highest ranking of the coup plotters was installed as the head of state, and the People's Redemption Council (PRC) took power in Liberia.⁶⁹ Doe and the PRC came to power with extensive public support and the perception that they had liberated the country (Boley 1983; Liebenow 1980; 1987).⁷⁰ While the PRC and Doe sought revenge on members of the Tolbert regime⁷¹, they also tried to satisfy all previously excluded Liberians--principally the indigenous population--who were expecting to be flooded with "money, jobs and other resources" (Ellis 1999, 56).⁷² Doe presumed that he could build political power by appealing to the public and using the levers of the state, including the military. However, the accumulation of power necessitated economic control, and therefore reliance on the same network of elites that Tolbert and Tubman had relied on. Rather than revolutionary change to the status quo, then, the power of Doe and the PRC's required not only the coercive potential of the military but support of the same patronage networks. The ability to pay off not only government bureaucrats, potential opposition, the military establishment and the powerful traditional rulers in the hinterland was dependent on Doe's ability to control resource revenues and dispense patronage.⁷³ These arrangements went "beyond corruption", diverting massive state revenues from development priorities to

⁶⁸ Reports of American involvement in the coup have been widely circulated (TRC 2009, 113). There is a debate as to who actually led the coup with some stating the leader was Samuel Doe and others suggesting it was Thomas Quiwonkpa

⁶⁹ Doe and Quiwonkpa were not yet 30 years old.

⁷⁰ The public executions of members of the Tolbert administration also sent many into exile.

⁷¹ This included a very public execution on a beach in Monrovia in front of television cameras.

⁷² The PRC was quick to respond to the public sentiment by abolishing the unpopular "hut tax" and raising government wages (soldiers and bureaucrats) by as much as 300 percent (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 5; Ellis 1999, 54).

⁷³ Doe ran the Forest Development Authority to divert timber concession fees and used the Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation and Liberian produce marketing corporation to himself.

priorities of patronage (Liebenow 1987; Reno 1998, 86). Between 1980 and 1983, despite growing exports, state revenue from rubber, iron ore, and timber fell by about \$125 million (Reno 1998, 86). The resulting weakening of state institutions, capacity and services was both blamed on and justified by the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and IMF that demanded reduced state spending, privatization and the use of international business (Reno 1998).

Following the coup, competition for political power, infighting among the PRC, and ethnic favoritism in government positions combined with limited resources to leave Doe in a precarious position. Rumors of counter-coups and a basic insecurity led Doe to disarm the military, increase the power of his personal security services and consolidate state power. This led to the imprisoning, coercing and outlawing of opposition groups.⁷⁴ However, responding to public demands--fueled by his increasingly unpopular authoritarian regime--Doe moved forward with elections in 1985 and presented himself as a viable leader.⁷⁵ Doe responded to demands for civilian rule by replacing the PRC with an interim assembly and lifting a ban on political activities. This allowed Doe to garner enough legitimacy, winning the election by a majority of votes (50.9 percent) (Liebenow 1987).⁷⁶

Doe's electoral victory was followed by an abortive coup by exiled Quiwonkpa causing the government to become increasingly suspicious.⁷⁷ From 1986 onward, violence and coercion grew worse and atrocities were carried out against Gio and Mano groups in

⁷⁴ It also led Doe to accuse army commander and fellow coup plotter Quiwonkpa of plotting a coup, forcing him into exile.

⁷⁵ Doe employed as advisors once members of the Tubman and Tolbert administrations to "groom" him to be president (Levitt 2005, 200). Doe began to see himself more as a civilian leader having made himself not only a general (from a master sergeant) but eventually the "Chairman of the PRC" and once the PRC was dissolved, the President.

⁷⁶ Certainly, few, except Liberia's ally the US government, believed the election verdict (Liebenow 1987, 297).

⁷⁷ Doe was reportedly tipped off by the Israeli government.

Nimba County, which had rumor had it supported the rebellion.⁷⁸ Doe manipulated ethnic tensions, which had been long dormant, to prevent the emergence of a united front against him.⁷⁹ The coup also caused Doe to adopt an aggressive attitude toward all opposition (or potential opposition) figures mirroring the detentions, arrests, torture and murder under the Tolbert regime. Every segment of Liberian society was affected by the repression with "the only consistency" being "military rule [and] the looting of society" (Sawyer 1992, 294) Like those before him, Doe concentrated on maintaining his patronage system by granting concessions to foreign companies " beholden to him for commercial opportunities" and using the revenues to buy local support (Ellis 1999, 64). One estimate suggests that in the decade of Doe's rule \$300 million were siphoned off by Doe for patronage and profit (Reno 1998, 85).⁸⁰ By 1989, however, his ouster was imminent.

The Liberian Civil War (1989-2003)

The Liberian conflict began on Christmas Eve 1989 when Charles Taylor led a violent rebellion against the government of Samuel Doe.⁸¹ The rebel assault by Taylor's force of 100 poorly armed fighters--a multi-ethnic coalition of Liberians and foreign insurgents fighting

⁷⁸ Quiwonkpa was ethnic Mano.

⁷⁹ Doe's inner circle and patronage network openly favored the Krahn, who made up an estimated 4-5 percent of the population, resulting in further "ethnicization" of Liberian society with political enemies and allies aligned along ethnic lines.

⁸⁰ To reiterate, this reduction in state services, institutions and capacity was enabled by structural adjustment policies by that advocating privatization and a reduction in the state.

⁸¹ Taylor was a former confidant of President Samuel Doe. He had once been the secretary-general of President Samuel Doe's Government Services Administration, a high ranking cabinet post. But Taylor--a protégé of Quiwonkpa --fled Liberia to the US as Doe cracked down on Quiwonkpa supporters. Taylor's flight to the US was followed by allegations by the Doe regime that Taylor had embezzled nearly a million dollars. At Doe's request, Taylor was arrested in the US and placed in jail for 18 months while awaiting extradition. However, under mysterious circumstances, Taylor escaped and made his way back to West Africa, meeting up with a small contingent of other revolutionaries with a dislike of Doe. Taylor was able to open a line of communication with Libya and most importantly, its leader Muammar Gaddafi, who had an interest in riding the continent of imperial powers. It was through these connections that Taylor was able to garner support from Libya, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire and training in revolutionary camps. As noted by Ellis (1999), it was by "chance" that Taylor became a leader of the NPFL at all.

under the name of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL).⁸² Taylor claimed the objective of the NPFL--which was a "network of armed dissidents" rather than a well-trained guerilla force or political party--was to get President Doe "off the backs of the Liberian people." He urged the population to take up arms against the government (Ellis 1999, 74). The main contingent of NPFL fighters was located in the northeast (Nimba County) but rumors circulated that teams of rebels were stationed around the country.⁸³ This began a spasm of killings by President Doe--and his Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)--who singled out and brutalized potential collaborators. Counter-insurgency tactics by Doe, however, had the effect of increasing rebel recruitment as thousands of civilians took up arms against the Doe regime fearing he wanted to "wipe out the Gio and Mano people" (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 20).⁸⁴ The NPFL offensive quickly diminished the moral of AFL troops--who largely resorted to looting emptied villages) while as the same time intensifying ethnically-driven animosities as Krahn and Mandingo groups that had nothing to do with Doe's excesses were unjustly targeted by rebels.

By July 1990, the NPFL was five miles outside Monrovia, controlled 90 percent of the country and had cut water, electricity and phone service to the capital. A generally popular Taylor seemed poised to take power as the NPFL entered Monrovia--committing atrocities against civilians and displacing an estimated 700,000 people along the way.⁸⁵ But

⁸² Reports on the numbers of insurgents vary. The NPFL was initially formed much earlier by Thomas Quiwonkpa. Taylor was married to a close relative. The assault originated in Cote d'Ivoire and Nimba County, which was where reprisals against the Gio and Mano groups occurred during and after the Quiwonkpa rebellion in 1985.

⁸³ Whether this was true or not is debatable. Taylor was a master of over exaggerating threats and instilling fear.

⁸⁴ During this time, the first child soldiers took up arms with the NPFL as children lost families, were displaced by AFL atrocities or were guaranteed access to food. Child soldiers reportedly as young as six or seven were forced to join the NPFL and forced to ingest drugs and taught to kill (TRC 2009, 224).

⁸⁵ At this time, Taylor enjoyed broad support among political insiders and the general population.

two factors conspired to deny Taylor a military victory.⁸⁶ First, although framed as an effort to bring peace to Liberia, Nigerian concerns that Taylor might take power led to an intervention by ECOWAS, West Africa's primary economic organization. With the tacit support of the United States and under considerable Nigerian pressure ECOWAS voted for intervention and an ECOMOG "peacekeeping" force made up of mostly Nigerian troops was sent to Monrovia (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 28-38).⁸⁷ Second, shortly after ECOMOG troops arrived, Prince Johnson--who had split from the NPFL and formed a rival group-- captured, tortured and assassinated President Doe ending his ten-year rule.⁸⁸ The end result of was a stalemate. The hinterland was controlled by Taylor and the NPFL and Monrovia was controlled by an interim Liberian government that relied on ECOMOG peacekeepers for security.⁸⁹ While these were viewed as positive developments internationally, and encouraged international organizations to return, the Nigerian military increasing had vested interest in staying in Liberia.⁹⁰

Taylor adapted to his denial of military victory and political aspirations by setting up a parallel government referred to as "Greater Liberia". Whereas the interim government lacked power and was saddled with billions in foreign debt, Taylor consolidated economic control over the country's resources and amassed a "personal fief" (Ellis 1999, 89). Taylor established relations with business interests, made easy by taking control of the port in Buchanan.⁹¹ For those with established interests in Liberia, including Firestone and the

⁸⁶ It is likely that Nigeria provided weapons to Doe. During this time, virtually all Anglo-phone actors would have supported US intervention, although the 2,000 US marines stationed off-shore only evacuated US citizens and foreign nationals without intervening. As Ellis (1999) notes, other world events such as the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began to receive most US attention.

⁸⁷ The US was particularly concerned about Taylor's relationship to Libya.

⁸⁸ For a vivid description of Doe's murder (Ellis 1999). DVD's of Doe's murder still circulate on the streets of Monrovia (and other West African capitals).

⁸⁹ The Interim Government of National Unity was set up literally by committee under the chairmanship of Amos Sawyer.

⁹⁰ ECOMOG commanders openly traded in commodities (Ellis 1999, 88).

⁹¹ Taylor came to realize that traders were willing to do business with him despite his "warlord" status.

Liberian Minerals Company, it was imperative to restart operations. After the NPFL took control of the Firestone plantation in 1990, Taylor used the buildings as administration offices and the company reportedly provided Taylor with a radio communications center that was converted into a radio station (KISS-FM). Firestone also signed a memorandum of understanding with the NPFL that allowed them to export about 12,000 tons of rubber in 1993 alone (Ellis 1999, 167).⁹² Newer arrivals, particularly the timber industry also discovered the necessity and attraction of dealing with Taylor who would grant licenses in return for personal payment in US dollars. Ivorian, French, Italian Israeli, Dutch and Thai logging companies gained access to forests. From late 1991-1993, Taylor had reportedly made at least \$75-\$100 million annually (Ellis 1999, 90) from the trade in diamonds, rubber, gold, iron ore and timber.

The control of Greater Liberia opened up new opportunities for Taylor to extend influence outside the borders of Liberia. Taylor provided support for the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 by the Revolutionary United Front largely driven by a deep animosity toward the Sierra Leonean government.⁹³ The spread of the war to Sierra Leone, along with a host of other factors, fostered the emergence of new factions inclined to fight the NPFL, including United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) (Ellis 1999, 94-104).⁹⁴ Feeling threatened, Taylor led a second NPFL assault on Monrovia in October 1992 that resulted in the systematic looting, widespread killing and rape. ECOMOG responded by using air strikes and artillery against NPFL positions, which resulted in extensive civilian casualties.⁹⁵ The end result, however, was a decisive victory for ECOMOG and ULIMO with

⁹² This was only of fraction of the over 100,000 tons exported before the war began.

⁹³ Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Taylor's motives for supporting the insurgency in Sierra Leone were largely political (Keen 2005). For example, Taylor harbored deep animosity toward the government in Sierra Leone that had supported ECOMOG and funded ULIMO elements.

⁹⁴ ULIMO was made up of Doe loyalists as well as ethnic Krahn and Mandingo fighters. ULIMO had the support of Sierra Leone and Guinea.

⁹⁵ Total number of deaths from "operation octopus" was estimated at 6500 (Ellis 1999, 99).

Taylor losing substantial parts of Greater Liberia, including the port at Buchanan.⁹⁶ The military pressure on Taylor raised the prospects of a political settlement as the three central players of the conflict, ECOMOG, NPFL and ULIMO signed the Cotonou Accord in 1993. Although the accords collapsed within a few months, they led to the establishment of a United Nations Observer Force in Liberia (UNOMIL), and for the first time, brought the NPFL to the negotiation table.

Realizing that Nigeria and the ECOMOG force stood in the way of what he wanted most--the presidency of Liberia--Taylor met with the Nigerian President in August 1995 to hammer the Abuja Accords.⁹⁷ The accords called for the formation of an interim "collective presidency" composed of the warring factions and disarmament while making preparations for national elections.⁹⁸ Taylor was dependent on ECOMOG for protection but he made a triumphant return to Monrovia where he enjoyed enormous advantages over his political opponents.⁹⁹ Taylor had amassed considerable monetary resources--he was able to pay ECOMOG officers and disperse patronage to political allies--and was an effective public communicator. In July 1997, over three-fourths of the population went to the polls, and an estimated 75 percent voted for Taylor. The election was deemed "the fairest in the country's history" although the conventional wisdom was that the vote was influenced by a perception that the conflict would restart if he did not win (Ellis 1999, 109).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ It should be noted that Taylor was not the only faction to use natural resources as ULIMO used diamonds to fund its operations.

⁹⁷ This was by one count, the fourteenth peace accord of the Liberian civil war (Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisaki 1999; TRC 2009)

⁹⁸ According to Ellis (1999, 105-106), the Abuja Accords fundamentally changed the "political and military mechanisms for securing the control of resources, which was the key to peace and war". This was because Taylor's control of Greater Liberia was not enough to attain the presidency and ECOMOG's control of Monrovia was insufficient to end the war.

⁹⁹ Even as the Abuja Accords were being implemented, NPFL fighters engaged in substantial fighting and looting in an effort to take what they could before elections were held. In fact, during this time Taylor and the NPFL reacquired Liberia's western diamond fields and timber areas.

¹⁰⁰ A famous chant about Taylor's election goes something like this: "He killed my pa, He killed my ma, I'll vote for him".

Despite initial accommodation with Taylor, regional tensions soon increased. ECOMOG accused Taylor of disregarding the Abuja Accords by rearming supporters.¹⁰¹ The UN, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana all accused Taylor's government of backing the RUF in Sierra Leone. Within Liberia hostility and dissatisfaction also began to build as Taylor came under increasing scrutiny for human rights abuses as his government settled old scores and eliminated and intimidated political opponents. Taylor was the target of several coup attempts and consequently tightened his grip on security and cleansed state institutions of any political opponents that might challenge his authority. But by-and-large, the international community seemed relatively unconcerned or unaware with Taylor's consolidation of state power, the looting of natural resources or his continued support for the ongoing war in Sierra Leone. From 1997-1999, violence in Liberia was at a relatively low level, providing Taylor with a modicum of support at home and abroad. The United States generally supported Taylor as well based on his ability establish order, and the perception that he could be transformed into a respectable leader (Ellis 1999).

Everything changed in April 1999 when conflict erupted on the border of Liberia and Guinea. Although Taylor accused Guinea of destabilizing the region, the region as a whole had still not accepted Taylor's presidency, especially given the NPFL's role in the conflict. The new attacks, which began "the second Liberian civil war", were carried out by new rebel groups, including Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) composed of former members of the ULIMO. The conflict escalated substantially in late-1999, and continued throughout 2001 and 2002.¹⁰² For the first time, the international community became visibly concerned with the scale of the violence, bloodshed and displacement, which was featured prominently on CNN (Jakobsen 1996). Meanwhile, accusations began to surface that Taylor was using diamonds from Sierra Leone to arm his personal security force

¹⁰¹ For example, Taylor did not keep the commitment to demobilize 40,000 former combatants.

¹⁰² During this time, ECOMOG continued to withdraw troops.

and the RUF. This led to UN sanctions against all diamond sales from Liberia (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000; UNSC 2001b). Adding to Taylor's problems was a growing lack of resources and an inability to procure weapons and dispense patronage. The diamond sanctions began to dry up Taylor's revenue stream--turning his attention to timber exports (Global Witness 2001a). Libya's Gaddafi and Burkina Faso, Taylor's traditional allies, were distancing themselves from him as international scrutiny of the conflict increased.

In early 2003, a new rebel group, composed of former Doe supporters calling themselves the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) also joined the fighting. The worsening situation in Liberia again caught the attention of the international community and the UN-Secretary General warned of the humanitarian crisis. Responding to reports that the trade in Liberian timber was now helping to fuel the conflict, the UN passed sanctions on Liberian timber in mid-2003. Taylor was subsequently indicted for war crimes by the UN-backed Special Court on Sierra Leone in early June 2003.¹⁰³ The charges alleged that Taylor backed the RUF during the Sierra Leone civil war and received diamonds in exchange for his support. In June 2003, Taylor signed the Accra Accords with LURD and MODEL under pressure from IBOs, civil society and religious groups that called for an immediate ceasefire--even as fighting continued. Despite Taylor's insistence that a majority of the Liberian people supported him, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CAP) called for a new transitional government (not to include Taylor) and an ECOWAS-led verification team to oversee the implementation. However, Taylor's intransigence, LURD and MODEL's reluctance to negotiate any further with Taylor, and ECOWAS's weakness led to increasing pressure on the United States to intervene.¹⁰⁴ US President George W. Bush urged Taylor to step down but

¹⁰³ At the requests of the Special Court, Switzerland froze the assets of Taylor, his relatives and members of his government.

¹⁰⁴ Many argued at the time that the UK role in sending in troops to end the Sierra Leone conflict (and French in Cote d'Ivoire) was a good model. Ironically, even Taylor argued the US to intervene to save Liberia.

stopped short of direct intervention.¹⁰⁵ Negotiations in Accra shifted toward the conditions of any cease fire and how to put together a transitional government. With ECOWAS set to send in thousands of soldiers, fighting intensified with LURD advancing into Monrovia and calling for Taylor to depart the country.¹⁰⁶ With the violence spiraling out of control and the situation in Liberia deteriorating quickly, the UN approved a resolution to send a large UN-backed peacekeeping force to Liberia.¹⁰⁷

On August 11, 2003 Charles Taylor resigned as the President of Liberia and left for exile in Nigeria.¹⁰⁸ The peace agreement called for the permanent end hostilities, the establishment of a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The NTGL, in which LURD and MODEL were guaranteed 12 seats each in the transitional assembly, had a mandate to enforce the peace agreement, promote reconciliation and prepare for national elections to be held in October 2005. The agreement also called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to uncover the root causes of the crises and deal with human rights abuses (TRC 2009). In October 2003, Charles Gyude Bryant, a businessman and leader to the Liberia Action Party, was selected as the chairman of the NTGL.¹⁰⁹ Shortly afterward, the UN Security Council approved the formation of the 15,000 member peacekeeping force known as United Nations Mission in Liberia.

¹⁰⁵ Ellis (1999) argues that, in a sense, the decision to "intervene" had already been decided based on growing international concern about the conditions in Monrovia, which was getting unprecedented media attention. In addition, in the context of 9/11, the instability in Liberia and West Africa was deemed a potential threat to the US, especially since failed states such as Liberia were increasingly viewed potential safe havens or funding opportunities for terrorists (Farah 2004).

¹⁰⁶ Reports of at least 600 dead were reported.

¹⁰⁷ The agreement provisionally stated that only those that had not fought in the war could serve in top government positions. However, representatives of LURD and MODEL argued that only leaders of the rebel groups could disarm fighters (Levitt, 2009, 233).

¹⁰⁸ In a moment of theatrics, it has been reported that just after Taylor's "sacrificial lamb" resignation speech; three US navy ships appeared off the coast.

¹⁰⁹ Bryant was chosen by representatives of LURD and MODEL.

Liberia's Forests in Historical Perspective

Liberia's forests have always supplied the resources needed for survival and the sustainable livelihoods of forest communities. They provide wood for construction, energy and trade and supply fruits, medicines, bush meat and other food stuffs (Lomax 2008; Lebbie et al. 2009). Forest areas are important for indigenous agricultural systems since they are cleared for the cultivation of rice and the production of other food staples. Forests are also of great cultural meaning to Liberians. For example, Sande and Poro secret societies ritualize and conduct rites of passage in particular forest groves. Liberia lies within in the Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem, which sits in parts of seven West African countries. It contains by far the largest contiguous blocks of the Upper Guinea rainforest belt representing between 40 and 50 percent of the remaining forest cover (Blundell 2003; UNEP 2004). An estimated 80 percent of the country is forested, with about 35 percent "undisturbed" rainforest (UNEP 2004, 44-45). The remainder of the country's forests is regenerating wooded areas or land used in shifting agricultural cultivation.¹¹⁰ At least 55 percent of the population resides in forested areas and nearly all of the people depend on charcoal and firewood for energy (UNEP 2004). Liberia's forests are fundamental to local livelihoods and cultural systems as well as an important global commodity. More recently, Liberia's forests have emerged as globally significant for biodiversity and climate change.

Liberia is located in the proximity of early trading routes that helped to shape the relationship between society and forests (Richards 1996). First, the area was heavily influenced by the regional and European trade in forest products including wood, gold, ivory, spices, dyes, nuts and beeswax. The slave trade also had a tremendous impact on the region. Second, the relationship between the people, land and forests changed forever with the arrival

¹¹⁰ Shifting cultivation is a farming system in which land is cultivated rotationally to maintain productivity. In Liberia, patches of forests or wooded areas are cleared every few seasons to plant rice and other crops after which the land is left fallow to be reclaimed by natural vegetation.

of the first settlers from the United States. The ACS attempted to purchase land from the indigenous population-- which was unknown and taboo--and brought with them a set of rules that included rights of individuals to own land. Traditionally, forests were managed by "customary land tenure", which is an indigenous system for "acquiring, holding and regulating land" (Wily 2007, 104). Such tenure arrangements are generally governed collectively by communities or in some instances by ruling lineages. According to Wily (2007, 104), customary tenure is generally an agrarian and community-based practice-- although contrary to the conventional wisdom--it is not static but shifts along with communities and changing environment and land pressures.

Wily (2007, 73) notes that by the 1850s the foundation of Liberia's land laws were in place and the institutionalization of new ownership regimes fundamentally made the indigenous people "tenets of the state on government land". In the early 20th century, state policy toward land and the indigenous population began to shift as a result of indirect rule and the growing interests in "developing" and "governing" the hinterland. For instance, in 1904-1905, changes to land policy mandated that allotments of public land could be owned by indigenous people as long as they become "civilized" (Wily 2007, 110). The "civilized" among the population, of course, were generally indigenous elites or traditional leaders courted by the government through indirect rule. Despite slight alterations in law over time, however, almost every conflict in Liberia has deep roots in competition over land and resources fundamentally because the rules that govern them have always been "diametrically opposed" (Levitt 2005, 86). The rules in question conferred on a certain group--primarily "Americo-Liberians"--the right to individual land ownership while forcing a vast majority of the population to remain under unfair land arrangements dominated by customary authorities or government officials. In short, oligarchic and oppressive state--using a policy of coercion and cooptation of traditional rulers to maintain order--established unfair land ownership and tenure rights that have persisted to become a constant source of tension and violence.

Between the 1920s and the 1950s, the government proclaimed--via the Hinterland Laws---that property in the periphery belongs to the "respective tribes, irrespective of whether or not they acquire and hold official deeds describing those areas"--the authority resting with the traditional chiefs and transferable to collective holdings with the permission of the state (Wily 2007, 114). These laws provided for "collective legal ownership" to indigenous peoples--laws that have not been found before or since anywhere on the continent (Wily 2007). These laws endowed the state with "territorial title" but allowed for Liberian citizens to purchase land from the indigenous groups so long as it was done with the consent of traditional chief--who is the custodian of the land (Wily 2007). These laws were progressive but did little to alter the underlying structure of land ownership. Regardless, changes to the laws in 1956 led to all but locked-in the power of the oligarchy through a "silent land theft at a considerable scale" (Wily 2007, 121). By changing a few words--from "right and title to land" to "right of use and possession of the land"--the Liberian state rendered the indigenous population "occupants and users" of land and forests and endowed the state with sole ownership (Wily 2007, 121). The new laws considered for the first time "property"--defined as lands that were "owned individually and registered with the state--produced a market by which those with money could buy land from the poor (Wily 2007, 123). The result was the further consolidation and control of the land by political elites.

While Firestone's extensive rubber concession's initiated the "Concession Era" in Liberia, changes to land laws and regulations corresponded to Tubman's "Open Door Policy", which sought to open up the country to international business interests for the production of agricultural products, iron ore, gold and timber. Although foreign entities cannot own land, the granting of rights to public and private land is permitted and the state has the authority to "lease any portion...of public lands...to any foreign individual, corporation or company for engaging in agricultural, mercantile, or mining operations" (Sawyer 1992, 244). While Tubman's stated purpose was to modernize Liberia, it was a first step toward foreign

economic domination of the Liberian economy (Sawyer 1992). The policy worked to wean Liberia from a reliance on Firestone by attracting numerous business investments in iron ore, agriculture and timber. International companies could now more easily lease land by obtaining long-term concessionary rights, contracts and agreements but generally at less than optimal terms for the state. The "Christie concession" handed an 80-year concession to the Liberia Mining Company in 1945 but at the extremely low rate of five cents per ton of ore (Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisaki 1999, 17). Such arrangements failed to spur economic development (although those in power got rich) and increased competition for land. As Sawyer (1992, 244) notes since the 1950s, "the strategy of undertaking economic development through concessionary agreements to foreign entities has...been contested in Liberian society".

Liberia's forests have undergone a gradual process of forest conversion, in contrast to neighboring countries--like Sierra Leone-- where the timber sector has been active for a century (Richards 1996).¹¹¹ However, beginning in the early 1960s, commercial timber operations began in many parts of the hinterland (Clower et al. 1966).¹¹² A survey of forests in 1951 showed that almost 60 percent of Liberia as covered in closed-canopy rainforest, of which an estimated 40 percent was unlogged. But by 1968 undisturbed areas of the forest had been reduced to about 25 percent (Parren and de Graaf 1995). While not as profitable or labor intensive as iron ore or rubber industries timber emerged as a vital part of Liberia's economy and generated thousands of jobs (Clower et al. 1966).¹¹³ Throughout the 1970s, there was a "timber boom" as production increased as a percentage of GDP and rose five-fold as a percent of Liberia's exports (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 132-142). In addition, the value of timber rose from an estimated \$32 million in 1976 to \$72 million in 1980 (even as volumes

¹¹¹ Sierra Leone's timber was reduced significantly in the early 20th century (Richards 1996).

¹¹² The Forest Act creates Bureau of Forest Conservation to manage forest areas.

¹¹³ Timber was not as profitable due in part to transportation, marketing and management limitations.

declined) making up about 10 percent of foreign exchange (FAO 1984, 3-6). By 1980 official figures estimated that the largest 20 forest concessions encompassed nearly 20 percent of Liberia's land area (Reno 1998, 83). The government and international actors largely viewed the 1960s-1970s as a time of "social stability and economic progress" (NTGL 2005, 24). The only problem, of course, was that the benefits accumulated to a small group of landowners, foreign investors and elites that left most of the country underdeveloped and a large segment of the population disenchanting. As Clower et al. (1966) suggested such outcomes can be attributed to an importunate system in-place to benefit the leaders of the state while incentivizing even further the consolidation of state power. The long-term consequence of such resentment and resistance being the contested notion that the Liberian state--as opposed to traditional rulers or rural communities--are actually the "authority" or "master of the land" (Sawyer 1992, 242).

Concerns about the pace of "rational forestry" led to greater attention to conservation during the 1960s-1980s.¹¹⁴ Ten national forests were established during the 1960s to "protect both forests and wildlife"--although they may have been "protected in name only" as agriculture and forest concessions reduced forest areas and hunting decimated wildlife (Verschuren 1983). During the 1970s, the effects of "slash and burn" agriculture and the protection of large mammals were the central concerns over time there was a "mounting awareness of the negative effects of the international timber trade" (Kolk 1996, 245). The result were efforts by international conservation groups-- most based in the West--to protect

¹¹⁴ Perhaps foreseeing a general trend toward an industrial forest sector, Forest Laws were passed in 1953. The objectives of the laws were to: "establish a permanent forest estate, made of reserved areas, upon which scientific forestry will be practiced" and "stop needless waste and destruction...bring about the profitable harvesting of all forest products while assuring...products are perpetual" (GoL 1953, 3). The law was the first in Liberia's history to address conservation values and established the Bureau of Forest Conservation to undertake forest inventories. The law also granted the Liberian President the authority to establish forest reserves, national parks and communal forests (GoL 1953). The law was supplemented in 1957 to provide guidance on the issuing of forest permits and concessions, the collection of revenues and receipts, and management of wildlife resources (GoL 1957). In spite of the emphasis on conservation, the priority was on developing the forestry sector for the "permanent good of the whole people"(GoL 1953).

blocks of forests as nature reserves, parks and wildlife areas. In 1980, the World Conservation Strategy labeled Liberia's forests as "essential" for worldwide conservation goals and it was listed as a priority country under the Worldwide Fund for Wildlife's (WWF) tropical rainforest campaign (IUCN 1980).¹¹⁵ Despite, or perhaps because of the "timber boom" of the 1970s-1980s, conservation gained momentum even as the political situation under Tubman and Doe deteriorated. A report by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the WWF titled the "Conservation of Tropical Rainforest in Liberia" was hopeful that the "great interest in conservation shown by the highest authorities of Liberia will allow for the forest ecosystem in Liberia to be saved before it is too late" (Verschuren 1983, 6).¹¹⁶

By the time Samuel Doe took power, the global economy was contracting, which led to decreasing timber production. Despite economic decline, the forest sector remained an important part of the economy contributing about 5 percent to GDP and exports totaling \$36 million in 1981-1982 (FAO 1984). The Doe regime, like Tubman and Tolbert administrations, continued to grant large concessions to timber companies. Verschuren (1983, 7) noted that by 1983 all primary and (old) secondary growth forests--or approximately 50 percent of the country--was part of a concession. What went unnoticed was the extent to which the timber sector, and other natural resources sectors, had been captured by the state (e.g., Tubman, Tolbert and Doe), and foreign investors (Reno 1998). Beginning in the 1960s, foreign domination of the Liberian economy, which greatly expanded the provision of property rights and concessionary agreements allowed local leaders and political elites to acquire wealth through business relationships, and then to distribute that wealth

¹¹⁵ Liberian forestry was perceived to have strong forest management, which was strengthened by the creation of the Forest Development Authority (FDA) in 1976.

¹¹⁶ In closing, the report stressed the need to establish national parks, and responding to such call, Sapo National Park was set aside by the Doe government in 1983 as the first nature conservation area in Liberia.

through patronage networks to gain and maintain support. Not only is patronage essential for political power--and financially dependent on natural resource revenues--but patronage thrives where agreements and concessions can be arranged without any transparency or accountability.

To help maintain power Doe set out separate forest resources--and their substantial revenues--from formal state institutions and the national economy. Doe promoted commercial alliances with timber companies, granted concessions to friends and channeled the rents into networks of patronage that bought political support. For example, Doe granted the largest timber contract in West Africa to an Israeli firm--and to make this happen appointed himself the managing director of Liberia's Forest Development Authority. Liberian presidents, and political and business elites, have long consolidated state power over natural resources to manipulate contracts and expropriate rents for political purposes. However, Doe shifted away from a policy based on access to state power and toward contacts with more fragmented and informal networks of power (Reno 1998). The result was a decline in state expenditures and the weakening of state institutions, public resentment, and the emergence of new opponents that could challenge Doe for power.¹¹⁷ Another dimension that was not a matter of concern until much later was the willingness of timber companies to trade weapons and military assistance in exchange for agreements and concessions (Reno 1998). What is significant about these developments is that after the Liberian conflict began Charles Taylor "found that he could tap...timber operations to fund military operations" in exchange for the protection of timber companies themselves (Reno 1998, 95).

International Peacebuilders and the Emergence of "Conflict Forests"

¹¹⁷ To reiterate an important point, structural adjustment policies of the IFIs also weakened the state by demanding reductions in state expenditures, privatization and the use of foreign businesses.

As ECOMOG and interim government established order in Monrovia, Taylor and the NPFL maintained control of "Greater Liberia" that includes vast stretches of tropical forest. These forests--along with other natural resources--not only provided rebel groups with a safe haven but provided Taylor with economic control of Liberia's natural resources.¹¹⁸ Scores of industries fled the country after fighting started but "not all investors shunned Liberia" (Johnston 2004, 443). With command over major ports and roads, Greater Liberia was stable enough for many foreign business interests that took advantage of the "stateless" situation. Taylor granted numerous and extensive timber concessions. Ivorian timber companies--who logged out domestic supplies--gained access to the vast forests of Nimba County. European logging firms from France, Italy, Israel, Netherlands and Thailand also established themselves in Greater Liberia. Between 1991 and 1992, Taylor exported about 343,000 hectares of timber to Europe alone. In fact, France's second biggest supplier of timber and wood products in 1991--estimated at \$19 million--was Liberia (read: Greater Liberia) (Ellis 1999, 165; Global Witness 2002, 12).

Foreign companies knowingly contributed to Liberia's "war economy" but the international consensus was that commercial activities were on balance beneficial--or at the very least tolerable--because free trade was not to be regulated. As Crossin, Hayman and Taylor (2003) note, there has always been a historical reluctance among consuming countries to control the trade in legal commodities such as timber. To reiterate: foreign businesses had long made deals with nefarious political elites in Liberia with varying degrees of authority and legitimacy over natural resource concessions and contracts. The difference in the early part of the Liberian conflict was that Taylor was not the leader of a sovereign state but an

¹¹⁸ As mentioned in the previous section, the realization that natural resource operations could operation outside of the formal state institutions and fund military operations probably started under the Doe regime.

un-sovereign"--albeit in control of vast resources. As Reno (1998, 107) noted perceptively, "the sovereign state was challenged as the primary reservoir of rewards".

The fact that timber activities carried out by Taylor in Greater Liberia were conduits for criminal activity, human abuses, environmental destruction and weapons trafficking was widely acknowledged by the population.¹¹⁹ Even though Taylor formed a "shadow FDA", a lack of sustainable management led to the destruction of as much as 2.5 million hectares of forest in Greater Liberia between 1990 and 1995 (UNEP 2004).¹²⁰ Fighting also occurred in and around forest areas leading to the displacement of tens of thousands and the forcing the conscription of people in forest communities, including children. The fighting also placed large areas of forests off limits, which drastically reduced the amount of land under cultivation and undermined the ability of forests to support livelihoods. Parren and de Graaf (1995) suggested that the commercial timber operations were fuelling the war and destroying forest reserves. The issue, however, got little, if any, attention from international peacebuilders, and was tolerated and accepted by Western governments.¹²¹

Following the elections, Taylor was emboldened as the president of a sovereign country to consolidate state control and authority over the formal economy, including Liberia's natural resources. The Strategic Commodities Act of 1999 gave the president the sole authority to "execute, negotiate and conclude all commercial contracts or agreements with any foreign or domestic investor" (GoL 1999).¹²² Greenpeace (2001, 5) stated that the Act made Taylor "the sole beneficiary of all revenue obtained, with a total contempt for economic and social well-being of his country." Activists and civil society actors in Liberia

¹¹⁹ Taylor exerted his influence in other ways as well decreeing a minimum wage of two dollars a day for those working in the timber industry--a substantial increase from before the conflict (Ellis 1999, 92).

¹²⁰ Key scientific data and reports were destroyed as buildings were looted and destroyed.

¹²¹ In addition, a French journalist accused the French government of contributing to the war (see Reno 1998).

¹²² Strategic commodities were defined as all mineral resources, all natural forest resources, all unique and rare arts and artifacts and all food and agricultural products.

argued that the law was unconstitutional even as Liberian officials "defended the law on the basis that the economy had always been controlled this way", and was a matter of national security (*Liberian Post* 2002). A new National Forestry Law similarly "declared that all forest resources are the property of the government except for communal and privately owned" plantations and empowered the FDA to collect fees and manage logging concessions (GoL 2000).¹²³ This more prominent role for the FDA was suspect given that Charles Taylor's brother was its executive director and another close associate sat on its board of directors (Global Witness 2001a).¹²⁴

After Taylor became president--during a brief period of relative stability--activists and journalists began to investigate reports that the "looting spree", which characterized the first seven years of the conflict, was continuing under Taylor's Presidency (*Perspective* 2000). What they found was that timber companies-- under the supervision of the Taylor government--had destroyed homes, constructed roads through communities and sacred areas, harassed women and arrested and beat villagers. The abuses were carried out by private militias and government security forces working on behalf of timber companies. They also accused timber companies of logging illegally and in an environmentally unsustainable manner without any benefits accruing to communities. There was also evidence that the profits from the timber industry were paying for weapons shipments that were contributing to the conflict in Sierra Leone and activists procured documents to link specific timber companies to arms smuggling in defiance of UN sanctions (on arms shipments). IBOs, however, were relatively indifferent with Taylor's consolidation of power over natural

¹²³ This law remains controversial since the final printed version was reportedly altered at the last minute from the version debated and agreed to by the Liberian legislature (see Laws and Regulations related to forestry in Liberia).

¹²⁴ Two on the FDA's board of directors were known to be involved in the diamond trade in Sierra Leone.

resources or the exploitation of Liberian timber--so long as full-scale conflict did not resume in Liberia.

With regards to Liberia, IBOs remained overwhelmingly concerned with the role of diamonds--not timber--in fueling the conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor was accused of organizing rebels in Sierra Leone and directly controlling that country's plentiful rough diamonds to traffic weapons and launder money (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000). A UN Panel of Experts (2000) found that Sierra Leonean diamonds were smuggled through Liberia with the involvement of Liberian officials, and that the diamonds revenues were actively fueling the violence. Based on the "unequivocal and overwhelming evidence" that the Government of Liberia was actively supporting RUF rebels in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1343, which reiterated demands that Taylor cease supporting armed groups in Sierra Leone (UNSC 2001b). The resolution mandated that "all States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia." Despite significant attention to "conflict diamonds", the same panel reported on the linkages between Liberia's forests and the conflict in Sierra Leone.

The principals in Liberia's timber industry are involved in a variety of illicit activities, and large amounts of the proceeds are used to pay for extra-budgetary activities, including the acquisition of weapons. Consideration should be given to placing a temporary embargo on Liberian timber exports, until Liberia demonstrates convincingly that it is no longer involved in the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds from, Sierra Leone" (UN Panel of Experts 2000, 12).

Global Witness and other international NGOs used the focus on "conflict diamonds" to establish a global campaign regarding "conflict resources", more generally. Not only were

diamonds exposed as fueling conflict in Angola and Sierra Leone but Global Witness made their name by drawing attention to the links between the timber trade and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1995. In January 2001, Global Witness presented evidence before the UN Security Council that Liberian President Charles Taylor was now using timber revenue to fund the conflict in Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2001b). Global Witness (2001b, 2) suggested that the timber trade had become "more financially valuable" to Charles Taylor than the trade in diamonds and " a significant portion of...revenue is used... to train, arm and supply the RUF." In fact, Global Witness suggested that because of the sanctions on diamonds, Taylor was forced to shift his attention to forests to fund the conflict in Sierra Leone and support his own security forces. Precise figures are uncertain but figures showed that the export value of timber in 1999 had increased substantially from the previous year to approximately \$21 million, with a majority being exported to Europe (Global Witness 2001b, 5-6).¹²⁵ Global Witness (2001b) calculated that over 100,000 m² of forests were logged in the first three months of 1999 alone with profits between \$50 and \$70 million.¹²⁶ For example, timber production in 2000 was estimated to be 934,000 m³, worth a *minimum* of \$187 million on international markets, with exports worth about \$130 million (Global Witness 2001a, 3). Taking into account production costs, Global Witness calculated that at least \$100 million was available to split between logging companies, Taylor and other patrons.

Global Witness pointed the finger at one company in particular--Oriental Timber Company (OTC)--which was accused of monopolizing the Liberian timber industry, harvesting in an unsustainable manner, and leaving forests in "crisis" (Global Witness 2001a). The UN Panel of Experts (2000, 36) reported that "roads built and maintained for

¹²⁵ The import value was estimated to be much more, approximately \$29 million.

¹²⁶ Five biggest importers of Liberian timber in 1999 were (Global Witness 2001; Greenpeace 2001): France 37%, Italy 19%, Turkey 15%, China 8%, Indonesia 6%, Spain 6%.

timber extraction are conveniently used for weapons movement within Liberia and for the onward shipment...to Sierra Leone." The same report (2000, 36) declared that the chairman of the OTC had organized weapon's deals and transferred arms from Monrovia to Sierra Leone.¹²⁷ The OTC was working with Charles Taylor to procure vast amounts of timber and operate illegally under Liberian law. A deal between OTC and Taylor was alleged to provide the company with the freedom to conduct timber activities, control the Port of Buchanan and construct all necessary roads (Global Witness 2001a).¹²⁸ Accordingly, the OTC paid Taylor \$5 million in exchange for tax-except status and exclusion from all regulations.

Based on this evidence, Global Witness (2001a, 1) recommended that the UN Security Council "impose a total embargo on the exportation and transport of Liberian timber, and its importation into other countries", which should remain into effect until the trade does not contribute to the RUF in Sierra Leone and is carried out in a transparent manner as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (UNSC 2000). Global Witness further recommended a detailed investigation into the Liberian timber industry, particularly the actions of the Oriental Timber Company to enable the UN and the international community to gain a comprehensive understanding of the role of the industry in Liberia and the conflict in Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2001a). The US and Britain also supported sanctions on Liberian timber based on growing concern--in the context of 9/11 --that the instability in Liberia and West Africa was a threat to developed countries (White House 2002; Duffield 2001).

But support for sanctions on Liberian timber was not universal. Taylor's government argued that it had the sovereign right to exploit its own natural resources without external

¹²⁷ The chairman of the OTC was Gus van Kouwenhoven,

¹²⁸ OTC was found by Global Witness (2001) to be clear cutting much more than the 4 percent allowable per annum for concessions and without the required reforestation. OTC, which was also required to build roads that would "benefit the people of Liberia" instead, built substandard roads through villages, homes, plantations and forest of cultural significance with no warning.

intervention, and in any case needed the revenues to defend the country from rebel attacks.¹²⁹ The timber industry suggested that sanctions would reduce employment opportunities that accrue mostly to the rural population.¹³⁰ France and China --with the largest financial stake in the timber sector--led international efforts to undermine any sanctions regime. China, the largest importer of Liberian timber in 2000, hinted at the potential humanitarian costs of such an intervention, and France, the second largest importer, argued that such a punitive approach is unwarranted given there is no proof of a link between timber and weapons smuggling (Global Witness 2001a, 17; *Perspective* 2001). Global Witness (2001a, 11), argued that while the sovereignty argument is the standard in such circumstances, in Liberia "where resources are being exploited contrary to Liberian law for the benefit of the elite, not the state or the population" such an argument falls flat. Moreover, those that wish to cite loss of employment or humanitarian concerns put off more long-term setbacks for the population. Given the importance of Liberian timber to France and China, the rationale for being against sanctions must be weighed against pure self-interest. As one activist stated, "the UNSC must consider our call for a moratorium on Liberian timber and respond positively to send a clear signal to Taylor that his military adventurism will no longer be tolerated...temporary job losses and economic hardship is a small price to pay for sub-regional peace and security" (Global Witness 2001a, 4). Despite support by the US and Britain, the objections from China and France the sanctions on timber were tabled by the Security Council.¹³¹

An influential UN Panel of Experts report published pursuant to UN Resolution 1343 also emphasized the need for sanctions (UN Panel of Experts 2001). The panel stated that

¹²⁹ Reports of demonstrations against UN sanctions went international (see: <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/12/20/liberia.un.protest.reut/>)

¹³⁰ For example, the Danish company DLH Nordisk suggested that sanctions would cost Liberia 100,000 timber related jobs (Global Witness 2001a, 11).

¹³¹ Although a reestablishment of an arms embargo and an embargo on Liberian diamonds and travel were imposed in Resolution 1343.

the United Nations should "impose a ban on all round log exports from Liberia."¹³² While timber production is a source of employment for Liberia and a prime source of revenue for the government, it is also a source of "sanctions-busting" (UN Panel of Experts 2001, 15).¹³³ But another way, revenue from timber concessions was found to be procuring weapons and ammunition that perpetuated the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone (UN Panel of Experts 2001, 13).¹³⁴

The Liberian conflict intensified and spread throughout 2002 even as the war in neighboring Sierra Leone had been declared over. Containing the conflict in Liberia was now deemed critical to consolidating peace in Sierra Leone. Even as the UN Security Council was reluctant to seriously address a ban on timber exports from Liberia, Global Witness continued to press for sanctions. A report concluded that the Liberian timber industry was both "a major driving force behind the threat" to Sierra Leone, and the "lynchpin of the current violence and destabilization" in Liberia (Global Witness 2002). With diamonds exports substantially reduced due to the diamond sanctions, the "importance of the timber industry to Liberian government's war machine...increased" as did timber exports and revenue--even though fighting had hampered the timber industry in certain regions (Global Witness 2002, 6; UN Panel of Experts 2002, 33). While the revenue could have been used to rebuild the

¹³² The report, also recommended that the government should reach an agreement with the IMF to commission an independent and detailed report on revenues from timber concessions from January 2001-July 2002.

¹³³ The report estimates calculate total round log production in 2000 rose to over 900,000 m³, with a value of over \$60 million. Log production is believed to be nearly 679,000 m³ for the first half of 2001 alone (valued at almost \$50 million). However, these figures may be underestimates of real exports by as much as 50-200 percent. Importantly, these figures do not include exports to Cote d'Ivoire. Total revenue for the government in 2000, based on official figures, was somewhere between \$6.7 - 13.3 million although the UN panel suggests it is probably \$25 million (UN Panel of Experts 2001, 70-71).

¹³⁴ While NGO accounts had focused largely on the nefarious dealings of OTC, who have concessions on an estimated 42 percent of Liberia's productive forests and are linked to weapons shipments to Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2001a; 2001b; 2001c), the UN Panel of Experts (2001; 2002) focused its attention on the company ETTE. The company was run by Leonid Minin who was arrested in Italy in 2000 on charges of weapons smuggling into Liberia. According to the panel, Minin had in his possession a significant number of documents "showing his involvement in timber but also in the arms shipments to Liberia", in direct violation of UN sanctions.

country, it appears as though much of it went to buy arms. The OTC was more deeply implicated in vast illegal weapons shipments throughout 2002 some of which were likely channeled to Sierra Leone and the others were used to arm logging company militias and government forces (Global Witness 2002). Global Witness (2002, 21) continued to press for UN sanctions, stating "sanctions on the timber industry are integral to any plan to stop the current, unrestrained violence in Liberia, and to prepare the country and West Africa for a sustainable future."

While Global Witness and other INGOs played a key role in magnifying the importance of "conflict timber"¹³⁵ throughout 2000-2002 by the links between revenue and conflict, local organizations such as Save My Future Foundation's (SAMFU), Green Advocates and Grand Gedeh Community Servants Association (GECOMSA) were also essential conduits of information.¹³⁶ These organizations detailed the practices of a timber industry that were leading to "plunder, deprivation, conflict, discontentment and environmental degradation as never before seen in Liberia" (SAMFU 2002, 2).¹³⁷ SAMFU's Liberian Forest and Human Rights Campaign documented the ways in which timber companies destroyed forest areas without any benefit for the Liberian people, undermined cultural practices and traditional institutions, and ruined livelihoods of rural people--the overwhelming percentage of which "depend on the land and forests for food, clean water, medicine and other forest products for survival" (SAMFU 2002, 7). The deforestation and road construction not only has environmental repercussions but also intensified competition among the population for dwindling agricultural lands that caused conflict and fueled the

¹³⁵ Global Witness defined "conflict timber" as timber that is traded at some point in the chain of custody by armed groups, be they rebel factions or regular soldiers or by civilian administration involved in armed conflict - either to perpetuate conflict or take advantage of conflict situations for personal gain (Global Witness 2002, 3).

¹³⁶ This also included exile political groups such as MDCL who called for timber sanctions in 2002.

¹³⁷ Many activists risked life and limb to report information. At one point, Taylor himself threatened with death the authors of a report by SAMFU about the timber sector and Senators were reported to have threatened the same authors (Interview 28).

bush meat trade by opening up new areas to commercial hunters.¹³⁸ In addition, to the long-term consequences of timber operations, SAMFU discussed the social and health impacts of makeshift logging camps on local communities, including a lack of sanitation and clean drinking water and the introduction of prostitution, drugs and crime to remote regions (SAMFU 2002).¹³⁹ Finally, SAMFU argued that while foreign businessmen and government officials got rich, local people got deceived, harassed and further impoverished. As one person put it in 2002, "OTC is extracting natural resources leaving behind nothing but sickness, hunger, poverty and poor welfare" (SAMFU 2002, 7).

Along with International NGOs, these Liberian-based NGOs and activists recommended--among other things--a ban on all round log exports, more transparency and less corruption in the sector, an end to forest crimes and human rights abuses perpetrated by the timber industry against communities and more protection for protected forests and biodiversity. Since 2000, the profile of conflict timber and its role in the Liberian conflict had grown exponentially. This was partially because images of the Liberian conflict were being transmitted around the world, the war in Sierra Leone was fragile but holding, and Global Witness and other international NGOs has been successful at publicizing the issues of conflict resources. UN lobbying efforts starting to have an effect as the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1408 calling for the government "take urgent steps, including the establishment of a transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that derived...from the Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes" (UNSC 2002).

By late 2002 and early 2003, shipping information was linking countries to Liberian timber-- making things uncomfortable in European capitals. British Waterways, for example,

¹³⁸ The report notes that while local people have had to rely more on protein from bush meat, to a large extent the market is dominated by foreign hunters with international markets.

¹³⁹ The reports tells of unsanitary bush camps set up next to creeks and streams from which rural people wash, bath, and drink causing ill health effects.

a government agency tasked with restoring the Avon Canal, was accused of purchasing "conflict timber" from Liberia and the Dutch firm DLH was accused of illegal activities (Global Witness 2002, 14). Moreover, Global Witness continued to provide evidence of illegal arms shipments linked to Liberian timber against UN Security Council resolutions that had the potential to destabilize Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. These claims were substantiated by UN Panel of Experts (2003a), which documented shipments of arms into Liberia from OTC or other timber companies. The panel reported that while the government had begun an auditing of the forestry sector for transparency and accountability, which was required by resolution 1408, the integrity of the process was suspect. Based on these findings, and a history of non-compliance, the Security Council passed Resolution 1478 in May 2003. This resolution, for the first time, placed timber sanction on a country. The sanctions demanded that "all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, for a period of 10 months, the import into their territories of all round logs and timber products originating in Liberia" (UNSC 2003a). In a nod to countries that disagreed with the need for sanctions, the UN decided that the sanctions would come into force on July 7, 2003, "unless the Council decides otherwise" (UNSC 2003a, 4).

Sanctions entered into force in July 2003 but the conflict had intensified to the point that most timber companies had ceased operations. While the warring parties in Liberia, including the government, MODEL and LURD, all requested that timber operations be able to continue, sanctions remained in force. While the effects of the timber industry were well known, a UN Panel of Experts (2003b) offered recommendations for the sector's future. It found that the sanctions most obvious benefit would be that armed State and non-state actors would be deprived of revenue and violations of human rights would decrease as would the overharvesting of forests (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 7). Even though the sanctions may be related to a "reduction in export income and employment" that may have "consequences for long-term development", the panel found that "these negative impacts may

be...overshadowed by the negative effects of the civil war" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 7). The panel declared that a ban on all commercial activities in the extractive sector should remain in place until "peace and stability are restored and good governance is established" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 7 and 31-34). The panel also recommended significant reform of forest governance to ensure that the sector is "participatory, transparent, accountable, effective and equitable and that promote the rule of law" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 26-30). In other words, any forestry sector reform must involve a broad segment of the population and benefit all of Liberian society; require opening the sector to public scrutiny and monitoring; and improve oversight and enforcement of the sector in concert with Liberian law and regulation. And finally, the panel stressed the importance of "getting the conditions right" to resume logging. Given the failure of the sector, "the Security Council should maintain the timber ban until governance in Liberia is improved... [and] these conditions will not be met under the current regime" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 26).

Conclusion

As mentioned at the outset, the dominant explanation for the Liberian conflict--particularly among IBOs--still centers on economic motives of combatants and the role of valuable natural resources--including "blood forests"--played in fueling the 14-year civil war. Liberia is still the prime example of a "new war" fought over forests and their revenues (de Jong, Donovan and Ken-Ichi 2007). This is the case despite considerable evidence that the conflict represents continuation and manifestation of historical grievances linked to an oppressive government, unfair land practices and underdevelopment; political conflict and competition for power. Forests and the control of forests and land in particular, have always been a source of grievance and resistance among the population and is not purely a feature of contemporary civil conflicts. To focus exclusively on economic motives of Taylor or the NPFL renders invisible the ways in which resentment can lead to recruitment or how political

and economic dimensions to achieving power are linked via systems of patronage. Taylor's motives were in essence political and involved the looting the country's resources, including forests--in much the same way as Doe and those before him.

This is important for several reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 5. The point is that despite ambiguity in the literature linking the environment and natural resources to civil conflict and the nuanced relationship between Liberia's forests and conflict discussed in this chapter, international peacebuilding organizations have framed the issue in terms of "blood timber". This stems from the accounts of Charles Taylor awarding concessions and trading timber in exchange for weapons that destabilized the region and threatened international security. The overarching perception, then, among IBOs has been that because of a lack of control and inadequate governance over Liberia's forests, the revenue went into the hands of rebels and a corrupt government in ways that fueled civil war rather than toward the economic development of the country. This may be an overly one-dimensional analysis but the solution is simple: transform Liberia's "conflict resources" (e.g. conflict timber) into "peace resources" (e.g., peace timber) so as to help mitigate conflict and consolidate peace. I show in the next chapter that IBOs attempt to do just that by promoting and establishing reforms and policies aimed at what I call "securitizing" and "marketizing" Liberia's forests. But questions remain: What are the effects of these reforms and policies? To what degree do they help--or even potentially hinder--peacebuilding?

Chapter 5: Securitized and Marketizing Liberia's "Conflict Forests"

Following the Accra Accords and the subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), conditions began to improve for a majority of the Liberian population as a result of the deployment of 15,000 international peacekeepers that opened up areas for humanitarian assistance, enabled the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants to commence and allowed people to return to their homes and communities. But considerable challenges remained. The conflict that killed between 50,000 and 200,000 people vastly disrupted the lives and livelihoods of the population with 90 percent having been displaced (Ellis 1999, 312-316). A country that before the war had high rates of poverty and difficulty meeting the basic needs was made significantly worse, particularly in rural areas. The conflict destroyed infrastructure, including bridges, roads, government buildings, hospitals, schools, universities and electric and water facilities.¹⁴⁰ The destruction was accompanied by the exodus of skilled workers and resulted in the collapse of "social, political, economic and traditional governance systems" (IMF 2008). The formal economy was literally destroyed. Between 1987 and 1995, Liberia's GDP fell by 90 percent precipitating one of the largest economic collapses ever (IMF 2008, 15). By the time the conflict ended, Liberia remained one of the lowest in terms of human development and

¹⁴⁰ An estimated 70 percent of all school buildings were destroyed with most youth spending little or no time at school over the course of the conflict.

among the poorest in the world with over three quarters of the population living in absolute poverty (IMF 2008).¹⁴¹

Despite these challenges, however, there was optimism that the transitional government with the support, assistance and oversight of international peacebuilding organizations would help move the country from "conflict to development". A framework was devised to advance "Liberia's transition from conflict to peace and stability, and from relief...to development" that included reforms in the clusters of security; good governance and democratic development; elections; basic services, restoration of productive capacity; infrastructure; economic policy and development (NTGL 2005, 25). At the same time, addressing the issue of "conflict forests" was peacebuilding priority. As the preceding chapter highlighted, international peacebuilding organizations came to understand the problem in terms of timber and timber concessions being traded in exchange for weapons, which destabilized the region and threatened international security. To reiterate, the predominant peacebuilding challenge for IBOs was to establish robust state control over forests, and improve governance so as to reduce the prospect for conflict relapse and support economic recovery. In short, IBOs endeavor to transform "conflict resources" into "peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace.

This chapter details the step-by-step efforts by international peacebuilding organizations to alter the "rules of the game" that govern Liberia's forests between 2003 and 2009. In the first part of the chapter, trace the reform process, which is manifest in new policies, laws, regulations, and practices but culminates in the passing of the National Forestry Reform Law (NFRL). I suggest that IBOs by-and-large promote and help establish reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" Liberia's forests for the purpose of transforming "conflict timber" into "peace timber". In the second part of the

¹⁴¹ Absolute poverty is living on less than \$1 per day; extreme poverty living on less than \$.50 per day (NTGL 2005, 25).

chapter, I examine the effects and consequences of the forest reform process, and argue that, if anything, they have engendered an unexpected period of contention and resistance.

Forest Reform: From Security to Global Markets

As just noted, this section charts in some detail the extensive efforts by IBOs to transform Liberia's "conflict forests" into "peace forests". In doing so, I trace the reform process--including new policies, laws, regulations and practices--which in some sense culminates with the passing of a comprehensive forest reform law. I argue that the reforms and policies aimed to "securitize" and "marketize" Liberia's forests. By "securitization", I mean establishing and consolidating state control and authority over forests and instituting good governance measures. By "marketization", I mean promoting the conditions that allow forests to generate revenue to support economic growth, alleviate poverty and supply state revenue.

IBOs and the argument for forest reform

Discussions about the future of Liberia's forest sector began almost immediately after the end of hostilities. Since UN sanctions were to be reviewed and a donor's conference held, the US government insisted that the transitional government create a committee to oversee forest reform. The 'Committee to Review Sanctions on Logs and Timber Trade' was formed in December 2003 with the objective of developing actions and recommendations to get the sanctions lifted "in a timely manner so that sector operations can begin" (NTGL 2003, 2). The committee stated that new forest reform should ensure "the full benefits of the logging and timber sector accrue to the Liberian people and ...undertaken in a manner consistent with internationally-accepted environmental standards" (NTGL 2003, 2).

Shortly thereafter, the committee, with considerable assistance from the US, produced a "roadmap" for reforming the forest sector (NTGL 2003). The roadmap recognized serious problems but underscored the significance of timber to the country's economy. It

acknowledged the role of the timber in supporting armed groups and destabilizing the region, and the impact conflict took on environmental management. A majority of the roadmap was focused on getting the sanctions lifted. It stressed the effects of sanctions on the economy and local employment pointing out that the forest sector contributed more than half of foreign exchange, earned the government \$20 million in taxes and employed 6,000-7,000 people with an average salary between \$800 and \$1,000 per year during the late 1990s (NTGL 2003, 3). The roadmap argued that UN sanctions might keep intact forest cover and protect the environment--which was important to conservationists and environmentalists--but the prohibition on timber exports would have a prolonged negative impact on Liberia's the economy.

Without providing details, the roadmap called for transparent and accountable systems of managing, maintaining and disbursing forest revenues and carrying out conservation activities when timber operations begin (NTGL 2003). Echoing Global Witness and the UN Expert Panel, the roadmap also sought to review all timber concessions and agreements to determine their legitimacy and verify whether logging was occurring legally in concession areas. All in all, however, the roadmap suggested that forest policy--and a large majority of the staff working for the Forest Development Authority (FDA)--was "solid" (NTGL 2003). While the roadmap suggested that "broader reform efforts of governance, financial management and equitable use of natural resources", the solution to restoring state authority and legitimacy to the forest sector, and regulating and managing forests more broadly, was to rapidly rebuild the capacity of the FDA through better staff compensation, training, transportation and facilities (NTGL 2003). The US largely agreed with the assessment, concluding that "problems with the forest sector were due more to Liberia's inability to enforce existing rules and regulations due to a lack of will and capacity; rather than from fundamental problems with the rules and regulations themselves" (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006, 84; Blundell 2003).

Despite the roadmap, the UN Security Council expressed serious concerns about "illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds and timber...and trafficking in illegal arms" documented by the Panel of Experts (UN Panel of Experts 2003b). Consequently, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1521; confirming the ban on Liberian timber and requiring further conditionalities. The transitional government was required to "establish its full authority and control over timber producing areas, and to take all necessary steps to ensure that government revenues from the Liberian timber industry are not used to fuel conflict or otherwise in violation of the Council's resolutions but are used for the legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including development" (UNSC 2003b, 4).¹⁴² The resolution demanded that forest reforms should include "oversight mechanisms for the timber industry that will promote responsible business practices and ...establish transparent accounting and auditing mechanisms to ensure that all government revenues ...are not used to fuel conflict (UNSC 2003b, 4). Citing the threat of Liberia's forests to international and regional security, the resolution determined that only if the conditions in Resolution 1521 were met could the sanctions be lifted.

Using the Liberian committee report as a basis for discussion, a "stakeholder roundtable" composed of international peacebuilding organizations, was assembled by the US. The reason was first, and foremost, to arrive at a general consensus among peacebuilders about the need for reform. Despite UN sanctions on Liberian timber exports, the forestry issue was only added to the donor's conference agenda after US persistence. The World Bank had to be convinced that forest governance was a serious peacebuilding priority and the European Union suggested that large-scale reforms might be premature without first undertaking robust inventories and assessments. The US, on the other hand, argued forcefully that despite the peace agreement and sanctions, forests posed a continued threat to

¹⁴² Realizing the lack of NTGL authority the resolution urged all parties to the CPA not to "hinder the restoration of the Government's authority throughout the country, particularly over natural resources."

both Liberian peace and international security. First, the government lacked control of forest areas, leaving them open to continued mismanagement and the misappropriation of revenue that could reignite conflict. Second, the conflict destroyed any genuine forest governance structures that existed before the conflict, opening up the possibility that local, national or international actors would try to seize forest assets. Third, Liberia's forests were essential for peacebuilding since the demand for state revenue to fund reconstruction and basic services was only going to increase. In short, the US argued that Liberia's long-term prospects for peace depended on its forest resources since they could act as an engine for economic recovery, poverty alleviation and employment.

A consensus did emerge among key international peacebuilding organizations under the leadership of the US government--not coincidentally the largest unilateral donor to Liberia and after 9/11 the country most concerned with the problem of failed states--that deep and significant reforms needed to be undertaken before sanctions could be lifted. As a member of an international organization stated, "international [peacebuilders] played an expansive role in constructing reforms, policies and values of forests" (Interview 1). Peacebuilders came to realize that UN sanctions provided a "window of opportunity" for forest reform that would be short-lived since pressure would rapidly mount to reopen the timber industry to generate revenue for the country's peacebuilding priorities (Blundell 2003, 4). Timely reforms were desirable to ensure the Liberian government established "immediate control of the forests" because "a majority of countries recovering from war return to war when revenue from natural resources is misappropriated by combatants to resume fighting" (Blundell 2003, 4). The reforms also protected the international community's peacebuilding investment by ensuring against the return of "conflict timber" (Blundell 2003).

The roundtable also served generate a shared understanding on the types of reforms and policies that would meet UN obligations under Resolution 1521, and assist in transforming the country's "conflict forests" into "peace forests" (Blundell 2003, 11). The

transitional government's roadmap provided only broad recommendations so the roundtable served to provide forest reform specifics. Five critical domains were identified: regulatory reform; revenue reform; concession review; inventory and parks (see Table 4).

Types of Forest Reform	Task
Revenue	Establishment a centralized collection agency to ensure transparency of timber revenue; a review and publication of all fees and taxation schedules; a full audit of all revenue generating agencies
Regulatory	Appointing a new FDA Board of Directors; empowering Liberia's Environmental Protection Agency ¹⁴³ ; supporting independent monitoring of the FDA by Liberian civil society and NGOs; rearranging the FDA's management structure; building capacity of FDA staff
Concession	Identify legal and illegal concessionaires through a process that would require timber companies to produce evidence of ownership; incorporate a review of forest contracts; harmonize concession and contracts with international agreements and practices
Inventory	Inventory all of country's forest areas ¹⁴⁴
Parks	Review and develop management plans

Table 4: Liberia Stakeholder Roundtable Forest Reforms (Adapted from Blundell 2003).

¹⁴³ Liberia's EPA was created in 2002 by the Taylor government although it was not functional per se until 2004.

¹⁴⁴ The last inventory of Liberia's forests was decades earlier.

An increased role for IBOs in the forest reform process

Despite consensus among international peacebuilders, the US government took a lead role. The US designated \$4 million toward reform from a package of nearly \$500 million allocated for humanitarian efforts, governance reforms and support of the UNMIL peacekeeping force. This did not include \$1 million given by the US State Department to the US Forest Service (USFS) to lead the rebuilding of the commercial sector, \$1 million awarded to the INGO Conservation International for leading protected areas and conservation activities, or funds given to the Centre for International Forestry Research and the World Agroforestry Centre to adopt community forestry initiatives (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006, 84). Beyond the financial support, the US Department of State¹⁴⁵ --with the help of US Agency for International Development (USAID) and USFS--created a "cross-cutting" initiative referred to as the Liberia Forest Initiative (LFI) to lead the forest reform process. US agencies and Conservation International were joined in LFI by an array of international peacebuilders, including the World Bank, IUCN, European Community, FAO, IMF, Flora and Fauna International, UN Environment Programme, Environmental Law Institute, and CIFOR.

The stated objectives of LFI, characterized as a partnership between the Government of Liberia was to "support the rehabilitation and reform of Liberia's forest sector" and "enhance cooperation and coordination of activities in Liberia" for the promotion of sustainable forest management (LFI 2004). LFI's role was to "promote and assist reforms that will allow for transparent management of forest resources and ... ensure that these resources are used for the benefit of the Liberian people" (LFI 2004). While LFI did recognize the multiple uses of Liberia's forests, there was an emphasis placed on reforms

¹⁴⁵ This was done under the auspices of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

and policies that would meet the conditions of UN sanctions, and lead to the return of large-scale timber activities (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006). In short, LFI intervened to help reduce the threat of forest conflict, and rebuild a sustainable timber sector that could provide "a revenue stream and jobs" (Interview 1). A key task of LFI was to assist the government in establishing authority and control over forests resources by rebuilding the capacity of the FDA and improving revenue management and accountability (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006).

Although the FDA was non-functional and no substantive changes were made in forest sector governance, the transitional government continued to lobby the UN to have sanctions lifted. Based on an IMF analysis indicating poor to stagnant economic prospects for Liberia, the government emphasized the need to generate income for the economy, create employment and encourage foreign direct investment (IMF 2004; 2007). This position was supported by the UNMIL peacekeeping force, which argued for a lifting of sanctions because security of forest areas had improved, revenue was needed for reconstruction and rural employment--especially among ex-combatants--was necessary (Mitchell 2004). In Liberia itself, the sanctions were also beginning to create tensions as the UN was accused of infringing on the country's sovereignty and retarding economic development (UN Panel of Experts 2004). To avert any popular resentment, the UN's Liberia Sanctions Review Committee, sent out a press release stating that the sanctions were not punitive but instead intended to help consolidate peace (*UN Press Release* 2004)

A UN Panel of Experts report, however, recommended that sanctions remain in place "until the forest is both secure and well managed" (UN Panel of Experts 2004, 37). The report concluded that although the sanctions "appear to have halted both commercial logging and exports of timber" several factors make ending sanctions unwise. First, because UN peacekeepers were not deployed to all of Liberia's forest areas, security remained precarious. For example, the panel reported ex-combatants looting an OTC timber mill. Second, the FDA

still had little oversight over the sector and failed in its ability to manage revenues in a transparent and accountable manner. The UN Expert Panel reported, for instance, that revenue from the small domestic sale of salvage timber by the FDA could not be accounted for. Finally, the transitional government had failed to carry out its obligation to reform the forest sector. No concession review had been started and no system for improving transparency and accountability had been developed despite the support of LFI (UN Panel of Experts 2004).

Forest concession review and state resistance to reform

Despite the continuation of UN sanctions and the involvement of LFI, the transitional government did not move forward with reform. The LFI inspired "Critical Path Timeline", a comprehensive plan to begin instituting policies to improve transparency and accountability met with "resistance" (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006, 87). The conventional wisdom was that the transitional government was "motivated more by a desire to see sanctions lifted so they could get back to business as usual than by a deep-seated desire for reform" (Liberia Update 2004). In fact, ex-generals were found to be hiring ex-combatants to meet a small but growing domestic market for timber and forest products (UN Panel of Experts 2004).¹⁴⁶ Concerned that the security situation was worsening, the Security Council demanded the government intensify efforts to meet the conditions set in Resolution 1521 and implement LFI's forest reform agenda. Under tremendous pressure, the transitional government gave in to international demands by establishing a Forest Concession Review Committee (FCRC). The FCRC was to develop an objective methodology for reviewing each timber concession and company and assess each of 70 plus holders to judge compliance in several areas, including: if they are a bona-fide company; if they have complied with Liberian

¹⁴⁶ While the Security Council placed most of the blame on the NTGL for its lack of progress, it also noted that only half of the pledges made at the Reconstruction Conference had been redeemed.

laws and labor regulations; if they had authentic contracts, if they were involved in the conflict and if they met financial obligations (FCRC 2005). The establishment of the review committee amounted to a "key reform goal" for IBOs because the common perception was that little could be done in the forest sector until an investigation of timber companies and contracts was complete (Interview 8).

The concession review was completed in May 2005, against what the NGO Coalition of Liberia called "formidable odds" (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2005). The FCRC uncovered widespread mismanagement of timber concession areas that included massive road building and overharvesting (FCRC 2005). Between 1985 and 2004 at least 26 million acres of timber concessions had been allocated by the government even though only 10 million acres exist in Liberia (FCRC 2005, 34-35). The review discovered that only about 14 percent of all taxes were ever collected on concessions leaving the government in arrears of more than \$64 million (FCRC 2005, 36). The committee also documented serious abuses by timber companies including "damage to crops, militia threats and unpaid salaries" that severely damaged the livelihoods of forest communities (FCRC 2005, 37). The FCRC concluded that no timber company could demonstrate that they had acquired their contract in a legal manner. Put another way, it appeared the government and timber industry had over the years conspired to loot and plunder the country's forests, damage the environment and abuse forest communities.

Based on the findings, the committee--with the assistance of LFI--advocated a series of forest reforms and policies to "place the commercial forestry sector in the context of the "three C's"--commercial, conservation and community-- in order to manage Liberia's forest sustainably and achieve ...accountability and transparency" (FCRC 2005). The committee encouraged the transitional government to "act immediately to cancel all existing forest concessions", recommended that future timber concessions be suspended and called for a

Forest Reform Monitoring Committee to establish necessary reforms and policies.¹⁴⁷ Despite the FCRC's work, the transitional government (and FDA) was unresponsive. Although LFI had largely "prepared the groundwork" for the kinds of reforms and policies necessary to lift UN sanctions, the government "declined to seize the opportunity" (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006, 88). Moreover, in spite of considerable international pressure to revoke all past timber concessions, they failed to do so. Interviews with former government officials indicated there was a deep distrust of the FCRC and the process that recommended all concessions be cancelled (Interview 21; Interview 2). Two high-ranking officials in the FDA, for example, stated that the process was "fixed" from the beginning and the criteria were so stringent that no timber company could have possibly complied (Interview 21; Interview 2).

Corruption, insecurity and increased intervention

International peacebuilders believed that forest reforms would be legitimate, and socially and politically acceptable, only if the government were viewed as partners in the reform process. But the peacebuilders apparently forgot that the transitional government was composed primarily of former warlords and "criminal elements" with an interest in perpetuating the status-quo and lacking the desire to set aside private interests for the good of the country (McGovern 2008). Given the government's intransigence--despite several million dollars invested by international peacebuilding organizations--increased intervention of the sector was understood as the only way to establish genuine reform. International peacebuilding organizations came to regard the UN sanctions as a necessary but insufficient requirement to compel changes to how Liberia's forests were governed.

¹⁴⁷ Reforms were to integrate: land use planning technologies for future concessions, establish a chain of custody system to track logging operations, develop an appropriate system of taxation and benefit sharing, revise the legal requirements for contracts, develop a competitive bidding system for future concessions, and increase ways to institutionalize public and community participation in forest management.

In fact, international peacebuilders apparently underestimated the degree to which corruption and profligacy of the transitional government could hamper the reform process. Large-scale improprieties were found in "import-export transactions, government contracts and budgeting, and the issuance of commodity marketing or land, natural resource, and associated concession rights" (Cook 2009, 23). The UN's Special Representative to Liberia noted that corruption and a lack of transparency "appear to be very much alive", and the UN Secretary-General decried the transitional government's "lack of transparency in the collection and use of revenues and the resistance of some government officials...to reforms" (UN 2005). An audit by the European Commission revealed that the granting of natural resources concessions in the rubber, iron and diamond sectors occurred under mysterious circumstances, and an appraisal of Monrovia's ports and petroleum refining company showed that managers were unable to account for large sums of money (EC 2005).¹⁴⁸ Peacebuilders were worried that the lack of transparency and accountability could reignite conflict or even provoke a violent reaction when the extent of government corruption became public.

Along with the corruption and delaying tactics were growing concerns about small-scale illegal logging and security in forest areas.¹⁴⁹ Although small-scale "pit-sawing" operations provided much needed livelihoods for forest communities, the UN was concerned about the revenue accruing to the ex-combatants that controlled the operations (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2005; UN Panel of Experts 2005). In addition, there were increasing reports of illegal logging operations that operated late at night and with the tacit support of UN peacekeepers (Global Witness 2004; UN Panel of Experts 2004). Moreover, a rubber

¹⁴⁸ The Chairman of the NTGL was charged with "economic sabotage" for embezzling over \$1 million in 2007 and a former finance minister had been charged with corruption.

¹⁴⁹ Small-scale operations also increased as a result of UN sanctions, which ended large-scale timber harvests and provided incentives to engage in smaller and smaller operations that would not be identified by peacebuilders. The benefits of these operations did provide important livelihoods for forest communities and ex-combatants although a majority of the revenue probably went to local landowners and political elites.

plantation in Guthrie operated by ex-combatants, as well as reports of 4,000 illegal loggers, gold miners and bush meat hunters in Sapo National Park, raised concerns among international peacebuilders about the transitional government ability or willingness to control the security situation, especially in remote forest areas.

Accusations of corruption, along with new security concerns, led international peacebuilders to threaten to withhold international aid or mandate conditionality for continued support. Because cutting off aid would be counterproductive, international peacebuilders pressed for increased intervention and additional control measures for the natural resources sector. The International Crisis Group (2004), for example, called on the international community to assume direct responsibility for the management of Liberia's revenue.¹⁵⁰ The World Bank, IMF, European Commission and USAID, also proposed a new mechanism for governing Liberia's economic affairs (Dwan and Bailey 2006). The result was the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), which mandated an independent expert to oversee financial management and accountability to "protect revenue streams of key revenue generating agencies and institutions", improve budgeting and expenditure management and procurement practices and granting of concessions (GEMAP 2006). Despite concerns it would undermine Liberia's sovereignty, under intensive pressure from peacebuilders GEMAP was approved by the government. The role of GEMAP, then, was to assist in the management of timber revenue, oversee a chain of custody system to track logs from harvest to export, and support the FDA in the issuing of forest concessions, contracts and permits.

After almost two years, international peacebuilders were frustrated with the pace of forest reforms. Commercial timber exports had stopped due to UN sanctions and a review of

¹⁵⁰ The transitional government passed the Public Procurement and Concessions Act, which was to improve accountability in managing state expenditures and revenue; and open competition in bidding in order to be transparent and screen out incompetent companies.

past concessions had been completed but the establishment of more comprehensive reforms and policies to govern the forest sector had stalled. Moreover, evidence of government corruption and reports of illegal small-scale timber operations managed by ex-combatants suggested that the security situation was still fragile. While peacebuilders intervened and had improved international oversight through LFI and GEMAP, long-term changes would require government action. Liberia's elections had the potential to create forward momentum and only one presidential candidate--Ellen Johnson Sirleaf--pledged to cancel all timber concessions and establish the forest reforms. Suffice to say, she had the support of international peacebuilders.

A period of reform and the lifting of UN sanctions

The relatively peaceful election of Johnson Sirleaf in November 2005--and her public support for the forest reform process--renewed calls to lift, or at least relax, UN sanctions. Throughout 2006, in fact, efforts to establish reforms and meet the conditions laid out in UN Resolution 1521 progressed rapidly. This stemmed in-part from Johnson Sirleaf's awareness that without forward progress on forest reforms momentum on her political agenda--which focused on "revitalizing economic activity"--would be impossible (GoL 2006a). In a symbolic first act, Johnson Sirleaf issued Executive Order #1, which adopted all the recommendations of the FCRC by cancelling all 72 existing timber concessions. The executive order also placed a moratorium on future commercial timber harvests stating "the Forest Development Authority is hereby mandated to grant or allocated future forest concessions only after it determines in writing that the measures for forest management reform ...are fully instituted and implemented and the necessary legislation enacted and regulations passed" (GOL 2006b). Despite resistance from timber companies that had benefited from the vague timber concessions in the past, and some Liberian lawmakers decrying the order illegal and unconstitutional, it was widely applauded by the international

peacebuilders as a huge step forward (LFI 2006b). The Executive Order further mandated the establishment of a Forestry Reform Monitoring Committee (FRMC), to be headed by the FDA with the "participation and assistance of the LFI, composed of Liberian and international representatives including international and local civil society", to oversee forest reform (GOL 2006b). The committee was to be responsible for "overseeing, monitoring, and verifying the formulation, development and implementation of the measures prescribed as a condition precedent to the resumption of concession grants and allocations, which would allow the resumption of timber harvesting in Liberia consistent with international standards and basic principles of accountability, transparency and sustainability" (GOL 2006b).

With the election of Johnson Sirleaf, international peacebuilders began to emphasize the significance of forest reforms and policies in helping to revive the timber sector and promote economic recovery rather than solely on controlling conflict timber. A report by the IMF (2004) stated that the dormancy of the timber sector was largely responsible for Liberia's stagnate economic growth (compared to other "postconflict" countries) and argued that increasing state revenues was not only needed to provide basic services and rebuild infrastructure but also to reconstruct the institutions required to revive the forest sector. The IMF (2004) also pointed to the employment potential and the projected economic benefits such as poverty reduction that could be realized from reviving the timber industry. A UN Panel of Experts (2005) report similarly praised the new government's "dramatic" improvements while for the first time underscoring the importance of forest reform to Liberia's future in economic and not just security terms. Referencing the IMF document, the panel noted that at full capacity the timber industry could produce \$80 million in exports annually with approximately \$15 million going directly to the government in taxes, fees and royalties. In addition, in just three years government revenue could increase four-fold from almost \$2 million to \$8 million, and produce over 2,000 jobs. In short, the election of

Johnson Sirleaf, which signaled an improvement security situation and resulted in forward momentum on forest reform, was a turning point.

The Johnson Sirleaf government strongly advocated for an end to sanctions based on its achievements, and IPOs acknowledged that far more was accomplished in the first five months of the Sirleaf administration than entire transitional government had done in two years. According to Sirleaf (2006), "our...pitch for the lifting of sanctions is that there is no more conflict...if there is no conflict and we now have peace and we have a new government that is doing the right things, then we want to see a change." Johnson Sirleaf (2006) argued that even if sanctions were lifted, her executive order placing a moratorium on future concessions was a safeguard that ensured no industrial timber operations would begin until the reforms and policies were implemented.

Liberian civil society was adamant in support of continuing the UN sanctions. The Sustainable Development Institute (SDI), an organization actively involved in the concessions review and assisting with the FRMC, stressed that without sanctions there would be no incentive to establish new reforms and ensure against illegal timber extraction (SDI 2006). SDI argued that the timber industry was still a threat because "without a reform process or making meaningful progress ...including chain of custody management arrangements, new allocation procedures and processes, new tax regimes and tax collection system there is a real possibility of going back to *business as usual*" (SDI 2006, 3 italics in original). As evidence, SDI documented the lack of government control over forest areas by suggesting that although the executive order had cancelled all concessions, several timber companies were still harvesting logs and operating sawmills. SDI reminded the UN Sanctions Committee that "increasing timber production and export after elections in 1997 (when Taylor was elected President) did nothing to contribute to Liberia's postconflict recovery then, and without reform, it will not contribute to postconflict development today" (SDI 2006, 7). SDI noted that increases of timber production between 1997 and 2002, which was often

cited by international peacebuilders as evidence that the forest sector can contribute to peacebuilding, was accomplished in a failed state devoid of forest governance, and did nothing to benefit local populations who were subjected to human rights abuses. SDI argued that international peacebuilders had an obligation to not let this happen again.

International peacebuilding organizations were split on the question of sanction. Global Witness--who was instrumental in publicizing the issue of "conflict timber"-- was optimistic about the direction of the reforms but ardently supported the continuation of sanctions for several reasons (Global Witness 2006). First, Liberia had not met the conditions in the UN Sanctions and technically the laws, regulations and policies in-place were analogous to those that existed during the conflict. Second, while the government demonstrated "a willingness to break from the past...benchmarks imposed by the sanctions should not be sacrificed for short-term political gains or gestures." Prematurely lifting sanctions would undermine future sanctions regimes, and expose Liberia's natural resource sector to abuse before the government retained full control. Third, due to institutional constraints, the government did not have the full authority and control over timber producing areas, and in fact, had little control at all. Global Witness highlighted the inability of the government to control widespread and illegal "pit-sawing" and "large swathes of territory....controlled by ex-combatants" (Global Witness 2006, 15). Without government control, forests remained open to illicit exploitation that could be used by spoilers to reignite conflict. Fourth, while the forestry reform committee and GEMAP were on the way to establishing financial oversight, including measures to ensure revenue transparency, "untried and incomplete systems...do not equate to a working system", and commencing timber operations before systems are in place is "likely to result in both revenue and resource loss and undermine the effectiveness of reforms" (Global Witness 2006, 14).

Reports also indicated that the UN Security Council was divided over whether to lift the sanctions or not. While all members wanted the sanctions lifted as soon as possible

divisions surfaced over whether Liberia had met all the conditions and whether lifting the sanctions would simply encourage spoilers and discourage continued government reform. Debate among the Security Council continued over whether the sanctions were having a more deleterious impact on Liberian society as a whole by limiting the country from developing one of its most valuable commodities, an argument that China was sympathetic too. Ultimately, acknowledging Liberia's progress, and in particular singling out the efforts of the new president, the UN Security Council lifted sanctions on the import of all round logs and timber products from Liberia with UN Resolution 1689 in June 2006 (UNSC 2006).¹⁵¹ The lifting of the sanctions was conditional, however, stipulating that the legislation proposed by the FRMC must be passed by the Government of Liberia in 90-days. The rationale for the timeline was that Liberia's progress so far had been held back by the lack of new reforms and policies, and urged the "speedy adoption of...necessary laws" (UNSC 2006).

Forest reforms culminate: security and commercialization

The FRMC drafted new forestry laws in July 2006 but the 90-day window mandated by the UN intensified debate over the details of the reforms and the extent to which the work of the FRMC should be confidential or public (LFI 2006a). The FRMC worked closely with LFI, international consultants, Liberian civil society groups, the FDA and government ministries, and international and Liberian business groups to develop the reforms and policies but failed to go through a period of public consultation. The prevailing view was that although Liberian law required 60-days of public vetting, given the time constraints imposed by the UN, extensive consultations would need to wait until after the law was passed. Regardless, the National Forestry Reform Law (NFRL) was passed in September 2006, just meeting the deadline imposed by the UN Security Council (GoL 2006c). Those involved

¹⁵¹ Sanctions on diamonds and an arms embargo were not lifted.

testified that passing the NFRL was not without discord. According to Alfred Brownell of Green Advocates, a Liberian civil society organization:

It was a difficult and enduring fight ensuring that the bill passed unadulterated. I mince no words when I say it was tough. The timber lobbyists fought to the dying minutes...we were no match for their money... they became desperate, issuing threats. The head of the timber conglomerate called me...and rained insults and threats. Even the government crumbled under pressure from the timber lobby and wanted to water down the law. We resisted that attempt (Brownell 2006).

The NFRL characterized the reforms and policies that IBOs had been promoting for almost three years. As one high ranking official put it, Liberia's government was under a "massive microscope" and had to act (Interview 14). For the UN Security Council, the reforms fulfilled the criteria for permanently lifting the ban on Liberian timber exports. More broadly, the forest reforms and policies were significant to IBOs because they seemingly "maximized the benefits from the forest sector to the Liberian people...put an end to the use of forest resources to fund conflict", and put the government in a "position to regain authority and control over forest resources" (*UN News Centre* 2006). According to the IMF (2008, 64), the reforms laid to groundwork for "sustainable forest management", and signaled the "economic revival of the sector" by opening up the possibility of new timber concessions.¹⁵²

Given the range of interests on the reform committee, and diverse sets of values placed on forest resources, the NFRL stressed a balance between the "three C's"-- commercial, community and conservation--as originally articulated by the concessions review committee. The reforms provided the basic qualifications for persons / companies

¹⁵² Although concessionaires that owned the government money could do so until paid back taxes. Moreover, there remained a vigorous debate as to whether past concessionaires should be legally able to apply for new concessions since all were deemed illegal.

wanting to conduct logging operations, established two types of contracts (e.g., forest management and timber sale) depending on the size of the concession, and articulated regulations for private and forest use permits. Consistent with the wishes of international peacebuilders, the law mandated that the government establish and maintain a chain of custody system consistent with international standards and publish payments received by companies to ensure revenue transparency. The law also mandated that 30 percent of land rental fees be given to forest communities who, by law, were entitled to equitable benefit sharing.¹⁵³ The reforms also provided regulations for environmental protection, forest areas networks and wildlife conservation. The law emphasized the importance of "ensuring that local communities are fully engaged in the sustainable management of the forests" and mandated at some point in the future regulations that "specify the rights and responsibilities of communities...establish mechanisms to promote informed community participation in forest-related decisions...create a framework that allows communities fair access to forest resources [and] establish social, economic and technical procedures for capacity building to ensure communities can equitably participate in and equitably benefit from sustainable management of forests" (GOL 2006c, 35). The law directed the government develop and pass a comprehensive law governing community rights to forest lands within one-year.

Although rights to land and forests have shifted over the course of Liberia's history, as discussed briefly in Chapter 4, the reforms stated that all forest resources in Liberia-- except those defined as communal forests or developed on private or deeded land-- are held in trust by the Republic for the benefit of the people (GoL 2006c; Wily 2007). This provision provided the government with the authority to oversee all matters on such land and establishes the state as the sole authority to divide forests into lands open to commercial

¹⁵³ The other 40 percent went to the Ministry of Finance for general revenues and 30 percent went counties.

forestry, lands defined as communal forests, and lands that are determined to be protected for the purpose of wildlife or biodiversity conservation.

The Liberian Forest Policy and Implementation Strategy stated that "historically the main focus of the forestry sector...has been the commercial harvesting of forest products" (GoL 2006d). While the NFRL stressed a balance between the commercial, community and conservation values, interviews with a wide-spectrum of international peacebuilders and government officials suggested that reforms and policies were bound to be "commercial centric" (Interview 1; Interview 7). Certainly, the Public Procurement and Concessions Act and NFRL--both key reforms of the forest sector--feature new "rules of the game" for commercial forestry: qualifications for timber companies; concession area bidding criteria; granting of concessions and contracts; harvest management; and the taxes, fees and royalty payments. In short, restarting the commercial timber operations dominated and took precedence over virtually all aspects forest governance.

This commercial "first" agenda developed from a variety of interconnected factors. First, forestry has a long history in Liberia and narratives of a once booming timber export operation remains deeply embedded in the government. Before the days of Charles Taylor and the concept of "conflict timber", many in the FDA remember the "better days" when timber exports contributed to "economic development" (NTGL 2005; Interview 2). This is despite evidence to the contrary, covered in the preceding chapter, that noted the strategy of development by way of concessionary agreements has always been contested and despite increasing revenue and GDP the country had experienced "growth without development". Second, the World Bank and IMF pointed to a pre-war forest sector that brought stability and progress. These international financial organizations point to the period between 1997 and 2002, when Charles Taylor was president and "conflict timber" became a household word, to highlight the significant contribution timber exports can make to the Liberian economy. For example, the IMF (2008, 63) estimates log and timber production of over 1 million cubic

meters valued at over \$100 million dollars and contributing as much as 7,000 jobs, 50 percent of export earnings and 20 percent of GDP in the late 1990s. What gets lost in translation is that the 1,300 percent increase in production from 1997 to 2002 was accomplished in a war-torn state, with no forest governance, corrupt timber companies, substantial human rights abuses and environmental destruction.

Developing commercial timber industry is also a key pillar of Liberia's "conflict to development" strategy, which emphasized the importance of resuscitating the economy, creating employment opportunities, rebuilding infrastructure and supplying basic services by "jump-starting" productive economic sectors. The country's poverty reduction strategy (PRSP), which effectively represents the country's "roadmap for the future" stresses the importance of reviving "traditional sectors of economic growth", which included opening up of the timber sector in order to alleviate poverty, and provide employment and state revenue (IMF 2008, 7-36). Increasing IBOs stressed the importance of economic growth to consolidating peace in Liberia since it can provide the required revenue to provide basic services, rebuild institutions, pay government officials and fix infrastructure. As the same time, there is the view that economic growth is vital for peace because negative growth and poverty supposed to be triggers of conflict (Bannon and Collier 2004).

As such, commercial timber operations appear to represent an enormous opportunity for economic recovery and employment, especially in a cash-strapped country with "unemployment" hovering at over 80 percent. As an international donor mentioned, forests are "one of only a few options for national revenue and development funds" (Interview 1). According to from the IMF (2008), timber production was projected to grow from 30,000cubic meters to over 1.3 million cubic meters between 2008 and 2011, with roughly 2.9 million hectares of forests allocated for timber extraction. This was estimated to provide the country with about \$50 million in revenue by 2010-2011. In addition, it was expected to

produce 5,000 jobs and "higher incomes for the rural population" (IMF 2008, 64).¹⁵⁴ The PRSP stressed reforms and policies that promote an open economy linked to international trade and amenable to foreign direct investment. The private sector was viewed as the "main driver of growth" (IMF 2008, 21).

With the reforms and policies now codified into Liberian law, international peacebuilders agreed that the future direction of the forest sector looked positive. Although negotiating the NFRL was far from easy and many outstanding issues were left to be addressed, the establishment of the NFRL appeared to be the "end game" since they basically laid out forest policy priorities and implementation strategy (GOL 2006c; 2006d). According to the World Bank (2008, 173-174) "laws can create institutions and define institutional power and responsibilities... [and] set the bounds of acceptable behavior", and therefore start the "healing process in postconflict countries". In short, IBOs viewed the reforms and policies as a road map that the government needed to implement. However, NGOs and numerous community groups believed that while the reforms and policies had been passed by the government they were largely illegitimate because the process was not transparent and the decisions did not incorporate the input of forest communities (Interview 29).

Taking stock of the forest reforms

The previous section has detailed an extensive forest reform process that to IPOs largely culminated with the National Forestry Reform Law. The reforms and policies were at the outset concerned with "securitizing" Liberia's forests by promoting and supporting the establishment of reforms and policies that helped to "firm-up" or consolidate state control and

¹⁵⁴ The UN Panel of Experts (2006) had a less optimistic projection for commercial forestry stating "it is highly unlikely any new concessions will begin operating before 2007 and even then 3-5 years before all concessions are awarded.

authority over forests. These reforms and policies stressed the importance of "good governance", which included measures to improve revenue transparency, government accountability and public participation. In short, international peacebuilding organizations wanted to guard against the possibility that timber and timber concessions could be traded in exchange for weapons, which could reignite conflict and threaten regional and international security once again. Over time, however, international peacebuilders turned their attention to "marketization", as the overwhelming emphasis on the commercialization of Liberia's forests in the forestry reform law shows. This signifies a not so subtle shift in thinking because the biggest threat to Liberia was no longer the ability to control forests but stagnant economic growth, endemic poverty and a lack of state revenue to pay for basic services and other improvements. Although IBOs remain worried about corruption (i.e. bad governance) in the forest sector--particularly given that the Taylor and those before him had largely monopolized forests for personal gain and political power--the overwhelming assumption was that good governance measures would reduce corruption, or at the very least bring it out into the open (IMF 2008, 22).

Liberia's Forest Reforms: Corruption, Contention and Resistance

Given that nearly a decade has passed since the end of the conflict, and almost five-years have elapsed since the forest reform law was passed a simple question remains: what have been the effects? I argue below that there is at present significant contention and resistance over the new "rules of the game" promoted by IPOs to govern Liberia's forests. I suggest that efforts to rapidly "securitize" and "marketize" has, in fact, exacerbated a "struggle for control" that at the moment is taking place in the rule making process. However, there remains a possibility that these struggles over forest reforms--some of them deep-seated--may galvanize spoilers or rally supporters for overtly political ends.

Disagreements over the forestry reforms law emerge

The passing of the National Forestry Reforms Laws registered as a success and was hailed by international peacebuilding organizations as a significant step forward for forest governance in Liberia. The reforms were recognized as being comprehensive and "cutting edge" (Interview 2). However, within weeks international and Liberian NGOs were pushing back against the reforms in ways that would come to define a struggle over the future of Liberia's forests. A coalition of 14 Liberian and seven international NGOs labeled the passing of the law a "missed opportunity". In a letter to the government, the coalition asked "what is left for communities?" More specifically, the reforms failed to address community land tenure, access and user rights or meaningful public participation (NGO Open Letter 2006). The NGOs argued that the law "prioritizes commercial exploitation of Liberia's forests by industrial loggers" with tenure, access and user rights alluded to briefly with "statements of intent" (NGO Open Letter 2006). Commercial timber contracts and permits, according to the NGO letter, require no legal obligation that communal tenure be addressed before timber harvesting begins, and social agreements between communities and timber companies do little to protect communities from unwanted encroachment.¹⁵⁵ The NGOs insisted that it would be more "effective and cost efficient to get the policies right now, rather than lock-in the expensive, damaging and long-term social, economic and ecological consequences" of the current reforms (NGO Open Letter 2006). The NGOs recommended that the NFRL place an emphasis on the rights of communities rather than the rights of timber companies.

Shortly thereafter, a report by the Forest People's Programme, a UK-based NGO, argued that the law received no public vetting or debate because government officials and

¹⁵⁵ The NGO letter gives the example of Ghana where 12 years after the forest policy gave a role for communities no legislation had actually been passed mandated this while at the same time, laws strengthened the timber industry.

international peacebuilders had a "fixed agenda" that emphasized commercial timber operations as the most efficient way to manage forests sustainably and alleviate poverty. According to the report, studies from around the world indicated that industrial timber operations have had negative impacts on local communities, including but not limited to increases in mortality, health problems, wildlife and habitat disturbance, discriminatory working conditions, breakdown of traditional social structures, denial of rights to land, forced resettlement and limitations on access, creation of dependency and community conflict (Forest People's Programme 2006). Rather than perpetuate a failed development model that equates timber operations with poverty alleviation the NFRL should empower communities to save and manage forests themselves. A member of an international NGO that assisted in the drafting of the report argued that communities "have always protected" Liberia's forests sustainably and it was the introduction of the "industrial model" that put new pressures on the land, forests and people and, "manufactured new threats" (Interview 25).

The report criticized the new reforms and policies for lacking a provision on how much forest lands would be classified by the government for communal forests or under what conditions the policies will genuinely uphold the rights of communities to control forest use and demand a fair share of benefits from the state and timber companies (Forest People's Programme 2006, 7-8). As someone familiar with the report suggested, the reforms prioritize timber extraction and "communities have no right to say no" (Interview 17). While the reform law does require social agreements between timber companies and communities it does not recognize community land tenure and access rights in commercial contracts. It also fails to recognize the perpetually poor negotiating position of forest communities, which lack the information to make decisions and are "manipulated by powerful elites" (Interviews 29). A member of a community NGO echoed this assessment, stating that even though the reforms are supposed to involve the community, the community believes that "whatever happens...we will lose" (Interview 8). The report was critical of the reforms for being

ambiguous in terms of community benefit sharing and public consultation. The report stated that despite "a number of progressive references to transparency, the NFRL relies too heavily on the assumption that putting information in the public domain would in itself lead to greater accountability and participation...without mechanisms by which communities can influence decision making and [hold] authorities to account" (Forest People's Programme 2006, 10). The report stressed the importance of establishing the proper structures and safeguards upfront, despite domestic and international pressure to begin timber harvesting. Almost from the beginning, then, NGOs began to question the extent to which communities would be part of the forests reform process and whether there was going to be real deliberation over the future direction of Liberia's forests.

Efforts to kick-start commercial forestry begin

In the shadow of the NFRL, efforts continued to get the commercial timber sector up-and-running. The Forest Development Authority conducted socio-economic surveys and inventories for six timber sale contracts and three forest management contracts and had approved 38 companies (out of 86) through a pre-qualification process that made these companies eligible to engage in future forestry or logging activities (FDA 2007).¹⁵⁶ According to the FDA Managing Director John Woods, "Liberia is now ready to commence commercial logging" and estimated that "depending on the companies' ability to mobilize funds and equipment after winning bids for contracts, logging could begin as early as March 2008, directly employing 1,800 persons...and generating \$1.7 million" (FDA 2007, 10).

Despite these enthusiastic pronouncements, however, progress was slow and increasingly beset by challenges. The FDA's forest management strategy, which was

¹⁵⁶ Timber sale contracts are characterized as smaller parcels of forest land no more than 5,000 hectares. Forest Management Contracts are larger tracts of forest no smaller than 50,000 hectares and no larger than 400,000 hectares. Each type of contract has different provisions and regulations pursuant to the NFRL 2006.

supposed to classify Liberian forest land into commercial, conservation and community categories, was widely criticized by Liberian civil society groups because the legal status of land, particularly customary rights of communities, had not yet been defined. As noted by a prominent Liberian activist, "where [timber] concessions, conservation and community forestry take place was made before any real deliberation...and by what criteria...who yields the power at this stage" (Interviews 29). The central grievance was that although the reforms place an emphasis on the "three C's", decisions on what forest lands were to be characterized as commercial, conservation and community had been identified by the government without any objective data or community consultation, which undermined the spirit of the law (Interview 29). Liberian activists and NGOs argued that the government made the determination of how land should be categorized without the know-how to do so and without any socio-economic studies (Interview 29). While government officials wanted to address the "immediate problem" of no timber revenue, civil society groups questioned why no information was done before the status of land was defined (Interview 1). Lomax (2008, 19) estimated that approximately 75 percent of forest land was set aside for timber production, 24 percent for conservation and only one percent for communal land.

The FDA had projected in early 2007 that ten short-term timber sales would be awarded, which would lead to increased production, rural employment and provide the government with revenue of between \$1.7 and \$16 million. However, delays in the bidding process resulted in an initial sale of six contracts and zero revenue from the legal export of logs and timber products. A year later, the IMF (2008) predicted revenue as high as \$24 million but still commercial timber exports amounted to nothing. Part of the problem stemmed from setbacks in economic governance and financial management, and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the FDA to follow through with the good governance requirements of the reforms. In particular, there were problems in allocating and planning timber concessions and finding qualified timber companies to bid on concession areas. But

there were other problems as well. The UN Panel of Experts reported a container of wood planks had left Liberia in a freighter that was said to contain sheet metal, raising concerns about illegal exports and government corruption.¹⁵⁷ In addition, despite joint patrols between FDA and UNMIL, reports of FDA rangers coming under attack in Sapo National Park, presumably by ex-combatants illegally mining and hunting, led to questions about the government's ability to control forest areas.

Evidence of improprieties in the commercial sector

The FDA had a problem awarding concessionary agreements to reputable companies and certain improprieties in the awarding of concessions raised questions as to the capacity, transparency and accountability of the government (UN Panel of Experts 2008).¹⁵⁸ In order to bid on timber sales and forest management contracts, timber companies must be pre-approved using a set of standards to screen out unqualified companies and ensure companies were not involved in the trade of illegal timber or in arrears to the government for back taxes (Interview 7). The preamble to FDA regulation 103-07, for example, states "to achieve sustainable commercial development of the forest the nation must ensure that forest users possess integrity of character and respect for the law, as well as financial and technical capacity" (FDA 2006). In fact, NGOs complained that the FDA had failed to establish a debarment list, which opens the door to the Oriental Timber Company and other logging companies that played a role in the conflict to reenter the sector at a later date (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2008).

Initial pre-qualification processes began in late 2007 and early 2008 and out of 86 companies that applied, the review panel approved 37 of them with 15 becoming pre-

¹⁵⁷ Exports of sheet metal were also illegal.

¹⁵⁸ There were also allegations of the FDA selling abandoned logs at the Port of Buchanan for a low price, which is not only illegal but also looked like corruption within the FDA.

qualified and eight becoming provisionally accepted. However, many issues arose with the pre-qualification process. First, the Sustainable Development Institute suggested that the letters of "non-involvement" in past illegal forestry were not authentic or issued without permission (UN Panel of Experts 2008). Moreover, the UN Panel of Experts, in conjunction with Liberian NGOs accused the government of failing to set proper standards that could result in manipulation, an unfair process and the qualification of unqualified companies. Documents suggested, in fact, that of timber companies labeled as "qualified" by the FDA not one had any experience in the timber industry and none had any appreciable equity or access to credit (Interview 7). An analysis by the UN Panel of Experts also found that bidders routinely failed to disclose the true ownership of the bidding timber company. A large majority of the bidding companies actually appeared to be "shell companies" that were without substance and that were bound to fail (Interview 7). Finally, international advisors to the FDA expressed concern that the bids were unrealistically high, which would likely result in pressure to overharvest in order to pay for land rental prices and lead to a "cut and run" mentality before the 25 year contract is up (Interview 18).

At the same time the above irregularities were cropping up, other improprieties began emerged. Forest management contracts totaling approximately one-third of all forest concessions were mysteriously altered in the FDA, and only discovered by GEMAP.¹⁵⁹ Documents specify that a land rental should be paid every year for the 25-year life of the timber contract. However, the contract signed by the FDA (and the Ministries of Justice and Finance), and submitted to the President for signature, provided only for a one-time payment for the same amount that the company would have had to pay annually. As the UN Panel of Experts (2008, 23) noted, "payments in years 2 through 25 were eliminated without any increase in the payment due in year one". This alteration would have amounted to a loss of

¹⁵⁹ The forest management contracts were also not advertised internationally as required by law.

revenue of over \$50 million over a 25-year period to the Liberian people while benefiting the timber company (Interview 7; Interview 18). This change in the contract would have also affected communities and counties, who each would have been entitled to 30 percent of the land rental fees, or about \$14 million. This episode raised serious questions about how the contract was altered and by whom.¹⁶⁰ Evidence also surfaced that bids for timber contracts were not advertised internationally as required by law. NGOs suggested this "oversight" was to reduce competition and favor certain companies. In addition, a panel that evaluates timber concession bids made was accused of not using the established system to choose the highest bidder but instead devising a "new system" on the spot. The result was that the lowest bidder (and one that should not have been pre-qualified in the first place) received the concessions. The transgressions--some might call it evidence of corruption --did shine an unflattering light on the government, and put an effective "hold" on fast-tracking commercial timber operations.

Throughout 2009 efforts to jump-start commercial forestry continued apace. Liberia signed the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which was aimed at managing revenues and bringing transparency to the natural resource sector including the forestry (EITI 2010). But implementing the forest reforms and granting timber concessions remained contentious and fraught with controversy. The government asserted that such controversies are caused not by its actions, which it insists under the circumstances are quite positive, but due to the legal complexities of the forest reforms that were written predominantly by IBOs. The government also blamed the delays on by IBOs, Liberian NGOs and even the reports of the UN Panel of Experts. Liberian NGOs placed the blame squarely on the government, stressing that "two years since the...reform agenda...all implications are that the...process is failing [and] the forest sector is gradually slipping back

¹⁶⁰ A further investigation into this matter is detailed in the UN Panel of Experts report June 2009.

into the old ways of doing business." The UN Panel of Experts, which had largely been supportive of the government's efforts, suggested that high levels of discretion being used by the government officials in the implementation of the reforms and policies is a concern" (UN Panel of Experts 2008, 51).

Much contention has arisen over the granting of concessions. The reforms provided a process by which timber permits and contracts are to be issued, including a handful of rigorous steps to pre-qualify companies that are then entitled to bid on timber concessions. These requirements were intended to ensure that the allocation of commercial timber concessions occurred in a transparent, fair and competitive manner, which would increase revenues for the state and communities. As of late 2009, the government had overseen the allocation of six timber sales and seven forest management contracts in a combined area in excess of 800,000 hectares. But growing controversy emerged about the pre-qualification process, bid evaluations and due diligence, the awarding of contracts, transparency and public participation have led the UN Panel of Experts, peacebuilders to question to question the credibility of reforms. According to the NGO Coalition of Liberia (2008), unless the government takes action by reversing controversial contracts and vetting companies, reforms are in jeopardy and the country may be headed for a "another cycle of widespread illegal logging", unsustainable forest management and conflicts with aggrieved communities.

One of the central criticisms was that almost, if not all, of the extensive timber contracts signed into law in 2009 were done too quickly, without due diligence and in violation of the law and regulations established in forest reforms. Global Witness and a group of Liberian NGOs¹⁶¹ argued that several forest contracts were simply too risky given serious flaws in the FDA allocation process (Global Witness 2009). Global Witness and the NGOs insisted that the company's bids were not only illegal but that each company lacked

¹⁶¹ The four NGOs are: Sustainable Development Institute, Liberia Democratic Institute, Foundation for Community Initiative and Children Development Program.

sufficient funds. In fact, the groups found that at least three of the companies may have colluded during the bidding process because for some reason the Atlantic Resources proposal was in the Southeast Resources' envelope. These same companies owed almost \$3 million to government and had not yet commenced operations because of a lack of financial resources. This raised serious questions as to whether they would be able to create jobs or generate revenue.

Three firms considered for major logging contracts--Alpha Logging, Atlantic Resources and Southeast Resources-- were linked financially to Samling, a large Malaysian timber company known for "destroying tropical forests and abusing local communities" (Global Witness 2009). Briefing documents by Global Witness, for example, suggested that due to serious flaws in the bid evaluation process and despite concerns expressed by the comptroller of GEMAP, Liberia's forests were about to be handed off to "timber pirates" that had a documented track record of illegal and unsustainable logging practices and human rights abuses. Global Witness argued that "given the timber industry's previous role in fuelling conflict in Liberia, letting in firms controlled by some of the world's most predatory loggers would be disastrous [and] one could hardly think of a worse choice" (Global Witness 2009). According to Global Witness, "there is precious little evidence that industrial logging in the tropics is ever sustainable or reduces poverty...if the Liberian government insists on once again turning its forests over to the global timber industry, it should, at a minimum, exclude firms that have a documented history of destruction and abuse (Global Witness 2009). Indeed, if the three companies keep their contracts it would indirectly give Samling a stake an estimated 760,000 hectares of commercial forest equivalent to 58 percent of the total forests allocated for commercial timber operations, and amounting to almost 8 percent of Liberia's total surface area (Global Witness 2009). Global Witness (2009) argued that letting the contracts move forward without properly examining the history of the three companies and their ties to Samling, would be a step back for forestry reform.

Despite extensive background investigations into the companies in question, Alpha, Atlantic and Southeast all rejected the Global Witness claims that Samling was involved in any way. According to the companies in a joint statement, they are all separate and distinct companies, with none being a subsidiary of either with each bidding separately and distinctly and won the bid fairly and within the law (*The Analyst* 2009). The companies suggested that Global Witness was either waging a "proxy war" on behalf of the losing companies or conducting a smear campaign against the companies with the a hidden agenda of not wanting to see timber harvests started in Liberia. While the UN Panel of Experts (2009) did not address the Samling allegations directly, it did find that a number of fundamental steps in the forest reforms and policies had been overlooked and many important criteria were ignored by the government in the awarding of contracts. During the process of allocating four large forest management contracts, for example, the bid evaluation panel recommended Euro-Liberia Logging over a more highly ranked bidder even though Euro-Liberia had not met the reserve bid-- the basic criteria for assessing bids. Moreover, contrary to the law, the government recommended that the Euro-Liberia negotiate a different bid after its initial one making the process not only uncompetitive but tilting the playing field in favor of a particular company. The UN panel report (2009) also stated that much of the required documentation needed to assess a company's ability to meet minimum standards, including knowledge in forestry and financial resources, were non-existent.

Tension over community rights and land ownership

A report by European NGO, FERN, stated that the forest reforms and policies maintain "a concentration of power over forest resources in the hands of the government...forest-dependent communities without deeded entitlement...have no recourse to compensation when forest resources are removed" (Lomax 2008, 18). The reforms provided the necessary regulations to "fast-track" commercial forestry, similar regulations concerning

community rights and participation were ignored with few provisions to ensure that forests comes into community control (Lomax 2008). People and communities have largely been excluded from the consultative process and have not received a "welcome response" from the government (Lomax 2008, 19). Although there are benefit sharing provisions in the reforms and policies--which amount to 30 percent of the land rental fee--these are small relative to the importance the forests play in the day-to-day life of forest communities (Lomax 2008, 20). Social agreements between the company and community, as mandated by the reforms also did not provide bargaining power over timber contracts on customary land or give communities a direct role in negotiating timber contracts. In fact, two-thirds of all timber contracts that were approved in 2008 were stopped by community opposition and a refusal to sign a social agreement (Interview 7).

Experience with the reforms and policies makes clear that the government and commercial interests are the "principal actors" and communities the "beneficiaries with a minimal financial stake, which does little to change the structure of forest governance over the last century" (Lomax 2008, 20). This status quo relationship highlights the incomprehension by the government and IBOs of the overlapping land claims, and the significance of determining who owns what before outlining the use of the forest land. It is estimated that over 90 percent of all cases in the Liberian courts are related to land disputes and this would only increase once commercial forestry begin (Interview 17). Liberia's Governance Reform Commission argued that the conflict had exacerbated an already "complicated and volatile situation" and a rapid and unlawful privatization of forests for commercial exploitation may lead to future conflict. Skirmishes and protests have occurred in several areas that the government has issued prospective timber contracts. In these cases, the government has been accused of ignoring local structures and "monopolizing the process" in a rush to begin timber harvests (Interview 1). In Bokumu District, for example, a local community refused to participate in the harvesting of its own forests without permission

(Interview 30). As a member of an International NGOs stated, the local community viewed it as "my Father's land", and "not the government's to give away" (Interview 8). An incident in 2008, in which 15 people were killed in land dispute provides ample evidence that violence is likely as communities compete for land with the government and timber companies. The worry is, according to an influential international peacebuilder, that "bad forestry will only exacerbate conflict" (Interview 7).

Efforts to tackle the problem of land ownership and tenure has so far been ineffective. When the FDA requested that all forest deed holders present documentation for verification over 8 million acres of deeds were presented, which amounted to almost 70 percent of all lands available for commercial forestry (Interview 18). The Governance Reform Commission suggests that people state that if we fight again, we will fight about land". Over 60 percent of Liberians reported that land ownership and distribution is the leading cause of violent conflict in areas where they live (Topka, Saryee and Asunka 2009). This has been echoed by the NGO Coalition of Liberia (2008), which states that the "fast tracking" of the commercial timber sector will not only undermine reform efforts but also "plunge some communities into conflict when timber harvests do start." As one interviewee stated, it is pertinent to "bring clarity to the confliction that exists since it will help resolve disagreements over the foundations of ownership".

The UN Panel of Experts (2009) reported a number of pre-felling operations that were deemed to be illegal and infringing on communities.¹⁶² In one case, a company began felling trees without paying the government and failing to meet various conditions.¹⁶³ In another instance, Tarpeh Timber cut down trees outside of its concession area and sawing

¹⁶² These are activities by concessionaires done before full scale timber harvests begin.

¹⁶³ The FDA halted the company's (B&V) logging activities.

logs without a permit.¹⁶⁴ The panel, as well as Liberian and international NGOs also identified serious problems associated with pre-felling including the completion of social agreements, environmental impact assessments, and management plans. The Sustainable Development Institute (2009) documented complaints by communities that social agreements are not in any way participatory and often are negotiated by those that live outside the community. In addition, social agreements in many communities appeared to have identical provisions and in the same handwriting leading NGOs to believe social agreements were being written up without any community involvement (UN Panel of Experts 2009). In another case, a community complained that a logging company had breached the social agreement even before harvesting began. In another case, several communities presented a land deed to the FDA to challenge the granting of two timber contracts and one forest management contract on communal land. However, the FDA noted that it could neither confirm nor deny the ownership of land, and therefore did not have the power to nullify the commercial contracts (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2008). This, according to the NGO Coalition of Liberia (2008), not only violates the law but "poses threats to the peace and security of the country as this has the potential to create conflicts between the state and the people on the one hand and people and logging companies on the other". In fact, these communities have said that they will "resist any attempt to log their forest" (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2008, 6).

Another serious point of contention emerged over the Community Rights Law (CRL), which the forest reform law mandated be enacted within one year. Although the government did not meet the deadline, it submitted a 9-page version of the bill to the

¹⁶⁴ The FDA fined the company \$2,000 for the infraction (even though the estimated value of the illegally cut logs was more than \$100,000 on the international market and also provided a sawing permit after the violation had occurred. This drew criticism from the UN Panel of Experts (2009).

president in July 2008.¹⁶⁵ However, the bill passed by the Legislature was a longer 32-page bill not the bill signed by Johnson Sirleaf. Nobody seemed to know how the longer version ended up in the Legislature and substantial questions remained on what the motives were for switching out the bills at the last moment. Suffice to say, that the mystery is significant because both are very bills were different in how they defined communal forests and community rights. In essence, the passing of one or the other would have had deep ramifications for Liberia's forests. The short bill, supported by the government and vetted by the LFI and a broad range of international experts and local actors¹⁶⁶, laid out the rights and responsibilities for community forest management and recognized tenure rights as that described in the Liberian Constitution. More specifically, endowed the Government of Liberia with the authority to manage and govern Liberia's forest lands on behalf of the Republic. By contrast, the longer version placed the ownership of Liberia's forests directly into the hands of rural communities, and sought to make communal forests the central construct of forest management (Wily 2007). This would have, in effect, recognized that forest owners have jurisdictional rights and established community tenure into the forestry law. Supporters of this version, including Sustainable Development Institute, members of the House Community Rights Law Caucus, and various communities¹⁶⁷, claimed it would, after decades of war and corruption, begin to genuinely empower communities and give them a direct voice in how Liberia's land is used. It would have also placed communities in control of all commercial forestry operations and protected areas. In effect, timber companies--rather than working through the government--would have had to deal directly with communities to arrange timber concessions or establish national parks or protected areas. Basically, it would have signaled a seismic shift in the governance of forest lands from a "state asset to a private

¹⁶⁵ Submission to the Legislature meets the minimum requirement of the NFRL.

¹⁶⁶ A meeting was held in Monrovia in 2008 with many international experts to discuss the community rights law.

¹⁶⁷ In particular, local Community Forestry Development Committees have supported the CRL.

resource of ordinary citizens (Wily 2007, 265). Not only would this empower rural communities but, for the first time, would help guarantee revenues and other benefits go directly to communities rather than government officials, timber companies and international conservation organizations.

The government and a large majority of international actors, including the UN Panel of Experts, suggested that handing over all of Liberia's land to communities would amount to a "land grab" and take away a large projected revenue stream that could benefit the entire country. Many have also been questions as to whether communities have the human resources or institutional capacity to negotiate with powerful timber companies and community "elites" who may want to co-opt the process (Interview 3). Conservation groups also worried that if communities own all land, it puts into question the existence of protected areas and national parks. For conservationists, the state appears much more equipped to protect biodiversity and endangered species than communities who it is believed are the major driver of deforestation.

The switching of the Community Rights Law caused considerable contention. Protesters in Monrovia asserted that the longer version had been signed by the president but that it disappeared "under dubious circumstances" only to resurface again without her signature at a later date (Binda 2010). According to news reports, some representatives in the Legislature took the news of the passing of the 32-page Community Rights Law to their constituencies, and told them that the law had returned their land to them, and made them the legitimate owners of the forests and its resources (Binda 2010). The government, however, stressing the mysterious switching of documents, called for a new law to be drafted, which reconciled the two-versions. What emerged was a 17-page Community Rights with Respect to Forest Lands Act, passed in October 2009. The Act defined community forestry lands and guaranteed communities a 55 percent share of revenues derived from timber ventures on community land (GoL 2009). More concerning perhaps, is that considerable hostility still

remains over the new Community Rights Law, particularly in various communities.¹⁶⁸ The anger stems from accusations that in creating the new law, "provisions calling for social benefits for various communities... [were] consciously removed by unknown persons." Other's called it an "attack since local communities...had suffered from historical injustices as a result of disenfranchisement of their lands...preventing them from their rights to development in accordance with their own needs and interests"(Binda 2010). Rather than celebrating a Community Rights Law, the result has been largely anger and disagreement about the rights of local communities.

Diminishing confidence and growing hostility to forest reforms

Stemming from the problems, disagreements and contention outlined above the forest reform process has come under mounting criticism not only for its "lack of progress" but also because the future of the reforms appear more uncertain. The optimism that existed after Johnson Sirleaf took office, the UN sanctions got lifted and the forest reforms laws passed have been replaced with a lack of confidence and growing hostility. This has been accompanied by an ongoing process of trying to cast blame. Much of the criticism concerns the delays in meeting the revenue projections of the commercial timber sector. It has been estimated that timber companies paid the government approximately \$8.63 million in 2010 (UN Panel of Experts 2010).¹⁶⁹ While these revenues represent a significant improvement over the previous years, it failed to meet the projections in the country's PRSP, which sets out a road map for how to attain economic growth, poverty alleviation and state revenue (IMF 2008). The period 2001-2011, for example, was projected to total \$107 million with the

¹⁶⁸ The author attended a community meeting in 2008 concerning the Community Rights Law and local representatives appeared to be stoking dissent.

¹⁶⁹ The government was still owed over \$4.5 million, including \$475,000 in late payment fees.

expected revenue of \$24 million for 2008-2009 and \$36 million for 2009-2010. Although the government modified its projections slightly, by all measures it will fall far short of estimates.

Part of the problem is that the government continues to provide optimistic revenue projections based on unrealistic scenarios, which raise expectations that cannot possibly be met (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 17). A report commissioned by the Liberian NGO Green Advocates found that the FDA routinely overestimates timber volumes due to a combination of poor baseline data and a lack of capacity (Shearman 2009). The overestimates provide for inflated revenue projections and may lead to unsustainable forest management practices both of which have a direct bearing on economic development and community relations. The report described more accurate projections that are likely to be less than half as much as estimates furnished by the government and international peacebuilders (Shearman 2009). The reduction in expected revenues can inhibit the forest reform process as well since vital functions such as the chain of custody contractor is paid using revenue from the sector it is reporting on.¹⁷⁰ The implications of inflated projections effect community revenues, county development funds and the management of protected areas since each is entitled to some percentage of revenues from the sector (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 27). The Sustainable Development Institute (2010, 35) claims that the projections are "largely responsible for the government's relentless effort to restart the failed industrial logging... model." At the same time, communities were told that they would share in the immense financial benefits of the commercial sector but so far this has not been the case. The consequences of not meeting these expectations is unclear but "there are likely to be tensions when timber companies start harvesting without meeting their social obligations and the government is unable to release their expected 30 percent" (SDI 2010, 36).

¹⁷⁰ As of 2010, the \$1 million to cover the expenses of the chain of custody had been secured as the government committed \$500,000 and the World Bank and DFID each contributing \$400,000.

As a ranking official in an international financial institution admitted, the government is under intense pressure to meet the expectations of the commercial timber sector (Interview 41). According to the government representatives, the problem in the complex and time consuming legal requirements of the forest reforms (Interview 2). For example, the UN has identified 32 different steps in the allocation process (UN Panel of Experts 2009). This has raised discussions, particularly in the government about modifying the law in such a way as to cut delays. While interviews confirm the perception that the reforms and policies may be "too legalistic" or the "too complicated" for an FDA that lacks technical know-how and capacity, IPOs suggest that delays occurred because of other factors (Interview 7). Several timber contracts were delayed because the bidding companies failed to meet a financial obligation of \$250,000 and other sales were deferred due to questions of land ownership (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 18). Moreover, some contracts were postponed due to an apparent lack of motivation in attending to details or, in fact, corruption by government officials that manipulate outcomes. For international peacebuilders that have invested at least \$20 million in the reforms, remedying the problem will take time as anti-corruption measures are undertaken and norms of good governance become institutionalized (Interview 39). However, one high ranking official in the FDA mentioned that from the perspective of the government, any so-called improprieties or corruption identified by IPOs actually represent "efficiencies" designed to get timber activities moving forward rapidly so as to keep promises to political constituents (Interview 42).

Government officials also suggest that the problems and delays in the commercial timber sector stem from interlocutors that want to put an end to industrial forestry in Liberia and obstruct progress (Interview 2; Interview 42). These interlocutors include both international peacebuilders and international and Liberian NGOs. People inside the FDA, for instance, have accused international peacebuilders, including employees of the World Bank and GEMAP of being "obstructionist", and holding the government to such strict standards

that it will halt the timber industry. An internal memo described GEMAP as engaging in a deliberate attempt to "...retard our progress" and vilified technical advisors for acts of "economic sabotage" and subverting the national interest--both of which are crimes punishable by imprisonment under Liberian law. Intimidation of IPOs by the government over the forestry reforms may be working because as recently as 2009 the World Bank advised its forestry advisor to "draw back from involvement of such contentious issues in the forestry sector, particularly commercial forestry" (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19; Interview 15). The UN Panel of Experts, has also come under criticism from the government for undermining economic development and providing NGOs with the information intended to "stop commercial logging" (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19; Interview 38). Government officials involved in the management of the natural resource sector have even gone so far as to accuse IBOs of intruding into the sovereign administration of the country (Interview 1; Interview 38).

International and Liberia NGOs have consistently been accused of undermining the forestry reforms. News reports--likely written by those close to government officials--have been highly critical of Global Witness, describing the organization as "paralyzing" the timber sector, and stating that "many Liberians especially rural Liberians ...will remain jobless as long as Global Witness and its collaborators continue ...to hold hostage the forest sector" (*The Analyst* 2009). At the same time, Liberian NGOs are accused of opposing all commercial timber activities and even the government's control of forests. As a member of a conservation organization put it, many local NGOs are attempting to pit communities against the government in order to halt industrial logging (Interview 4). Recently, the government has "issued press statements, and at least one member of its staff has written an article, "questioning the motives" of NGOs (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19). To this effect, the FDA published a public notice in the country's newspapers stating that it was no longer necessary for the government or international peacebuilders to support local groups engaged in

discussions related to forest reforms and policies. The notice noted that Liberian NGOs had an obligation to acknowledge state authority on forest matters, and a failure to do so could result in "actions compatible with the rule of law" (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19-20).

International and Liberian NGOs equate the delays to which the government and international peacebuilders are concerned represents a much deeper problem related to the "fast-tracking" of commercial timber operations. While some organizations believe that more public pressure needs to be applied to the Liberian government (Interview 8), others suggested that a flaw in the development model that commercial forestry represents is to blame (Interview 9; Interview 29). Global Witness has stressed that the in the rush to resurrect the forest sector has resulted in the "same mistakes that in the past have resulted in natural resource-fuelled instability, corruption and poverty" and that peacebuilders "overlook legal breaches, irregularities, evidence of corruption and poor governance" (Global Witness 2010). The Sustainable Development Institute (2010), suggests the government has betrayed its promise of fully implementing forest reforms, which not only puts "the livelihoods of communities at risk [but] undermines the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy". SDI reported that in almost every aspect the government has failed to meet its legal obligations and there is no "political will in the government to reign in timber companies or to insist on transparency, accountability and the rule of law". In short, pressures to fast-track the timber industry has led politicians to crumble and without concerted efforts to get forest reforms back on track, "logging will not be properly regulated, sustainability requirements will be discarded and community rights will be violated with impunity...and all of this will be for nothing because the expected revenue and jobs might not materialize (Global Witness 2010; SDI 2010). This view suggests that there is still a window of opportunity for the government to get things back on track but it will take a commitment by President Sirleaf to fight corruption and the renewed efforts of peacebuilders.

The Sustainable Development Institute, and other Liberian NGOs, argues that without meaningful dialogue with communities on key matters such as land tenure, community rights and land ownership and without public access to forest-related information that can be used by communities for decision making, commercial forestry should not be allowed to move ahead. The groups question how the timber sector can support Liberian peace if contentious and occasionally violent episodes over land ownership and tenure still exist. These groups have also labeled forestry reforms as "fundamentally flawed" because they have "fast tracked" the commercial sector without meaningful dialogue or participation with affected communities. Since communities have not historically benefited from the timber industry, and have absorbed all the social and environmental costs, there is a widespread perception that if communities do not derive the benefits they feel entitled too; it may result in a serious disruption of peacebuilding and possibly conflict (Interview 28; Interview 20). Given the deficiency of trust between communities and the government in Liberia, a more deliberate set of activities need to be discussed including one that puts communities--and not commercial forestry at the center of the paradigm; rather than the periphery (Interviews 28).

Finally, NGOs largely agree that despite several years and tens of millions of dollars, and despite the passing of cutting edge forest reforms, at this point the structure of the forest industry remains very similar to the past and "nothing has changed the character of key industry actors" (SDI 2010, 44). This is evident not only in the issues described above, but in what NGOs describe as the gradual "attacks on civil society and the spread of misinformation about critics" (SDI 2010, 41; UN Panel of Experts 2009). Guidelines circulated in early 2009 that suggested that all forestry matters must be approved by the government was viewed as an attempt to silence" NGOs (Interviews 28). A common refrain among international and Liberian NGOs is that the government is attempting to turn people against these organizations and even "pit communities against communities" by discrediting them (Interview 25). For

instance, the government now routinely labels NGOs as "anti-development" or "anti-logging" when all they are doing is holding state institutions to the rule of law (Interview 28).

According to a member of a Liberian NGO, one of the biggest changes from the past has been the "changing dynamics of power", in which the government has to listen to NGOs and civil society (Interview 28). Senior officials in international peacebuilding organizations are also beginning view international and Liberian NGOs as hostile or "distrustful" which is a new trend that did not exist when forest reforms began (Interview 25). A senior World Bank official dealing with forest issues remarked that a vocal NGO was undermining peace and security by "insisting on the full implementation of the law...which stalls... logging... and undermines the Poverty Reduction Strategy" (SDI 2010, 88; Interview 15).

A growing number of people are also beginning to present the case that large-scale industrial timber operations, contrary to the conventional wisdom does not alleviate poverty or provide good employment opportunities for forest communities (World Bank 2008a). Instead, commercial forestry promotes conflict since it fosters a culture of patronage, "consolidates old rivalries over resources and agitates grievances among the population" (Interview 28). Interviews suggest that the rush to return to an industrial timber industry ignores Liberia's long history of exploitation, in which communities and the population at-large did not benefit but became poorer, and fails to consider the cultural and livelihood values of forests (Interview 28; Interview 9). One critic could not understand why "Liberia would export all its timber only to import toothpicks" if not for a system in which places an incentive on "rent-seeking behavior" (Interview 9). As suggested by SDI (2009, 1), the fact that the forests reforms and policies have been so contentious should not be surprising since experiences from across Africa show that "progressive laws and equitable laws on paper are not followed...and corners start to be cut".

Conclusion

International peacebuilding organizations have come to understand the link between forests and the Liberian conflict as characterized by so-called "conflict timber". Specifically, the problem was that timber and timber concessions were traded by the corrupt Taylor government in exchange for weapons, which destabilized the region and threatened international security. The predominant peacebuilding challenge, then, was for IBOs was to help establish state control over forests, and improve governance to mitigate conflict and support economic recovery. In essence, IBOs endeavor to transform "conflict resources" into "peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace.

This chapter has traced the forest reform process--including new policies, laws, regulations and practices--which culminated with the passing of a comprehensive forest reform law. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, IPOs were concerned with "securitizing" Liberia's forests by promoting and supporting the establishment of reforms and policies to "firm-up" or consolidate state control and authority over forests. These reforms and policies stressed the importance of "good governance", including measures to improve revenue transparency, government accountability and public participation. The purpose was to ensure the dynamics of "conflict timber" did not resurface. Over time, international peacebuilders turned their attention to promoting reforms and policies that stressed "marketization", as exemplified by the emphasis on the commercialization of Liberia's forests in the NFRL. This signified a changing perception that the biggest threat to Liberia--and by extension international security--was no longer a lack of control over forest revenue but stagnant economic growth, poverty and a lack of state revenue.

Given that nearly a decade has passed since the end of the conflict, and almost five-years have elapsed since major forest reform what has been the effects? While it appears that the reforms and policies have played a role in reestablishing state authority over the sector,

the government has made little progress in granting timber concessions and collecting the projected timber revenue. The reason, I suggest, is that we are also witnessing a period of contention and resistance over the "rules" for governing forests, which by-product of a struggle for control that is slowing down the process. Since the rules, once established persist and often determine who has access to forests and who feels the effects of the environmental and social costs and benefits, it is not surprising that struggles persist, especially in societies where forest lands are fundamental to all aspects of political, economic and social life. The main points of contention and resistance appear to catalyze around issues of corruption, land ownership and tenure, a lack of genuine participation, and the consolidation of state authority over forests. This contention and resistance has resulted in a few episodes of protest and opposition although the current trend is toward less trust and more hostility. There is a growing perception, in fact, that the forestry sector is resuming the "old ways of doing things" (Interview 29). The larger concern, which I turn to in Chapter 8, is to understand the source of the resistance and contention and determine what the consequences might be for peacebuilding.

Chapter 6: Minerals, Diamonds and Conflict in Sierra Leone

Like the Liberian conflict, the brutal and protracted nature of the Sierra Leonean conflict has produced a diverse and expanding literature that has vastly enhanced our comprehension of a long and violent civil war (Reno 1995; Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005; Keen 2005; Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004). Despite this literature however, a persistent set of explanations, many of which were put forth in the early years of the conflict, have floated to the surface and stuck. For example, the conflict was blamed initially on a resurgence of Sierra Leone's "primordial" nature, which was triggered by over population and environmental decay, or even modernity (Kaplan 1994). Still other explanations focused on post-Cold War dynamics that led to the collapse of governance and state institutions, lawlessness, and the emergence of a new breed of warlord with little interest in stability (Kaldor 1999; Richards 1996).

This chapter suggests that the prevailing explanation of the Sierra Leonean conflict, especially among international peacebuilders focuses on the economic agendas of the combatants and the role of valuable natural resources and their revenues played in the conflict's conflagration. Much like the conflict in Liberia, the prominence of literature discussed in Chapter 3, which employed an economic logic to link the environment and natural resources to conflict was influential. Such explanations highlighted the role of "loot-seeking" rebels and "greedy" warlords--most prominently Liberia's Charles Taylor--that plundered Sierra Leone's vast diamond deposits to buy arms, get rich and sustain conflict. In fact, Sierra Leone is synonymous with the phrase "blood diamonds" and the war will likely

be perceived in perpetuity as a novel species of civil war driven by the globalization or "warlordization" of the diamond trade (Campbell 2004). I argue that these explanations, however parsimonious and intuitive, have done little to better our understanding and have largely misrepresented the conflict's complex dynamics especially with reference to conflict and Sierra Leone's diamonds. The conflict does not resemble a "new war" but represents a continuation of political conflict, social grievances and competition for power in which diamonds have played a central role. This is significant, I assert, because IBOs have been active in promoting and establishing reforms and policies in Sierra Leone to address the issue of "conflict diamonds", and therefore need understand the political, economic and social dynamics of the diamond trade.

This chapter begins with an overview of Sierra Leone's historical trajectory from British rule in the early 1800s until the eve of the civil war in 1990. In this section, I highlight the impact of colonialism on the economic, political and social landscape that has influenced the formation of a sovereign Sierra Leone. I, then, detail Sierra Leone's civil war, which raged between 1991 and 2002, and in doing so emphasize the long history of patronage and grievance that made the rebellion possible. I then provide historical background on Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals to better understand the ways in which these resources have played a pivotal role the country's development. The final section of the chapter, then, describes the links between the diamonds, minerals and the conflict, how this relationship has been constructed by IBOs, and what is being done by peacebuilders to tackle the "threat" of "conflict resources".

The Long Road to Conflict in Sierra Leone

The British Colony: Oppression and indirect rule

Sierra Leone was founded by British abolitionists as a free settlement for former slaves in 1787. After a period of conflict and collapse, the British took full control of the settlement--renamed Freetown--and the surrounding peninsula in 1808, declaring it officially a "Crown Colony". British authorities rapidly exploited the areas vast natural resources throughout the 1800s. In the valley's near Freetown tropical timber was extracted in for the construction of British Navy ships and the export of Mahogany (Richards 1996). The British intensified trade with the interior, with colonial trading companies purchasing agricultural and forest products destined for Europe and the US (Zach-Williams 1995). This substantial trade activity led to the use of slave labor by indigenous chiefs that took advantage of their position as the "custodians of the land" to garner substantial profits and prestige.¹⁷¹

In 1896, all of Sierra Leone became a British Protectorate and instituted colonial rule throughout the hinterland. By bringing colonial administration to the indigenous peoples--that now became "protected" peoples--the British believed it could more easily control trade and guarantee stability. Colonial officials quickly recognized, however, that the colonial bureaucracy could not carry out the central tasks of managing trade and collecting revenues given the costs in money and legitimacy direct domination (Reno 1995).¹⁷² Therefore, the British had to rely on the traditional authority of indigenous chiefs to extend influence and

¹⁷¹ It also fostered violent competition between chiefs that led to sporadic uprisings and power struggles and led Colonial authorities also established the Frontier Force in 1890 to maintain law and order (Keen 2005).

¹⁷² As Reno (1995, 30) suggests, the dilemma of direct rule was that continued coercion by British forces to force compliance with administrative demands would cause local chiefs to form a counterweight to British "abuses" and local "collaborators" and become more involved in trade and potentially undermine what was most desired-stability.

carry out tasks in the interior.¹⁷³ As a colonial policy, "indirect rule" was employed in ways that rewarded indigenous chiefs that carried out the wishes of the colonial government. The idea was to allow chiefs to employ their traditional authority and legitimacy to maintain stability, guarantee a plentiful supply of labor, demand tax payments and provide access to land and natural resources desired by the British and various trading companies.

The introduction of cash crops such as coffee and cocoa and the completion of the Sierra Leone railway continued to enrich chiefs but also began to "drag" Sierra Leone into an expanding "taxable cash economy" (Reno 1995, 38). Estimates suggested that the value of exports reached between £1.6 and £2.2 million between 1920 and 1930 despite the Great Depression (Zach-Williams 1995, 44). This was a welcome development since the business of colonial administration and the increasing demands to build infrastructure required revenue. The desire to control trade led to the gradual domination of export markets by European trading companies and Lebanese traders, which had the effect of crowding out traditional Creole middlemen. This had the effect of pitting the interests of the Protectorate against the interests of the elites in Freetown (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999). The development of the "dependent" economy also was marked by continued tension and violence characterized by struggles over working conditions and wages as laborers realized they were "being denied their fair share of the proceeds" (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 46-48; Zach-Williams 1995, 44).

A changing economy and the consolidation of colonial authority

By the 1930s, Sierra Leone was transformed by the emergence of a mining sector and the economic, political and social changes that followed it. The discovery of alluvial gold,

¹⁷³ There was a discrepancy between those in Britain who wanted to rule Sierra Leone's interior with an iron fist and those colonial administrators who realized that because the British could not dominate the hinterland needed to rely on indigenous chiefs and a policy of indirect rule (Reno 1995).

diamonds, iron ore platinum and chrome motivated colonial rulers to establish control of all aspects of mining in an attempt to monopolize the revenues.¹⁷⁴ Between 1929 and 1932 mining licenses were granted to European companies. Whereas the "dependent" economy--based on agricultural and forest products--required the co-option of indigenous chiefs to supply labor and maintain law and order, the mining sector and particularly the alluvial diamond sector sought to preclude any involvement of chiefs or indigenous labor. This was because the government worried about competing "illicit" operations that would capture state revenues and company profits.¹⁷⁵ To protect these interests, the diamond company was authorized to provide its own armed security force.

The exclusion of chiefs from diamond mining was seen as an "unwarranted extension of state power", and an infringement on their customary rights to be involved in the Protectorate's economic development (Reno 1995, 46-49). As Reno (1995, 46) notes, decades of collaboration with the British "taught chiefs to expect direct economic gain" in exchange for "political loyalty." The arrival of armed mercenaries to guard alluvial diamond mining areas was not welcome. Tensions between the colonial administration and chiefs also stemmed from the increasing involvement of "strangers"--wealthy African and Lebanese elites from Freetown--accused by the government of illicitly mining diamonds and paying chiefs that were excluding from formal mining operations, for "rent" and protection (Reno 1995, 49).¹⁷⁶ The chiefs then began playing an intermediary role where they would intervene in the diamond business on behalf of all concerned-"strangers".¹⁷⁷ Native Authority Scheme

¹⁷⁴ Part of this was experience of the British in Ghana or the Gold Coast where it was believed that involving African's in mining would lead to exploitation, smuggling and a lack of revenues for the colonial administration.

¹⁷⁵ Alluvial diamond mining was dominated by SLST, which operated a 99-year lease.

¹⁷⁶ These strangers had been increasingly squeezed out of legitimate trade given the preference for European companies.

¹⁷⁷ This was heightened with the Native Authority Scheme, which provided chiefs with lavish salaries to cut back on illicit mining. For example, the colonial administration believed that only through wealth-seeking behavior would chiefs begin to crack down on the "strangers" activities.

was approved to provide chiefs with lavish salaries as an incentive to cut back on illicit mining. The presumption of the colonial administration was that only through wealth-seeking behavior would chiefs begin to crack down on illegal mining activities. However, despite the new payments to keep diamond mining in the formal sector, chiefs remained deeply involved in illicit diamond mining playing off the dividing interests of the different actors. Put simply, chiefs did not respond to reforms if that "undercut their own political power through the control of markets" (Reno 1995, 55). This exemplifies how political authority came to be divided in terms of the formal and informal sectors that distinguish a parallel "shadow state" to the institutional state (Reno 1995).

Despite efforts to crack down on illicit diamond mining by using indirect rule, during the "diamond rush" of the 1950s as many as 70,000 people were involved in illicit operations, mostly as diggers. This rush paralleled post-World War II movements for increased political representation, a demand for more services like education from colonial authorities and increasing disturbances targeted at popular resentment over chief's privileges and taxes. Much of the resentment, in Kono District at least, was over the perception that the government controlled the best diamonds fields and held a monopoly over diamonds in which the benefits accrued to European companies, British officials and local chiefs while the population remained poor and marginalized (Reno 1995; Zach-Williams 1995). Another issue was that the intensification of alluvial diamond mining led to a reduction in lands dedicated to subsistence agriculture, and this was done with the permission of chiefs who benefited from the illicit mining operations. In 1955 local miners attacked SLST mercenaries and local police forces in response to these grievances. Understanding that unrest threatened law and order-and colonial rule directly--the government moved to reform local government and end the SLST's monopoly on diamond mining. The colonial authorities also legalized some illicit mining--even though only the wealthy and well connected could acquire a productive plot or purchase a license. Despite these changes, however, Sierra Leone's

diamond wealth was leaking from the country making investments by the colonial government nearly impossible, and leaving the population in a persistent state of underdevelopment (Keen 2005; Zach-Williams 1995).

One-party rule, patronage and rural exclusion

The developments in Sierra Leone's alluvial diamond areas intersected with post-World War II political events that would lead to independence and the consolidation of party politics in post-colonial Sierra Leone. While decolonization is a long process, British attitudes towards its colonies in the aftermath of the Second World War led to political and constitutional reforms. These reforms were intended to increase African representation. Such overtures were not without controversy as they exacerbated rivalries between the peoples of the Protectorate, including powerful chiefs and an educated class in Freetown (Cartwright 1970). Out of these developments emerged political parties that promoted the causes of certain constituencies and regions. For example, uniting people of the Protectorate was the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) led by Dr. Milton Margai.¹⁷⁸ The SLPP enjoyed much economic and political authority in the waning years of British rule, which was a sign that the colonial rulers were grooming them take control after independence. However, the SLPP divided along regional and ethnic lines and came to be seen as hegemony of elites-doing little to change colonial dynamics (Cartwright 1970). The result was the formation of a new party, the All People's Congress (APC), which emerged under the leadership of Siaka Stevens just as independence from the British was made official in April 1961.¹⁷⁹

Steven's APC garnered its support from "wage workers, the rural poor, the lumpen proletariat, and those peasants who were chafing under the oppressive yoke of the chiefs"

¹⁷⁸ Margai was the Protectorate's first medical doctor.

¹⁷⁹ Stevens and Albert Margai (Milton's brother and the first Protectorate Western-educated lawyer) initially launched the People's National Party (PNP) in September 1958. However, a break in the leadership led to the "Election Before Independence Movement" that hatched the APC.

along with the "mostly educated" --making it a party that would enjoy mass popular support (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 70-71). Post-independence elections in 1962 saw Margai elected as Sierra Leone's first head of state, largely due to the unconditional support of the SLPP by the Paramount Chiefs (Cartwright 1970). Margai's government was legitimized by a post-independence nationalist fervor and a form of "tolerated pluralism" that came to resemble a messy but democratic form of politics. However, the SLPP exercised patronage and coercion to consolidate power. For example, Margai and the SLPP leadership continued to dispense development revenue to chiefs in the north in return for support while also allowing chiefs to put down any APC opposition violently (Reno 1995).¹⁸⁰

With Margai's death in 1964, Albert Margai took office but understood that the APC was emerging as an opposition party, and that state power needed to be consolidated. The legitimacy of Margai and the SLPP continued to decline as suspicions of corruption, coercion and other authoritarian tactics increased. Feeling threatened, Margai increased the number of Mende officers in the army and looked to Guinea for military support.¹⁸¹ Margai's rule not only introduced the military into Sierra Leonean politics but began to use ethnicity as a political tool. Despite the ethnic and regional cleavages however, the population was united against the SLPP--with the APC winning elections in 1967 and bringing Siaka Stevens to power.¹⁸²

Seeking to build a "state hegemonic project", Steven's worked to diminish and divide any political rivals by employing intimidation and violence (Keen 2005; Reno 1995; Zach-Williams 1999). Steven's Special Security Division, which was virtually a private security

¹⁸⁰ As Keen (2005, 14) suggests, this policy did not "endear the SLPP to the people of the north" and was not going to unite the country.

¹⁸¹ Margai was reportedly the target of a coup in 1967 in which mostly northerners and Creole in the army were punished.

¹⁸² The election results threatened Mende elements in the army, which joined with a handful of SLPP politicians to stage a coup against the APC. However, the military regime was unpopular and quickly overthrown, returning the APC and Siaka Stevens to power in April 1968.

force, suppressed interlocutors and terrorized political dissidents. Elections in 1973 and 1977 suffered from intimidation and violence. Moreover, mass student protests against the deteriorating educational facilities in urban areas were routinely suppressed using harsh tactics. His grasp on power was increased when Stevens established a one-party state in 1978.¹⁸³ Although Steven's use of violence and repression of opponents was critical to consolidating political power, it was not sufficient.

Like the British, Stevens needed access to the natural resources that lie at the heart of political authority in Sierra Leone, and therefore needed the collaborate with or co-opt Paramount Chiefs. Revenue was dependent on diamonds, minerals and other primary resources, which meant that Steven's needed to buy-off chiefs or appoint "intermediaries" to establish control.¹⁸⁴ Stevens formally attempted to control of the diamond sector through state-owned diamond mining companies. As Reno (1995, 95) suggests, these state-owned companies gave many chiefs a "powerful incentive to cooperate with government efforts to regulate the organization of mining, both illicit and legal, in order to increase the volume of resources available for distribution". The state, wanting to cement its relationship with friendly chiefs and ensure stability in diamond areas, provided security forces to suppress illicit mining operations and helped to protect chiefs from their own people. Most of the revenues from the state-run operations failed to increase government revenue and substantial illicit mining continued. Between 1968 and 1973 diamond production decreased by at least 25 percent in official channels (Reno 1995).

Understanding that political threats were likely to emerge from informal markets, Stevens saw to it that plots were handed out to APC supporters such as government officials

¹⁸³ Stevens famously stated that "An opposition party can...be destructive and useless force for a party committed to the good of the country-and the interests of my country must always come first with me".

¹⁸⁴ Intermediaries were largely chiefs selected by the APC that lacked any legitimacy at the local level.

and chiefs.¹⁸⁵ In essence, alluvial diamond plots were given in exchange for loyalty (Reno 1995, 106). The new policy also had the impact of shifting production away from the mining company and toward private production in the range of \$60-70 million per year by 1980 (Reno 1995). Movement toward private production was in concert with a crack-down on small-scale miners and depriving the local population of the benefits. In 1974, the government also ended De Beers monopoly, awarding export licenses to several private dealers connected with Stevens. This arrangement gave Steven's direct access to the foreign exchange that had largely been unavailable to the state and a stake in diamond sales themselves (Reno 1995). In short, Steven's gained access to substantial private revenues blurring the lines between the state and the "shadow state".

The system that Stevens had imposed was not solely about personal enrichment (although this was certainly part of it) but also about maintaining a grip on power. Revenues from diamonds and other resources were used to sustain a system of patronage in which revenues are distributed by patrons (Stevens and his cronies) to clients in return for loyalty and support. Revenues from natural resources played a large part (Richards 1996).¹⁸⁶ In the production of minerals such as rutile and bauxite government officials colluded with mining companies to evade taxes and manipulate contracts that kept state revenues minimal while allowing profits to accrue to companies and politicians.¹⁸⁷ In this way, the natural resource sector strengthened patrimonial relations while depriving the state of taxes that could be used for the development of the state.

¹⁸⁵ Stevens allowed this through the Cooperative Contract Mining (CCM) company.

¹⁸⁶ An identical dynamic was at play during the 1980s fascination with "privatization". In fact, privatization only enriched prominent politicians and businessman who colluded to avoid taxes. Chabal and Daloz (1999, 122) referred to this as the hijacking of privatization.

¹⁸⁷ This same dynamic was evident in the agricultural sector as government marketing boards set low prices on cash crops that deprived the state of revenue while importing more white rice for the population which enriched government officials and trading agents alike.

While patronage leads naturally to opportunity and even enrichment for some supporters and associates, it also requires the marginalization and repression of societal groups that resist domination or pose a threat to the status quo. As Reno (1995, 126) argues, Steven's patronage monopolized opportunities and created resentment and popular unrest from those outside the "in" patronage networks. In Sierra Leone, products and income that largely originated in rural areas--diamonds, agricultural and forest products--ended up benefiting urban groups, government officials and foreign investors. In fact, in rural areas the Sierra Leone government was a remote entity that provided very little in the way of basic services while using repression to control the extractive economy. But Steven's system began to erode in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a global recession undermined the national economy, which was based on primary commodity exports. This was exacerbated by falling levels of domestic food production caused by an increasingly urban population, a rise in diamond mining (and cash crop cultivation) that ate up arable land.¹⁸⁸ Between 1980 and 1985 per capita income fell by an average of six percent annually and inflation was high (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 116).¹⁸⁹ Needing an influx of revenue the government agreed to a structural adjustment package by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which mandated reductions in government spending and privatization of state-run enterprises all of which placed hardships on Sierra Leonean society and further eroded state institutions (Reno 1995).

In a country where many people relied on a systems of entrenched patronage and financial favors, the sudden the lack of revenue raised questions about how to secure loyalty and support from powerful benefactors like army commanders, Paramount Chiefs, senior government officials and intellectuals. Often using money provided by international financial

¹⁸⁸ This led to a dependence on rice imports.

¹⁸⁹ Against the backdrop of drastic drops in state revenue, budget deficits and rising debt payments was the 1980 Organizations of African Unity Conference that burdened Sierra Leone's people with a \$200 million price tag.

institutions or foreign aid Steven's continued to leverage the "shadow state".¹⁹⁰ Fearing a threat to his rule, Stevens withdrew state support from the rural areas to consolidate power in urban centers (Keen 2005). This further disenfranchised rural communities (in the south and east of the country) and produced disaffected urban elite outside of Steven's patronage system. Riots were common but were put down by security forces. By 1985, Siaka Stevens was an unpopular dictator in his eighties. Faced with economic and political turmoil Stevens retired, and appointed Joseph Momoh, a loyal "protector" and head of the military, as president.¹⁹¹

Momoh's political survival was premised on his ability to regain control of diamond producing areas in order to rebuild patronage networks (and meet IMF demands) (IMF 1990). Momoh used foreign companies as a counterweight against the entrenched groups by granting a monopoly concession over a wide area.¹⁹² Momoh also cracked down on the informal trade in diamonds through an emergency act and two military campaigns (which the IMF supported as a policy of "regularization") to "force accumulation back under [state] control and to undercut ...the informal economy" (Reno 1995, 159). However, as Reno (1998, 121) argues, "this assertive strategy, which seemed appropriate to centralize state control over resources, instead widened the gap between the state's authority in the capital and its capacity to control the minefields" in rural areas. Up to 25,000 miners--mostly young men whose livelihoods were based on illicit mining--were forcibly removed from mining areas provoking considerable anger (Reno 1998, 121).

¹⁹⁰ Due to economic hardship, Stevens paid off his soldiers with rice and other commodities, which only raise the prices for ordinary citizens. As noted in Keen (2005, 27) the average bag of rice equaled a month's wages.

¹⁹¹ Momoh had the support of the APC and was the only candidate in the presidential election.

¹⁹² The company involved was LIAT Construction and Finance, an Israeli company. LIAT had been implicated in funneling supplies and possibly armaments to apartheid South Africa.

¹⁹² Operation Clear All and Operation Clean Sweep

Despite attempts to increase state control over diamond mining areas, however, economic decline continued. Momoh vigorously pushed a "reform" agenda to secure IMF loans to pay the military and civil servants, maintain electricity in the capital and provide even basic health and education services. But such "reforms" proved to be destabilizing. In 1989, inflation was at 100 percent and austerity measures increased the price of petrol as much as 300 percent, and rice to nearly 180 percent (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 126). As Reno (1995, 170) notes, "Sierra Leone's citizens saw a presidential network that existed only to extract resources." In addition, the "middle strata"--those that were supposed to benefit most from reforms in exchange for political support--found life even more unbearable. Protests and agitation by teachers, lawyers and students for fixing the economic situation and demanding a return to a multi-party system continued.

War in Sierra Leone (1991-2002)

In March 1991, a small group of rebels crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberian territory controlled by Charles Taylor's NPFL. The rebels, who called themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), were commanded by Taylor confidante Foday Sankoh and supported by members of the NPFL and "mercenaries" from other parts of West Africa.¹⁹³ The RUF leadership was motivated by political albeit not necessarily ideological goals (Keen 2005). Sankoh and his fighters declared themselves "freedom fighters" battling to free Sierra Leone's people from the corrupt one-party rule of the APC. In the RUF's manifesto, the rebellion was to stop the "pattern of raping the countryside to feed the greed and caprice of the Freetown

¹⁹³ Sankoh was a former corporal in the Sierra Leonean army who under the Stevens regime spent seven years in jail for taking part in a coup attempt.¹⁹³ After being released, Sankoh found his way to Libya where he trained with Taylor and other "revolutionaries" and later fought with Taylor's NPFL in Liberia.

elite and their masters abroad" (RUF 1995, 14-15).¹⁹⁴ Taylor also harbored strategic reasons for sponsoring the rebellion, including anger over Sierra Leone's support of ECOMOG forces in Liberia.¹⁹⁵ Taylor openly threatened President Momoh with invasion unless he withdrew his support.¹⁹⁶

To combat the RUF, Momoh expanded the Sierra Leonean army that was largely unprofessional and ill-equipped.¹⁹⁷ The increase in troop numbers, however, did little to push back the rebels. In fact, there is little evidence that the army, which was neglected and left on its own, confronted rebel elements directly. Instead it pursued a policy of looting property and harassing civilians it believed to be supporting the insurgency. This resulted in the rounding up of civilians and episodes of brutality and destruction that rivaled those carried out by the rebels. Although rebel recruitment was linked to grievances spurred by disaffection over a lack of viable livelihood opportunities (no land and disruption of diamond mining) and chronic underdevelopment, widespread violence by the Sierra Leonean army against civilians drove young men to join the rebels.¹⁹⁸ Civilians found themselves with little protection from the violence, and while most preferred to flee, young men who were the targets of government atrocities were often recruited or forced into the RUF ranks. This realization among the population that they would have to fend for themselves started the

¹⁹⁴ Much has been written about the motives of the RUF cadre with Richards (1996) arguing that the underlying motives were inspired by Gaddafi's revolutionary-inspired "Third Way". This explanation has been refuted by Bangura (2004).

¹⁹⁵ There have also been arguments that Libya had a strategic reason to stoke the rebellion in Sierra Leone (Keen 2005).

¹⁹⁶ Taylor may have also wanted to create a "buffer zone" between his forces and those of the anti-Taylor ULIMO forces that were increasingly harassing NPFL forces.

¹⁹⁷ Stevens purposefully kept the army dysfunctional and ceremonial because it was seen as a threat to his power.

¹⁹⁸ It is also well documented that throughout the conflict recruitment to the RUF and Sierra Leonean army was forced leading to the child soldiers.

"civil defense movement" or "Kamajors", which would eventually spread throughout the country.¹⁹⁹

In April 1992 a group of disgruntled junior soldiers led a coup against President Momoh.²⁰⁰ While the coup ended the APC's nearly a quarter of a century of one-party rule, it did not lead to the rebuilding of a multi-party state but started four years of military rule. The APC ruling elites were replaced by a young cadre of army officers--led by Captain Valentine Strasser--with little education and no governing experience.²⁰¹ The new regime, calling itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) promised to end the war, democratize the country, and pursue an anti-corruption agenda. However, this populist message was short-lived. The NPRC was preoccupied with threats to its rule, which led to political repression and summary executions. In addition, rather than trying to end the conflict, Strasser and the NPRC escalated it by expanding the army. The financial weight of the war, and a lack of state revenue, also led the regime to increase control over the mining sector as the government granted concessions to mining companies and cracked down on diamond smuggling--which was made permissible by a series battles that returned the most productive diamond fields to government control. However, these victories created new motives for the continuation of the conflict as army forces took control of the lucrative diamonds fields. For the first time, the Sierra Leone's army had access to significant economic resources and "many officers were now keen to volunteer for duty in Kono District" (Keen 2005, 117).

A period of quiet in late 1993 started the flow of humanitarian assistance and renewed calls for the provisional military government to hold elections but this was disturbed by significant rebel advances. The RUF--armed with new weapons and uniforms--increased

¹⁹⁹ The term "Kamajor" refers to traditional Mende hunters that were traditional hunters believed to be endowed with special or supernatural powers.

²⁰⁰ It appears as though the RUF supported the coup leaders by promising to hold off on any attacks in the immediate aftermath of the coup (Keen 2005, 94).

²⁰¹ The average age of the coup leaders was twenty-six.

attacks on civilian targets, retook areas rich in diamonds and carried out attacks on the outskirts of Freetown²⁰² Rather than traditional battle lines, however, what emerge was what Keen (2005) has termed a "strangely cooperative conflict" in which government soldiers and rebels colluded with each other to continue the conflict. Reports of collusion were widespread with government forces normally fleeing rather than engaging the RUF in battle. The strategy, if there was one, was for the army and rebels to engage in small-scale skirmishes and brutality to depopulate rural areas prolong the war and continue to loot diamonds (Keen 2005). During this time the term "so-bels" came to signify those with dual loyalties--"soldiers by day and rebels by night".²⁰³ The NPRC's vested interest in keeping the conflict alive by colluding with RUF and its leaders was seriously challenged by rebel attacks on key mining operations, including the Sieromco bauxite mines and Sierra Rutile, in 1995. The destruction and looting of these areas, largely with the complicity of "so-bels", greatly reduced the government's export earnings and ability to fund the army, which was now eating up three-quarters of the state's official budget (Reno 1998, 126). While the Sierra Leonean army was in corrupt and weak, the Kamajors had become an effective counter-insurgency force.²⁰⁴

A rebel offensive on Freetown in early 1995 severely constrained government ambitions to regulate mining or gain control of the country, and signaled the growing power of the RUF. For Strasser and the NPRC, the threat was heightened by collusion between the rebels and the armed forces. To ensure the regimes protection, Strasser began to enlist private mercenaries.²⁰⁵ With the RUF moving closer to Freetown, Strasser reached out to a

²⁰² The RUF has established several extensive camps in forest areas.

²⁰³ Strasser was reported to have quipped that 20 percent of the army was disloyal (Gberie 2005).

²⁰⁴ The Kamajors were also implicated in human rights abuses (Keen 2005).

²⁰⁵ The first of such relationships was with Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) that were paid tens of millions of dollars and diamond concessions and openly engaged in battle with the RUF (Reno 1998). While the Gurkha's repulsed rebel attacks, an ambush that killed GSG's commanding officer led to their quick withdrawal for Sierra Leone.

mercenary firm based in South Africa called Executive Outcomes (EO).²⁰⁶ EO's mission was to engage and destroy the RUF, help restore internal security, and by extension help attract new economic investment (Gberie 2005). EO had business ties with the Branch-Heritage Group, which owned another security company (Sandline International), and mining (Branch Energy and DiamondWorks) and oil (Heritage Oil and Gas) companies. Strasser agreed to pay EO \$15 million and a share of several diamond concessions in Kono, which were granted to Branch Energy three months after EO started operations in Sierra Leone.²⁰⁷ Despite the fact that the money paid to EO could have been spent on government troops or addressing the needs of the country, by late 1995 EO operations had brought relative stability to the country.²⁰⁸ EO effectively pushed the rebels out of Freetown and successfully returned diamond-mining areas.²⁰⁹

The relative calm, which emerged as a result of the EO offensive, provided an opening for the NPRC to hold elections in early 1996. Strasser's transformation from a soldier to a civilian politician backfired when his second in command Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio staged a peaceful and internal coup. With Bio in control as the new NPRC chairman, efforts to hold an election and initiate peace talks continued. In March 1996, an election was held and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became Sierra Leone's new president despite the lack of RUF participation and a brutal effort by rebels to undermine the vote.²¹⁰ Kabbah, a member of the SLPP party, was peacefully handed power by Bio for the first time in the country's history. After the election, international aid increased dramatically although the

²⁰⁶ The use of mercenaries, and EO in particular, was not universally accepted by Sierra Leonean civil society - although groups that protested were targeted by the military regime and punished harshly (see Gberie 2005). However, in Kono District, the people were largely supportive of EO since it led to drastic reduction in fighting and brought a relative moment of peace.

²⁰⁷ Branch Energy also obtained shares of Sierra Rutile and Sieromco.

²⁰⁸ Bangura (2004) suggested that the millions spend on EO by Strasser and the NPRC could have increased the salaries of the Sierra Leonean army by 8-fold.

²⁰⁹ EO's success has been attributed to the deployment of attack helicopters, the inclusion of Kamajor units in EO operations, and the assistance of foreign troops.

²¹⁰ According to reports, the RUF amputated the hands of thousands of civilians in a bid to stop the elections (Gberie 2005).

government continued to rely on small-scale mining concessions for revenue and EO for security. While many heralded the democratic elections, relative stability and security throughout 1996, Reno (1998) highlighted how EO and other foreign private security forces pushed out local strongmen from diamond mining areas so as to increase Kabbah's political network. In short, even though the power of the rebels and government soldiers had been reduced, these network relations "kept economic opportunity in privileged hands" (Gberie 2005, 95; Reno 1998, 137).

The election occurred just as peace talks between the NPRC and RUF were getting started in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. Bio initiated the talks but Kabbah made them central to his presidency, even meeting with RUF leader Sankoh on several occasions and agreeing to a truce.²¹¹ The RUF was reluctant to sign a peace treaty with EO and other foreign troops still in the country and Sankoh wanted to be assigned, along with ranking members of the RUF, high-level posts in the government as any condition for laying down their weapons (Abraham 2004). Offensive operations by the Kamajors and EO, which included decisive military defeats of the RUF, led Sankoh to give in to demands and sign the Abidjan Peace Accord in November 1996.²¹² With a peace agreement in place, pressures from the International Monetary Fund, public dissatisfaction (at least in part of the country) with foreign mercenaries and as part of the Accords demands, EO's contract was terminated and departed the country. But the gap left by the departure of EO cannot be overstated. First, it had the effect of placing corrupt government forces in control of the country, and leaving diamond areas unprotected from large-scale exploitation, collusion and competition between RUF rebels, government forces, Kamajors and business interests (Keen 2005; Reno 1998). Second,

²¹¹ Kabbah originally refused to meet directly with Sankoh or the top RUF commanders deeming it "unconstitutional and unethical".

²¹² It has been reported that Sankoh dropped his objectives and supported the peace plan because he was positioning himself for a power-sharing position in a post-coup NPRC administration (Abraham 2004).

the RUF without fear of EO reprisal became less reluctant to abide by the peace settlement, and saw a new opportunity to gain political and economic advantage.²¹³ Reports that the RUF was planning to continue the conflict and purchase weapons led Kabbah's government and Sankoh break off relations--only to have Sankoh held on weapons smuggling charges in Nigeria for 18 months.²¹⁴

Despite Kabbah's election and the peace agreement, fighting between the armed forces, Kamajors and rebels continued. A military coup against President Kabbah in May 1997, by members of the Sierra Leonean army forced him to flee to Guinea. The coup, which started when soldiers released and armed some 600 prisoners onto the streets of Freetown, was apparently done in concert with the RUF leadership and "was the culmination of long period of collusion" between the army and rebels.²¹⁵ Johnny Paul Koroma, a "so-bel" of the highest order, was installed as the leader of the new Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC).²¹⁶ According to Koroma, one reason for the coup was Kabbah's inability to foster a lasting peace with the RUF, and invited all rebel elements to come to Freetown to be part of a "People's Army" and join in a new coalition government that would lead to peace (Gberie 2005).²¹⁷ Koroma, proclaiming the war over, banned the Kamajors, suspended the Constitution and installed Foday Sankoh as the country's second in-command. The proclamation of a joint government led the RUF to enter Freetown in droves. The capital was looted and the population brutalized by elements of the AFRC and RUF. In a matter of

²¹³ Keen (2005, 203-207) describes how the international community failed to maintain a commitment to the Abidjan Peace Accord, which may have been a factor in reigniting the conflict

²¹⁴ This sparked an internal feud within the RUF in which Sam Bockarie, a former diamond miner and confidant of Sankoh took control (Hirsh 2001).

²¹⁵ Although Sankoh was under house arrest in Cote d'Ivoire, he was reported to be in constant contact with the RUF leadership.

²¹⁶ Koroma was freed from Pademba Prison and had been accused of a former coup plot a year earlier.

²¹⁷ Koroma also listed Kabbah's ethnically charged politics and closeness with the Kamajors as rationale for the coup (Gberie 2005). However, the coup may have also been sparked by Kabbah's efforts to demobilize parts of the army. The AFRC enjoyed support from anti-SLPP elements including former President Momoh.

months, actions of the new junta triggered chaos, massive displacement and a refugee crisis on a level unknown since the conflict began.²¹⁸

In January 1999, ECOMOG, with between 10,000-14,000 troops along with Sierra Leonean Civil Defense Forces (CDF) , began a intensive effort to retake Freetown.²¹⁹ Within days, remnants of the AFRC and RUF junta were fleeing upcountry leaving a vast swath of looting, rape and killing in their path. In March, Kabbah was restored to power and large majorities of the country, including the diamond producing areas, were under the control of ECOMOG and CDF control.²²⁰ With AFRC junta and RUF on the run and Sankoh guilty of treason and in a Freetown prison, it appeared the country could begin to rebuild. However, once Kabbah returned as president, the security situation declined throughout 1998. For the first time, the Sierra Leone conflict began to get increased media attention, which arguably compelled the international community to get more involved. Although calls for an UN-led peacekeeping force were disregarded, pressure mounted for a peace settlement. In particular, Nigeria, the US and Britain advocated dialogue between the warring parties, which began in Lomé, Togo in May 1999.²²¹ To Sierra Leonean civil society and many Sierra Leoneans in general, further negotiations with the RUF seemed pointless. The government's position was that they would not agree to any power-sharing agreement or national unity government (Gberie 2005; Hirsh 2001). The RUF, on the other hand, demanded cabinet-level positions, particularly for Sankoh who was sentenced to hang.²²² Despite a deep reluctance to deal with Sankoh, who he despised as a "treacherous and evil man" who could not be trusted, Kabbah

²¹⁸ An estimated 400,000 fled Freetown.

²¹⁹ These Civilian Defense Forces were made up of Kamajors and other anti-AFRC elements. They began an assault in eastern diamond mining areas in January 1998.

²²⁰ As Keen (2005) notes, ECOMOG commanders and Kamajors were engaging in illicit diamond mining.

²²¹ The week previous, Kabbah flew to Lomé to agree to a ceasefire. Many believed, at first, that he was forced to sign it by US envoy Jesse Jackson.

²²² Interviews with Kabbah in Gberie (2005) suggest he did not want to negotiate with Sankoh but did so under international pressure.

believed the only way the UN would intervene in Sierra Leone was if a peace agreement was reached (Gberie 2005, 157). In July 1999 the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed by the government and RUF.²²³ The agreement gave the RUF at least seven ministerial positions, enabled the RUF to assemble itself into a political party and placed Sankoh in charge of the mineral rights commission and Vice Presidency.²²⁴

With the Lomé Agreement the UN role in Sierra Leone grew substantially from its almost non-involvement in the years before.²²⁵ The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was authorized by the Security Council via UN Resolution 1270 to oversee disarmament and demobilization activities and provide up to 6,000 peacekeepers (UNSC 1999).²²⁶ Although the Lomé Accord signaled peace between the warring factions it did not guarantee it since many factions, including Sam Bockarie's RUF contingent, was against any agreement or UN involvement (Keen 2005, 254-256).²²⁷ This resulted in almost constant harassment of the UN contingent culminating in the RUF taking over 500 peacekeepers hostage in the city of Makeni and an RUF offensive aimed at Freetown in May 2000.²²⁸ In protest, as many as 30,000 demonstrators marched to the home of Sankoh demanding the peacekeepers be released and the war ended. Sankoh was captured and placed into

²²³ Among the many provisions, Lomé did provide for a Truth and Reconciliation and Human Rights Commission but granted amnesty to all parties to the conflict. According to Gberie (2005), this "scandalized Sierra Leoneans and the human rights community around the world". According to Coll (2000), despite the documented atrocities carried out by the RUF, they were being treated as victors. Reacting to the agreement, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights announced that the amnesty provisions left open the possibility of prosecuting those responsible for the atrocities and war crimes (Gberie 2005).

²²⁴ Gberie (2005) called the head of the mineral rights commission the "diamond czar". Ironically, he was charged with responsibility for controlling the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources of strategic importance to Sierra Leone.

²²⁵ In some respects, the UN became the "guarantor" of peace in Sierra Leone.

²²⁶ This was in addition to the nearly 12,000 Nigerian soldiers already deployed. The Nigerian troops were withdrawn over time.

²²⁷ A related problem was that combatants failed to see that peace was a desirable outcome because DDR efforts excluded many armed groups (AFRC, CDF and Sierra Leone army) and were largely unsuccessful at providing alternative livelihoods or counseling to those that were included (Keen 2005). In addition, as Keen (2005) suggests, many combatants were still manipulated by their leaders and therefore were reluctant to put down their arms.

²²⁸ The peacekeepers were later released.

government custody. As evidence surfaced that Sankoh had been involved in diamond smuggling, Kabbah requested that the UN establish a special court to prosecute those in the RUF most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Hirsch 2001).²²⁹

These events, coupled with accusations that Nigerian officers had been deeply involved in diamond smuggling, led to the virtual collapse of the UN peacekeeping endeavor and the Lomé Agreement (Olonisakin 2008; UN Panel of Experts 2000, 30). Making light of UNAMSIL's constraints, the mandate was broadened to allow a vigorous response to hostile attack and a mission to extend state authority and establish law and order (Olonisakin 2008).²³⁰ While the weak UN peacekeeping efforts were certainly to blame for the back slide, other factors were equally important. For one, Liberian President Charles Taylor continued to support it by supplying weapons and buying diamonds. A report published and widely disseminated in early 2000 by the NGO Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) found that Sierra Leone's diamonds had been plundered by Taylor to support his political and economic ambitions and were equally indispensable to the RUF (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000). In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306 in July 2000, which prohibited the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone.

The kidnapping of the UN peacekeepers and the advance toward Freetown in May 2000, proved to be beginning of the RUF's steady decline. Part of this can be attributed to UNAMSIL's gradual strengthening both as a military and political force (Olonisakin 2008). However, RUF incursions into Guinean territory, ostensibly to gain access to an area rich in diamonds, resulted in a massive response from the Guinean army.²³¹ More importantly, the

²²⁹ According to Olonisakin (2008, 119), the idea of a special court was the brainchild of the US, The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by the government and UN in January 2002.

²³⁰ According to Olonisakin (2008) there was a belief that the failure of UNAMSIL would create a Somalia-like situation from which the UN may never recover.

²³¹ Guinea was supported by French, US and British intelligence as well as Civil Defense Forces (Donsos). Not only did this weaken the rebels but since many of the RUF's most hardened fighters had

British introduced a military force into Sierra Leone that was able to dismantle and intimidate the RUF at will and convince them it was in their best interest to honor the peace agreement. In fact, by the end of 2000, over 1,000 British troops were on the ground to provide security (Gberie 2005, 175).²³² The RUF's decline is also related to international attention to "conflict diamonds" (Le Billon 2008). The UN Panel of Expert report, for example, confirmed that diamonds were an important resource for the RUF and Liberian official involvement (UN Panel of Experts 2000). By mid-2001, the RUF was also disarming and demobilizing in conjunction with the 1999 agreement.²³³ Although an isolated Taylor was still in power in Liberia, the UN's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy continued to gain momentum. This went more smoothly than expected for two reasons. First, the RUF's new leader was motivated by a "war-weariness" within the ranks and determined to clamp down on human rights abuses and keep the peace in order to form a viable political party (Keen 2005). Throughout 2001, the Sierra Leone conflict was ultimately coming to an end as representatives from the warring parties came together to hammer out another ceasefire in May 2001²³⁴

Sierra Leone's Diamond and Minerals in Historical Context

Sierra Leone is endowed with substantial mineral resources. While a geological survey failed to locate minerals in a 1918-1921 expedition, a subsequent survey in 1926 turned up minerals and diamonds that changed Sierra Leone forever (Zack-Williams 1995, 45).²³⁵ Alluvial gold

been "deployed" to Liberia to defend Charles Taylor, few reinforcements were available (Gberie 2005).

²³² Of course, Britain's military assistance was only one component. Britain was the largest donor, provided considerable financial support to the government and was the main sponsors of UN Resolution 1270 and 1306.

²³³ Until the early part of 2001, RUF fighters were still engaged in sporadic gun battles with Guinean troops and Civil Defense Forces and therefore were reluctant to disarm without a guarantee for protection from UNAMSIL.

²³⁴
²³⁵ Geologic surveys' were initiated because colonial authorities wanted to diversify the economy.

deposits were discovered in Tonkolili District, and diamonds in Kono in 1926-1927, along with iron ore in Marampa (Port Loko District in the north), platinum on the Freetown peninsula and chromites in Kenema District.²³⁶ In 1927, colonial authorities assumed all mineral rights to gain control of the future revenues (Reno 1995, 46).²³⁷ Soon afterwards, a mining license was given to the European firm, African and Eastern Trading Company. Platinum and gold exports began in 1930 (Zack-Williams 1995).²³⁸ In 1933, iron ore was exported for the first time, again by the African and Eastern Trading Company, who began construction on a railway from the deposits in the north of the country to the port. The company secured a 99-year lease on about five square miles with an estimated annual payment of £250 going to the tribal authorities. The Colonial Development Act was passed in 1929, which led to a new company--the Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO)--which would be active in the export of iron ore for the next 40 years with very generous terms of trade (Zack-Williams 1995, 49).

The first alluvial diamonds were discovered in the Nimi Koro Chiefdom in Kono District. Prospecting started soon after the deposits were found to be "probably the richest alluvial diamonds in the world" (Hall 1970). Mining began in earnest when colonial administrators signed a concessionary agreement with Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), a corporation controlled by a London company--Selection Trust Group--that had shares held by the South African De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited.²³⁹ In 1932, CAST formed a new company, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which was awarded a 99-year concession. Two years later, SLST's diamond mining lease would cover all the land outside of the Freetown peninsula. The alluvial diamond mining, the colonial government and

²³⁶ There is some confusion and uncertainty as to when certain minerals were discovered.

²³⁷ Part of this was experience of the British in Ghana or the Gold Coast where it was believed that involving African's in mining would lead to exploitation, smuggling and a lack of revenues for the colonial administration.

²³⁸ An addition, eleven exclusive prospecting licenses were awarded solely to European firms.

²³⁹ CAST was also operating diamond mines in the Gold Coast or present day Ghana.

the SLST attempted to prevent the involvement of chiefs or indigenous labor, because the government worried about competing illicit operations.²⁴⁰ However, the exclusion of chiefs and local peoples from alluvial diamond mining was seen as an "unwarranted extension of state power" and an infringement on their customary rights (Reno 1995, 46-49). As a result, chiefs began playing an intermediary role in the diamond business by mediating access on behalf of Lebanese businessman, the government and their people-all the while being rewarded with greater prestige, power and resources.²⁴¹

By the 1950s, the economy was largely dependent on mineral exports although the most important sector remained agriculture. According to Zack-Williams (1995, 54), total mineral exports rose from less than one percent in 1929 to 73 percent in 1940 and almost 88 percent in 1960. Whereas in 1953, iron ore accounted for 74 percent of total value of minerals, less than a decade later diamonds had taken the place of iron ore amounting to almost 80 percent of the total (Zack-Williams 1995, 56). This growth of mining operations changing the composition of labor, employing thousands of workers and led to a growing population of "floating" migrant labor and spawning of "boom towns" adjacent to mining areas.²⁴² The number of illicit miners increased from 5,000 to as many as 70,000 in the mid-1950s. This "diamond rush" was propelled by a series of crop failures in which many farmers turned to mining to meet their livelihood needs. The diamond rush also had other consequences. For instance, diamond pits spread across the landscape it destroyed land suitable for agriculture, had an impact on food availability, water drainage and the environment, more broadly.

²⁴⁰ SLST also employed an armed security force to control its operations.

²⁴¹ This was heightened with the Native Authority Scheme, which provided chiefs with lavish salaries to cut back on illicit mining. For example, the colonial administration believed that only through wealth-seeking behavior would chiefs begin to crack down on the "strangers'" activities.

²⁴² The direction of the migration was mostly from the north to the south where opportunities in illicit diamond mining were perceived to be substantial.

Regular attempts by colonial authorities to crack down on illicit mining led to popular resentment, in Kono District and other diamond-rich areas over the perception that SLST held a monopoly over diamonds that disproportionately benefited European companies, British officials and local chiefs while the population remained poor and marginalized (Zack-Williams 1995; Reno 1995). Unrest led colonial administrators to create the Mining Area Development Administration (MADA), which was to manage rural development projects derived from diamond revenue.²⁴³ In addition, colonial authorities ended SLST's monopoly on diamond mining by surrendering some of its diamond concessions and legalizing some illicit mining through the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS).²⁴⁴ These reforms, however, had the effect of opening up diamond mining only to the wealthy and well-connected since most Sierra Leoneans lacked the resources to enter the diamond mining business.²⁴⁵ This, in part, led to increased levels of smuggling, which accounted for roughly two-thirds of the total value of diamonds produced (Hall 1970).

To combat smuggling, the Gold and Diamond Office (GDO) was set up to buy and sell exportable diamonds.²⁴⁶ The GDO was to pay higher prices than could be obtained through the "black market" and reduce smuggling that weakened De Beers' market position. Smuggling was also to be curtailed by deploying security forces-augmented by De Beers' mercenaries- to crack down on illicit mining operations.²⁴⁷ Reports from the period suggest that the GDO and increased security had the effect of reducing smuggling and increasing legal diamond exports although substantial revenues for the government remained out of

²⁴³ As Reno (1995, 65-68) notes, side payments to chiefs under the auspices of the MADA since they central to maintaining stability and implementing policy in the hinterland. This effort at development largely strengthened the "shadow state".

²⁴⁴ The SLST still held on to the most productive areas around Tongo in return for increased protection from colonial authorities.

²⁴⁵ Paramount Chiefs and the ruling families, in particular, benefited from their ability to grant licenses and reserved the best deposits for themselves by taking advantage of their role as the custodian of all lands in the Protectorate (Zack-Williams 1995).

²⁴⁶ The GDO was run by Diamond Corporation, a part of the De Beers cartel.

²⁴⁷ Keen (2005) remarked that Kono looked like a "police state".

reach while profits for De Beers increased dramatically.²⁴⁸ In short, Sierra Leone's diamond wealth was leaving the country and leaving the population in a persistent state of underdevelopment (Keen 2005; Zack-Williams 1995).

Throughout the developments of the 1960s, most notably Sierra Leonean independence and the emergence of party politics, minerals and diamonds remained front and center in Sierra Leone politically, economically and socially. Although Margai's SLPP party united the people of the protectorate in the waning years of British rule, over time his rule came was linked to the colonial system based on corruption and coercion to control access to diamonds. Even so, Margai's rule was viewed as a time of "stability and predominantly legitimate operations...alluvial diamond mining has become an established and accepted feature of the economy of the country and provides a living for about 25,000 miners...smuggling is no longer a serious problem, and miners now receive a reasonable proportion of the export value of their diamonds" (Hall 1970).²⁴⁹ Certainly, official diamond exports reached their apex in the mid-1960s with average production estimated at \$250 million and contributed to 60 percent of foreign exchange earnings. However, the APC and Siaka Stevens, who garnered most of his support from the rural poor in Kono, used diamonds to oppose the SLPP and bring Stevens to power in 1968. Stevens argued that diamonds represented "the little man's only hope for wealth" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 41) as a way to oppose Margai's policies.

Given challenges to Steven's rule by chiefs and other political rivals, natural resources played a large part in the Stevens' objective to build a "state hegemonic project" and consolidate state power in the 1970s. In 1971, Stevens formally attempted to gain control of the diamond sector by forming a state-owned diamond mining company (NDMC or

²⁴⁸ According to Van der Laan (1965), diamonds produced under the ADMS was one-thirtieth of the value on the world market. This provided De Beers with a substantial profit while reducing the amount the government could tax.

²⁴⁹ This paints a very rosy picture of the diamond sector under Margai.

DIMINCO) to increase diamond production in order to increase sources of foreign exchange and state revenues. However, the operation failed to increase government revenue. As a result, Steven's set about to privatize mining by rezoning mining areas as cooperatives that were given largely to APC supporters. The new policy shifted production away from the mining companies and local chiefs and toward private production in the range of \$60-70 million per year by 1980 (Reno 1995). Movement toward private production was in concert with a crack-down on small-scale miners and a policy of repression to control the extractive economy. When the government ended De Beers' monopoly Stevens gained direct access to the foreign exchange that had largely been unavailable to the state and a stake in diamond sales themselves (Reno 1995). Revenues from diamonds and other resources were used to sustain a system of patronage by which revenues are distributed to patrons in return for loyalty and support rather than supporting economic and social development. Ultimately, this led to the decay of state institutions and growing resentment from young men outside the circles of patronage and with few livelihood options outside of alluvial diamond mining.

The same dynamic of patronage continued well after Stevens handed power to Momoh in 1985. To illustrate the pattern, which started under Stevens, official diamond exports in 1970 were about two million carats but by 1980 had dropped to 595,000 carats and 48,000 in 1988 (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 5). In 1988 diamond exports flowing through official government channels reached only \$22,000 while the informal sector exported an estimated \$250 million. Momoh's political survival was premised on controlling diamond producing areas since it provided his government foreign currency and was a way to control local strongmen and illicit miners. Momoh's "assertive strategy", which used military forces to control minefields, pushed 25,000 miners, mostly young "diggers" whose livelihoods were based on illicit mining and who started mining diamonds due to a lack of land and other opportunities for making a living were forcibly removed from mining areas (Reno 1998, 121). Momoh's actions further angered rival strongmen that had benefited from

illicit mining for decades and resented APC control. Finally, moving the army, which was poorly paid and equipped, created an incentive for soldiers to get involved in illicit diamond mining.

While diamonds have garnered the lion's share of attention, the mining of gold and iron ore continued since the 1930s, the production of minerals such as rutile and bauxite began in the 1960s.²⁵⁰ Rutile, produced by Sierra Rutile Limited, which changed ownership several times, increased production during the 1980s and early 1990s, amounting to about one-third of world output (World Bank 2005). In 1991, just before the war started, production of rutile and another titanium mineral, ilmenite, totaled over 200,000 tons, which was valued at \$86 million (World Bank 2005). The rutile mines provided employment for about 2,250 workers, making it the largest private employer in Sierra Leone. Plans to expand the operation were put on hold due to risks associated with the war (World Bank 2005, 5). At the same time, Sierra Leone's bauxite, which was mined by Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company (SIEROMCO), was a relatively small player in global markets.²⁵¹ Just before the conflict, Sierra Leone produced about 1.2 million tones of bauxite valued at \$25 million (World Bank 2005). Faced with decaying infrastructure, low international prices and the risks associated with the civil conflict, SIEROMCO ended operations and withdrew from the country. As with the diamond sector, it was common knowledge that government officials colluded with mining companies to evade taxes and manipulate contracts that kept state revenues from the sector minimal while allowing profits to accrue to companies and politicians. In this way, the natural resource sector strengthened patrimonial relations by

²⁵⁰ Iron ore mining, which was started by DELCO in the 1930s, was discontinued in the early 1980s due to depletion of the iron reserves. Production resumed in 1982-1984 from tailings but was unsuccessful (World Bank 2005). Gold mining is of the artisanal variety and was estimated to be about 50,000 ounces or \$15 million annually (World Bank 2005, 6).

²⁵¹ Sierra Leone produced about one percent of world bauxite (World Bank 2005, 5).

providing "big men" and their followers to benefit from private accumulation while depriving the state of taxes that could be used for the development of the state.

If anything the availability diamonds and minerals, and the corresponding accumulation of wealth by elites, enabled such political, social and economic developments by strengthening the power of the traditional chiefs and ruling classes, destabilizing and marginalizing rural communities and rationalizing the use of state-sponsored violence (Abdullah 2004).²⁵² These factors, taken together, had the effect of weakening state institutions, undermining the legitimacy of the state as a governing force and fostering patterns of resentment and alienation that made the recruitment of rebel leaders and fighters possible.

International peacebuilders and the emergence of "conflict diamonds"

The economic, social and political trajectory of Sierra Leone being deeply linked to the mineral and diamond mining, it is surprising that these factors did not emerge as an explanation of the conflict until at least seven years after it began. Among Sierra Leoneans diamond mining, and to a lesser extent, industrial mining operations, had been a locus of conflict and violence almost since they were discovered. This was particularly the case in Kono District where the RUF emerged and gained a foothold. In addition, the rebels and government soldiers took turns controlling the country's most lucrative diamond fields throughout the conflict, apparently even colluding to avoid peace. A handful of scholars did point out the role diamonds and minerals played in constructing the "shadow state" and exercising political power (Reno 1998, 113). William Reno (1995; 1998), for instance, acknowledged the role diamond and mineral revenue--and the control of mineral resources

²⁵² Sierra Leone's dependence on international financial institutions also helped to fund such governing pathologies.

more broadly--played as a key component of the conflict since it functioned as a means to pay soldiers, mercenaries and keep a hold on power for warlords and government leaders. Likewise, Ian Douglas (1999) touched on how political and economic actors in Sierra Leone had always used the control and exploitation of mineral resources as a means to political power. But international actors by-and-large did not appear concerned with the diamond trade as long as it was fueling an internal conflict (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004). The RUF established an office in Brussels--close to Antwerp's diamond markets--with little fanfare. Moreover, it was no secret that the substantial amounts of diamonds flooding into Tel Aviv and Antwerp from Liberia and Guinea had originated in war ravaged Sierra Leone.

As discussed in Chapter 3, scholarship in the late 1990s turn to economic motives and rebel greed to explain the emergence and growth of civil wars in the developing world (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 1999; Keen 1998). As Keen (1998) noted at the time, "conflict can create war economies, often in regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting...winning may not be desirable." The work of Keen and others appeared to reflect the ongoing situation in many war-torn states, particularly in Africa. A focus on diamonds, in particular, emerged when Global Witness reported on the role of diamonds in fueling the Angolan conflict (Global Witness 1998). This led almost immediately to UN Security Council Resolution 1173 enacted in June 1998 that instructed all member states to "take the necessary measures...to prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled by the certificate of origin regime" managed by the Government of Angola (UNSC 1998).

The discourse of African conflicts began to shift away from the discourse of new barbarism" and toward economic explanations that focused predominantly on diamonds.²⁵³ As an editorial in the *New York Times* in August 1999 stated: "loot not better government has motivated...the brutal guerillas of Sierra Leone... [who] trade diamonds they control for arms through neighboring Liberia, under the sponsorship of President Charles Taylor, their longtime patron." The editorial underscored the prevailing discourse and emphasized the importance of an international embargo on so-called "conflict diamonds" until there are international controls in place, and US consumers are shamed into ending their role in Africa's misery (*New York Times* 1999). Global Witness soon initiated a global campaign with four other European NGOs to educate the global public about the consequences of conflict diamonds.²⁵⁴ The campaign, called 'Fatal Transactions', began with a press release with the heading: "Campaign launched to stop billion dollar diamond trade from funding conflict in Africa". The campaign targeted select journalists, newspapers and jewelry retailers in the US and Europe.²⁵⁵ An article in the *Washington Post* appeared the same month noting how "diamond hunters" were fuelling Africa's brutal civil wars and Charles Taylor was using diamonds to fund the war in Sierra Leone (Rupert 1999).

By late 1999, the significance of "conflict diamonds" to the RUF was beginning to get the attention of IBOs. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Britain's Department of International Development (DFID) developed diamond industry reforms and policies designed to address the link between diamonds and conflict

²⁵³ International attention turned to Sierra Leone in 1998 and 1999 stemming in part from failure of elections to bring an end to the conflict, the brutal assault on Freetown and emerging reports of amputations, child soldiers and civilian casualties. It should be noted that this was not always the case. For example, an expose of the Sierra Leonean conflict by *Washington Post* reporter Steve Coll in early 2000 only made two brief mentions of diamonds.

²⁵⁴ Fatal Transactions was led by Global Witness (UK), Medico International (Germany), Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa and Novib (Oxfam Netherlands).

²⁵⁵ Part of the campaign entailed sending fake diamond rings to journalists and retailers with messages about the detrimental effect of the diamond trade on efforts to stop the conflict in Angola.

(USAID/OTI 2001, 2). In the US Congress, trade legislation reflected the emerging prominence of conflict diamonds on the international agenda. Congressman Tony Hall advocated for a disclosure clause in which the source of diamonds imported into the United States would be identified. Hall (1999) noted that since Americans bought a majority of diamonds sold globally, such a provision could change the market and send a message to the diamond industry that diamonds fuel wars.

By 2000, the blame for the Sierra Leone conflict had been placed squarely on "conflict diamonds."²⁵⁶ An influential and widely read report by international NGO Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) gave a detailed depiction of Sierra Leone's diamond industry and its corruptive and violent impact. The report, which was published in January 2000, detailed how "diamonds--small pieces of carbon with no great intrinsic value--have been the cause of widespread death, destruction and misery for almost a decade" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 1). While the report suggested that the genesis of the conflict goes back to the privatized violence of the 1950s and the emergence of Steven's "shadow state" in the 1970s, it argued that the conflict was not caused by political grievance so much as by "economic opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 2). The conflict was not being fought for a "better government" but as a means to looting diamonds and engaging in "profitable crime under the cover of warfare" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 11). The informal diamond mining sector that had long existed in Sierra Leone, according to the report, had become globalized and influenced by transnational smuggling networks in which "violence was central to the advancement of vested interests" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 3).

²⁵⁶ The PAC report received widespread publicity around the world and was covered in most major newspapers (Gberie 2005).

The report exposed inner workings of the international diamond trade and documented the "secretive, iconoclastic and exploitative" industry, which sells 67.1 million pieces of jewelry valued at \$50 billion annually. PAC provided an overview of the major commercial and corporate interests, including De Beers that controlled 70-80 percent of the market supply of rough diamonds, and Belgium and the Diamond High Council.²⁵⁷ The report stressed that De Beers was not actively involved in mining activities in Sierra Leone but that trading companies in neighboring countries, particularly Liberia, were buying diamonds that originated in Sierra Leone. PAC noted that the Government of Sierra Leone recorded exports in 1998 totally 8,500 carats although numbers registered in Belgium pointed to exports in the range of 770,000 carats. In addition, although Liberian diamond mining capacity was estimated to be between 100,000 and 150,000 carats records in Belgium indicated Liberian imports at over 31 million carats between 1997 and 1998 (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 5).²⁵⁸

The PAC report also found that as the conflict spiraled out of control, the RUF's diamond mining activities became more extensive and coordinated by Charles Taylor. PAC maintained that the RUF managed special armed mining camps that used captives and "freelance" miners--mostly young men with no other options--to mine diamonds.²⁵⁹ The

²⁵⁷ Antwerp, according to Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, is "undeniably the world centre for rough diamonds" and the Diamond High Council is an organization tasked with promoting the Belgian diamond industry.

²⁵⁸ Without international companies actively involved in diamond mining during the conflict, the industry was largely left to small companies referred to "juniors", which took an industry that had largely operated on the margins as "disorganized crime" began to transform the industry into "organized crime" bent on the smuggling of not just rough diamonds but guns, drugs and money (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 14). These "juniors", which were primarily Canadian were willing to take risks that international companies were not, were linked to fraudulent diamond concessions, private security firms and violence. DiamondWorks, which later acquired Branch Energy, was linked to Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, two security companies hired by the Government of Sierra Leone to provide security and protect mining areas.

²⁵⁹ One thing the PAC report underemphasized was the level to which all combatants--the RUF, NPRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors and the Sierra Leone Armed Forces colluded to destabilize the country in order to maintain access and control of diamond resources. As Keen (2005) notes, peace was a threat to the combatants who benefited from the chaos of conflict. According to Gberie (2005, 184), who was a co-

report concluded that Charles Taylor was the principle beneficiary of the RUF activities, given his primary role in training, arming and mentoring the rebels for the purpose of "plunder" rather than any strategic or political calculations (Gberie 2005, 184; Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 46). The report concluded by stating: "no peace would be sustainable until problems related to mining and selling diamonds had been addressed, both inside Sierra Leone and internationally" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 1). PAC's recommended international oversight over the global trade in rough diamonds and advocated that the UN take action to ban diamonds that originate not only in Sierra Leone but also Liberia. The PAC report also tried to apply pressure to De Beers and Belgian diamond industry. For example, De Beers was urged to increase oversight to reign in smuggling and to close its Liberian purchasing offices. At the same time, the PAC put pressure Belgium and European Union to establish oversight measures of the diamond industry to take seriously the origins of diamonds.

The reaction was swift among government leaders, including Britain, Sierra Leone's largest donor of international aid. British Foreign Minister urged Western governments and the UN to consider "ways to stamp out the theft of Sierra Leone's diamonds" which "fund conflict" while depriving the government of revenues in needed to develop the country. Efforts to address the issue of diamonds in conflict zones also began to bring together the international diamond industry, non-governmental organizations and delegates from producing and importing countries, predominantly due to increasing public pressure (Bieri 2010). A meeting was held in Kimberley, South Africa that began discussions on an international scheme to certify rough diamonds and make sure they do not originate or transit war zones. These initial discussions would serve as the origins of the "Kimberley Process".

author on the PAC report, those caught stealing diamonds in the RUF camps were shot by the RUF who preferred children for diamond mining since they were less likely to steal.

Expressing its concern to end the conflict, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306 in July 2000 at the urging of the British government. The resolution expressed "concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighboring countries....including Liberia" (UNSC 2000). The resolution requested that all states "take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory" for a period of 18 months. It also directed the Government of Sierra Leone, under the guidance of IPOs, to ensure that "an effective certificate of origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone." Once a certificate of origin regime is put into place by the government, certified diamonds will be exempt from import restrictions.

At the same time, the US, Britain and Belgium were forging a "trilateral approach" to assist the Government of Sierra Leone with export policies intended to control "conflict diamonds", primarily within the context of a "guideline" document written by USAID. For instance, USAID submitted a summary of outputs for assistance in the diamond sector that concentrated on putting in place a set of reforms and policies to improve transparency and accountability while stemming corruption (USAID/OTI 2001, 4). Part of the process, which began as discussions between the USAID and Diamond High Council of Belgium, was to develop a certificate of origin regime for Sierra Leone--modeled after the Angolan certificate--that would qualify Sierra Leone for exemption under Resolution 1306. Sure enough, in mid-October, after several meetings at the UN stressing key elements of the new mining and export regime, the Security Council granted an exemption and allowed the government to permit exports so long as the framework was adequately implemented.²⁶⁰

²⁶⁰ One complication, of course, was that much of Sierra Leone's productive diamond fields were under the control of the RUF.

In December 2000 hearings on conflict diamonds had intensified at the UN.²⁶¹ Three consecutive hearings convened as part of Resolution 1306 by the UN Security Council focused on (1) the country's diamond industry--including the nature of the diamonds, export patterns and current regulation; (2) links between illicit diamond revenue and the trade in arms and other materiel and; (3) avenues for developing a sustainable and well-regulated diamond industry (UNSC 2000). The key finding: The "smuggling of diamonds through neighboring countries has funded the Revolutionary United Front" and that Charles Taylor regularly supplied the RUF with arms funded by Sierra Leone diamond production (UNSC 2000).

Based on these hearings, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 55/56: "The role of diamonds in fueling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts." The resolution "expressed concern" over the problem of "conflict diamonds", which the document defined as "rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate governments" (UNGA 2001, 1).²⁶² The resolution noted that the problem is an international one and endorsed the Kimberley Process.²⁶³

A UN Panel of Experts Report was also mandated by UN Resolution 1306 minced no words when it announced:

²⁶¹ It's also safe to say that RUF diamond mining was intensive during this period as reported by USAID (2001). The intensity of mining was likely caused by the RUF realizing that due to international attention the window of opportunity for mining was closing (and this coincided with the dry season).

²⁶² The resolution singled out Sierra Leone and Angola.

²⁶³ The first time the term "Kimberley Process" was officially used was during a meeting of 38 governments assembled in Namibia in February 2001 to continue discussion on conflict diamonds.

Diamonds have become an important resource for Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in sustaining and advancing its military ambitions. Estimates of the volume of RUF diamonds vary widely, from as little as \$25 million per annum to as much as \$125 million. Whatever the total, it represents a major and primary source of income for the RUF, and is more than enough to sustain its military activities (UNSC 2000, 8).

The report found substantial evidence for what was what was largely known, that most of the RUF diamonds are smuggled through Liberia with the involvement of "Liberian government officials at the highest level" (UNSC 2000, 8). The report uncovered "unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing training, weapons, and related materiel, logistical support, a staging ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation, and for public relations activities" (UNSC 2000, 10). The panel found that President Charles Taylor was "actively involved in fueling the violence in Sierra Leone and many businessmen close to his inner circle operate on an international scale, sourcing weaponry" (UNSC 2000, 10).²⁶⁴ In March 2001, in response both to the Panel of Experts Report and General Assembly Resolution 55/56, the Security Council passed Resolution 1343 that demanded that Liberia cease its support of the RUF, expel RUF members from the country and end the direct or indirect importation of Sierra Leone rough diamonds not controlled by the government's Certificate of Origin regime (UNSC 2001b). In affirming the evidence that large quantities of Sierra Leonean diamonds were transiting through Liberia, the resolution placed a ban on the "direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether such diamonds originated in

²⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, the report found that the Lomé Agreement, which placed Foday Sankoh in the Chairmanship for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources was a failure that largely resulted in nefarious agreements with international business firms and the enrichment of Sankoh and his associates.

Liberia" (UNSC 2001b, 3).²⁶⁵ This was the first time the UN had imposed sanctions on a country for its refusal to comply with sanctions in another (Olonisakin 2008, 78).

By mid-2001, IBOs acknowledged that progress was being made in terms of the reforming the Sierra Leonean diamond sector, specifically to address "conflict diamonds" by ensuring that increasing numbers of them flow through official state channels (USAID/OTI 2001). These reforms and policies were concerned mostly the certificate of origin regime, which entailed two interlinked approaches. First, it monitored diamonds to identify "clean" stones that did not originate in rebel-held areas, and second, it established a chain of custody system to track from the mining field to export to identify smuggling. While a USAID report documented a range of challenges, a review of Sierra Leone's certification of origin regime in August 2001 found it to be a "major success" since it resulted in over \$30 million in exports since it was put into place (UNSC 2001c, 5). Export figures showed substantial increases as rough diamonds valued at almost \$13 million was exported compared to \$6 million the previous year.²⁶⁶

Despite progress in the form of state revenue, however, an article published in the *Washington Post* in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks dramatically increased the urgency of tackling Sierra Leone's "conflict diamonds". The article, by Douglas Farah (2001), titled "Al Qaeda cash tied to diamond trade" quoted US and European intelligence officials as saying that the terrorist network had acquired millions of dollars from the illicit sale of Sierra Leonean diamonds.²⁶⁷ According to reports, Al Qaeda operatives bought the diamonds a bargain basement prices beginning in 1998 and sold them in Europe for large profits that helped fund international terrorist activities. While the diamonds originated in

²⁶⁵ As mentioned in Chapter 5, feeling international pressure to curb the trade in diamonds, Taylor had begun shifting his attention to the timber exports so as to fund weapons shipments to the RUF.

²⁶⁶ This is from areas not under RUF control.

²⁶⁷ The reports suggested that diamond revenue may have helped to support terrorist activities in Lebanon during the 1980s with the help of Sierra Leone's vast Lebanese Diaspora and fund and the twin bomb attacks in Tanzania and Nairobi in 1998.

Sierra Leone Liberia was the transit point and the Liberian government acted as a liaison. A European investigator quoted in the article, suggested that in order to "cut off Al Qaeda funds and laundering activities you have to cut off the diamond pipeline" (Farah 2001). The article received enormous attention and increased the international pressure on the UN to establish control of diamond mining areas and enforce the ban on diamond exports from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004, 98).

IPOs remained focused of the role of "conflict diamonds" and by the end of 2001 the situation in Sierra Leone had improved. The RUF was weakened by a host of factors, and Charles Taylor was increasingly isolated in Liberia. The security situation had stabilized as the parties to the conflict began to disarm and demobilize in accordance with the Lomé Agreement and UN peacekeepers and small British contingent were deployed with a vigorous mandate to extend state authority and establish law and order. By mid-July 2001, UN peacekeepers had established control of Kono and Tongo diamond fields.²⁶⁸ In addition, world-wide attention to role of diamonds in African conflicts as the result of NGO activity combined with international efforts by international organizations, states, businesses and NGOs to regulate the trade in conflict diamonds vis-a-vis a certificate of origin regime had arguably led to progress in terms of removing diamonds revenues from the hands combatants and channeling diamonds into official government channels. This is despite the fact that as much as 60 percent of Sierra Leone's diamonds were still smuggled out of the country.

Conclusion

As alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, the most prevalent explanation for the Sierra Leonean conflict, especially among international peacebuilding organizations, focuses on the economic agendas of combatants and the role valuable natural resources and their revenues

²⁶⁸ These improvements are despite escalation of the Liberian conflict.

played in fueling the conflict. Sierra Leone has certainly become synonymous with the phrase "blood diamonds", and the war will undoubtedly be perceived for the foreseeable future as "new" type of civil war driven by the globalization and the "warlordization" of the diamond trade (Campbell 2004). This is in spite of extensive evidence discussed in this chapter that the conflict represents a continuation, or perhaps a manifestation, of political conflict, societal grievances and competition for power that has a long historical trajectory. There can be no doubt that alluvial diamonds--and to a lesser extent the mineral trade--have always been a source of grievances and resentment linked to a widespread underdevelopment and a lack of available land linked to unjust and corrupt political system. At the same time, the control of natural resources--and their revenues--has always been central to acquiring political power and dispensing patronage that not only creates resentment but undermines state institutions. Put bluntly, focusing almost exclusively on economic drivers of conflict or characterizing it simply as a "new war" distracts us from the more nuanced ways in which diamonds and minerals may be linked to conflict.

This is important for several reasons. First, despite considerable uncertainty in the literature linking the environment and natural resources to conflict and the broader dynamics of the Sierra Leonean conflict discussed in this chapter, international peacebuilding organizations have come to understand the issue in terms of "blood diamonds". This stems from the evidence that Charles Taylor and the RUF were trading diamonds in exchange for weapons and other implements of destruction that destabilized West Africa and threatened international security. The perception, then, is that a lack of state control and authority over diamond mining areas undermined the project of economic development by allowing rebels (and other combatants) to buy weapons and fuel conflict. Framing the conflict in this way suggests that what are needed are reforms and policies to transform "conflict resources" (e.g. diamonds and minerals) into "peace resources" to end conflict and build long-term peace and stability. In the next chapter, I detail efforts by IBOs to promote and establish reforms and

policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the diamond and mineral sectors. The larger question --which I will address in Chapter 8--is whether efforts to control "conflict resources" have ultimately been helpful for peacebuilding.

Chapter 7: Securitizing and Marketizing Diamonds and Minerals in Sierra Leone

Despite weaknesses in the Lomé Peace Agreement, the deployment of 17,000 UN peacekeepers, the presence of a small contingent of British troops, and a concerted effort to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants led to substantial security improvements. Even so the scale of the human tragedy was vast. Estimates suggest that between 20,000 and 200,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded or maimed (IMF 2005, Gberie 2005). Most of the population had their lives and livelihoods severely disturbed with nearly half of the country's 5 million people reporting to have been displaced or made refugees (IMF 2005). The war plunged at least 80 percent of the population into extreme poverty (GoSL 2001, 8). While informal diamond mining continued, and end to industrial mineral operations and the demise of agriculture undermined livelihoods and created an unemployed rural population. The highest percentage of the unemployed was youths that without agricultural opportunities were forced to become combatants or join the ranks of the displaced or urban poor (IMF 2005).²⁶⁹ The economy was devastated as the GDP fell by 50 percent amounting to a dismal \$142 per capita by 2000 (IMF 2005, 1). By war's end, the country ranked at the bottom of the world's Human Development Index with indicators such as illiteracy, primary school enrollment, life expectancy, maternal death, malnutrition, and child mortality just about the worst on the planet (GoSL 2001). The lack of effective state

²⁶⁹ During the conflict, combatants used coercion and the threat of execution to recruit young men to fight or work diamond mines (Keen 2005; SLTRC 2004).

institutions severely hampered the government's ability to provide of basic services and the conflict damaged much of Sierra Leone's physical and economic infrastructure.

By the time the conflict was officially declared over in January 2002 hopes and expectations were high. There was an optimistic feeling that with proper planning, political will and commitment by IBOs, the country could recover. The government's National Recovery Strategy (NRS) laid out benchmarks for "consolidating peace" and making the "transition towards sustainable development" that included restoring state authority; rebuilding communities; addressing human rights; and the restoration of the economy (GoSL 2003). At the same time, addressing the issue of "blood diamonds" was a top peacebuilding priority. As the preceding chapter highlighted, international peacebuilding organizations came to understand the problem as related to rough diamonds, which were traded by rebels and other non-state combatants in exchange for armaments that destabilized the region and threatened international security. Recall that in 2001, evidence linked the "War on Terrorism" to Sierra Leone's illicit diamond trade. Again, the principal peacebuilding challenges for IBOs was to consolidated state authority and control over diamonds and diamond producing areas, and improve governance so as to ensure diamond revenue funds economic recovery rather than conflict. Due to an inherent distrust that diamonds could be readily controlled, IBOs also stressed the importance of rebuilding Sierra Leone's mineral sector. The objective of IBOs was to transform problematic "conflict resources" into "peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace.

This chapter examines in-depth efforts by international peacebuilding organizations to alter the "rules" that govern Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals between 2002 and 2009. The beginning of the chapter, details the reform process, including ongoing initiatives to put into practice new policies, laws, regulations, and practices. Much like Liberia's forests, I suggest that IBOs by-and-large promote and help establish reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals for the purpose of

transforming "conflict diamonds" into "peace resources". In the second part of the chapter, I examine the effects and consequences of the diamond and mineral reform process, and argue that they have resulted in conflict and even episodes of violence.

Diamond and Mineral Reform: Control and Trade

As noted above, this section charts in detail the extensive efforts by IBOs to transform Sierra Leone's "conflict diamonds" into "peace resources". In doing so, I track the reform process-- including new policies, laws, regulations and practices. Similar to the Liberian forest case in Chapter 5, I argue that the reforms and policies are designed to "securitize" and "marketize" diamonds and minerals. By "securitization", I mean establishing and consolidating state control and authority and instituting good governance measures. By "marketization", I mean promoting the conditions that allow diamonds and minerals to generate revenue that supports economic growth, alleviate poverty and supply state revenue.

President Kabbah declared the conflict over in January 2002 and set up a timeline for elections. The focus on the securitizing mining areas and governing the trade in "conflict diamonds" would remain at the forefront of peacebuilding. While efforts to curtail conflict diamonds had improved, the UN unanimously renewed sanctions on the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone for another 12 months, except those controlled by the government under its certificate of origin regime. In doing so, the UN Security Council acknowledged the fragility of the peace and determined that the country "continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security" (UNSC 2001b, 2). In response, a host of reports were published by IBOs consider the necessary steps to reform the diamond sector in line with the country's larger peacebuilding strategy. The Sierra Leone Diamond Policy Study (2002) called for "new start" aimed at differentiating in the public's mind from an "old system" to a "new system" that emphasized a "diamond policy for a new Sierra Leone" (DFID 2002, 4). While the report found that current policies are generally comparable with

legislation in other African countries, it argued for new legislation and regulations to augment the Mines and Minerals Act of 1996, including amendments to reduce the friction between mine operators in the formal and informal sectors, transparency and accountability in diamond dealing and exporting, and attention to the environmental impacts and social aspects of the industry.

But efforts in the diamond sector were soon accompanied by IBO initiatives to revive the mineral sector's "socially responsible and economically important" role as an engine of growth and poverty reduction (World Bank 2005, vi). Numbers vary widely but report stressed the importance of exploiting Kimberlite diamonds as well as alluvial deposits projecting that by 2006, somewhere between 750,000 and 1 million carats could be produced at a value of \$180 million.²⁷⁰ Direct employment was projected to be upwards of 15,000 people with an additional 140,000 people dependent on the diamond sector for their livelihoods. The report's principal problem with the diamond industry was that policies had historically reinforced a "whole industry for the advantage of a few." The report goes on to say:

Whatever options are chosen ...they will not be effective unless the Government also takes steps to rid the country, and particularly, the diamond industry, of its greatest threat - corruption. Changing or improving the structure of the industry will not, of itself, prevent corruption, and without addressing the scourge of corruption even the best policy decisions will not bring to Sierra Leone the benefit of the industry and the stability which it needs (World Bank 2005).

The World Bank (2002b), in a report titled "A Mining Strategy for Sierra Leone's Post-War Recovery Efforts" produced an early but comprehensive attempt to assist the

²⁷⁰ Of this, approximately \$40-\$80 million would be derived from the artisanal sector.

government by proposing reform of the mining and diamond sector. The World Bank noted that reforms are "crucial because of their [diamonds and minerals] long-established importance to the economy and their current potential for income and employment generation, especially in the rural areas where the mining activities take place, as well as for generating fiscal revenues for the government from large-scale mining activities" (World Bank 2002a, 2). The report stressed the historically under-utilized potential of minerals as a "pro-poor growth and rural development" engine, and reflected on the sectors "relatively low share of fiscal revenues as well as significant trade through unofficial channels... [that] can be largely attributed to inadequate policies and governance as well as traditionally weak administration of the mining sector and a lack of an enabling environment attractive to investors" (World Bank 2002b, 2). The role of the government, according to the World Bank, is to ensure clear, non-discretionary and consistent policies and promote reforms that stress foreign investment and ensure social and environmental responsible development while leaving exportation and exploitation to the private sector (World Bank 2002b, 6). The report suggested that the size of the mining sector is modest by international standards but that Sierra Leone is largely dependent on it due to its high contribution to GDP and exports throughout the 1990s.²⁷¹ In addition, approximately 14 percent of the country's workforce was at one point directly or indirectly tied to the mining sector in some way.

Given the importance of industrial minerals to the country's economy before the war, attention also turned to reviving and reactivating the large-scale industrial mining sector, including the rutile and bauxite mines and the exploitation of Kimberlite diamond pipes.²⁷² These industrial minerals, when compared to alluvial and small-scale diamond mining were viewed as a particularly important by IBOs because they are perceived to come with fewer

²⁷¹ Approximately 20 percent of GDP and 90 percent of registered exports.

²⁷² As noted in the previous chapter, rutile and bauxite operations were largely looted and destroyed by the RUF during the conflict.

risks, and more benefits, than the alluvial diamond sectors. For example, the character of industrial minerals meant it was far easier for the government to control and tax, less amendable to any kind of rebel exploitation, and comparably larger in terms of both reserves and projected revenues. The expectation of IBOs was that rutile production could begin in 2003 with bauxite, Kimberlite diamonds, and other identified minerals (iron ore, ilmenite) following soon afterwards.²⁷³

The World Bank (2002b, 5) defined the mineral sector as involving three aspects: (1) the large-scale production of non-precious minerals such as rutile and bauxite; (2) large scale production of precious minerals - diamonds; and (3) artisanal and small-scale production of precious minerals such as diamonds, and to lesser extent gold. According to World Bank estimates by 2012 large-scale mining activities were projected to conservatively result in four new mine, in addition to the reactivation of three mines that could generate annual export revenues of \$370 million. This would include the employment of an estimated 38,000 people.²⁷⁴ To achieve this, the World Bank focused on the need to attract foreign investment to increase output, provide employment, bring in state revenue and contribute to foreign exchange earnings. On the other hand, the Bank (2002b) proposed tightening control over alluvial diamond mining to limit their use as a source of potential rebel funding, and to improve the overall standard of living for communities. According to the Bank, this could be achieved by (1) licensing mineral rights using a first-come-first serve approach with rapid and transparent processing, incorporating a cadastral system supported by satisfactory monitoring, administration and enforcement; (2) facilitation of mechanization and lending for the

²⁷³ Resolutions from the National Consultative Conference on Just Mining in Sierra Leone in 2000 offered key resolutions aimed at the mineral sector. Key issues included the formulation of pro-people mining policy, problems with generating and distributing revenue from mining, the impact of mining on the environment, the effects of mining on local communities and the consequences of mining on culture.

²⁷⁴ Including dependents and extended families it was projected that about 300,000 people would depend on these mines for livelihoods and sustenance.

purchase of equipment that would reduce miner's dependence that fosters patronage and poverty; (3) extension of services to assist miners, identify license holders and address environmental conditions; and (4) provision of fair commercialization to improve trading prices for miners and diggers and ensure license holder sell only to authorized buyers. The report argues revival of the mining industry would provide livelihoods, directly and indirectly for a large segment of the population, and support more stable and positive economic performance.²⁷⁵

IBOs stressed the importance reconstructing government capacity and formulating a new national mineral policy to promote the sector as a "socially responsible, economically important engine of growth" (World Bank 2002b, 7). The new mineral policy encouraged by IBOs would emphasize "participatory" mining legislation and regulations that are realistic in the national and international economic context and are sensitive to social and environmental impacts of mining (World Bank 2002b, 7). A revised policy would also restructure the links between government and local authorities, and enhance institutional capacity while establishing systems of governance to ensure transparency and effective decision making, accountability (World Bank 2002b, 8). Because implementation of a comprehensive mineral policy would take several years to implement, IBOs emphasized that the rejuvenation of the sector cannot wait until an "ideal process" is in place and had confidence that the existing Mines and Minerals Act of 1996 (and subsequent amendments) serves as an adequate foundation for an investment friendly, socially responsible mineral reforms.

The "way forward" then was immediately revive large-scale mining activities that ended during the 1980s-1990s, in particular rutile. Furthermore, large-scale operations in the bauxite and Kimberlite diamonds were to progress in a timely manner so that income, exchange and government revenue could be realized quickly. The World Bank stressed the

²⁷⁵ The report does note that in the longer term, Sierra Leone will need to diversify the rural and urban economies.

importance of establishing an "internationally competitive mining environment" and a fiscal regime generally reasonable and flexible for large-scale operations" (World Bank 2002b, 58). The benefit of the resuming activity quickly would also send a signal to potential investors that after a long period of conflict, Sierra Leone is "open for business". In the alluvial mining sector, the IBOs highlighted the need for the government to gain control over diamond mining areas to limit smuggling and illicit operations, and ensure "legitimate licensed miners" can continue to mine. One particular note of caution--highlighted by the UN--was that many ex-combatants were coming back to mining communities and increasing the potential for instability. With that in mind, the World Bank noted the importance of the diamond development fund to make sure the sale of diamonds benefits community welfare and the certificate of origin regime continues to operate effectively.

As the government of Sierra Leone and IBOs continued to discuss comprehensive recommendations for reforming the mineral sector there emerged international concern about a new "diamond rush" after the war. Estimates suggested that between 200,000 and 500,000 people were mining alluvial diamonds (ICG 2003). Significant numbers of these miners had no other livelihood option in the aftermath of the conflict and were attracted to the potential of mining to provide some immediate employment. International peacebuilders cautioned that the rush to diamond mining areas was led and dominated by former combatants, which increased the potential for illegal mining and instability. The UN realized the need to gain control of diamond mining areas and identify illegal activity that could result in conflict diamonds. The problem was that even if ex-combatants were involved little could be done since the mining activity did provide local livelihoods for miners and communities that would have proved harmful if disrupted. Moreover, since the advent of the certificate of origin regime diamond exports had been increasing and contributing greater sums of revenue to the government, which provided little incentive for disrupting illegal operations.

In 2002, negotiations and preparations were underway to rebuild the industrial mining sector. Sierra Rutile Limited signed a letter of intent with the US government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation for a \$25 million loan to restart the now largely destroyed operation. Likewise, the British loaned £25 million to the government to begin the process of rehabilitating the mines and preparing for production.²⁷⁶ This was in addition to a reported \$114 million loan from the World Bank's International Finance Corporation. An agreement was negotiated resulting in the Sierra Rutile Agreement Act of 2002, which replaced a 1989 agreement between the government and the company and established new financial terms and obligations. The terms of the contract were generally in line with international standards by civil society groups (NACE 2009). The royalty rate was 3.5 percent of total sales and income taxes between 3.5 and 37.5 percent depending on turnover (GoSL 2002). The Act contained a stability clause that allowed the company to continue paying the negotiated tax and royalty rates for the duration of the 25-year lease, even if the government decided to enact new legislation raising taxes or royalties. The agreement set import duties at 5 percent for equipment and other plant infrastructure but did not make any provision with regard to the employment of expats or Sierra Leoneans. The most controversial provision in the agreement allowed the company to create and maintain an armed security force and import weaponry to deter "incidents". This raised concern among local communities and civil society groups since it was the only company given permission for an armed and uniformed security force in the postconflict period.²⁷⁷

Efforts by Koidu Holdings, S.A. began to resume Kimberlite diamond operations near the town of Koidu in eastern Sierra Leone. The original agreement to commence Kimberlite mining for 25 years was originally signed between Branch Energy and the Kabbah

²⁷⁶ Sierra Rutile Limited was owned by Consolidated Rutile Ltd. of Australia and US-based Nord Resources Corp. Nord sold its half to MIL in 1999 while Consolidated Rutile sold its share to UK-based Titanium Resources.

²⁷⁷ According to Mboka (2003) this security force was routinely hostile to local communities.

government in 1995 and subsequently approved in 1996 by the parliament as rebels were just on the outskirts of Freetown.²⁷⁸ Branch Energy's assets were completely destroyed by rebels. In June 2002, Branch Energy began to show interest in resuming operations but was bought by DiamondWorks and Magma Diamond Resources Limited both agreeing to form a joint venture called Koidu Holdings begin redeveloping the kimberlitic project. Eventually Koidu Holdings was purchased outright by MDRL with the intention of starting production slated for 2004.²⁷⁹

International efforts to govern alluvial diamonds continued apace. Negotiations over the terms and conditions of the Kimberley Process moved forward aggressively, and in November 2002 representatives from 37 countries and the EU agreed to launch the certification scheme in January 2003.²⁸⁰ Although there remained uncertainties in how exactly to monitor the trade in diamonds and establish independent control systems given sovereignty concerns, the process had widespread international support.²⁸¹ This meant that only participant countries were allowed to trade rough diamonds with each other and countries that wished to participate were given more time to implement national legislation.²⁸² At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was announced by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (EITI 2010). Given international attention to the issue of conflict resources (including but not only diamonds and minerals) the goal of EITI was to increase the transparency of payments by companies to governments and revenue transparency by

²⁷⁸ Branch Energy had links to the private security firm Executive Outcomes, which was discussed in the previous chapter. Branch Energy and all of its mineral rights were acquired by Canadian firm DiamondWorks in 1996.

²⁷⁹ Magma Diamond Resources Limited is wholly owned by BSG Resources.

²⁸⁰ Many participant countries, including the US and UK, were not prepared to implement the Kimberly Process in January 2003. A grace period was put in place until May 2003.

²⁸¹ Because many participating countries, including the US and UK, were not ready to implement the agreement a grace period was extended until May 2003 at which time all participant countries implemented the Kimberly Process and it came into force

²⁸² The US passed HR 1584 the "Clean Diamonds Trade Act", which implemented regulations that brought the US in compliance with the Kimberly Process (GAO 2006).

governments themselves. The impetus for such a system emerged European governments and NGOs concerned that revenues natural resources if not properly governed can create conditions for instability and conflict. Specifically, the mismanagement and lack of accountability and transparency over natural resource revenues was viewed as exacerbating poor governance, corruption and economic decline when it should be an engine for economic growth and positive human development. The role of EITI was to increase transparency and openness by getting countries rich in resources to provide information to citizens and civil society organizations in order to hold governments accountable for the revenues they collect. The system was also advertised as potentially significant for attracting foreign direct investment given that responsible companies would benefit from such a plan while corrupt and nefarious ones would not.²⁸³

It is also important to note that although the international spotlight remained largely on the role of "conflict diamonds" in fueling the conflict and efforts to set up an international governance regime, Sierra Leone civil society was organizing with the help of international organizations to address "mining for the people" (Brima 2003).²⁸⁴ International attention to conflict diamonds, in fact, worked to open space for civil society in late 2000, organizing a coalition of human rights groups, environmental organizations, academic institutions, the Bar association, student and trade unions, community development organizations, theatre groups, youth, nurses and women's groups to promote "just mining" policies and practices. Whereas mining was previously the "preserve of government and a few individuals" the Campaign for Just Mining demanded that the government and industry introduce a human rights framework that will "empower the people and make them owners and beneficiaries of their resources"

²⁸³ The subtext is that responsible companies are international ones while the corrupt ones are domestic companies. The dominant view, a promulgated by the World Bank and IMF, was that international investment by larger firms was more stable and less inclined to corruption or abuse.

²⁸⁴ International organizations actively involved included PAC, Global Witness, International Peace Information Service, Action Aid, Oxfam, and Amnesty International (Brima 2003).

(Brima 2003). The work of these NGOs led the government to establish the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) in December to secure a portion of the export tax on the sale of diamonds for "chiefdoms where diamond mining is taking place and neighboring communities who utilize the social and economic services. The DACDF allocated 25 percent of revenue accrued from diamond export taxes and represented a first-step in the emergence of Sierra Leone civil society to increase the opportunities for mining communities.

While the US Government began to pay attention to the diamond sector following the Lomé Agreement in 1999, technical assistance focused on meeting with stakeholders to support the Kimberly Process and establishing a legalized channel for rough diamonds, providing equipment for the mines monitors and monitoring the DACDF fund and sensitizing communities to its existence. However, the objectives of US assistance broadened with the goal of introducing "peace diamonds" from Sierra Leone to the rest of the world through a process that maximized benefits to communities and empowered local miners and diggers.²⁸⁵ This was deemed important vitally important since the "control and ownership of most production is in the hands of a small but powerful trading elite, depriving licensed miners and their diggers the opportunity to secure a fair return on their labor" (Even-Zohar, 2003, ii). What emerged was the Peace Diamond Alliance a cooperative effort to bring together civil society organizations, international non-governmental organizations and the MMR to help communities to demonstrate that "the alluvial diamond industry can maximize benefits to local miners/diggers and their communities, minimize corruption, mobilize local surveillance and mines monitoring and convert consumer awareness around conflict diamonds into reconstruction" (Tutusaus 2007, 8). Thus, the goal was to convert rough diamonds from a

²⁸⁵ Diamond diggers are those who do a vast majority of manual labor in alluvial diamond mines. Diggers carry out various activities including carrying mud, washing gravel or doing other manual labor.

"source of war and desperation to the foundation for peace and prosperity" (Tutusaus 2007, 10).²⁸⁶

There was a substantial increase in officially recorded rough diamond exports with 250,000 carats exported in 2002 and 500,000 in 2003. Although at least 55 percent of all mining operations in Sierra Leone were reported to be operating illegally and some 85-90 percent of all rough diamonds were believed to be smuggled out of the country efforts to "regularize" artisanal mining was recognized as on the right track. Tax receipts and exports of diamonds were increasing and Sierra Leone's certificate of origin regime and participation in the implementation of the Kimberly Process exhibited signs that the country was serious about reforms and laying the foundation for a more regulated, transparent and accountable diamond sector. In light of these efforts by the Government of Sierra Leone to "strengthen and improve...management of the diamond industry", the UN Security Council agreed not to renew the embargo against the importation of rough diamonds, which was imposed by Resolution 1306 in 2000.²⁸⁷ In essence, the UN and its members agreed that Sierra Leone was no longer a home for conflict diamonds.

While the lifting of the sanctions was newsworthy and important sign that things were heading in a positive direction, the international community remained wary of the potential for diamonds reignite conflict. According to USAID, only \$41 million of the projected \$300 million worth of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone was legally exported in 2003 with little money returning to the communities for the benefit of postconflict reconstruction. As US Ambassador Peter Chaveas (2003) noted although security was beginning to return to Sierra Leone and "blood diamonds" was in the global lexicon, the conditions on the ground in mining communities had changed little since the end of the

²⁸⁶ Although the Peace Diamond Alliance was eventually transformed from a coalition of interest groups

²⁸⁷ Sanctions on Liberian diamond exports remained intact.

conflict. In order to ensure the country did not return to "business as usual", the US Ambassador argued that wealth derived in diamond mining areas must stay in Kono and Sierra Leone if lasting peace is to be achieved (Chaveas 2003). The position of the US Government was that with "relatively minor adjustments to credit, production and marketing systems, hundreds of millions of dollars annually could be redirected to 300,000-400,000 Sierra Leoneans engaged in the diamond industry" (Even-Zohar 2003, v). This was not seen not only as an opportunity to ensure communities received a fair share of benefits but also to reduce the incentive to smuggle by ensuring that diamond revenue would return to producing communities and chiefdoms.

In 2003, the government signed a "special agreement" with Sierra Rutile in a 'Memorandum of Understanding' that altered provisions in the 2002 Act.²⁸⁸ The new MOU lowered the company's royalty rate to 0.5 percent until 2014 (after which it would revert back to 3.5 percent) and ended the corporate income tax and other taxes for 10-years. In return, the company offered the government the opportunity to purchase up to 30 percent stake in operations in lieu of the payments and taxes, which were valued at \$37 million. The company maintained that it had drastically underestimated the scope of the investment needed to restart production and that the MOU was needed if Sierra Rutile was to swiftly resume rutile exports. The World Bank and IMF suggested that despite the trade-offs the government should concur with the special agreement even if the fiscal terms would impose a revenue burden on the government (World Bank 2006; IMF 2004). There was substantial disagreement among the international stakeholders involved as to whether such concessions were the price of attracting foreign direct investment in a postconflict situation or simply a case of companies taking advantage of a fragile, postconflict situation. Many actors, including the US government, criticized an "investment at all costs" attitude based on the idea

²⁸⁸ This MOU would be agreed to in the so-called First Amendment Agreement of the 2002 Act in 2004.

that not agreeing to the MOU would send the wrong message to international investors (Interview 65). They suggested that Sierra Leone should negotiate from a position of strength and dictate the terms and conditions (NACE).²⁸⁹

Sierra Leonean civil society organizations, including the National Advocacy Coalition on Extractives suggested that the special agreement with Sierra Rutile should be reviewed for its apparent illegality. It questioned whether the country could afford a reduction in projected revenues of \$37 million. Mboka (2003) also argued the agreement was signed by a seriously corrupt process carried out without the participation of landowners that were not properly compensated for the destruction of crops affected by mining operations. There was increasing criticism about the company's resettlement policy, in which approximately 5,400 residents were moved from areas zoned for mining even before activities commenced without the provision of adequate water supplies or fertile land. The company was also condemned for its security forces holding farmers at gunpoint and arresting them for allegedly farming on company property.²⁹⁰ Mboka (2003) warned of future problems and tension over these and other issues since the history of rutile mining was one of "unmitigated exploitation" and a legacy of abject poverty and ecological disaster. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Mboka (2003) suggested that rutile mining has historically had negative not positive effects on the lives of neighboring communities and that efforts to fast-track rutile production in the name of development was deeply troubling since it did not include local communities in the decision making process.

By late 2003, the government had passed several significant mining laws. The first was an amendment the Mines and Minerals Act of 1994, which set penalties for diamond smuggling. Shortly after the Core Mineral Policy was passed that was "designed to create an

²⁸⁹ A report by NACE (2009) suggested that revenue losses to the government due to the Sierra Rutile revisions amounted to a loss of approximately \$100 million over 10 years or \$8 million annually.

²⁹⁰ According to Mboka (2003) the farmers were ill treated while in custody.

internationally competitive and investor friendly business environment in the mining sector...[and] assist in the mining industry in attracting foreign and local private sector funds and to provide benefits and protection for the people and the environment of Sierra Leone" (GoSL 2004, 1).²⁹¹ One of the objectives of the policy was to provide an "enabling legal and fiscal regime for all mining operations from large-scale mines such as those of Sierra Rutile to the small artisanal gold and diamond mines in the provinces" (GoSL 2004, 1). The policy's vision was to "facilitate a fair and transparent business environment to stimulate development of a successful minerals sector" via a "free-market approach and economic policies" (GoSL 2004, 2). The government, which owns all rights in, and control of, minerals under or upon any land in Sierra Leone, stated in the policy that it will do everything in its power to make sure that the revenues from minerals including diamonds will be used for the benefit of the country and this will be achieved by ensuring that all licensing fees, royalties, taxes and any other forms of income from the exploitation of minerals are collected and properly recorded and that all mining, trading and exporting companies in the mineral sector operate within the laws that comply with international trading protocols (GoSL 2004). The policy also committed the government to reviewing and amending mining laws, regulation and associated laws to make them as attractive as possible for investment and improving the regulation and efficiency of artisanal and small -scale mines (GoSL 2004, 6-7).

The conventional wisdom among IBOs by mid-2004 was that Sierra Leone is making tremendous progress in terms of rehabilitating the large-scale diamond mining sector and regulating artisanal mining activity (IMF 2004). Real and rapid GDP growth continued and exports from the alluvial diamonds had increased over 10-fold since 2000. However, what looked like positive trends was combined with weak revenue projections in the sector that were largely overestimated due to constraints of getting the rutile and kimberlite sectors

²⁹¹ The World Bank was largely assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in revising the Core Mineral Policy.

producing and slow developments getting bauxite development underway. The IMF (2004) stressed the importance of attracting investment in the large scale industrial production but highlighted that substantial investments required were substantial and may therefore require "fiscal incentives" by the government to facilitate investment. Fiscal incentives refer to "special agreements" like the one granted to Sierra Rutile. Although less revenue would accrue to the government over the short-term, the IMF called this "trade-off" important for investor confidence provided it was backed up by sound fiscal policy. The IMF expressed concern that each time a company applied for a mining lease in post-war Sierra Leone that company explicitly sought out and received a special agreement incorporating beneficial fiscal terms. For example, the original agreement with Sierra Rutile was changed; the agreement with Koidu Holdings was to leave existing 1995 agreement with lesser terms in place; and negotiations with African Minerals with respect to bauxite mining was thought to include substantial tax breaks.

Throughout 2004 there were reports of a "diamond rush" in the eastern part of Sierra Leone that raised security concerns among international donors. One key concern was that the rush could lead to an increase in smuggling and a higher likelihood of diamond -related conflict. A report by commissioned by USAID found that despite significant improvements the borders of Sierra Leone remain porous-particularly at points of entry like Lungi Airport-and the combination of corruption and the illicit trade made diamonds a continued security threat (Corkill 2004). While the "rush" exaggerated, it had the effect of directing attention to the lack of opportunities not only for ex-combatants that had been demobilized but also amount the general population of men with no work and no other livelihoods opportunities.²⁹² In fact, this led to an increase in illicit mining operations although by all accounts smuggling continued to decline. Regardless, international actors continued with efforts to "regularize"

²⁹² This rush could have also been caused in part to rumors of state consolidation over the sector.

the artisanal mining sector so as to "eliminate the incentives for smuggling" (IMF 2004, 32). As the IMF (2004, 32) notes, artisanal mining is more open to smuggling (in comparison to kimberlite mining) because it takes place over vast, "insecure regions that are difficult to control and is often associated with limited competition between buyers because of barriers to entry and implicit contracts, give rise to uncompetitive domestic prices", thus increasing incentives for smuggling.

These "implicit contracts", as the IMF termed them, contributed to smuggling and a lack of transparency because artisanal miners and diggers have irregular earnings and therefore need to borrow money in order to purchase equipment and guard against decreases in production (IMF 2004). This financial backing typically comes from diamond dealers or "supporters" that manage specific operations and include an exclusive right to buy their diamonds. Diamond dealers have similar contracts with exporters. These implicit contracts limit competition and allow export companies to purchase diamonds at prices well below international markets, creating incentives to smuggle. Partners tied to these implicit contracts therefore have the incentive to smuggle in order to get a higher price than what the exporter would pay. At the same time, for the exporter it can be lucrative to bypass formal government channels so as to hide the true value of diamonds being exported, which allows the exporter to undervalue them and reduce the price paid to the dealer. This is extremely common given that exporters are most able to assess the true value of a stone and smuggle in outside the country (IMF 2004).

The lack of transparency in the alluvial diamond sector caused by these implicit contracts was a source of concern for international donors. This is because non-transparent pricing allows exporters to underpay dealers, and allows dealers to underpay miners and diggers. A vast majority of the rents generated by the sector accrue to a small cadre of people with most of the value leaving the country. While estimates varied, local costs associated with production were likely not more than 10-15 percent with at least 80 percent of the value

accruing to exporters and foreign traders. In some cases, dealers, miners and diggers captured none of the diamond rents. While there was surely concern that diamonds should pass through official channels so the government can acquire revenues, a particular concern is that these rents could be used to buy weapons or reignite conflict. Another worry was that diamond smuggling and associated money laundering could fund criminal enterprises or at worst global terrorism (Global Witness 2003).

According to the IMF (2004), the general fiscal regime for artisanal diamond mining was appropriate since reforms implemented in the early 1990s, including a low import tax of three percent to encourage the regularization of the diamond trade through official channels.²⁹³ Since no other taxes or fees are levied other than income taxes-and the cost of smuggling is estimated at 2-3 percent of revenues,-the taxes were deemed appropriate and not an impediment to legal exports. The view of the IMF was that the real impediment was the government's unwillingness to enforce its own policies and fiscal regimes, and the property rights and mining regulations that underpin it. A survey by the UNIMSIL (2003) found that the government and in particular the Ministry of Mineral Resources was ill trained to address illicit mining and smuggling activities (UNIMSIL2004). To address these needs, the World Bank provided technical assistance installing a cadastre system to help define property rights and thereby provide some basis for the enforcement of mineral rights. As the IMF (2004, 35) states, "secure property rights and better prepared government agencies will go a long-way toward bringing the mining sector back under the government's control and restoring law and order."

It became increasingly important in the eyes of international donors, particularly the US Government, to engage in projects to ensure local communities benefit and get proportionate share from mining operations and that miners and diggers are empowered to

²⁹³ The revenue situation in the early 1990s and concerns that diamond rents were not being captured by the state led to the reforms in the Mines and Mineral Act of 1994.

gain a greater share of diamond revenues. While USAID started out prioritizing the consolidation of state control over the industry and certificate regimes like the Kimberly Process, a USAID commissioned report by Even-Zohar (2003) made the case that such programs need to be integrated with "grassroots concerns and needs" (Tatusaus 2007, ix). The goal was to devise programs was to improve revenue to government and benefits to community so that "Sierra Leone's diamonds can never again be used to fund conflict" (MSI 2004), and not coincidentally reduce the potential that money from diamonds was not used to launder money by international crime syndicates and terrorists. The operating premise was that the security threats associated with illegal mining and smuggling could be constrained or prevented by ensuring that "local people benefit from legal mining and marketing so that they develop a commitment to transparent, legal diamond industry."

This programmatic area was driven by a perception that the conflict was caused in part by "idle" and uneducated youths that did not benefit from mining and had nothing better to do than loot the country. Since alluvial diamond mining is overwhelmingly done by groups of "diggers"-predominantly young uneducated men -who work for licensed miners, ensuring more equal distribution of benefits was deemed a significant security and development priority by USAID and non-governmental organizations like Global Witness.²⁹⁴ The problem, however, is that miners and diggers operate within an integrated system (implicit contracts) that requires them to sell their "winnings" to specific supporters or dealers.²⁹⁵ While miners hold the actual mining license and can employ up to 100 diggers on a one acre site they are often not the driving force in artisanal mining. Miners often deal with authorities, pay license fees, and collect a share of winnings. Miners are intensely dependent on financial supporters, who are often dealers or agents or supporters with close ties to

²⁹⁴ Mining licenses can only be given to Sierra Leonean nationals.

²⁹⁵ Miners are the individuals that hold the actual mining license, entitling them to the mine. They are often the manager of the operation although when there is an external supporter from outside financing the enterprise, a mining supervisor may be involved.

dealers.²⁹⁶ These dealers have access to capital and can advance miners the cost of the license, tools and food for the operation.²⁹⁷ Dealers Although this relationship can be viewed as a "profit sharing arrangement" more often than not miners and diggers go into debt after all expenses are paid. This debt and marginalization often increases poverty of miners, diggers and local communities while exporters with connections to paramount chiefs or other landowners get wind fall profits and the regions vast wealth is exported to Europe and Asia. In short, miners and diggers are enticed by the possibility of immediate wealth from finding a big diamond but often remain in deepening and worsening poverty. The UN Commission on Human Rights has characterized these relations as "a system of debt bondage" and classified as contemporary variant of slavery (Moyers 2003).

Studies estimated that the share of a digger's per capita share of industry revenues is at or below subsistence income levels (World Bank 2005).²⁹⁸ The only genuine opportunity for diggers and licensed miners to get a decent price for their winnings is to smuggle higher value diamonds. This smuggling is not done to avoid export taxes or a preoccupation with smuggling but to by-pass these "financial supporters" who "at best, offer minimal rewards- and then only after deducting real or imagined costs and...debts" (Even-Zohar 2003, 7). As one can imagine given the incentive to smuggle there is little trust between the miner and supporter. However, as Levin and Gberie (2006, 10) suggest diggers and miners are unlikely to gain much more than what they would earn selling to a supporter since he is unlikely to realize "even marginally" the actual price of a stolen diamond due to a lack of knowledge and the "rush to sell the diamond so as to not get apprehended."

Most of the local level reform, which has been described as an 'earth to export scheme' was funded by USAID, who focused attention on exploitative labor relationships

²⁹⁶ This is commonly referred to as a "tributor system"

²⁹⁷ According to Even-Zohar (2003) at least 80 percent of licensed miners in Sierra Leone lack the means to finance operations, including buying the mining license or paying land rental fees.

²⁹⁸ If you take away from these higher returns to a few diggers the situation is probably much worse.

between supporters, miners and diggers noting that the continued lack of benefits for local communities is a substantial threat to security.²⁹⁹ The major program was called the Integrated Diamond Management Program (IDMP), which was essentially tasked with developing pilot projects to integrate "finance and alluvial diamond mining tracking system grounded in providing better prices to miners and laborers" (Tatusaus 2007, 10).³⁰⁰ One such program was to promote diamond cooperatives designed to rationalize artisanal production by by-passing traditional "supporters", who coincidentally are believed to be deeply involved in smuggling and inflating prices, and empowering diggers and miners to become independent of the exploitative system and bringing a greater proportion of diamond value to the producer level demonstrating the advantages of extending credit to miners was good for bankers and miners alike and encouraging self-policing. By 2004, 35 cooperative were formed although the scheme ended in 2005 unsuccessfully since "not one cooperative found enough diamonds to pay back their loans or turn a profit" (Levin and Turay 2008, 5).³⁰¹

To a large extent the concerns about miners, diggers and local communities emerged at the international level with the emergence of the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI). While donor governments were involved in initial discussions, the DDI is largely a collaborative effort between the World Bank, international NGOs Global Witness and PAC and business (De Beers and International Diamond Manufacturers Association) to address the "political, social and economic challenges facing the artisanal diamond mining sector in order to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal diamond mining to miners and their communities" (Levin and Gberie 2006).³⁰² The objectives of DDI were to gather and disseminate information on artisanal diamond mining and promote better understanding of, and possible solutions for: government and mining regulation; distribution and marketing and

²⁹⁹ Through a contract with Management Systems International

³⁰⁰ The IDMP also served as a technical capacity to formulate strategy.

³⁰¹ One cooperative reportedly produced no diamonds at all.

³⁰² DDI was not just confined to Sierra Leone but African countries where diamonds are mined.

organizational aspects of artisanal production (Levin and Gberie 2006). DDI was formed in many ways as a companion to the Kimberly Process. For example, while the Kimberley Process addresses conflict diamonds it does little to target the underlying problems of the alluvial diamond sector that also have considerable security and development dimensions. As noted in a PAC report in 2007:

The Kimberly Process is strictly about controlling the trade in rough diamonds, in order to ensure...[the] are not used to finance conflict. There is nothing in the KPCS requiring governments to improve the lot of diamond miners, to distribute wealth from diamond mining to local communities, or to use revenues from diamond mining for anything at all (PAC 2007).

The Kimberly Process and firmer government control over diamond mining areas began to transform the discussion of conflict diamonds into discussion about how the mineral sector as a whole could "contribute to peace and development" (World Bank 2005, iii). The World Bank released a report titled "Tapping the Mineral Wealth for Human Progress-A Break with the Past", which was a reissued but updated version of a 2002 report. The report stressed that the sector continued to not fully exploit the mineral potential available and thus needed to carry out additional geological investigation and revise mineral frameworks to attract potential investors in large scale mining create better living conditions for artisanal miners . With a an reforms Mines and Mineral Act, sound trade policies and a fiscal framework designed to induce investment, the World Bank continued to report that annual mining potential of the industrial sector could amount to \$370 million annually, including 38,000 people directly and indirectly employed and another 300,000 or more deriving livelihoods from the sector.

By 2005 was a perceptible shift in emphasis with more attention focused on large-scale industrial mining sector. Many factors contributed to the push of fast-tracking industrial mining. First, in the mid-2000s and ending in 2009 the world was in the midst of one of the largest commodity booms in history and the government and its international advisers wanted to take advantage of excess global capital. According to a government adviser interviewed, in 2005 and up to late 2008, \$50 billion in capital was floating around to invest in extractive industries world-wide and Sierra Leone was maneuvering to get in on the boom (Interview 43). Second, although alluvial mining was contributing to growth, Sierra Leone faced substantial revenue deficits. International advisers at the World Bank (2005) and IMF (2004) among others also did not view artisanal mining as efficient or economically viable in the long-term. According to an IMF (2004, 8-10) report the positive impacts of large-scale mining grossly outweigh the positive impacts from small-scale mining. For example, large-scale mining contributes to positive macro-economic, socio-economic, infrastructure, skills development, empowerment, social security and environmental impacts missing from small-scale mining.

In Sierra Leone, alluvial diamonds were long believed by experts to be in decline with alluvial mining was being done in areas previously mined. The economic answer was to scale-up for better productivity and revenue potential. This included not only a shift to large-scale industrial mining operations but also mechanized alluvial diamond operations overseen by companies. The alluvial sector, which is dependent on manual labor of hundreds of thousands of diggers and miners often engaged illegal operations, was increasingly seen as backwards, inefficient and ungovernable (Le Billon and Levin 2009). The growing preoccupation with the industrial sector can best be exemplified by President Kabbah's comments:

A primary focus now... is to attract bigger mining companies, which means foreign investment....They are easier to monitor. They keep a paper trail, and they are bringing in a lot of revenue in the form of taxes and employment. The alluvial mines are a problem. They always have been, and will probably continue to be. Until we are able to attract companies...to invest in the alluvial mines-which are overwhelmingly dominated by artisanal miners-the problem of illicit mining, and therefore smuggling will continue (PAC and NACE 2005, 1)

International advisers and government realized that given the importance of alluvial mining to young males (15-30 years old), the demographic group most likely to be recruited into any future conflict and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others it would not be feasible to "crack down" on the sector. It was not politically or socially feasible to "just get rid of it" (Interview 43). International experts believed that even if sector was not productive economically, the security imperative was to ensure that youth are content and smuggling does not contribute to conflict. There was a desire to keep a lid on the alluvial mining sector while moving forward rapidly to get industrial sector going. The irony was that as the industrial mining sector started to gain momentum artisanal diamond mining continued to contribute to the country's economic growth with official exports increasing from \$10 million in 2002 to over \$125 million in 2005 due in part to the Kimberly Process scheme, it was largely thought of as a threat to security and development. This was because since the end of the conflict the numbers of illegal diamond mines and smuggling remained high. The Peace Diamond Alliance (2005) estimated illegal production at around \$400 million and the UN (2005) suggesting that at least half of all diamond mining activities went unlicensed despite the considerable international attention to the issue.³⁰³ Moreover, although the alluvial sector

³⁰³ In a Kimberly Scheme (2005) report response the government states that only 10-15 percent of exports are smuggled.

was contributing to revenue it is was small since it is a share of the three percent tax and license fees.³⁰⁴

However, there was no denying that the alluvial diamond sector was changing. The number of mining licenses increased from 100 at the end of the war to well over 2,000 by 2005. Reports also concluded that the government's Gold and Diamond Office, which values exports was contributing too much needed increases in government revenue. However, the capacity of the Ministry of Mineral Resources was still weak at the field level. Mines Monitoring Officials remained poorly paid, trained and equipped and thus unlikely to be efficient and fair regulators of such a lucrative industry. Despite this it appears that by one measure governance reforms of the alluvial diamond sector have been successful. Since the end of the war diamond exports and revenues have been consistently increasing. For example, figures obtained from the GGDO, suggest that after the KPCS was implemented increases in exports of alluvial diamonds has risen sharply. For example, between 2002 and 2007, exports of alluvial diamonds increased by an estimated \$80 million (calculated from GGDO figures) and this amounted to over 90 percent of imports.

The rise in diamond exports and revenues has been viewed by the government and donors as evidence of success in governing conflict diamonds. Not only did the Kimberley Process have a role in ending the wholesale trafficking in conflict diamonds but also helped to control the trade in illegal trade and formalize the sector raising state revenues in the process. However, while the certification scheme deserves credit, other factors have contributed to the rise in official exports (Cooper 2008, 108). For example, increased control over diamond areas by UN peacekeepers, a substantial increase in mining and public attention that kept the diamond business engaged. There is also evidence that the UN sanctions on Liberian diamonds as well as instability in neighboring Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea

³⁰⁴ According to the IMF (2004) any tax rate over three percent would incentivize smuggling.

provided an incentive to smuggle diamonds into Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2005; World Bank 2006). While by most accounts a majority of diamonds are still exported illicit, what Cooper (2008, 108) calls the "security and policing framework" was relatively successful.

Sierra Leone's Diamond and Mineral Reforms: A Period of Contention

The "good news" about alluvial diamond exports, however, was increasingly tempered by other concerns. First, it is not clear the degree to which alluvial diamonds actually contributed to state revenue. Because of Sierra Leone's porous borders, and the impact on the price paid to miners, the amount of the export tax the government could impose on diamonds was set at three percent. Including license fees only about \$5.28 million was returned to the government from the alluvial diamond sector in 2006 (GoSL 2010).³⁰⁵ Of this almost a million dollars were distributed to mining communities (GoSL 2010). While this number does not take into consideration the direct role alluvial diamonds play in employing and providing revenue, it makes clear that state revenues from the sector are likely to be limited. This is due to the difficulty of taxing alluvial diamonds and the broad consensus among international peacebuilders that the alluvial diamond sector has peaked, and is currently in decline. While little scientific analysis has been done, anecdotal evidence suggests that people are increasingly mining previously worked over areas (Interview 48). The only way to increase production potential of the alluvial sector, then, is to mechanize and bring in small-scale companies. Mechanization would help increase production compared to hand digging while small-scale companies, in theory at least, is believed would be easier to regulate and tax. While it is necessary to continue to promote the alluvial sector for "political reasons", according to one interview, the mindset of IBOs was that large-scale

³⁰⁵ License fees on approximately 2,000 licenses.

industrial mining or "modern-sector mining" holds the real promise for Sierra Leone in terms of economic growth, development and poverty reduction. As one mining consultant described it, there had to be less an emphasis on "splitting up the mineral pie" (who gets what royalty, tax, etc) and not enough emphasis on "growing the [mineral] pie" (Interview 43).

Community resentment and Sierra Rutile

The problem is that the rush to "jump-start" the industrial mineral sector has resulted in controversy, which has plagued the two large-scale mining operations--Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings. Both of these operations were deemed critical to expanding state revenue and showcasing improvement for foreign investors. Sierra Rutile restarted production in 2006 investing over \$200 million in facilities and infrastructure (NACE 2009, 24). The company's resurrection was enabled by loans from international lenders and the government amounting to an estimated \$50 million, and controversial financial terms negotiated with the government. In its first year of operation, the company reported that almost \$30 million worth of rutile had been exported; second only to alluvial diamonds and that approximately 1,400 were employed benefiting directly the surrounding community (NACE 2009, 24).³⁰⁶ The revenue numbers were hailed by the government and IBOs as a significant step in the development of Sierra Leone; it was the collapse of a dredge in 2008 that received most of the attention. The dredge collapse, which killed several workers, led to a halt in production and layoffs of more than 25 percent of the workforce focused public attention on the Sierra Rutile and the industrial mineral sector more generally.³⁰⁷

Although the company was back to work after an accident, the event raised several issues. First, it provided a window of opportunity for civil society organizations to question

³⁰⁶ As NACE (2009) reports, Sierra Rutile is the only significant employer in the region and with average monthly salaries higher than people can expect to earn any other way.

³⁰⁷ The company also asked for and received a two-year moratorium on interest payments to the government on the \$25 million EU loan.

the transparency of the sector and sound the alarm about the agreement that had been negotiated between the government and Sierra Rutile. A government review found that losses to the government near \$100 million between 2004 and 2016 due to the tax concessions and a diminished royalty payment granted to the company. Civil society organizations maintained that the agreements were illegal and needed to be reviewed by the government. The company projected profits of over one billion dollars over 20 years, which would contribute some \$25 million annually to state revenue. However, civil society organizations as well as the IMF (2004) suggested that revenues will only amount to between \$10 and 20 million in the next two decades under the current agreement. In short, there is a question as to whether or not the state will acquire the much coveted revenue in the short to medium term from Sierra Rutile mine. While the government promised to review the concessions in 2009 to ensure they benefit the people of Sierra Leone, the review has not been completed.

The dredge accident also raised the profile of working conditions, grievances and resentments in adjacent communities. A lack of clean water, high unemployment, a disproportionately high cost for basic commodities and a diminishing supply of agricultural land has been reported (Interview 80). Conversations in the communities found that despite promises by the company to provide more wells few have been built. And where wells have been built, it was done without the consultation with the community (Interview 80). In addition, people complained of high prices for basic essentials (Interview 80). As a Sierra Leone civil society group stated, the company is "sitting on top of so much money, but no one benefits" (Interview 81). In addition, as many as 15,000 youth are unemployed in the vicinity of the mine due to consistent rumors of employment that does not exist (Interview 81).

Most contention is over the impacts of the Sierra Rutile mine on agricultural land and consistent accusations that the company's operations are reducing community land without

just compensation or surface rents. Since the process of mining rutile involves removing, dredging, flooding and separating rutile from the topsoil the impact is tremendous. While it remains unknown precisely how much land was impacted hundreds of households have apparently been affected and as the mining site expands this number is expected to increase substantially (NACE 2009). Interviews in the area suggest that mining operations have reduced the available supply of land and this translates into diminished incomes and a lack of food for households (Interview 80). This is significant because most of the available land is used for growing food and there exist few livelihoods alternatives to farming. Making matters worse, many of the people currently losing agricultural land for mining were relocated by Sierra Rutile in the past (NACE 2009). In a survey, NACE (2009, 25) found that approximately 84 percent of affected households are experiencing increasing land pressure that can lead to increased poverty near the mining site.

The make matters worse, the community reported that surface rents paid to the landowners as well as compensation for the loss of crops has been very low in comparison to what the land can produce in food can income over the life of a farmer (Interview 81; NACE 2009). In 2008, it was estimated that Sierra Rutile paid a little over \$11 per acre annually in surface rents.³⁰⁸ In addition, compensation for the loss of crops is not adequate primarily because it is based on one-year of production. As a report by NACE (2009) suggests, a kola tree can produce over 200,000 Leones worth of product per year and can last 30 years, yet compensation is only a one-off payment of 40,000 Leones. The same is true of a mango tree, which can produce up to 400,000 Leones of fruits per year although compensation is just a one-time payment of 50,000 Leones. Like the surface rents, the rates were set through

³⁰⁸ Surface rent rates are set in the agreement between Sierra Rutile and the government and were agreed to without any public consultation or participation. Surface rents are annual payments by the company. The rates were set at \$10 in 2003 with a 3 percent increase per year thereafter. Only 45 percent of the rents accrue to the landowner with 20 percent going to district councils, 20 percent to Chiefdom Development Fund and 15 percent to the Paramount Chief.

negotiations with the company when the mining agreement was finalized with the government. At the same time, communities and land owners have seen little environmental remediation of disturbed mining sites, which are often left flooded and unusable. In the company's Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, it committed to reclaiming more land than it disturbed so the land can be used again for income generation. However, to date of the 13,000 hectares impacted by rutile mining, past and present, perhaps 80 hectares have been rehabilitated (NACE 2009, 27).³⁰⁹

Efforts to relocate communities due to mining operations have been met with resentment and anger. According to NACE (2009) between 1985 and 1994 almost 6,000 people--about 6 percent of the regional population--were relocated with mixed success. While many reported better constructed homes and schools most people also saw a corresponding loss in agricultural land that made them less food secure while reducing incomes. While Sierra Rutile has a policy that every household should be "at least as well off, if not better than it was" before any resettlement--the signs that it will be able to meet its obligations are not good. One case in point is the small village of Foinda, which was scheduled to be moved in 1994 and has been in a state of limbo ever since. In fact, because resettlement has been proposed the company, it has instructed people to not plant cash crops and if they do they will not be compensated. Interviews in the village highlighted a sincere lack of trust in Sierra Rutile particularly whether the company will be able to provide adequate land or development programs to help construct new livelihood opportunities to compensate for relocation. Moreover, the resettlement location - adjacent to the town of Madina, which was relocated in 1994--is largely deemed wholly inadequate (NACE 2009). Not only are schools

³⁰⁹ The amount of land impacted by rutile mining in the area remains unknown. The company cites a figure of about over 3,500 hectares while the World Bank suggests that between 13,000 and 30,000 hectares have been affected.

and health clinics in disrepair but villagers report that since the relocation they have had to rent rather than own land (NACE 2009).³¹⁰

On top of that all this controversy, efforts by the communities to protest the company and raise awareness to their issues has been suppressed by police with some community leaders reportedly detained (Interview 81). The perception is that this heavy handed approach is the result of pressure to extract rutile at all costs given that Sierra Rutile has received generous backing by the government and international organizations, and therefore cannot afford "agitation" that could bring bad publicity or halt production. In the end, what is particularly worrying is that the communities feel as if they are up against a wall, and as one member of civil society suggested, "people are willing to die for this area (Interview 57). While this may be hyperbole, it does not sound like a recipe for peace and development by any standards.

Violence and Koidu Holdings

There appears to be a similar pattern of discontent in the communities surrounding the Koidu Holdings in Kono that began mining Kimberlite diamonds in 2004.³¹¹ Koidu Holdings exported approximately \$28 million in diamonds in 2007, or roughly 20 percent of the Sierra Leone's overall diamond output (NACE 2009). State revenue from these exports amounted to about \$3.2 million of which just \$1.7 million was from royalties. According to the company, it employed about 600 Sierra Leoneans. The revenue projections for the mine have been estimated at almost \$400 million, which would amount to nearly \$25 million in state revenues and an additional sum of several million to the Kono community through a 10 percent profit share.³¹² While increases in revenue and employment are certainly positive

³¹⁰ At the same time there existed only one well for over 600 people.

³¹¹ Koidu Holdings expanded in the Tongo diamond fields by getting a mining lease from the government in 2008.

³¹² This profit sharing agreement was negotiated in 2006 and was scheduled to begin in 2014

signs for the industry, mining operations in Koidu have been undermined by events. In December 2007, violence erupted in Koidu that killed two protestors and brought a halt to operations for nearly two years. While the event itself was significant, the lasting perception, especially among the community and portions of Sierra Leone civil society, is that the protest (and the resulting violence) was effective since it brought a halt to mining operations and got the attention of international actors, the government and Koidu Holdings itself.

The protest, involving an estimated 400 people, was organized by civil society organizations to bring attention to the grievances of the surrounding community's lack of sufficient compensation to landowners for land and crops "taken", problems with relocation of housing in the mining area and the lack of employment opportunities for local people (NACE 2009). For example, like Sierra Rutile, communities were angered over what they saw as a lack of genuine compensation for the loss of land and crops due to mining activities. Like the case of Sierra Rutile, one time payments were offered to farmers that did not approximate the value to employment, livelihoods and household revenues over the long-term. Because the government negotiated the rates of land and crop compensation with the company, communities- some 5,000 households in all-perceive Koidu and the government working together to take and then profit from their land.

Another point of contention is over blasting without adequate notification and relocation. In fact, it was unannounced blasting that led to anger and the subsequent protest in which two people were killed and 18 wounded by bullets fired by armed police forces. As one person who was there mentioned, the people did not think police would actually shoot (Interview 40; Interview 83).³¹³ The blasting shakes the area, reportedly causes damage to property and is stressful to the population, who often gets no advanced warning.³¹⁴ If they do get warning, which is supposed to be two-days in advance, people are often away from their

³¹³ Rumor has it that the police had run out of tear gas, so decided to fire live rounds.

³¹⁴ There is a "blast siren" installed by the company.

homes at times for several hours, if not more. Representatives of the company agree that the community should be evacuated but sometimes this is not possible and blasting is essential for mining and mining brings benefits. There has also been considerable contention over the relocation of those near the mining site and susceptible to the affects of the blasting. Much of the disagreement has been over the type of construction and the relocation site itself, with some people reportedly being bullied by the company and the consultant (CEMMAT) overseeing the Koidu Holdings maintains that it has consulted with those affected but after there is some agreement the community changes its mind and demands more and more. Regardless of who may be "right" in the debate over blasting and relocation little trust exists between communities and the company.

International outcry over the killing of the protesters lead to a halt of all mining operations and resulted in a government enquiry and report.³¹⁵ International peacebuilders were well aware that the conflict started in this area and the stakes were high. The report documents the events of the day and accused the police acting in an "indiscriminate, disproportionate and reckless" manner and suggested that Koidu Holdings should had shown more restraint and sensitivity toward the demonstrators. The report also accused the company of not relocating people in the timeline originally agreed upon and suggested a larger radius from the blasting site be notified. The report also found that the houses built for relocation are "not of a sufficient standard as would be expected of any building being constructed for human habitation in 2008" (Jenkins-Johnson Commission 2008). In addition, the report found failures in basic sanitation and water supply at the resettlement village, without basic facilities (no school or market).

However, in mid-2009 tensions still run high. Little had been done since the enquiry and report and the situation may be getting worse. There is a general perception among the

³¹⁵ See the Report of the Jenkins-Johnson Commission of Enquiry and the Government White Paper on the report of the Jenkins-Johnson Commission.

community that the government is corrupt and does not have an interest in protecting the citizenry but only in ensuring the company can operate to export diamonds. Many in the community asserted that they don't mind mining but want the government to keep its promises. As evidence the government's recommendations were not implemented, the police responsible for shooting the protesters were not prosecuted, and the growing perception that Koidu Holdings is bribing government officials and local chiefs to "look the other way" (Interview 83). The local community believes that even the contractor hired to settle the land, crop and resettlement issues-CEMMAT- lacks any credibility since its owner sits on the board of Koidu Holdings. Only civil society organizations like National Movement for Justice and Democracy (NMJD) are the "only organizations that will tell [us]...what is going on (Interview 84)." A local community organizer sums up the tension by suggesting that people are being "radicalized" and locals "are fed up, and enough is enough" (Interview 83). From the perspective of the company, they doing all they can under difficult economic conditions and that without Koidu Holdings, the employment and economic situation would be much worse for the local people. The common perception among some is that civil society organizations like NMJD are only attempting to agitate the population and put a halt to mining without offering any alternative. In short, these types of "activist" organizations are creating conflict by pitting people against the government and communities. As one international consultant mentioned in passing, civil society was "stoking unrest" and using it as a "bargaining chip."

After almost five years of consultations with international advisors, the government passed the Mines and Minerals Act of 2009.³¹⁶ The Act replaced the Act of 1994 and the subsequent amendments, which was deemed by the international donors as largely not up to

³¹⁶ The government also passed, again with the assistance of international donors and consultants the Diamond Trading Act of 2009 (GoSL 2009b). The Act is intended to provide for the internal monitoring of the production and trade in rough diamonds, controls on the export, import and transit across Sierra Leon and an improved certification scheme under the Kimberly process.

standards. The new Act was to make Sierra Leone the leader in West African mining legislation by balancing the interests of investors and communities and making oversight of the sector and its revenues more transparent in order to benefit the "economy, local communities and the country" (GoSL 2009a, 2). The objective of the Act was to address "several issues not previously covered by the law including health and safety, environmental protection and community development" (GoSL 2009a). The Act was also supposed to help tighten rules for administrators and mineral rights holders and investment and mineral sector development by ensuring security of tenure and rebalancing fiscal arrangements by raising royalty rates for precious stones and minerals.

Controversy over new industrial mining contracts

Although the passing of the Mines and Mineral Act was celebrated as a milestone by the government and international donors, it has also been contentious. Many international and Sierra Leone NGOs believed that the Act had not been properly vetted or publicized, despite the fact that it was in the works for five years (Interview 72). The conventional wisdom was that the rush to pass the law was to "show it off" at a donor's conference in London to potential investors. Others were critical of provisions of the Act that gave mining officials amnesty in dealing with mining companies as long as it could be proven that any improprieties were in "good faith." This provision only serves to concentrate power in the Ministry of Mineral Resources, and can lead to a lack of accountability and corruption. In short, it seemed to give excessive powers to the government, which mirrored pre-war arrangements. These same groups were also critical of the 0.1 percent of the gross revenue that the Act mandated be given to mining communities stating that this seemed low given that "the land belonged to the people, and they must benefit from the mines that destroyed their lands, and forced them out of traditional farming" (Fofana 2009). As one NGO official put it "lands are destroyed by mining without any environmental reclamation; people are paid a

pittance for the land; and agricultural activities that sustain communities are destroyed by big mining corporations in the name of development" (Interview 57). The larger concern, of course, was the laws made in Freetown did not involve or include the input of local people or civil society organizations. When asked about this an international consultant commented that consultations with communities would slow down the process, which needs to be fast-tracked while dealing with international and local civil society groups was limited because they were not "constructive" (Interview 43).

By 2008, the Ministry of Mineral Resources had awarded 83 exclusive exploration or prospecting licenses, ten mining leases and over 20 small-scale mining leases for mechanized gold and diamond operations. This highlights a growing mineral sector. Although the problems with Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings received significant attention, more recently two large scale iron ore agreements, linked to British companies, have raised questions about Sierra Leone's reforms in the mining sector. As the *Economist* (2010) put it Sierra Leone is "breaking its own rules on exploiting resources."

The first is London Mining, which signed an agreement and received a mining lease in 2006 to redevelop an abandoned iron ore mine in Marampa, north of the Freetown. According to London Mining the site consists of about 14 km² of brownfields formerly operated by the state-owned Sierra Leone Development Company.³¹⁷ According to NACE (2010a), a Sierra Leonean NGO, the London Mining lease agreement is illegal, was negotiated in secret, goes against the spirit of reform and represents past practices (NMJD 2010). One of the main concerns, for example, is that agreement grants a tax concession that reduces future benefits to the state and communities substantially. The "tax holiday" would reduce the tax rate from 37.5 percent to six percent for 10 years. While the lease is for 25 years it is renewable under the same terms and conditions for an additional 15 unless the

³¹⁷ The Marampa mine was in operation from the mid-1930s until 1975, reaching peak production in the mid-1960s.

company suggests otherwise. There is no provision for this arrangement in Sierra Leonean law or internationally. As NACE pointed out that although Mines and Mineral Act of 2009 had raised royalty rates on minerals, these were being subverted in favor of fiscal incentives that benefit the company (NACE 2010a). According to the member of an NGO, this places the company above the "law, country and people" (Interview 40). While the company, government and IMF suggest that these "fiscal incentives" are necessary to attract investment and kick start the economy - NGOs such as NACE suggest it is a "bad precedent" for subsequent negotiations on other mining contracts. In short, rather than bring development it will undermine the national development agenda. Another point of contention is the agreement's reported contribution of 0.1 percent Community Development Fund, which is not only a tiny fraction of what was promised to local communities.

Critics have also raised concern about a so-called "confidentiality clause" in the agreement, which will be used to limit the release of public information that undermines Sierra Leone's commitment to transparency and the EITI (NACE 2010b). The company suggests that such confidentiality is needed to protect business interests, NGOs argue that such clauses only create opportunities for government corruption since it obfuscates revenues. Another clause in the agreement that has raised alarm is that the company is not liable for any pollution, loss of land or environmental damage that occurred before the mining lease was signed (NACE 2010b). This has been difficult for the local community because the company was active for years in exploration but cannot be held responsible for damages. In addition, while Sierra Leone's Environmental Protection Agency declared the mine suspended due to a failure to meet environmental requirements, this declaration was mysteriously reversed the same day, leading to perceptions of corruption. As a director of a civil society organization remarked, "is the government in charge of the company or the company in charge of the government" (Interview 43)? While these community-level concerns have garnered local press, it is the apparent lack of transparency that has gotten the

attention of international actors. According to Global Witness the agreement is a "bad deal" for all Sierra Leoneans and should be made public in the spirit of openness and transparency (NMJD 2010). As a member of an international NGO put it, "why spend vast sums of donor money on reforming the mineral sector and passing new laws, if they are only to be ignored" (Interview 43).

A much larger agreement, and to date a more controversial one, is with Africa Minerals, who has succeeded at getting a 25 year mining lease on arguably the largest deposit of magnetite in the world. According to geologists almost 10 billion tons of iron ore may be contained in the area around Tonkolili. According to the company's controversial chairman Frank Timmis, the mine will be Africa's largest and one of its lowest-cost producers (*The Exclusive* 2009).³¹⁸ The mine is expected to begin exports at the end 2011 with total exports to reach \$1 billion by 2018 and help the country bring about "financial independence" (Scanlon 2010). Timmis claims that at its peak, the mine could generate revenue of \$3 billion a year, which would be six times the annual revenue of the country (*Reuters* 2010). To mine the ore the company is beginning to construct a 200 km railway line to the port at Targrin and update the port, which would handle the export of up to 45 million tons of ore annually. The company also announced that it expects employ 10,000 Sierra Leoneans directly or indirectly at the mining site, which would make it the largest employer in the country.³¹⁹ President Koroma in a speech at the groundbreaking in Targrin stated that the partnerships with the private sector - like African Minerals- is vital for national development agenda and economic growth (*The Exclusive* 2009). The President of Sierra Leone stated that "mining companies

³¹⁸ Frank Timmis, CEO of African Minerals has been controversial. A Romanian, Timmis moved to Australia started a gold mining company and became successful. However, a mine he owned in Romania led to local tensions and environmental degradation. Another company he founded, Regal Petroleum was at the center of a scheme to sell off the company after claims that of a Greek Oilfield held the largest reserves in Europe were found to be false

³¹⁹ Not a small thing in a country where 800,000 youths are without full employment (out of a total population of 6 million).

are indispensable partners in development" and stressed the importance of transparency and creating a stable and conducive business climate in which mining companies can "operate freely and which guarantees fair returns on investments" (*The Exclusive* 2009). Africa Minerals has been helped by a \$1.5 billion dollar investment by Shandong Iron and Steel Group, one of China's largest state-owned steel mills. At the same time, China Railway Materials Commercial Corporation purchased a 12.5 percent stake in Africa Minerals.

The problem, according to international and local NGOs is that the mining agreement fails to conform to the new mining act that Sierra Leone drew up in 2009 with substantial international support. According to NACE the agreement contains at least 10 clauses that contradict existing Sierra Leonean law and proclaim that the country is on a "precipice" and needs a "agreed, transparent, legal regime to ensure that mining companies finally operate in ways that benefit Sierra Leoneans" (NACE 2010). Not only has the agreement been viewed as illegal but was carried out in secrecy. Like the other large mineral deal that was pushed through, it does not meet the tax rate of 37.5 percent, instead paying only six percent initially and exempt when in a tax loss position.³²⁰ Others are also skeptical about the sudden "spectacular discovery" of "high quality grade ore" especially given Timmis' history in the Regal Petroleum debacle (Interview 72). The behavior of the government resembles that of diggers and miners motivated by the possibility of fast and easy "winnings" in the short term at the expense of long-term security and development. There is no independent verification of the precise amounts of iron ore in African Minerals concession area nor the precise numbers that may be employed and it is not uncommon for prospectors to exaggerate a "find" so as to attract support from actors and weaken any proponents of the project. For example, NGOs and civil society organizations in Sierra Leone that have been questioning the legality

³²⁰ According to the Minister of the Mines and Mineral Resources, after the initial period of a tax holiday and assuming the company is not in a tax loss position, the country would eventually get 41 percent of revenue (including taxes, royalties, surface fees, etc). However, according to the President this will be 25 percent. The point is nobody really knows what is in the agreement.

of the African Minerals (and London Mining) agreement have been accused of "not having the country's national interest in mind."

The dispute over African Minerals goes well beyond the mining lease and agreement due to recent tensions with local communities that have turned violent. These problems are generally around the company not keeping promises to local communities. The company has promised to provide training and new schools but have thus far failed to do so. However, most disputes are over land in Kemedugu area. In one case, young men became upset over the company destroying piece of farmland to construct a dam and barricaded a road and effectively took several members of the company hostage. The farmland was deemed to be "sacred bush" for the community. Although the group wanted to negotiate with the company and be included in decisions that impact their land, local police used tear gas and live rounds to disperse a crowd of protestors. New reports at the time suggested that several protestors were badly beaten and hospitalized and that fearing retribution from police young men fled the area. Tensions remain high with local groups damaging a drilling rig valued at over \$400,000 in protest. Others residents of the community have refused to abandon the land the company has been planning to excavate only increasing resentment. Although the company insists that it will relocate villages in the vicinity of mining operations, communities remain skeptical given the problems and controversies associated with resettlement at Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings. The fact is that the mining operations at African Minerals (and London Mining) are only in the initial stages yes conflict over land and benefits is already boiling over. The problem is that mines and the related infrastructure require land just as communities require land for livelihoods and farming, so there is bound to be contention and conflict.

The core argument for pursuing industrial-scale mineral extraction was its ability to contribute large revenues to the state for the purpose of reconstruction and development. By 2010, almost eight years after the conflict came to an end this objective has had very mixed

results. While revenues have increased due in part to the Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holding starting production as well as companies like African Minerals and London Mining turning from exportation to mining, thus far at least revenues are far below projections. This is due to a combination of factors that have been discussed above, not least of which may be overinflated and unrealistic projections. These projections of the productive potential of the sector not only work to drive the sector forward but it also creates unrealistic expectations. Postconflict countries tend to have higher expectations for "rapid, equitable and visible development progress" (UNEP 2009, 57). However, these expectations can not only over estimate the amount of revenue available that might be available to the government but also have implications at the local level where the people expect to see immediate peace dividends. When these dividends do not materialize--either in the form of jobs, health centers, education or development projects- then there is the potential for popular resentment and grievance - although the consequences are far from clear. While potentially justified, the lack of immediate social services from companies has resulted in growing accusations over government corruption. In short, in a sector that incentivizes outlandish projections there is a need to manage expectations both in terms of what is realistic and

At the same time, however, overhauling mineral governance, including efforts at transparency and accountability were viewed as essential to ensuring revenues do not get absorbed into patronage networks or undermine security. There have certainly been notable improvements but again the record is mixed at best. The mining cadastral project is a case in point. International donors and financial institutions funded the development of a cadastral system as a critical part of modernizing and bringing clarity to the sector by linking geographic locations to ownership, mining rights and payment of fees. While the Ministry of Mineral Resources supported the project in theory, implementation has been slow. Government officials suggest this is due to a lack of knowledge and capacity since the system is composed of a computerized data base. However, international consultants have argued

that the cadastre project would begin to chip away at the discretionary decisions that officials leverage for side benefits and therefore have been reluctant to move forward (Interview 41). More specifically, maintaining uncertainty and disorder about ownership, licensing, and prospecting, exploration and production activities benefits both companies and government officials. Or put another way, lack of capacity or "incompetence" is orchestrated to create confusion, which ends up benefiting a "faceless" groups of politicians and other elites (Interview 43). There is also concern that state revenues from the sector remain less than transparent. Although the first EITI report found discrepancies over almost \$1 million over a two year period this was deemed the result of government entities failing to report or the inability to substantiate payments (EITI 2010). Le Billon and Levin (2009, 709-710) suggest that these totals contrast sharply when land rental fees are added in, questioning the veracity of revenue transparency initiatives.³²¹

At the same time, the secrecy in which large industrial contracts, which involve large sums of money, is becoming an increasing concern of the international community. While international and local NGOs have been vocal about the lack of transparency and accountability in the sector, international actors remain cautiously optimistic. While international pressure led the government to form a task force to examine the mining contracts for Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings, there is growing apprehension about the African Minerals and London Mining contracts. The UN's Executive Representative in Sierra Leone cautioned that while the country's mineral endowment may bring help "break...high donor dependency...[and] pursue development goals more aggressively" dependence on the export of raw materials can cause "social disruptions, huge income disparities and rampant corruption" that can result in conflicts (von der Schulenburg 2010). The UN representative suggested that the iron ore contracts could be a "game changer" that

³²¹ Le Billon and Levin report that when a multilateral funding agency expressed concerns about revenue transparency they were told to be "quieter for their own security." (2009, 706).

alters the country's economic, political and social landscape in ways that may simply "dwarf the capacities of the government itself" (von der Schulenburg 2010). Of particular concern was whether the mining agreements were done transparently and if they are in compliance with the new mining law. A still larger concern was impact such "huge commercial interests could have on the integrity of an underpaid public service, the media and civil society" (von der Schulenburg 2010). While interviews with British and US government officials in Sierra Leone turned up similar concerns, as one mentioned ironically, they are "reluctant to get involved in the internal decisions [of the Sierra Leonean government] (Interview 84).

Contention in the small-scale mining sector

It should also be noted that although much attention has focused on these large-scale industrial operations there has also been increasing conflict around smaller companies that are exploring, prospecting or beginning to extract minerals. A report by a group of civil society organizations, for example, argued that in Kono District the Sierra Leone Mining Company and Milestone Mining Company were not operating in accordance with national laws or international standards, keeping secret both the mining lease agreements and the required Environmental Impact Assessments. Moreover, local chiefdom authorities have been accused of selling off lands to mining companies without consultation or consent of chiefdom people (NACE 2006). Landowners reported being denied access to their farmland, which was described as "grabbed" by the mining companies without permission or compensation (CJM 2007). According to community testimonies, the Sierra Leone Mining Company had taken hold of substantial land holdings with no regard for the need of local communities to farm or "sacred bush" that forms the core of local custom and tradition (CJM

2007).³²² While chiefdom officials announced that they gave permission for mining operations on approximately 130 acres it was done with the tacit agreement that the company would support community development projects although nothing had been done in this regard. Furthermore, any effort to investigate the company's mining areas was either deterred by Sierra Leone police forces or young men wielding knives.³²³

While problems in the large and smaller-scale industrial sector point not only to mixed results but increasing levels of conflict and contention that may be undermining the consolidation of peace, other related dynamics exists in the alluvial mining sector. While revenues are increasing due in part to more government control of the sector and the Kimberly Process, significant challenges remain. The foremost of these is that alluvial diamond mining is in decline in Sierra Leone and despite the best efforts of programs to improve the lot of diggers and communities; nothing will restore diamonds to the ground. Anybody that has spent time with diggers (and miners) in the pits of Sierra Leone understands that while many harbor dreams of "getting rich" by finding a particularly rare or large diamond, most are simply trying to earn a livelihood. The problem is that alluvial deposits in the both due to growing scarcity in combination with unequal power relations in the diamond mines will fail to meet livelihood needs and provide future opportunities for youth.

And two other factors will continue to diminish the ability of youth find even meager livelihoods. First, international security imperatives to control illegal alluvial mining and government's pursuit of revenue from legal mining has lead to a crackdown that reducing even further the available opportunities while fostering resentment. It is not uncommon for police to issue warnings that illegal mines will "face the full brunt of the country's law"

³²² According to Ministry of Mineral Resource data (2008), the Sierra Leone Mining Company has exclusive prospecting licenses to almost 25,000 hectares, at least half of which is in Kono District.

³²³ Reports suggest that the mining company hired young thugs to break up any meeting that was being held to discuss the areas mines.

(Yongai 2009). While this hard-handed approach may work to discourage some illegal operations, often these operations reflect a sincere search for livelihoods by diggers and miners, and securitization by police forces is an unwarranted intrusion of state power, especially because these illegal mines are more often than no implicitly sanctioned by local chiefs and power brokers. In these cases, the security threat of illegal mining is exaggerated while the contribution to incomes, poverty alleviation and livelihoods goes underemphasized. Second, diminishing alluvial diamonds reserves that can be extracted by hand-and pressure to garner tax revenue-is increasing the pressure to mechanize and corporatize the sector. This not only reduces the need for artisanal diggers and miners (and their dependents) that relies on alluvial mining for livelihoods but also can have environmental implications on streams that diminish neighboring diamond mining activities as well as This has resulted in growing numbers of conflict, some turning violent (World Bank 2008b).

More importantly perhaps is a growing recognition that a majority of diggers want alternative livelihoods. Specifically, a large majority of young men who toil in alluvial diamond pits want to be engaged in subsistence agriculture but have limited or no opportunities to do so.³²⁴ This is partially the result of land scarcity that is due almost exclusively to exclusive land ownership and tenure rights that make acquiring land for farming and agricultural production almost impossible for diggers (or unemployed youth, more broadly). The fact is that alluvial miners have other possible livelihoods. Interviews with diggers in Kono District find conclusively that young men go into diamond mining because there is no other means of making a living and once they are "hooked" on mining it is difficult to find other work. Land in Sierra Leone is either owned by powerful elites who are provided access by the government through concessions to grow cash crops or administered by local chiefs with incentives to control land for patronage and economic and

³²⁴ Often these young men want to return to their home communities.

political power.³²⁵ This dynamic of increasing elite control of agricultural land is only being exacerbated by efforts to both increase the role of small scale mining companies and divvy up the country to large international mining companies.³²⁶ As has been recounted above, this is already creating contention and conflict among landowners and communities more generally. Put simply, diggers, and to a lesser extent miners, are trapped between an occupation they did not choose (alluvial mining) and an occupation they cannot have (agriculture), and this is beginning to foster increasing resentment and contention as the youth population continues to grow and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods shrink. This is despite a wealth of good faith efforts to govern alluvial diamonds and increase the benefits to miners by international actors and the government.

Finally, there is indeed a segment of civil society that question the long-term development prospects of mineral exploitation and whether the benefits from mineral resources can really be the key to postconflict peace and development. From this perspective, minerals-whether alluvial diamonds or large-scale industrial operations-offer little hope to the population. This perspective is derived from the undisputable fact that Sierra Leone has been mining diamonds for three-quarters of a century and still remains one of the most impoverished countries in the world. What is most striking is that the regions with the highest levels of poverty have been those in districts and chiefdoms that rely on mining or are adjacent to large-scale mining operations (UNEP 2010). As one person was quoted as saying-"we see diamonds carted away from here daily, but remain impoverished" (Fofana 2009). In addition, the country has a checkered history with the mining sector, including exploitation of workers, human rights abuses, environmental degradation and war and the notion that better governance and more efficient state control can transform decades of

³²⁵ Many Paramount Chiefs charge substantial "rents" for access and are therefore reluctant to relinquish any control of land in the chiefdom.

³²⁶ There is also a large drive to privatize land for massive agricultural plantations for cash crops.

mismanagement, patronage and corruption into prosperity in a matter of years is met with genuine cynicism.

An influential member of a civil society group working on mining matters suggests that it is important to understand that natural resource and environment issues and the struggles of communities are not only complex but have been going on forever. What is new is that the international community has been made more aware of them and civil society is more powerful in terms of its authority and legitimacy. Sierra Leone developed and perpetuated an opportunistic system in which politicians that "think they own the country" use the business of resources to gain more control and power. In short, many argue that at the heart of Sierra Leone's problem is elite struggle to extract resources as quick as possible—often with the same people in power—because they may be out of power next week. Not only does this fail to lift up the population up and contribute to development and genuine poverty alleviation but leads to plunder of the country's resources. What is ironic is that the policies of the international donors and the international financial institutions seem to be rebuilding if not intensifying pre-war mining arrangements and many in international and local groups are asking whether the industrial model is worth it. And while it is often local elites that gain, some NGOs accuse the international community of promoting a development model grounded in the sense that if resources are governed well it will benefit the country and its people. However, this puts the people last and the "wealthy class" first. As one member of a local NGO summed it up, "Sierra Leone has gone full circle, [we]...are in the same place as before the war" and that in many ways the only "counter-force" holding the country together is a shared "war-weariness" (Interview 57).

International donors and the government, on the other hand, counter with two arguments. First, despite the problems in the mineral sector the country is on the right track. For a country that needed to basically start from scratch in terms of industrial scale mining and regain control of an ungovernable alluvial sector it has made tremendous progress. The

reforms that have been implemented need time to work but have shown in other places that over long-term extractive industries will add to state revenues, benefit local communities and support sustainable development (World Bank 2005). The key to such reforms is to manage expectations, implement measures to increase transparency and decrease corruption, and provide regulatory clarity so reputable companies will want to invest in a risky postconflict setting in a risky industry. Although the World Bank and IMF caution against continued "fiscal incentives" to mining companies such "easy deals" was deemed an imperfect necessity in order to raise state revenue and jump-start the sector World Bank 2005; IMF 2004).

Second, there is the widespread view that Sierra Leone really has no choice but to fast-track the industrial mineral sector. As the director of an international organization explained the Minister of Finance cannot even import gas or pay government salaries without mineral revenues and if the country is going to alleviate poverty and improve economic growth a future of mineral exports are vital. Moreover, there is a growing acknowledgement that artisanal mining while politically significant is not efficient or productive in terms of long-term economic productivity. Calls by NGOs to close the sector or slow it down as to be more participatory are accused of ignorance of the realities and practicalities of Sierra Leone and the need to engage in international trade. These same NGOs are blamed for following their own narrow agenda and not being representative of the communities they claim to support. At least one Sierra Leonean NGOs has been called "treasonous". In fact, interviews with civil society organizations routinely turned up the perception that the government and mining companies were trying to divide people by colluding with local leaders while the government and mining companies accused NGOs of exactly the same thing (Interview 83; Interview 40). Suffice to say, the mineral sector is divisive and becoming increasingly politicized.

In sum, mineral reform in Sierra Leone is arguably in a state of confusion. While international actors and the government point to increasing state revenues and a new Mines and Mineral Act as obvious successes, the ups-and-downs of the global economy as well as

increasing contention raises serious questions. What is known, however, is that considerable human and financial capital has been spent on the premise that mineral wealth can be transformed into postconflict peace expectations of the population remain high.

Conclusion

International peacebuilding organizations by-and-large understand the relationship between diamonds and the Sierra Leonean conflict as characterized by "blood diamonds". The problem was that rebels groups were able to trade diamonds in exchange for weapons, which destabilized West Africa and threatened international security. The central peacebuilding challenge, then, was for IBOs was to consolidated state authority and control over diamonds and diamond producing areas, and improve governance to ensure diamond revenue funds economic recovery rather than conflict. Due to an inherent distrust that diamonds could be readily controlled, IBOs have also stressed the importance of rebuilding Sierra Leone's mineral sector. The objective of IBOs was to transform problematic "conflict diamonds" into "peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace.

This chapter has tracked the diamond and mineral reform process--including new policies, laws, regulations and practices. I have argued that the reforms and policies are designed to "securitize" and "marketize" diamonds and minerals. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, IBOs were concerned with securing Sierra Leone's diamonds by promoting and supporting the establishment of reforms and policies to consolidate state control and authority over diamonds revenues. These reforms and policies stressed the importance of "good governance", including the improvement of revenue transparency, government accountability and public participation. The ultimate purpose was to ensure the dynamics of "blood diamonds" do not reoccur. The reforms and policies promoted by international peacebuilders also stress what I refer to as "marketization", as exemplified by the emphasis on "formalizing" the alluvial diamonds sector and restarting the industrial mining sector. The

overarching rationale among IPOs is that stagnant economic growth, poverty and a lack of state revenue threaten a sustainable and long-term peace.

The reforms and policies appear to have influenced the consolidation of state authority over the alluvial diamond sector, which has helped to provide stability and raise considerable revenue. At the same time, efforts to restart the industrial mining sector have resulted in several major concessionary agreements and new sources of state revenue. All of this has led to a perceptible uptick in the country's GDP. At the same time, however, everything is not alright with the diamond and mineral sectors. There is substantial contention and resistance over the "rules of the game"--that define how people behave relative diamonds and minerals--and their consequences. In the alluvial diamond sector a combination of the state "cracking down" on "illicit" operations, mechanization, and a lack of available land and alternative livelihoods is creating palpable resentment and potentially deepening poverty. At the same time, efforts to "jump-start" industrial mining have resulted in not only resentment and anger over conditions in adjacent communities but also episodes of violence. Central areas of contention and resistance revolve around the perception of too much state power, corruption, a lack of land and livelihoods, and exclusion. After much optimism there is a sense that things are reverting back to past practices (Interview 57). The larger issue, which I turn to in the next chapter, is to understand what the source of the underlying tensions might be, and determine the potential consequences might be for peacebuilding.

Chapter 8: Governing the Environment and Natural Resources: Pathologies and Consequences

In Liberia and Sierra Leone civil conflict has not resumed and this is the result of a host of contingent factors, not least of which is sustained peace operations and intervention by international peacebuilding organizations. Peace remains fragile in both countries but given the extent of the brutality and violence it is an impressive accomplishment. Yet, the question I pose is not whether conflict resumes or not. Instead, my objective is to examine how environmental and natural resource governance reforms help or hinder peacebuilding. To be more precise if environmental and natural resource governance "helps" peacebuilding, we should be able to detect a related decrease in the propensity of violence. At the same time, if environmental and natural resource governance "hinders" peacebuilding, we should be able to identify a subsequent increase in propensity of violence. As the cases show, international peacebuilders have been actively involved in promoting and supporting the establishment of reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural resources in an effort to transform "conflict resources" into "peace resources". In short, international peacebuilders have been actively engaged in altering the "rules of the game" with the objective of turning "bad governance into good governance" and by extension conflict into peace (Chandler 2010, 6).

The purpose of this chapter is to compare IBO efforts to govern Liberia's forests and Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals, respectively. First, I explore the similarities and differences. What I find--and what is nakedly evident from reading the case studies--is that IBOs have responded to the problem of "conflict resources" in broadly similar way that leads

to reforms and policies that are strikingly analogous, almost as if they were being written by the same "script". I argue that this indicates the development of standardized set of peacebuilding practices--with regards to environmental and natural resource governance. While these have produced some positive benefits, a closer look at the cases reveals a mixed verdict. Rather than serve as focal points for trust, confidence and cooperation, the reforms and policies are divisive and wrought with contention and resistance--some resulting in violence. I suggest the reason is that "securitization" and "marketization" give rise to numerous linked pathologies that include: the danger of inattention to livelihoods and the environment, the problem of unrealistic expectations, the risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements; and the danger of provoking societal competition. Given these inherent effects and pathologies, environmental and natural resource governance may be counterproductive for peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone because they increase the propensity for violence. To reduce methodological uncertainties, I also briefly examine the relative lack of international attention to governing diamonds and minerals in Liberia and forests in Sierra Leone.

The Development of Standardized Peacebuilding Practices

The problem and solution: From "conflict resources" to "peace resources"

Over the last decade, the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been the subject of a growing literature that has improved our understanding of complex, puzzling, and horrific civil wars. Despite this literature, however, there remains a general inability of analysts to fully comprehend the conflict, and instead focus on aspects that are easier for (Western) audiences and policy makers to digest. Early explanations of the conflicts, for example, focused on the region's Hobbesian "state of nature", characterized by "new

barbarism" in which irrational and uncivilized warlords and rebels--motivated by ethnic hatreds or primordial savagery--committed murder for no reason (Kaplan 1994; Richards 1996). Other explanations blamed the conflict on globalization and the end of the Cold War, which undermined state institutions and made countries ungovernable (Kaldor 1999). As discussed in Chapter 4, explanations for the Liberian conflict center on the economic motives of combatants, and the responsibility valuable natural resources played in starting and fueling the 14-year civil war. Such narratives emphasize the role of "greedy" warlords and corrupt government officials, who traded in "blood timber"--among other resources--to amass wealth and buy weapons. Liberia remains to this day the "poster child" of a greed-driven, natural resource conflict, and *the* prime example of a "new war" fought over forests and their revenues (de Jong, Donovan and Ken-Ichi 2007). The conflict in Sierra Leone, likewise, conflict, is explained through the lens of "economic agendas" and "conflict resources". Such explanations highlighted the role of "loot-seeking" rebels and "greedy" warlords--most prominently Liberia's Charles Taylor--that plundered Sierra Leone's vast diamond deposits to buy arms, get rich and sustain conflict. In fact, Sierra Leone will forever be synonymous with the term "blood diamonds (Campbell 2004).

It's worth repeating that the practice of controlling the environment and natural resources for power and patronage--at the expense of the population--has a long historical trajectory in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Until the late 1990s--a full six or seven years after the conflicts began-- it caused little alarm among the international community. However, several issues intersected to construct the problem of "conflict resources". First, a flurry of academic work linking the environment and natural resources to civil conflict emerged to influence how IPOs came to understand the problem. In short, abundant natural resources were a cause for alarm since they could not only entice undermine government or even increase poverty but instigate rebellion. Second, international non-governmental organizations increasingly put the "spotlight" on the role of diamonds or timber in fueling the

conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and elsewhere. Given public pressure to do something, and the emerging idea that peacebuilding needed to expand to address new challenges, the issue of "conflict resources" garnered tremendous attention among IPOs. Because the UN had been unsuccessful to some degree ending wars through negotiation (the Liberian civil war had at least 14 separate peace agreements), mitigating conflict by controlling the trade in natural resources was appealing. And finally, the international security implications of "conflict resources" increased dramatically after news reports surfaced that diamonds were indirectly funding *al Qaeda* operations after 9/11 (Farah 2001). Almost overnight the issue of failed states and the global trade in natural resources merged with the "War on Terror" (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004).

As discussed in Chapter 3, the extensive literature linking the environment and natural resources to civil conflict remain tentative and controversial, at best. Despite these ambiguities, the idea of "conflict resources" remains a central "problem" for in the world of peacebuilding and has come to define how IPOs understand the relationship between the environment, natural resources and conflict. Because of this, it has also had a profound influence on the ways in which IPOs understand the linkages between the environment, natural resources and peace. The dominant way the environment and natural resources are to help consolidate peace or improve international security involves using them as "peace resources". "Peace resources" stresses the idea that financial flows from high-value natural resources can "fund" peace, particularly if the state has the capacity, authority and legitimacy to govern. The general assumption, which emerges from the peacebuilding literature, is that rebuilding war-torn states, and providing for people in the aftermath of conflict, requires substantial state revenue to repair infrastructure, pay government officials and provide basic services. In this way, the government can signal to potential combatants that the benefits of peace outweigh the costs. A second key assumption is that establishing a sustainable and long-term peace requires economic growth, which is the best way to raise incomes and

provide employment. Recall, that in Liberia, the commercial timber sector is a critical part of the country's peacebuilding strategy based on its potential to trigger economic growth, alleviate poverty, and provide state revenue and employment opportunities. A similar dynamic, of course, exists in Sierra Leone where formalizing the export of rough diamonds and resurrecting the industrial mining sector are deemed by IBOs to be key components in the transition from conflict to development.

While Liberia and Sierra Leone share a similar pattern with regards to how international peacebuilders understand the environment and natural resources, there are some distinctive features. In Liberia, "conflict timber" is associated to the corrupt government of Charles Taylor, more so than to rebel groups. As discussed in Chapter 6, timber was of little concern to international peacebuilders in the years before Taylor became president despite evidence that rebels were using some timber exports to fund the conflict. Conversely, in Sierra Leone "conflict diamonds" were linked to marauding rebels even though subsequent research suggests that rebel groups, government soldiers ("sol-bels"), political elites, and peacekeepers all colluded to main disorder so as to trade diamonds. Despite this, the Government of Sierra Leone has largely been viewed as an important ally to ending the trade in "conflict diamonds". Stated another way, "conflict resources" in Sierra Leone existed in "weak states" in which diamond- producing areas lacked state power and authority. The opposite was true in Liberia, which was in a sense considered an "strong state" because of its ability to keep the country "stable" and secure even though it was corrupt and suppressing any political opposition.

These differences may be because timber and diamonds have a different character, which creates differences in types of "conflict resources". Diamonds are extraordinarily "lootable"-- meaning they are not costly to extract, do not require expertise and are widely accessible. In addition, diamonds are derived from a "point source", dispersed over a broad area, and have a high value to weight ratio that promotes smuggling. As the Sierra Leone

case underscores, diamonds exporters could simply go to Guinea or Liberia to gain access. This dynamic produces resources that are more conducive to rebel or insurgent movements often thought to be associated with the trade in conflict resources. Timber, on the other hand, is more diffuse although capturing extensive rents requires road building, sophisticated means of transportation and the control of ports. This explains --in part--Taylor's need to collude with timber companies, and control major transit points. It should be noted, however, that although timber was used by Taylor and other rebel groups, it was always the "second choice." Even as the president of a "strong state", Taylor preferred to trade diamonds from Sierra Leone to fund conflict because they were more valuable, required less infrastructure to exploit and could be easily transported. Recall, that only after UN sanctions were imposed on diamonds transiting through Liberia did Taylor turn aggressively to timber exports.

The peacebuilding strategy: Securitization and marketization

Despite differences, however, the framing of "conflict resources" and "peace resources" by international peacebuilding organizations in Liberia and Sierra Leone is analogous. The irony, of course, is that in both cases the "conflict resources" are the "peace resources", and vice versa. The central dilemma for peacebuilders is, then, to reduce the threat of "conflict resources" and subsequently leverage the benefits of "peace resources". As noted throughout, international peacebuilders have been actively involved in promoting and supporting the establishment of reforms and policies aimed at a "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural resources in an effort to transform "conflict resources" into "peace resources". What is striking is that despite differences in the cases, and differences in the character of the resources themselves, efforts to alter the "rules" that govern forests in Liberia and diamonds and minerals in Sierra Leone are strikingly similar.

Concern that "conflict resources" would continue to fuel conflict and threaten international security increased the pressure on IPOs to do something. A common refrain

was that UN peacekeepers should deploy to resource-rich areas to disrupt the illicit trade in "conflict resource" at the source. However, in both cases, physically controlling territory was not feasible. First, the UN was sensitive to sovereignty claims. In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL's mandate did not address diamonds or seek to interfere with the country's economic activity. Even as evidence mounted that diamonds were fueling the conflict, the UN was reluctant to approve deployments that might result in fighting to control mining areas. To complicate matters, UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were actively involved in illegal mining and colluding with rebel groups (UNSC 2000; Keen 2005). It would be three years after the conflict officially ended, in fact, that peacebuilders received a mandate to assist Sierra Leone's security forces to secure "illegal" diamond mining areas. Learning from Sierra Leone experience, the UNMIL mission in Liberia did allow peacekeepers to assist the government to "restore proper administration of natural resources", including timber-producing areas (UNSC 2003c). The problem is that forest areas in Liberia are vast, dense, remote, and almost impossible to police. The best UN peacebuilders could do was control points of entry so that timber could not be openly shipped out of the country illegally.

The deployment of UN peacekeepers aside, strategies to control "conflict resources" in both cases began with UN sanctions. The objective of the sanctions was to stem the flows of revenue from natural resources to combatants, and increase security by excluding timber or diamonds from international trade. The fundamental problem the sanctions sought to address was the lack of state control and authority over contested, resource-rich areas. This is particularly interesting because in Liberia the problem with conflict resources. In addition, the sanctions provided early framework indicating the "rules of the game" should established to get UN sanctions lifted. And third, the sanctions for carrying out international attention to conflict resources and as a tool to leverage action. In both cases, the sanctions were a starting point for subsequent actions and resolutions. The sanctions also functioned as a critical focal point for discussions, meetings and international reports and debate about reforms, policies,

laws and regulations. In both cases, the trigger for lifting of the sanctions revolved around the degree to which state control over natural resources had to be subjectively achieved. In Liberia, forest areas are difficult to "control" so passing reforms and policies provided enough evidence to peacebuilders that the state had consolidated authority over the sector. In Sierra Leone, the lifting of the sanctions occurred after official exports of rough diamonds had increased and Sierra Leone committed to the Kimberley Process.

There are some differences worth noting. First, international peacebuilding organizations were reluctant to place sanctions on Liberian timber. This reluctance stemmed from the perception that sanctions would interfere with the country's sovereignty since Taylor had been "freely" elected. Timber exports were also important to France, China and other importers, which slowed any attempts to implement sanctions. Only after evidence emerged that Taylor was using timber revenue to support the RUF and destabilize Sierra Leone did the conflict resources narrative emerge and UN sanctions materialize. Another difference between the cases was that diamonds were viewed not only as a Sierra Leone specific issue but an international "problem" that needed an international solution. This resulted in the Kimberley Process. In contrast, "blood timber" in Liberia was not viewed in the same way, and did not result in a scheme equivalent to the Kimberley Process. The reason for this difference has to do with the character of alluvial diamonds, which are easily smuggled and once removed from their country are difficult to track. Moreover, since diamonds require extensive labor--mostly from young men --IPOs worry about the threat of renewed conflict. In addition, "conflict diamonds" not "conflict timber" was linked to the "War on Terror" with the US government support for Kimberly Process increased dramatically after 9/11 (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004).

Beyond UN sanctions there is also broad similarity in the host of international initiatives and programs that emerged in both countries. These initiatives and programs had almost an identical intent--to assist governments to gain control of natural resources and

begin to lay the groundwork for new reforms and policies to address the problem of conflict resources. In Sierra Leone, the most notable initiatives are the Kimberley Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which were created to monitor the trade in rough diamonds and increase transparency of diamonds revenues. The impetus for both initiatives, of course, was to help securitize the trade in conflict diamonds and ensure that associated revenues do not reignite conflict. Likewise, in Liberia, the Liberia Forest Initiative and GEMAP were promoted by peacebuilders to deal with controlling the problem of "conflict timber". Recall that LFI was tasked with helping the government establish its authority over forest resources and creating policies to allocate resources in an equitable and transparent manner. GEMAP, on the other hand, was intended to improve transparency and financial management of the resources sector.

While UN sanctions and various initiatives are important ways in which peacebuilders shape reforms and policies, they are involved in promulgating and promoting particular reforms and policies. While some differences emerge, the reforms and policies are closely matched in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In both cases, "securitizing" the environment and natural resources includes a focus on "good governance". Specifically, reforms and policies emphasize revenue transparency, government accountability and public participation. This should not be surprising because "poor governance" and corruption of the natural resources sectors is what peacebuilders understand as a critical factor in precipitating "conflict resources". Good governance is also viewed by IPOs as vital to enhancing public trust that is necessary to gain state legitimacy and maintain order.

The reforms and policies promoted and supported by international peacebuilders followed a concerted strategy of securitization to help establish order and control "conflict resources". But securitization of the natural resources sectors had another purpose, to help establish the conditions to jump-starting economic recovery. Recall that efforts to resume the timber trade in Liberia began immediately following the conflict. The drive to marketize

Liberia's forests was based on generous revenue projections and the perception that the timber sector could provide jobs and alleviate poverty. Despite stalling by the transitional government all forest concessions in the country were cancelled to make a clean break between the "old" and the "new". Although the forest agenda appears broad and inclusive because it incorporates the "three C's"--conservation, commercial and community-- the reforms and policies prioritize commercial timber, and specifically, promote actions that need to be taken so that timber harvesting can commence. The efforts to restart industrial mining in Sierra Leone closely resemble that of Liberia. The sector ceased to operate during the conflict but in the immediate aftermath became an international peacebuilding priority. Rebuilding the sector was triggered by sizeable revenue projections as well as the conventional wisdom that the mineral sector can provide employment and alleviate poverty. It was also seen as an alternative to the alluvial diamond sector since it is easier to tax and more secure because it cannot be exploited by rebel groups. While there was language in the reforms and policies referring to "social and environmentally responsible development", the dominant agenda was to negotiate agreements with individual companies so that mining operations could resume production as quickly as possible.

The key reforms and policies in each sector also mirror each other quite closely. The central elements of Liberia's forest reforms focus on new laws and regulations detailing the qualifications for conducting timber harvests, the issuing of concessions and contracts, managing forests and disbursing taxes, fees and royalty payments. Granted, reforms and policies do stress transparency accountability, participation and equitable benefit sharing but these exist only to govern commercial timber operations. The point is that the reforms and policies put a priority on marketizing Liberia's forests. The commonalities are striking in comparison to Sierra Leone's mineral sectors, in which new laws and regulations discussed in Chapter 7 focus on the acquisition of mineral rights, issues of mineral licenses, mining practices, and tax, royalty and duty rates. Like Liberia, there are numerous reforms and

policies that emphasize the transparency, local participation, accountability and community benefits but these are largely *in relation to* the larger marketization strategies. In short, reforms and policies promote a strategy in which marketization represents a dominant element of both Liberia's and Sierra Leone's natural resource governance agenda.

The prominence of marketization is can be seen the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) of both countries. Liberia, for instance, focuses on reforms and policies that promote an open economy linked to international trade and amenable to foreign investment. The private sector is the "main driver of growth" (IMF 2008, 21). While the PRSP suggests Liberia's overall strategy includes references to infrastructure improvements, diversification, and the provision of basic services, the central priority is to revive traditional sources of economic growth, which includes most prominently timber. The rationale: alleviate poverty, "create significant numbers of jobs, provide substantial budget revenues and initiate rapid growth" (IMF 2008, 36). Sierra Leone's PRSP stressed in almost identical fashion the need to "open up of investment and trade to deliver economic growth" (IMF 2005, 6). Despite calls to improve infrastructure, diversity the economy and promote human development, the PRSP argued for increased investment in the mining sector because it "directly impacts the economy as a whole" and the "ability of the government to generate resources" (IMF 2005, 93-95). Again, the rationale is identical: to improve poverty outcomes, deepen economic growth, create jobs and produce revenue (IMF 2005). In both cases, however, the focus on marketizing natural resources comes with the proviso-prominent and repeated in all reforms, policies and planning documents-- that economic growth, poverty alleviation, jobs, and revenue will not be possible without "good governance". This should not be surprising because, as discussed in the preceding section, poor governance and corruption of the natural resources sectors was a precipitating factor in the emergence of conflict resources. In short, good governance is viewed as vital not only to enhancing public trust and as a necessary condition for attracting investment and promoting exports but also

maintain order. Good governance reforms in both countries include policies to overhaul procurement and concession process, install revenue and expenditure controls, strengthen financial management and investment protocols, and improve accountability and budgeting practices to ensure transparency.

It is important to note that in both cases there are alternative strategies being employed by international peacebuilders that do not appear to fit neatly into the categories of securitization and marketization. In fact, international peacebuilders view the two strategies as compatible and mutually enforcing. Securitization and marketization are two sides of the same coin. The real question, however, is to ascertain what the effects of such strategies for transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources" have been. I turn to this below.

Gauging the Effects: Contestation and Resistance

I have argued that international peacebuilding organizations promote and establish governance reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural resources. While this is a novel insight that adds to our understanding, I am concerned with how such reforms and policies might help or hinder peacebuilding. Recall that the objective of peacebuilding is to establish the conditions for a long-term peace in countries emerging from civil conflict. Peace, then, is largely understood by IBOs to be the absence of full-scale civil conflict. However, this definition unduly renders invisible from any analysis numbers of fatalities below this arbitrary benchmark and particular forms of violence outside of the civil conflict, insurgency, rebellion typology that is all too common. Moreover, if peacebuilders are genuinely concerned with the underlying conditions that may engender further civil conflict, we should be concerned with violence broadly understood as "practices or acts that cause direct harm to humans" (Peluso and Watts 2001, 26). To be more precise-- if environmental and natural resource governance "helps" peacebuilding, we should be able to detect a related decrease in the propensity of violence. At the same time, if

environmental and natural resource governance "hinders" peacebuilding, we should be able to identify a subsequent increase in propensity of violence.

Securitization and marketization: State stability and revenue

Efforts by international peacebuilding organizations to securitize Liberia's "blood timber" and Sierra Leone's "blood diamonds" has been relatively successful by some measures. Action was slow to materialize but international intervention by peacebuilders brought some degree of order and stability to natural resource sectors that were in complete disarray and resembled a "free for all". A range of factors conspired end the wars but UN sanctions, while an imperfect remedy, helped to bring order by regulating the trade in conflict resources. Moreover, international initiatives, like the Kimberley Process in Sierra Leone, and GEMAP in Liberia, helped to prevent the trade in "conflict resources" through increased oversight and regulation of the diamond and timber sectors, respectively. By promoting and supporting new policies, laws, regulations, institutions and practices--peacebuilders helped to shape the way people behave relative to the environment and placed restraint on action and interests, which brought order and stability to the natural resources sector. International engagement in Liberia's forest sector or Sierra Leone's diamond sector in the immediate aftermath of the conflict worked to limit the rush to exploit or control forests and diamonds by rebel groups, opportunistic entrepreneurs or corrupt government officials. In this respect, the likelihood of large-scale violence--related to the trade in "conflict resources" has been reduced.

International peacebuilding efforts to marketize Liberia's forests, and Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals have also been fairly successful in increasing official exports. In particular, there has been a significant jump in revenue from alluvial diamond mining in Sierra Leone since the end of the conflict. While extensive smuggling continues, a ten-fold rise in exports can be attributed to the imposition of UN sanctions, the national certificate of

origin regime, and the Kimberley Process--all of which have altered the risk and opportunity calculations of local diggers and miners as well as the diamond industry. As a result increasing numbers of diamonds are passing through official state channels. Sierra Leone has also seen exports of industrial minerals start to increase over the last few years as international peacebuilding organizations have promoted the restoration and expansion of large-scale industrial mining. Conversely, efforts to export Liberian timber have been less successful due to problems outlined in Chapter 5 but still represent a net increase since the end of the conflict. Suffice to say, export and revenue projections advertised and promoted by international peacebuilders and the national government remain optimistic. Sierra Leone is projected to triple diamond and mineral output within five years and Liberian timber exports are expected to increase at least as much. According to the literature, at least, increased state revenues hint at reduced propensity for violence because it suggests not only increasing GDP and incomes, which are deemed the "best protection against civil war" but also provides the government with the resources to provide basic services vital for "buying confidence" in peacebuilding (Bannon and Collier 2003, 8; Woodward 2002, 183).

In short, the strategies employed to "securitize" and "marketize" natural resources--for the purpose of transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources"-- have produced benefits. They have helped to maintain order and stability--and may reduce the propensity for violence in both countries--by preventing the trade in conflict resources and delivering some revenue to the state. A closer look at the case studies, however, reveals that the effects of the reforms and policies are not as straightforward as international peacebuilders assume. The cases also show that the process has been divisive and wrought with contention and resistance--some of it resulting in violence. Not only is this counterproductive for peacebuilding, but Liberia and Sierra Leone are still vulnerable and fragile to disruption. The question is whether the results of such contention and resistance can be resolved peacefully or through violence.

Securitization and marketization: Contention and resistance

The benefits of stability and new revenues notwithstanding, the case studies indicate that the governance reforms and policies aimed at securitization and marketization--and indeed the overlap between the two--is focal points for contention and resistance. By this, I mean that actors or groups of actors do not accept the configuration of rules and institutions governing the environment and natural resources or do not consent to the desired social order (Migdal 1988). Contestation and resistance come in two distinct forms. First, the contention and resistance reflects action by people and groups of people to cope with the consequences or perceived consequences of new "rules of the game" and institutions promoted by peacebuilders to securitize and marketize natural resources. Second, the contention and resistance reflects efforts to alter or change the rules and institutions promoted and established by international peacebuilding organizations. This process includes efforts to reframe narratives about the relationship between natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding. While the contention and resistance does not suggest that civil conflict will resume, there is some evidence that in certain instances it is increasing the propensity for violence.

Governance reform the alluvial diamond sector in Sierra Leone was born out of international concern about "conflict diamonds". There is an array of policies, initiatives, institutions and laws--including most prominently the Kimberley Process--to securitize the sector by reducing smuggling and policing illegal mining activities to capture a greater share of the tax revenue for the government. This securitization strategy has been successful in terms of controlling conflict diamonds and increasing state revenues. What gets overlooked or dismissed are the increasing episodes of contention and resistance that continue to surface in reaction to securitization. First, international imperatives securitize diamond mining areas have resulted in police "crack-downs" that have resulted in coercion and episodes of violence

(World Bank 2008b). Public pronouncements that illegal artisanal mining will "face the full brunt" of Sierra Leone's security forces is in some cases viewed as an unwarranted intrusion of the state that is undercutting local livelihoods (*Independent Observer* 2009). As described in Chapter 6, this hard-handed approach has historically led to reductions in illegal mining and increasing state revenue but at the high cost of eliminating livelihoods and deepening poverty. More concerning is that such strategies have historically resulted in instability, resentment and the formation of shadow states. Recall that efforts by Siaka Stevens to fund networks of patronage in the 1980s led to a decline in state services and a withdrawal of support from rural areas that exacerbated tensions among disenfranchised young men that were later absorbed into the RUF.

Second, initiatives by international peacebuilders to promote mechanized alluvial diamond mining and large-scale industrial mines in the name of both improved security and productivity is fostering localized contention and resistance. Recall that industrial mining contracts currently cover approximately 90 percent of the country, which includes virtually all of alluvial mining areas. In Sandoh Chiefdom, rioting has occurred numerous times in response to industrial concessions on land historically set aside for artisanal mining or agriculture. As noted in Chapter 7, landowners have been denied access to their own land because of new industrial concessions and threatened with violence or retribution by security forces. While international peacebuilders view these skirmishes as relatively minor events-- and do not systematically document such events-- the local population tends to view it in the context of "land grabs" by an overzealous state and business interests without the participation of local or traditional authorities. Third, despite more diamonds passing through official government channels and increasing revenues, there is growing resentment that the securitization of the alluvial mining sector has not trickled down to adjacent communities or those toiling in the mines. Diggers and miners are habitually pulled into diamond mining by prospect of big "winnings" and many expected conditions to get better after the conflict.

International peacebuilders initially funded programs to increase the benefits to miners and diggers and redress the exploitative relations that exist in mining areas. People are becoming increasingly aware that diamonds fetch substantial sums outside of Sierra Leone but there have not been genuine improvements in mining conditions or financial returns. The general perception is that this is the result of mismanaged state institutions and persistent corruption among national elites. In short, securitization is a strategy designed to enrich a small segment of Sierra Leone's elite and foreign investors.

While alluvial mining has historically been Sierra Leone's "powder keg", as Chapter 7 highlights recent contention and resistance is in reaction to efforts to kick-start the industrial mining sector. Recall that while industrial mining is certainly a marketization strategy, it has also been promoted as a more orderly and secure alternative to alluvial mining. Over the last five years, there has been an almost continuous pattern of contention, resistance and even violence against industrial mining operations by adjacent communities concerned about a lack of sufficient benefits and environmental and social costs. Time and time again, people have complained to the government about a lack compensation for land and crops, inadequate housing relocation and a lack of basic necessities such as clean water and schools from companies such as Koidu Holdings and Sierra Rutile. But time and time again, government officials have ignored the problems or side with the companies, which has led to protests and rioting. Only after two people were shot to death in Koidu did the government--and international peacebuilding organizations--even acknowledge there were potential problems even though no police officers were ever prosecuted and the same issues remain largely unresolved. Attempts by the communities to protest have also been suppressed by local police forces. The dominant perception among adjacent communities is that the state cares more about getting mineral operations started and receiving revenue from companies than to the grievances and complaints of its own people. This can be summed up by the director of an NGO, who stated that elites in Sierra Leone "think they own the

country" (Interview 3). People in mining areas tend to see the government as captives of the international peacebuilders --and the economic system they perpetuate--who provide loans to mining companies and promote the industrial sector on security and economic grounds. Most believe that rural areas will be plundered by mineral companies for the benefit of a few well-connected Sierra Leoneans. So while fast-tracking of the industrial mineral sector was rationalized by peacebuilders to provide a "rapid, equitable and visible development progress", at the moment resistance and contention is starting to boil over into violence.

Likewise, in Liberia efforts to securitize and marketize forests have resulted in contention and resistance albeit to a lesser extent than Sierra Leone. As referred to in Chapter 5, several forest communities have reacted to halt or at least postpone timber harvesting operations. Recall that skirmishes and protests have occurred in several areas that the government had issued prospective timber contracts. In these cases, securitization rather than simply marketization was the culprit because it was the government and FDA that was accused of ignoring local structures and "monopolizing the process" in a rush to begin timber harvesting (Interview 12). An illustrative example was the timber concessions awarded in Bokumu District that the local community stopped by refusing to participate in the harvesting of its own forests without permission. And it was not marketization that was to blame per se but the fact that the land set aside for "commercial" uses by the government was done without any understanding of overlapping land claims or consultation with the community. As a member of an International NGOs stated, the local community viewed it as "my Father's land"--and "not the government's to give away" (Interview 12). In addition at least two-thirds of all timber sale contracts were stopped by community opposition about overharvesting on tribal lands (Interview 15). This should not be surprising given that over 60 percent of Liberians believe land ownership and distribution is the leading cause of violent conflict in areas where they live (Topka, Saryee and Asunka 2009). An incident in 2008, in which 15 people killed in lands dispute provides ample evidence that violence is possible as

communities compete for land with the government and timber companies. The worry is, according to an influential international peacebuilder, that "bad forestry will only exacerbate conflict" (Interview 15).

A majority of the struggle and contention, in Liberia however, has been over the meanings, narratives and frames that end up shaping the character of the reforms and policies. Put another way, efforts to rapidly set in motion sets of reforms and policies aimed at consolidating state authority and marketizing forest resources shortened the shadow of the future and produced contention. This is because the reforms seek to impose a governing logic on a valuable national and societal asset over a short time horizon. The overarching perception among all actors is that this is short "window of opportunity" and that "who is there first" will determine the future of Liberia's forests. International peacebuilders, who have been focused on first securing and then marketizing the country's forests, have continuously stressed the importance of harnessing the revenues from timber in ways that do not ignite conflict but fund economic growth, development and poverty reduction, which is led by the government. As long as the government trends closely to the forms, by being transparent, accountable and inclusive, the overwhelming assumption is that over the long-term such a strategy will help sustain a long-term peace.

Although reforms and policies have dealt overwhelmingly with commercial-centric strategies to secure and market Liberia's forests, conservation has also emerged in the background as a significant issue that is sparking contention and resistance. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict international peacebuilders stressed the importance of regaining control of national parks and reserves since they provided, at least theoretically, remote areas where rebels could regroup (Interview 50). While some of the activity in parks was a consequence of a displaced population, international actors and the government worried that illegal mining, hunting and timber extraction could undermine state security and impact biodiversity and wildlife essential for a future eco-tourism industry. Several attempts have

been made to evict the illegal "squatters" from Sapo National Park but it remains a Liberian national security issue. Another problem related to conservation is that communities have begun to question the demarcation of protected areas, particularly when they intersected with communal lands. Recall in Chapter 5 that 30 percent of Liberia's forests were to be preserved as a Protected Forest Area Network and the integrity of existing reserves and parks protected. But efforts to demarcate borders have been challenged by local communities who have clashed with government officials (UN Panel of Experts 2008). This should not be surprising since the border regions of most of Liberia's most established parks and reserves remain contested by local communities who were never included in the decision making process (Interview 50).

The consequences--or perceived future consequences of securitization and marketization--have been a focal for contention and resistance in Liberia and Sierra Leone--and at times reaching the level of violence. However, as mentioned above, there is also contention and resistance associated with efforts to change or alter the prevailing "rules of the game". This is important because rules--including institutions, laws, regulations, practices--fundamentally pattern what is socially and politically acceptable; what is deemed possible and what is even deemed possible to discuss relative to governing the environment and natural resources (Lipschutz 2004). Moreover, these rules and institutions often persist and pattern the future. Given that a "window of opportunity" exist in the aftermath of conflict is should not be surprising that the battle over rules--and in fact ideas about how the environment and natural resources are governed and in whose interest--is ongoing and contentious.

In Liberia, international and civil society groups have used the space opened up to by international peacebuilders to address the future of forests in ways that veer from the securitization and marketization strategies promoted by peacebuilders. This is based on a perception that marketization strategies leave forest communities subordinate to the timber-

producing priorities. Based on historical experience these groups have little confidence that communities will benefit from commercial forestry activities or that a development model based on timber exploitation will genuinely lead to poverty alleviation or genuine development. In addition, despite rhetoric of public participation and inclusiveness, these groups argue that strategies based on reestablishing state authority left little room for meaningful dialogue with forest communities on key matters, including land tenure, ownership and community rights--even while discussions to grant timber concession was almost continuous. And without meaningful dialogue with communities, the reforms and policies are "fatally flawed" and commercial timber operations should be halted and renegotiated. As a member of a prominent Liberian NGO stated, "how can timber harvesting support peace when contentious and violent episodes over land tenure are still going on" (Interview 26). These groups point to problems finding respectable timber companies and improprieties with handling contracts, concessions and bidding as evidence that the nexus of securitization and marketization was marking the return of the "old way of doing business" that existed before and during the conflict.

Another point of contention concerns the extent to which the state has the right and ability to construct and enforce "rules of the game" that govern Liberia's forests. The contention revolves around the fundamental questions of who owns the forests and what is the primary entity to manage them on behalf of the country. While international peacebuilders rushed to reestablish state authority over forest resources, these groups note that traditionally the state has been deeply corrupt and used its authority to exploit forests for personal enrichment. Moreover, an identical arrangement, which put the state in charge of forests, was thought responsible for enabling and perpetuating the conflict. The reforms and policies, then, have been increasingly viewed as an internationally sanctioned land grab by the state to benefit political elites and foreign business interests. As an alternative, a handful of groups insist that the authority of forest communities is central to governing and managing

Liberia's forests. By endowing communities with authority and diminishing that of the state, it then might be possible to realize the benefits.

To a lesser extent, reforms and policies associated with diamond and mineral resources have led to contention in Sierra Leone over the "rules of the game". Civil society groups argue that securitization and marketization rather than a recipe for peace may be recreating the violent struggles and contention that has been going on "forever" in Sierra Leone (Interview 3). The argument is that international peacebuilders and the government ignore issues like land ownership and public participation while promoting marketization. In short, international peacebuilders ignore the grievances and abuses of mining communities and support the state in negotiating mining agreements behind closed doors for the fear that addressing these issues will slow down economic growth and reduce state revenue. While there have been modest attempts at improving the conditions of diggers and miners, the priority have been on securitizing and increasing exports. The problem, of course, is that a reduction in available diamonds, combined with increasing population, an emphasis on mechanization and a serious lack of alternative livelihoods will only exacerbate previous problems.

Contention and resistance to the rules of the game can be an important process in determining how the environment and natural resources are governed. What determines the prevailing rules and institutions is often a push and pull of different factors from a variety of groups. What sets Liberia and Sierra Leone apart is that environmental and natural resources are high stakes issues in fragile war-torn states. In fact, the rhetoric has heated up to concerning levels. In Liberia, actors are accusing other actors of pitting the "state against society", "communities against the government" or "communities against communities". And in Sierra Leone, there is a perception that marketization and securitization are actually putting the people last and wealthy first in ways that threaten peace. While some might

question the importance of such contention and resistance to the rules of the game, in both cases it is fostering cycles of suspicion and creating competition and deep division.

The reforms and policies are working to reconstruct and lock-in historical sources of conflict and violence. I find that the reforms and policies are also creating new conditions that may endanger peace through several mechanisms. First, while fostering economic growth, providing employment and generating state revenue is important, it tends to dominate discussions and crowd out other factors vital for the consolidation of peace. Governing high-value natural resources is a high stakes issue that needs attention from peacebuilders but putting diamonds and timber into the international spotlight can lead to tunnel vision that risk overlooking the sustainable livelihoods of communities. A comprehensive focus on sustainable livelihoods related to agricultural production or the use of forest resources by rural communities, are viewed as part of the “informal” economy and do not receive attention in peacebuilding efforts. The factors that habitually impede communities to meet their livelihoods, including perverse land ownership and tenure rights and unfair systems of hierarchy or patronage, which fosters a majority of grievances and resentments, is rarely, if ever, addressed. Aside from some tokenistic efforts, there is little in the way of genuine reform to address these issues. Indeed, interviews in both countries turn up a widely held perception that livelihoods and communities are being left behind in the peacebuilding process at the expense of marketizing forests, minerals and agricultural products. Liberia's focus on commercial timber is not matched by comparable efforts to rebuild communities and ensure food security with input from communities themselves. In Sierra Leone, reforms continue to stress the "formalization" of the alluvial diamond mining sector and "jump-starting" industrial mining rather than addressing alternative livelihoods for a growing population of youth that want to return to subsistence agriculture.

Linked Pathologies of Securitization and Marketization

The observations above suggest that governance reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone based on a strategy of securitization and marketization, which are largely sponsored and promoted by international peacebuilding organizations, offers mixed results. On the one hand, securitization has helped to stop the flow of conflict resources, reestablish state authority and enable marketization reforms and policies move forward. The result has been improved stability and increases in state revenue. On the other hand, however, the securitization and marketization have been a focal point for contention and resistance--some of it resulting in violence. This leads to an important question: *Why* exactly do reforms and policies aimed at securitizing and marketizing the environment and natural resources generate these side-effects? *Why*, contrary to the "environmental peacebuilding" discourse that environmental and natural resource governance can establish trust and foster cooperative relations is it seemingly having the opposite effect? I argue that four linked pathologies of securitization and marketization actually increase the propensity for violence and, thus, are working to hinder peacebuilding.

Risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements

Efforts to securitize and marketize Liberia and Sierra Leone's environment and natural resources runs the risk of recreating and potentially "locking-in" political arrangements that have historically been sources of civil strife and violence. Recall, the conventional wisdom is to lay the blame for both conflicts on the greedy and self-serving warlords and combatants that used the control, exploitation and trade in natural resources to fuel conflict and amass wealth. The problem is these explanations are an oversimplification, as Chapters 4 and 6 make clear. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are deeply rooted in a history of resentment and hostility toward a long line of oligarchic, dysfunctional and oppressive governments and bitter tensions over unfair land ownership and tenure rights

thrust upon the population by elites. These dynamics opened up its forests and minerals to international exploitation with the benefits accumulating to a small group elites and foreign investors but left the rest of the country underdeveloped, with few opportunities and little access to land. This trend only intensified in political systems that centralized control of natural resources and left the population few opportunities to own land or adequately meet their livelihood needs. Grievances over land and underdevelopment in both countries stem from a historically unjust and corrupt political systems that are based on systems of patronage dedicated to exploiting the country's resource base. Both the Sierra Leone and Liberian conflicts were the result of political struggles with a long history, and are best understood through the lens of patronage, which involves consolidating power over economic resources as a means of gaining and keeping power. Patronage tends to flourish in places like Liberia and Sierra Leone where a substantial rents come from the exploitation of natural resources, and agreements and concessions are arranged with little transparency or accountability (Reno 1998; Richards 1996). Systems of patronage are political practices that can undermine the state by diverting revenues to key groups or supporters instead of provisioning basic service to the population. A characteristic of patronage is the marginalization of particular groups and fostering conditions that give rise to shadow states--both of which are known to increase the propensity for violence.

In Liberia, the underlying structure of forest governance is largely being recreated by the reforms and policies. First, the reforms and policies carry-over the idea that the state is endowed with the power to oversee all matters on land and unilaterally divide forest lands irrespective of land ownership or tenure rights. Second, the reforms are both "state-centric" and commercial centric, which defines the government and commercial interests as the "principal actors" while communities where forests are located are at a minimum beneficiaries of commercial forestry. The NFRL and Community Rights Law do make improvements from previous laws and regulations by referencing community access to forest

resources, equitable benefits, and participation in forest management. However, because the reforms and policies are "commercial-centric", there is a feeling that communities are being excluded from decisions that have a bearing on the future of forests and livelihoods. In addition, there is a perception that factors that have long led to violence and conflict including issues over land ownership, access and user rights, benefit sharing and genuine inclusion are being pushed aside in a rush to export timber that will only benefit political and economic elites. As a consultant for an international organization stressed, "we may be repeating the same mistakes of export" in which the "money accrues to a few" (Interview 35). Like in the past, there is a sense that Liberian's do not control [their] destiny" and this time "the people may rise up" (Interview 9). Recall that where timber operations have commenced, communities have resisted citing a lack of trust with timber officials or disputes over land ownership. In the forest sector, in particular, there is the perception, that "peace my fall apart because tensions and contradictions that led to conflict have not been addressed" (Interview 15).

Likewise, in Sierra Leone, international peacebuilders assumed the major problem was conflict diamonds and the unregulated revenues in the hands of rebels and corrupt officials that fueled conflict. The solution was to first have international peacebuilders intervene through UN sanctions and oversight through the Kimberley Process while at the same time reestablishing state control over diamond mining areas and by establishing reforms and policies. The problem is that in Sierra Leone diamonds and minerals have long been the target of colonial and state authorities. As Chapter 6 notes, from the beginning of diamond and mineral mining accusations of too much state power were commonplace. The period between 1950 and 1980 led to resentment and violence as the government used force to increase state control of diamonds and "crackdown" on smuggling, which led to repression and marginalization of rural populations. Current reforms and policies run the risk of reestablishing and perpetuating historic sources of conflict and violence. First, the emphasis

on the state consolidation of power over diamond areas to control smuggling and procure revenues for the state development is congruent to past practices. International peacebuilders find such policies necessary to control conflict diamonds and help contribute to economic recovery. The problem is that while such reforms and policies may increase state revenue, they do little to improve the conditions and circumstances of diggers, miners and communities or alter what is for many a source of desperation. International peacebuilders tend to view diggers and miners involved in alluvial mining as a problem since smuggling of diamonds is difficult to stop. The solution is to police "illegal" mining and establish reforms and policies that require mining licenses. The problem is that diggers and miner cannot afford licenses and because mining is an important livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people restricting access can create a serious backlash.

Political arrangements in Liberia and Sierra Leone have historically required the leveraging of the economic benefits of natural resources, which often presages agreements and concessions that are arranged with business interests with no genuine inclusiveness, transparency or accountability. This not only fosters resentment and grievance but can lead to shadow states that can undermine conventional statebuilding by diverting revenues into patronage networks, marginalizing certain populations and undermining the provision of basic services. International peacebuilders have emphasized the importance transparency and accountability on the premise that if corruption continued and the people failed to benefit peace would be difficult to sustain. In Liberia, problems finding respectable timber companies and improprieties in handling contracts and bidding have raised questions about transparency and accountability. While these improprieties may be simply poor judgment or a lack of capacity, it also might be evidence of parallel systems of "doing business". Conversely, in Sierra Leone, reports that mineral agreements and concessions are negotiated behind closed doors and to the benefit of Koidu Holdings, Sierra Rutile, African Minerals or London Mining raises concerns that two systems of commerce exist. If reforms only rebuild

previous patronage-resource structures without the necessary oversight, it can legitimize and deepen systems of patronage and work to weaken government and divert revenues away from peacebuilding priorities, which only increases the propensity for violence.

Danger of provoking societal competition

The reforms and policies are working to reconstruct and lock-in historical sources of conflict and violence. I find that the reforms and policies are also provoking societal competition that may increase the likelihood for violence. Reforms that stress marketization of valuable natural resources are often "fast-tracked" on the premise that peacebuilding objectives of poverty alleviation, economic growth and the provision of basic services will be realized faster if the process of natural resource extraction and export is started as quickly as possible after the conflict ends. However, this works to shorten the "shadow of the future" and produce conflict since the reforms seek to impose a governing logic on a valuable national and societal asset over a short time horizon. The overarching perception is that "who is there first" will determine the future of natural resources and the environment and this increases episodes of conflict and resistance. Second, despite the inclusion of transparency, accountability and benefit sharing in the governance reforms, marketization fosters deep-seated grievances, resentments and hostility. For example, policies aimed at attracting foreign direct investment for the extraction of raw natural resources has led to violence and conflict associated with the perception of too much state power and too little community participation, struggles over property and land ownership issues that undermine the provision of sustainable livelihoods, and antagonism pertaining to community access and access to local or rural "environments".

An emphasis on economic growth, foreign direct investment and fast-tracking the export of exploiting valuable natural resources has resulted contentious political struggle over the "rules of the game" in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, the "backlash" stems

from a perception that community objectives are subordinate to the governments and international timber producing priorities while failing to address historical grievances over land ownership, tenure and community rights. In fact, there is both little confidence based on historical experience that communities will benefit directly through the government's commercial forestry activities or that a development model based on timber exports will genuinely help communities. At the same time, Sierra Leone's diggers and miners as well as communities adjacent to industrial mining areas continue to feel exploited by much powerful actors and under threat from security forces. In addition, there remain few other opportunities to mining since land is difficult, if not impossible, to attain. At the moment, it appears that tension and mistrust will likely sow discontent, particularly as long as community concerns are perceived as a low priority.

And finally, the focus on economic potential of natural resources as the predominant peacebuilding mantra generate a cycle of unrealistic export and revenue projections creates dangerously high expectations among the population. In Liberia, for instance, timber projections have been widely off the mark in recent years to the tune of \$25 million given that no timber has been exported. In Sierra Leone, revenues from diamonds and minerals have increased since the end of the conflict, although it remains to be seen whether the sector can triple its output as projected over the next five years. What is obvious is that the government and international actors have a certain incentive to calculate unrealistic projections since it highlights a sector's "potential" under optimal market conditions. However, such predictions can have perverse effects on a population by raising expectations for development. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone there needs to be a more concerted effort to manage expectations when it comes to natural resources.

Inattention to the environment and sustainable livelihoods

With the international peacebuilding spotlight focused brightly on the transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources" it is not surprising that reforms and policies overwhelmingly targeted high-value natural resources in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Despite being a focal point for contention and resistance, the attention to securing "conflict resources" has been important in terms of helping to forge order and stability--particularly in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in both cases. Furthermore, efforts by peacebuilders to marketize natural resources have led to increases in state revenue, particularly in Sierra Leone. But the cases also highlight different problem. Chiefly, international peacebuilders have "pathology of inattention". Specifically, attention to high-value natural resources had resulted in a lack of attention to other important factors associated with the environment and natural resources.

First, the framing of environmental and natural resource governance challenges almost solely in terms of "conflict resources" and "peace resources" has all but rendered invisible the "environment". It takes attention away from the environmental--as opposed to natural resources--needs of the population. While natural resources refer to potential sources of wealth from raw materials, the environment is the physical conditions that affects natural resources and the ecosystem services that sustain life. What goes unnoticed is that conflict directly and indirectly damages ecosystems and natural assets that are essential for well-being of the population. Vital environmental issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, and energy supplies are almost overwhelmingly overlooked. For instance, reforms and policies designed to restart Liberia's timber sector have not been matched by comparable efforts to rebuild communities and ensure food security. In Sierra Leone, reforms continue to stress the alluvial diamond mining sector and focus on industrial mining rather than creating new opportunities for a growing population of youth that want to return to subsistence agriculture.

A failure to respond to these environmental problems--and putting all the attention to conflict resources may actually deepen poverty, make development more challenging and exacerbate environmental problems. The focus on securing and marketizing natural resource also renders invisible the ways in which natural resource exploitation can lead to poor environmental outcomes. Alluvial and industrial mining, and timber harvesting, are not environmentally benign. Recall that even after the substantial environmental devastation wrought by timber companies during the conflict; international peacebuilders were not particularly concerned about the environmental toll. In Sierra Leone, mining and industrial mining has huge environmental implications, which has been a point of contention for adjacent communities.

Second, efforts to securitize and marketize natural resources shifts attention toward a global commodity view of the environment and natural resources--and to a lesser extent a "global" ecosystem view. From this perspective it is the economic lives of the environment and natural resources that matter most. In Liberia, forests are significant as a cultural and livelihood resource for a majority of the population. A key point of contention and struggle revolves around the extent to which commercial timber may impede on the ability of rural communities to meet their day-to-day existence. Factors that habitually impede the ability of these people to meet their livelihood needs such as perverse land ownership and tenure rights, environmental degradation, and unfair systems of patronage have not been addressed in the forest reforms and policies. While not normally considered a culturally significant activity, there is no doubt that Sierra Leone's alluvial diamonds constitute a vital sustainable livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people. One problem is that attempts to crack down on illegal mining is reducing livelihood opportunities and created newfound resentment. The other problem is that while there is a growing scarcity of alluvial diamonds there is also a lack of alternative livelihoods due to land scarcity as a result of exclusive ownership and increasing efforts to commercialize agricultural land. In areas adjacent to large-scale industrial sites there is also inattention to sustainable livelihoods as mining disturbs land that

people rely on for livelihoods. Put another way, local populations are viewed chiefly as beneficiaries of high-value natural resources that "trickle down" either in the form of land fees or as part of national development program. There is of risk of overlooking or underemphasizing the sustainable livelihoods that are intimately tied to the land and a fundamental component of local economies. More importantly perhaps, strategies that emphasize securitization and marketization of the environment and natural resources can serve to aggravate these factors and generate tension and conflict that can undermine peacebuilding. Indeed, interviews in both countries turn up a widely held perception that livelihoods and communities are being left behind in the peacebuilding process.

Third, aggressively pursuing reforms to address conflict timber and conflict diamonds that fit particular economic narratives has led international peacebuilders to neglect other sectors that may deserve international attention. An estimated 70 percent of Sierra Leone's population lives in rural areas that rely on the interaction between agricultural production and forest resources for their livelihoods. In addition forests provide most construction materials and 95 percent of the country's firewood. Combine that with concerns that Sierra Leone's remaining forests are under pressure, from agriculture, mining, hunting, urban development and timber harvesting. Despite the significance of forests to Sierra Leone's population, forest governance has not been an international peacebuilding priority (Beevers 2011). Likewise, in Liberia the mining sector has remained largely ignored in the peacebuilding process (Brownell 2009). Although this has recently begun to change largely in response to international peacebuilders concerned with the security implications of a revived mineral sector.

The problem of unrealistic expectations

Sierra Leone and Liberia remain in fragile but the prospects for a sustainable and long-term peace have improved considerably. But peacebuilding comes with high

expectations. The end of conflict and international intervention represents a new starting point for the country, government and people despite the fragility of the peace and the desire of spoilers to undermine it. International peacebuilding moved relatively quickly to establish a wide range of policies, strategies, programs, regulations, laws and practices that are intended to bring stability and consolidate peace. At the same time, elections are usually organized to provide a venue for public discussion that is accompanied by an array of political promises. The danger, of course, is that once the population moves beyond the initial peace dividends and the expectations cannot be met that this will undermine the legitimacy of the state and open up new opportunities for instability.

The reforms and policies promoted by international peacebuilders in Liberia and Sierra Leone play a substantial role creating an "expectation gap" among the population and government. First, the emphasis on marketization places unrealistically high expectations on the natural resources sector. Recall that timber projections in Liberia have consistently been off the mark to tune of tens of millions of dollars. A majority of years, no timber was even exported from the country. In Sierra Leone, revenues from diamonds and minerals have increased substantially since the end of the conflict but have yet to fully meet projections. Experience suggests that the triple output for minerals and diamonds currently projected for Sierra Leone over the next five years is over optimistic. The source of these export and revenue projections remains a matter of controversy. Civil society organizations in both countries accuse the government and international peacebuilders of inflating revenue projections based on unrealistic scenarios in order to rationalize reforms and policies of marketization (Shearman 2009; UNEP 2010). A report commissioned in Liberia, for example, found that timber volumes were routinely overestimated by at least half. In Sierra Leone calculating diamond and mineral reserves is largely guesswork with the government and international peacebuilders relying on industry data, which may be severely inflated. What also gets forgotten among peacebuilders who emphasize marketization is that natural

resources--and other primary commodities--are also susceptible to significant "price shocks" due to global economic conditions. As an IFI economist mentioned, all the reforms and policies in the world could not help the fact that "Sierra Leone missed the largest commodity boom in history" after mineral demand contracted in late 2008 (Interview 43).

It is normal for countries to have high expectations for equitable and visible development progress in the aftermath of conflict. The presence of international peacebuilders and the rebuilding of state institutions and governance lend itself to optimism--for the state, peacebuilders and the population. In countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, in which exploitable natural resources can serve to kick-start economic recovery expectations are even greater in terms of state revenue, economic growth and job opportunities. Poverty reduction strategies, which in war-torn states are the blueprint for peacebuilding, track very close to projections of natural resource derived revenue. Better development outcomes based on these projections are often the most prominent illustration to the population as to whether corruption and malfeasance is being curtailed and the benefits of peace and natural resources are being shared. Recall that forest communities in Liberia expected immense benefits that have not been forthcoming. Likewise, the expectations of benefits from a reformed artisanal and industrial mining in Sierra Leone has failed to materialize in adjacent communities. When ordinary citizens do not see perceptible changes--due in part to unrealistic expectations--on the level of those that were anticipated increased tension and a lack of confidence in state institutions can prevail. This only reinforces perceptions that the benefits of natural resources either accrue to elites or are absorbed by foreign investors. Not only are expectations dashed but if the benefits are perceived to go disproportionately to those outside of communities that "own" such resources--social unrest and hostility may result. Rather than increase trust and confidence in the state--inflated and unrealistic expectations can undermine state legitimacy.

While unrealistic expectations can create anxiety and resentment among local communities and the population, it can also provide ammunition for spoilers trying to undermine peace. First, overconfidence by international peacebuilders in the ability of natural resources to quickly produce development outcomes and ultimately sow together a stable and lasting peace by way of increased transparency and accountability can provide for potential spoilers when expectations do not match reality. A lack of tangible benefits along with accusations of corruption and state mismanagement can aggravate already existing grievances. When reforms come under criticism or expectations go unfulfilled there is bound to be rigorous discussions as why "progress" has stalled, particularly in given the significance of the environment and natural resources. The result can be a process of casting blame that can be politicized as the fault of government or the failure of a certain segment society that can serve to divide society along political, ethnic or social lines and have lasting ramifications for peace. Moreover, the ways in which marketization and securitization can trigger the violence alluded to above can be used by opportunistic entrepreneurs to press claims or interests that can amplify localized issues in ways that can create instability for the country as a whole.

A Look at Sierra Leone's Forests and Liberia's Minerals and Diamonds

Claims that certain reforms and policies promoted and supported by international peacebuilding organizations had "positive" or "negative" outcomes raises the question: "compared to what"? More specifically, due to the absence of adequate "control" cases in which the independent variable (e.g., environmental and natural resource governance) is absent, how can we know what would have happened in the absence of international peacebuilders? This methodological challenge should not be dismissed in attempting to establish causal outcomes from the cases and the findings should be regarded with some

caution. With that in mind, however, I have employed two analytic strategies to address this point. First, as discussed in Chapter 1, I have employed process tracing to do the hard work of narrowing the list of potential causal pathways and illuminating the conditions in which they occur. As the cases highlight, international peacebuilding organizations have--largely to maintain regional stability and minimize the threats posed by "failed states"--supported and established the reforms and policies that are deeply contested in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Second, I examine briefly the closest thing we have to control cases--Liberia's mineral and diamond sector and Sierra Leone's forest sector. What distinguishes the cases is that they have until very recently been devoid of significant intervention by international peacebuilding organizations. While only preliminary, these observations help us to understand the extent to which reforms and policies promoted by peacebuilders were determinative in the outcome

Sierra Leone's Forests

Approximately 18 percent of Sierra Leone is forested (Baker et al. 2003). Rainforests historically comprised approximately 60 percent of the total land area but was reduced by the early 20th century from a combination of shifting cultivation and timber extraction by colonial authorities (Richards 1996). As Richards (1996, 117) notes, if Liberia was the last country in West Africa to have its forests exported, Sierra Leone was the first. Forests did not contribute significantly to conflict or its outbreak, and "conflict timber" was not implicated in funding or sustaining the hostilities (Baker et al. 2003). Part of this is probably the result of limited commercial timber and the inability of rebels or the government to access and root forest areas. Where forests are linked to the conflict, it is largely in the context of small-scale resource use. An estimated 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas and rely on agricultural production and forest resources for sustainable livelihoods and as a cultural asset. Not only are forests and wooded areas important in the evolving process of shifting cultivation of rice and other sustenance crops but also provide most construction

materials and are used by 95 percent of the population for fuel in the form of firewood and charcoal (Baker et al. 2003).

Despite the significance of Sierra Leone's forests to the people, reforming the forest sector has not been a peacebuilding priority for IBOs. As discussed in Chapter 4, Sierra Leone's peacebuilding strategy emphasizes the importance of economic growth and poverty alleviation--and in particular rebuilding the country's mining sector. Forests are rarely discussed as an important component of sustainable livelihoods for the population by international peacebuilders. Instead, forests are discussed only in relation to on-going deforestation, poor land use, and biodiversity loss that are believed to "deepen poverty" (World Bank 2005, 105). Current forestry and wildlife regulations — are 37 and 21 years old, although the forestry act was revised before the war in 1990.³²⁷ While new wildlife regulations and forest policy were drafted in 1997 and 2003, they were not passed, and no comprehensive attempt to address forests has occurred since.

Only recently have concerns about the management of Sierra Leone's forests increased among a small group of IBOs that have discussed comprehensive forest and trade reforms (Howard 2009).³²⁸ The concerns stem in part from a perception the government lacks control over its remaining forests areas and reports of illicit timber harvesting in reserves and parks (Ford 2008). Second, there is concern about conserving Sierra Leone's remaining forests, which are deemed by conservation groups as under pressure from agriculture, mining, hunting, urban development and timber harvesting. To regain control, the government placed a temporary ban on all timber exports until forest reforms can be introduced (Ford 2008). Ironically, there are conflicting views of where the "threats" to Sierra Leone's forests come from and whether such threats can undermine peace. Information

³²⁷ The Wildlife Act of 1972 and the Forestry Act of 1988, respectively.

³²⁸ In early 2009, forest management was restructured by the Ministry of Agriculture to mirror that of Liberia and is now disaggregated by conservation, commercial and community.

from civil society and activists suggests that illicit timber harvesting occurs with sanctioning from local chiefs and government officials who profit from the revenue and dispense patronage to subjects (Interview 67). The worry is that even small-scale trade in forest products may sustain “shadow states” that can lead to conflict or deprive local communities of needed resources that can exacerbate forest and land-based grievances. Others however, mostly in government and international organizations, lay blame for deforestation and biodiversity loss on “slash and burn” agricultural practices and hunting, which are thought to rise in tandem with future population growth and diminished opportunities to “get rich” in diamond mines (Interview 62). This view suggests that one threat to peace is increasing forest scarcity that can foster competition over remaining stands and provide little opportunity for youth looking for alternative livelihoods tied to forest resources. Still others suggest that deforestation in Sierra Leone is “overplayed” by conservation organizations and converting forests to agricultural land and using forest products sustainably is necessary for meeting livelihood needs of forest communities (Interview 51). The concern here is that government attempts to control forests may diminish livelihood opportunities and hence, increase tension between local communities, customary chiefs and the government.

Liberia's Diamonds and Minerals

Liberia is endowed with substantial mineral resources, including most prominently diamonds, gold and iron ore (GoL 2010). Since the 1950s--and the country's "Open Door Policy" these resources made a significant contribution to the country's economy, although the benefits were not widely distributed among the population (Soto-Viruet 2010). Before the war, minerals --mostly iron ore--composed approximately 65 percent of the country's export earnings and a quarter of GDP, although all major mining operations were subsequently looted and closed in the early 1990s. While small-scale alluvial mining is widespread, it has historically contributed little to state revenue compared to Sierra Leone.

Regardless, tens of thousands of Liberians depend on diamonds (and gold) for their livelihoods even though most live in impoverished conditions and are susceptible to exploitation (Brownell 2009).

Despite the significance of Liberia's mineral sector--and to a lesser extent diamonds--to the economy and population, reforming the sector has not been a peacebuilding priority for IBOs until recently. As discussed in Chapter 4, Liberia's peacebuilding strategy emphasized the importance of addressing "conflict timber" and jump-starting country's commercial forest sector. Minerals and diamonds are generally not perceived by IBOs as complicit in the conflict--despite evidence that Taylor and the NPFL exported stockpiled materials and were actively involved in alluvial mining in Liberia (Brownell 2009). Regardless, restarting the mineral sector is rarely discussed in early peacebuilding documents as an important component of peace consolidation (GoL 2006a; IMF 2004). However, in early 2007, efforts by peacebuilders to address restarting the industrial mineral sector increased. In 2010, the "Mineral Policy of Liberia" passed with the help of IBOs and its vision was the: "equitable and optimal exploitation of Liberia's mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development." With that in mind, the Liberian government only recently began issuing mineral agreements to foreign companies to extract iron and Kimberlite diamonds (Soto-Viruet 2010). The biggest agreement was negotiated with global giant Arcelor-Mittal to redevelop the massive iron ore deposits in Nimba County, which was to be accompanied by rehabilitating over 200 km of railroad and the Buchanan Port.

While attention has begun to turn to industrial minerals production due to its potential to spur economic benefits, the alluvial diamond sector is still largely ignored by IBOs. In fact, the first documented participatory appraisal to assess problems with alluvial diamond sector occurred in 2008, a full five years after the conflict came to an end (Brownell 2009). Although Liberia's new mineral policy does address the importance of alluvial mining in communities, little concerted action to address the significant challenges has been

forthcoming. As Brownell (2009) suggests, the sector is hobbled by "poor regulations, lack of investment, disorganization, ignorance, abused labor and resources" (Brownell 2009, 1). More than any other natural resource sector, Liberia's alluvial mining "present challenges for health, environment, gender, education, child labor and poverty alleviation" (Blundell 2009, 2). Despite this, IBOs have failed to recognize the sector as important for peacebuilding and thus have not channeled the resources.

After examining Sierra Leone's forests and Liberia's minerals and diamonds several things are worth noting. First, it appears that because forests in Sierra Leone and minerals and diamonds in Liberia were not perceived as "conflict resources" by the IBOs they were not important in the first five or so years after the conflicts ended. In fact, only recently has the Liberian mineral sector received attention largely because of the substantial economic potential that it represents. Meanwhile, alluvial diamonds and Sierra Leone's forests have been largely ignored despite the fact that large swaths of the population depend on them for their livelihoods and well-being. Second, the lack of international attention appears not only to have reduced the potential positive benefits related to revenue but has ensured that the contention, resistance and violence associated with rapid peacebuilding reforms and policies has also been reduced. The violence that has emerged around Sierra Leone's industrial mineral sector has thus far at least not occurred in Liberia. Third, while further research needs to be conducted, it appears that several of the pathologies linked to securitization and marketization reforms and policies have been moderated. For example, societal competition spawned by "fast-tracking" and the expectations that accompany the reforms and policies do not exist. While these findings are certainly preliminary, the fact that IBOs place certain environments and natural resources into the international spotlight may have ramifications for peacebuilding.

The Consequences of Securitization and Marketization for Peacebuilding

The first litmus test for any peacebuilding strategy or agenda is whether it can be linked directly or indirectly to the resumption of civil conflict. The good news is that in Liberia and Sierra Leone conflict has not resumed. The question that surfaces, then, is to what extent did the strategy of securitization and marketization described in this study contribute to this successful outcome? I argue this is a difficult question on two fronts. First, whether a war-torn state sustains peace after civil conflict ends cannot be boiled down to a particular factor but depends on a range of variables that make the propensity for violence more or less likely. These factors include, but are not limited to, the conditions that led to the onset of the war, the characteristics of the previous conflict, the nature of the peace settlement, and the scope and timing of UN peacekeeping operations. Sustaining peace also depends on the mix of strategies, reforms and policies promoted by international peacebuilders. Second, even if we could identify one single factor, or even set of factors responsible for the current period of peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, peacebuilding is not defined by the absence of conflict. As noted in Chapter 2, the fundamental purpose of peacebuilding is to establish the conditions for a sustainable and long-term peace.

Based on these provisos two things become clear. First, it is too early to tell whether peacebuilding has been successful in either Liberia or Sierra Leone. Simply put, a host of important factors and conditions are still playing out and it will be decades before any retrospective analysis of success or failure can be rendered. Second, because of this limitation, we require a framework to be able to evaluate how specific strategies, reforms and policies influence and shape peacebuilding at a particular points in time. One framework, developed by Paris (2004) adheres to a "do no harm" approach.

This framework suggests that at a minimum, environmental and natural resource governance should: (1) not recreate or "lock-in" conditions that increase the propensity for violence and; (2) "do not harm"--that is not create new conditions that increase the propensity for violence. Any of these outcomes would appear to contradict or at the very least challenge the notion that environmental and natural resource governance helps peacebuilding. As I suggest above in the section on linked pathologies marketization and securitization as governance reforms appear to do both.

But another way to analyze the potential consequences of governance reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone is from what might be termed a "peacebuilding" framework. This approach suggests that peacebuilding requires multiple interventions and is premised on the notion that "peace revolves around the reform of governance" (Richmond 2009, 23). From this perspective, international peacebuilding interventions--if deployed properly--can reduce the propensity for violence (Call and Wyeth 2008).

While the list of possible interventions is virtually endless when it comes to war-torn states, I examine four specific outcomes that are thought by international peacebuilding organizations --and largely substantiated in the scholarly literature--to decrease the propensity for violence. These outcomes are: (1) security improvements; (2) increased economic development; (3) enhanced social cohesion and trust; and (4) strengthen state institutions. These conditions are important to consider in dealing with environmental and natural resource governance because they can potentially provide insight into historical conditions responsible for violent conflict but also provide peacebuilders--to the extent possible--with levers that can be used to improve outcomes. More specifically, by considering the "upstream" factors it may allow IBOs not just to "do not harm" but, in fact, improve peacebuilding practices in ways that decrease the propensity for violence and help the peacebuilding project. Below, I evaluate efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone see whether these essential conditions have been helped or hindered by the governance reforms discussed

in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively. I suggest that negative outcomes, at the very least, challenge the assumption that securitizing and marketizing the environment and natural resources in war-torn states in reality helps peacebuilding.

Security improvements

The core objective of international intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone boils down to security or order. The conflicts inflicted death, destruction and displacement on the civilian population and had regional implications. At the same time, the international community increasingly viewed the conflicts as a threat to international security and stability. Peacebuilding emerged as a response to these security challenges and was an effort to consolidate peace over the long-term. By definition, without security, peacebuilding is impossible. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the state's monopoly on violence--a key characteristic of "stateness"--has been reclaimed with the international assistance of peacebuilders. Although security is virtually guaranteed by 15,000 peacekeepers in Liberia and a British security force in Sierra Leone, substantial reform of the security sector has rebuilt the army and police forces. The situation in both countries is fragile and characterized by episodic violence but has been secure enough for relatively peaceful national elections, activities of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, the reintegration of former combatants and the return of refugees and displaced peoples. In short, if we compare Liberia and Sierra Leone to how they looked in the mid-1990s when the civil wars were raging, the security situation has vastly improved.

In one sense, security and order now characterizes the environment and natural resource sectors in which the problem of conflict resources garnered the most attention from international peacebuilders as the threat. In Sierra Leone, international peacebuilding efforts to reduce the threat of conflict diamonds have been successful--even though smuggling remains significant. This is largely due to the reassertion of state control of diamond-mining

areas and reforms and policies, such as the Kimberley Process, to control the rough diamond trade. There is a similar dynamic in Liberia as efforts to end the trade in "conflict timber" have been successful. The Liberian government has an increased its presence in forest areas and the smuggling of timber has been significantly reduced. When compared to the threat posed by conflict resources, the security situation appears much better.

In another sense, if we unpack security to focus on people and communities-- specifically a human-centered framework that prioritizes livelihoods, justice and rights-- security looks different. In Sierra Leone, despite almost a decade of new reforms and policies to better govern the mineral sector, mining community's in particular remains areas of broad insecurity. Despite a few attempts by international peacebuilders to improve the conditions of miners and diggers, poverty in diamond mining communities remains pervasive and higher than anywhere else in the country (UNEP 2010). Moreover, efforts by the government to securitize alluvial mining reduce the ability of people to earn a livelihood since few alternatives exist due to a lack of available agricultural land. This lack of land results from land that is controlled by an entrenched elite and being eaten up by new mining and industrial agriculture concessions. The story is the same in communities adjacent to large-scale industrial operations where communities are impoverished, feel exploited as land is taken away by mining companies with little compensation, and revenues do not benefit the people. This has resulted in episodes of violence and instability. In Liberia, there is a sense that in spite of the reforms and policies communities are being excluded from decisions that have a bearing on the future of forests and livelihoods. This is viewed as the state making a "grab" for what is rightfully a community resource. There is an emerging perception factors that undermine the security of the rural population, including land ownership, access and user rights, benefit sharing and genuine participation are being pushed aside in a rush to export timber that will only profit political and economic elites. Where timber operations have commenced in Liberia, communities have cited a lack of trust and disputes over land that

have resulted in stoppages and local resistance. As a UN adviser commented, the trouble will begin "when large-scale timber exploration conflicts with community land...since land is the basis of the Liberian livelihood" (Interview 14).

I draw a distinction, then, by questioning the "target" of the security improvements. An emphasis on conflict diamonds places the security of the state at the center of any analysis. The state is deemed the "protector and regulator of society, and its economic development" and therefore must be rescued (Pugh, Cooper and Turner 2008, 2). But it is also because international peacebuilders assume that states--particularly those that are market democracies--are the best guarantor of international security. Security can be heralded as an achievement if elections are held, security forces are reorganized and there is an absence of war. The problem is that while an emphasis on rapidly securitizing and marketizing the environment and natural resources in an effort to address the state's security may undermine the security of people and communities. This is because the state does not always have society's best intentions at heart--a fact that the people of Liberia and Sierra Leone know all too well--and also because state-centric security priorities can unintentionally or not conflict with local political and economic priorities.

Increased economic development

It is orthodoxy to view poverty as the handmaiden to conflict. This logic rests on the widely-held assumption that peace between and within states rests on increased economic development that helps to initiate political transformation. A related finding is that the likelihood of conflict is increases in tandem with levels of poverty and negative economic growth (Collier et al. 2003). Because civil conflict destroys formal economies, intensifies poverty, increases unemployment and reduces economic growth, the prevailing peacebuilding wisdom is that reforming the economic sector is absolutely essential for peacebuilding. These economic reforms emphasize market-oriented policies based on free-trade and private

investment to stimulate economic growth, produce jobs and procure state revenue. It should not be surprising; then, that international peacebuilding organizations promote and help establish reforms that emphasize the marketization of the environment and natural resources. As the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases show there is an assumption that timber, diamonds and minerals can be quickly leveraged in name of economic development.

On a range of measures, Liberia and Sierra Leone's economic development appears to be increasing. Sierra Leone has recovered strongly with real GDP growth hovering at seven percent annually (IMF 2008). Revenue generation has also increased substantially due in large part to the mineral and diamond reforms that places a priority raising diamond revenue and reviving the industrial mineral sector. Not only did GDP and revenue increase at least ten-fold since early-2000s but projections are expected to swell dramatically in the future with continued private investment (IMF 2008). Likewise, Liberia has seen a relatively strong GDP growth averaging about eight percent per annum. Revenues in Liberia have been increasing steadily even though commercial timber extraction has been well below projections. While there has been uneven progress and even some problems, international peacebuilding organizations believe things are on the right track and over the long-term economic development will help consolidate peace (IMF 2008). Despite some progress, however, the reforms and policies have not led to the levels of development anticipated. At \$200 and \$190 GDP per capita, respectively, Sierra Leone and Liberia remain the poorest and most unequal countries in the world (IMF 2008). Although life expectancy and child mortality in both countries have rebounded since the end of the conflict, they are some of the worst in the world (World Bank 2008b). Formal employment in both countries also hovers around 70 percent.

The development figures above are ambiguous but there remains a question as to whether the reforms and policies discussed will amount to genuine development outcomes in Sierra Leone or Liberia. Exports of rough diamonds and industrial minerals have been

increasing steadily in Sierra Leone due to increased state control over the mining sector and efforts to prioritize commercial exports. The problem is that currently most of the revenues accumulate outside the country's borders limiting the ability of the government to acquire revenue to fund basic services. At the same time, poverty levels remain higher in mining areas with very few benefits trickling down to the workers and communities, who are largely exploited and in a state of debt bondage. Efforts to crack down on "illegal" diamond mining, along with declining amounts of available land for farming, has also pushed people to the margins and left many without sustainable livelihoods. Efforts to jump-start the industrial mining sector have also been extremely problematic as mining agreements have been negotiated behind closed doors, with little public accountability and often at odds with the law. Violence and grievance have also been increasing as communities adjacent to large-scale operations complain strenuously about police abuse, a lack of compensation for land and crop, environmental issues related to water pollution and an inability to participate actively in decision making. All this is compounded by restrictions on land tenure and ownership that restricts people's ability to improve well-being and foster sustainable livelihoods. Revenue projections for Liberia's forest sector have been routinely overestimated, perhaps on purpose, but efforts to sell off huge chunks of commercial forest lands to concessionaires continues apace. While some timber harvesting has commenced there has been community opposition to timber contracts and social agreements. Because what constitutes timber-producing areas has been decided *a priori* and forest communities have been excluded from decision making there is a perception that communities will be "pushed aside in the name of economic development" (Interview 32). Given the importance of forests to the day to day existence of Liberia's people, communities want some control over forests and a right to "develop in accordance with their own needs and interests" (Binda 2010).

Again, it is important to draw a distinction that might be important for peacebuilding. First, development is predominantly used to refer to higher incomes and poverty alleviation so as to reduce the likelihood of future conflict. But development has a human side that expands the meaning of development beyond income to "enlarge people's choices", and to encompass things like equity, sustainability, livelihoods and empowerment (UNDP 2009). While over the long-term the reforms and policies may be able to increase incomes, efforts to securitize and marketize timber, diamonds and minerals may be impeding human development over the short-medium term.

Enhanced social cohesion and trust

The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone tore society apart leaving them divided by hostility, anger and insecurity. This had substantial influence on peacebuilding because if societal dynamics remain contentious and divisive it can perpetuate negative attitudes and fears about other groups, and also lead to resumption of conflict if violent behaviors continue to leave people vulnerable and in despair (Colletta, Lim, and Kelles-Viitanen 2002). Therefore, peacebuilding requires efforts to understand and make sense of the conflicts as well as its consequences. To this end, Liberia and Sierra Leone held Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that investigated the cause, gave voice to victims, and prosecuted those that were responsible in the name of reconciliation and forgiveness. At the same time however, peacebuilding requires that reforms and policies established in the aftermath of conflict help to foster social cohesion and build trust in order to transform divided societies and help people heal. Reducing social cohesion and trust arises by reducing disparities and feelings of exclusion while also strengthening social bonds (Colletta, Lim and Kelles-Viitanen 2002). It is assumed that the environment and natural resource governance may be particularly helpful in efforts to deepen social cohesion and build trust (Conca and Dabelko 2002; UNEP 2009). This is because shared cooperative efforts to manage shared environments and natural

resources may promote communication and interaction--between adversarial social groupings or between civil society and the state--that create shared identities and trust. In short, the interdependent nature of the environment and natural resources may be able to transcend the political boundaries and social cleavages in the name of social cohesion and peacebuilding.

In Liberia, forest reforms and policies have created opportunities for engagement and dialogue. Though the contours of the reforms and policies were largely predetermined by the demands of international peacebuilders, the reform process encouraged interaction between stakeholders. This was particularly the case in discussions over forest concessions and in the crafting of the forest reform laws, when cooperation was at an all-time high due to international pressure. While this dialogue was confined to a hand-selected group of individuals, it did help to build trust and confidence because all actors "at-the-table" got something in return. Once implementation of the forest reforms and policies got underway, however, the process began to fracture under the weight of contention and expectation. Increasing resentment has emerged over the lack of community participation, the intrusion of the state, the commercial-centric agenda and a lack of attention to land ownership issues and community rights. In addition, the promised benefits of a functioning and efficient timber sector have not materialized as promised in communities or trickled down to the population. This has resulted in increasing distrust and a lack of confidence. The government and FDA have recently accused international peacebuilders and Liberian civil society of thwarting economic development by publicly questioning the motives of officials and bringing up allegations of corruption. The FDA continues to assert that holding the forest sector to strict and complex international standards and holding up errors as examples of corruption has slowed down the awarding of timber contracts: each time a new allegation arises, commercial timber activities that could contribute to economic growth, state revenue and poverty alleviation are put on hold because of public and international pressure. At the same, Liberian civil society groups blame the government for circumventing the reforms and

policies and undermining the country's fragile peace by fast-tracking commercial forestry without genuine systems of transparency and accountability, and first addressing the needs of forest communities. These groups suggest that despite the reforms and policies, the government is resorting to the "old ways of doing business" and not adequately addressing issues that have long been catalysts for conflict. For the communities and the population, there is also a palpable lack of confidence and trust in the government's ability to leverage forest resources for development. This "lack of progress" leads to perceptions that the government is corrupt, incompetent or both.

In Sierra Leone, diamond and mineral reforms and policies have largely been done by a select group of international peacebuilders, business interests and government officials. Unlike the forest reforms in Liberia, which took several years and included a variety of stakeholders, efforts to quickly reduce the influence of conflict diamonds led to a less inclusive process. There have been some disjointed programs designed to make the lives of miners and diggers better but the reforms and policies did little to unite groups or initiate a dialogue about the future diamond or mineral sectors outside of international peacebuilding channels where there was an urgency to stem the flow of conflict resources and rapidly rebuild the economy. The overriding perception was that a combination of security and economic recovery would in and of itself build trust and social cohesion, and that too much consultation would "slow [the] process down" (Interview 44). In fact, it appears that an emphasis on state revenue or more control over diamond mining (e.g., Kimberley Process) has undermined trust between mining communities and the state. This is because the focus on revenue and control of diamonds has done little to improve conditions for diggers, miners and local communities or provide new opportunities for land ownership and alternative livelihoods in agriculture. At the same time, efforts to jump-start the industrial mining sector has led to disputes over mining leases, concessions and agreements that put adjacent communities and the environment at-risk and underscore the extent of corruption in the

mining sector. International peacebuilding organizations are critical of the government but suggest the reforms and policies need time to work. Communities and civil society groups, on the other hand, have suggested that the reforms and policies enable the kind of state control that leads to economic mismanagement and corruption.

In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the reforms and policies have served a very useful purpose of bringing to the surface historical grievances and exposing the corruption and patronage that has traditionally been associated with forests, diamonds and minerals. The importance of this cannot be overstated since these debates and discussions have historically been off-limits in public discourse. In Liberia, reforms and policies were first largely hammered out among a small group of stakeholders in a climate of trust and cooperation but over time this process has fractured over increasingly contentious issues. In Sierra Leone, confidence and trust in the reforms and policies continues to decline even as the government has successfully been able to implement the Kimberley Process and raise government revenue. This is largely due to a lack of attention to the plight of diggers and miners and increasing evidence of corruption by the government in negotiating contracts with mineral companies. In both cases, then, the reforms and policies are not at the moment helping to build social cohesion and trust but may be having the opposite effect. Since the reforms and policies may ultimately alter people's relationship to the environment and natural resources, they can inherently bring people together or divide them over time. The lesson here is that governance reforms, particularly in war-torn states like Liberia and Sierra Leone is a slow and contentious process that may succeed in building trust and cohesion among the population and government--it is far from certain.

Strengthened state institutions

Recently, there has emerged a focus on legitimate state institutions as an essential condition for a lasting and sustainable peace (Fukuyama 2004; Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris

and Sisk 2009). According to Paris (2004, 173-174), state institutions are critical for peacebuilding since the conditions above--security, economic development and social cohesion and trust--take place within institutional constraints that can resolve competing societal disputes, openly debate and create policy, and enforce a system of rules and regulations that govern the polity. Fractured, ineffective or illegitimate state institutions that cannot balance societal demands or protect certain groups may be susceptible to contestation or violence (Paris 2004, 173). State institutions should be legitimate in the eyes of the population and international community. Legitimacy, then, refers the consent of the population to accept certain "rules of the game" and the capacity to exercise a monopoly on the use of force, the ability to collect revenues and govern expenditures (Call and Wyeth 2008).

From the view of international peacebuilders in Sierra Leone, state institutions dealing with the environment and natural resources--specifically diamonds and minerals--have been strengthened since the end of the conflict. Before the intervention of international peacebuilders, the diamond sector was not only an unmanaged free-for-all but helping to fuel the conflict. At the same time, the industrial mineral sector was in ruins and not contributing to the economy. Not only has Sierra Leone restored its monopoly on the use of force but has been successful at gaining control of diamond mining areas. By establishing new reforms and policies, it has successfully been able to reestablish its authority to collect revenues as can be seen by the upswing in diamond and mineral receipts. While international peacebuilders remain vigilant to counteract corruption, the general consensus is that the mineral sector is on the right track. Security has been restored, economic development is increasing and social cohesion has been enhanced all because of strengthened and increasingly legitimate states institutions. However, whether the state institutions are legitimate in the eyes of certain portions of the population remains uncertain. While the more legally mined diamonds are flowing through official channels, smuggling remains extremely prevalent because that is the

only way diggers and miners can capture a decent price. In addition, despite continued attempts to crack-down on illegal mining operations they continue to be widespread because such operations, although illegal, offer livelihoods. In this sense, the people that rely on small-scale alluvial diamond mining elude the state's grasp and apparently do not consent to the rules and institutions. If the violence and conflict is any guide, there is also evidence that communities adjacent to industrial mining operations are unwilling to consent to policies they view as unjust. Finally, public attention to corruption in negotiating large-scale mineral contracts has raised suspicion as to whether the state is willing or able to leverage the environment and natural resources for the benefit of the population.

In Liberia, there is a sense among international peacebuilders that the reforms and policies in the forest sector is evidence of strengthened state institutions. Certainly during the conflict the forest sector had been unmanaged, overharvested and hijacked by rebels and corrupt government officials to sustain a brutal conflict. The government has reestablished its monopoly on violence and regained control of forests areas. Although the government has not been able to meet revenue projections and despite a host of problems, international peacebuilders highlight that state institutions have contributed to peacebuilding. But just like Sierra Leone, there is reason to believe that state institutions do not enjoy popular legitimacy and support, particularly among forest communities. This is largely based on two observations. First, because the forest reforms and policies are essentially dictating how people should behave relative to forests, which to reiterate have always supplied the resources needed for survival and sustainable livelihoods, it was expected that community rights would be part of a national dialogue. Although reforms and policies do stress the importance of active public participation in forest management there is little genuine inclusion in the decision making process. Timber contracts have been contentious based on a lack of community input, and government's allocation of 800,000 hectares of land for timber contracts was awarded despite overlapping land claims. Second, there also exists a

fundamental question about "who owns the forests?" This is a long-standing struggle that has played out over the Community Rights Law and concerns whether forests are a state asset or an endowment of rural communities. Because of a long history of powerful local and national elites and business interest controlling Liberia's forests at the expense of communities and the environment, the reforms and policies that place the state once again at the center of decisions is illegitimate.

Conclusion

Despite differences in the cases, I found that the reforms and policies pursued by international peacebuilders follow a broadly common strategy aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural resources. While there are peace-enhancing benefits to these policies and reforms, I found that they come with four linked pathologies that can give rise to contention and resistance, which appears to be increasing the propensity for violence. In terms of peacebuilding outcomes, it appears that by prioritizing primarily economic outcomes like GDP and state revenue and state authority, other factors are being either ignored that can play a significant role in how the environment and natural resources can help reduce the likelihood of violence. It appears that IBOs ignore the lack of inclusiveness and participation, a deficiency of sustainable livelihoods, inequitable or disputed land ownership and tenure rights, and equitable benefit sharing at their peril. . While environmental and natural resource governance may be counterproductive at the moment, our reaction should not be to discard our efforts. Nor do I suggest that "securitization" or "marketization" should be abandoned outright since state control and economic growth are clearly part of the solution. Indeed, peacebuilders need chart a new way forward by taking stock in the current strategies and priorities while also being aware of faulty assumptions and the deep contradictions inherent in peacebuilding operations.

Chapter 9: A Way Forward

The peacebuilding literature has expanded considerably in recent years but few studies have scrutinized in any detail environmental and natural resource governance. This is surprising because peace operations have integrated environmental and natural resource governance reforms into war-torn states for over a decade. Perhaps the reason is that scholars deem the subject matter "low politics" or focus on other facets of areas perceived to be more consequential for establishing a sustainable and long-term peace. Either way, the peacebuilding agenda and policy are out in front of the scholarship, and there is a lot we do not know about the role of environmental and natural resource governance in war-torn states. The objective of this research is to fill this gap in the literature, and examine the extent to which environmental and natural resources governance helps or hinders peacebuilding.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the significance of this research for Liberia and Sierra Leone; for peacebuilding operations; and for scholarship, more generally. Second, because this work is a preliminary step in a longer project I describe three areas for future research. And finally, I chart a new way forward for environmental and natural resource governance by briefly elucidating the challenges IBOs inherently face and new strategies that may be helpful for peace operations now and in the years to come.

Significance of this Work

Given the importance of peacebuilding as a means of addressing civil conflict and the threats they pose to international security and human welfare any opportunity to improve the effectiveness of future peace operations should be pursued. Since the mid-1990s there has

been a decrease in the number and intensity of civil wars but a growing supply of war-torn states (Mack 2007). According to Call and Wyeth (2008, 1) “peacebuilding may be as – if not more – important than conflict prevention in reducing the fact and toll of civil war.” As such, the stakes of peacebuilding failure and the prospects for success underscore the fundamental importance in understanding and establishing the conditions for achieving a sustainable and lasting peace. Although this dissertation focuses on only two cases, the last several years we have witnessed not only new peacebuilding operations but several that have significant environment and natural resource dimensions. For instance, as of this writing, Cote d'Ivoire, and Libya are on the threshold of civil conflict and both have significant natural resources.

Because peacebuilding operations are likely to increase in the coming decades, my work endeavors to bridge the world of theory and policy. The findings that emerge from this research--that current strategy aimed at reforming environmental and natural resource governance may undermine positive peacebuilding trajectories--have almost immediate significance for those involved in peace operations on-the-ground. International peacebuilders and analysts concerned with reforming environmental and natural resource sectors should be interested in this work. If anything, it should raise the specter that strategies, agendas and policies employed by IBOs may lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Beyond that, however, this research presents challenges for those designing plans for economic recovery, which are inherently based on assumptions about the ability of the environment and natural resources to provide goods and services at a variety of levels. While it is important not to over-generalize the findings, we can make contingent generalizations that suggest with a high degree of confidence that in volatile and fragile in war-torn states efforts to establish, maintain or alter the "rules of the game" for governing the environment and natural resources can have palpable consequences for a sustainable and lasting peace because the stakes are so high.

This work is also important for scholars of international relations and comparative politics. It raises questions about the role of the environment and natural resource governance that have not been addressed with any detail. Broad claims regarding the way the environment and natural resources can "concretely" contribute to peacebuilding may need to be reexamined in light of this information (UNEP 2009). The premise, for example, that interaction and communication around the shared environments and resources can promote cooperation and peace is by no means easy or assured. Furthermore, this work adds substantial detail to arguments in the peacebuilding literature that market-oriented reforms undermine peacebuilding outcomes but never clearly delineates any specific mechanisms by which tension, contention and conflict may development (Paris 2004). Moreover, if Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 47) are correct that rebuilding war-torn states is determined by the rebuilding of social trust this research provides another set of factors beyond political institutions, power sharing arrangements and the like that need to be considered. Lastly, I should mention that this research also contributes to the scholarship on the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases, respectively. In fact, it represents the first detailed account of Liberia's significant and well-publicized attempts to govern forests for peace as well as the first to address Sierra Leone's efforts to govern both the mineral and diamond sectors. But further research is needed. I have examined only two cases so similar studies in other countries and sub-regions are certainly desirable. Further research should be conducted on the dynamics of different resources, including those that sit outside of the international "spotlight". More research is also required on the precise actor's efforts to govern the environment and natural resources. For example, can we unpack the role of civil society? And finally, are there new variables that emerge from this research that may be able to inform new quantitative studies?

Challenges and a Way Forward

International peacebuilding organizations have placed a great deal of faith in the reforms and policies responses promoted and established in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As it turns out, however, any the peace-enhancing traits are threatened because the reforms and policies can trigger pathologies that can undermine the conditions they were intended to strengthen.

However, our reaction should not be to discard efforts to govern the environment and natural resources. Nor do I suggest that "securitization" or "marketization" should be abandoned outright since state control and economic growth are clearly part of the solution. Indeed, I argue the peacebuilders need to do three things: (1) rethink strategies and priorities; (2) beware of assumptions and; (3) address embedded tensions.

Rethink peacebuilding reforms, policies and priorities

To establish a sustainable and long-term peace, strategies and policies need to be devised that can foster trust, build confidence and engender cooperation, particularly in the decade or so after a conflict ends. As this research points out, this is no easy task when the political, economic and social dynamics are deeply intertwined with the environment and natural resources. But there needs to be some way to remedy the pathologies identified. If we look closely, we find that the most common grievances concern land ownership and tenure, corruption, exclusion and a lack of sustainable livelihoods. I suggest that slowing down efforts to "marketize" the environment and natural resources while speeding up efforts to provide sustainable livelihoods to the population may be helpful. Reorienting such priorities, I believe, would help ensure that issues that have historically aggrieved populations get resolved early on, the "expectation gap" gets reduced, and potential windows of opportunity in which spoilers can emerge are minimized. At the same time, peacebuilders need to make sure that reforms do not simply rebuild or reassemble pre-war arrangements and structures that had played a role in the conflict. "Slow-tracking" would also allow enough

time not only to rebuild state institutions--and begin the long-process of institutionalizing norms of transparency and accountability that brings patronage out into the open.

"Slow tracking" would also allow for a comprehensive focus on sustainable livelihoods related to agricultural production and the use of forest products that are often labeled as part of the "informal" economy or as so-called "low stakes" issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, and energy supplies. Indeed, interviews in Liberia and Sierra Leone turn up a widely held perception that livelihoods and the well-being of communities are being left behind in the peacebuilding process. Liberia's focus on commercial forestry has not been matched by comparable efforts to rebuild communities and ensure food security with input from communities themselves. And in Sierra Leone, reforms continue to emphasize an alluvial diamond mining sector and industrial mining rather than creating new livelihood opportunities for a growing population of youth that want to return to subsistence agriculture.

I certainly envision this "way forward" to be criticized on two grounds. The first is that "slow-tracking" rather than "fast-tracking" environmental and natural resource governance will not only increase the cost and duration of international peacebuilding but deprive war-torn states of revenue that can fund peacebuilding activities shortly after conflict ends. This may appear to be a solid critique but as the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases highlight the promise of such revenue is far from clear. It is hard to tell in the abstract but perhaps commercial forestry in Liberia would be further along and industrial mining less violent if only the process was "people-centered" rather than "state-centered". The second potential critique is that a reorienting peacebuilding so that it focuses more on the local livelihoods and ownership needs of the population can undermine peace since it would slowdown peacebuilding. The real fear, I suspect, among IPOs and governments is that too much public participation, decentralization or local control is deemed a threat. In addition, the notion that development is state-led rather than part of local-level dynamic goes against the conventional wisdom. However, what really weakens the war-torn state, and its ability to

govern, is a lack of legitimacy of an overzealous central authority that could be enhanced by placing an emphasis on local dynamics of peacebuilding *as well as* the national.

Beware of faulty assumptions and constructs

One must be keenly aware that the ways in which conflicts are constructed by actors reflects sets of assumptions about the character and extent of problems, which justify certain actions. The ways problems are constructed also determines the character any reforms or policy responses. While the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts were fuelled in part by greedy warlords and combatants that controlled valuable natural resources this is an oversimplification. The country has a long-history of corruption and networked patronage that is intertwined the environment and natural resources to create "shadow states". The environment and natural resources were used as levers to buy the loyalty of local actors. Such relationships were shaped by a combination of endemic underdevelopment and unfair land practices, and exploited by ethnic groupings and political allegiances. Representing the conflict in the terms described above had tremendous implications for the scope and extent of reforms and policies in two ways. First, it lends itself to understanding the relationship between the environment, natural resources and conflict in terms of "conflict resources". This leads to reforms and policies bent on securing and controlling the environment and natural resources at all cost. A focus on economic motives of combatants renders invisible the ways in which the political and economic dimensions are linked via corruption and systems of patronage. It also ensures that historically relevant points of contention, which are linked to the consolidation of state power, are ignored or minimized. Finally, suggesting that new wars are a novel phenomenon deflects attention from the destabilizing effects of market economic systems or the behavior of international actors.

The emphasis on marketization emphasizes the security enhancing traits of the environment and natural resources. Peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone are premised on deeply

held assumptions that poverty and a lack of economic growth is the most significant risk factor for war-torn states. In addition, since state authority and power is essential for security, revenues key preoccupation of peacebuilders. Moreover, integrating countries into the global economic order is presumed to help guarantee peace and security. The recipe, then, is to rapidly exploit and export available natural resources. Construction the relationship between the environment, natural resources and peace in terms of marketization has impacts the reforms and policies in several ways. First, it decreases the likelihood that factors which habitually foster grievance and resentment—including perverse land ownership and tenure rights, and unfair systems of patronage--will be addressed. A focus on marketization tends to dominate discussions and crowd out other factors vital for the consolidation of peace. Vital environmental issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, and energy supplies are almost overwhelmingly overlooked. Moreover, while valuable natural resources are high stakes issues, putting diamonds and timber into the international spotlight can lead to tunnel vision that risk overlooking the sustainable livelihoods of communities, more broadly. A comprehensive focus on sustainable livelihoods related to agricultural production and the use of forest products are often labeled as part of the “informal” economy or as low stakes issues, and does not receive comparable attention in peacebuilding efforts.

Reforms and policies are based on faulty or at least uncertain assumptions and constructs that help create pathologies of marketization and securitization. The reason for this may be an unwillingness to question underlying assumptions that link state authority and market oriented policies to peace in war-torn states (Paris 2004). It might also be due to an inherent inability of international peacebuilder to "see" how politics and economics are linked in resource-dependent states. For a variety of reasons international peacebuilders are both discouraged from digging deep into national politics or historical analyses. Finally, peacebuilders have been unable to deal with a lag time between academic research and policy responses. While analysts have largely debunked the "lootable" resources explanation for

civil war, take exception to a description of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia as caused "new barbarism" and question the accuracy of the "Liberal Peace Thesis" of war-torn states, the reforms and polices still reflect these dubious ideas.

Address embedded tensions

What emerges with striking clarity is that environmental and natural resource governance is fraught with contradiction. As we have seen consolidating state authority has received pushback from local communities concerned about the historical conditions by which economic and political elites have captured the environment and natural resources and used it as an instrument of private gain and tool of patronage rather than to improve public well-being. Bypassing or reducing state authority and control on the other hand is problematic as well because it undermines the effectiveness of the state and reduces its legitimacy in the eyes of peacebuilders. A lack of state capacity state control opens up opportunities as had to effect of fostering a tradition of contention, competition and violence. At the same time, a lack of state authority can empower local warlords, who likewise can capture and control environment and natural resources for personal gain--also part of patronage networks. There is an embedded tension --securitizing the peace is needed and particularly the assistance of international peacebuilders in doing so--but sustaining it needs local ownership of the processes. While international peacebuilders talk about--and reforms and polices reflect--decentralization and local participation and control it is largely not felt in practice. This is largely because such local options represent a threat to state power and open up the potential for security threats in the future.

We have also seen how marketization has been contested by communities and NGOs who argue that in the past such prescriptions have not only been counterproductive but have sown the seeds of conflict. Historically such efforts have only resulted in corruption and patronage that has ensured that benefits will only accrue to an allotted few elites that control

the state. These policies have also served to undermine the legitimacy of the state with the local population that can leave the country vulnerable to popular discontent and armed insurgency. At the same time, a reluctance to aggressively marketize resources can leave the state drastically dependent on international peacebuilders for cash and may leave the state unable to cash in the peace dividend and fund a return to basic services, pay government officials, and rebuild state institutions. This can not only create discontent but leave institutions in a state of fragility that can only increase vulnerabilities for conflict. This point to another embedded tension-- marketizing the environment and natural resources may be needed to some extent--and international peacebuilders are likely necessary to ensure transparency and accountability are improved.

This idea of embedded tensions highlights two things. First, analysts that advocate a wholehearted endorsement of the current peacebuilding agendas or suggest a need to abandon peacebuilding altogether are off-the-mark. In fact, neither option is possible at the moment. What is needed is a better understanding of the trade-offs and innovative ways of negotiating and legitimizing reforms and policies that are clearly contentious and tension filled. Second, international peacebuilders face tough choices because an emphasis on state authority and neoliberal prescriptions for peace has implications for local well-being and development. In short, IPOs need to be attentive to the fact that dealing with the environment and natural resources in war-torn states is intrinsically difficult. As guideposts, peacebuilders should ask precisely "whose peace" they are trying to secure and what kind of development genuinely leads to human well-being and security (Pugh, Cooper and Turner 2008).

Appendices

Interviews Conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone

Interview Number	Organization Name / Affiliation	Position
Liberia		
1		Bi-lateral donor
2	FDA	Liberian Government Official
45		City / Community Meeting (75)
3		International Env Conservation NGO
4	UN	International Organization
5	Ministry of Mines	Liberian Government Official
6	UNDP	International Organization
7		International Organization
8		International NGO
9		Liberian NGO / Consultant
10		Liberian Government Official
11	UNDP	International Organization
12		International NGO
13		Liberian Government Official
14	UN	International Organization
15		Bi-lateral donor / Contractor
16		Liberian NGO (labor)
17		Bi-lateral donor
18	IFI	International Organization (IFI)
19		Liberian Government Official
20		Consultant / Academic
21	FDA	Liberian Government Official
22		Liberian NGO
23		Liberian NGO
24		International NGO
25	IFI	International Organization (IFI) / Consultant
26		Liberian NGO
27	UN	International Organization
28		Liberian Government Official
29		Liberian NGO
30	UN	International Organization
31		Liberian NGO
32		Liberian NGO
33		International NGO (conservation)

34		Village / Community Meeting (5)
35		Village / Community Meeting (11)
36		International NGO
37	House of Representatives	Liberian Government Official
38		International Organization
39		Liberian NGO / Former Government Official
40	FDA	Liberian Government Official
44		Bi-lateral donor (former)
41	IFI	International Organization (IFI)
42		Academic / Former Government Official
43	UN Panel of Experts	International Organization

Sierra Leone

46		International NGO
47		Sierra Leone NGO
48	UNDP	International Organization
49		Diamond / Gold Industry
50		International Organization / Consultant
51		Academic / Consultant
52		Sierra Leone NGO
53		Sierra Leone NGO
54		Sierra Leone Government Official
55		Sierra Leone NGO
56		Mining Industry Executive
57		Sierra Leone NGO
58		Sierra Leone Government Official (Env)
59	IFI	International Organization
60	IFI	International Organization
61		Sierra Leone NGO (labor)
62		Sierra Leone Government Official
63		Sierra Leone NGO (Env)
64		Sierra Leone Government Official
65		Sierra Leone Government Official
66		Sierra Leone NGO
67		Sierra Leone NGO
68		Sierra Leone Government Official
69		Diamond / Mineral Company
70		Bi-lateral donor
71		Bi-lateral donor
72		Sierra Leone NGO
73		Academic / Consultant
74		International Consultant / Expert
75		Sierra Leone NGO / former government official
76	UN	International Organization
77		Bi-lateral donor / International NGO
78		Bi-lateral donor
79		Bi-lateral donor
80		International NGO

81	Village Chief	Traditional Leader
82		Sierra Leone Government Official
83	Paramount Chief	Traditional Leader
84		Sierra Leone NGO

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