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HUMAN RIGHTS AND US FOREIGN AID:
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF AID ALLOCATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR ON TERROR

Brian L. Miller,
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Directed By:

Professor Paul Huth
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park

In this study, I examine the influence of human rights considerations on the US foreign aid decisionmaking process during the war on terror and, for comparative purposes, prior to its onset. The findings indicate that respect for human rights has been negatively related to the yes/no decision to allocate economic aid and the amount allocated since 9/11. In other words, more economic aid has flowed—and more readily—to regimes with poor human rights records since the onset of the war on terror. The findings also indicate that human rights considerations failed to influence post-9/11 military aid decisions. While these findings run counter to the Congressionally-mandated positive relationship between human rights and foreign aid, and my own
expectations of American exceptionalism in the guise of human rights promotion, additional analysis indicates they were not a first. I also found that respect for human rights was negatively related to economic aid allocations under every administration since Reagan’s and during the post-Cold War era. Only during the Cold War, and only for military aid, did better human rights practices increase the prospects of a regime receiving aid. In analyzing allocations to partners and non-partners in the war on terror, I found that human rights considerations negatively influenced decisions on economic aid amounts for both groups but only the yes/no decision for military aid allocations to partners. Looking across the models, and taking into account the influence of the control variables, one possible explanation for the lack of positive findings on the human rights variable becomes apparent: other, competing considerations—namely addressing recipient “need,” promoting democracy, and confronting perceived threats to national security—regularly overshadow human rights concerns, leading US decisionmakers to extend aid to regimes with questionable human rights practices.
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By

Brian L. Miller

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Advisory Committee:
Professor Paul Huth, Chair
Professor Ken Conca
Professor Virginia Haufler
Professor George Quester
Professor IM Destler
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Chapter 1: Introduction

*From Controversy to Consensus and Back Again*¹

In response to growing calls that US policy abroad ought to promote the rights and protections ordinary Americans enjoy at home, Congress in 1976 amended the Foreign Assistance Act to make promotion of “increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world” a key goal of the US foreign aid program (Section 502B: 230).² US law has since required foreign aid decisionmakers to restrict the flow of economic and military aid to countries perpetrating human rights abuses unless “extraordinary circumstances,” which Congress left largely undefined, dictate otherwise (231).³ The law immediately attracted the attention of international relations (IR) scholars, with McKinlay and Little’s (1977) early finding that “human needs” play no role in an allocation process predicated on the self-serving interests of “power-political and security concerns” sparking significant debate (80). By the late-1990s, however, this debate had given way to consensus. Scholars generally agreed that human rights considerations influenced US foreign aid

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¹ The analysis and findings presented in this manuscript are the author’s alone, as are any errors or omissions, and should in no way be construed to reflect negatively on those who so graciously and patiently served as dissertation committee members or reviewers.

² Congress two years earlier included a “Sense of Congress” statement in the Foreign Assistance Act requesting that the president curtail the flow of aid to governments committing gross human rights violations. Not until 1976, however, did Congress drop the Sense of Congress statement to make the language legally binding on US foreign aid decisionmakers (Apodaca 2005).

³ “Extraordinary circumstances,” sometimes referred to as “emergency situations,” historically have involved the allocation of aid to countries on the basis of what US decisionmakers consider an overriding US strategic or national security objective. The Reagan administration’s allocation in 1983 of an additional $55 million in aid to El Salvador over Congressional objections probably is the most oft-cited example in literature—qualitative and quantitative—on US foreign aid decisionmaking (Walldorf 2008; Poe 1991 and 1992; Eberstadt 1988; Burgerman 2004).
decisionmaking, though the magnitude and direction of that influence fluctuated in light of countervailing strategic, ideological, economic, and humanitarian concerns (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1991 and 1992; Abrams and Lewis 1993; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Callaway and Matthews 2008). This consensus appeared poised to deepen, and the influence of human rights on aid allocations set to grow, as the threat of communism faded and US decisionmakers redirected increasing amounts of foreign aid to consolidating post-Cold War democratic transitions, fostering Middle East peace, and promoting good governance initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Korb 2008; Clark and O’Connor 1997; Stark 2000; Apodaca 2006).

With yet another shift in US foreign policy priorities, this time in response to Al-Qaeda’s attacks in 2001 on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the consensus was lost and controversy again ensued. To be sure, the shift toward countering the threat of international terrorism “focused urgently—and rightly—on protecting Americans and preventing further attacks” (Massimino 2000: 23). For many, however, the shift also raised serious concerns about the United States’ commitment to promoting human rights abroad and the future of human rights as a US foreign policy goal. As paraphrased by IR scholars and human rights observers, these concerns have been articulated as distinct but overlapping arguments that today represent the conventional wisdom on the issue: some argue that the George W. Bush administration in prosecuting the war on terror used human rights as a rhetorical
and political foil but, practically speaking, cast the issue aside in pursuit of Al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates (Mertus 2005; Apodaca 2006). In the administration’s response to the attacks, so their argument goes, “the promotion of human rights [became] one of the major casualties of the 9/11 terrorist attacks” (Acharya 2008: i). Others tend to focus not on the Bush administration but the war on terror itself, asserting that its onset marked a new era in US foreign policy hostile human rights promotion. They argue that the “era of human rights ended shortly after September 11, 2001,” when countering the threat of international terrorism became the United States’ overarching foreign policy paradigm (Mertus 2008: 1). Since the onset of the war on terror, the human rights gains of the 1970s, including those embodied in the human rights provision, have been in the “process of being dismantled, as security concerns have taken precedence over human rights abuses” (Christie 2008: 16). Still others focus on the Bush administration’s division of the world into countries that were “either with us or against us” in the war on terror (Bush 2001). This third group argues President Bush’s ultimatum created a double standard in US human rights policy whereby decisionmakers disregard human rights considerations when allocating aid to countries that partnered with the United States in the war on terror but held others to the standard mandated by the human rights provision (Ingatief 2005; Weiss, Crahan, and Goering 2004; Callaway and Matthews 2008). The implication is that human rights considerations failed to influence US foreign aid allocations to all but non-partners in the war on terror, and that they are unlikely to again so long as
decisionmakers perceive international terrorists are capable of mounting attacks against the US homeland (Forsythe 2006; Christie 2008).

Interestingly, and despite their variation, each of these arguments assumes the war on terror is best understood as constituting a set of extraordinary circumstances under the Foreign Assistance Act, if not officially than in practice.\footnote{The Foreign Assistance Act requires the president to certify in writing that extraordinary circumstances exist and warrant the allocation of US foreign aid to a country involved in human rights violations. However, presidents, including Carter, who signed the human rights provision into law, have been able to sidestep this requirement due to a number of defects in the human rights language of Section 502B.} That is to say, each argues that the war on terror severed, to varying degrees, the Congressionally-mandated relationship between human rights and US foreign aid allocations. Yet, despite the moral and legal implications of these arguments, to the author’s knowledge no study has used them as a springboard for an empirical analysis of the post-9/11 linkage between human rights and US foreign aid.

**The Research Puzzle**

This study seeks to provide that analysis. In so doing, my aim is neither to promote nor undermine any one of the arguments sketched above. Rather, it is to examine their generalizability and advance scholarly knowledge in this small but important subfield of US foreign policy studies. By filling in some of the first pieces of the research puzzle that is the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid in the “Age of Sacred Terror,” I also hope this study will pique scholarly interest and spur more vibrant debate on this issue (Benjamin and Simon 2002: i).
I search for pieces of this puzzle in a pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCTS) dataset spanning a “global” sample of countries for the years 1977-2008, the most comprehensive to date. By including years prior to the onset of the war on terror, I embed my analysis in historical and comparative perspective, which provides for a deeper understanding and more robust discussion of post-9/11 US foreign aid decisionmaking. My primary goal is to answer the following set of research questions derived from the arguments outlined above: did the Bush administration jettison human rights considerations during the US foreign aid allocation process? If so, was this disregard for human rights considerations a historical first? Or, have past administrations bound by Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act also set aside these considerations? Did this jettisoning reverse an otherwise positive trend in the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid? Is there evidence to suggest that the war on terror represents an “era” in US foreign aid decisionmaking, one that altered the previously-established relationship between human rights and aid? If so, how does the human rights-foreign aid linkage during the war on terror compare to the Cold War and post-Cold War era? Did US foreign aid decisionmakers ignore human rights abuses by partners in the war on terror while penalizing those of non-partners? On balance, what do the answers to these questions say about the war on terror as a set of extraordinary circumstances and the prospects for human rights considerations to influence US foreign aid decisionmaking as the war on terror progresses, if not in name than spirit?
Significance of This Study

In providing empirical answers to the research questions highlighted in the previous section, this study adds to the cumulative knowledge and scholarly understanding of the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid in several ways. Only one quantitative study, Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz’s (2009), addresses post-9/11 US foreign aid allocations, but only in passing since the authors’ focus was the nexus between US economic aid allocations and democracy promotion. From a quantitative standpoint, then, this study squarely places human rights and US foreign aid allocations during the war on terror as the focus of inquiry. Additionally, I make in this study the novel contribution of analyzing the human rights-US foreign aid linkage for two previously unexamined groups of aid recipients—partners and non-partners in the war on terror. From a theoretical standpoint, I offer readers a study that speaks to the relative explanatory power of the three IR approaches that have dominated the study of human rights and US foreign aid for more than four decades (Lai 2003; Barratt 2008; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Robinson and Finn 2000). The first, which Congress had in mind when noting that human rights, in “keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States,” should be a “principal goal of US foreign policy,” is the positivist school of American exceptionalism (P.L. 87-195, 230). American exceptionalism traditionally

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5 In fairness to the theories in question, I only sketch the broad contours of what may be considered the common understanding of these theories in the human rights-US foreign aid literature. I leave the various, lesser known and used sub-strains of each theory that may apply to this vein of literature to future researchers.

6 This school, “associated with Hamilton and most presidents since Woodrow Wilson, would have the USA actively involved in world affairs [and the promotion of human rights] –on the
takes inspiration from President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, known as the “Four Points” speech, in which he called for expanding the US foreign aid program beyond rebuilding post-World War II Europe to facilitating the transition of African and Asian countries from colonial possessions to independent and functioning members of the international community (Hattori 2003; Veillette 2008; Thorbecke 2000). While recognizing other considerations influence the aid allocation process, American exceptionalism in its purest form contends that the process is at heart a humanitarian endeavor aimed at promoting international peace and prosperity (Hattori 2003; Callaway and Matthews 2008). As Hattori (2003) points out, studies in this liberal tradition proceed from three ethical tenants that are missing in its two main theoretical rivals:

the first identifies foreign aid as an “imperfect obligation” of the industrialized to the “less developed” states to provide “basic needs,” which are identified as fundamental human rights…the second ethical justification identifies foreign aid as a moral response to problems that can be remedied with technical expertise…finally, foreign aid is identified as embodying the ideal of humanitarianism (230).

Understood as such, foreign aid is akin to a gift of money, materiel, or technical expertise to a less fortunate member of the international community (Williams 2000). The upshot of this approach is that US foreign aid’s purpose is to promote American liberal values, such as respect for individual rights, democratic norms, and the rule of law abroad and thus improve the human condition on a global scale (Lai 2003; Lipset 1996; Gaddis 1992; McCormick.

assumption that US impact would be for the better” (Forsythe 2006: 161). To be sure, though, there is an “alternative, negative kind of exceptionalism, namely, unilateralism and disengagement from international cooperation” that is more commonly highlighted in the qualitative analysis of human rights and US foreign aid (Powell 2008: 107). Mertus (2008), for example, emphasizes this negative exceptionalism in her study when she argues that the United States has held disfavored countries to higher human rights standards while ignoring the abuses of friends and allies.
and Mitchell 1998; Forsythe and Beetham 1995; Monten 2005; Callaway and Matthews 2008). Proponents of this approach tend to view its precepts as holding, or at least holding their own, in the face of other considerations known to influence aid allocations irrespective of presidential administration or era in decisionmaking (Walldorf 2008).

The second approach, realism, lays out the familiar counterargument that US decisionmakers allocate foreign aid to secure political support abroad for the purpose of enhancing US national security (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1962). Whereas “allocating foreign assistance on the basis of ethical considerations [inherent to the American exceptionalism approach] suggests a positive relationship between aid and respect for human rights, one does not expect improved respect for human rights from the allocations of foreign assistance on the basis of donor self-interest [upon which realism is founded]” (Callaway and Matthews 2008: 26). Following this logic, realists argue that US decisionmakers generally allocate foreign aid to security partners, such as treaty allies and partners in the war on terror, irrespective of their human rights records (Hattori 2003).

The third, and perhaps the least employed approach in the literature, the pluralist-business approach, asserts that US foreign aid decisionmaking is based on preferences of politically powerful domestic interest groups (McKeown 1984). Most studies employing this orientation view the US business community, particularly US multinational corporations (MNCs), as the dominate interest group. They view MNCs as leveraging their economic clout to tempt or
cajole US decisionmakers into funneling foreign aid to countries based on economic interests and trade relations rather than human rights or security concerns (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). In addition to evaluating the relative utility of these theoretical approaches, I also evaluate the merits of my own pragmatic version of American exceptionalism, which I outline in detail in the next section.

In addition to my primary and secondary goals of providing insight into the human rights-foreign aid linkage since the onset of the war on terror and evaluating the relative utility of the theories of aid decisionmaking mentioned above, respectively, I also address a number of topics that may be of interest to US policymakers. These topics include: trends in US foreign aid allocations; the relative importance over time of key considerations on US foreign aid decisionmaking; historical adherence (or lack thereof) to the human rights requirements enumerated in Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act; and the overall influence of human rights on the foreign aid allocation process. Having a deeper understanding of these issues could make for more informed US foreign aid decisionmaking in the future. Additionally, US decisionmakers interested in promoting respect for human rights and American exceptionalism may find my analysis of considerations that have tended to trump the two during the foreign aid allocation process of particular interest.

Finally, I have a practical contribution in mind for this study. US foreign aid is a scarce resource and its allocation a trust between the American people and the elected representatives who make allocation decisions on their behalf.
In a 1994 article published in *Human Rights Quarterly*, Poe, Pilatovsky, Ogundele, and I expressed a belief that the American public deserves to know how foreign aid decisionmakers are spending US taxpayer dollars and portraying American interests abroad. I believe this contribution is today too often overlooked in the literature, and I seek to advance it again on behalf of my late mentor, Dr. Steven C. Poe, and other coauthors. If ordinary Americans want their elected representatives to embrace American exceptionalism, to follow the letter and spirit of the human rights provision and, in so doing, use foreign aid to promote respect for human rights throughout the world, I hope this study informs them of how we, as a nation, are faring and what need be done if we are to achieve this lofty goal.

**Theoretical Orientation**

The theoretical orientation I employ in this study is the same that I relied on in the 1994 article. I approach the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid from the positivist school of American exceptionalism. However, my approach differs from the purist variant outlined in the previous section. I reject the assumption that regards the “United States as an exception in the midst of a violent and immoral world” when allocating foreign aid (Wipfler 1979: 183). I assume instead that the United States is a willing, forceful, and primarily self-interested participant in that world and that US foreign aid decisionmaking reflects this reality. Consequently, and not surprisingly, I also reject the claim that US foreign aid is best regarded as a gift predicated on US decisionmakers’ concerns for the global downtrodden. I make room for such pure gift-giving in
my understanding of American exceptionalism, but only in cases of overwhelming recipient need—as in the aftermath of natural disasters—in the guise of humanitarian assistance.

As the opening sentence of this chapter suggests, I envision American exceptionalism as an outgrowth of the uneven but growing acceptance and, by the late-1960s, entrenchment of human rights norms in the US electorate. This entrenchment, I contend, took root on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement and amid growing popular discontent with the Vietnam War and the seemingly amoral foreign policy decisions of the Nixon administration (Lumsdaine 1993; Sunstein 1997; Holsti 2000; Forsythe 2000). The culmination of this entrenchment was the election in the mid-1970s of decisionmakers willing to advance and, ultimately, adopt into law the human rights provision. Thus, I regard the provision incorporation into the Foreign Assistance Act as a rational response by elected representatives to citizens’ demands for the expression of morality in US foreign policy. As Finnamore (1998), then, I site the origin of this norm “not in preexisting state interests but in strongly held principled ideas (ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those ideas” to avoid repeating foreign policy missteps of the past (518).

In the decades since the adoption of the human rights provision, “moral entrepreneurs”—the same ordinary Americans and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that secured that adoption—have continued to advance these ideas and elect representatives who share their values and norms (Nadelmann 1990: 120). Bureaucratic structures, such as the State Department’s
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, enable their efforts, as have Congressional reporting requirements on the executive branch concerning human rights conditions abroad. Against these electoral and institutional backdrops, US rhetoric in support of human rights has been translated into foreign aid reality (Poe et al. 1994; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Poe 1991 and 1992; Abrams and Lewis 1993; Holsti 2000). This translation is all the more noteworthy, as are the efforts of these entrepreneurs, since the human rights provision is effectively nonbinding, owing to a variety of definitional deficiencies, vagaries, and loopholes in the Congressional language.\(^7\)

With this theoretical orientation in mind, I content that America has exhibited genuine exceptionalism in US foreign aid-giving despite the overall self-serving nature of the allocation process. This exceptionalism has been manifest in the positive influence of human rights and other humanitarian-related considerations, such as recipient need and democracy promotion, on foreign aid decisionmaking. While this influence has not been as consistent or strong as purist variants of the American exceptionalism contend (let alone reached a “tipping point” that affords them anything close to a taken-for-granted status), I view human rights considerations as embedded in and influencing the allocation process. Moreover, despite giving way to other considerations and subject to setback, I regard human rights considerations as resilient and occupying the moral high ground in the US foreign aid narrative thanks to the ongoing efforts of moral entrepreneurs (Sunstein 1997; Finnamore and Sikkink

\(^7\) For a concise and excellent overview of these defects, see Clair Apodaca’s 2005 article, “US Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance: A Short History,” in Ritsumeikan International Affairs 3: 63-80.
1998). For the purposes of this study, the issue is whether these entrepreneurs succeeded—through the human rights provision and ongoing pressure—in securing the influence of human rights considerations on post-9/11 aid allocations or whether the United States sacrificed the “human rights of others to advance its own security and prosperity” after the onset of the war on terror (Forsythe 2006: 6).

**Expected Results**

I anticipate finding that the influence of human rights considerations on US foreign aid decisions diminished somewhat as decisionmakers reoriented aid toward advancing the war on terror. However, and in contrast to the arguments that spurred this study, I also anticipate finding that human rights considerations survived the 9/11 attacks and were positively related to aid allocations. In looking forward to the empirical models in Chapters 4-6, I expect to find that greater respect for human rights—and, for that matter, increases in other indicators of American exceptionalism—exerted a positive influence on the Bush administration’s foreign aid allocations, though strategic concerns are likely to prove more influential. I also anticipate finding the human rights-foreign aid linkage under his administration represents less of a break with past administration’s practices than the conventional wisdom and the arguments that inform it permit. When examining post-9/11 aid allocations as the outgrowth of a new “era” in US foreign policy, I expect to find that human rights considerations had a positive effect on allocation decisions and that this effect will be most pronounced during the post-Cold War era. Finally, I anticipate
finding that the US decisionmakers did not institute a human rights double standard when allocating aid to partners and non-partners in the war on terror. Taken together, then, I anticipate rejecting most of the hypotheses explicated in the next chapter, which are worded consistent with critics’ arguments about the human rights-foreign aid linkage during the war on terror and, thus, at odds with my own rather pragmatic version of American exceptionalism.

Outline of Chapters

To determine whether the arguments sketched above are grounded in empirical “reality,” I proceed in the coming chapters as follows: in Chapter 2, I take stock of the empirical literature on the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid. In the process, I identify the conceptual and methodological issues and selection of variables that will facilitate construction of well-specified quantitative models of US foreign aid decisionmaking. Toward the end of Chapter 2, I offer and discuss a set of hypotheses derived from the research questions highlighted above. I provide in Chapter 3 an overview of the data and methods used to construct and test these hypotheses. Chapters 4-6 are the empirical chapters. In Chapter 4, I present and discuss the findings for models of the human rights-foreign aid linkage under the George W. Bush administration and its predecessors. In Chapters 5 and 6, I do likewise for models of eras in decisionmaking and partners and non-partners in the war, respectively. I use Chapter 7 to synthesize the overall findings of this study. In the process, I revisit the hypotheses and research questions and discuss how the
findings advance scholarly knowledge of the US foreign aid allocation process. To further the secondary goal of this study, I also evaluate in Chapter 7 the utility of the theories typically employed to explain US foreign aid allocations, including my own. Finally, I offer suggestions for future research and conclude with a final word on American exceptionalism and the need for moral entrepreneurs to continue to push to elevate human rights considerations to greater prominence. With this roadmap in mind, I now turn to a review of the literature on human rights and US foreign aid decisionmaking.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I briefly discussed the impetus for this study—three common arguments about the linkage (actually lack thereof) between human rights and US foreign aid allocations during the war on terror—and my primary goal of investigating that linkage via empirical analysis. To advance this goal, I presented a research puzzle—consisting of three sets of research questions inspired by those arguments—and outlined a research design that promises to fill in pieces of that puzzle. I also highlighted the three main theoretical orientations typically employed by scholars when analyzing the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid, in addition to my understanding of American exceptionalism, and my secondary goal of evaluating their relative explanatory power.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine past multivariate studies for conceptual and methodological innovations and variables that will ensure I begin to construct well-specified models of US foreign aid decisionmaking in Chapter 3. My review of the literature unfolds in three sections. Owing to the

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8 My review is not exhaustive. The literature on human rights and US foreign aid has exploded over the last decade, owing in large part to concerns about the war on terror. Since this is a quantitative analysis of US foreign aid decisionmaking, I have opted to highlight only those multivariate studies that directly examine the influence of human rights considerations on aid allocations. Moreover, I limit my inquiry to studies published since Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) study, which introduced the two-stage decisionmaking model that has come to dominate the analysis of US foreign aid and spurred much of the subsequent interest in the topic. For a concise overview of quantitative studies on human rights and US foreign aid prior
The point-counterpoint progression of the literature, particularly early on, the review proceeds chronologically. The first section examines the studies of those scholars whose exchanges in the mid-1980s set the tone for the ongoing debate over the influence of human rights on US foreign aid allocations. The second section highlights a more recent and diverse set of scholars who have joined the debate since the early-2000s. The last section synthesizes the findings of the literature review to assist in the explication of hypotheses. With this progression in mind, I turn to the scholarly debate at the heart of this chapter.

**A Debate on Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Begins…**

In an effort to address the methodological shortcomings or misspecifications of past studies, which consisted primarily of simple correlation matrices and bivariate regression models (McKinlay and Little 1977; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Schoultz 1981), Cingranelli and Pasquarello in 1985 conducted one of the earliest and to date most controversial multivariate analyses of the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid decisionmaking. Their primary contribution to the literature was the introduction of a two-stage conceptual model for analyzing the allocation process, which has since become an industry standard. Based on interviews conducted in 1982 with Congresspersons and executive branch officials involved in the allocation process, the authors conceptualized US foreign aid decisionmaking as follows:

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in the initial stage, US policy-makers performed a function analogous to “gatekeeping”; some countries were systematically excluded from the recipient pool, while others were passed on to the second stage of the decision process. In the second stage, policy-makers interacted to decide the level of assistance to provide (540).

The authors went on to persuasively argue that past studies, in focusing exclusively on the second-stage level of assistance analysis, had effectively ignored the possibility that different considerations may exert more influence at one stage than the other. The first stage of their analysis included all country-years in the study, some 30 Latin American countries for the years 1979-82, with a dichotomous dependent variable; “1” denoted aid recipients in a given year and “0” non-recipients. The second stage, which included only recipient countries, used a continuous dependent variable representing the level of assistance US decisionmakers had allocated to these countries. Using logit and ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate models for the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage, respectively, the authors observed for the first time a statistically significant relationship between human rights and military and economic aid. Specifically, they showed that the Reagan administration used human rights criteria to deny countries military aid at the gatekeeping stage while rewarding the “relatively enlightened human rights practices” of recipient countries with greater levels of economic aid (560). Recipient “need,” measured by a constellation of variables, including gross national product per capita (GNP), was shown to be the most important determinant of whether a country would pass the gatekeeping stage during the allocation of economic aid. This finding was replicated in their military aid model, where volume of trade with
the United States also played a statistically significant role in the initial yes/no gatekeeping decision to allocate aid. In contrast to previous studies like McKinlay and Little’s (1977), which tended to back realist explanations of aid allocations, American exceptionalism and the pluralist-business explanation thus found support in Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage model.

Conceptual and methodological innovations notwithstanding, Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s study drew immediate (and justifiable) criticism from numerous scholars. In perhaps the most significant critique and reappraisal, Carleton and Stohl (1987) drew attention to three shortcomings of the study.\(^9\) While accepting the utility of the two-stage allocation model, Carleton and Stohl (1987) took exception with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) operationalization of human rights based exclusively on US State Department *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Carleton and Stohl (1987) showed that a parallel scale of human rights constructed from Amnesty International information differed significantly on its coding for some countries. This led the authors to surmise that the *Country Reports* suffered from a systemic political bias against leftist regimes, which Poe, Carey, and Vazquez demonstrated for the first time in 2001.\(^10\) Even more problematic in my estimation was Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) exclusion of El Salvador as

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\(^9\) The following year McCormick and Mitchell (1988) leveled a similar critique against Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985). Their argument is not rehearsed here, however, since it largely mirrors that of Carleton and Stohl in terms of basic criticisms.

\(^10\) The authors found that US State Department *Country Reports* tended to forgive allies’ human rights abuses but not those of leftist regimes. They went on to say that this tendency had diminished between the years of 1976 to 1995 and hypothesized that it would continue to do so over time. Moreover, they found that hypotheses that were consistent with critics’ claims about the inherent bias of *Country Reports* explained “only a very small percentage of the variance in the differences between the two reports [Country Reports and Amnesty International reports]” (Poe, Carey, Vazquez 2001: 679).
a “non-routine” case of US foreign aid allocations (545). Carleton and Stohl (1987) showed that the relationship between human rights and economic aid uncovered by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) disappeared entirely when they reinserted El Salvador into the model. Carleton and Stohl went on to also criticize Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) for choosing to analyze only those US foreign aid programs that, in Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s opinion, were clearly economic in nature and directly distributed by the US Government. Reanalyzing, as opposed to replicating, Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s analysis of economic aid at the second stage of the allocation process, but with aggregate economic aid as the dependent variable, Carleton and Stohl (1987) found that there was no relationship between human rights and aid allocations. They concluded their critique by arguing that Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) achieved their results only after questionable sampling techniques. They closed by stating that Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s findings posed little challenge to previous correlation-based and bivariate findings supporting the realist explanation of aid-giving (Chomsky 1978; Schoultz 1981a and 1981b; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Carleton and Stohl 1985 and 1986).

Poe in 1991 challenged Carleton and Stohl’s (1987) findings. Correcting for many of the sampling and variable-related shortcomings of Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) study, he reexamined the relationship between human rights and US military aid under the Carter and Reagan administrations in 1980 and 1984, respectively, for two distinct groups: Western hemisphere countries and a random sample of countries, excluding microstates like Brunei. In a
departure from previous studies, and in an effort to ameliorate the then-suspected biases of Country Report while more closely approximating the foreign aid decisionmaking process, Poe (1991) combined the human rights measures of Amnesty International and the State Department into a single 5-point ordinal scale based on Stohl and Carleton’s (1985) coding rules. He also included a second, but today rarely employed, human rights variable developed by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) that tapped year-to-year changes in scores to determine whether the United States rewarded or punished countries as their human rights practices improve or worsen. To this, he added several control variables, including what I consider an overly inclusive, conceptually muddled, and, by his own admission, crude “strategic importance” index; the index consisted of a dummy variable for leftist and Marxist-oriented governments; a variable tapping a country’s tendency to comply with US interests, as indicated by UN General Assembly roll call votes; a variable representing US bilateral economic interests (US exports to and imports from a country); and a measure of a country’s humanitarian need, represented by GNP per capita (207). Poe’s findings suggest that both the Carter and Reagan administration kept human rights abusers in the Western hemisphere from passing the gatekeeping stage of the aid allocation process. Interestingly, and despite the still popular view that Carter made human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda while

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11 The “strategic importance” index tapped whether a country was non-communist but bordering a communist neighbor; in the Western hemisphere, the United States’ traditional sphere of influence; hosted a US military presence of 500 or more; had critical minerals that the US must obtain from abroad; or faced a violent threat from the left. I believe components of the index would have been better tested separately before any such aggregation. In any event, since its publication some of the index’s components have been shown to exert an independent influence over the allocation process in a number of studies highlight later in this review.
Reagan generally deemphasized such concerns, the negative effect of abuses achieved moderate statistical significant (.05 level) only for the Reagan administration. In contrast to Carter, the Reagan administration seemingly penalized human rights abuses at both the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage when allocating military aid. Under both Carter and Reagan, and not surprisingly, leftist countries tended to pass the gatekeeping stage less often and to receive less aid than others in the West. He also found that US decisionmakers favored needy countries in the Western hemisphere throughout the allocation process. For the random sample of countries the findings were more robust, with human rights practices and recipient need influencing the initial decision to allocate aid and the amount allocated under both administrations. Having demonstrated the influence of human rights on military aid allocations, which I would add are arguably the tougher case since realist concerns likely inform much of the process, Poe again asserted an American exceptionalism explanation of US foreign aid decisionmaking. He concluded by noting that “as a result of these findings it seems that the effect of human rights considerations on military aid can no longer be denied” (211).

The next year Poe (1992) followed up his 1991 study with a parallel study on economic aid allocations, the only other difference of which was the inclusion of a control variable tapping a country’s population size in the level of assistance stage of the analysis.\(^\text{12}\) He found that under the Carter and Reagan

\(^{12}\) Poe justified the inclusion of this variable by arguing that “it is reasonable to believe that the large the population of a country, the more dollars worth of aid that country will require to achieve the goals of the US government, ceteris paribus. This reasoning, however, should not affect the gatekeeping decision” (154).
administration the human rights abuse variable was in the hypothesized positive
direction for the Western hemisphere sample, though it achieved only weak
statistical significance (0.1 level) and only in the case of Carter. The variable
tapping year-to-year change in human rights conditions in a country also verged
on statistical significance under Carter, though as in the previous study failed to
achieve it in any model. Leftist countries were once again shown to be less
likely and needy countries more likely to pass the gatekeeping stage, with the
latter achieving high statistical significance at the .01 level. At the second stage,
recipient need dominated decisions. However, neither the human rights nor the
human rights change variable—though in the anticipated positive direction—
achieved significance. For the random country sample, and at the gatekeeping
stage, both the Carter and Reagan administrations considered need and
penalized leftist governments during allocation decisions, with Carter also
regarding trade and Reagan strategic importance of the country as significant
too. At the level of assistance stage, Poe first addressed the problem of an
outlier in the dataset. Egypt received massive amounts of aid in 1980 and 1984.
Unlike Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), who lacked theoretical justification
for excluding El Salvador from their study, Poe took pains to justify Egypt’s
exclusion. He noted that Egypt’s higher than average economic aid levels were
attributable to a unique historic event. Both Egypt and Israel (which was not in
the study) receive massive amounts of economic aid as a condition of the Camp
David Accords, a pattern of allocations that continues today, though my
preliminary examination of the aid data indicates the amounts allocated have
been in a general and gradual decline (Tarnoff and Lawson 2009; Kegley and Wittkopf 1982). Thereafter, Poe found that human rights abuses had a statistically significant effect on aid allocations in the anticipated direction but that this expression of American exceptionalism was tempered by the influence of the realist-oriented strategic and population size variables. Both variables were in the anticipated positive direction for Carter and Reagan, while recipient need influenced allocations only under Reagan.

Abrams and Lewis (1993) added further evidence of a relationship between human rights and foreign aid, making a rare approach on the subject from the field of economics. They conducted a maximum-likelihood tobit analysis of US economic aid allocations to 117 countries in 1989 using in my opinion a problematic expert opinion measure of human rights compiled by Charles Humana (1986) as their independent variable. Despite what I view as the inherent limitations of their human rights measure, they found that respect for human rights played a positive and statistically significant role in determining levels of assistance, as did recipient need and a dummy variable for Central America. Racial and religious biases, measured as the percentage of Anglos and Christians in a country, respectively, did not influence aid allocation decisions. While previous studies had been more circumspect about the implications of their findings, Abram and Lewis (1993) broke with this

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13 Humana’s Human Freedoms Index (HFI) suffered from a number of problems, all of which tend to call into question any causal inferences based on its use. For example, the index relied on Western academics’ estimation of human rights conditions in the countries they studied rather than ground-truth, standards-based evidence. Additionally, the questions were not derived from the UN International Bill of Human Rights. Rather, they tended to overemphasize one aspect of human rights—freedom of association. For a more detailed critique of the HFI, including these and other problems, see Barsh’s (1983) “Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose,” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 87-121.
tendency. They forcefully argued that their findings showed Congress’ insertion of Section 502B into the Foreign Assistance Act had its intended effect of bringing American exceptionalism to the fore of the allocation process. However, in my opinion, the persuasiveness of their argument was further undercut by their use of *per capita* foreign aid as the dependent variable. From a conceptual standpoint, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found during their 1982 interviews that US foreign aid decisionmakers did not conceptualize aid in per capita terms. Rather, they discussed aid in terms of gross dollar amounts allocated annually. Additionally, Uslaner (1976) had previously shown that the use of a per capita dependent variable is methodologically questionable, since the per capita transformation can lead to erroneously high or low correlations and induce unwarranted statistical relationships between variables.  

Poe and Sirirangsi in 1994 expanded the inquiry into human rights and US foreign aid to 133 countries for the years 1983 to 1988, analyzing economic aid allocations for each year separately. Combining State Department and Amnesty International measures of human rights abuses into a single 5-point index, as Poe (1992) had two years prior, but this time incorporating Freedom House’s scales of political and civil rights too, the authors found that human rights abuses worsened the prospects for aid allocation in the probit gatekeeping model for some years but did not lower the amount of aid allocated in the OLS regression models at the second stage. Moreover, while the human rights

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14 Uslaner instead maintains that the “solution to problems of standardization is better met either by the use of direct linear transformations on the original variables, where possible, or by examining order-preserving transformations (such as beta weights) on the estimated coefficients” (131).
coefficient at the second stage was in the expected (negative) direction, it repeatedly failed to achieve statistical significant. The authors further found that gatekeeping decisions were consistently dominated by considerations of recipient need (measured by GNI per capita). Whereas need increased, ideological disagreement with the United States (a dummy variable for leftist countries) decreased, the likelihood of economic aid allocation. These same considerations also dominated amount decisions, alongside the intended recipient country’s population size (logged) and proximity to the United States (a dummy variable for Central America). The authors concluded on an uncharacteristically realist-oriented note, saying:

while the US government can make the claim that human rights are considered in the decision-making process, it is not an argument that is likely to be very convincing given the outcomes of the aid allocation process, where human rights abusing countries, because of their political and strategic attributes, are at times allocated substantially more economic aid than others (507).

On balance, then, the analysis called into question Poe’s (1992) previous finding that human rights considerations influence aid amounts, as he admitted, by suggesting that they might have been sample bound.

In an exploration of whether human rights considerations influenced decisions at the second stage of the allocation process on the amount of aid, which only one study up to that time had shown (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985), Poe teamed with Pilatovsky, Ogundele, and Miller in 1994 to conduct one of the first PCTS analyses of economic and military aid. Their data consisted of aid allocations to 24 Latin American countries for the years 1983 to 1991. Latin America was chosen because the authors reasoned that US interests
had been particularly high for countries in the region since the articulation of the Monroe Doctrine. As such, the authors envisioned the study as a more critical test of the influence of human rights on foreign aid than previous studies. Their goal was to determine whether humanitarian-related considerations associated with American exceptionalism, such as human rights and recipient need, had influenced allocations to a region where realist-oriented concerns were presumably so entrenched. They argued that the test was doubly difficult because the years examined covered those for the Reagan presidency and the first few years of George H.W. Bush’s, who had followed in Reagan’s foreign policy footsteps in attempting to roll back communism in the region (Apodaca 2003). The authors employed the same 5-point ordinal scale measure of human rights as Poe (1992) and included control variables for country size, Central America, and the presence of 500 or more US military personnel in-country. In an effort to sidestep the potentially confounding methodological issues of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, seminal problems for OLS regression models using PCTS data, the authors adopted Stimson’s (1985) recommendation to use generalized least squares-autoregressive moving average (GLS-ARMA) with dummy variables as an estimation technique. After estimating the initial aid model, and following Stimson (1985), the authors rather than excluding cases introduced dummy variables for the outliers of El Salvador, Jamaica, Peru, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and the 1989 Panamanian intervention. Thereafter, the findings were generally consistent with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985), indicating that human rights and recipient need influenced
economic aid allocations. But other findings led the authors to offer a truce with
their realist-oriented interlocutors. The authors admitted that:

more self-serving strategic concerns such as location in Central
America, population, and ideological disagreement [by leftist
governments], are also extremely important. Further, some of the
country dummy variables (e.g., the Panamanian intervention, El
Salvador) are clearly tapping strategic considerations not accounted for
adequately by other variables entered in the model. These findings
indicate that while human rights abuse is somewhat important in
determining economic aid allocation levels in the general case, strategic
considerations are the overriding concern (553).

In the military aid model, which used an identical specification as its economic
counterpart, the authors identified El Salvador, Honduras, and Colombia as
outliers and dummy variable candidates. Thereafter, the results of their analysis
indicated that human rights abusers were penalized, albeit mildly, with lesser
military aid. Recipient need and US military presence in-country also had their
expected positive effect on military aid allocations, though in the case of the
latter that effect was small and barely achieved statistical significance.
American exceptionalism thus was found to influence the aid allocation process,
even in what the authors envisioned as a realist realm, though once again
strategic variables predominated.

Meernik and Poe in 1995 offered the first genuinely global analysis of
military aid allocations, focusing on the decade of the 1980s. Departing from
the traditional analysis of aid allocations by presidential administration, the
authors sought to test the so-called “Cold War consensus” of the 1980s, in which
Democrats and Republicans supposedly agreed to increased cooperation to
ensure the defeat of communism (McCormick 1992: 205). Noting the frustration
with the relatively poor explanatory power of two-stage multivariate models to date, which hovered around 20-35 percent of the variance, Meernik and Poe opted for a Heckman (1979) selection or “censored” probit model. While most past studies had accepted the conceptual utility of modeling aid in two stages, they had failed to forge a methodological link between the two. In forging this link, the authors effectively dealt with the selection bias that arises in the second stage of the aid allocation process (which I discuss in greater detail in the next chapter). The goodness of fit for the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage was 53 percent and 80 percent, respectively, a substantial improvement over previous studies’ approximately 30 percent that seemingly bore out the utility of the Heckman (1979) method. The findings suggested that US decisionmakers tended to take human rights abuses into account at the gatekeeping stage, consistent with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) finding, but not thereafter. At the second stage, however, year-to-year change in human rights practices was statistically significant and indicated that a one-point improvement on the 5-point human rights scale garnered a recipient country an additional $20 million in military aid. Recipient need (GNP per capita) and having a communist neighbor also made a country more likely to pass the gatekeeping stage, while a leftist country had an increased chance of being “screened out” for US military assistance (Meernik and Poe 1995: 406). Having a communist neighbor increased levels of assistance as well. The same could be said for trade with the US, which gave limited support to the pluralist-business approach to aid allocations. Interestingly, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
membership was not important at the gatekeeping stage but the opposite at the level of assistance stage. The authors explained this finding by noting that almost all NATO members were able to meet their defense requirements but, for those that could not, their importance to furthering the goals of the security pact meant they tend to acquire enormous amounts of aid. The authors concluded by noting that human rights considerations were balanced against self-serving, realist-oriented interests during the allocation process but had been a persistent feature of aid decisionmaking during the Cold War. The authors ended by arguing that future researchers needed to “pry open the ‘black box’ of [US] domestic and governmental characteristics as well as the international environmental factors that influence foreign aid decisions as a starting-point to explain and predict future trends” (409).

Lebovic (1998) sought not to open the black box of aid allocations but foreign aid itself.\textsuperscript{15} He convincingly demonstrated that aid is a multidimensional category, “a whole that encompasses distinct forms of assistance that can be directed at distinct objectives” (118). In making this argument, he reminded readers to bear in mind that not all military aid is security-related and not all economic aid is developmental. His analysis focused on the level of assistance flowing from four economic and military aid component programs and allocated

\textsuperscript{15} Lebovic’s study has been excluded from previous literature reviews on the topic precisely because he questions the utility of the traditional groupings of aid into an economic and military category (Poe and Sirirangsi, 1994). While I do not follow his lead in this study by breaking up and mixing these categories, I accept the possible utility of doing so and offer a real-world policy-oriented reason for why researchers may want to follow Lebovic (1998) in my suggestions for future research.
to 112 countries in 1980 and 1984.\textsuperscript{16} His aim was to determine whether McKinlay and Little’s (1977) realist-oriented “donor interests” or the exceptionalism-oriented “human need” they dismissed best explained aid allocations (80). In a methodologically innovative step, Lebovic (1998) logged the dependent variable to ameliorate the influence of the well-known outliers that had plagued previous studies. He was thus able to include Egypt, Israel, El Salvador, and other such outliers in the analysis. Lebovic used three sets of independent variables—proxies for each of the three theoretical orientations typically employed to analyze aid allocations—in a factor analysis and multivariate models: UN roll call votes in agreement with the United States and an index of “military inducements” (military expenditures as a percentage of GNP and standardized distance from the United States and Soviet Union) to measure US political-military interests; exports to the United States and total US direct private investments to measure pluralist-business related US economic interest; and GNP per capita and human rights as indicators of American exceptionalism. The factor analysis revealed a significant difference in each administration’s handling of these programs, particularly the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which was specifically established by the Foreign Assistance Act to assist countries in which the United States had a security stake but that did not qualify for development assistance. Whereas Carter tended to use the ESF, contrary to Congressional intent, as a supplement to address human need,

\textsuperscript{16} The four types of economic assistance were loans and grants from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and Export-Import programs. The four types of military assistance included aid from the Military Assistance, Foreign Military Sales, Economic Support Fund, and International Military Education and Training programs.
Reagan tended use the ESF and all other programs in a “single-dimensional” policy aimed at securing US political-military interests (121). Though Lebovic did not draw the conclusion, I view this finding as substantiating criticism of Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) intuitive selection of aid programs they regarded as solidly economic in nature (one of which was the ESF). Lebovic (1998) then constructed OLS models based on the grouping of programs obtained from the factor analysis—two groups of four programs for each administration—and all programs together. Taken together, the OLS models tended to suggest that political-military considerations best explained allocations by Carter and Reagan. Human rights were shown to generally dampen the amount of aid allocated by both administrations, with the human rights variable reaching statistical significance in the model analyzing all aid programs together and the more human needs groupings under each president. Recipient need also tended to play a role, as did economic interests under Reagan. Lebovic concluded by observing that aid programs are not necessarily fungible, as Morgenthau (1961) and likeminded realist argue, but that McKinlay and Little’s (1977) early contention that self-serving donor interests dominate aid allocations nevertheless appears consistent with his findings. He added that the observable changes in program use between Carter and Reagan were largely a matter of emphasis, though, since the persistence of political-military considerations across each administration argues for continuity in the aid decisionmaking process.

17 For Carter, this grouping consisted of USAID and the Food for Peace program. It was the same for Reagan, save the addition of the military assistance program.
Returning to the analysis of aggregate foreign aid, rather than its constituent programs, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) tested the explanatory power of the three IR approaches (though renaming them) on aid allocations for 127 countries during and after the Cold War era. Whereas the “systemic approach” had hallmarks of realism, including locating the primary determinant of US aid decisionmaking in the nature of the international self-help system, and was measured by US military presence (100 or more troops) and dummy variables for formal alliance with the United States, the “societal [pluralist] approach” proceeded from the understanding that foreign aid is a reflection of the preferences of MNCs as measured by level of imports to the US and adherence to free market principles (level of trade/GNP). The “statist,” or American exceptionalism, approach emphasized human needs in the guise of an Amnesty International-US State Department combined human rights and GNP per capita variable. This last approach also included the more ideological interest of promoting democracy abroad, based on Gurr’s Polity III regime type score. Total bilateral aid (economic + military aid) served as the dependent variable despite the potential pitfalls of combining categories of aid long—and in my opinion rightly—regarded as conceptually distinct. The authors used a Heckman (1979) selection model, consisting of probit and OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), to estimate the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage of the allocation process, respectively. As for the results, both during and after the Cold War, the human rights variable was statistically significant and in the expected positive direction at the gatekeeping stage.
However, the sign on the variable was in the opposite direction at the level of assistance stage. This rather paradoxical finding suggested to the authors that if a country adhered to basic human rights criteria to pass the gatekeeping stage it was not be penalized with reduced aid amounts for subsequent human rights abuses. US military presence was positively related to aid allocations at each stage of the process before and after the Cold War, and the same could be said of democracies and needy countries. As expected, those countries with a communist neighbor were more likely to receive aid, and more of it, during the Cold War but not thereafter. Taken together, the results tended to suggest that there are significant differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War and that the two are rightly regarded as distinct eras when it comes to aid allocations. The post-Cold War dummy variable further drove home this point. Countries tended to receive $29 million less in total aid after the Cold War, suggesting that as the communist threat diminished something analogous to a “peace dividend” emerged. The authors conclude by noting that their analysis suggested that the security-driven goals inherent to the systemic [realist] approach had become less important in the post-Cold War era as the statist [American exceptionalism] approach rose in prominence. They cautioned, however, against assuming that the promotion of human rights and democracy would continue to ascend in importance if the international environment changed or a major threat to the United States reappeared.

Returning to the more traditional analysis of administration-specific rather than era-oriented allocations, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) analyzed US
economic and military aid allocation decisions to 140 countries for the years 1976 to 1995. Their goal was to highlight differences in allocations under the second Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administration, in addition to the first few years of Clinton administration. US economic and military aid per capita served as the dependent variables notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological limitations noted by Uslaner (1976). The authors used the Political Terror Scale (PTS) as the independent variable, which effectively systematizes the 5-point State Department-Amnesty International scale employed in previous studies. Their models also included a previously-untested control variable, past aid allocations, which the authors argued was theoretically justified because Guess (1987) had found that some foreign aid appropriations had been included in continuing resolutions (CR) as a result of bureaucratic inertia and disagreement over annual appropriations bills. Interestingly, and unlike in previous studies, presidential administrations were coded as dummy variables using the Carter administration as a reference category instead of modeled separately. They used logit to estimate the gatekeeping model and a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) covariance procedure to estimate the level of assistance models. At the gatekeeping stage for economic aid, the authors found that only the Clinton administration failed to use human rights as criteria for deciding whether a country would receive aid. Past aid and recipient need proved significant for each administration, as did economic interest (US exports) for Clinton and the Latin American region for Carter, the first Reagan, and the G.H.W. Bush administration. At the second stage, the human rights variable achieved
statistical significance at the .01 level and was in the anticipated negative direction. Past aid again proved influential, as did recipient need. Perhaps most interestingly, the dummy variables representing presidential administrations failed to achieve statistical significance, indicating that allocations under Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton were not much different than those under Carter (the categorical referent). This suggested that the allocation process is marked by continuity of interest, a conclusion Lebovic (1998) previously offered. For military aid at the gatekeeping stage, the Carter, Reagan (both terms), and G.H.W. administration were found to have relied on human rights considerations in making gatekeeping decisions. Past aid and recipient need also were influential for all but Clinton. At the level of assistance stage, the human rights variable was in the anticipated direction but failed to achieve statistical significance. Only the variables past aid, US military presence, and Latin America achieved significance. The second Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton administration dummy variables also achieve statistical significance and tended to reduce military aid relative to Carter. Taken together, these findings suggest that political and security considerations often overruled Carter’s good intentions and rhetorical commitment to the promotion of human rights. However, based on the finding that human rights had influenced most aid gatekeeping decisions, including Reagan’s, despite his public declaration that human rights were not the proper aim of US foreign policy, the authors agreed with Donnelly (1995) assertion that over this period “human rights actually became more and more institutionalized in US foreign policy” (239). Apodaca
and Stohl (1999) nevertheless went on to say that “overall budget cuts, not concerns for human rights, were the most important inputs in the reduction of individual nation’s military aid allocations” (195).

...And New Voices Join In

In more recent years, new voices have joined the debate over US foreign aid and human rights initiated by Poe, Stohl, Apodaca, Meernik, and Cingranelli and Pasquarello, among others. Lai (2003) was one of the first. His goal in so doing was to test Meernik, Krueger, and Poe’s (1998) claim that the influence of human rights considerations was increasing and security interests decreasing in the post-Cold War era. Lai (2003) argued that the authors had failed to anticipate the emerging threat posed by “rogue states” in the post-Cold War era. In attempting to reassert realist explanations of aid allocations, Lai compared the determinants of US foreign aid decisionmaking in the Cold War (1982-90) and post-Cold War (1991-96) eras using a Heckman (1979) selection model. Following Lebovic’s (1998) example, Lai (2003) took the natural log of his dependent variable—total (economic + military) foreign aid—to facilitate the inclusion of statistical outliers. In an interesting coding technique, which in my

18 Though I regard Douglas Gibler as one of the most thought provoking of these new voices, I do not review his 2008 Journal of Politics article, entitled “United States Economic Aid and Repression: The Opportunity Cost Argument,” in this study. In that article, Gibler attempts to show that human rights records influence US foreign aid allocations indirectly. He argues that in monitoring human rights abuses the US Government effectively raises the costs of repression. In light of this monitoring, regimes that hope to receive US foreign aid must weigh the utility of abuses against a possible loss of millions of dollars of US assistance. While this is an interesting argument, the indirect effect Gibler investigates is not what Congress had in mind in drafting Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act. Congress drew a direct link between human rights abuses and US foreign aid, stating that no “assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” (P.L. 87-195: 230).
estimation mitigated much of the conceptual confusion associated with Poe’s (1991) overly-inclusive strategic index variable, Lai (2003) created a variable to tap the evolving nature of security threats—and only threats—to the United States. To do so, he examined State Department and executive branch documents to identify rogue states. Lai then combined this information with older, established measures of US security concerns. The dummy variable he created coded countries with a communist neighbor during the Cold War, Latin American countries long considered by US decisionmakers as within the United States’ sphere of influence, and countries bordering a rogue state during the post-Cold War era as “1” and all others “0”. In contrast to past studies (Poe et al. 1994; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998), Lai (2003) found that human rights—as measured by combining Freedom House political and civil rights measures into a 7-point ordinal scale—did not influence the initial yes/no gatekeeping decision to allocate aid in either the Cold War or post-Cold War era. Nor did the Freedom House measure influence second-stage decisions concerning levels of aid, though a secondary dummy variable tapping human rights achieve moderate-to-high statistical significance (.05-.01 level) for various models and suggested that abusive countries are likely to receive less aid than others.19 Interestingly, his finding for Gurr’s Polity 98 democracy variable also was contrary to previous findings, perhaps owing to the inclusion of

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19 Lai (2003) coded the dummy variable “1” if a country scored a 6-7 on the Freedom House scale, which he reasoned are the two categories reserved for the most egregious human rights abusers and “0” for all others. This decision was based on the belief that a lack of variation in the more commonly used 5-point PTS may lead to confounding results. Lai reasoned that “since a small number of the cases [for the PTS] are in the worst two human rights offender groups (Groups 4 and 5), statistical significance to this variable may be due to US aid to states in the middle group (Group 3) and not because the USA is aiding states in the worst two groups” (109).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which scholars have routinely excluded from previous studies by arguing that US foreign aid decisionmakers rarely considered OECD countries for aid during the years under examination (Apodaca and Stohl 1999). In any event, US decisionmakers allocated democracies less aid than non-democracies according to Lai (2003). Curiously, security concerns also appeared to be as important, if not more so, to aid decisionmaking in the post-Cold War as in the Cold War era. Lai’s composite threat variable also achieved statistical significant at the gatekeeping stage, but not thereafter, suggesting threat perception of US decisionmakers mattered in deciding which countries they allocated aid but not in which countries were allocated more. He also found that past aid, lagged by one year, and population (logged) were statistically significant and positively related to levels of assistance, as was the Correlates of War (COW) alliance variable. Looking across his findings, Lai opted to conclude on a methodological note. He asserted that methodological pitfalls, particularly autocorrelation, had confounded the findings of previous studies on the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid. He opined in closing that realism continues to be the best explanation of allocation decisionmaking.

Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) sought to extend the general study of US foreign aid, including its relationship to human rights, with an investigation into the role political considerations have played in disaster-related foreign aid allocations before and after the Cold War. Their aim was to challenge what they perceive as the conventional wisdom that decisionmakers
allocate such aid apolitically and solely on the basis of human need. Taking a
cue from Lebovic (1998), the authors focused exclusively on aid flowing from
one component of the US foreign aid program—the US disaster assistance relief
fund—for the years 1964 to 1995. They operationalized four variables—the
COW alliance measure; a Cold War dummy variable (1964-89); regime type
(Polity IV); and need/level of development (GDP per capita)—to account for
considerations previously demonstrated to influence US foreign aid
decisionmaking. In a welcome departure from previous studies, which often
mention but rarely incorporate US domestic considerations into their models, the
authors heeded Meernik and Poe’s (1995) admonishment and opened the “black
box” of US domestic politics. Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005)
incorporated three domestically-focused variables—the US budget deficit (as
percentage of the total government budget), US disasters (property damage
estimates and deaths), and media attention to a foreign disaster (number of
references in the New York Times index)—into the analysis. Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) data in millions of constant 1994 US dollars served
as their dependent variable. The authors employed Cingranelli and
Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptual model along with the Heckman
(1979) selection method to estimate allocation decisions. At the gatekeeping
stage, they found that alliance ties strongly influence aid decisionmaking before
and after the Cold War. The Cold War variable also was statistically significant,
though, suggesting the United States allocated disaster-related aid for apolitical
(presumably humanitarian) reasons to non-allies too. Poorer countries were
more likely than their wealthier counterparts to receive disaster aid, while democracies and non-democracies were almost equally likely to receive such assistance. The US domestic variables also achieved statistical significance. Larger domestic deficits constrained disaster assistance, but only modestly, suggesting the OFDA and Congress somewhat factored in a potential negative reaction from taxpayers to high allocation outputs. Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) also found the impact of *New York Times* coverage was significant, but only marginal, with an increase in ten stories covering a disaster increasing the probability of receiving aid from 47 to 50 percent. US disasters had only marginal effects, as well. At the level of assistance stage, and in contrast to results of the gatekeeping analysis, the US foreign policy and deficit variables proved statistically insignificant. This suggested to the authors that OFDA must “defend which disasters it recognizes as worthy, not the level of response to each” (469). In short, the findings provide at least some support for the hypothesis that the allocation of disaster aid is not an objective, apolitical process and that it is influenced by political considerations at home and abroad. Their findings also reinforced the utility of time-tested explanatory variables of US foreign aid allocations—irrespective of how the dependent foreign aid variable is parsed out (see Lebovic 1998)—and highlighted the importance of testing for US domestic effects on decisionmaking.

Finally, Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) returned to a more direct analysis of the human rights-US foreign aid linkage. They analyzed data on 151 countries from 1977 to 2004 in an effort to determine whether the impact of
human rights varied by countries’ level of democracy or economic development and, as a secondary matter, whether respect for human rights had become more or less influential in the allocation process since Cold War’s end. The authors chose to focus solely on economic aid (constant US 2004 dollars), which they logged at the level of assistance stage so that outliers could be included in the study. The PTS served as the human rights variable, the natural log of GPD per capita for recipient need, level of trade with the US as a measure pluralistic-business interests, with population (2002 figures logged) and alliance (COW measure) tapping US strategic considerations. Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers’ (1995) Polity IV democracy measured level of democracy. Values for this variable, which range from -10 to 10, were transformed by the authors so that the most democratic countries had the highest values, autocracies the lowest, and “transitional” countries scored -6 to 6. Using a Heckman (1979) selection method, the authors found that recipient need was the most important determinant and human rights of no significance at the gatekeeping stage during the Cold War. However, in the post-Cold War an interesting finding emerged for the human rights variable. The variable demonstrates a significant but negative effect on allocations, suggesting that greater respect for human rights decreased the likelihood of decisionmakers allocating aid. The authors further found that human rights were among several variables that influenced the level of economic assistance allocated in the post-Cold War era, including regime type and recipient need, but their influence was again unexpectedly negative. Together these finding tended to support the pioneering single-stage studies of
US foreign aid (Schultz 1981a and 1981b; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984) and that of Carleton and Stohl (1987), the latter of which suggested US decisionmakers do not incorporate human rights considerations into the aid allocation process. The authors went on to find that US decisionmakers have a tendency to hold autocratic countries with poor human rights practices to a higher standard of human rights practices than autocracies with relatively good practices, suggesting change in human rights practices over time matters in the post-Cold War period and, more generally, that a systemic double standard may be present in the allocation process. However, US decisionmakers typically allocated countries with low economic development and better human rights practices less aid than those with poor practices. The authors in closing surmise their findings “generally…support the refrain of critics that US aid behavior is not consistent with human rights rhetoric” (196). In so doing, they harkened back to Poe and Sirirangsi (1994) concluding remarks and make the most recent contribution to this ongoing debate.

**Discussion and Hypotheses**

With the contours of this ongoing debate fresh in mind, I turn in this section to explicating hypotheses that not only speak to the research questions outlined in the first chapter but also build upon, compliment, and extend the past findings on human rights and US foreign aid decisionmaking highlighted in the literature review. To achieve this goal, I synthesize the conceptual and empirical themes that emerged during the review below and, when appropriate,
incorporate them into the hypotheses. One such theme is the near universal acceptance of Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptual model of the aid allocation process. Persuaded that theirs remains the most theoretically defensible conceptualization and motivated by a desire to ensure my findings fit neatly into the existing literature, I follow their example. Thus, I explicate each hypothesis as effectively two-in-one; that is, I word the hypotheses such that they simultaneously relate to the (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage of the US foreign aid decisionmaking process.

I group the hypotheses by, and word them consistent with the expectations of, the three arguments about US foreign aid decisionmaking during the war on terror that spurred this study. The arguments hinge on claims that decisionmakers in the post-9/11 environment jettisoned human rights considerations during the allocation process, except for when these considerations served as a readymade excuse to penalize countries that failed to partner with the United States in the war on terror by denying them aid. Save for this exception, then, critics argue human rights considerations failed to influence US foreign aid allocations—let alone in the manner Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act requires—during the war on terror. Thus, the hypotheses run counter to my expectations of American exceptionalism and a positive relationship between human rights and foreign aid in all but one instance. Hypotheses 1-3 relate to the argument about the relationship, or lack thereof, between human rights and US foreign aid allocations under the G.W. Bush administration. Hypotheses 4-5 treat those allocations as the first in a new
era, the war on terror, which critics argues has been indifferent to the promotion of human rights, and contrast them with allocations made during the war on terror with previous eras. Hypotheses 6-7 examine the human rights-foreign aid linkage for partners and non-partners in the war on terror, where critics argue only for a linkage in so far US decisionmakers applied the human rights provision’s requirements to non-partners but not partners when allocating foreign aid.

**Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations under the George W. Bush Administration**

As mentioned, the first set of hypotheses evaluates the relationship between human rights and foreign aid allocations under the G.W. Bush administration and, for historical and comparative perspective, previous administrations also bound by the human rights provision. This approach is designed to determine whether human rights promotion was a casualty of 9/11, as critics claim, because the G.W. Bush administration redirected US foreign policy away from “soft” power concerns like human rights and toward meeting the threat posed by international terrorism (Nye 2009). Critics also content this casualty was a historical first, with some adding that it abruptly ended the positive influence human rights considerations had been exerting on US foreign policy.

Studies on previous administrations highlighted in the literature review tend to cut against the discovery of “firsts” in the decisionmaking process. On
the whole, they argue for continuity in decisionmaking from administration-to-
administration, particularly when it comes to the influence of strategic security
concerns (Lebovic 1998; Lai, 2003; Meernik and Poe 1995; Carleton and Stohl
1987; Poe 1991 and 1992). However, the results are somewhat more mixed on
the influence of human rights. Some studies have shown human rights
considerations have at times enjoyed a modest but positive influence on US
foreign aid allocations, primarily at the gatekeeping stage of process. Such has
been the case in a study on the Reagan administration, the G.H.W. Bush, and, on
occasion, the Carter administration (Poe 1991 and 1992; Apodaca and Stohl
1999; Poe et al. 1994; Stohl and Carleton 1985). Still others, including more
recent studies, have reached the opposite conclusion (Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg
and Moskowitz 2009). To my knowledge, findings for the G.W. Bush
administration have yet to be added to this literature. The hypotheses explicated
below promise to elicit those findings. In so doing, they promise to fit neatly
into the empirical literature, most of which focuses on aid allocation by
presidential administration (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Carleton and
Stohl 1985; Poe 1991; Lebovic 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Again,
consistent with critics’ arguments, my initial set of hypotheses is as follows:

**Hypotheses 1a-b:** After 9/11, human rights considerations had no
significant effect on the G.W. Bush administration’s decisions
regarding (a) which countries would receive aid and (b) the amount
these countries could expect to receive.
**Hypotheses 2a-b:** The failure of human rights concerns to influence foreign aid allocations consistent with the human rights provision (and my own expectations) under the G.W. Bush administration at the (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage was a historical first.

**Hypotheses 3a-b:** In contrast to the G.W. Bush administration, as the human rights record of a country improved, the (a) probability of that country receiving aid and (b) the amount it could expect to receive under previous administrations improved.

Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations during the Era of the War on Terror

In contrast to the first set of hypotheses, which treats the war on terror as a finite policy pursuit of the G.W. Bush administration, the second set treats the war on terror as an era in US foreign policy in which human rights concerns have ceased to influence US foreign aid allocations.  

I thus assume for the purposes of hypotheses 4-5 that the war on terror represents a “paradigm shift” in US foreign aid decisionmaking, as some critics of the war contend, one that has fundamentally altered allocation outcomes in ways that are antithetical to the promotion of human rights. One can expect this paradigm to endure, so their argument goes, so long as combating terrorism remains the United States’

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20 Thus, while the theoretical understanding and interpretation of findings differ for the first and second set of hypotheses, owing to the differing arguments about the war on terror from which they are derived, the years for the G.W. Bush administration and era of the war on terror are coterminous. For a fuller discussion on this issue, see the introductory section of Chapter 5.

21 As I demonstrate and discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5, there is cause to believe this assumption is grounded in the empirical “reality.”
overriding foreign policy goal (Christie 2008: 13-15). Consequently, any observable disruption in the human rights-US foreign aid linkage between the war on terror and previous eras I take on critics behalf as, at least in part, owing to this shift (Mertus 2008; Apodaca 2006). Whether the current administration’s allocations are indicative of this shift is a matter of speculation that is beyond the scope of this study. Here, I simply examine allocation decisions made during the war on terror using the data at hand (2001-2008). In so doing, my hypotheses extend the findings of studies that have examined the human rights-foreign aid linkage in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Meernik and Poe 1995). As indicated in the literature review, past studies suggest that linkage is bound up with the nature and scope of US strategic security threats. Whereas that threat was communist expansion during the Cold War (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Meernik and Poe 1995), it morphs into rogue regimes in the post-Cold War era (Lai 2003). Poe (1991) has called on researchers to improve scholarly understanding of the “evolution of the effects of human rights on aid allocations” over theoretically interesting time periods, particularly as threats to US security emerge and subside (211). Meernik and Poe (1995) echo this call. The aforementioned studies have answered this call for Cold War and post-Cold War eras. With the following hypothesis, I attempt to do likewise for the war on terror:
Hypotheses 4a-b: In contrast to the war on terror, during the post-Cold War era the greater the respect for human rights the greater the (a) prospects of a country receiving aid and (b) more of it.

If the United States’ promotion of “human rights ended shortly after September 11, 2001,” as some critics argue, might that promotion extend back through the post-Cold War and into the Cold War era too (Mertus 2008: 1)? Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found that respect for human rights had become an increasingly influential determinant of US foreign aid allocations as the threat of communism faded and the post-Cold War era emerged. But Poe (1991; 1992) and Poe et al. (1994) found that human rights considerations influenced aid decisionmaking even before the threat of communism faded. Together these findings provide some optimism for believing that the era of human rights that the war on terror supposedly ended may encompass the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. To explore this possibility, I offer a hypothesis on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid that speaks to all three eras in decisionmaking:

Hypotheses 5a-b: The war on terror ended a positive trend in the human rights-foreign aid linkage, one that subsumes the post-Cold War and Cold War era and is evident at the (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage.
Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-partners in the War on Terror

The third and final set of hypotheses treat US aid allocations during the war on terror as a self-contained quantitative case study. In a November 6, 2001 speech, President G.W. Bush told countries that they could chose to be “either with us or against us” in the war on terror. The following hypotheses test whether the President’s ultimatum was a mere rhetorical catchphrase or a meaningful policy statement that created a double standard in the US foreign aid allocation process similar to what Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) found when focusing on disaster aid. I have worded the hypotheses to elicit differences, if any, in the human rights-foreign aid linkage for partners and non-partners in the war on terror. Countries that were “with us” are considered partners and “against us” non-partners in the war on terror. If US foreign aid decisionmakers turned a blind eye to, or otherwise failed to create disincentives for, the human rights abuses of partners while penalizing those of non-partners as some contend, hypotheses 6-7 promise to illustrate this hypocrisy. My final set of hypotheses is:

**Hypotheses 6a-b:** Human rights considerations failed to influence the (a) prospects of a partner receiving aid and (c) the amount they could expect to receive.

**Hypotheses 7a-b:** In contrast to partners in the war on terror, US decisionmakers held non-partners accountable for their human rights
practices such that those with poor human rights records were (a) less likely to be allocated aid and (b) could expect lesser amounts.

Conclusion

The discussion of themes from the literature review that helped to inform my explication of the above hypotheses continues in Chapter 3. Because my focus in the next chapter is the construction of multivariate models of US foreign aid decisionmaking, the discussion turns from conceptual and empirical themes to variable selection and methodology. It is to these aspects of the discussion that I now turn.
Chapter 3: Modeling the Human Rights-US Foreign Aid Linkage

Introduction

In this chapter, I construct multivariate models of US foreign aid decisionmaking to test the hypotheses explicated in Chapter 2. Informed by the literature review, I operationalize in the first section the dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables. In the second section, I highlight methodological issues, including the potentially confounding methodological problems that may arise for models employing PCTS data and my proposed correctives. The final section discusses preliminary model robustness checks and data preparation, including my identification and coding of presidential administrations, eras in aid allocations, and partners and non-partners in the war on terror.

Variables Operationalizations

Dependent Variables

Selecting the dependent variable, or variables, is a contentious issue in the study of human rights and US foreign aid. While some opt to use total (economic + military) foreign aid (Meernik, Poe, and Krueger 1998; Lai 2003), arguing it lends insight into the broad contours of the US foreign aid program, others treat economic and military aid as conceptually distinct categorizations
(Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994). Still others, such as Lebovic (1998) and later Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005), remind readers that US foreign aid is a multidimensional whole comprised of various aid components that may be disaggregated into distinct funds. While Lebovic’s (1998) admonishment is well-advised, and serves as the basis for one of my suggestions for future research, disaggregating aid into its various funding components makes little sense for the purposes of this study. The arguments that spurred this inquiry recognize, either explicitly or implicitly, the traditional categorical distinction between economic and military aid while making few specific claims about particular funding components or, for that matter, total foreign aid. Moreover, examination of Foreign Operations budget requests and related appropriation reports suggest both the White House and Congress observe this traditional distinction (Library of Congress 2010). Based on these considerations, and in an effort to ensure my findings fit neatly into the existing literature, I test my hypotheses against the two most often used dependent variables in this subfield of foreign policy studies: US bilateral economic and military aid.

For each dependent variable, I obtained aid figures from the US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations, and Loan Authorizations, commonly known as the “Greenbook.” The Greenbook provides a complete and official record of allocations—as opposed to actual disbursements—authorized by US foreign aid decisionmakers on an annual basis (Poe 1992). To accommodate Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s
(1985) two-stage decisionmaking model upon which my hypotheses are based, I operationalized the dependent variables twice. The first operationalization is a dummy variable representing the initial yes/no decision of whether a country will pass the gatekeeping stage. Thus, I have coded the dependent variables at this stage as “1” for countries allocated aid and “0” for those allocated nothing in a given year. As with most previous studies, the dependent variables at the second stage—where levels of assistance are determined—are continuous aid dollars. Consistent with Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) interview data, I recorded these figures in gross US dollars (millions of constant 2008 dollars) rather than per capita dollars to avoid the potential methodological difficulties highlighted in the literature review that the per capita transformation may create. To compensate for extremes in the gross amounts of US foreign aid allocated within and between countries, I followed the lead of past studies (Lebovic 1998; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009) in adopting Uslaner’s (1976) suggestion of taking the natural log of the dependent variable. While this transformation complicates the interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficient for continuous explanatory variables, it can be overcome through statistical means and does not influence the direction or statistical significance of affected variables. Moreover, the transformation allows me to incorporate into the analysis such “non-routine” cases as El Salvador, Egypt, and Israel, and more importantly for an analysis of aid allocations during the war on terror, Afghanistan and Iraq.

22 In the interest of thoroughness, I also tested annual change in economic and military aid as dependent variables. The models proved unsatisfactory, with the explanatory variables generally performing poorly relative to gross aid allocations.
Independent Variable

My primary criterion in operationalizing human rights is to remain faithful to the conceptualization espoused by the arguments that spurred this study. The arguments beg for a measure that approximates the human rights “reality” in which US foreign aid decisionmakers during the war on terror operated—one in which the human rights abuses of would-be aid recipients were widely known but, at least according to the war’s critics, ignored to varying degrees. With this in mind, my options are to operationalize that reality based solely on US State Department Country Reports, which US decisionmakers are required by the Foreign Assistance Act to consider when allocating aid, or to combine the Reports with other readily available sources of information. The CRS 2005 Report for Congress entitled, “East Timor: Potential Issues for Congress,” identifies one such oft-used source as Amnesty International. Official transcripts of US decisionmakers debating human rights and foreign appropriations also cite Amnesty as a source (Congressional Record 2011).

With this “reality” in mind, and based on its respectability in the literature and fewer missing values, I operationalize the concept of human rights using the Political Terror Scale (PTS). However, had I opted to employ only the State Department measure, my model results would have been virtually identical to those presented hereafter since the PTS and State Department
measures are highly correlated at 0.95. Developed by Stohl et al. (1984) and currently maintained by Gibney, Cornett, and Wood (2010), the PTS employs a 5-point scale to measure the level of state-sanctioned political violence and terror a country’s citizens endure in a given year based on internationally-recognized human rights norms. The scale is based on an average of scores derived from Amnesty International reports and Country Reports. As constructed, the scale ranges from countries that score a “1” for having a secure rule of law under which politically-motivated imprisonment, torture, and murder are extremely rare to those that score a “5” because terror has expanded to the entire population. For ease of interpretation, this study adopts the common

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23 Though the variables are virtual proxies for one another, in the interest of thoroughness I substituted the State Department human rights measure into my models to test for the possibility that US decisionmakers discuss Amnesty International reports but, ultimately, fall back on Country Reports when determining aid allocations and that model differences—however unlikely—could arise. In any case, substituting the State Department measure of human rights for PTS with the same two year lag produced virtually identical results. For example, in the G.W. Bush economic aid model presented in Chapter 4, whereas the PTS human rights coefficient at the level of assistance stage was -.762, the State Department coefficient was -.750.

24 I considered other prominent measures of human rights, most notably Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, which also is a standards-based index of fifteen internationally-recognized human rights measures for 195 countries. Unfortunately, the CIRI data only covers the years 1981 to 2007 and the research design of this study and the arguments it seeks to address require an analysis of the entire period covered by the human rights provision. Thus, measures going back to 1977 were a serious consideration in my selection of an independent variable. I also considered Freedom House measures of civil and political rights. However, based on their high correlations with the PTS—91.7 percent—the Freedom House measures almost certainly would produce similar results to those presented hereafter. I also considered combining the PTS and Freedom House measures. However, given their high correlation and the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological difficulties posed by combining the PTS 5-point scale with the Freedom House 7-point scale, I did not pursue this option. Finally, I also tested a conceptualization of human rights appearing in Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) and Poe’s (1991) study—change in human rights—by coding a “1” for any improvement and “−1” and worsening in human rights conditions from year to year. The coefficient on the variable carried a positive sign in most models, but it failed to achieve statistical significance in bivariate analysis.

25 For some country-years one of the two scores was missing. In these cases, I used the available score rather than treating the case as missing. Given its more complete coverage, the State Department score usually were the available score.

26 The PTS is a 5-point ordinal scale originally developed by Freedom House and first compiled by Gibney and Dalton (1996). According to the original coding, which I have reversed, the scale is as follows: level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these
practice of reversing the scale such that greater respect for human rights is recorded as the higher values. Thus, if better human rights practices are associated with higher levels of aid, as American exceptionalism contends, the coefficient on the human rights variable should carry a positive sign in the models to come. Consistent with previous studies (Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994), I lagged the human rights variable two years. The two-year lag reflects the real-world, inevitable delay between the compilation and delivery of *Country Reports*—again, the US Government’s official record of abuses—and vetted Amnesty International information to US foreign aid decisionmakers and their allocation decision. In effect, it “approximates the information available to decisionmakers in the year immediately previous to the fiscal year under study, when foreign assistance decisions are typically made” (Poe 1992: 151).

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27 I also tested lags of 0-3 years. The two-year lag on averaged performed best and, as discussed, remains the most theoretically defensible. Of the lags tested, the human rights variable elicited similar results as those reported—in terms of the sign of the coefficient—though statistical significance tended to diminish at the extremes.
Control Variables

To ensure any influence human rights considerations may have on US foreign aid allocations is not overestimated, and to further my goal of evaluating the explanatory power of the three most common theoretical approaches to the study of US foreign aid decisionmaking, I employ a number of control variables. My choice of control variables is based on theoretical considerations, their performance in previous studies highlighted in the literature reviewed, and my own preliminary analysis. Taken together, they tap to varying degrees the constellation of considerations believed to have influenced the US foreign aid program since its inception under the Marshall Plan (Veillette 2008; Eberstadt 1988). The first two control variables tap a humanitarian consideration other than human rights and an ideological consideration that, as mentioned in the literature review, are regarded by some scholars—myself included—as additional indicators of American exceptionalism. The next five tap realist-oriented considerations previously shown or theorized to influence foreign aid allocations. The final control variable taps interests related to the pluralist-

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28 Responding to Meernik and Poe’s (1995), and following Cooper, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) example, this study also opened the “black box” of the state to examine how oft-mentioned, but rarely tested domestic variables influence the aid allocation process. Two such variables were tested in preliminary models: the US deficit and a dummy variable called “divided government” that identified those years in which different parties controlled the White House and Congress. Both variables were conceptualized as potential domestic constraints on aid allocations, with the latter understood to also constrain a presidential administration’s ability to resort to “extraordinary circumstances” without risking political backlash from Congress. Interestingly, neither added much to the models. The divided government variable was generally negative, indicating that the prospects of receiving aid and the amount received were lessened when divided government was present, but the variable regularly failed to achieve statistical significance. The US deficit variable showed little relation to aid allocations. This finding may be because foreign aid is not a big-ticket budget item—typically constituting one percent or less of the annual US budget—and is rarely in jeopardy of dramatic funding cuts since its contributes so little to the deficit (Tarnoff and Lawson 2009).
business explanation of US foreign aid. My operationalizations of the control variables are as follows:

**A. Humanitarian Interests (other than human rights)**

The results of previous studies highlight the importance of including a variable that taps whether US decisionmakers consider level of economic development, or “recipient need,” during the allocation process. While various measures are available, in this study I employ **GDP per capita** (constant 2000 dollars).\(^{29}\) Higher values represent higher levels of economic development for a country and, thus, less need. As such, American exceptionalism anticipates a negative relationship between GDP per capita and US foreign aid at both stages of the allocation process. I obtained the data from the World Bank’s *World Development Indicators, 2009*. The data are logged because of their skewed nature and lagged by two years.

**B. Ideological Interests**

I include one ideological variable indicative of American exceptionalism in the form of democracy promotion. I incorporate the variable, **level of democracy**, into my models in recognition that the United States has a longstanding goal of exporting American democratic values abroad and that US decisionmakers have used US foreign aid as a vehicle to further this goal (Lai 2003; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). Whereas Lai (2003) found that US

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\(^{29}\) During preliminary analysis, I tested various measures of need to include most measures of GDP and GNI reported by the World Bank. I chose to employ GDP per capita because the figures are more complete than most GNI measures, particular during the 1970s, and tended to perform better in the models.
decisionmakers tend to allocate economic aid to less democratic countries, most studies—consistent with American exceptionalism—indicate otherwise, with some suggesting there is a tendency to allocate more aid to more democratic countries since the end of the Cold War. In keeping with past practices, I operationalize level of democracy using Gurr, Marshall, and Jagger’s (2009) Polity IV dataset. The variable ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values denoting more democratic countries.

C. Strategic Interests

I incorporate five variables tapping US strategic interests into my analysis, which previous studies have employed to explain US foreign aid allocations on the basis of realist expectations.\textsuperscript{30} Past studies have shown that countries that are allies of the United States have enjoyed greater access to US foreign aid and more of it (Poe and Meernik 1995; Meernik et al. 1998; Lebovic 1988). Two

\textsuperscript{30} Other realist-oriented control variables tested in preliminary analysis but discarded because of poor performance, statistical insignificance, or theoretical considerations include a variable tapping \textit{US military troop deployments} constructed by Dr. Tim Kane (2011) based on the DOD’s \textit{Deployment of Military Personnel by Country} and a dummy variable identifying the location of major \textit{US military bases}. The former on rare occasion achieved statistical significance but, interestingly, carried a negative sign on the coefficient, indicating countries hosting greater numbers of troops were less likely to receive aid and to receive less of it. This finding is likely due to the fact that most of largest troop deployments throughout the world for the years in question were to developed countries, such as Germany and South Korea. I tested but did not include a number of regional variables. The \textit{regional dummies} generally performed poorly in preliminary models, save a Central American dummy that was positively related to economic aid in select models. The significance of the Central America dummy in the Cold War gatekeeping stage, for example, could have been owing to the emphasis US decisionmakers placed at that time on advancing the war on drugs or other, older interests flowing from the Monroe Doctrine. However, ocular inspection of the data suggested much of the dummy’s influence was attributable to the “non-routine” case of El Salvador. Subsequent testing supported this view, with an El Salvador dummy performing comparable to the Central America dummy. Since these dummies are of little theoretical interest in this study and, most importantly, did not affect the significance or direction of the human rights variables in my models, I excluded them. I highlight the issue here so that a more detailed study of the El Salvador and/or Central America case might be undertaken in the future by interested researchers.
measures of alliance are common in the literature. Over the past decade, studies have tended to employ the COW dyadic alliance measure. However, the COW dataset is not sufficiently updated for the purposes of this study. Consequently, I fell back on the older practice of employing a dummy variable that identifies countries in formal alliances with the United States. The alliances in question are NATO, which Poe and Meernik (1995) found to be a significant determinant of US military aid allocations, and major non-NATO allies, such as Thailand, Australia, and South Korea. I coded the Ally variable as “1” for alliance members and “0” for all others.

Population serves as a second strategic variable. More populous countries on average are more important as an economic and military partner than their less populous brethren, according to classical realism, primarily because their size affords the former group greater industrial and manpower capacity than the latter (Morgenthau 1961; Mearsheimer 2001). As such, realists anticipate US decisionmakers will allocate foreign aid, and more of it, to more populous countries. To test this claim, I incorporate population figures from the World Bank’s (2009) World Development Indicators Online. I logged these figures because they are extremely skewed and lagged the variable two years to account for a country’s population at the time of allocation decisions.

Another important, but rarely tested, strategic consideration for decisionmakers is whether a would-be aid recipient country is engaged in a militarized dispute with the United States. Presumably, countries at loggerheads with the United States on a particular issue are less likely to pass
the gatekeeping stage to receive aid and, when they do, as has been the case with economic aid for such countries as Syria and Iraq, less of it. Since my preferred measure for this variable, the COW militarized interstate dispute dyad measure, was only current through 2003, I operationalized the variable using the international crisis behavior (ICB) dataset. The variable is coded “1” for a country that was the target of direct US military intervention in a given year and “0” for all others.

The forth strategic variable indicative of realist concerns is a dummy variable representing countries sharing a land border with another country perceived by US decisionmakers as posing an ideological (and possibly physical threat) to the United States, which I refer to hereafter as threat neighbor. Realists anticipate that for security and containment-related reasons US decisionmakers look favorably on these countries during the foreign aid allocation process (Lai 2003). I conceptualized threats as including communist regimes during the Cold War, rogue regimes during the post-Cold War, and state sponsors of terrorism for all years in the study. Using Lai’s original threat proximity variable, which he graciously made available on his website, as a base, I updated it by coding any countries sharing a land border with one of the three threat groups mentioned above as “1” and all others “0”. I coded threat neighbors based on the COW’s Direct Contiguity Data, version 3.1. I identified countries posing threats to the United States as follows: following convention (Poe 1991; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Lai 2003), I regard communist regimes as those that were either members or official
observers of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for the years 1977 to 1990. Post-Cold War rogue regimes consist of those identified by Lai in his 2003 study. I also updated Lai’s list based on the US Government’s definition, which indicates rogue regimes:

- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of the regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands (2004).

I identified and coded countries that meet this definition by examining US State Department Background Notes and Country Reports. I identified the final group tapped by the threat variable, state sponsors of terrorism, based on information contained on the US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism website. (See Appendix 3.1: Communist Countries, Rogue Regimes, and State Sponsors of Terrorism for a list of these countries). Unlike most variables in the model, I lagged this variable by only one year. This is to reflect the reality that the emergence of a threat—arising from a coup by leftist guerillas or a regime’s vocal opposition to the United States in the UN General Assembly, for example—is more quickly reported by mass media outlets and relayed by US diplomats to aid decisionmakers in Washington than officially vetted and confirmed reports of human rights abuses.

My final strategic variable is a dummy variable identifying partners in the war on terror, which I include only in the war on terror era models. On its website, the DOD defines the operative category—partners in the war on
terror—as countries that joined the US-led coalition established on September 12, 2001 to confront the threat of international terrorism. The DOD website lists some 60 countries as having partnered with the United States in the war on terror since 2001, including a narrative on each country that flags the year in which their partnership began.\(^{31}\) (See Appendix 3.1: Partners in the War on Terror.) I have coded the first year in which a country was identified by DOD as a partner and all subsequent years, unless a country withdrew from the coalition (Mexico), as “1” and all other countries “0”. To this list, I add post-invasion Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2004), which have been key partners in the war on terror.

\(\text{D. Economic Interests}\)

Finally, I include one variable measuring a country’s economic importance to the United States in the analysis.\(^{32}\) By way of reminder, proponents of the pluralist-business orientation argue that US aid allocations are determined by the preferences of dominant domestic interest groups and/or classes in American society. Most emphasize the influence of US business groups and economic elites, given their disproportionate access to resources and capitalist clout, and their interest in expanding trade and opening new markets.

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\(^{31}\) For all but four countries on the list, the year they became a partner in the war on terror is mentioned in an accompanying narrative on the DOD website. Bosnia/Herzegovina, Djibouti, Jordan, Morocco, and Nepal were exceptions. In these cases, various authoritative sources—including Patterns of Global Terrorism, Country Reports, and official public statements by the United States or governmental representative of these countries—were employed to identify this date. The complete list is available online at http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition.

\(^{32}\) In preliminary analysis, I also tested a variable that Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) employed as a proxy for the pluralist-business orientation—free market—in addition to the level of US exports to and imports from a would-be aid recipient. The variables performed poorly in almost every model and carried mixed signs on the coefficients.
abroad. To this end, trade partners are viewed as prime recipients of US foreign aid. In an effort to open those markets and deepen business ties, proponents of this argument anticipate US decisionmakers afford these partners preferential treatment during the aid allocation process. To speak to this pluralist/business orientation, I coded a trade partner variable by adding a country’s annual exports to and imports from the United States. Since my preferred source, Kristian Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade Dataset, was current only through 2000, I employ the COW trade flow data. The data are available on the COW Dataset Hosting Program homepage. The export and import data are measured in millions of US dollars. I lagged the data two years to reflect US decisionmakers’ delayed access to accurate trade statistics.

Table 3.1 summarizes the control variables outlined in this section, including the theoretical orientation they tap, coding rules, and data sources. After the presentation of this table, I move in the next section to methodological issues that need be addressed and dataset preparation that must take place prior to any analysis.
Table 3.1  Control Variables in the Human Rights-US Foreign Aid Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Theoretical Orientation</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>Ideological (Democracy promotion)</td>
<td>American Exceptionalism</td>
<td>A scale ranging from +10 to -10, with higher scores denoting more democratic countries, measured one year prior to an aid allocation.</td>
<td>Gurr, Marshall, and Jagger’s (2009) Polity IV dataset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>Strategic (Collective security)</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>A dummy variable, with “1” denoting a NATO or major non-NATO ally and “0” otherwise.</td>
<td>NATO and Department of Defense (DOD) websites, among other sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Strategic (Manpower)</td>
<td>Realism (classic)</td>
<td>The natural log of population two years prior to an allocation.</td>
<td>World Bank’s (2009) World Development Indicators, CD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>Strategic/ideological (Security threat)</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>A dummy variable, with “1” denoting a country that is a target of US military action and “0” all others.</td>
<td>International Crisis Behavior database.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Neighbor</td>
<td>Strategic/ideological (Containment)</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>A dummy variable identifying countries that share a land border with a US-designated threat—a Cold War communist regime, post-Cold War rogue regime, or state sponsor of terrorism—in the year.</td>
<td>Lai’s (2003) threat variable, updated in conjunction with the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contiguity data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Strategic (Collective security)</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>A dummy variable that identifies partners in the war on terror.</td>
<td>DOD website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>Economic (domestic business)</td>
<td>Pluralist-business</td>
<td>Exports from + imports to the United States, measured two years prior to the aid allocation.</td>
<td>COW trade flow data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodological Issues

Since the mid-1990s, empirical studies on the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid have increasingly relied on PCTS datasets. My study is no exception. I employ a dataset of 191 potential aid recipients—all countries listed in the *Greenbook* whether allocated aid or not—for the years 1977-2008. By employing such an expansive dataset, I seek to enhance the generalizability of this study’s findings while avoiding any possible sample selection bias. But there are numerous other benefits to using PCTS data. By pooling observations across both space (countries) and time (years), the dataset does more than simply expand the number of cases under examination. It also avoids the “small N” problem an analysis of either dimension may encounter on its own if the number of explanatory variables exceeds the degrees of freedom required by an empirical model (Stimpson 1985). Pooling likewise allows the researcher to test hypotheses across both dimensions simultaneously, adding confidence to one’s findings (Schmidt 1997). Finally, PCTS data allows the researcher to examine the influence of variables across cases that do not vary significantly within cases—so-called temporally-invariant variables—that are present in this study (Stimpson 1985). Employing a PCTS dataset thus affords me greater overall confidence in my model results, particularly when I move from discussing specific findings to drawing broader conclusions and highlighting direction for future research.

The benefits derived from PCTS data are not without potential costs, however. PCTS data regularly violates a number of assumptions made by the
statistical workhorse of IR—OLS. In violating these assumptions, which center on error term estimates, regression analysis performed on PCTS data may lead to over- or underestimated confidence levels in one’s findings (Beck and Katz 1995). The two main culprits are autocorrelation (or serial correlation) and heteroscedasticity. I address each of these potentially confounding methodological problems below for binary and continuous dependent variables, since Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage allocation model makes use of both. Thereafter, I address the remaining methodological pitfalls of multicollinearity and selection bias.

Autocorrelation

Autocorrelation is a common problem in the analysis of time-series data. While researchers record their data in discrete temporal units (in this case annual aid allocations), neither time nor aid decisions are so discrete. Aid allocations in one year are often related to previous decisions, particularly regarding amounts (Apodaca and Stohl 1999). Or, to put it in methodological terms, an aid decision at time t is at least partially related to the decision made at t-1 (Stimpson 1985). This may even be the case when the decision (at t-1) was to deny an aid allocation, since political pressure may build thereafter on US decisionmakers to provide or resume aid now (at t). While numerous options are discussed in the literature to correct for autocorrelation, Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) offer one of the simplest and most widely accepted “fixes” for binary variables. Following their advice, I control temporal dependency in my probit (gatekeeping stage) models by including a count variable with natural
cubic splines or time dummies. According to Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), inclusion of these variables neutralizes autoregressive processes in the analysis by marking the “number of periods since either the start of the sample period or the previous occurrence of an ‘event’” when combined with either the dummy or spline variables (1261). In this study, the count variable marks the last year (previous occurrence) in which US decisionmakers allocated aid to a country (the event) in all models.

Beck and Katz (1995) recommend including either a lagged dependent variable or otherwise transforming the data to correct for autocorrelation when employing a continuous dependent variable, as is the case in my OLS models. Once autocorrelation is accounted for, Beck and Katz continue, the researcher should estimate models using OLS with robust standard errors. While both recommendations allow for the accurate estimation of confidence intervals and improve the reliability of statistical test, I opt to include time dummies in my level of assistance models.

33 The count and natural cubic spline variables were calculated using Tucker’s (1991) *BTSCS: A Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Data Analysis Utility (version 4.0.4)* download for STATA. The download of the BTSCS procedure is available for most statistical programs online at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rtucker/programs/btscs/btscs.html.

34 As the authors show, the spline variables essentially save degrees of freedom in a model that time dummies otherwise would consume but produce virtually identical results as time dummies. Testing confirmed this in my models as well.

35 Based on advice from Dr. Lai in an e-mail exchange, this study locates the spline variables evenly across the country-years in question beginning with the first, third, fifth year and so forth. I arrived at this decision after experimenting with various placements of the splines, which had no substantial effects on the model results.

36 In addition to the other possible control variables mentioned in previous footnotes that I tried and discarded, I also included a lagged dependent variable called “past aid” in preliminary level of assistance models. My initial inclusion of the variable was in recognition of Beck and Katz’s (1995) methodological suggestion and Apodaca and Stohl’s (1999) substantive findings. It also held the promise of making my model more robust. The variable performed as expected; it was positively associated with gatekeeping and level of assistance decisions in the economic and military aid allocation models. However, in a number of models it tended to undercut the utility of my methodology—the Heckman (1997) method—by affecting the statistical significance of
Heteroscedasticity

The second potential methodological pitfall encountered when analyzing PCTS data is heteroscedasticity. OLS assumes error terms are homoscedastic, exhibiting constant variance across cases (Stimpson 1985). When these terms are not constant, the accuracy of coefficients falls into question. In a study such as this with a global sample consisting of diverse countries, heteroscedasticity could well pose a challenge. Therefore, in modeling both the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage of the foreign aid allocation process, I employ White’s (1980) robust standard errors clustered on recipient countries. White’s technique corrects for heteroscedasticity, when detected, but in its absence does not substantively alter model coefficients.

Multicollinearity

Another potentially confounding problem, multicollinearity, represents a situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a regression model are highly or perfectly correlated. When multicollinearity is present, coefficient estimates for the explanatory variables may change radically and erroneously large standard errors appear as the data and models undergo refinements. I followed Lewis-Beck’s (1980) advice for detecting multicollinearity, which entails first inspecting a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables for any correlation of 0.8 or higher. This inspection initially gave me pause for concern.

rho. Since my primary concern was accurately modeling the two-stage aid allocation process identified by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) in a methodologically sound manner, I sided with the majority of past studies in excluding the variable from the analysis. As with previous discarded control variables, I flag the issue here to encourage future research on the matter.
because the partners and ally variable were correlated at 0.82, slightly above the recommended level.\(^{37}\) (See Appendix 3.2: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables for details.) In light of this suspect correlation, I took additional steps to investigate the possibility that multicollinearity could pose a problem for the two models of eras in the war on terror that include the partners in the war on terror variable. I regressed the explanatory variables on one another and re-specified the models by dropping variables in and out—particularly the partners variable—in an effort to uncover any possible confounding findings that could arise in the presence of multicollinearity.\(^{38}\) Taken together, these auxiliary tests alleviated my concerns. Paying particularly close attention to the human rights variable during these re-specifications, I found that the sign on the coefficient remained the same and the magnitude of the coefficient did not change dramatically in the models.\(^{39}\) Additionally, I observed no unexpected shifts in the models. I thus concluded that multicollinearity did not pose a serious problem for the two models.

**Selection Bias**

Finally, there is the issue of sample selection bias highlighted in the previous chapter. In political science, this bias is most often encountered in

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\(^{37}\) The correlation between the two was reasonable foreseeable, however, since the DOD website lists NATO and Major non-NATO allies as partners in the war on terror.

\(^{38}\) The highest \(R^2\) yielded during this process was 0.48, which is below the 0.7 level that typically warrants additional investigation (Lewis-Beck 1980).

\(^{39}\) For instance, when I dropped the partner variable from the economic aid model for the era of the war on terror as an initial test, the coefficients on the human rights variable changed only slightly; in any event, the difference are apparent in comparing the Chapter 4 and 5 models. As discussed in Chapter 5, the only noteworthy difference in the models aside from the performance of the partners variable was in some of the other realist-oriented variables, which one would expect when a variable as “weighty” as partners in the war on terror enters the model.
survey data. Those who participate in a survey, either through selection or self-selection, may be systematically different from non-participants. As previously indicated, interviews conducted by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) of US decisionmakers suggest a similar bias is built into the foreign aid allocation process since only those countries decisionmakers allow to pass the gatekeeping stage are eligible for some level of assistance thereafter. From a methodological standpoint, failure to account for this bias—which poses a threat to the error terms—could prove detrimental to my level of assistance models by producing unreliable parameter estimates that lead to erroneous causal inference (Greene 1981; Berk 1983). As a handful of previous studies have argued (Meernik and Poe 1998; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009), the Heckman (1979) selection model is one method of accounting for the nonrandom selection decision that initiates the US foreign decisionmaking process. With the Heckman method, a selection term—the inverse Mills ratio—is computed for the selection (gatekeeping) model and incorporated into the outcome (level of assistance) model to compensate for bias. Based on its theoretical applicability and demonstrated utility, I employ the Heckman method in this study. However, because its demonstrated utility is limited to only three studies in this subfield, I also estimate separate OLS models as a robustness check and draw attention to this auxiliary analysis in my discussions of findings if the results differ substantially from those obtained from the Heckman models; if there is no substantial difference, I report the findings of this analysis in the footnotes.
To provide statistically reliable results, the Heckman method requires the researcher to omit at least one explanatory variable—the instrumental variable—in the probit model from the OLS model. In order to serve as a credible instrument, the variable must be critical to the selection but not the outcome equation. Identifying a variable that meets that criterion in the US foreign aid decisionmaking process is a difficult task since it requires a variable that affects the yes/no decision to allocate aid but not the amount allocated, and decisionmakers’ motives are not so easily parsed into discrete stages. The task is doubly difficult since I specify 18 Heckman models that span four presidential administrations, three eras, and two functional groups and a credible instrument in one may be less so in another. In search of such an instrument, I identified two candidates from past studies: the first was ally, which Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) employed because “alliance should be important in the US decision to provide aid, but once that decision has been made it should vary little and be less significant in determining the amount of aid” (190). The second was the GDP per capita variable, which proved a credible instrument for Lai (2003) because countries with high GDP per capita are less likely than poorer countries to “need, request, or receive assistance” (111). The GDP per capita proved a credible instrument and, at times, exceptionally “strong” instrument in my economic models. For the military aid models, the ally variable was credible in some models but not others. I therefore turned to my dispute variable as an instrument. It proved the “strongest” instrument because countries engaged in a
dispute with the United States are carefully scrutinized by US decisionmakers at the gatekeeping and less likely to be allocated assistance.

Robustness Checks

In addition to performing the robustness check on each Heckman (1979) model mentioned above, the results of which are reported in the coming chapters, I also tested the overall robustness of my findings on the human rights variable by moving two sets of countries in and out of my dataset. These additional checks were in recognition of the possibility that my decision to incorporate all potential aid recipients listed in the *Greenbook* into my model—i.e. a “global” sample—is not without tradeoffs. Specifically, I focus these checks on the influence of wealthy democratic countries. All of these countries were potential aid recipients, according to USAID, and a number have received economic and military aid over the years, including since the onset of the war on terror, which argues for their retention in the models. Nevertheless, their inclusion may influence the findings of my models because of their greater respect for human rights, on average, relative to the rest of countries listed as potential aid recipients by the *Greenbook*. With this in mind, I excluded and reintroduced these countries into the models to observe whether the sign on the human rights coefficient “flipped” or any variable that achieved statistical significance became insignificant.

The first set of countries I excluded from my models consisted of those in the G8. While altering the magnitude of various coefficients, including the
human rights variable, in no model did the sign on the coefficient flip from positive to negative (or vice versa). Additionally, those variables that had achieved statistical significance in the models reported in Chapters 4-5 remained significant after the removal of G8 countries. To push the robustness check further, I also excluded a wider set of democracies—OECD countries—from my models. The signs on the human rights coefficients remained unchanged in all economic and military aid models despite the exclusion of these countries, including for the human rights variable. However, at the gatekeeping stage of the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror economic aid models, the statistical significance of the variable changed from significant to slightly below significance. Interestingly, further investigation indicated this change in significance was not attributable to the exclusion of the OECD as a group. Rather, it was attributable to the removal of a select subset of OECD countries that regularly received aid—including Turkey, Spain, and Greece—from the models. Given the theoretical importance of these countries to the war on terror, as denoted by their designation as partners in the war on the DOD website, I opted for their continued inclusion in the models. Nevertheless, the OECD check highlights the sensitivity of US economic aid models—even when the dependent variable has been logged to mitigate the influence of outliers—to select cases (at least at the gatekeeping stage) and the need to carefully consider and justify sample selection criteria in this vein of literature. I return to these themes in Chapter 7 when I offer suggestions for future research.
Dataset Preparation

I now turn to dataset preparation. As you will recall, the first set of hypotheses explore the linkage between human rights and US foreign aid allocations under the G.W. Bush administration and previous administrations bound by the human rights provision. Preparing the dataset for administration models is a relatively straightforward process. Presidential administrations are coded according to a president’s term in office: Reagan (1981-88), George H.W. Bush (1989-92), Clinton (1993-2000), and George W. Bush (2001-08). The task requires more thought, however, for the second set of hypotheses that examine the war on terror as a distinct era in US foreign aid allocations. As with past studies (Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009), the Cold War era includes the years 1977 to 1990. However, deciding where the post-Cold War ends and war on terror begins is more conceptually “sticky” than it first appears. According to a Congressional Quarterly Weekly (2001) article, Congress in October 2001 deferred a decision to incorporate funding specifically earmarked for the war on terror into the US foreign aid program. The same article indicates that Congress made that decision the following year. On its face, this would suggest that for the purposes of US foreign aid allocations the war on terror began not in late 2001 but 2002. However, this line of reasoning ignores the possibility that US decisionmakers may reprogram aid (Poe et al. 1994). In the absence of reporting requirements, reprogramming is difficult to detect. But a CRS report on aid allocations following the war on terror provides some support

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40 Though President Carter was the first administration to be bound by the mandate, I excluded his administration from the analysis because it was free to “redirect” existing aid allocations to countries prior to the provision becoming law.
for the view that existing aid funds were reprogrammed as a result of the onset of the war on terror (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005). In any event, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Consequently, this study identifies the post-Cold War years as 1991-2000 and the war on terror as those years since.

Finally, the 3rd set of hypotheses explores US aid allocations to partners and non-partners in the war on terror. To accommodate these hypotheses, I divided my dataset into partners and non-partners. The DOD list of partners in the war on terror was the basis for this division.

**Conclusion**

The variables and methodological issues discussed above are combined into models and tested against the hypotheses related to presidential administrations in the next chapter. The same is done for the era and partner-related hypotheses in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. By way of reminder, in the coming empirical chapters these hypotheses perform double duty; they are tested using models that employ economic and military aid allocations as the dependent variable. To smooth the integration of findings into the existing literature, this study follows the practices of constructing separate models for each administration and era, and for partners and non-partners in the war on terror. Thus, Chapter 4 includes eight models (four administrations x two dependent variables), Chapter 5 six models (three eras x two dependent variables), and Chapter 6 four models (partners and non-partners x two dependent variables). With the methodological specifications outlined above
and this progression of models in mind, I turn to the empirical analysis of Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: Models of Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration

Introduction

In the previous chapter I operationalized concepts to assist in the construction of Heckman (1979) models that explore the relationship between human rights and US economic and military aid allocations before and after 9/11. In this, the first of three empirical chapters, I present the results for the first set of models. By way of reminder, the models examine the human rights-foreign aid linkage under the G.W. Bush administration and, for historical and comparative perspective, the three previous administrations also bound by the human rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act. Table 4.1 and 4.2 report the results of my two-stage models for economic aid and military aid decisionmaking, respectively. In my discussions of findings, I first examine the summary statistics associated with the models. I then examine the actual model results for the gatekeeping and level of assistance stages, which are presented side-by-side in each table. The primary focus of these discussions is the performance of the human rights variable in the G.W. Bush administration model—highlighted in the first row—and its bearing on my administration-related hypotheses. I then draw attention to the results of statistically significant

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41 I constructed the models in Chapters 4-6 using STATA-Intercooled (version 10.1) with updates current through April 2011.
control variables that assist in my secondary goal of evaluating the relative explanatory power of the three theoretical approaches researchers typically employ in studies of US foreign aid. I examine the performance of the control variables indicative of American exceptionalism, realism, and the pluralist-business explanation of aid allocations in turn. To further understanding of the influence of human rights considerations on aid allocations, I also include a companion to the results table that reports the substantive effects of the human rights variable—provided it achieves statistical significance—on the predicted values of aid allocations for the model of interest (the G.W. Bush administration). Additionally, I report predicted aid values for select other variables of interest in the main text. Finally, and on a stylistic note, rather than proceed in a mechanical fashion, examining the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage results in turn for each model, I interweave the two in my discussions of findings. This tack enables a structured but flowing narrative of the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid allocations to develop. With this introduction in mind, I now turn to the models for economic aid allocations by presidential administration.

Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the G.W. Bush administration reframed the rationale for US economic aid. Administration officials relied heavily on the human rights rhetoric through the reframing process (Apodaca 2006). They declared shortly after the onset of the war on terror that the United
States would allocate economic aid, and more of it, in an effort to reduce the
global inequality and poverty administration officials argued were the root
causes of terrorism (G.W. Bush 2002). In helping countries improve the living
conditions of their citizens, the administration reasoned that these citizens would
embrace the promise of a brighter future rather than radical Islamic ideology.
Promoting “hope was an answer to terror,” and economic aid a vehicle for its
spread (G.W. Bush 2002: 1). To quicken this spread, the G.W. Bush
administration established two new funds—the Global AIDS Initiative in 2003
and Millennium Challenge Account in 2004—that are folded in with all other
economic aid funds into the dependent variable.

Looking first at the summary statistics, reported in the last row of Table
4.1, the first item of note is that the rho is statistical significance across the four
administration models, indicating the selection and outcome equations in each
are correlated. Thus, my initial administration models lend empirical support to
Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptualization of the US
economic aid decisionmaking and suggest that I am accounting for the selection
bias inherent to the allocation process. The second is that the G.W. Bush
administration apparently acted on its declaration. Having reframed the
rationale for economic aid, the G.W. Bush administration dramatically expanded
its scope. The percentage of cases passing the gatekeeping stage and allocated
aid at the level of assistance stage in the models grew to nearly 89 percent

42 In modeling the second stage (OLS) level of assistance decisions as a single equation, to check
for model robustness, I obtained essentially the same results as those reported in Table 4.1.
While the magnitude of the coefficients changed, owing to the removal of the selection bias
term, the sign and statistical significance of the explanatory variables remained unchanged.
(1054/1189) under the administration, 11 percent higher than the next closest administration, Clinton’s, and 22 percent higher than that of the Reagan administration, which allowed the fewest cases to passed the gate.\textsuperscript{43}

US economic aid under the G.W. Bush administration grew in real terms as well, to higher than any time since the post-World War II reconstruction period of the early 1950s (Lawson 2009), with top recipients including post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan followed by partners in the war on terror like Pakistan and Russia and then Israel. Lawson (2009) goes on to report that most of this growth—allocated as cash grants rather than the historically more common loans—was guided by the administration’s “more strategic sense of importance, cast frequently in terms of contributing to the global war on terror” (2). Despite the rationale for and rhetoric employed to reframe US economic aid and justify greater aid flows, critics argue that US decisionmakers implemented these increases with no regard for the human rights provision or the American exceptionalism it embodies (Mertus 2008; Apodaca, 2006; Christie 2008). The empirical results reported in Table 4.1 speak to this argument by highlighting the role human rights considerations played in the administration’s new framework for economic aid.

Row 1, columns 4 and 8, report the performance of the human rights variable for the G.W. Bush administration model at the gatekeeping and level of

\textsuperscript{43} This calculation is based on the number of uncensored observations (those country-year cases that advanced beyond the gatekeeping stage) divided by the total number of observations (all country-year cases that in theory could pass the gatekeeping stage) in the models. Percentages for the remaining administration are: Reagan 67 percent (590/874), G.H.W. Bush 76 percent (359/468), and Clinton 78 percent (776/986).
assistance stage, respectively. The human rights variable is highly statistically significant (.01 level) at both stages of the G.W. Bush model. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests human rights had a greater effect under the G.W. Bush administration than the next closest—the Clinton administration—or any other. The findings thus lend no empirical support to critics’ claims about the failure of human rights to influence post-9/11 economic aid decisionmaking. I therefore reject **H1 (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance (economic)**. But neither do the findings lend support to my theoretical orientation. American exceptionalism, the same I understand as embodied in the human rights provision, which anticipates a positive sign on the coefficients, is notably absent. The coefficient’s sign at both stages of the allocation process is negative. The findings thus suggest that decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration neither created incentives for good human rights behavior nor disincentives for poor behavior when allocating economic aid during the war on terror.

The substantive effects of this negative human rights variable are reported in Table 4.1.1. The G.W. Bush administration allocated enormous sums of economic aid to countries with poor human rights records in hopes of advancing the war on terror. Strong examples of this tendency drawn from the dataset include Pakistan, Sudan, and Azerbaijan. The average annual predicted aid amounts reported in the table show the effects of this allocation strategy. The total change in the human rights variable, highlighted in the fifth row, indicates that a country transitioning from least to greatest respect for human
rights (an improvement on my human rights variable from “1” to “5”) could expect a 95 percent reduction in the predicted amount of economic aid. Moreover, the previous four rows indicate an average reduction of around 57 percent in predicted aid amounts of aid as human rights practices improved from one point to the next. While intuitively one might expect such reductions, since countries with the best human rights records almost always are wealthy democracies with little need for economic aid, the findings still run counter to the plain language of the human rights provision and its aim of allocating aid in ways that advance human rights abroad.

To seat the relationship uncovered for human rights and economic aid under the G.W. Bush administration into historical and comparative perspective, and to provide an exploratory answer to hypotheses two and three, I now introduce the results for previous presidential administrations bound by the human rights provision into the discussion. Donnelly (1995) has persuasively argued that human rights norms have become more and more embedded in US foreign policy decisionmaking, particularly under the Reagan administration, but the results suggest the US foreign aid decisionmaking process may be an exception. Incorporating the findings from past administrations into my discussion strongly suggests a commitment to promote human rights through the US economic aid program has been lacking for some time. I again need look no further than the G.W. Bush administration’s immediate predecessor; the human rights variable is negative and statistically significant in the Clinton administration model at both stages of the allocation process. President Clinton
entered the White House criticizing G.H.W. Bush for failing to press for human rights improvements abroad, but the findings suggest his administration did no better (and at the gatekeeping stage worse) (Apodaca 2005). If Clinton acted on his campaign pledge to make human rights considerations a pillar of his foreign policy approach, they are conspicuously absent from the allocation process. Under the Clinton administration, Russia, Colombia, Egypt, and other countries with poor human rights records received many of the largest allocations of economic aid. With these historical comparisons in mind, I reject H2a-b (economic) and conclude that decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration were not the first to fail to employ human rights considerations in a manner consistent with the requirements of the human rights provision. In fact, while the magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat lessened, in all but the G.H.W. Bush and Reagan model at the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage, respectively, the human rights coefficients are negative and statistically significant across all models. This suggests on average that greater respect for human rights has not improved the prospects of a county receiving aid or the amount received, ceteris paribus. For previous administrations, then, my findings mirror those of Poe and Sirirangsi (1994) and Carleton and Stohl (1985), among others, in suggesting that the influence of human rights considerations on economic aid decisionmaking has not been as Congressional drafters intended. Based on these consistently negative findings, then, which deal a significant blow to my expectations of American exceptionalism, I also reject H3a-b (economic).
TABLE 4.1 Human Rights and US Economic Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration

Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating economic aid (gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage) for the G.W. Bush administration and, for historical and comparative perspective, past administrations also bound by the human rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Gatekeeping Stage (Probit Selection Models)</th>
<th>Level of Assistance Stage (OLS Outcome Models)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>-.266**</td>
<td>-.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
<td>-1.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.154)</td>
<td>(.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>.026*</td>
<td>.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.168</td>
<td>-.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.333)</td>
<td>(.333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.316**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>-1.49***</td>
<td>-.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.51)</td>
<td>(.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Neighbor</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.288)</td>
<td>(.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>.231**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.6***</td>
<td>13.1***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). ---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.

Table 4.1.1  The Substantive Effect of Human Rights on the Predicted Values of Economic Aid Allocated by the G.W. Bush Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(a) Initial predicted economic aid amount</th>
<th>(b) Predicted economic aid amount after variable change</th>
<th>(c) Change in predicted economic aid amount, b-a</th>
<th>(d) Percentage change in predicted amount of economic aid, c/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>G.W. Bush Administration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights, Change 1 to 2</td>
<td>147.4</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>-78.1</td>
<td>-53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 2 to 3</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 3 to 4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>-17.4</td>
<td>-54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 4 to 5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total change 1 to 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>147.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>-140.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>-95%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Values derived from the G.W. Bush administration model presented in Table 4.1. Values have been converted into constant millions of US dollars and are calculated for those countries passing the initial gatekeeping stage of the allocation process that were allocated some level of assistance (uncensored observations). Predicted amounts and percentage were calculated holding all other variables constant while changing the value of the human rights variable.
Turning to the control variables, and in doing so my secondary goal of evaluating the explanatory power of the three primary theories of aid-giving, I find support for American exceptionalism. Though the GDP per capita variable performed poorly at the level of assistance stage in my preliminary analysis, which along with theoretical considerations led to its use as my Heckman (1979) instrumental variable, it performs as expected at the gatekeeping stage. The variable is statistically significant and negative across all gatekeeping stages, suggesting decisionmakers consistently take into account recipient need when determining which countries will gain access to US economic aid. In the case of the G.W. Bush model, the finding also suggests that the administration followed through on its reframing commitment to attempt to address global poverty. Interestingly, the administration under which need influenced aid allocations most—if we take the magnitude of the coefficient as an indication—was that of G.H.W. Bush, whom many political commentators credit as the first compassionate conservative (Wead 1986).

Additionally, apart from the G.W. Bush administration’s gatekeeping and G.H.W. Bush’s level of assistance decisions, decisionmakers exhibited a commitment to American exceptionalism by rewarding higher levels of democracy with increased access to and levels of economic aid. The democracy variable is consistently positive and on average moderately statistically significant (0.05 level) across the models. Under the G.H.W. Bush administration democracy promotion rhetorically served as an important justification for US economic aid as Cold War communist adversaries passed
into history. The G.H.W. Bush administration established two economic aid funds—the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) and Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support (FREEDOM)—specifically to facilitate democratic transition in former Soviet bloc countries (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005). The findings suggest that US decisionmakers under the G.H.W. Bush administration considered a would-be recipient country’s level of democracy before admitting it into the pool of intended aid recipients, as did Clinton’s. The same cannot be said of the G.W. Bush administration, though the findings suggest his tended to hand out the largest economic incentives. Predicted economic aid increases for moving from lowest to highest levels of democracy (-10 to 10 on the Polity scale) ranged from a low of $18.7 million to a high of $43.6 million for the Clinton and G.W. Bush administration, respective.

Looking at the realist-oriented variables, it is worth noting that a number perform contrary to realist expectations. For example, in the two instances in which the ally variable achieves statistical significance, the coefficient carries a negative sign; decisionmakers in the Clinton administration were less likely to grant an ally access to economic aid and those in the G.W. Bush administration lesser amounts of aid. The finding is particularly interesting when one considers that the ally variable includes major non-NATO allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, which are less developed countries important to US security but may lack the requisite resources to meet their bilateral and collective security commitments. Taking into account the findings for the threat neighbor and
dispute variable, for every administration it apparently was more important to check enemies than reward friends during the allocation process.

Additionally, decisionmakers showed no favoritism toward more populous countries and countries sharing a land border with a US-designated threat. Only at the level of assistance stage and, even then, only in select cases did either variable achieve statistical significance and carry the positive sign that realist anticipate. One such interesting case is the threat neighbor variable in the Reagan administration model. As G.W. Bush would do some two decades later, the Reagan administration—which was also populated, at least up to Reagan’s reelection, with realist-oriented ideologues—proclaimed international terrorism the chief threat to the United States and freedom-loving peoples everywhere (Apodaca 2005). Unlike the G.W. Bush administration, though, the Reagan administration viewed leftist—particularly communist—ideology as the wellspring of this terrorism and allocated significant amounts of economic aid to countries bordering regimes espousing this ideology. These countries could expect on average to receive $178 million dollars more in predicted economic aid annually than others. Honduras and Costa Rica, both of which shared a border with the US-designated threat in the 1980s (Nicaragua), are strong examples of such countries. Moreover, other countries on the frontlines of the battle against communism and the war on drugs could expect similar preferential treatment. The Philippines, Pakistan, and El Salvador were among the countries receiving the most from the Reagan administration—a policy the G.H.W. Bush administration largely continued based on an examination of the data.
Nevertheless, the G.H.W. Bush administration did depart from its predecessor in
deemphasizing threat proximity as a primary determinant of aid levels, which
suggests a level of pragmatism missing under the Reagan administration’s
mostly counter-communist allocations. Finally, countries engaged in a dispute
with the United States, such as Libya (on several occasions), were less likely to
pass the gate under Reagan and Clinton and to receive less aid under the G.H.W.
and G.W. Bush administrations.

As for the pluralist-business orientation, the G.H.W. Bush administration
—again expressing its pragmatism—favored a foreign policy approach that
emphasized economic over ideological goals, and it shows in the trade partner
variable (2005). For the first time, the trade partner variable become positive
and statistically significant under the administration. The findings indicate that
decisionmakers have since continued to favor trade partners at the gatekeeping
stage, where the variable is positive and statistically significant. In short, the
higher the volume of trade (exports + imports) between the United States and a
country, the higher the probability of the latter receiving economic aid. Mexico
and Brazil are two trade partners drawn from my dataset exemplifying this
trade-aid connection. Having passed the gate, however, trade partners did not
enjoy greater levels of economic aid under any administration.
Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Military Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration

In contrast to economic aid program, the G.W. Bush administration had no need to reframe the rationale for military aid after the onset of the war on terror. Military aid remained an avenue for friends and allies of the United States to acquire US military training and hardware (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004). Rather, the change to US military aid program under G.W. Bush was one of increased scope. The summary statistics attest to this increase and, as a brief aside, the advisability of modeling military aid allocations as a two-stage process based on the statistical significance of rho across all models.\(^{44}\) Decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration allowed roughly 67 percent (795/1189) of countries to pass the gatekeeping stage and receive some level of military assistance, which was the first percentage increase since the Reagan administration—also intent on dismantling an international threat (through economic aid as well). Yet this increase was only three percentage-points above that of the Clinton and G.H.W. Bush administrations, both at 64 percent.\(^{45}\) For G.W. Bush that access including granting post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq and Pakistan and Jordan some of the largest military aid packages constructed, verging on or in the billions of dollars, making these countries some of the top

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\(^{44}\) As with the economic model, I ran a single-stage (OLS) equation as a robustness check on my findings. In the case of the G.W. Bush model, the human rights variable also failed to achieve statistical significance at the level of assistance stage—which affords additional confidence in the results reported in Table 4.2. However, in the single-stage equation, the threat neighbor variable—which is only weakly (0.1 level) significant—became statistically insignificant. As such, I consider its statistical significance in the Heckman (1979) models as tentative empirical support only.

\(^{45}\) Based on the calculation method outlined in the previous footnote, percentages are as follows: Reagan (58 percent, an increase over Carter), G.H.W. Bush (64 percent) and Clinton (64 percent).
aid recipients. To determine whether this percentage increase under the G.W. Bush administration was associated with the human rights-military aid linkage critics contend, I draw attention to Table 4.2.

Looking at the G.W. Bush administration model, again located in columns 4 and 8, the sign on the coefficient suggests that human rights had a negative effect on military aid allocations at both the gatekeeping and level of assistance stages under the G.W. Bush administration. However, unlike in the case of economic aid, the coefficient fails to achieve statistical significance at either stage of the allocation process. The findings thus suggest that decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration did not take into account human rights considerations when allocating military aid, as critics contend. I therefore accept \textit{H1a-b (military)} and conclude that human rights concerns failed to significantly influence the administration’s military aid decisionmaking. This failure to heed the human rights provision in allocating military aid was not without precedent. The same may be said of previous administrations under examination as well. Since the failure was not a first, I reject \textit{H2a-b (military)}.

Though the human rights variable carries a positive sign at the gatekeeping stage for the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administration models, which is my first findings suggestive of American exceptionalism and adherence to the human rights provision, neither achieves statistical significance. Moreover, where statistical significance is achieved—in the same two models at the level of assistance stage—the results are again negative. For added
historical context, Cohen (1982) found “extraordinary circumstances” influenced the Carter administration’s allocation decisions—to Indonesia in particular—despite Carter’s personal commitment to advancing human rights. Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson (1984) found that this influence arose at the level of assistance stage and persisted through the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush years. I have seemingly found this same influence, which led decisionmakers in the Reagan administration to allocate annually predicted military aid in the amount of roughly $250 million to countries with some of the poorest human rights records, as in the case of El Salvador in the mid-1980s. Thus, I reject $H_3a-b$ (military) too.

In examining the two control variables also indicative of American exceptionalism, I find less support for my theoretical orientation than in the economic aid models. GDP per capita is negatively related to gatekeeping decisions in all but the Clinton model, though its statistical significance is weak (0.1) in the Reagan model. Nevertheless, this suggests decisionmakers generally sought to “screen out” wealthier countries from the military aid program so as to bolster the capabilities of less developed (and democratic) friends (Poe and Meernik 1995: 406). Interestingly, the wealthiest of those not screened out found favor during the allocation of military aid under the Clinton and G.W. Bush administration. Poe and Meernik (1995) found a similar dynamic at work.

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46 For example, Carter denied a number of abusive Latin American countries US security assistance over the course of his presidency: Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua, among others. At the same time, however, the Carter administration continued to allocate security assistance to Indonesia despite the government’s well-documented human rights abuses by claiming that there was not a consistent pattern of human rights violations—as defined in Section 502B—since Jakarta had a plan in place to someday release its political prisoners (Apodaca 2006).
in their study of military aid allocations in the 1980s, though their GDP per capita variable fell short of statistical significance in the level of assistance stage. A review of the data explains the counterintuitive finding in this study: South Korea and Greece were among some of the highest GDP per capita countries in the pool of intended recipients, securing in some years upwards of $700 million in military aid. Additionally, the democracy variable proves a fairly consistent and positive influence on gatekeeping decisions, as American exceptionalism anticipates. Aside from the Reagan administration, administrations have consistently granted countries with higher levels of democracy greater access to military aid. But these higher levels seemingly were of no value in securing larger aid packages.

Interestingly, the realist-oriented variables meet with mixed results under most administrations; but, where they achieve statistical significance, the variables exert substantially greater influence on US military aid decisionmaking than others in the models. Countries engaged in a dispute with the United States, not surprisingly, were less likely to gain access to US military aid irrespective of presidential administration and those bordering a communist, rogue regime, or state sponsor of terror more likely under the Reagan administration. Predictably, decisionmakers in every administration provided allies with greater amounts of military aid—none more so than the Reagan administration based on the magnitude of the coefficient. As with its economic model, the Reagan administration tended to give the greatest sums of military aid to friends in the fight against communism, such as South Korea. As
Apodaca (2005) found, the results also indicate that decisionmakers in the G.H.W. Bush administration typically took their cues from the Reagan administration in terms of the considerations affecting aid allocations. One interesting difference, however, is the tendency of the G.H.W. Bush administration (and its successors) to extend greater amounts of military aid to countries neighboring threats. Lai (2003) found that as the threat of communism faded the G.H.W. Bush administration shifted some aid from allies to countries sharing a border with rogue regimes or state sponsor of terrors; my findings tend to suggest the same.

Finally, the trade partner carried the positive coefficient devotees of the pluralist-business explanation of US military aid anticipate in only half of the models. However, the variable failed to achieve even weak statistical significance in every administration model and at both stages of the allocation process. Not surprisingly, then, the issue of conflict or cooperation with a potential recipient tended to dictate which country would receive military aid and how much.
### TABLE 4.2 Human Rights and US Military Aid Allocations by Presidential Administration

Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating military aid (gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage) for the G.W. Bush administration and, for historical and comparative perspective, past administrations also bound by the human rights provision of the Foreign Assistance Act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Gatekeeping Stage (Probit Selection Models)</th>
<th>Level of Assistance Stage (OLS Outcome Models)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>-.211*</td>
<td>-.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.118)</td>
<td>(.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.863**</td>
<td>-.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.357)</td>
<td>(.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.099)</td>
<td>(.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>-8.16***</td>
<td>-1.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.159)</td>
<td>(.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Neighbor</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.332)</td>
<td>(.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>5.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.89)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). ---a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  
Reagan: total obs. = 874. Uncensored obs. = 505. Rho = -.88 Wald test of rho = 0.01. Log likelihood = -1418.3.  
Conclusion

The findings for the economic and military aid models presented in this first of three empirical chapters produced interesting and sometimes unexpected results. The results supported critics’ claims about the human rights-foreign aid linkage during the G.W. Bush administration in the case of military allocations for $H1$ but not economic aid or military allocations elsewhere. As for economic aid, the findings indicate that a negative relationship between human rights and US foreign aid existed under the administration and others. Thus, I found no support for my theoretical expectations of American exceptionalism based on the human rights variable. While decisionmakers in the G.W. Bush administration allocated economic aid to countries with some of the poorest human rights records, presumably to advance the war on terror, the findings nevertheless suggest that they kept an eye toward promoting democracy and addressing recipient need (GDP per capita). The findings also indicate that recipient need influenced all other administration’s decisions to allocate economic aid and all but one administration’s decisions military aid, which along with the results for the democracy variable lend some support to American exceptionalism apart from human rights. However, as with previous studies, realist-oriented variables when statistically significant and in the anticipated direction exerted on average the most influence on aid allocations (Lebovic 1998; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Poe et al. 1994) and the pluralist/business-oriented trade variable the least.
Chapter 5: Models of Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations by Era

Introduction

In this second empirical chapter I examine US economic and military aid allocations during the war on terror relative to previous eras. Past studies of aid allocations during the Cold War and post-Cold War included two or more presidential administrations per era (Meernik, Krueger, Poe 1994; Lai 2003; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009). This study includes only one for the war on terror—the G.W. Bush administration. The absence of a second or third administration in the war on terror model may prompt some readers to object to the forthcoming analysis, concluding that it is for now premature. I am sympathetic to this position in light of the findings from the previous chapter that there has been a negative and statistically significant relationship between human rights and US economic aid since the onset of the war on terror. My hope is that the current administration is, and its successors will, prosecute the war on terror in ways that not only create the incentives for improvements in human rights practices but also their overall human rights record during the allocation of US foreign aid. However, objections notwithstanding, there are theoretical and empirical grounds to suggest the war on terror may constitute a new and ongoing era in allocations. From a theoretical standpoint, human rights scholars have persuasively argued that the war on terror already has the
trappings of an “era” that will structure aid allocations for decades. As Apodaca (2006) puts it, “although the war on terrorism began as a response to the events of 9/11, it soon became a global and permanent condition” hostile to the promotion of human rights (176). Christie (2008) also notes the war on terror’s permanency, noting that the war “by default [has] become the central feature of international relations in the period since 9/11” and currently is entrenched as a “paradigm” in US foreign policy (13-15). Lebovic’s (1998) empirical finding that once a US foreign policy paradigm—in his analysis the Cold War threat of communism—is established, US “policy resides less in the elected leadership than within the forces impinging on it,” which makes US foreign aid “surprisingly impervious to change,” further drives home the point (129-130).

The results of preliminary analyses also provide moderate to strong empirical support for modeling the war on terror as a distinct era. When entered into multivariate models for all years (1977-2008) as a dummy variable, the war on terror variable was positive and strongly statistically significant (0.01) for economic aid at both stages of the allocation process and moderately statistically significant (0.05) for military aid allocations. Bearing these findings in mind, I thus accept era-related arguments as deserving of empirical examination and treat the G.W. Bush administration’s allocations as the first (but probably not the last) guided by the paradigmatic forces of the war on terror.

Given this overlap in the models with the previous chapter, I neither rehearse the findings of the war on terror models nor revisit the substantive
effects of the human rights variable. Instead, I move immediately to an examination of the influence of the human rights variable during the war on terror relative to the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. However, the overlap between the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror model is not complete. As previously noted, to demonstrate the theoretical importance of studying partners in the war on terror as a distinct group of aid recipients, the purpose of Chapter 6, I include a dummy variable identifying partners in the war on terror models. With this distinguishing factor in mind, I turn first to my discussion of findings for human rights and economic aid allocations.

Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocations by Era

Table 5.1 presents the model results for the relationship between human rights and US economic aid allocations for the war on terror and Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Looking first at the summary statistics, reported in the last row of the table, and focusing on the number of total and uncensored observations in each model, there is an interesting historical trend. Of the 1,297 cases eligible for economic aid during the Cold War, US decisionmakers permitted 899 (69 percent) to pass the gatekeeping stage and allocated them some level of aid. This percentage climbs by double-digits to 79 percent (1084/1369) for the post-Cold War and, as previously presented, 88 percent after

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47 Readers should note, however, that the model results differ somewhat based on the inclusion of the partners variable. Most importantly, though, the inclusion of the variable did not substantially impact the performance of the human rights variable. On a related note, the findings for the single-stage level of assistance models did not change substantially either owing to the inclusion of the partners variable.
the onset of the war on terror. Tarnoff and Lawson (2009) conclude the most striking trends in economic aid allocations over the past two decades has been the growth of development assistance, such as humanitarian and food aid, and the increased emphasis on security assistance since the onset of the war on terror. No doubt these factors are undercurrents to the trend uncovered here. The summary statistics also provide support for Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage conceptualization of the aid allocation process when analyzing aid by era in the form of statistically significant rho parameters across all models. The Wald test of rho thus supports the general utility of modeling aid allocations as gatekeeping and level of assistance decisions, as was the case for economic and military aid decisionmaking in the previous chapter. For insights into the role human rights considerations played in these decisions over the eras in question, I look to the model results of Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1 Human Rights and US Economic Aid Allocations by Era

Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating economic aid (gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage), 1977-2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Gatekeeping Stage (Probit Selection Models)</th>
<th>Level of Assistance Stage (OLS Outcome Models)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.284***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
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<td>-.742***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
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<td>.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.458*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.93)</td>
<td>(.245)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.451)</td>
<td>(.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Neighbor</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.199)</td>
<td>(.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners in War on</td>
<td>---^b</td>
<td>---^b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.153*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.73***</td>
<td>7.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). Time dummies omitted.
---^a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable. ---^b Only applicable to the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror models.

Row 1 of Table 5.1 highlights the performance of the human rights variable in each era. To provide historical and comparative perspective on the to the human rights variable in the war on terror, I first look at the post-Cold War model. Did human rights considerations exert a positive effect on economic aid allocations during the post-Cold War that was nullified by the onset of the war on terror? The model indicates the answer is “no.” The human rights variable is negative at both stages of the allocation process and, as Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) found, statistically significant (0.05 level or greater). The finding deals another blow to my expectations of American exceptionalism and seemingly undermines the consensus formed at Cold War’s end that the influence of human rights considerations would increase as the threat of communism receded (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Korb 2008; Clark and O’Connor 1997; Stark 2000; Apodaca 2006). Indeed, the human rights variable’s negative and statistically significant post-Cold War performance arguably offers a glimpse of what is to come in the post-9/11 environment. Consequently, I reject \( H_{4a-b} \) (economic), and find cause to question the notion that the post-Cold War era entailed a peace dividend that led to an increased emphasis on human rights in US foreign policy.

Turning to the human rights variable in the Cold War model provides some hope for American exceptionalism. As Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found, the human rights variable is positive at the gatekeeping stage. But the possible support this finding could have provided to American exceptionalism is short-lived by the failure of the coefficient to achieve statistical significance.
Additionally, the coefficient is negative (though again statistically insignificant) at the level of assistance stage. The findings thus suggest that human rights considerations on average had no discernable relationship with US economic aid allocations during the Cold War decisionmaking process. Thus, no support is found for the claim that the war on terror ended a positive era in human rights that subsumed the post-Cold War (and possibly the Cold War) at both the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage of the economic aid allocation process. On the contrary, the findings suggest a positive era in human rights—one consistent with my theoretical expectations and required by the human rights provision—has yet to be realized. As such, I also reject $H5a-b$ (economic).

Turning to the control variables that are secondary indicators of American exceptionalism, I find recipient need (GDP per capita) is negative across all eras and significant at the 0.01 level for all gatekeeping stage decisions. This finding supports the notion that American exceptionalism in fact informs gatekeeping decisions even in the face of the self-serving donor interests, such as advancing the war on terror. Moreover, these countries regularly are selected by US decisionmakers to receive needed economic aid despite an apparent overall lack of realist-oriented strategic importance to the United States. Strong supporting examples include numerous African and Southeast Asian countries; Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Bangladesh and Cambodia are a few examples. It is worth noting at this point that the relationship between need and US economic aid is one of the most enduring, as evident in the literature review, and empirical support for this
enduring finding is mounting in this study as well (McKinlay & Little 1979; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Meernik and Poe 1995; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Lai 2003). The same may be said of the democracy variable; with the exception of the war on terror gatekeeping stage, the variable is moderate to highly statistically significant across all eras. The findings thus indicate that US decisionmakers over the past three decades have consistently sought to promote democracy by allowing more democratic countries access to economic aid and allocating these countries greater amounts of aid.

As for realist explanations of economic aid allocations, neither the population nor ally variable is in the anticipated direction at the gatekeeping stage, though more populous countries did receive greater amounts of aid in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. In contrast to Lai’s (2003) finding, the realist-oriented threat neighbor variable led to increased aid allocations to countries sharing a border with a communist neighbor or state sponsor of terror during the Cold War—West Germany and South Korea are strong examples, respectively—but not to those sharing a border with a rogue regime or sponsor of terror thereafter. This finding supports previous studies suggesting geopolitical strategic considerations were of greater importance to US economic aid decisionmakers during the Cold War than post-Cold War era (Meernik, Krueger, Poe 1998; Poe 1991). On the other hand, the findings suggest that involvement in a dispute with the United States was of greater importance during the post-Cold War and war on terror. Dispute involvement decreases the
probability of a country passing the gatekeeping stage during the post-Cold War era and, as with the war on terror, the amount of economic aid it could expect.

The pluralist-business explanation of economic aid allocations finds modest support in at the gatekeeping stage of the post-Cold War and war on terror models. The trade partner variable is statistically significant (0.1 or higher) and positive for post-Cold War gatekeeping decisions, which probably reflects in part the United States’ efforts to provide trade and aid to bolster former Eastern bloc market openings and democratic transitions (Huntington 1991). For example, Belarus in 1992 went from no trade with or aid from the United States during the Cold War to significant levels of trade and hundreds of millions of dollars in economic aid thereafter, as did numerous others, including Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania. However, the trade variable fails to perform as Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found during the Cold War and is negatively related to levels of aid in the post-Cold War and war on terror models.

Finally, the results of the partners variable provides strong but limited support for studying economic aid allocations to partners in the war on terror. The partners variable is positive and highly statistically significant (0.01 level) in the second-stage model. While partners did not receive preferential treatment at the gatekeeping stage, the findings indicate that they tended on average to receive greater levels of economic assistance than non-partners, ceteris paribus.
Table 5.2 reports the results for eras in military aid allocations. As with the economic aid models, I find support in the summary statistics for modeling eras in military aid allocations as a two-stage process. The Wald test of rho is statistically significant across all models. And, again as with the economic aid models, I find that the cases passing the gatekeeping stage (uncensored observations) relative to those that did not (total observations) has grown in each era. The “United States provides military assistance to US friends and allies to help them acquire US military equipment and training,” and more of those friends and allies gained access to military aid annually after the onset of the war on terror than in either the Cold War or post-Cold War period (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005: 7). But the post-9/11 growth in military aid allocations has been far less dramatic than for economic aid. Whereas 56 percent and 64 percent of cases passed the gatekeeping stage during the Cold War and post-Cold War era, respectively, the percentage rose slightly to 67 percent (795/1189) during the war on terror. This rather modest increase stands in contrast to the approximately threefold (21 percent) increase for economic aid since 9/11 and calls into question arguments that center on a dramatic expansion in the number of post-9/11 countries receiving aid. On a conceptual note, this differential rate of passing the gatekeeping stage also tends to argues for modeling economic and military aid separately as the war on terror proceeds. To be sure, Lebovic’s (1998) reminds us that the “aggregation of qualitatively distinct types of aid
[economic + military] can obscure the role of interests and human needs in foreign policy as well as the means by which donors pursue their foreign policy objectives,” and the models presented in this chapter support his point (118).

Turning to the actual model findings, I find that human rights considerations exerted a statistically weak but positive influence on Cold War gatekeeping decisions. This finding provides the first (and only) tentative empirical support in this study for US decisionmakers’ adherence to the human rights provision and American exceptionalism in human rights promotion. In so doing, it mirrors the findings of Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) and Poe (1991), and argues for the “importance of human rights practices primarily in the initial stages of military aid allocation decisions” (Meernik and Poe 1995: 406). However, the human rights variable enjoys no such influence thereafter. Despite this initial encouraging finding, the variable is negative and statistically significant at the level of assistance stage. Poe and Meernik first uncovered this rather paradoxical dual finding for the Cold War in their 1995 study. Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) later found the same, and interpreted the finding as I do now: “having cleared certain basic criteria regarding human rights [at the gatekeeping stage], states that make it into the pool of aid recipients are not penalized for those abuses they do commit” (79). This negative relationship between human rights and military aid at the level of assistance stage in the Cold War model carries through to the post-Cold War model as well, though in the case of the latter the coefficient fails to achieve statistical significance. As such, I reject $H4a-b$ (military). My findings indicate that the post-Cold War era was
no kinder to the human rights-military aid linkage than the war on terror. In both eras, human rights considerations would seem to be of little to no consequence to decisionmaking.

As for hypothesis 5, the war on terror did not bring a supposed era of human rights to an end in the case of military aid allocations. If anything, the model results indicate that the post-Cold War era brought the only possible semblance of such an era—at the gatekeeping stage during the Cold War—to an end. I thus find no support for $H_{5a-b}$ (military).

Despite the mostly disappointing results for the human rights variable, the secondary indicators of American exceptionalism fair somewhat better. As with past studies, the models indicate that US decisionmakers tended to consider recipient need (GDP per capita) when deciding whether to allocate a country military aid during the Cold War and war on terror (Meernik and Poe 1995; Poe 1991; Lai 2003). Interestingly, at the second stage recipient need became a non-factor during the Cold War and even positively related to levels of military assistance thereafter. Bahrain is a case in point; despite its relatively high GDP per capita, US military aid began to flow—sometimes in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually—after the Cold War. Level of democracy also exerts a moderately statistically significant (0.05 level) and positive effect on military aid allocations after the Cold War, a partial replication of Meernik, Krueger, and Poe’s (1998) findings that suggest democracy promotion and stabilization became a military aid funding priority as the threat of communism subsided.
As for remaining control variables, the ally variable performed contrary to realist expectations at the gatekeeping stage in all era models. Only at the level of assistance stage in the Cold War and post-Cold War models does the variable exhibit a positive and highly statistically significant (0.01 level) relationship on military aid allocations that realism anticipates, which Poe (1991 and 1992) also found. I interpret this finding as once an ally made it past the gatekeeping stage, where membership was of no advantage or even a disadvantage, it found enormous favor thereafter and was allocated military aid to ensure it could meet its security-related obligations. The coefficient on the Cold War ally variable—one of the largest thus far encountered at the level of assistance stage—indicates US decisionmakers allocated allies that made it past the gatekeeping stage a staggering $220 million more military aid than non-allies, ceteris paribus. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, stand out as strong examples on this count, as they “were allocated greater levels of aid than all other countries in the world save for Egypt and Israel” through the 1980s (Poe and Meernik 1995: 407). This advantage began to fade in post-Cold War era and ended with the onset of the war on terror, according to my findings. Countries adjacent to a US-designated threat found similar favor, though in lesser amounts, during the post-Cold War only. Sharing a border with a US-designated threat in the form of a rogue regime or state sponsor of terrorism during the post-Cold War garnered countries increased military aid. Thereafter, that favor seemingly migrated to partners in the war on terror.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Gatekeeping Stage (Probit Selection Models)</th>
<th>Level of Assistance Stage (OLS Outcome Models)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>-.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.065)</td>
<td>(.067)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
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<td>-.055</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Level of Democracy</td>
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<td>.037**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(.011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.524**</td>
<td>-.056*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.266)</td>
<td>(.276)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
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<td>-1.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.326)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Neighbor</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>-.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.265)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners in War on Terror</td>
<td>---b</td>
<td>---b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.176)</td>
<td>(.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1 ***p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed). Time dummies omitted. ---* Omitted Heckman instrumental variable. ---b Only applicable to the G.W. Bush administration and war on terror models.


War on Terror: total obs. = 1189. Uncensored obs. = 795. Rho = -.65. Wald test of rho = 0.0001. Log likelihood = -1842.03.
Partners not only gained access to military aid more readily but also were allocated more at the level of assistance stage. Whereas population failed to perform at the gatekeeping stage as realists anticipate, and generally at the level of assistance stage as well, the dispute variable performed as expected. Not surprisingly, US decisionmakers were strongly disinclined to provide countries engaged in a dispute with the United States access to military aid. Finally, and in stark contrast to realist-oriented explanation, the models provide no support for the pluralist-business explanation of military aid allocations.

**Conclusion**

If the war on terror may be considered an emerging era in US foreign aid allocations, as some content and my analysis suggests, the findings of this chapter suggest that the negative relationship between human rights and economic aid observed in this new era has more in common with previous eras than not. Nevertheless, American exceptionalism found strong support in the overall performance of GDP per capita and democracy variable while the realist and pluralist-business explanation of economic aid allocations found only weak and occasional support. As for military aid, the results indicate that human rights considerations did not exert a statistically significant influence on allocations during the war on terror. Rather, it did so only during the Cold War and, even then, with mixed results. Self-serving donor interests in the guise or realist-oriented variables were less influential in the economic aid models than the military aid. The findings indicate that disputes with the United States were of paramount concern to decisionmakers at the gatekeeping stage irrespective of
era, with allies, countries bordering a US-designated threat, and partners in the war on terror garnering increased amounts of military aid. For a closer look at the last group, partners in the war on terror, I now turn to Chapter 6.
Chapter 6: Models of Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror

Introduction

In this, the third and final empirical chapter, I examine the G.W. Bush administration’s foreign aid allocations as a single quantitative case study, focusing on economic and military aid allocations to partner countries “with us” and non-partners that were “against us” in the war on terror (Bush 2002). Having demonstrated in the previous chapter that partners were a statistically significant grouping of countries in all but economic aid gatekeeping decisions and that this group garnered greater amounts of economic and military aid during the era of the war on terror because of this partnership, I now search for evidence of whether partners in the war on terror benefited from a double standard in US human rights policy. This double standard may be stated as: section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act continued to guide aid allocations to non-partners, ensuring that human rights considerations played their Congressionally-mandated role in the process, but during allocations to partners US foreign aid decisionmakers set aside this mandate to ensure aid reached the 60 or so countries supporting the war on terror.

In search of this possible double standard, I turn in the next section to the results for the economic aid models. The presentation of findings proceeds along the now-familiar lines laid out in Chapters 4 and 5. First, however, I draw
attention to a modeling issue: the first relates to the exclusion of the ally variable in all non-partner models and dispute variable in the partners model and the second an instrumental variable change in the military aid model for partners. On September 12, 2001, NATO declared—consistent with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—that it considered the terrorist attacks on the United States to be an attack against all member-countries (NATO 2010). Other countries allied with the United States, including major non-NATO allies, followed suit in expressing support for the war. As a consequence, the ally variable has been dropped from the non-partners models since no allies were non-partners in the war. The instrument change in the partners model arises for a similar situation. Because no partners were engaged in a dispute with the United States, the dispute variable could not serve as an instrumental variable. However, as with Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz (2009) found in their analysis of aid-giving by era, the ally variable proved a theoretically defensible and methodologically credible substitution. Bearing these changes in mind, I discuss in the next section economic allocations to the two groups.

**Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror**

Looking at the model statistics at the bottom of Table 6.1 highlights an interesting finding. The G.W. Bush administration tended to allocate economic aid to a greater percentage of non-partners than partners. Ninety-three percent (698/743) of non-partner cases passed the gatekeeping stage of the
allocation process as opposed to 80 percent (359/446) of the partner cases. In the case of the latter, inspection of the data indicates the 20 percent that failed to pass the gatekeeping stage typically were wealthy Western European partners. Yet US decisionmakers during this period did begin to allocate economic aid—in some cases for the first time ever—to wealthy Western democracies that also happen to be partner in the war on terror (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005). Canada and Belgium are two such examples drawn from the partners dataset. Thus, the G.W. Bush administration said “yes” at the gatekeeping stage to allocating some level of economic aid to even the wealthiest partners in the war on terror at times. Nevertheless, if one’s arguments about the war on terror under the G.W. Bush administration hinges on partners’ securing greater access to economic aid than non-partners, the summary statistics suggest the premise is flawed.

Turning first to the probit estimates for the prospects that a partner in the war on terror would pass the gatekeeping stage, located in the first column of Table 6.1, indicates human rights considerations failed to influence gatekeeping decisions for partners and non-partners alike. American exceptionalism is thus on shaky empirical ground in both case, a dilemma that is further exacerbated by the performance of the human rights variable at the level of assistance stage.

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48 With all but seven percent of non-partner cases admitted to the economic aid pool, one has to wonder if US decisionmakers propensity under the G.W. Bush administration for saying “yes” so often at some point might erode the methodological utility—as opposed to theoretical justification—for employing Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage decision-making process. Nevertheless, the Wald test of rho supports modeling economic aid allocations to partners and non-partners as a two-stage process.

49 The single-stage (OLS) check on the partners and non-partners level of assistance allocations produced substantially similar results as the Heckman (1979) models. The human rights variables were negative and statistically significant, though the magnitude of the coefficients did decline in both, including by more than half in the partners model. Thus, while I can be confident of the sign and significance—which are key to my acceptance or rejection of the
As with the gatekeeping stage, the human rights variable carries a negative sign. However, at the level of assistance stage the variable is statistical significance (.05 level or greater) in both models. The findings lead me to accept \( H_{6a} \) \textit{(economic)}, since partners’ human rights records failed to influence their prospects of receiving aid. However, I reject \( H_{6b} \) \textit{(economic)}, not because human rights considerations had the positive influence I expected but rather a negative relationship to levels of assistance.

The substantive effects reported in the fifth row of Table 6.1.1 indicate that a partner country with the worst human rights score of “1” could expected an initial predicted economic aid allocation of $809 million dollars, a staggering 99 percent more than partners making the hypothetical switch to the best score of “5.” In addition, looking at the point-to-point changes in the human rights variable (recorded in rows 1-4) indicates that every one-point improvement on my inverted PTS on average cut a partner’s predicted economic aid amount by about 74 percent. Most of these predicted aid dollars flowed to post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, by far the largest to any partners in the war on terror. While allocations to the two are regarded in this study as an integral part of the US strategy for winning the war on terror, since they are the outgrowth of a policy aimed at denying international terrorists a foothold in either country, a closer look at allocations to Afghanistan and Iraq is revealing. Since becoming partners in the war on terror, economic aid to both countries soared annually from $500+ million to Afghanistan to in the billions for Iraq. However, most hypotheses—the magnitude of the coefficient should be viewed with some reservation, depending on whether one agrees that that two-stage model is the most appropriate method for modeling allocations.
remaining partners receiving aid took home approximately $100 million annually.

The performance of the human rights variable in the non-partners model also proves intriguing. One might anticipate based on the findings mentioned above that partner allocations were responsible for the negative relationship between human rights and economic aid at the post-9/11 level of assistance stage, but the non-partner findings suggest otherwise. As with partners, the results indicate human rights did not influence gatekeeping decisions and were statistically significant and negatively related to level of assistance decisions. The implication is that US decisionmakers did not hold non-partners to a higher standard of respect for human rights than partners during the economic aid allocation process. I therefore reject $H7_a-b$ (economic). As noted in Table 6.1.1, the substantive effects of the human rights variable suggest that non-partners with a score of “1” could on average expect to receive substantially less in predicted economic aid than their partner counterparts. However, once Afghanistan and Iraq are removed from among the partners, the initial predicted economic aid allocation to non-partners is comparable to that of partners.

In looking to the control variables, recipient need (GDP per capita) once again provides strong and consistent support for American exceptionalism at the gatekeeping stage. Poorer partners and non-partners were more likely to gain access to economic aid. One plausible interpretation for this finding in the case of partners is that the G.W. Bush administration chose not to reward partners simply for being “with us,” as critics contend, but rather to favor those at the
gatekeeping stages whose counterterrorism capabilities lagged behind others due to lack of resources. The data suggests partners from Kenya and Uganda to Mongolia are prime examples. Interestingly, only in the non-partners model at the level of assistance stage did US decisionmakers extend increased aid to countries with higher levels of democracy.

Looking further down Table 6.1 shows the realist-oriented variables fared poorly in the partners and non-partners models. Non-partners engaged in a dispute with the United States could expect to pass the gatekeeping stage less and receive less aid than countries engaged in no such dispute, but otherwise realist explanations of economic aid giving fall flat. The performance of the threat variable is particularly problematic for realism. One would expect partners assisting in the war on terror that also shared a land border with US-designated rogue stage, state sponsor of terror, or both to be more likely than others to gain access to US economic aid and more of it, all else being equal. But this is not the case, and only at the level of assistance stage is the coefficient positive—though still statistically insignificant. In contrast, the pluralist-business explanation of aid allocations receives a modest boost in the guise of a positive and highly statistically significant (0.01 level) coefficient for the trade partner variable in the partners model. Higher levels of trade with the United States afforded partners greater access to economic aid, ceteris paribus, though the results suggest this access did not precipitate allocations decisions that led to increased amounts of aid.
TABLE 6.1 Human Rights and US Economic Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror

Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating economic aid (gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage) to partners and non-partners in the war on terror, 2001-2008.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Non-Partners</th>
<th>Level of Assistance Stage</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Non-Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Probit Selection Models)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OLS Outcome Models)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>-.318</td>
<td>-.241</td>
<td>-1.32***</td>
<td>-.533**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(.189)</td>
<td>(.226)</td>
<td>(.159)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>-.209***</td>
<td>-.418***</td>
<td>---^a</td>
<td>---^a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.372)</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.088***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>-.209</td>
<td>---^b</td>
<td>-..945*</td>
<td>---^b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.372)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.491)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.839***</td>
<td>.215</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>.7***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.198)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.191)</td>
<td>(.115)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>---^b</td>
<td>-1.21**</td>
<td>---^c</td>
<td>-2.74***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.581)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.601)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat neighbor</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-.831*</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>-.352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.778)</td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(.632)</td>
<td>(.508)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.166)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>35.02***</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>-5.45***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.81)</td>
<td>(3.24)</td>
<td>(3.19)</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01 (two-tailed).
---^a Omitted Heckman instrumental variable. ---^b Dropped because all allies were partners in the war on terror.
---^c Dropped because no partners engaged in dispute with United States.

Table 6.1.1  The Substantive Effect of Human Rights on the Predicted Values of Economic Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-partners in the War on Terror

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(a) Initial predicted economic aid amount</th>
<th>(b) Predicted economic aid amount after variable change</th>
<th>(c) Change in predicted economic aid amount, b-a</th>
<th>(d) Percentage change in predicted amount of economic aid, c/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1 to 2</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>213.8</td>
<td>-595.1</td>
<td>-73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 2 to 3</td>
<td>213.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>-157.3</td>
<td>-74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 3 to 4</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>-41.5</td>
<td>-75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 4 to 5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total change 1 to 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>809</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>-805</strong></td>
<td><strong>-99%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-partners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1 to 2</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>-46.4</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 2 to 3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>-27.1</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 3 to 4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>-15.7</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 4 to 5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total change 1 to 5</strong></td>
<td><strong>110.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>-98.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>-89%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Values derived from the Partners/non-partners models presented in Table 6.1. Values have been converted into constant millions of US dollars and are calculated for those countries passing the initial gatekeeping stage of the allocation process that were allocated some level of assistance (uncensored observations). Predicted amounts and percentage were calculated holding explanatory variables constant while changing the value of the human rights variable from 1 (worst) to 5 (best).
Discussion of Findings: Human Rights and Military Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror

In the final analysis of this last empirical chapter, I focus on the G.W. Bush administration’s military aid allocations to partners and non-partners in the war on terror. As was the case with economic aid, decisionmakers in the post-9/11 environment moved quickly to increase or, if previously denied, reestablish military aid flows to countries deemed capable of advancing the war (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005; Gabelnick 2002). US decisionmakers once again allocated military aid to countries that had previously been denied US military assistance because of their poor human rights record—most notably, Pakistan and Indonesia—after they pledge to support the war on terror (Apodaca 2006). Unlike in the economic aid model, where the percentage of non-partner cases allocated aid was 13 percent higher than that of partners, the percentage of cases allocated military aid is more evenly split between the groups than many would expect. Non-partners passed the gatekeeping stage at a rate of 67 percent (499/743) compared to 66 percent (296/446) for partners. This suggests partners were not allocated military aid significantly more often than non-partners just for being “with us”—the United States—in the war on terror.

As for the actual model findings, I open the examination by noting that Apodaca (2005) argues the G.W. Bush administration sidestepped Section 502B when allocating military aid to “frontline allies in the fight against terrorism”

---

50 Bear in mind, however, economic aid allocations easily outstrip military aid allocations despite the post-9/11 increase in the latter. Tarnoff and Lawson (2009) report that US military obligations as a share of total aid obligations peaked at 42 percent in 1984 but has since been in decline and as of 2008 represented less than 18 percent of total aid.
and, in so doing, provided numerous countries with poor human rights scores aid (73). She cites a number of examples, including Pakistan, and in follow-on work, Armenia and Azerbaijan (2006). The human rights variable at the gatekeeping stage tends to support her analysis, owing to the negative and statistically significant coefficient. At the level of assistance stage, however, human rights considerations seemingly had little impact on decisionmaking as most critics claim.\textsuperscript{51} I thus reject $H6a$ (military) and accept $H6b$ (military) since human rights considerations failed to influence aid allocations.

Looking at the non-partners model, respect for human rights is positively related to the initial decision to allocate military aid. However, the human rights variable fails to achieve statistical significance at this stage. I thus find that the G.W. Bush administration did not use human rights behavior as a basis for the initial decision to extend military aid to this group. I am consequently led to reject $H7a$-b (military) and conclude that there was no human rights double-standard for partners and non-partners in the war on terror. Neither partners nor non-partners with better human rights records found favor during the military aid allocation process under the G.W. Bush administration. Conversely, decisionmakers did not penalize poor human rights performance in both groups. American exceptionalism thus finds no support in military aid allocations to partners and non-partners.

\textsuperscript{51} As with previous models, the OLS single-stage equation for the level of assistance stage produced similar results in terms of the statistical insignificance of the coefficients. However, in the case of non-partners, the sign on the coefficient turned positive—but again remained insignificant—in one specification of the single-stage model.
### Table 6.2  Human Rights and US Military Aid Allocations to Partners and Non-Partners in the War on Terror

Heckman models of the influence of human rights considerations on the prospects of US decisionmakers allocating military aid (gatekeeping stage) and the amount allocated (level of assistance stage) to partners and non-partners in the war on terror, 2001-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Non-Partners</th>
<th>Level of Assistance Stage (OLS Outcome Models)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeeping Stage (Probit Selection Models)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>-.58***</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>-.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.198)</td>
<td>(.101)</td>
<td>(.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>-.179</td>
<td>-.339***</td>
<td>.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.238)</td>
<td>(.1)</td>
<td>(.342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>.048*</td>
<td>.025*</td>
<td>-.098**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>.862***</td>
<td>---c</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.317)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>-.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.176)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>---b</td>
<td>-7.65***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat neighbor</td>
<td>-.135</td>
<td>-.258</td>
<td>1.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.437)</td>
<td>(.233)</td>
<td>(.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Partner</td>
<td>-.418</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.514*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.182)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>4.41***</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.22)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(5.91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1 **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed).
---a: Omitted Heckman instrumental variable.  ---b: Dropped because no partners engaged in dispute with United States.
---c: Dropped because all allies were partners in the war on terror.


Looking down the list of control variables, American exceptionalism as an explanation of US military aid allocations meets with mixed results. Support arrives only at the gatekeeping stage, where the results indicate US decisionmakers favored poorer non-partners, most of which the data indicates are in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe. Partners and non-partners with higher levels of democracy also had better prospects of securing aid, though the variable’s weak statistical significance (0.1 level) in both models suggests this is best regarded as a tentative finding. In contrast, realist-oriented variables have a stronger showing in the military than economic aid models for partners and non-partner in the war on terror. US allies who were partners were more likely to gain access to military aid than non-allied partners and non-partners with a dispute less likely to gain access. Interestingly, despite the transnational character of international terrorism, partners adjacent to more traditionally defined US-designate threats like rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism garnered more military aid than others. The coefficient indicates partners that also shared a border with one or more threats—such as Turkey (bordering Iran and Syria)—could expect to receive an average $25 million more in predicted military aid annually that other partners. The results also indicate more populous non-partners could expect greater amounts of aid as well, ceteris paribus. Finally, I also find weak statistical support (0.1 level) for the pluralist-business explanation of US military aid allocations, at least in the case of amounts of aid allocated to partners in the war on terror, though the influence of the trade partner variable is less than half that of the threat neighbor variable.
**Conclusion**

In this final empirical chapter I examined economic and military aid allocated under the G.W. Bush administration to partners and non-partners in the war on terror. I found no empirical support for critics’ claims of a human rights double standard between partners and non-partners in the war on terror; human rights considerations failed to influence gatekeeping decisions and were negatively related to levels of assistance decisions for both groups in the economic aid models. As for the military aid models, human rights considerations typically failed to influence decisions; only in the case of gatekeeping decisions for non-partners did the human rights variable carry the positive sign I expected. Taken together, these findings cast considerable doubt on American exceptionalism in the guise of human rights promotion and, by extension, the efficacy of the human rights provision for allocations to non-partners and partners in the war on terror. Any claim of American exceptionalism derived from my models in this chapter thus ride on the performance of the GDP per capita and level of democracy variable.

Having completed the empirical analyses and evaluated the hypotheses for this and the previous two chapters, I now summarize these findings and explore their implications in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

In this final chapter I summarize the empirical findings of this study. The summary begins with a table that provides a hypothesis-by-hypothesis synopsis of the findings from Chapter 4-6. Rather than rehearse these findings again, I focus here on translating them into exploratory answers to the research questions that spurred this study as outlined in Chapter 1. In answering these questions, my goal is to begin to fill in some of the pieces of the research puzzle surrounding the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid during the war on terror that this analysis has uncovered. Having fulfilled my primary goal, I then examine how this study speaks to our secondary goal of evaluating the relative utility of the three main theoretical orientations employed by scholars studying human and US foreign aid. I offer suggestions for future researchers that promise to build on the findings of this study and advance our understanding of US foreign aid decision-making during the war on terror before concluding with some final words on American exceptionalism.

Summary of Findings

Table 7.1 highlights the findings for the economic and military aid decision-making models constructed for this study by hypothesis. Reflecting on the research questions, I may now offer a number of answers based on our acceptance or rejection of various hypotheses. First, the findings allow me to
conclude with a fair degree of confidence that human rights considerations have exhibited a negative relationship with economic aid allocations since the onset of the war on terror. This runs counter to Section 502B requirements and, consequently, my expectations of American exceptionalism in the form of human rights promotion. Interestingly, it also leads me to reject most of the critics’ claims—embodied in the hypotheses—regarding the irrelevancy of human rights considerations in the post-9/11 environment (though obviously not for the reasons I had anticipated). On their face, then, the findings suggest that the G.W. Bush administration’s economic aid allocation decisions were predicated at both stages on the “extraordinary circumstances” of the war on terror. But the negative relationship between human rights and economic aid observed during the war on terror was not a first. I also found this negative relationship between human rights and aid under previous administrations and in previous eras at the gatekeeping and level of assistance stage of the allocation process. The findings indicate the same cannot be said of the G.W. Bush administration’s military aid allocations, however, where human rights failed to influence allocation decisions. But this was no first either. Only at the gatekeeping stage in the Cold War model did the human rights variable exhibit a positive relationship with military aid decisionmaking. I am thus left to conclude that human rights have been for the most part a rhetorical refrain rather than a policy reality of economic and military aid-giving.

If extraordinary circumstances are meant to apply on a case-by-case basis, as a plain-language read of the Foreign Assistance Act suggests, how
might they have become the norm for economic aid allocations under the G.W. Bush administration? The findings of this study highlight one such possibility. Section 502B and other human rights provisions are “shot through” with legally- permissible exceptions, as previously mentioned, one of which is the “needy people” clause. Congress originally included such clauses to pacify Congresspersons who believed that denying impoverished people economic aid because the regime ruling over them engages in human rights abuses made life doubly difficult (Apodaca 2006). Recall, that in reframing the rationale for economic aid, the G.W. Bush administration declared global poverty a “root cause” of terrorism and its alleviation a primary goal of the US economic aid program. And, indeed, I did find that recipient need (GDP per capita) played a significant role in economic aid allocations under his administration. Whether the G.W. Bush administration adopted this tack in a genuine effort to reduce poverty or political maneuver to sidestep Section 502B requirements is an open question I hope will be an ongoing topic of debate for IR and human rights scholars who may read this study. Interestingly, given the poor performance of the human rights and strong performance of the need variable across all administrations, it appears as though this is an open question for previous administrations too. As such, it may be that in its reframing of aid the G.W. Bush administration was updating and articulating for the age of terror a well-worn refrain and emphasis on addressing need in US economic aid allocations. This possibility, along with the fairly consistent performance of the democracy variable, offers a degree of empirical insight into the mostly negative
relationship between human rights and economic aid. Why the negative relationship? In short, it appears as though addressing need and promoting democracy overshadow human rights considerations during the decisionmaking process, which may lead US decisionmakers to allocate aid to regimes with poor human rights records for the sake of advancing these “higher” priorities. On a final point, and for my part, I see little reason why the US economic aid program would be incapable of promoting better human rights practices while reducing global poverty (and for that matter promoting democracy) simultaneously. Packaging these liberal values into a cohesive aid policy rather than continuing to go about their promotion piecemeal seems a viable and, heretofore, unused strategy.

When I examined the war on terror as a new era in US foreign aid allocations, which empirical evidence presented in this study suggests is justified, I found that human rights considerations fared no better or worse than in the post-Cold War era. Human rights have been negatively related to economic aid since the post-Cold War era and failed to influence military aid allocations since then as well. The supposed “peace dividend,” which I and other proponents of American exceptionalism had hoped would boost the influence of human rights considerations in the post-Cold War period, failed to materialize in the US foreign aid allocations process (Vignard 2003:1).
### Table 7.1 Summary of Findings by Hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Economic Aid Allocations</th>
<th>US Military Aid Allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gatekeeping Stage</td>
<td>Level of Assistance Stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations by the G.W. Bush Administration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypotheses 1a-b</strong>: After 9/11, human rights considerations had no significant influence on administration decisions about (a) which countries would be allocated aid and (b) the amount allocated.</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypotheses 2a-b</strong>: The failure of human rights considerations to influence US foreign aid allocations consistent with the human rights provision’s mandate (and my own expectations) under the G.W. Bush administration at the (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage was a historical first.</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypotheses 3a-b</strong>: In contrast to the G.W. Bush administration, as the human rights record of a country improved, the (a) probability of it receiving aid and (b) the amount it could expect to receive increased under previous administrations.</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Allocations in the Era of the War on Terror</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypotheses 4a-b</strong>: In contrast to the war on terror, during the post-Cold War era greater respect for human rights improved the</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) prospects of a country receiving aid and (b) more of it.

**Hypotheses 5a-b**: The war on terror ended positive era in the human rights-foreign aid linkage, one that subsumes the post-Cold War and Cold War, and is evident at the (a) gatekeeping and (b) level of assistance stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Hypotheses 6a-b**: Human rights considerations failed to influence the (a) prospects of a partner receiving aid and (c) the amount they could expect to receive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Hypotheses 7a-b**: In contrast to partners in the war on terror, US decisionmakers held non-partners accountable for their human rights practices such that those failing to respect human rights were (a) less likely to be allocated aid and (b) could expect lesser amounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Moreover, the findings indicate that only during Cold War military aid allocations and at the gatekeeping stage did human rights exert a positive but weakly significant influence on the process. On balance, the models tend to suggest that military aid allocations are dominated by considerations of national security and threat perception with human rights considerations only occasionally influencing the process. It thus seems safe to conclude that the war on terror did not cut short an era of human rights promotion in US foreign aid decisionmaking. On the contrary, the findings indicate that era has yet to begin!

Finally, I found that respect for human rights was negatively related to levels of economic aid for partners and non-partners in the war on terror and likewise for partners in the military aid models. Thus, I found no support for the argument that there was a human rights double standard at work under the G.W. Bush administration; those countries that were “against us” during the war on terror were not held to a higher human rights standard—consistent with the human rights provision. On the contrary, they were seemingly held to the same low standard during the aid allocation process as those that were “with us.”

**Theoretical Implications**

As for the secondary goal of this study, my own rather pragmatic brand of American exceptionalism led me to expect more mixed results on the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid during the war on terror than either the pure variant of American exceptionalism or any of the arguments that spurred this inquiry would admit. My expectations were grounded in the assumption that the US foreign aid decisionmaking process is a microcosm of
the larger US foreign policy decisionmaking process, with all the power struggles, competing claims, inconsistencies, and contradictions that are bound to emerge when major foreign policy players clash (Hinckley 1994; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Apodaca 2006). While the models bore out the utility of this assumption, they proved a disappointment for my expectations of American exceptionalism. I had hoped that my version of American exceptionalism—and, in truth, a purer one—would find support in the empirical models. Recipient need (GDP per capita), level of democracy and, in at least one model, human rights performed as expected, but for the most part the human rights variable fell short of my expectations and—owing to the negative sign it often carried—performed worse than even critics of the war on terror imagined. I thus conclude that American exceptionalism survived the war on terror, but in a diminished version sustained only by the importance to decisionmakers of addressing recipient need and promoting democracy abroad.

**Directions for Future Research**

During the course of this study a number of potentially fruitful research avenues arose that I had to set aside as suggestions for future research. Here, I offer two sets of suggestions. The first focuses on empirical research related to US foreign aid allocations as the war on terror progresses the second on conceptual and methodological issues that future researchers may want to bear in mind in exploring this research puzzle. On the first count, a detailed examination of regional variation and case studies in aid allocation appears in order. No doubt some regions have been important and will continue to grow in
importance as the war on terror progresses. The Middle East is the obvious example. An analysis of US foreign aid allocations to the region, including to partners in the war on terror in each region, seems an appropriate next step in advancing the exploratory findings of this study. Research that promises to provide additional insights into whether the G.W. Bush administration’s aid allocations were the first in an emerging era also seems a worthwhile avenue for further exploration. Throwing open the “black box” of US politics and demonstrating how its contents influence the human rights-US foreign aid linkage is a mostly unexplored research avenue that remains wide open. This study opened that box in the preliminary analysis, and as noted in Chapter 3, constructed models that included variables tapping the annual US budget deficit and years in which the president and congress were of opposite parties, both of which presumably constrain the US foreign aid allocations. However, neither variable produced particularly interesting results and were dropped from the study. Yet it is clear from various presidential budgetary requests and Congressional deliberations examined in preparation for this study that US domestic considerations and party politics play a significant role in foreign aid allocations and the impact of human rights on the decisionmaking process. The significance of these considerations seemingly begs for a two-level linkage model that combines domestic and international variables and explores their interaction and relative influence in the allocation process. Another avenue to consider is alternative conceptualizations of the dependent variable. One could follow in Lebovic’s (1998) footsteps and analyze nontraditional, but
nevertheless theoretically and methodologically defensible, groupings of aid programs. The G.W. Bush administration’s Foreign Assistance Framework seems a reasonable starting point. Under this framework, the administration conceptualized foreign aid as promoting five primary objectives: encouraging recipient countries to govern justly and democratically; to invest in people; to promote economic growth; to improve living conditions for those in need; and to ensure peace and security.\footnote{The Framework is available online at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/88433.pdf. The primacy of counterterrorism for peace and security is illustrated online at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/115258.pdf.} The Framework documents indicate that the Bush administration grouped aid programs aimed at advancing the war on terror—both economic and military aid programs—almost exclusively in the peace and security category. Thus, an analysis of the relationship between human rights and “peace and security” aid could further inform our understanding of aid allocations during the war on terror and reenergize the analysis of programmatic aid.

On the second set of more process-oriented suggestions, I offer a cautionary tale to future researchers. During the preliminary analysis phase of this study, it became clear that much—frankly, too much—of model output on the relationship between human rights and US foreign aid depends on the sample of countries and years one chooses to collect data on and analyze. The robustness checks I performed in Chapter 3 highlight this point, as did preliminary analysis on various regional subsets. On that note, the human rights variable in some preliminary (mostly regional) models “flipped” signs as I moved specific countries and groups of countries in select organizations—such
as the OECD and NATO—in and out of the sample. The variable also changed statistical significance in some instances. These finding held even after I logged the second-stage dependent variables in preparation for use in my final models, which is widely assumed to smooth the extremes in foreign aid allocations and thereby reduce the influence of outliers. This suggests future researchers—when in doubt—should opt as I did to employ a “global” sample of countries, since all (even wealthy democracies) are regarded as potential aid recipients, according to USAID, and identified as such in the *Greenbook*. In any event, these same researchers would be well advised to carefully consider their samples, have a theoretical basis for the retention or removal of any cases, and proceed with caution—shying away from broad generalizations or speculation—when discussing their findings. Finally, it is worth noting that this study followed others in demonstrating the general theoretical and methodological utility and durability of Cingranelli and Pasquarello’s (1985) two-stage decisionmaking model of the US foreign aid decisionmaking process.

**Final Words**

Having offered some suggestions for future research, I opt to revisit American exceptionalism and conclude on a theoretical note. Many deride American exceptionalism as a myth. In their view, its proponents—particularly those who adhere to a belief that the United States is a “shining city upon a hill”—are at best naïve and at worst delusional (Reagan 1989). In one sense, the findings of this study supply critics of this purist variant of American
exceptionalism with ample empirical ammunition. Human rights considerations typically failed or had the opposite effect on aid allocations as American exceptionalism predicted. Truth be told, these findings have left me to contemplate whether those of the study I coauthored in 1994—which demonstrated a positive relationship between human rights and US foreign aid and informs my pragmatic American exceptionalism—were sample-bound. Yet the findings of this study also indicate that human rights considerations exerted a positive influence on gatekeeping decisions during Cold War military aid allocations. For students of US foreign aid such paradoxes—the significance and positive influence of human rights in one instance and the opposite elsewhere—are hallmarks of the allocation process. As Apodaca (2006) puts it, the “evolution of the United States’ human rights policy can best be understood as a succession of paradoxes and not as a simple linear advancement” (191). If American exceptionalism and the human rights provision are to serve as guiding principles for the US foreign aid program moving forward, and we are to resolve such paradoxes, I return to the begin of this study—to the moral entrepreneurs who have been and can continue to be agents for positive change. America’s exceptionalism lies not in the human rights provision, per se, but in the willingness of ordinary Americans to demand that our elected representatives embrace this exceptionalism and consistently hold recipients of US foreign aid accountable for their human rights record.
## Appendices

### Appendix 3.1: Partners in the War on Terror, 2001-2008


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Appendix 3.2: Communist Countries, Rogue Regimes, and State Sponsors of Terrorism

Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
Members: Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany (east), Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Vietnam. Observers: Afghanistan, China, Ethiopia, Laos, Nicaragua, North Korea, Vietnam, Yemen (south), Yugoslavia.

Rogue Regimes

State Sponsors of Terrorism
Appendix 3.3: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables

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