

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: EVALUATING SOCIAL EXCLUSION: THE
INTERACTION BETWEEN GROUP GOALS AND
TARGET CHARACTERISTICS

Cameron Bruce Richardson, Doctor of Philosophy, 2011

Dissertation directed by: Professor Melanie Killen
Department of Human Development

Past work has revealed that adolescents utilize a variety of justifications to support exclusion and inclusion judgments. Group functioning justifications (e.g., "She will ruin the group/make the group work well") are one frequently cited class of considerations. This type of justification is suggestive of an attempt by the adolescent to coordinate group concerns with what the target will likely bring to the group. The above account of group functioning considerations, however, has yet to be formally tested. In this report, both target characteristics (e.g., aggression, shyness, gender) as well as group goals (competitive, noncompetitive) are manipulated in a soccer context to assess the extent to which exclusion judgments rely on the perception of target-group fit. We demonstrate evidence consistent with a target-group fit account of exclusion judgments. Implications and future directions are considered.

EVALUATING SOCIAL EXCLUSION: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GROUP
GOALS AND TARGET CHARACTERISTICS

by

Cameron Bruce Richardson

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2011

Advisory Committee:

Professor Melanie Killen, Chair
Professor Dennis Kivlighan
Dr. Yoonjung Park
Professor Ken Rubin
Professor Allan Wigfield

©Copyright by
Cameron Bruce Richardson
2011

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to those of you who have pushed me to do and be better. I hope that my contributions to psychological science will reflect in part the light that you have shined on me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would be incomplete without acknowledging the many people who have assisted me throughout the process. Thanks to my dissertation chair, Dr. Melanie Killen for your continued mentorship throughout not only the dissertation process, but throughout my graduate career. As I move forward in my career, I can only hope that I will be able to provide the level of support to my students that you have provided to me.

My thanks also to my dissertation committee: Dr. Allan Wigfield, Dr. Ken Rubin, Dr. Amanda Woodward, Dr. Yoonjung Park, and most recently Dr. Dennis Kivlighan who have supported this project with thoughtfulness. I appreciate your willingness to help me strengthen the quality of my project, from conceptualization, to methods, to results.

Thanks to the many peers with whom I have had engaging conversations that have strengthened and broadened my thinking about psychological science. Thanks also to the College of Education and the Department of Human Development who have provided assistance throughout the process. The dissertation was funded, in part by a Support Program for Advancing Research and Collaboration (SPARC) Graduate Research Grant from the College of Education.

Thanks to my family and wife who have provided me with much needed diversion and love. Thanks finally to my research assistants Jayme Proctorstein, Caprice Retterer, Megan Runion, and Lauren Rudin. Without your assistance, the dissertation process from start to finish would have been much less interesting, and much more difficult to manage.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	vi
List of Figures	vii
CHAPTER I	1
Theoretical Rationale.....	1
Study Rationale	3
Considerations within Exclusion Scenarios.....	8
Study Design and Hypotheses.....	12
Expected Contribution to the Field.....	25
CHAPTER II.....	26
Background Literature.....	26
Social Domain theory	27
Use of Information in Judgments	34
Evaluations of Harm and Others' Welfare.....	34
Behavioral Manifestations of Harm	40
Intentionality and Harm.....	41
Adolescent Social Cognition, Peer Relations, and Norms.....	47
Multifaceted Situations: Evaluations of Exclusion	50
Group Membership Characteristics.....	52
Information Beyond Group Membership	58
Summary	64
Future Directions.....	65
CHAPTER III	79
Methodology	79
Participants.....	79
Design	80
Measures	80
Procedure	85
Justification Coding Responses.....	86
Reliability.....	87
Plan for Analysis	87
Exclusion Scenario	88
CHAPTER IV	90
Result	90
Plan for Analysis	90
Data Entry, Cleaning, and Examination of Outliers.....	90
Judgments of Social Exclusion.....	91
Participant Variables (Demographic)	91
Participant Variables (Predictor).....	97

CHAPTER V.....	109
Discussion	109
Participant personality traits.....	118
Limitations and Future Directions.....	121
APPENDICES	156
Appendix A: IRB Approval.....	156
Appendix B: Assent Form	157
Appendix C: Noncompetitive Version	160
Appendix D: Competitive Version.....	174
Appendix E: Pilot Study	188
REFERENCES.....	190

List of Tables

Table 1: Overview of Survey: Exclusion Scenario	127
Table 2: Overview of Survey: Dependent Measures.....	128
Table 3: Overview of Survey: Justifications.....	129
Table 4: Summary of Hypotheses & Analysis Plan, Organized by Question Order...	132
Table 5: Hypercompetitiveness Attitude (HCA) Scale Component Matrix	136
Table 6: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments, by Target Characteristic and Acceptability Judgment (Proportions)	137
Table 7: Mean Table for the 2 (Sex: Male, Female) X 2 (Grade: 7 th , 11 th) X 2 (Nationality: Majority, Minority) X 2 (Context: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Target Characteristic: Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) ANOVA.....	138
Table 8: Participant breakdown.....	151

List of Figures

Figure 1: Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic and Group Goal	152
Figure 2: Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic and Group Goal	153
Figure 3: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments (Okay to Exclude) ..	154
Figure 4: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic (Not Okay to Exclude).....	155

CHAPTER I

Theoretical Rationale

Peer relationships have been shown to be important for adolescent's healthy development (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). With a lack of quality peer relationships, and particularly in situations in which individuals are rejected from social groups, children experience a wide range of negative consequences such as antisocial behavior and depression (Rubin et al., 2006). One line of research, conducted from a Social Domain theory perspective (Smetana, 2006), has been designed to examine how children reason about social exclusion. This approach has investigated children and adolescents' evaluations of the acceptability of different kinds of social exclusion from groups based on a range of factors, including group membership, such as gender, race, and culture, and personality traits, such as aggression and shyness (Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007).

This research program complements behavioral research conducted on the phenomenon of social exclusion, which focuses on the types of target characteristics that children use to include or exclude others in peer interaction situations (see Rubin et al., 2006 for a review). Specifically, the ability to systematically manipulate variables within hypothetical vignettes that have been found to be important in behavioral work gives researchers the chance to probe more deeply into the nature of a participants' reasoning about those variables (see Killen, Richardson, & Kelly, 2010, for a review). Further, this orientation to social exclusion serves to advance developmental theory regarding child and adolescent perspective taking and moral development by shedding light on the origins and development of morality. This line of research has examined the underlying

social-conventional, moral, and psychological bases by which children exclude some peers and include others.

Studies on how children and adolescents evaluate exclusion from groups have shown that children and adolescents show concern for the targets of exclusion (Horn, 2003), for the group who excludes (Theimer, Killen & Stangor, 2001), and for personal choice considerations (Park & Killen, 2010). A main finding has been that concerns with group functioning increase with age, and that these concerns are often driven by stereotypic expectations (Killen & Stangor, 2001). An example of a concern for group functioning is as follows: “Admit the one who is more qualified because then the club will know more and work much better as a group together” (Killen & Stangor, 2001, p. 179), and one focusing on stereotypic expectations would be: “It’s okay to pick the girl for ballet because boys aren’t good at ballet” (p.183). In this second instance, it is clear that stereotypes drive the assessment of who will most likely help the group function, which in turn drives the choice of whom to exclude.

Complementing this line of research have been studies conducted on group dynamics and intergroup attitudes (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009). This line of research has focused on evaluations of exclusion through an examination of how it is that children evaluate deviance from group norms. This line of research has been conducted from a Social Identity theory perspective, which focuses on the importance of group identity in the maintenance of self-esteem (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). As an example, this research has shown that deviating from one’s group norms (i.e., cheering for another nation’s soccer team) is evaluated harshly through exclusion of the deviant member. Recently, these two lines of

work have been integrated to more fully explore the nature of group functioning considerations in exclusion (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010).

Study Rationale

In past research, information about a target (e.g., nationality, aggression, loyalty to group) and the group to which the target desires entry (e.g., activity, norms) was provided. With this information, participants were asked to decide whether exclusion of a particular target was acceptable or unacceptable.

As mentioned above, by manipulating information about a target, research on social exclusion has revealed that group functioning considerations become increasingly salient across adolescence. Specifically, as concerns with group functioning increase in salience, it becomes more acceptable to exclude based on certain target characteristics that are perceived to be detrimental to efficient group functioning. While research has manipulated the information presented about the target (gender, ethnicity, nationality, aggression, shyness, prior experience, talent, merit, reputation), and even the group's goals (to win a race, to not draw attention to the group, to finish school projects) no research to date has systematically varied the group goal along with target characteristics for comparative evaluation. Rather, past work typically varies target characteristics while holding constant the group to which the target desires entry (for a review of the different contexts and characteristics used, see Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010; Killen et al., 2007).

This past work has demonstrated that exclusion based on group membership characteristics (e.g., gender, nationality, and ethnicity) is evaluated more negatively than exclusion based on information about personality or loyalty (e.g., aggression, cheering

for another team) (Park & Killen, 2010; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). What remains unclear is whether these judgments are relative to or generalizable across different group goals (e.g., competitive, noncompetitive). The extent to which judgments about exclusion shift with shifts in group goals allows for a metric of how information about target characteristics is used. If, for example exclusion based on a target's aggression as opposed to a target's shyness is seen as acceptable across a variety of group goals, then there is evidence that aggression is seen as a more generally disruptive personality trait than shyness.

Past studies have noted greater group functioning concerns cited in support of excluding disloyal and aggressive targets than targets described by their gender, nationality, or ethnicity. Given this, it was reasoned that adolescents would take into consideration the group's goals when determining the acceptability of excluding different targets. Further, it was expected that the acceptability of excluding any one target would depend on the extent to which an adolescent could judge target-group fit. That is, if the target was perceived to fit well with the group, (ex: a good soccer player trying to join a competitive soccer team) then exclusion would be seen as unacceptable. In contrast, if the target were seen to fit poorly with the group, (ex: a bad soccer player trying to join a competitive soccer team) then exclusion would be deemed acceptable. Finally, if target-group fit was difficult to determine, (ex: someone with long hair trying to join a competitive soccer team) then exclusion would be seen as unacceptable. Because past work has yet to systematically manipulate both group goals and target characteristics, the interactive effect of group goals and target characteristics on exclusion judgments has yet to be addressed.

Participants were asked to evaluate the acceptability of excluding different targets in either a competitive or noncompetitive soccer club context. Further, a novel aspect of this study was to examine how stereotypes about others bear on exclusion decisions in competitive and noncompetitive contexts. That is, how does the group goal of competition elicit (or inhibit) the use of stereotypes to make decisions about exclusion? These were the overarching questions addressed in this study.

Two main reasons were forwarded as justification for the importance of studying how group goals affect exclusion judgments. Theoretically, a full analysis of group functioning considerations in social exclusion requires an assessment of the extent to which group goals interact with target characteristics to affect exclusion judgments. Additionally, from a social cognitive perspective, there may be important distinctions between being able to judge a group's goal states, judging the likelihood that a target will negatively impact the group's ability to achieve a goal state, and the judgment that is thought to result from these two considerations.

Based on the extensive literature on theory of mind and perspective taking (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2009; Banerjee, 2000), it is expected that knowledge about the group's goals will aid participants in judging whether a certain target will help the group to function. To the extent that the target is deemed to be a liability to the group's functioning, it is expected that exclusion will be evaluated positively. It may be however, that despite our ability to judge when targets do not fit with group goals, the moral concern for the target outweighs the group's concern for efficient functioning. If this is the case, exclusion evaluations will not be expected to vary

depending on the target-group fit, but will rather be evaluated negatively regardless of how well the target fits with the group.

In this study, and considering the argument that target characteristics are evaluated in light of group goals, different target characteristics, such as shyness, aggression, nationality, and gender, were predicted to be differentially salient to an exclusion decision depending on the group's goals (e.g., competitive or non-competitive). More specifically, if a *competitive* soccer club is deciding whether to include different targets, they may prefer information about one's soccer ability, as those with ability will more likely help the group to win competitions. In contrast, a *noncompetitive* soccer club that wants to play soccer for fun may want to know whether targets are enjoyable to be around before deciding whether to include them, as enjoyment of one's time will be easier when enjoyable people are included. The overarching expectation of the study was that group goals provide a means by which individuals evaluate whether a target is likely to affect the group's functioning. Said another way, it was expected that exclusion of a target would be seen as acceptable to the extent that the target is considered a barrier to group functioning.

While competition exists in a range of social contexts (e.g., academics, sports, music, art), the focus in this study was on competition in the context of sports given that past studies on exclusion have oftentimes included sports as the focus of the group (see Abrams & Rutland, 2008). The contrast between explicitly competitive and noncompetitive group goals was thought to allow a detailed assessment of how it is that adolescents integrate considerations of group goals and target characteristics when making exclusion judgments.

Secondly, no studies have systematically evaluated competitive contexts in which a target is put in a position to either help or hurt a group directly as a result of his or her skill at the activity in question. This focus on group goals, and competitive contexts in particular, was thought to help further clarify how it is that stereotypic conceptions of groups affect exclusion judgments. Specifically, and due to the salience of the goal of winning in competitive contexts, it may be that individuals reject exclusion based on gender or nationality in favor of exclusion based on whether or not the target is good at soccer. Similarly, in noncompetitive contexts, information about a target's personality (e.g., "is she aggressive or shy?") might be important when evaluating the acceptability of exclusion. To the extent that stereotypes influence exclusion judgments, it is expected that different stereotypes will be salient depending on the context (i.e., stereotypes about ability for competitive contexts, and stereotypes about personality for noncompetitive contexts). Beyond theoretical considerations then, a second goal of this study was to evaluate the extent to which individuals make use of *stereotypes* to justify exclusion based on a group's goals.

Indeed, Social Domain theory research on children and adolescents' evaluations of social situations has shown that children and adolescents possess the capacity for careful reflection on complex issues (Park & Killen, 2010; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). Documenting adolescents' capacity to flexibly assess group goals when considering the acceptability of exclusion situations is yet another means by which researchers can evaluate the extent to which adolescence is a time of deliberate reflection.

Considerations within Exclusion Scenarios

Adolescents make use of peer crowd affiliation (e.g., Jocks, Preppies) when making judgments about social situations (Brown, Mory, & Kinney, 1994; Horn, 2003; Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999). One argument is that the use of information about group membership serves to reduce the cognitive load associated with trying to make sense of the social world (Bigler & Liben, 2006). For some, knowing an individual's gender or nationality activates stereotypes, (Baron & Banaji, 2006) which can bias one's recall of stereotype-confirmatory or disconfirmatory evidence about group members (Bigler & Liben, 1993).

While stereotypic associations can serve to simplify and bias our recall of information, these associations are often misrepresentations that do not fully capture the variation within the groups by which individuals are categorized. Further, the above-mentioned research does not reveal whether the activation of stereotypic associations will reduce the motivation to search for information about individual group members. One expectation is that, when given direct information about a target, (e.g., personality, interests) individuals will use that information over any stereotypic notions that are active. In support of this contention, McGlothlin and Killen (2006) found that children rated dyads that shared activity interests as more similar than dyads who only shared racial characteristics.

Given the above finding, predictions can be made regarding what information will be most salient in social situations. When asked whether race or gender-based social exclusion is considered acceptable, one might expect some individuals to utilize stereotypes to make a judgment about exclusion acceptability. In a soccer context, individuals may activate the stereotype that females are not as good as, or not as

competitive as males in athletic contexts, while they may activate the stereotype that Brazilians are better at, or more competitive than Americans in soccer contexts.

These expectations have some indirect support from the literature. For instance, Horn, Killen, and Stangor (1999) have shown that stereotypes are utilized narrowly when deciding whether a group should receive punishment for a transgression in which no proof of guilt exists. In these types of situations, some individuals will utilize stereotypes as a means of filling in where proof is missing. In this study in particular, when a transgression was consistent with a stereotype about a group, (e.g., techies likely damaged the computer systems) adolescents viewed it as more acceptable to blame that group. This finding extends to situations in which prior history of transgression serves as the only piece of information to which an individual is privy when trying to judge whether a target had committed a transgression (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010). Results revealed that adolescents were more accepting of accusations when the suspect had than did not have a prior history of transgression. In both cases, without proof, other information was utilized to make sense of the ambiguous situation.

Given the above, it could be expected that some individuals will make use of information about a target's gender and ethnicity given no other information. In terms of exclusion expectations based on stereotypic conceptions of targets, it would be expected that individuals would be more accepting of excluding a female than a Brazilian from a soccer club. It might however, be the case that individuals will reject exclusion until they are presented with more pertinent information about the targets. This result would suggest that stereotypic conceptions are not strong enough to sway one's exclusion

considerations. From this standpoint, one would expect that neither ethnic or gender exclusion would be considered acceptable.

Social exclusion is often ambiguous, given that we often need to consider many variables when deciding whether someone should be included or excluded. Recently, Park and Killen (2010) have shown, in a context in which a target desires entry into a group of peers completing their school projects, that exclusion of an aggressive target is much more readily accepted than exclusion of a target based on her gender, nationality, or level of shyness. This evidence seems to provide support for the notion that stereotypes are not salient enough to justify social exclusion. Whereas information about one's aggression and shyness provides direct information about behavioral propensities, information about gender and nationality do not provide such direct evidence. Justifications for judgments provided further support for the contention that group membership information does not provide direct evidence of behavioral propensities. Specifically, group functioning concerns were cited more often for personality-based than for group membership-based exclusion.

Toward the end of evaluating the above expectations, two characteristics (i.e., lack of soccer ability and long hair) were included to anchor the judgments made for the above-mentioned characteristics. Specifically, a target that lacks soccer ability was expected to evoke group functioning concerns in a competitive context but not in a noncompetitive context, while the target described as having long hair was not expected to evoke group functioning concerns in either goal condition, given the lack of relevant stereotypes for either a competitive or noncompetitive context. In this way, these two

anchor characteristics serve to provide a test of the “relevant information” account of information use in social exclusion scenarios.

As mentioned above, another goal of the present study was to extend this past study through the assessment of these same target characteristics across competitive and noncompetitive contexts, with the expectation that, to the extent that participants reveal stereotypic expectations about females (not as athletic as males) and Brazilians (more athletic than Americans), they will accept and reject exclusion from competitive soccer groups, respectively. In contrast, it was expected that exclusion of shy and aggressive targets would be evaluated contextually, with positive evaluations of exclusion in noncompetitive contexts and negative evaluations in competitive contexts, given that dispositional characteristics were expected to be more salient to a group trying to have fun than a group trying to win.

Finally, follow-up questions were asked that pitted the original characteristics (aggression, shyness, hair length, gender, and nationality) against further individuating information. Specifically, participants were asked to judge whether it would be more, less, or similarly acceptable to exclude the above targets if it was found out that they were: 1) better than others on the team; and, 2) worse than others on the team. Again, in terms of the relevance of information account of decision making, it was thought that this information would trump the original descriptions. This was expected given that the original descriptions were thought to be more loosely associated with group functioning considerations than information about the target’s ability.

Study Design and Hypotheses

While the concern with group functioning increases throughout adolescence (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001), the willingness to accept exclusion based on stereotypic conceptions of groups decreases (Horn, 2003). It is for this reason that 14 (7th grade), and 17-year-old (11th grade) participants were included in this study. Participants were first presented with a prompt specifying the group's goals (to win or to have fun while playing soccer).

They were then asked to evaluate the acceptability of excluding 6 different targets that vary on the characteristic described: *GROUP MEMBERSHIP*: 1) gender, 2) ethnicity; *PERSONALITY*: 3) aggression, 4) shyness; *PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS*: 5) hair length; and, 6) lack of soccer ability. The exclusion context (i.e., competitive or noncompetitive) was a between subjects factor, in that each participant only evaluated one context.

While it may be argued that competitive co-ed soccer groups are infrequent at this age, we wrote the prompt in the following way to eliminate this concern:

“A group of kids decide to form a competitive soccer club. There are many other soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to have the best shot at winning the local tournament's first prize trophy. They come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to exclude based on each rule.”

It was argued that including the phrase: “There are many other soccer clubs in their area” would serve to make more salient the group's goal of winning, as well as to suggest that there exist other outlets for those who are excluded from this group in particular. This we argued would put the focus on the group, rather than an institutional

convention that males and females cannot play together. As a result, it was argued that this prompt would serve to equate all forms of exclusion in the competitive context. While there was not the same concern in the noncompetitive context, this scenario was nonetheless written in a similar manner:

“A group of kids decide to form a noncompetitive soccer club. There are many other soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to be able to have the most amount of fun playing together. They come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to exclude based on each rule.”

Beyond evaluating the six exclusion scenarios in isolation, participants were asked to consider further individuating information about the targets. Specifically, participants were asked to consider the acceptability of excluding the same target if that target were discovered to be: 1) better than most in the club, and 2) worse than everyone in the club. This manipulation was argued to provide an opportunity to assess the relative weight adolescents give to different types of information about a target when considering exclusion situations in both competitive and noncompetitive contexts.

Participant Variables. Beyond design variables, four main participant variables were assessed that were thought to relate to exclusion judgments: 1) hypercompetitiveness (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990); 2) affirmation of stereotypes (i.e., how good, and how competitive, are certain groups in a soccer context); 3) experience with competition and exclusion; and 4) belief in the changeability of traits (Levy & Dweck, 1999).

Hypercompetitiveness. Participants were asked to describe themselves in terms of the extent to which they saw both competitive and noncompetitive contexts through a competitive lens (see Appendix D for the instrument).

Affirmation of Stereotypes. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they saw the following “groups” (girls, boys, Brazilians, and Americans, those who are aggressive, and those who are shy) as, 1) competitive; and, 2) good at soccer.

Experience with competitive sports and exclusion. Items were developed that asked participants to judge how often they have been involved in competitive contexts, how often they have been excluded, and how often they have excluded others from group activities more generally.

Changeability of personality. Two items taken from Levy and Dweck (1999) were used to assess the extent to which participants believe personality to be changeable.

Group Functioning Considerations, Group Membership, and Stereotypes. It was expected that not only would excluding based on hair length be seen as unacceptable in the competitive context, but that it would be seen as unacceptable in the noncompetitive context as well. The basis for these predictions was again the presumption that hair length would not carry with it any stereotypic associations about either ability (salient in the competitive context) or personality (salient in the noncompetitive context).

In contrast, it was expected that gender and nationality (Brazilians) would be associated with stereotypes about ability, and potentially competitive drive, such that in the competitive context, exclusion based on gender would be seen as acceptable and exclusion based on nationality would be seen as unacceptable. Again, it was argued that

stereotypic conceptions of groups' abilities (e.g., females are not as good as males at soccer; Brazilians are better at soccer than Americans) may be more readily called upon in a competitive context, as the group desire to win a competition necessitates the inclusion of group members who are good at the activity in question. As mentioned above however, this expectation was tempered given that, because the stakes are high in the competitive context, individuals may want more information before excluding based on a stereotypic conception of ability, and thus reject exclusion based on stereotypes about a group's soccer ability. In contrast, it was argued that stereotypic conceptions of groups' likeability or personality may be more readily called upon in noncompetitive contexts, as the group goal is to enjoy the activity. Finally, and as with the above expectation, we were aware of the possibility that, similar to the competitive context, participants may want more information about a target beyond group membership before making an exclusion decision, and thus would reject exclusion based on stereotypes about a group's likeability.

Gender exclusion is often viewed as more acceptable than racial/ethnic exclusion in the context of exclusion from a friendship dyad, and a music club (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002). Thus, for the non-competitive context in this study, it was expected that exclusion based on gender would be seen as more acceptable than exclusion based on nationality.

When adolescents are presented with both the target's group membership characteristics and their ability, it is predicted that ability will trump group membership as a means of deciding whether exclusion will be considered acceptable only in the competitive context, as it is expected that ability information will be the most salient

information one could desire about a target in the competitive context. It is acknowledged however that participants might believe that groups can have more fun in a noncompetitive soccer context when good players are included, and therefore a target's lack of ability may increase the acceptability of exclusion in the noncompetitive context as well.

Group Functioning Considerations and Ability. As Horn (2003) has shown in adolescents' considerations of whether to exclude a target from student council described as belonging to the 'dirty' social crowd (i.e., group members often wear old/dirty clothing, are uninvolved in school, and participate in delinquent activities), information about a target becomes more salient to an exclusion situation as that information becomes more relevant to considerations of group goals. In addition to providing the target's crowd membership, Horn manipulated the target's involvement in school activities as well as his reputation with his teachers and peers. The question addressed was whether information about one's crowd membership alone (the ambiguous condition) would be used differently than information about one's reputation and past behaviors, either positive or negative (unambiguous conditions). Results revealed that participants were more willing to accept exclusion of the target from the student council given negative manipulations (the target is not active in school, and is negatively perceived by teachers) than either positive manipulations (the target is active in school, and positively perceived by teachers) or no information beyond group membership (the target belongs to the 'dirty' crowd). Because her study focused solely on manipulation of target characteristics, she was not able to assess the extent to which information about the target is used contextually based on a group's goals. This study sought to extend her work by

manipulating both target information as well as information about group goals. In the context of this study then, it was expected that exclusion based on soccer ability would be seen as acceptable only in the competitive context, as ability will be seen as highly relevant when the group goal is to win a soccer tournament.

Group Functioning and Aggression. It was further expected that while exclusion based on aggression will be seen as acceptable across both contexts, it would be seen as more acceptable in the noncompetitive context than in the competitive context. Using a non-competitive context in which a group is preparing projects for school, Park & Killen (2010) have shown that it is more acceptable to exclude based on a target's aggressiveness than on a target's shyness or group membership characteristics (gender or nationality). Researchers have often noted the social salience of externalizing symptoms in the peer group, as assessed, for instance, through negative correlations between sociometric popularity and aggressive behavior (Hymel, Rubin, Rowden, & LeMare, 1990). Converging on sociometric ratings, Park and Killen (2010) have shown that participants are aware of the aggressive child's potential for violence against the group who decides to include, and that this concern helps them justify their judgments of the acceptability of exclusion. In essence, one group goal is to avoid being hurt in the process of completing the group project, a goal that they may have judged to be more difficult to achieve with an aggressive target in the group. From this perspective then, it was expected that excluding an aggressive peer would be seen as acceptable across both competitive and noncompetitive contexts (note the conflict between this expectation and the expectation derived from a stereotypic conception that aggressive targets may be good for a competitive context).

When considering whether it is acceptable to exclude an aggressive target from a competitive context who is also better than most of the players on the team, it was expected that exclusion would be evaluated less positively than when exclusion was based solely on aggression, because the group functioning considerations become more complex (he may get us kicked out of tournaments because he is fighting, but he may help us win).

Group Functioning and Shyness. In contrast, shyness involves internalizing difficulties (Findlay, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009) and does not bring with it the same concerns for personal safety from the group's perspective as does an externalizing target. Indeed, reasoning about safety does not show up in one's justifications for exclusion when asked about excluding a shy target (Park & Killen, 2010). It is because shy individuals are not perceived to pose a threat to group functioning that exclusion based on shyness was expected to be seen as unacceptable across both competitive and noncompetitive contexts. While this prediction was made, it was also acknowledged that shy individuals may be seen as having the potential to negatively affect group functioning, especially in the noncompetitive context due to their social reticence, which in noncompetitive contexts could affect the group's ability to have fun.

Again, as with group membership information (gender & nationality) and information about aggression, ability information was expected to trump information about one's shyness in the competitive context.

Age of Participant. The decision to sample 14 (7th grade) and 17 year olds (11th grade) was based on the attempt to extend the age range of inquiry. Specifically, Killen and Stangor (2001) have shown increases in group functioning considerations across 1st,

4th, and 7th grade participants, and this study served to assess whether 11th graders make even greater use of group functioning considerations beyond that which 7th graders utilize. Horn (2003) has shown that younger adolescents exhibit a greater propensity to accept exclusion based on stereotypic conceptions of groups. Based on this finding, and given older adolescents' greater experience with groups, it was expected that in the competitive context, 14 year olds (7th grade) would be more accepting of exclusion based on gender and nationality (i.e., excluding a Brazilian and a female) than would 17 year olds (11th grade).

Age differences were expected to disappear however when information about ability was provided in the competitive context. That is, it was expected that information about ability would be salient enough to eliminate any age differences in perception of the competitive context.

Gender of Participant. As has been reported across many studies, females are less accepting of exclusion than their male counterparts (e.g., Horn, 2003). Given past findings, it was expected that females would be less accepting of exclusion overall than males, and in particular they would be less accepting of gender based exclusion than males, given that this type of exclusion makes salient the fact that they are also potential targets as a result of their gender. While this served as the overriding expectation for the present study, as with age expectations, it was expected that gender differences would disappear when information about a target's ability was presented. It was further predicted that any difference in acceptability judgments by gender in the competitive context would be explained by gender differences in hypercompetitiveness.

Nationality. Past studies on judgments about social exclusion utilizing Social Domain Theoretical expectations have included studies with a range of ethnic backgrounds (most ethnic majority, mostly minority, and evenly divided samples) with few differences reported for the participants' ethnicity except for studies in which racial and ethnic exclusion is the explicit focus (in which cases the findings have shown minor but significant differences in terms of how wrong it is with all samples viewing it as wrong). Given past findings, it was expected that ethnic minorities in the sample would be less inclined to accept nationality-based exclusion than would ethnic majority individuals.

Hypercompetitiveness. As one main goal of this study was to assess the extent to which individuals think differently about competitive and noncompetitive group goals, this participant variable was expected to relate to that goal. In particular, it was expected that those who are hypercompetitive would be more likely to see exclusion based on ability as acceptable across both competitive and noncompetitive contexts. In contrast, those individuals who are not hypercompetitive were expected to view exclusion based on ability as acceptable only in the competitive context. Again, the more general expectation was that characteristics that are perceived to deter groups from achieving their goals would be seen as a legitimate basis by which to justify exclusion. With a hypercompetitive individual, it was thought that the perception of the noncompetitive group goal of having fun might incorporate being good at soccer (i.e., hypercompetitive individuals would more likely perceive bad soccer players as deterring the group from having fun).

Affirmation of Stereotypes. Before specifying expectations about the role that stereotyping plays in one's judgments, it is worthwhile to explain the multiple ways in which we coded for stereotype use. First, we assessed participants on how likely they were to make use of a stereotype about competitiveness and ability through explicit questioning about how competitive and good they thought different groups were (i.e., how competitive are Americans?). Secondly, and because stereotypes have been defined as an overextension of a trait to a group without regard to intragroup variability, we coded spontaneous justifications that extended a characteristic beyond the main descriptor as a stereotype. For instance, the following type of comment was sought when coding for justifications that relied on a stereotype in the gender or nationality context: "It's okay to exclude because females are bad at sports"; "It's okay to exclude Brazilians because they are aggressive". Similar comments that extended the described characteristic were sought for the other four characteristics: "shy people don't play hard"; "people who get into fights are good at soccer"; "People with long hair aren't nice". The key difference between gender, nationality and hair length, and the other three characteristics, is that the first three characteristics do not explicitly specify a behavioral propensity. It remained an open question whether participants would utilize stereotypes more or less frequently based on this distinction between characteristics that did or did not specify a behavioral propensity.

It was expected that participants who stereotype a group as good or bad at soccer would be more likely to accept exclusion of a member of that group in the competitive context, as ability in a domain was expected to be most salient when considering competitive group goals. In contrast, it was expected that stereotypes about the

competitiveness of the groups would relate to the acceptability of exclusion in the noncompetitive context, as competitiveness was expected to be antithetical to noncompetitive group goals.

Just as an individual might stereotype a certain nationality or gender as competitive or as good at soccer, so too could an individual stereotype those that are labeled as aggressive or shy. Just as with gender and nationality then, stereotypes about ability or competitiveness that are linked to aggression or shyness were expected to similarly affect exclusion judgments.

Interaction between Hypercompetitiveness and Affirmation of Stereotypes. It was expected that those hypercompetitive individuals who stereotype groups based on ability would accept exclusion of a member of the negatively stereotyped group across competitive and noncompetitive contexts. For instance, if a hypercompetitive individual believes that females are not good at soccer, then that individual is expected to accept exclusion of females across both contexts. It was further expected that any stereotypes about ability that a non-hypercompetitive individual attributes to groups would only be utilized as justification for exclusion in the competitive context. As above, if a non-hypercompetitive participant holds a stereotype about competitiveness, they were expected to accept exclusion of that target in the noncompetitive context.

Experience with competition and exclusion. The amount of experience one has with competitive contexts was believed to relate to the extent to which ability information was deemed a valid means by which to include in competitive contexts. The basis for this expectation was a perspective taking account of exclusion considerations. Specifically, those without experience in competitive contexts may find the target's feelings more

salient than the group's goals when deciding whether exclusion was acceptable. In contrast, those with experience in competitive contexts may find the group's goals most salient. A number of items were developed that asked participants to judge how often they have been involved in competitive contexts.

Experience with exclusion, both as an excluder and as someone who has been excluded was thought to relate to the acceptability of exclusion. Specifically, it was predicted that those who have experience excluding others would, similar to those who have been involved in competitive contexts, show more concern for the group's goals than for the target's feelings. In contrast, it was predicted that those who have been excluded would have a heightened sensitivity to the perspective of the target.

Changeability of personality. Perhaps the most important consideration is whether exclusion judgments based on a target's ability, and more specifically a target's behavior, relate to group functioning concerns only if the traits are perceived to be unchangeable. Past behavior has been shown to be salient in ambiguous contexts in which individuals evaluate the acceptability of accusations of wrongdoing (Killen, Richardson, Kelly, & Jampol, 2010). Specifically, an individual viewed accusations of wrongdoing (i.e., stealing, skipping school, pushing, leaving a mess) as more fair if the "transgressor" had been caught before for committing the transgression in question. The belief that past behavior reflects on current and future behavior is one of at least two orientations to the use of information about one's past (i.e., that the past will be stably represented in the present and the future). An important second orientation that stands in contrast to that above is the belief that the past does not necessarily reflect on the present or future behavior of the individual in question.

In the context of this study, some may believe that prior instances of aggression and shyness can be changed (see for example Levy & Dweck, 1999). The acceptability of exclusion was argued to be dependent on whether one believes behavior to be changeable. It was expected that if you believe behavior to be changeable then no link between past behavior and potential to interfere with group goals would be made. As a result, exclusion would be seen as less acceptable than if you believe behavior to be stable, assuming that the behavior was perceived as negative from a group goals perspective. To address this issue, participants were asked to make judgments about the extent to which they believed behavior to be changeable. As an example, it was expected that someone who believes aggression to be stable as well as detrimental to a group's goals would accept exclusion of a target described through past aggression. In contrast, someone who believes that past behaviors do not necessarily inform predictions about future behavior would be more likely to reject exclusion of an aggressive target.

Stereotypic expectations were expected again to interact with the belief in the changeability of behavior. Specifically, and continuing with the females and soccer example, if someone believed females to be bad at soccer, and they believed this to be a stable relationship, then they would accept exclusion. Contrast this with the expectation that exclusion would be seen as less acceptable if one believed that females are bad at soccer, but also believed that individuals had the capacity to develop over time.

Justifications for Judgments. Based on Social Domain theory, it was expected that participants who rate exclusion as unacceptable would do so primarily because exclusion violates a moral concern for harm to the target. In contrast, it was expected that participants who accept exclusion would do so because they found group functioning

considerations to be salient. In the context of this study, it was expected that moral justifications would be most often utilized when evaluating gender, nationality, and hair length based exclusion, while exclusion judgments based on shyness, aggression, and ability would be most often justified with group functioning concerns.

Expected Contribution to the Field

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, peer relationships have been shown to be important for adolescent's healthy development (Parker & Asher, 1987). By studying children and adolescents' interpretations of different exclusion situations, it is feasible to document how it is that individuals of different ages understand and evaluate exclusion situations. Adolescents who view exclusion situations very differently than their peers may be at greater risk for exclusion.

The attempt to assess the extent to which adolescents make use of stereotypic conceptions of groups across different group goals may help in developing interventions aimed at revealing how stereotypes can affect morally relevant decision-making. To the extent that adolescents engage thoughtfully with difficult social situations, interventions aimed at revealing the ways in which stereotypes can affect judgments may help adolescents engage with their own preconceived notions toward the end of adjusting how they consider variables in morally relevant decisions. In sum, this study sought to further the theoretical discussion of group functioning by assessing adolescents' use of group goals, in terms of whether the goals are explicitly competitive or non-competitive, as a guide for judging group functioning considerations.

CHAPTER II

Background Literature

The focus of this literature review is research on individuals' evaluations of social exclusion (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006; Killen, Kelly, & Richardson, 2010), derived from an integration of research on peer relations (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006), intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999; McKown & Weinstein, 2003; Tajfel, 1978) and Social Domain theory (Smetana, 2006).

This review builds off of past reviews of Social Domain theory and exclusion (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006; Killen, 2007) by suggesting a reframing of the extant research on children's reasoning about peer exclusion. Specifically, this review calls for viewing judgments of the acceptability of exclusion from a perspective that takes into account the nature of the information presented to participants about both the target of exclusion and the group's goals.

As this area of study draws from research derived from Social Domain theory, so too does this review. Social Domain theory is, at its most broad level, a conceptual framework for investigating how individuals reflect, evaluate, construe, categorize, and understand the social world. Specifically, thirty years worth of evidence from a Social Domain theoretical perspective shows that individuals consistently reason about social events and interactions from three qualitatively different perspectives (i.e., domains): the moral (e.g., unprovoked hitting), social-conventional (e.g., calling a teacher by her first name), and the psychological (e.g., personal choice of when to get a haircut) (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006).

This review will start with a general review of social domain theory, as well as other theoretical frames or reference where applicable, that identifies important contextual information used to evaluate actions, and when it is that the information becomes salient to the individual. For example, research has shown that children's moral judgments are heavily dependent on whether harm is present in a situation (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). Being able to assess whether harm is present in a situation is in turn heavily, but not solely dependent on whether behavioral distress is present (e.g., crying) (Smetana, 1985). Behavioral distress is one example of information that may be used to infer the presence of harm to another, which is in turn used to evaluate whether an action is morally relevant.

This more general review will then turn to the more specific topic of research on evaluations of exclusion, again with a focus on research that confirms that certain types of information are used to make evaluations. Beyond the simple review of the extant research in these related areas, another goal is to identify *why* it is that certain pieces of information hold more weight in one's evaluations of actions, both within as well as outside of the social exclusion domain. The underlying theme of this review is that certain pieces of information invite stronger inferences about a situation and its actors than other pieces of information. The review will conclude with suggestions for future research.

Social Domain theory

Social Domain theory arose from a Piagetian constructivist perspective (Turiel, 2006), which in its most basic form suggests that individuals construct knowledge. Turiel and others before him (e.g., Piaget (1932/1965), Peterson, Danner, & Flavell, 1972) have

argued that, similar to the acquisition of logical and scientific knowledge, we construct knowledge of the social world as well (i.e., just as we actively construct a more refined understanding of the principle of reversibility through experience and argumentation, so too do we develop a more refined understanding of fairness). Recognizing limitations in Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1963), Turiel (1983) formulated an alternative conceptualization of moral development, in which three primary domains of social knowledge (moral, conventional, and psychological) were posited as the way in which individuals parsed the social world. Social Domain theory has used both hypothetical vignettes to measure judgments as well as observational schemes to code social interactions (Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Turiel, 2008). Assessments of judgments have included both hypothetical vignettes in which prototypic situations are evaluated (i.e., situations in which an action is perceived as being relevant to only one domain), as well as multifaceted situations (i.e., situations in which actions are perceived as being relevant to two or more domains). In addition, measures of social interactions have been conducted using coding schemes examining both peer and parent-child interactions (Nucci, Killen, & Smetana, 1996; Killen & Turiel, 1991).

Theoretically, Nucci and Turiel (1978) make the following distinction between the moral and conventional domains:

“Social conventional acts in themselves are arbitrary in that they do not have an intrinsically prescriptive basis: alternative courses of action can serve similar functions...As an example, the content of a conventional uniformity regarding modes of dress (e.g., formal attire in certain social

contexts) is arbitrarily designated, so an alternative mode of dress could be designated to serve the same function.” (p. 400)

And,

“In contrast, within the moral domain actions are not arbitrary, and the existence of a social regulation is not necessary for an individual to regard an event as a (moral) transgression. An example of such an act would be one person hitting another and thereby causing physical harm. An individual's perception of that type of event as a transgression would stem from factors intrinsic to the event (e.g., from the perception of the consequences to the victim).” (p. 401).

Empirical research, comprising over 120 research studies (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006) has borne out these early theoretical expectations. In addition to the distinction between moral and conventional domains, children and adults view a range of issues as falling within the psychological domain, which is characterized by activities whose regulation by outside entities is thought to illegitimately violate personal autonomy (Lagattuta, Nucci, & Bosacki, 2010; Nucci, 1981, 2001; Smetana, 1988). A prototypic example in this domain is choosing how to wear your hair (Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro, 1996).

Given that the ability to identify when an action will cause harm to another is the means by which the moral becomes differentiated from the conventional and psychological domains (Smetana, 1985), it is perhaps equally important to note how it is that the conventional is reliably distinguished from the psychological domain. Again, results suggest that the distinction is made to the extent that one perceives regulation

from outside entities such as teachers, parents, and other authority figures to be justified. This consideration seems to revolve around the perception of the role that the regulation will have on the maintenance of social order. As an example, it is more often seen as unacceptable to regulate one's hairstyle than one's manner of address toward one's teacher, with the former scenario consistent with the psychological and the latter with the conventional domain (Nucci, 1981; Smetana & Asquith, 1994).

It is important to emphasize that early research found evidence in support of the individuals' ability to distinguish and reason between different domains, and that this early evidence was garnered from testing participants in prototypic situations (e.g., unprovoked hitting with intent to harm). More recent research has documented the ways in which participants reason about multifaceted situations (e.g., excluding an aggressive child from a play group), in which a number of domain considerations become relevant, finding within a more complex picture that can be explained in part by what we will argue is a differential weighting of domain concerns across these multifaceted contexts, that often involve the salience of the act (e.g., how wrong or how disruptive the act is for the individual or the group). Research by Smetana and colleagues (1994) has shown for example that adolescent - parent disagreement can be explained by the extent to which a parent and a child reason differently about an action (Smetana & Asquith, 1994). More specifically, disagreements arise when a child perceives an action as falling within a different domain than does the parent (e.g., cleaning one's room as a conventional or personal choice issue) (Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Daddis, 2004).

As another example, research in the area of social exclusion has revealed an interesting asynchrony between evaluations of different types of race-based exclusion

(Killen, Stangor, Price, Horn, & Sechrist, 2004). As an example, racial exclusion in the form of racially motivated voting patterns has been evaluated more negatively than racially motivated dating patterns, explained by an increased reliance on personal choice reasoning in the dating context (i.e., she can date who she wants to date).

Finally, while cultural differences have been identified, such as Chinese as compared to Canadian adolescents' greater appeals to utility when reasoning about non-democratic forms of government (Helwig, Arnold, Tan, & Boyd, 2007), or that working-class Brazilian adolescents were found to be more concerned about personal autonomy in dating contexts than were their middle-class counterparts (Milnitsky-Sapiro, Turiel, & Nucci, 2006) it is the extent of the similarities between members of different cultures that are striking. Helwig (2006), for instance notes in his review that the development of personal autonomy concerns is a phenomenon that has been observed in every cultural context studied to date. Wainryb's (2006) review of the literature has revealed that individuals from both "individualistic" and "collectivist" societies assert their right to maintain control over certain issues, such as personal appearance, while at the same time exhibiting concern for interpersonal obligations, a notion that some argue is antithetical to an individualist orientation. Finally, in his review, Turiel (2002) argues through evidence that individuals in "collectivist" societies reject illegitimate authority control, opting instead to rebel against authority in an attempt to establish a realm of personal control that again seems to be a culturally universal need. Because so much has been written on the unwarranted focus on cultural differences in spite of the extensive evidence for cultural similarities, we will refer the interested reader to the above review articles rather than devoting more space to the issue here.

While there is striking similarity in judgments across cultures, disagreement does indeed manifest both within and across cultures (e.g., Wainryb, 1991). To the extent that there exists variation in one's orientation to whether an action is deemed morally acceptable or not (take for example the debate about spanking), research has shown that informational assumptions drive the difference (Smetana, 1981; Wainryb, 1991). Importantly, differences in informational assumptions link to different ways of conceptualizing the morally relevant concern for harm to individuals (e.g., spanking is effective, and therefore is worth the temporary pain caused to the child v. spanking does not work, and therefore is not worth the pain caused to the child), and thus the difference in acceptability judgments regarding the act. The observation that there can exist disagreement between individuals in matters of harm does not mean that the disagreement arises as a result of a differential propensity to concern oneself with harm to others; indeed, it seems to be that both groups are concerned with avoiding harm. In essence then, both groups are concerned about avoiding harm; the groups simply have different perspectives on the worth of the temporary pain caused by spanking in light of their beliefs about the long-term benefit of spanking.

The picture would not be complete without a discussion of the minority of human beings who show no concern for harming others (Blair, Newman, Mitchell, Richell, Leonard, Morton, & Blair, 2006; Raine, Lencz, Bihrlé, LaCasse, Colletti, 2000). In these extreme cases we find evidence for a lack of concern with the prospect of harming others.

As an historical note, I argue that the utility of domain theory in accounting for variability in multifaceted situations is nowhere more apparent than in the reinterpretation of Kohlberg's (1963) findings on moral development (Turiel, 2008). Specifically, from a

domain theoretical perspective, Kohlberg's dilemmas involved more than one domain, making all of his dilemmas multifaceted in nature. Specifically, Heinz, as a result both of the obstinacy of the druggist and an inability to procure the necessary funds to purchase a drug to cure his wife's health problem (despite varied attempts to procure the funds legally), was faced with the choice to either let his wife die, or steal the drug to save her life. In this scenario, Heinz had to consider the harm to his wife due to inaction (moral-physical harm), the harm to the storekeeper of action (moral), the harm to himself if caught in action (personal choice), and the societal implications of his actions (conventional – free market economy & monopolization of a market). At the time that Kohlberg was interpreting the results, he did not have access to the theoretical formulations of Social Domain theory, nor did he have access to the wealth of evidence that has been garnered in support of Social Domain theoretical propositions. Kohlberg was essentially trying to make sense out of a multifaceted situation before he had a sense of the extent to which his scenarios could be further reduced into separable domains. In other words, Kohlberg had unknowingly conflated domains by using a multifaceted situation, making it difficult to accurately identify how it was that participants were engaging with the story (Turiel, 1974).

In contrast to Kohlberg's starting point, Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana started with prototypic, fully reduced scenarios (i.e., scenarios in which only one domain concern was present) in order to assess whether young children showed an ability to identify situations as morally relevant, finding that even at three, children can differentiate between morality and convention (Nucci, & Turiel, 1978). Once domain theorists had a strong empirical base with which to argue that individuals reliably use domains in prototypic contexts,

they moved on to assess how it is that individuals coordinate domain concerns in multifaceted contexts (Smetana, 1983). This was, in essence, a shift back to where Kohlberg had started, but with a better sense of the reducible nature of the multifaceted situations. As briefly reviewed above with the exclusion example, domain theorists found consistency in what others may have viewed as inconsistency in reasoning. Domain theorists simplified Kohlberg's scenarios by challenging his developmental account that children were simply selfish moralists, noting instead that children could identify victim status even at three years of age (Turiel, 2008).

Use of Information in Judgments

What is it that makes certain domains salient in a social situation? Research has shown that individuals reliably consider the information given in the description of the scenario (Smetana 1985), and when not enough information is given, individuals will sometimes fill in what they need to make a judgment with stereotypic conceptions of groups (Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001) or inferences about how likely certain outcomes are as a result of an action (Nucci, 1981; Park & Killen, 2010). In fact, Social Domain theory's proposal that social life could be organized into three domains hinged on the ability to predict differences in judgments given different information.

Evaluations of Harm and Others' Welfare

In one of the first studies to attempt an empirical verification of the proposed theoretical domains, Nucci and Turiel (1978) observed and interviewed preschool children (range = two years, ten months - five years, two months) about social transgressions witnessed in preschools, assessing whether they could place transgressions into either the moral or the conventional domain (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). An example of

a conventional transgression was playing an activity in the wrong area, while an example of a moral transgression was one individual hitting another. In this study, the test was to see 1) whether and to what extent child and adult responses to observed transgressions differed by domain classification, 2) to what extent children would identify a distinction between domains, and 3) to what extent children's and observer's distinctions would converge. Specifically, children were asked a rule contingency question (e.g., If there were no rule against [hitting] would it be alright then?) to identify the ability to distinguish between domains. To be clear, Social Domain theory's proposition is that actions that are conventionally bound will be evaluated negatively contingent upon the presence or absence of rules prohibiting the action. This is in contrast to theoretical expectations for actions that are morally bound, which are evaluated as unacceptable irrespective of the presence or absence of rules prohibiting the action.

As expected, the children's responses to the rule contingency question were consistent with the trained observer's ratings of particular events as moral or conventional in 83% of the cases, suggesting that children spontaneously distinguished between domains as predicted by theory. For the purposes of this review then, information about a prohibition against a certain action became salient only when harm was not likely to result from an action.

The convergence between observer and child interviewee through responses to the rule contingency question (mentioned above) was the first concrete piece of evidence that participants, even at the age of 3, did indeed make reliable distinctions that were consistent with theoretical claims. This study did not, however, ask participants to justify their judgments, which leaves us without a way to empirically verify whether the

distinction between morally and conventionally relevant situations was drawn by identifying the intrinsic consequences to a victim or by some other means (note that, as quoted above, the intrinsic consequences to a victim are proposed to be present only in morally relevant situations).

Nucci's study (1981) was the first study to look at the nature of individuals' (age range: 7-20years) domain distinctions. Not only did this study help to ground judgments with justification data, but it also provided evidence that distinctions are made not only between actions that are prototypically moral or conventional, but also between actions that fall in the personal domain (Nucci, 1981). An example of a conventional transgression was one person stealing something, while a conventional transgression was a boy addressing a teacher by her first name, and a personal issue was a boy wearing long hair that was contrary to stated rules.

Confirmation of domain distinctions was found through asking participants to sort actions according to: 1) degree of wrongness; 2) degree of wrongness in the absence of rules against the act; and, 3) whether the decision to engage in the act should be up to the individual. It was found that participants sorted moral transgressions into the "most wrong" pile more often than conventional transgressions, which were in turn sorted as "more wrong" than psychological transgressions. Older children and young adults more often justified their placements of actions into the most wrong pile by citing harm to others as a result of engaging in the action.

Results from the above studies support the contention that it is the concern for intrinsic negative consequences that distinguishes moral from conventional and psychological domains (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Given that this study showed that individuals evaluated

scenarios consistent with Social Domain Theory's expectations, it was possible to extend this finding to see under what conditions domain distinctions could hold, and in what ways they might break down. Smetana (1985) for instance studied the ability of participants to make domain distinctions in the absence of a specified action.

Smetana (1985) interviewed children ranging in age from 38 to 76 months about unspecified actions (i.e., actions identified by nonsense words) to see whether context cues were sufficient in making domain distinctions. Specifically, the context cues that were varied were: 1) consistency of the prohibitions of the acts, and, 2) the type of responses to the acts. Results revealed that when actions were not consistently prohibited (i.e., conventionally relevant) they were evaluated as more permissible and less serious than the actions that were consistently prohibited. Information about the consistency of the prohibition then is used as information to judge an action.

Why might this result manifest as it did? One suggestion is that the results hinge on the participants' perception of the regulators. With no information about the nature of the action, a participant may be less likely to question the legitimacy of the regulation (i.e., more likely to trust the regulator's good sense) when two regulators prohibit an action than when only one of the two regulators prohibits the action (see Jaswal & Neely, 2006 for empirical confirmation of a "trust the authority" orientation in childhood).

For this study on regulation of novel actions, trust in the regulator may come in the form of accepting that the regulator is asking for compliance when compliance is considered legitimate (i.e., when compliance is perceived to maintain social order). Because this study does not allow an assessment of the trustworthiness of individual regulators (i.e., participants do not know anything about the regulators except that they do

not want the child to engage in the novel action in the consistent prohibition, and that one of the two regulators does not want the child to engage in the action in the inconsistent prohibition), participants seem to “trust” the consistent regulators more than the inconsistent regulator. While interesting, this finding may be an artifact of the lack of information about the regulators. One testable implication of the “trust-through-past-behavior” explanation for the findings is that participants may rate the novel action as more permissible than reported in the study when they know that the regulators have tried in the past to illegitimately regulate behaviors that are seen as personal choice concerns.

In terms of harm and the perception of novel actions as morally relevant, participants’ justifications for their judgments were consistent with Nucci’s (1981) study in that when victim distress was present, participants made mention of that fact when justifying their judgments. Interactions between prohibition and behavioral distress are also important to note, such that in the consistent prohibition condition with no victim distress present, participants were less able to justify their judgment that the act was unacceptable than they were when they were given information about victim distress. Another person’s welfare was the justification given by over half of the participants when the child victim showed distress and when no distress was mentioned, more than two-thirds of participants said they did not know why the act was morally relevant, with 14% of participants justifying their judgment by citing the consistent prohibition. The simple theoretical explanation for this finding is that consistency in prohibition is not what is used to sort actions into the moral domain, but rather the presence of harm to others.

In the above-mentioned studies, it is clear that information provided in the situations is used to evaluate the scenario. Also clear is the fact that information is added

as needed, when not specifically provided. For instance, hitting is evaluated as a moral transgression, except in cases in which a target desires to be hit (Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). Individuals, even at the age of three, will differentiate between actions by domain both with and without behavioral cues, and with and without typical act-outcome relations. Indeed, researchers studying theory of mind would not find this result surprising, as work by Tomasello and colleagues has shown that toddlers will infer intent from certain behaviors of a confederate without any explicit verbal indication of one's intent (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). It seems that humans are very ready to infer information from less than explicit cues.

Given that behavioral distress is a useful way to infer harm to another, and thus the moral relevance of an action, the question becomes to what extent does behavioral distress guide us to moral relevance, and are there situations in which behavioral distress might lead to an incorrect conclusion about the moral relevance of an act? Up until this point, the proposed link has been from behavioral distress to harm to moral relevance. It should be further specified that harm implies a victim; specifically, that harm to another is equated with harm to a victim. Given this further specification, one can ask whether there are times in which behavioral distress results from a situation that does not involve victimization.

At least one study suggests that it is incorrect to automatically infer victimization from behavioral distress (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006) and one study that suggests that it is incorrect to automatically *reject* victimization in situations in which victim distress is absent (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). As mentioned above, when thinking about the moral domain, it is additionally important to assess not only when victimization

occurs, but also when victimizers are culpable (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996).

Behavioral Manifestations of Harm

It has been argued, both here and by other researchers (e.g., Smetana, 1985), that the ability to identify harm is an important component needed to be able to evaluate the moral relevance of actions. What has not yet been considered is the complexity of the task of identifying when distress implicates victimization, or relatedly, transgressor culpability, as individuals can show distress in many situations in which there is no one to blame. Leslie and colleagues compared moral judgments of 4-6 year olds in a prototypical unprovoked hair pulling scenario (a victim cries as a result of getting her hair pulled) with moral judgments in a situation in which behavioral manifestations of harm do not correspond to victimization (a “victim” cries upon being thwarted in her attempt to eat both hers and another’s cookie). The harm without victimization condition was labeled the “cry baby” condition (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). As expected, results revealed that children evaluated pulling hair as negative, which is consistent with the behavioral distress account. More importantly, results reveal that children evaluate eating one’s own cookie as positive; regardless of the effect it has on others.

This finding is of major theoretical interest, as it requires that participants make a decision about whether the act of eating one’s cookie is morally relevant given that eating one’s cookie caused the “victim” distress. The basic finding suggests that behavioral distress, while important in moral judgment as an indicator of harm/victim status, is not the sole determinant of moral judgment, at least for this age group. What is it then that helps children flexibly apply knowledge of behavioral distress when trying to infer

victimization? Drawing an analogy to Nucci's sorting task, the act of eating one's own cookie would likely be evaluated as least wrong, as it is likely to be seen as a prototypically personal domain issue (i.e., an action that primarily affects the self). If this is the case, then children may be able to disregard distress as a result of acting in the personal domain, as prohibiting actions in the personal domain is seen as unacceptable (Nucci, 1981). Whether this finding would hold in a condition in which the cookie owner eats her cookie despite knowing that eating her cookie will cause distress to a victim remains to be seen, but results from Piaget's early work on intention, and other's more recent work with varied intention paradigms would suggest that if the intent was to harm the victim by eating one's cookie, then eating one's own cookie in order to cause distress would be evaluated negatively.

The above review suggests that harm to another is a factor that is flexibly applied when attempting to identify the moral relevance of an act, and yet, dating back to (Piaget, 1932/1965), it is well known that the intentional structure behind the act also plays a role in one's moral evaluations. In fact, it looks as if we integrate information about harm and intent when deciding on whether the transgressor in question should be punished (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). In the next section, the research on intention within the moral domain will be reviewed, as intent is yet another piece of information that is sought when evaluating a morally relevant scenario.

Intentionality and Harm

Piaget's now classic moral judgment task, which involved asking children to evaluate two basic action sequences, provided the foundation for research on the role of intention in act evaluation. One sequence depicted a child who unintentionally caused

substantial property damage while engaging in a prosocial act (a boy made a large ink mark on a table cloth in an attempt to help fill his father's empty ink well with ink), and one that unintentionally caused minimal property damage while engaging in an prohibited act (a boy dropped and broke one cup in an attempt to get some jam while his mother was out). Piaget noted that children begin taking into account the intentional structure underlying actions at around age 10, evaluating the "sneaky" act of getting a forbidden item as less acceptable than the prosocially intentioned act of helping maintain a household (Piaget, 1932/1965, p.123). The scenarios that Piaget utilized bear striking resemblance to the scenarios developed by Leslie, Knobe, and Cohen (2006), in which actors act knowing that their actions will have unintended side effects for others.

Extending Piaget's research on the link between intention and moral judgment, Zelazo, Helwig, and Lau (1996) developed scenarios in which a transgressor either intended or did not intend to physically harm a victim, and was differentially successful in bringing about the desired outcome. Results revealed that at five years of age, children began to take into account the intentional structure behind the actions, evaluating positively intended actions as more acceptable than negatively intended actions (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). These studies suggest that it is not only the outcome of the action (i.e., harm) that identifies the moral relevance of an action, but that the intent is used as salient information with which to make an evaluation of an act.

The above three studies (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Piaget, 1932,1965; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) definitively converge on the same conclusion that, in addition to harm to another, intentional structure is important when evaluating the moral

relevance of an act. There are cases, though, in which we do not have direct access to the intentional structure behind acts, and yet in many ambiguously intentioned situations we find a strikingly consistent interpretation of intention across individuals. Take for example research on evaluations of lying, in which a person's intentions are methodologically left vague, and yet we find consistency in evaluations of lies, suggesting perhaps a 1-to-1 correspondence between the nature of the lie and the intentional structure presumed to support it. Bussey (1999) found that children at all ages (four, eight, and eleven years) included in the study evaluated antisocial lies (defined as comments meant to hide the liar's negative action from another) as more serious than white lies (defined as comments meant to hide the lie teller's true feelings that would hurt another if expressed) (for further confirmation/extension of the above findings, see Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). The above studies converge on the idea that lying is evaluated contextually, and in cases in which both harm to another and the liars' intentions are left implicit, the harm and intentional structure are nevertheless extracted in a reliable manner, resulting in predictable evaluations of situations. Again, it is the study of the ability to infer moral relevance from different salient factors (e.g., harm to another; intentions) that I think will help clarify inconsistencies in the research on evaluations of social exclusion.

Up to this point, it has been shown that evaluations of moral relevance hinge on intentions of the transgressor and the victim's behavioral distress in response to certain actions. What about cases in which a victim does not show obvious signs of distress? A

study by Shaw and colleagues asked to what extent participants would identify an act as morally relevant when the victim's response cannot easily be identified as distress (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). Using situations in which participants resist, subvert and comply with a transgressor's unfair demands, Shaw and Wainryb found that although all participants recognized that a transgressor's requests were selfishly motivated, and were thus evaluated negatively, 83% of five year olds attributed sadness to victims who resisted, compared to 10% of 16 year olds, who instead opted for accomplishment as the emotion most likely to be shown by a victim who resists. Similarly, when victims subverted the transgressor, 96% of 5 year olds attributed sadness to the victim, whereas only 2% of 16 year olds did so, instead attributing to the victim the following emotions: fear (17%), accomplishment (25%), and anger (50%). Finally, for victims who complied, 5 year olds were most likely to attribute sadness (50%) and pro-social (46%) emotions to the victim, whereas 16 year olds were most likely to attribute fear (54%) (p. 1055).

Given this discrepancy in emotion attribution at the different ages, it may already be clear that for the youngest age groups, victim status will be mistaken for freely chosen prosociality when the victim complies with the transgressor's demand. Indeed, 5 year olds evaluated compliance as the most positive response, whereas 16 year olds evaluated resistance as the most positive response to a transgressor's unfair demands (p.1056).

There seems to be an age related change in participants' ability to coordinate both the actions of the transgressor and the responses of the victim. Specifically, five year olds held that resistance was unfair toward the transgressor, while concurrently suggesting that the transgressor's demands were unfair toward the victim (these two orientations to the situation are logically irreconcilable, because if one holds, the other cannot). At age

seven, participants start to recognize the negative implications of compliance, beginning to coordinate the transgressor's unfair demand with the victim's compliance. Shaw and Wainryb (2006) suggest that at around age seven, children begin to understand the difference between compliance, which is forced, and consent, which is freely chosen. I argue that results from this study complement the results garnered from the study by Leslie, Mallon, and DiCorcia (2006) in that there is further confirmation that victim distress is not the sole determinant of the moral relevance of an action, and may in fact play a role in this determination only to the extent that other conditions are met (e.g., whether the distress is appropriate, the ability to coordinate a transgressor's actions with a victim's reactions).

Again, both harm to another as well as the transgressor's intentions seem to be powerful pieces of information that support our ability to make domain distinctions, with both variables becoming more salient with age. Further, we seem to have a relative amount of flexibility when making use of this information, being able to infer harm and intention when it is not explicitly given (Dodge, 1980; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006), and being able to use harm and intention information in a multitude of situations (Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). What do we need to extract from a situation in order to be able to infer intention and harm? To answer this question, one can profit from a focus on the research on theory of mind (ToM) (e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944). More specifically, I argue that inference processes within a morally relevant situation draw on the ability to extract: 1) the actor's desires/goals (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), 2) the actor's access to information (Woodward, 2003), 3) the actor's beliefs (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007), and 3) any heuristics/assumptions/stereotypes that would help to identify the above three

pieces of information (Bodenhausen & Wyer, Jr., 1985) (see Sobel & Kirkham, 2007 for a related discussion about inference processes derived from nonsocial information).

For instance, research in social information processing has shown that attributions surrounding a negative event (i.e., provocation or rebuff) depend in part on whom it is that is provoking or rebuffing (Nummenmaa, Peets, & Salmivalli, 2008). If it is someone who is disliked, then attributions will be more negative than if someone who was liked drove the same action.

The review of how it is that we infer certain mental states and foresee or predict certain outcomes and behaviors (i.e., how we infer a transgressor's intentions, a victim's feelings, and when outcomes will be harmful towards the in-group) when the mental state is not explicitly mentioned is relevant to the discussion of the research on social exclusion. Specifically, the proposition is that the age related increase in the acceptance of certain exclusion scenarios results in part from an increasing capacity for inference given access to certain pieces of information about a situation. At the most basic level, an evaluation of an exclusion situation potentially involves taking into consideration: 1) the potential harm to the target upon exclusion (a moral domain concern), 2) the potential harm to the group upon inclusion of the target (a moral domain concern), 3) the potential reduction in group functioning upon inclusion of the target (a conventional domain concern), and 3) the right to choose with whom one desires association (a personal domain concern).

Given the focus of this proposal on group functioning considerations in exclusion judgments, the ability to infer motives, desires, and beliefs may predispose older children, adolescents, and adults to judge all exclusion as unacceptable. To clarify, and as

mentioned above, targets who desire group entry will be disappointed if they are excluded. Furthermore, targets that desire group entry might be judged to be willing to support the group in whatever way they need. Given this potential to view targets that desire inclusion into the group to be willing to help the group function, then harm to the target may be seen as more salient, and exclusion judged more harshly.

As noted above, however, along with the ability to judge desires, beliefs, and motives, individual also make inferences about the likelihood that an individual will have the capacity to help the group function effectively (Killen & Stangor, 2001). Two questions addressed in this proposal then are: 1) do participants link the desire to join a group with the desire to help the group function; and, 2) do participants differentiate between a desire and the capacity to help the group?

Finally, and as mentioned above, individuals vary in their tendency to judge behavioral propensities as stable across time (Levy & Dweck, 1999). The judgment of the likelihood that an individual will remain as described may affect the perception of the likelihood that a target will disrupt group functioning. Before addressing the literature on evaluations of social exclusion, it will be instructive to briefly review the peer relations literature, toward the end of further synthesizing the two literatures.

Adolescent Social Cognition, Peer Relations, and Norms

Peer ratings of individuals in their social surroundings have proven time and again to be a useful assessment tool, (Gest, Rulison, Davidson, & Welsh, 2008) complementing teacher, parent and self-report methodologies. This suggests that peers, at least at an aggregated level, are highly attuned to what others exhibit in their social milieu. The findings of group and friendship homophily, both from a behavioral and a values

perspective also suggests an ability to identify and associate with individuals that have certain desired tendencies (Chen, Chang, & He, 2008; Hill, Rubin, & Peplau, 1976; Kandel, 1978; Rubin, Lynch, Coplan, Rose-Krasnor, & Booth, 1994).

Beyond the ability to judge individuals' fit with group or personal desires/goals, the ability to identify group norms seems to be similarly developed. One interesting instantiation of adolescents', young adult's, and adults' capacity to extract meaning out of subtle cues in the social environment is that of the effect of descriptive (i.e., what people do) and injunctive (i.e., what people believe is acceptable) norms on behavior. A study focusing on norms and their relation to littering behavior revealed relations between the norms that were extracted from environmental cues (i.e., a clean or an already littered environment) (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). For example, it was argued that when individuals noticed an already littered environment, they were more likely to litter themselves, suggesting that norms had the power to alter behavior.

In addition, norms as well as direct peer communication have been revealed as a predictor of adolescents' use of alcohol (Real & Rimal, 2007). Beyond the perception of what is normative, adolescents evince an ability to utilize person-information as well. Horn's (2003) study on the acceptability of exclusion from social groups, for instance revealed that adolescents made greater use of an individual's level of school engagement than their group membership (e.g., dirty, preppy, gothic) when evaluating whether it was acceptable to exclude a target from the cheerleading club.

While adolescents as a group seem to be able to parse the subtlety of social interaction, atypical social information processing has also been identified for increasingly well-defined subgroups of adolescents. Fite, Goodnight, Bates, Dodge, and

Pettit (2008) for instance, asked adolescents to indicate the extent to which they endorsed an aggressive response to a hypothetical and ambiguous provocation. They found that the relation between response evaluation and adolescent aggression was moderated by how impulsive the adolescent was rated to be by his or her teachers, with the most impulsive participants endorsing aggression more often than those low in impulsivity. Self-efficacy beliefs regarding aggressive behavior have also been shown to relate to adolescent aggression (Davis-Kean, Huesmann, Jager, Bates, Collins, & Lansford, 2008).

The question that I now address is whether the above-mentioned research can inform the research on social exclusion. In particular, the question is whether and to what extent does the evidence presented in favor of a developing ability to coherently integrate information into a judgment relate to judgments in social exclusion scenarios. Specifically, for typically developing adolescents the above suggests an ability to assess the fit between the self, others, and social groups in one's environment. From a judgment perspective, it is expected that this capacity to engage with accessible information will translate to considerations of social exclusion in hypothetical situations. In particular, it is expected that judgments of the acceptability of exclusion will involve taking into consideration the perspective of the group and the perspective of the target of exclusion. As a result, both research on behavioral distress as well as research on perspective taking will be applicable to a study of social exclusion.

First, I will detail the main findings in the area of reasoning about social exclusion, moving next to a discussion of how these findings may link to the research reviewed above, concluding with an attempt to identify future directions within this research program.

Multifaceted Situations: Evaluations of Exclusion

Our ability to evaluate an action has been shown to be dependent, at least in part, on the information to which we have access. Knowledge of an action, and any explicit contingencies surrounding that action aids us in evaluating the likelihood that the action will result in victimization (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006; Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Smetana, 1981; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). It is generally accepted that the act of excluding a target often results in psychological distress for the target, and it is the knowledge of the link between exclusion and distress that is proposed to drive, in part, one's moral judgments in multifaceted exclusion situations. Importantly however, exclusion situations comprise more than just moral concerns for the target. Beyond the moral concern for the target, individuals seem to take into consideration the group's conventional concerns about, or desire for, efficient group functioning, as well as each individual group member's personal choice about who they desire to associate with more generally. Finally, group members can be granted victim status just as targets of exclusion could be. Essentially, the argument in this proposal is that some types of exclusion are, if not deserved, then readily justifiable given considerations for the group's welfare. This line of thought will be extended after the literature on exclusion judgments has been reviewed.

As was shown in a subset of the above studies, (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) with age, individuals could more readily integrate information, which in turn affects their judgments. Age related increases in the acceptability of exclusion have also been reported (Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Park & Killen, under review; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor,

2001). What is it that changes with age? For one, concerns for group functioning become increasingly salient. As indicated above, and where relevant in the review of exclusion studies below, I attempt an integration of the research reviewed above toward the end of identifying which pieces of information seem to be most salient to individuals in exclusion situations, and whether developmental trends are a result of a developing ability to integrate multiple pieces of information, or whether certain pieces of information become more salient over time regardless of competing considerations. Finally, I will suggest future directions that attempt to detail why it is that those pieces of information are differentially salient.

Over 10 years of study by Killen and colleagues has shown that exclusion situations are evaluated differently based on certain factors that are or are not present in each situation (for a review see Killen, Richardson, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, revise-and-resubmit; Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007). Some general findings reveal that, 1) Exclusion is evaluated negatively when it is explicitly based on a target's group membership (e.g., gender, or ethnicity), but that gender exclusion has been more accepted than ethnic exclusion (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002); and, 2) In comparison to exclusion based on a target's group membership, exclusion is evaluated less negatively when it is based on knowledge of a target's behavioral tendencies or reputation. Below I will review in depth these two general findings, with a focus both on the methods and age of the sample used, toward the end of identifying gaps in our knowledge base where future research should be directed.

Group Membership Characteristics

One of the first studies to look at exclusion from a social domain perspective was conducted by Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey (2001) in which they asked young children (4.5 year olds and 5.5 year olds) to judge the acceptability of group based exclusion using different hypothetical vignettes. Children were given four exclusion situations to evaluate. The doll scenario is provided as an example: “A group of girls is playing with dolls. John comes over and asks if he can play. Two of the girls say that John cannot play because he is a boy. Is it all right or not all right for the girls to tell John that he cannot play? Why or why not?” (p.590). The other three stories involved group play with trucks, and role-playing a teacher or a firefighter. Findings revealed that 87% of children judged the straightforward exclusion to be wrong, with the most often cited justification being moral reasons (84%) (for convergent findings using ethnicity as an additional group membership category, see Killen & Stangor, 2001).

These findings are of theoretical interest as this scenario pits ostensible concerns about group functioning with concerns about harm to the target. To be more specific, two girls desire exclusion due to the target’s gender status, which could be based potentially on the stereotypic belief that John (and boys more generally) will not be good at the activity. Because there were so few group functioning justifications for exclusion (and many moral justifications for inclusion), it was assumed that children reject the group functioning concerns raised by the two girls, in favor of protecting the target from harm. In light of the above discussion about processes of inference, it may be tempting to suggest that, through rejecting exclusion these young children reject stereotypes, as the boy’s gender is the only reason cited for exclusion. Minimally, we know that exclusion is rejected in favor of inclusion, suggesting either that these children do not think that the

target's gender is relevant for assessing whether to exclude, or that any relevance of the target's gender is overwhelmed by the concern for harm to the target.

The question that arises from the above result is whether, and under what conditions, children accept a target's gender as relevant to an exclusion decision. The second scenario presented to participants in Killen and colleagues' study (2001) asked participants to evaluate a complex exclusion scenario in which the choice was between including a female or male child in the play group (participants received both a male stereotyped activity and a female stereotyped activity). No additional information was provided beyond the straightforward exclusion scenario: "Let's say that two children, Tom and Sally, come over and want to play with the girls. There is only one doll left. The group has to decide whom to pick. Whom should the group pick? How come they should pick him/her?" (p.590). Although asking the participants who they would pick is, on the surface, slightly different from the evaluative question posed in the straightforward situation, comparisons remain relatively coherent between the scenarios. Results revealed that less than half (44%) of the sample chose the stereotypic child for the play activities. It should be noted that given the relative proximity to chance responding (50%) the results suggest that there was little compelling the participants as a group to include one or the other target, and yet we see a slight preference for the nonstereotypical child in the activities condition. Again, it should be noted that stereotypic conceptions of gendered activities could have affected one's judgments of the acceptability of exclusion. As indicated throughout this review however, stereotypic conceptions of gendered activities may not be salient enough to overcome concerns for harm to the target.

Given that gender was the only information provided about the two targets, why do we see this differential pattern of responding across the simple and complex exclusion scenarios? It might relate to the fact that in the complex case, someone is assured of being hurt by exclusion, and therefore the decision about whom to include becomes less clear as a result of the impending harm that will befall one of the two targets, whereas when only one target desires entry, the harm to the target becomes more salient as inclusion would eliminate any harm caused to the target. It should be noted that in the complex exclusion scenario, as in the simple exclusion scenario, gender is the only piece of information available for the children to use.

Children's selections (e.g., choosing to include the stereotypical child) were probed by having them consider reasons for including the child not selected. Specifically, for children who chose the stereotypical child to play, the interviewer asks participants to consider that someone might want to include the nonstereotypical child as that child does not often get an opportunity to play the nonstereotypical activity (moral probe). Likewise, if the child chose the nonstereotypical child to play, the interviewer asked the participants to consider that someone might chose the stereotypical child as the stereotypical child is the one who usually plays with the stereotypical toy (conventional probe). Results revealed that children were more likely to switch their choice of whom to include from stereotype to nonstereotype than from nonstereotype to stereotype. 61% of children chose the nonstereotypical child post-probe. Compare this to the straightforward exclusion condition in which participants overwhelmingly said that gender exclusion was not acceptable (87%). Why is it that in the complex exclusion case children are not overwhelmingly choosing to include the nonstereotypical child, even after being probed

with a moral concern for equal opportunity? It might relate, as mentioned above for the pre-probe choice in the complex scenario, to the fact that in the complex case, someone is assured of being hurt by exclusion, making the need to switch one's choice for moral reasons less salient.

The results from the counterprobing in the complex scenario, and the simple exclusion scenario suggest that for this age group, either the stereotypical information about gender is not yet relevant enough to maintain concerns for group functioning, or moral concerns trump conventional concerns no matter the relevance of the information to which one has access. Given the review of the studies that follow, the former possibility is more consistent with the overall trends.

Thinking back to the argument about the ability to draw inferences from information, one can ask whether a target's gender is seen as a relevant piece of information with which to draw inferences, and derivatively, to make a decision about whom to include. Recall that behavioral distress has been shown to be a relevant piece of information which children make use of in their moral evaluations (Helwig, Zelazo, & Lau, 2001; Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006; Smetana, 1985; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). Focusing on the simple exclusion scenario, gender does not appear to be considered a relevant piece of information by which one can justify exclusion. Specifically, participants overwhelmingly reject exclusion based on gender in the simple exclusion scenario. Why might this be the case? I argue that it may be that information about one's gender does not provide enough information as to why exclusion should be condoned. In other words, it may be that a target's gender cannot readily be used to infer reductions in-group functioning.

To be clear, in the first scenario in which a girl desires the exclusion of a boy from the doll playing group, the desire to exclude could derive either from a stereotypic belief about boys' lack of doll playing prowess (and that this incapable boy will reduce group functioning), or a dislike of boys more generally. Indeed, research has revealed a distinction between an individual's sociometric ratings depending on the gender of the target at around this age (Hayden-Thomson, Rubin, & Hymel, 1987; Ramsey, 1995). It should be recalled that the maintenance of group functioning is seen as a legitimate basis for action when harm to others is minimal or nonexistent (e.g., Nucci, 1981). I argue in a similar vein that the maintenance of group functioning is seen as a legitimate basis for the exclusion of a target that may threaten the group's functioning, provided that the exclusion does not create undue harm to the target. Given the increasing distinction made between boys and girls throughout early childhood, gender may be salient from a group functioning perspective. Add to this the fact that the context involves a gender stereotypic activity, and it may be no wonder that half of the participants select a gender consistent target for inclusion.

The relation between stereotypic conceptions and group functioning deserves further elaboration. Many scholars have shown the effect of stereotypic conceptions on cognition (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Bigler & Liben 1993). The association between a group membership category, a behavior, and an individual belonging to that group may affect the acceptability of exclusion. Importantly, in the context of this proposal, it is expected that stereotypic conceptions of groups will only affect exclusion decisions to the extent that the stereotype can in some way be linked to reductions in the group's functioning. As described above, if a group's goal is to win in a

competitive soccer tournament, then stereotypes about ability will affect exclusion judgments (e.g., girls are bad at soccer, and therefore we should exclude girls from the soccer club). In contrast, in a noncompetitive soccer club context, stereotypes about ability may not be as salient, as the group goal may no longer be consistent with including good soccer players. Instead, stereotypes about behavioral propensities may predominate any exclusion decisions in the noncompetitive context (e.g., Brazilians are aggressive, and we don't want aggressive people to ruin our fun).

What does it mean to have a legitimate concern about threats to group functioning? It is argued that legitimate concerns derive from both the information about the group's goals as well as information about a target to which one has access. Once information is collected about a situation, then one may make judgments about whether the information provided about the target is relevant when deciding whether to accept or reject exclusion. A group has to make decisions about who to include based on information about targets that desire group entry. Some major classes of information have already been thoughtfully identified in the extant research, and include: 1) group membership information (Killen & Stangor, 2001), 2) information about behavioral propensities (Park & Killen, Under Review), and 3) experience information (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Related, but not synonymous with the experience category is ability information (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003). I argue that the above four categories of information about a target can be laid out on a "continuum of relevance" that people use when evaluating the acceptability of exclusion.

Information Beyond Group Membership

A study similar in form to that of Killen et al., (2001) was conducted by Killen and Stangor, (2001), in which older children (seven, ten and thirteen year olds) were asked to evaluate different acts of social exclusion in the presence of more information about the relative qualifications of the targets (Killen & Stangor, 2001). The selection of older participants was for comparative purposes to the findings with the younger children. The expectation was that with age, children would grant more salience to group functioning concerns, as a result of their greater exposure to situations in which group functioning is important. As in the above-described study, participants negatively evaluated exclusion based on group membership (gender or race) in straightforward stereotypical play conditions (ballet without boys, baseball cards without girls, math without blacks, and basketball without whites). In the second and third condition, as in the complex exclusion scenario developed in the study by Killen et al, (2001) the participants had to make a choice of who to exclude, given that there were two targets desiring group entry, and only one space left in the playgroup. In the equal qualifications condition, participants more often chose the nonstereotypical child to be included (gender exclusion percentages: 7 yr olds: 71%, 10 yr olds: 67%, 13 yr olds: 60%, with more participants choosing to include the nonstereotypical target in the race context: 7 yr olds: 79%, 10 yr olds: 88%, 13 yr olds: 77%). In the final condition, participants were asked to choose whom they would include given the fact that the stereotypical target was also more qualified in the activity. In this condition, 13 (78%) year olds more often than 7 (59%) or 10 (45%) year olds justified choosing the more qualified gender target for group functioning reasons, again with less participants selecting the more qualified race target (7 yr olds: 49%, 10 yr olds: 26%, 13 yr olds: 71%). Although the target's qualifications

were not isolated from their group membership status (i.e., there was no control condition in which the nonstereotypical child was more qualified than the stereotypical child), we can look at the extent of the shift between the straightforward and complex exclusion scenarios. To the extent that there is a shift in choice of whom to include from the equal to the unequal qualifications conditions, we can say that experience information is relevant to one's decision to include. Put another way, participants may be sensitive to the fact that someone who is better qualified for the activity in question will be more consistent with group goals, which in this case may be to simply have fun. Indeed, looking at the percentages, all three age groups shifted in their judgments from the equal to the unequal qualifications condition, more often choosing the target that fit the stereotype when that target was also more qualified, and so this use of relevant information might be robust across a wide age range. As will soon become apparent however, the moral concerns in an exclusion situation can create another layer of complexity, even in the case of increasing the information available to participants.

Even though the unequal qualifications conditions affected the choices of all ages, the result for the 7 and 10 year olds looks similar to the results of the 4 and 5 year olds in the Killen et al., (2001) study in that they did not seem to be compelled either way by the information given (i.e., their responses were close to chance responding). What will happen when younger children evaluate exclusion in unequal qualifications conditions? A study by Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, (2001), addressed this question in a manner identical in form to the Killen and Stangor (2001) study, by looking at how 4 and 5 year olds use relative qualification information (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Again, as in the above two studies, a straightforward exclusion scenario revealed that children

evaluated exclusion negatively. Interestingly, and in contrast to the findings in the older age groups, 4 and 5 year olds were more likely to suggest including the nonstereotypic target when she was relatively unqualified than when she was equally qualified. This is of interest, as it suggests that there might be a shift in one's use of relevant information around the age of 6, which is consistent with Shaw and Wainryb's findings regarding the ability to integrate competing considerations at this age (2006). Either that, or younger children are equally aware of the potential for reduction in group functioning, but are more concerned with questions of equal access for the target who has less experience with the activity in question. Specifically, and assuming that children are making the distinction between the target's qualifications and the target's group membership (i.e., gender or race), 4 and 5 year olds seem to be increasingly interested in giving the unqualified target an opportunity to play, whereas older children seem to be more interested in making groups function efficiently. This interpretation is reflected in the differential justifications for the choice of whom to include across ages. Specifically, the younger children's justifications reflect greater use of moral justifications for their choice in the unequal qualifications condition, whereas older children's responses reflect greater use of social conventional justifications for their choice in the unequal qualifications condition.

I propose that this age related finding will hold across many exclusion scenarios, but will interact with the level of harm caused to the target as a result of exclusion (i.e., excluding a physically disabled child) as well as the level of need for efficient group functioning (i.e., excluding an uncoordinated child from a group competing for a prize in which coordination is required to win).

One concern about the above findings is that costs to group functioning are yet again left implicit, and when this is the case, the moral justifications for inclusion of the target could be multiply determined. Specifically, these justifications to include could either reflect: 1) a lack of awareness of the potential costs to the group, 2) a lack of concern about the potential costs to the group in light of the harm that will result from exclusion of the target, or 3) the lack of an ability to integrate both costs to the group and target when making a decision. The latter explanation derives from the above mentioned research by Shaw and Wainryb (2006) in which the shift in the prediction of the target's emotion between ages five and seven was interpreted to be a result of an increasing capacity to integrate distinct pieces of information. In contrast to the interpretive difficulties given moral justifications, it is reasonable to assume that those that are citing group functioning reasons for exclusion are those same participants who are thinking about group costs of including the less experienced individual.

Based on the lack of ability to directly compare across straightforward and complex exclusion scenarios in the above three studies, it remains unclear whether older children will make similar use of, and younger children will make any use of different pieces of information in straightforward exclusion scenarios. To be clear, the basic concern is that we do not know to what extent the results are tied to the fact that this was a manipulation done in a complex exclusion scenario as opposed to a straightforward scenario. It might be that manipulating the qualifications in a straightforward scenario would not affect exclusion judgments because the harm to the target remains more salient than how capable the target is in the activity in question. In the case where someone is assured to be harmed, the children might favor perceived increases in-group functioning

by including the more qualified target over perceived decrements in group functioning by including the less qualified target. It would be prudent for future studies to assess participants' judgments in different contexts and with different descriptions of the target(s) both within a straightforward exclusion scenario, as well as a complex exclusion scenario. For instance, and as proposed as a part of this proposal, one could have participants evaluate exclusion of targets who are bad and good at soccer in competitive and noncompetitive contexts, respectively. If there exists a developmental shift in the propensity to consider group functioning, then it would be expected that those who consider group functioning would accept exclusion of a bad soccer player only in the competitive context, while those who do not consider group functioning will show no difference in their acceptability judgments across the contexts.

What about cases in which a target is described by her propensity to behave a certain way? A recent study by Park and Killen (under review) sought to compare the acceptability of different pieces of information. Specifically, they varied the pieces of information about a target, such that one context described the exclusion of an aggressive target, another a shy target, the third a female or male target (depending on the gender of the participant), and the fourth a Korean or American target (depending on the nationality of the participant). In addition to varying the information provided about the target in each of four conditions, they also varied the type of exclusion, including a friendship rejection, group exclusion, and victimization situation. Results revealed that participants viewed victimization as least acceptable, with friendship exclusion as most acceptable, and exclusion from groups as more acceptable than victimization, and less acceptable than friendship rejection. It may be of no surprise that excluding based on aggression was

seen as more acceptable than excluding based on shyness, as aggression is salient from a moral perspective, such that the excluders may consider the cost to the self through the concern that they will be aggressed upon, whereas excluding a shy target may only involve a personal choice plea in that the individual does not want to be around a shy person.

From an inference perspective, it may be that excluding based on a target's behavior is more acceptable than excluding based on group membership characteristics because information about one's behavior helps an excluder to figure out what a target will do in the future. If that is the case, then information about a target's behavior can help one to infer whether including the target will come with threats to smooth group functioning.

Similar to information about one's behavioral propensities, information about one's reputation seems to be relevant to exclusion decisions. Horn (2003), for instance, assessed the acceptability of excluding a target that was labeled as a dirty (i.e., someone who wears old/dirty clothing, is uninvolved in school, and participates in delinquent activities) from the student council because of his membership in the 'dirty' crowd. In addition to providing the target's crowd membership, Horn manipulated the target's involvement in school activities as well as his reputation with his teachers and peers. The question addressed was whether information about one's crowd membership alone (the ambiguous condition) would be used differently than information about one's reputation and past behaviors, either positive or negative (unambiguous conditions). Results revealed that participants were more willing to accept exclusion of the target from the student council given negative manipulations (the target is not active in school, and is

negatively perceived by teachers) than either positive manipulations (the target is active in school, and positively perceived by teachers) or no information beyond group membership (the target belongs to the ‘dirty’ crowd).

Summary

It has been shown that exclusion decisions involve moral, conventional and personal domain considerations, all or none of which may be utilized in the process of making a judgment about the acceptability of exclusion. Varying information about the target results in different acceptability judgments, with exclusion based on race seen as most unacceptable, exclusion based on gender and shyness as next most unacceptable, and exclusion based on aggression as most acceptable (Park & Killen, 2010). Horn (2003) showed in a similar vein that the valence of individuating information about a target relates to the acceptability of exclusion, such that it is seen as less acceptable to exclude a target who associates with the “dirties”, but who is perceived positively within the school than it is to exclude a dirty who is perceived negatively by the school.

The context in which exclusion is manifest also makes a difference. Specifically, varying the intimacy of the exclusion scenario (i.e., a personal domain consideration) affects the acceptability of exclusion, with exclusion from a romantic partnership seen as most acceptable, exclusion from friendship as next most acceptable, and exclusion from an opportunity not having to do with friendship as least acceptable (Killen, Stangor, Price, Horn, & Sechrist, 2004).

Judgments are supported by domain justifications. Specifically, if exclusion is deemed to be unacceptable, it is largely a result of a concern for the harm to the target (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001). If on the other hand exclusion is deemed to be acceptable,

it is largely a result of a concern with the maintenance of one's ability to choose with whom he or she associates (e.g., Killen, et al. 2004), or of a concern with group functioning (e.g., Killen & Stangor, 2001).

Future Directions

Group Functioning Concerns and Exclusion Judgments. Of particular interest to exclusion scenarios is the notion of concerns for group functioning. What exactly is it that makes a group function, or alternatively, how is it that individuals perceive group functioning? One suggestion, and the focus of this proposal, is that it depends on the nature of the group's goals.

Take, for example, two exclusion scenarios that only vary by the group's goals. In one context, the group wants to play soccer to win prizes in competitions, while in another context the group wants to play soccer for fun on the weekend. If adolescents understand how target characteristics can affect the likelihood that a group's goals will be met, then a target that lacks ability in soccer may be perceived differently across these contexts.

More specifically, ability information may be more salient to a group in which the desire is to win than it is to a group who wants to have fun while playing. To the extent that adolescents accept exclusion of a bad soccer player in the competitive context and reject exclusion of that same player in the noncompetitive context, there exists evidence as to the relative weight group functioning considerations are given in exclusion situations in adolescence. Knowing whether and when individuals consider group goals in light of target characteristics in exclusion decisions may help to further our understanding of peer interaction, and can provide yet another means with which to integrate research on theory

of mind (e.g., understanding of others' desires, including the understanding of a group's goals) into research in moral judgment.

How exactly might individuals think about ability information in the above example? From a group functioning perspective, ability information about a target may provide information through which participants evaluate the likelihood that the target's inclusion will result in reductions in the potential to achieve the group's goals (to win or to have fun, respectively). Including a target that is not good at soccer will likely reduce the chance that the group will achieve their desire of winning matches. In contrast, while including this same target in the noncompetitive context may bring with it the same concern about the likelihood that they could win competitive matches, winning may not be the standard against which they judge whether or not they achieved their goals (to have fun). In short, one's ability in the domain and one's ability to contribute to the enjoyment of the interaction may not coincide. Adolescents' justifications for their exclusion judgments are expected to reveal this orientation to information about a target.

What then would be salient in noncompetitive contexts if not ability information? Information about one's behavior might be salient in contexts in which the desire is to have fun. Someone who is aggressive or shy, for instance, may be evaluated differently than someone who is easy-going. Identifying whether these relations exist between information about a target and the group context of exclusion will allow both basic and applied researchers to further contextualize the complexity of exclusion scenarios.

Salient Information from a Group Functioning perspective. The fact that information about a target's reputation, (Horn, 2003) behavior, (Park & Killen, 2010; Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003) ability, (Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe,

2003) and gender (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001) is related to the acceptability of exclusion is provocative. Specifically, these disparate pieces of information about a target may provide a window through which participants can evaluate the likelihood that the target's inclusion will result in a reduced chance of fulfilling the group's goals.

Some information about a target might be more readily identified as salient when judging whether a target is likely to negatively affect the group's goals. Analogous to ability information, information about one's reputation and past behavior (e.g., Horn, 2003) could be used to judge the likelihood that the target will negatively affect the group's goals in future engagements. Park & Killen (2010) have shown, for example, that participants accept the exclusion of an aggressive peer more readily than they accept exclusion based on a target's nationality or gender. When asked to justify their judgments about excluding an aggressive peer, participants mentioned concerns about the maintenance of the group's goals (e.g., "This is okay because the group might not want someone to disrupt their peace." p.15).

As mentioned above, personal choice and group functioning considerations are salient in exclusion decisions. If the group desires the maintenance of peace, and inclusion of the target might result in the group desire not being fulfilled, then exclusion is seen as acceptable. Essentially, exclusion judgments seem to simultaneously consider the extent to which the group may need to adjust its goals upon inclusion of the target, and the extent to which the target should be asked, or could be convinced to adjust herself to fit with the group's goals. The more the balance shifts toward the group making concessions for the target, the more the exclusion is seen as acceptable.

From a moral perspective, the idea of balancing concessions between group members and target is a simple and yet powerful means with which to judge fairness in a social setting. If, for instance, a group of 10 is playing happily together and a target that desires group entry insists that the group change the game to suit her needs, fairness, per force of the lack of equitability in the number required to make concessions on either side, would often suggest the exclusion of the target. To think otherwise would privilege the target's desires over the 10 other group member's desires. In fact, Leslie, Mallon, and DiCorcia (2006) have presented evidence that four year olds are not willing to privilege one child's desires over another's.

In the context of this proposal, this logic links to the expectation that it will be viewed as acceptable to exclude a bad soccer player from a competitive soccer club, or an aggressive soccer player from a noncompetitive soccer club, because the group's desires hold more weight than does the target's, simply as a result of the greater number of individuals that would be required to make concessions upon inclusion. One way to test the extent to which this logic holds would be to vary the number of people that would have to make concessions around a group goal (i.e., would it be perceived as different if 10 people get excluded so that 10 people could put themselves in a position to fulfill the goal of winning the competition?).

Stereotypes as Salient Information. If we are to believe that individuals make use of information about a target to assess the likelihood that the target will negatively affect the group's chance at fulfilling its desires, and that this assessment will affect one's acceptability ratings of exclusion, then how can we reconcile the fact that information about a target's gender can affect one's acceptability ratings (Theimer, Killen, & Stangor,

2001)? More specifically, in what way might information about a target's gender help one to judge the likelihood that inclusion will result in reductions in the potential to achieve the group's goals?

As mentioned above, another future direction, and goal of the proposed study is to evaluate the extent to which stereotypic conceptions of groups will influence decision making about the acceptability of exclusion under conditions in which group goals vary. For instance, how does the competitive desire of the group bear on individuals' views about exclusion based on group membership, such as gender and nationality? On the one hand, stereotypic conceptions of ability might dominate an exclusion decision when the group desire is to win. When the stereotypic associations are negative, such as is often the case with gender (girls are not good at sports), then this could lead to more exclusive judgments; when the stereotypic expectations are positive, such as with nationality (Brazilians are good at soccer), then this could lead to more inclusive judgments. An alternate interpretation, derived in part from the moral and the conventional domain, is equally plausible however. It may be that as a result of the group desire to win, exclusion based on group membership may be seen as unacceptable, as group membership does not provide you with enough certainty about an individual's ability with which to make an exclusion or inclusion decision. If someone believes that group membership information does not provide enough information about the individual, then it is predicted that moral concerns for the target will increase in salience.

Finally, as mentioned above, it is predicted that different group goals will result in different stereotypes being made salient, such that the noncompetitive context will invite stereotypes about likeability or behavioral propensities, whereas the competitive context

will invite stereotypes about ability. In the competitive context, after being told about the target's gender, nationality, aggressiveness, or shyness, respectively, it is predicted that information about the target's ability will overwhelm any stereotypic notions about that target's ability previously considered. In contrast, information about a target's ability in the noncompetitive context is not expected to overwhelm any stereotypic notions about likeability or behavioral propensities based on the initial descriptions of the target, as ability information is not predicted to be salient in noncompetitive contexts.

Extensive research has shown that stereotypes serve to organize the social world for some individuals (Levy & Dweck, 1999; Bigler & Liben, 1993). Staying with the above-mentioned example, if an individual believes that girls are not good at sports, and that a girl desires entry into a competitive soccer club, then it would not be surprising to see that person accept gender-based exclusion. In fact, research has shown that stereotypic expectations about others are used to justify exclusion. Theimer, Killen, and Stangor (2001) showed that, when asked to consider whether it was acceptable to exclude a boy from a group of girls who were playing with dolls, or a girl from a group of boys who were playing with trucks, nearly half of the participants referenced a stereotype in their justification for their judgment. These issues are central both to future directions and to the present project.

Group Goals. It is a simple, and important extension to manipulate not only what is described about a target, but also the group's goals, as these goals can come in many forms (e.g., to enjoy time together, to win a competition, to make money). I argue that not only is information about a target important when evaluating exclusion, but that information about a group is equally important in one's evaluations. Specifically, I

propose that information about the target will be evaluated as relevant or irrelevant to an exclusion decision depending on one's knowledge of the group's goals.

This has many interesting implications, which are ostensibly applied in day-to-day life (e.g., a child's ability to play the piano will be seen as irrelevant when that child is being evaluated for inclusion in a competitive chess club, but will be seen as relevant when being evaluated for membership in a band). In less benign exclusion situations, information that may often be seen as irrelevant when deciding on whether to include (e.g., gender or skin color) may become relevant depending on the group's goals. Take for example the oppression of women throughout history, the criteria for oppression being gender. In these cases, the goal of oppression is highly salient and consequently, so too is gender as a relevant category of information. It should be noted however that the relevance of gender in this situation might be of a different quality than the relevance of gender in a case where oppression based on gender is not the group's goal. Specifically, because one's group membership is often uninformative of many individual qualities, such as interests, abilities, personality and behavior, (e.g., both females and males can be good at sports, interested in clothing, intelligent, aggressive) this information will be, by nature of the variability within the category of interest, less informative than direct information about those individual qualities. Take for example the situation in which a group of chess players knows that the target is very tall and is not very good at chess. The hypothesis is that the latter piece of information will be more readily utilized to both infer the extent to which inclusion of the target will affect group functioning, and derivatively, to evaluate the acceptability of exclusion. This is a testable hypothesis, and would allow for more firm conclusions about what it is that relates to the acceptability of exclusion.

As for attempting to answer *why* it is that different pieces of information are used differently given variations in exclusion scenarios, one could profit from an analysis of how the individual perceives the situation in total. This might take the form of asking participants to predict the group's exclusion decision, the group's level of prejudice toward the target, the target's effect on the group's functioning, and expectations about the target's future behavior. As an example, one could ask participants to infer why it is that a group excluded a target who was ostensibly consistent with group goals in terms of relevant traits (e.g., a chess group, made up of males, excludes a highly capable, very nice woman target from their group). The ostensible reason for exclusion is that she was not a male. The extent to which a participant evaluates this situation as unacceptable could be a measure of the extent to which they define moral relevance in terms of the use of relevant information to make an exclusion decision.

Developmentally, and based on prior research, it may be that younger children have difficulty reconciling the different domain concerns when coming to a conclusion about whether exclusion is acceptable or not. In this case, moral concerns might remain the most salient, and thus the reason for the fewer instances of children viewing exclusion as acceptable.

Emotional Distress. Beyond, and integrally linked to questions about behavioral prediction and perception of costs to the group (i.e., recognition of group functioning concerns), there exists an interesting question about the role that emotional distress plays in one's judgments about exclusion more generally (see Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). It is argued that moral justifications for inclusion are associated with recognition of the harm that would be done to the target upon exclusion, but as Leslie et al. noted,

harm (as assessed through emotional distress cues) does not necessarily imply victimization. At the age of 4, children demonstrate an ability to differentiate victims (e.g., those who cry as a result of getting their hair pulled without cause) from cry babies (those who cry as a result of not being able to eat both their own and another peer's cookie) (Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006). Might this result extend to the exclusion scenario, and methodologically, is there a way to equate an exclusion situation to something like the cry baby scenario? I argue that there exists such a possibility; namely, that by increasing the costs to the group, the definition of victim becomes blurred between the target and the group. Specifically, one can think of a case in which an aggressive target cries as a result of being excluded, with the exclusion being motivated by a desire to avoid harm at the hands of the target. Similar to the above logic about behavioral prediction, emotional reactions to exclusion might be similarly contextually important depending on the target's identified characteristics.

In the above-mentioned studies (e.g., Park & Killen, under review), it is argued that the threat to group functioning was not increased enough to give us the ability to develop a cry baby exclusion scenario. By systematically increasing the threat to the group by giving participants information about the aggressiveness of the target in one condition, Park and Killen (under review) might have given participants greater impetus to view the aggressive target as posing a greater threat to the group than a comparative target that was described only by her group membership. What if the aggressive target cries after being excluded? Does that aggressive child have a claim to victim status, given that the aggressiveness might infringe on the right of the group members to avoid harm? The suggestion laid out in this review, and purposefully similar in form to Leslie's logic

in the cry baby case is that distress will be contextually relevant depending on the reason for exclusion. Specifically, in cases in which the group is at risk for harm as a result of inclusion of the target, (e.g., inclusion of an aggressive target) the target's distress will not be taken into consideration when evaluating the exclusion decision. In contrast, when the group is under no threat of harm as a result of the target's inclusion, (e.g., inclusion of a shy target) the target's distress *will* be taken into consideration. Essentially, the argument is that exclusion of certain targets is often seen as reasonable from a group functioning perspective. In this proposal, the assessment of exclusion judgments over multiple contexts will help to identify the characteristics that are salient across both competitive and noncompetitive contexts, and those characteristics that are salient only in one context.

Linking the hypotheses about emotional distress to the hypotheses about the effect of the relevance of information, it is argued that emotional distress/harm to the target will be more relevant when exclusion is based on group membership traits, as that piece of information is argued to be less relevant than other pieces of information such as character traits or ability. Finally, the assumption is that 1) the relevance of the information, 2) the emotional distress of the target, and 3) the rights of the group members will be meaningfully integrated toward the end of evaluating the exclusion decision starting at around the age of six. As mentioned in the above review, the ability to integrate disparate pieces of information seems to emerge at around the age of six (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). At this age, children may have the information processing capacity to maintain in mind different considerations toward the end of integrating perspectives into a coherent judgment (Magimairaj, Montgomery, Marinellie, & McCarthy, 2009).

In terms of evaluating exclusion, the prediction from a relevant information account is that when the target is in some way irreconcilable/mismatched with group goals (e.g., a bad chess player wants to join a championship chess club, an aggressive child wants to join a group that does not want to be aggressive), then exclusion will be evaluated positively. Alternatively, when a target is matched to group goals (e.g., a great chess player wants to join a championship chess club, a nonaggressive child wants to join a group that does not want to be aggressive), then exclusion will be evaluated negatively, and as mentioned, it may be inferred that the group has a prejudice against the target in cases in which the group desires exclusion of a target who seems consistent with group goals. Finally, one can have a case in which the information is irrelevant, and, as in the case of matched characteristics to goals, participants are hypothesized to be less accepting of exclusion, as there is no relevant information for them to go on in the scenario. The goal for future research then is to more systematically connect participants' inferential processes given information about a target to evaluations of exclusion.

Given the above mentioned approach to more fully connect the process of inference in exclusion situations to one's evaluations of exclusion, it may be possible to more fully define the nature of the age related shift seen in the above three studies in how participants use information to evaluate exclusion at around the age of six. As stated above, it might be that, 1) children around this age reject the concern for the group's functioning in light of concerns for the harm to the target, or 2) before the age of seven children can take information about targets and exclusion contexts into account, but they lack the ability to integrate the information about the target, the potential harm to the target, and the concerns for group functioning (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig,

& Lau, 1996). Indeed, even 18 month olds can correctly assess another's desires (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), and 4 year olds have been shown to take the perspective of their play partner (Putallaz & Gottman, 1981; Rose-Krasnor, Rubin, Booth, & Coplan, 1996). It therefore should not be assumed that this six-year shift is a result of an increase in the ability to take the perspective of others, as this ability is evident much earlier than age six.

In order to isolate the ability to assess decrements in group functioning, one could ask participants whether a certain target will increase, decrease, or keep the same the functioning of the group. This independent variable could then be used to predict the acceptability judgments of different types of exclusion that are based on the manipulation of both contextual as well as target characteristics.

Lastly, and in addition to the above mentioned points that need to be addressed, it will remain important, to the extent that it is possible, to separate out stereotypic activities from neutral activities. As a relevant example, using dolls and trucks, versus playing at the water table could be one easy way to hold constant the stereotypicality of the activity in question. This point is practically important, as using stereotypical activities prevented Theimer, Killen and Stangor, (2001) from developing the appropriate control condition for their study (a nonstereotypical child who had more experience with the nonstereotypical activity). The reason they did not include this condition is simply due to the fact that children rejected the premise that this scenario could exist. This finding alone suggests that stereotypes are strongly held even at the age of 4, which is generally known (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006). The additional benefit of having a stereotype neutral activity is that one can assess the use of group membership information in

isolation from a stereotypic activity, whereas in the above studies, the two were conflated. This might matter to the extent that children only use group membership information when the activity is somehow relevant to that information. Again, the only reason group membership would be relevant to the activity in question would be if participants held a stereotypic expectation about performance in that activity based on group membership. Indeed, play activities have been shown to be highly stereotyped along gender lines (Fein, Johnson, Kosson, Stork, & Wasserman, 1975). In this proposal, the decision was made to use a soccer exclusion context, as it is normative for both males and females to play the sport.

Developmentally, older children are less likely to agree with statements that include explicit stereotypes than are younger children, and this has led to a move toward implicit measures to capture stereotypes (e.g., Baron & Banaji, 2006). Although an important literature, the reason for bringing up this work is not to make progress in this literature *per se* but rather to isolate variables of interest in the judgment of exclusion, without having to deal with any preconceived notions about aptitude given stereotypic activities.

In summary then, the argument is that *relevant* information about a target is used to assess the extent to which inclusion would result in reductions in group functioning. If reductions in group functioning are perceived to be likely upon inclusion, then exclusion will be evaluated more positively than if reductions in group functioning are perceived to be unlikely. In order to study this, one needs to systematically vary target-group mismatch, as well as the nature of the mismatch so as to be able to document under what conditions people judge certain information to be relevant to an exclusion decision.

Social Domain theory has provided the field with thoughtful critiques to many practically and theoretically important arguments, including arguing that moral beliefs are universally shared across time and place, and that it is our informational beliefs that create different practices or responses to identical events across time and place (Wainryb, 1991, 1993); that moral education might profit from a more bottom-up approach, specifically that children should be taught to attend to important features of other's beliefs rather than being taught the right way to think (Wainryb, Shaw, Langley, Cottam, & Lewis, 2004); and that the acceptability of lying is contextually bound (Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Shaw, & Wainryb, 2006). It is hoped that this review provides some insight into the nature of moral judgments and potential ways in which research on social exclusion, and maybe the field of moral psychology more generally can be linked together with other fields.

CHAPTER III

Methodology

Participants

Participants were 122 7th ($M = 12.6$ years, $SD = .69$, 70 Female) and 79 11th ($M = 16.5$ years, $SD = .57$, 52 Female) grade students, for a total sample size of 201 participants (see table 9). The sample size was chosen based on results from multiple power analyses (Cohen, 1992; Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003) using relevant data in the literature (Horn, 2003; McGlothlin & Killen, 2006; Park & Killen, 2010).

The decision was made to study these age ranges based on the salience of exclusion for adolescents in middle and high school (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). Beyond the salience of exclusion, with age, adolescents make less use of information about group membership (Horn, 2003), and give increasingly greater consideration to group functioning (Killen, Henning, Kelly, Crystal, & Ruck, 2007).

The ethnic breakdown of the sample was as follows: 36% African-American, 33% European-American, 11% Hispanic-American, and 11% mixed ethnicity, representing a heterogeneous sample, similar to past studies utilizing similar methods (e.g., Crystal, Killen, & Ruck, 2008). It was hypothesized that those participants in the numeric minority, (i.e., groups other than European-American), would be less accepting of exclusion based on nationality than will those participants in the numeric majority. No differences were expected however in judgments given information about a target's personality traits (aggression, shyness) or physical characteristics (ability, hair length). All participants were from low-middle, to middle income backgrounds.

Design

The study involves between-subjects and within-subjects factors for an overall design that includes a 2 (gender: Female, Male) X 2 (age: 7th, 11th) X 2 (ethnicity: majority, minority) X 2 (group goal: competitive, noncompetitive) X 6 (target characteristic: shyness, gender, aggression, nationality, ability, hair length) model with repeated measures on the last factor.

As shown in Figure 1, the group goal is a between-subjects variable; participants evaluated either a competitive or a non-competitive group goal. The target characteristics factor is a within-subjects variable: all participants evaluated each of 6 target characteristics as a basis for exclusion. Specifically, this survey employed a within (target characteristic: aggressive, shy, gender, nationality, ability, hair length) and between-subjects design (group goal: competitive, noncompetitive) (see tables 2 and 3).

Measures

Group Goal. There were two different group goals to be evaluated in this survey: competitive and noncompetitive. Each participant evaluated one of these two goals. In both goals, it was a soccer club that was presented as the group context (description of the competitive context: “A group of kids decide to form a competitive soccer club. They had been playing with a noncompetitive soccer club, but they want to create their own club so they can enter different tournaments to try to win trophies and prizes”).

Dependent Measures. As mentioned above, participants were first asked to consider the acceptability of exclusion within either a competitive or noncompetitive group goals based on one of the following descriptions of a target: aggression, shyness, female, Brazilian, long hair, and not good at soccer. After this, participants were asked to reconsider their judgment given additional information about the target’s ability or lack

thereof (see below). It should be noted that five of the six characteristics do not include ability information, and thus the manipulation of information about ability proceeds logically. This is not the case, however when the target is described as bad at soccer, and therefore the follow-up adjustments are not assessed for this characteristic due to the incoherence of such a manipulation.

Judgment, and Justifications. Specifying group members desires for exclusion was chosen as the means by which participants would be presented with an opportunity to judge the acceptability of excluding different targets: 1) Acceptability of exclusion judgment – Characteristic (e.g., “People who are from Brazil cannot be members” (1 = Very not okay, 6 = Very okay); “Why (is this okay or not okay)?”); 2) Acceptability of exclusion judgment – Ability + Characteristic (e.g., “Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members?”); and, 3) Acceptability of exclusion judgment – No Ability + Characteristic (e.g., “Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members?”).

The three Judgment questions were evaluated on a 6-point Likert scale, from 1 = *very not okay*, to 6 = *very okay*, while the associated open-ended *Justification* questions allowed the participant to write-in a justification for their judgment. Justifications were coded (for coding rules, see table 3).

As mentioned in the introduction, having participants evaluate target characteristics was meant to provide an anchor for exclusion judgments on a trait that was likely to have no association to group goals (length of hair) and a trait that could not be

more closely linked to group goals (information about how skilled the target is at soccer). With these anchors, it was believed that interpretation of the other four characteristics (i.e., aggression, shyness, gender, nationality) would be enhanced.

Independent Measures Hypercompetitiveness Attitude Scale. Participants were asked to answer questions about their orientation to competition (e.g., “I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest or conflict.”). A 5-point Likert scale, from 1 = Strongly disagree, to 5 = Strongly agree, was filled out for 25 of the original 26 items specified in the original formulation of the scale (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990). This instrument was modified to remove any negatively worded items to reduce the processing capacity required to answer the questions, and one item that referred to driving was removed as it was not relevant for a middle school sample. In order to assess whether shortening the length of the scale from 25 to 10 items was feasible, 28 college student participants were recruited to complete the scale. Items were selected from the initial pool for the reduced scale by assessing the strength of the correlation of each item to the total score, which was calculated as the sum of responses to all items. The 10 items with the highest item-total correlations were retained (range of item-total correlations for items retained: $r = .53 - .86$). Cronbach’s alpha for the full scale was .86. Recalculating alpha with the reduced scale revealed no reduction in alpha (.90).

The Hypercompetitiveness Attitude Scale (HCA) (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990) was selected for this study as a psychometrically reliable instrument designed to measure how competitive one is in daily life. This scale was administered to

all participants (see Appendix A). This measure of individual difference in propensity to see the world in competitive terms was chosen to assess whether any differences in hypercompetitiveness would relate to the acceptability of exclusion. Specifically, those who were deemed more hypercompetitive may be more likely to accept exclusion based on ability in the noncompetitive context than those who were deemed less hypercompetitive.

As mentioned above, the HCA scale has demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .91) and test-retest reliability ($r = .81$). Validity evidence has been argued through correlation analyses between the HCA and the Win-at-any-Cost Sports Competition Scale ($r = .24$), competitive-cooperative attitude scale ($r = .48$), as well as a negative correlation ($r = -.34$) between HCA and a Self-Esteem Scale, and finally through a positive correlation ($r = .48$) between HCA and a scale of Neuroticism.

The choice to utilize the HCA as opposed to the win-at-any-cost scale was made because of the moral neutrality in item writing for the HCA. Where the win-at-any-cost scale had participants assess items such as the following: "Player A during a golf match made noises and movements when player B was getting ready to make a shot", the HCA assessed participants on items that did not have the "sportsmanship" component embedded in the question (i.e., "I compete with others whether they are competing with me or not."). The win-at-any-cost scale items ask participants to indicate whether they approve or disapprove of doing something that is a violation of good sportsmanship. Said another way, this win-at-any-cost scale was thought to conflate hypercompetitiveness with moral concerns for good sportsmanship.

As mentioned above, following Ryckman and colleagues' (1997) procedures for scoring this instrument, responses to each item were scored from 1 to 5, and total scores were calculated as the summation of the scores on each individual item. While evidence for validity has been reported, no factor analyses have yet been undertaken to assess the validity of the 1-factor model specified in the authors' theoretical formulations. Because a sufficiently large sample size was not utilized for the pilot study to be able to conduct and produce stable results in a factor analysis, (Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003) total scores were utilized at this piloting stage. For the study sample however, factor analysis was run on the 10 items that were retained.

Experience with exclusion. Participants were asked to answer questions about: 1) their experience with being excluded (e.g., "I have been excluded from competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball)"; questions 33-36 in Appendix C); 2) their experience with excluding others (e.g., "I have excluded someone from an activity before"; question 37 in Appendix C); and, 3) their involvement in groups (e.g., "I have been involved in competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball)"; questions 39-41 in Appendix C). As above, a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Never, to 5 = Always was filled out for all items. Because the experience with exclusion items were expected to load on the same factor (perceptions of exclusion experience), as with the HCA scale, a total score was derived and reliability (alpha) and validity (Factor Analysis) of the scale items were assessed. If appropriate in light of reliability and validity analyses, the total score will be used as a predictor of acceptability judgments in regression analyses.

Stereotype Affirmation Measure. Participants were asked to answer questions about their perception of the extent to which different groups are competitive and good at soccer (e.g., “When it comes to soccer, how good are Brazilians?”). A 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Not at all, to 6 = Very was filled out for all 12 items. Like with the experience with exclusion items, these items were not expected to load together, and were utilized in isolated regression equations as relevant (i.e., items about affirmation of gender stereotypes will be used as predictors of acceptability of exclusion judgments given a female target). In order to guard against model misspecification, participant gender and ethnicity were included in the model as predictors along with the propensity to stereotype when the stereotype referenced either gender or ethnicity-based stereotypes.

Belief in Change. Participants were asked to answer two questions about their perception of the extent to which individuals can change their personality (e.g., “No matter who somebody is and how they act, they can always change their personality”) (Levy & Dweck, 1999). A 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Very strongly disagree, to 6 = Very strongly agree was filled out for both items. Because the items were expected to load on one factor, the scores on each item will be summed to create a total score over the two items. This total score will be used as a predictor of exclusion judgments.

Procedure

The IRB granted a waiver of parental consent. After receiving school district approval and contacting principals, visits to schools were made for the administration. Only adolescents who gave assent were surveyed (for flyer and assent form, see Appendices B & C, respectively).

At the school visit, the study was described, the assent form was distributed and the voluntary, confidential and anonymous nature of the survey was described during allotted class time for group administration, and the survey was distributed to all who provided assent. Adolescents who chose not to participate were given the choice of working on their own work, or were provided with a short research article to read.

Adolescents were told that they could raise their hands and ask questions at any time during the session. In addition, adolescents were told that there were no right or wrong answers, and failure to complete the survey would in no way affect their school grades. They were instructed to fill out the survey as completely as possible. The survey took approximately 20 minutes to complete.

Each participant was asked to provide basic demographic information (age, gender, school, and ethnicity). Next, participants were presented with the social reasoning about exclusion survey as well as the Independent variables mentioned above.

Justification Coding Responses

Justification responses were coded using a coding category system based on previous research used to analyze social reasoning (Killen et al., 2001; Smetana, 1995) and on the results of the pilot data reported below. The categories that were used to code the justifications were: 1) Moral (e.g., “The team is *jumping to conclusion* that he wouldn’t be an asset to the team *without even getting to know him*”); 2) Social Conventional – Group Functioning (e.g., “If Joe is bad [at soccer], he should not play on a competitive team, regardless of where he’s from”); 3) Social Conventional – Group Functioning with Stereotype use (e.g., “If they are shy, they will not run after the ball/stand around”); 4) Social Conventional – Conventions/Traditions (e.g., “My parents

say that it is not alright to exclude a child”); 5) Psychological – Personal Choice (e.g., “If they don’t want the kid to join, it’s okay. It’s their club”); 6) Psychological – Personal Development (e.g., “Maybe being active in soccer will take his anger away”); 7) Prudential (e.g., “His hair could get pulled and he could get hurt”) and, 8) Undifferentiated (unreadable, incomplete). (See Table 3).

Reliability

Reliability of the coding system was calculated using two coders who independently code 20% of the surveys. Inter-rater reliability was determined by the percent agreement between the coders as well as the more conservative Cohen’s kappa statistic, which adjusts for chance agreement.

Plan for Analysis

Hypotheses were tested using ANOVA and Regression. Any required follow-up tests for significant findings in ANOVA were conducted using the Bonferroni correction to control for accumulation of Type 1 error given multiple follow-up tests. The main hypotheses and analyses run to test each hypothesis is listed in table 4.

Participant Variables

Gender, numeric minority status, and age of participant were included in all analyses. Any relations found between gender of participant and acceptability judgments were expected to be explained by gender differences in levels of hypercompetitiveness. Numeric ethnic minority status was expected to be related to the propensity to reject exclusion based on ethnicity. Age of participant was expected to relate to the acceptability of exclusion, as studies have suggested that younger adolescents are more accepting of exclusion given ambiguous situations (Horn, 2003). The primary goal

however was to assess the extent to which differences in context affected the acceptability of exclusion based on different target characteristics.

Exclusion Scenario

Hypotheses concerning the six questions about the acceptability of exclusion in each exclusion scenario respectively were assessed with 2 (Gender: Female, Male) X 2 (Age: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Ethnicity: Minority, Majority) X 6 (Target characteristics: Shy, Gender, Nationality, Aggression, Hair Length, Ability) ANOVAs. This served to provide a between subjects comparison for participants' ratings of the acceptability of excluding based on a target's characteristics.

It was expected, and has been shown in past studies (Park & Killen, 2010), that excluding based on aggression would be seen as most acceptable. Justifications were expected to differ according to the characteristic described in much the same way that acceptability judgments would. Specifically, it was expected that moral concerns for the target would be less salient (i.e., less often cited as justification) when the target was described as aggressive than when the target was described by group membership (gender or nationality) or as shy.

It was further predicted that gender and nationality of target would be inversely related to acceptability judgments in the competitive context to the extent that the participant stereotypes females as worse at soccer than males, and Brazilians as better at soccer than Americans. To assess this, as well as other links to participant variables, regressions were conducted testing relations between the independent variables and acceptability judgments and justifications. Regressions were conducted on acceptability judgments with hypercompetitiveness, experience with exclusion, stereotypic

conceptions of groups, and perceptions of the changeability of traits as the predictors. As another example, it was expected that those who self-identify as hypercompetitive would be more accepting of exclusion based on ability and less concerned about the harm to the target as a result of exclusion.

2 (gender: Female, Male) X 2 (age: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Ethnicity: Minority, Majority) X 2 (Group Goal: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Target Characteristics: Shyness, Gender, Aggression, Nationality, Hair Length, Ability) repeated measures ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor were conducted to assess the effect of context on the acceptability of different exclusion scenarios. It was expected that exclusion based on aggression would be seen as more acceptable in the noncompetitive context than in the competitive context.

When adding information about a target's ability, it was expected that exclusion judgments would depend on whether the target was described as good or bad at soccer. Further this information was predicted to make a greater impact on judgments in the competitive than in the noncompetitive context.

CHAPTER IV

Result

Plan for Analysis

Hypotheses were tested using repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)¹ (1 = footnote: ‘see Wainryb, et al, 2004, or Wainryb, et al, 2001 for logic of this analysis for dichotomous justification data’) and multiple linear regression analysis. When appropriate, follow-up tests on the ANOVAs were conducted using univariate ANOVAs for the within-subject factors and all follow-up paired samples t-tests were corrected for type-I error inflation using the Bonferroni correction. To control for violations of sphericity in the repeated measures ANOVAs, the Huynh-Feldt correction was utilized. The primary participant variables of interest for this study include the independent variables of gender, age, and ethnicity, and the predictor variables of hyper-competitiveness, belief in the changeability of traits, propensity to stereotype, and experience with exclusion. The primary design variables of interest include the soccer context (between subjects: competitive, noncompetitive) and the target characteristics (within subjects: shy, aggressive, gender, nationality, soccer ability, and hair length). The primary dependent variables include participant judgment about the acceptability of exclusion (“How acceptable is it to exclude [girls]?”), and their justification for their judgments (“Why?”).

Data Entry, Cleaning, and Examination of Outliers

The data for this study were double entered to ensure accuracy. Examination of outliers and deletion of incomplete cases proceeded as follows. First, for examination of outliers, participants whose responses fell 3 standard deviations above or below the mean on any survey question were noted and patterns of extreme responding were tracked.

Given the size of the standard deviation terms, only one participant was flagged twice, and it was decided that this participant would be retained in the data file given the infrequency with which the responses were extreme. Secondly, missing data was analyzed, and it was found that one participant had failed to complete the second half of the survey. This participant was deleted from the data file. 93% of participants responded to all questions, with the rest missing responses to one or two questions. Analysis of questions revealed that the personality change items that referred to shy and aggressive traits were overrepresented in terms of missing data. After looking at the surveys, it was found that these questions were not included in a subset of the noncompetitive version surveys (7 packets were affected), and that these packets were distributed only to 11th grade participants. Given the nature and minimal extent of the missing data (resulting from experimenter error), this missing data was considered missing at random.

Judgments of Social Exclusion

A 2 (Sex: Male, Female) X 2 (Grade: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Nationality: Majority, Minority) X 2 (Context: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Target Characteristic: Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) ANOVA was conducted on participants' acceptability judgments with repeated measures on the last factor (see Table 8 for descriptive statistics). Three- and four-way interaction effects were not analyzed, given the small number of participants in each group.

Participant Variables (Demographic)

Participant Gender. Results revealed as predicted, that across target characteristics females were less accepting of exclusion than were their male counterparts $F(1,175) = 6.67, p < .05, \eta^2 = .04$ (Female $M = 2.29; SD = .60$; Males $M = 2.52; SD =$

.63). Results also revealed an interaction effect between gender and target characteristics $F(5,875) = 2.73, p < .05, \eta^2 = .02$. Follow-up analyses revealed that males were more accepting of exclusion based on gender $F(1,175) = 15.71, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$ (Males $M = 2.38, SD = 1.33$; Females $M = 1.74, SD = 1.09$) and hair length $F(1,175) = 4.61, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$ (Males $M = 1.58, SD = .87$; Females $M = 1.30, SD = .56$) than were females.

Participant Age. Results revealed that across target characteristics, 11th graders were more accepting of exclusion than were 7th graders, $F(1,175) = 5.11, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$ (7th $M = 2.30, SD = .62$; 11th $M = 2.51, SD = .63$). An interaction effect between participant age and characteristics was revealed $F(5,875) = 4.16, p < .01, \eta^2 = .02$. Follow-up analyses revealed that participants in 11th grade were more accepting of gender $F(1,175) = 14.34, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$ (11th $M = 2.40, SD = 1.42$; 7th $M = 1.72, SD = 1.00$) and ability $F(1,175) = 4.72, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$ (11th $M = 3.22, SD = 1.66$; 7th $M = 2.96, SD = 1.35$) based exclusion than were 7th graders.

Participant Ethnicity. Contrary to expectations, there were no interaction effects between participant ethnicity and characteristic nor were there any main effects of participant ethnicity across characteristics.

Target Characteristics. A significant main effect was found for Target Characteristic, $F(5,875) = 257.94, p < .001, \eta^2 = .60$. Follow-up tests confirmed the expectation that participants would rate exclusion based on a target's aggression as the most acceptable reason to exclude ($M = 4.60, SD = 1.23$). Lack of soccer ability was seen as the next most acceptable reason to exclude ($M = 3.05, SD = 1.62$), while nationality was seen as the least most acceptable reason to exclude ($M = 1.23, SD = .65$). Exclusion

based on the length of the target's hair length ($M = 1.41$, $SD = .79$) was seen as more acceptable than excluding based on nationality but less acceptable than excluding based on shyness ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.19$) and gender ($M = 2.16$, $SD = 1.27$) which were not differentiated.

It is instructive to note that only aggression had a mean on the 'acceptable' end of the response scale (from 4 = okay to exclude to 6 = very okay to exclude). A descriptive analysis of the proportion of participants who rated exclusion as acceptable provides another means of analyzing the differences found in the above analysis of the role of target characteristic in one's exclusion judgments. Results revealed that while 87% of participants rated it as acceptable to exclude an aggressive target, only 1 and 2% of participants rated it as acceptable to exclude a target based on his nationality or on the target's hair length, respectively. In contrast, 10% of participants rated it as acceptable to exclude based on shyness, 15% based on gender, and 38% based on soccer ability.

Target Characteristics X Group Goals (Competitive/noncompetitive). The expected interaction between characteristics and group goals was significant $F(5,875) = 3.69, p < .01, \eta^2 = .02$. Follow-up analyses revealed, partially disconfirming expectations, that exclusion based on shyness and aggression was not evaluated contextually. However, a distinction in exclusion judgments was made that took into account the group's goals when the target was described by his lack of soccer playing prowess. Specifically, participants found it more acceptable to exclude a target who was no good at soccer when the group goal was competitive than when it was noncompetitive $F(1,175) = 6.03, p < .05, \eta^2 = .03$ (Competitive $M = 3.33, SD = 1.44$; Noncompetitive $M = 2.76, SD = 1.48$). All other comparisons were not statistically significantly different (see figure 1).

In summary, while gender- and nationality-based exclusion was evaluated similarly to hair length-based exclusion (i.e., evaluated negatively regardless of goal condition), expectations were only partially confirmed for the expected relation between aggression, shyness, and ability; only ability was evaluated contextually based on goal condition, whereas exclusion based on shyness and aggression was evaluated similarly across goal conditions.

Judgments of Social Exclusion Given Further Individuating Information. A 3 (Individuating Ability Information: Good, Bad, Undefined) X 6 (Target Characteristic: Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) ANOVA was conducted on participants' acceptability judgments with repeated measures on both factors. Consistent with expectations, there was a main effect of Characteristic $F(4,792) = 357.34, p < .001, \eta^2 = .64$; Individuating Ability Information $F(2,396) = 105.51, p < .001, \eta^2 = .35$, and an interaction between Characteristic and Individuating Ability

Information $F(8,1584) = 38.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16$. Because the main effect of target characteristic was previously reported, the focus in this section will be on the effect that individuating information has on judgments. Pairwise comparisons between the three different information conditions revealed that, across all characteristics, there was no difference between the baseline characteristics (hair length, shyness, aggression, gender, nationality) and when these targets were described as better at soccer than others on the team ($M = 2.24, Std Error = .04$; $M = 2.23, Std Error = .05$, respectively). These conditions revealed negative judgments of exclusion compared to when the targets were described as worse at soccer than all of the members ($M = 3.15, Std Error = .08$). The interaction between characteristic and individuating information revealed unexpected use of information for nationality & hair length-based exclusion, such that compared to the baseline characteristic condition, adolescents were more accepting of exclusion when the target was described as better than other members (Nationality: $M_{no\ info} = 1.24, Std Error = .04$; $M_{good\ at\ soccer} = 1.61, Std Error = .08$; Hair length: $M_{no\ info} = 1.40, Std Error = .05$; $M_{good\ at\ soccer} = 1.64, Std Error = .08$). Aggression-based exclusion revealed that it was seen as less acceptable to exclude if the target was good at soccer than if the target was only described as aggressive ($M_{no\ info} = 4.55, Std Error = .08$; $M_{good\ at\ soccer} = 4.04, Std Error = .09$).

As expected, for all characteristics except aggression, when the target was described as worse than others it was found to be more acceptable to exclude than the baseline description and when the target was described as good at soccer (Gender: $M_{no\ info} = 1.99, Std Error = .09$; $M_{bad\ at\ soccer} = 3.02, Std Error = .10$; Nationality: $M_{no\ info} = 1.24, Std Error = .04$; $M_{bad\ at\ soccer} = 2.68, Std Error = .10$; Shyness: $M_{no\ info} = 2.04, Std Error =$

.08; $M_{bad\ at\ soccer} = 2.96$, $Std\ Error = .11$; Hair Length: $M_{no\ info} = 1.40$, $Std\ Error = .05$; $M_{bad\ at\ soccer} = 2.68$, $Std\ Error = .10$). In contrast, there was no difference between baseline judgments and judgments when the aggressive target was described as bad at soccer ($M_{no\ info} = 4.55$, $Std\ Error = .08$; $M_{good\ at\ soccer} = 4.44$, $Std\ Error = .10$).

In summary, the group goal manipulation was effective to the extent that participants viewed exclusion based on ability as more acceptable in competitive than in noncompetitive contexts, but the findings were unexpectedly overwhelmed by the main effect of ability, which revealed that participants viewed ability information as salient across both competitive and noncompetitive group goals.

Participant Variables (Predictor)

Hypercompetitiveness. In evaluating the ten items in the adjusted hypercompetitiveness attitude (HCA) scale, three questions did not correlate with the other seven, which cohered together in a statistically significant manner (i.e., all r s ranging between .14 - .48). As a consequence, Cronbach's alpha was low (.63). Rerunning Cronbach's alpha with the reduced 7-item scale resulted in an increase in alpha (.73). A factor analysis was run to assess the tenability of the 1-factor structure of the HCA as posited by the authors (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990). Fit indices suggested that the 1 factor model was not tenable (SRMR = .058; RMSEA = .087). In light of the disconfirmatory results, and given that the items formed a reliable scale, it was decided that the summative scale would be used in regression and compared to regression analyses in which principal components (an analysis technique in which no model is specified) were used in predicting exclusion acceptability judgments.

As with the correlation analysis above, a principal components analysis was run on the 10 indicators to see whether the three items flagged were also flagged in this analysis. While Bartlett's test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy met the conventional criteria for factorability ($>.7$) for the 10-indicator set, the item individual measures of sampling adequacy (MSA) indicated that the same three items that did not correlate significantly to the other items as mentioned above did not reach the conventional criteria of .7, suggesting that the items did not cohere with the other seven. In looking at the scree plot from the PCA, two factors were indicated, with the three uncorrelated questions loading on the second component, and the seven questions that had shown coherence loaded on the first component (see table 1).

Given that varimax rotation did not improve interpretability of the components, a decision was made to leave the two extracted components uncorrelated.

Finally, in order to assess whether participant age may have affected the interpretability and factorability of the HCA items, separate reliability analyses were run for 7th and 11th grade participants respectively. Results revealed no difference in the reliability of the items across grade ($\alpha = .71$ and $.75$ for 7th and 11th grade participants, respectively).

Two regressions were run; one that regressed the summative HCA scale against the acceptability of excluding a bad soccer player, particularly in the noncompetitive context, and one that regressed the first two principal components extracted from the seven HCA indicators against the same exclusion acceptability question. When using the HCA scale as a regressor, it was found that those who were more hypercompetitive were more accepting of excluding a bad soccer player in the noncompetitive group goal condition than those who were less competitive ($r^2 = .06$, $F = 6.15$, $p < .05$; $\beta = .239$). Similar results were revealed when running the regression with the first two components as regressors; such that the higher scores on the first component, the more acceptable it was seen to exclude a bad soccer player from a noncompetitive club ($r^2 = .05$, $F = 5.65$, $p < .05$; $\beta = .230$). As expected, given that the second PC revealed loadings inconsistent with any substantive interpretations, the second component did not relate to exclusion acceptability judgments.

Experience with exclusion. As with hypercompetitiveness, the items measuring experience with exclusion were correlated to assess the extent to which the self-reported experiences with exclusion cohered. Indeed, those reporting more exclusion experiences

in one domain (e.g., competitive nonathletic) reported significantly more exclusion experiences in other domains (e.g., noncompetitive athletic, with correlations ranging from .174-.476). Unlike with the HCA scale however, Cronbach's alpha estimate (.65) did not meet conventional criteria for reliability of a scale. Running a PCA revealed a 1-factor solution for the four exclusion experience items. The first factor explained 51.69% of the variance in the four items. As above, a decision was made to sum the scores from the four items into one Exclusion Experience item, to use for prediction purposes, but caution in interpretation of the results of regression analyses with this summed scale score was maintained.

Using this summative scale to assess whether experience with exclusion was related to the acceptability of excluding a bad soccer player, particularly in the noncompetitive context, it was found, contrary to expectations, that those with more exclusion experiences were more accepting of exclusion than those with less exclusion experiences ($r^2 = .04$, $F = 3.93$, $p = .05$; $\beta = .194$). As above, a regression was run with the first extracted component, and as above, the regression confirmed the results found with the summative scale. Again, this finding is not given much weight given the low reliability.

Because the above sets of analyses for experience with exclusion and HCA were run with just the ability question in mind, and because there was a concern that the model may have been misspecified given that simple univariate regression analyses were run which would not allow for a test of the extent to which collinearity effects may have adjusted the above interpretations of significance, a decision was made to include the above HCA and experience with exclusion predictors, as well as the participant variables

of gender, grade, and majority/minority status in a stepwise regression. Results revealed that only majority/minority status, experience with exclusion and HCA level predicted and remained significant predictors in the model, such that those who self-reported as more hypercompetitive ($r^2 = .07$, $F = 6.84$, $p = .05$; $\beta = .25$), having more experience with exclusion ($r^2 = .04$, $F = 4.03$, $p = .05$; $\beta = .22$), and those with minority status ($r^2 = .05$, $F = 6.06$, $p = .05$; $\beta = -.24$) were more accepting of exclusion of a bad soccer player in the noncompetitive context, with each predictor adding significantly to the variance explained in exclusion acceptability judgments ($R^2 = .16$).

Involvement in competitive activities. Judgments of acceptability of excluding a bad soccer player from a competitive context were regressed against participant self-report of frequency with which they engaged in competitive activities (both athletic and nonathletic). Contrary to expectations, there was no relation between the extent to which a participant reported being involved in competitive activities and the acceptability of excluding a bad soccer player from a competitive soccer club.

Stereotyping. It was expected that participants who affirmed stereotypes about competitiveness and ability would make use of those stereotypes in exclusion judgments. For these stereotypes in particular, it was expected that participants would be more likely to judge females as less good at soccer than males, while participants would judge Brazilians as better at soccer than Americans, and that these stereotypes would be more likely to influence exclusion decisions in the competitive context. In order to test this, participant's scores on gender and nationality stereotypes were regressed on participants' exclusion acceptability judgments for gender and nationality, respectively.

When gender exclusion was regressed on participants' perceptions of how good females are at soccer, it was found that the more able you thought females were at soccer, the less acceptable you found exclusion of females in the competitive context ($r^2 = .15$, $F = 16.74$, $p = .001$; $\beta = -.39$). This finding remained significant when participant sex was entered in the model, despite the significant correlation between participant sex and propensity to stereotype females as good at soccer ($-.385$) (note that the tolerance (.911) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) (1.098) statistics did not suggest problems with collinearity). The same was true for nationality-based exclusion, such that the more talented you perceived Brazilians to be, the less acceptable you found their exclusion from competitive soccer clubs ($r^2 = .13$, $F = 14.17$, $p = .001$; $\beta = -.36$). As above, this interpretation was not altered despite entering participant majority/minority status in the model, which did not correlate with perceptions of Brazilian's soccer ability.

When analyzing stereotypes about shy individuals' competitiveness, the more competitiveness perceived, the less acceptable it was seen to exclude ($r^2 = .04$, $F = 4.32$, $p = .05$; $\beta = -.21$). Similarly, when perceived as more able in soccer, exclusion of shy

individuals was seen as less acceptable ($r^2 = .05$, $F = 4.80$, $p = .05$; $\beta = -.22$). Because no measure of participant shyness was provided to participants, it was not possible to assess whether these results would hold taking into account the participants' levels of shyness.

HCA-Stereotype Interactions (Moderation effects). It was thought that as HCA increased, the effect of stereotypic conceptions of groups would become more relevant in noncompetitive contexts. According to Baron and Kenny, (1986) moderation effects of HCA on the relation between stereotypic conceptions of groups and exclusion acceptability of a target from the group in question were tested by regressing exclusion acceptability judgments on stereotypic conceptions of groups, HCA scale score, and then the product of the stereotypic conceptions of groups and HCA scale score. Contrary to expectations, there was no interactive/moderation effect of HCA on the relation between stereotypic conceptions of groups and exclusion acceptability for the gender, nationality, or the shyness based exclusion scenarios.

Involvement in Competitive Contexts-Stereotypes Interactions

Similar to the above expectations, it was expected that the more experience with competitive activities one reports, the more that stereotypic conceptions of groups would influence one's acceptability of exclusion judgments. As above, exclusion acceptability judgments were regressed on stereotypic conceptions of groups, HCA scale score, and the product of the two variables. When analyzing the acceptability of excluding females from competitive soccer clubs, and given that female participants were found to be less accepting of excluding females, participant gender was included in the regression analysis. Results revealed that when participant gender was included in the model, the effect of involvement with competitive activities failed to reach statistical significance. In

contrast, and while there was no interaction between competitive activity involvement and stereotypic conceptions of groups, there was a negative relation between involvement in competitive athletic activities and exclusion acceptability regarding the exclusion of a Brazilian target from a competitive group ($r^2 = .07$, $F = 7.25$, $p = .01$; $\beta = -.27$). No relations tested revealed the expected relation between involvement in competitive activities and stereotypic conceptions of groups.

Change. In order to assess whether participants' exclusion judgments were influenced by their belief in the changeability of traits, we regressed participants' exclusion judgments on explicit questions asking whether people can change. No relations were revealed between exclusion acceptability and the belief in the changeability of traits.

Justifications for Judgments. To assess whether participants' group functioning justifications (e.g., "You may not win if you have bad players") differed by group goal condition, a 2 (Goals: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Group Functioning Justifications across Target Characteristics: Gender, Ethnicity, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of Ability) ANOVA was conducted with repeated measures on the last factor. Results revealed a main effect of characteristic $F(5,995) = 205.31$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .51$. Across goal conditions, group functioning justifications were used with minimal frequency for Nationality ($M = .01$), Hair length ($M = .02$), and Gender ($M = .05$), and used with more frequency when considering exclusion of a shy ($M = .11$) or aggressive target ($M = .74$) as well as a target that was described as bad at soccer ($M = .40$). Focused follow-up analyses on group functioning justification data that was utilized by more than 10% of participants was conducted to assess whether there existed an interaction effect

between goal condition and target characteristic. Three independent samples t-tests were conducted on the following characteristics: aggression, shyness, and lack of soccer ability. Contrary to expectations, no differences between goal condition and group functioning justifications emerged.

To assess whether stereotype reasoning was influential when evaluating the exclusion of a female and a Brazilian target (negatively and positively stereotyped soccer ability groups, respectively), t-tests were run with participant judgment taken into account. While stereotypic reasoning was not utilized frequently, as expected all 9% of participants utilized this form of reasoning when justifying why it was unacceptable to exclude a Brazilian from a soccer team (e.g., “You shouldn’t exclude because he is good at soccer”) $t(197) = -4.91, p < .001$. Contrary to expectations, gender based exclusion did not reveal differential stereotype justifications in support of accepting the exclusion of females. Finally, and unexpectedly, shyness based exclusion elicited stereotype reasoning ($M = .10$). When evaluating the acceptability of excluding a shy target, participants more frequently specified a negative stereotype (e.g., “he won’t go after the ball”) when justifying why it is acceptable to exclude (45%) than when justifying why it is not acceptable to exclude ($M = .06$) $t(223) = 3.42, p < .01$.

In summary, while justification data failed to reveal the same group goal distinction as was found in the judgment data for bad soccer playing targets, it was found that group functioning justifications were heavily influenced by the nature of the characteristic under consideration. That is, surface information about targets regarding nationality, gender, and hair length did not evoke group functioning concerns, whereas more deep level information about aggressiveness, shyness, and soccer ability did evoke

group functioning considerations. Finally, and regardless of goal condition, stereotypic conceptions of persons informed judgments when focusing on the acceptability of excluding a female, Brazilian, and a shy target from a soccer group.

Because there was no interaction effect in the above analysis of group functioning justification data, and because justification data represent the proportion of the sample that used a particular justification category, it was deemed important to make sure that participants' justifications were properly represented. One means by which one can judge whether the justification data has been properly represented is to assess the extent to which certain justifications reflect a majority of participants' reasoning through adding proportion data for each justification category. Results from this descriptive analysis reveal that social conventional and moral justifications account for a large percent of participant reasoning given each characteristic evaluated (see table 4). Specifically, moral justifications for gender exclusion accounted for 74% of the participant responses, while accounting for 86% and 90% of the responses in the nationality and hair length exclusion decisions, respectively. In contrast, group functioning considerations accounted for 74% of responses in the aggressive target scenario. It should, however be noted that while gender, nationality, hair length and aggression are all well represented by the two moral and social conventional justifications, there is a substantial lack of representation of the sample for shyness and lack of soccer ability (the moral and social conventional codes only account for 57% and 53% of the participant sample, respectively).

In order to better represent the sample's justifications, as well as to test the hypothesis that certain characteristics (aggression, shyness, lack of ability) will make salient the idea that the target in question can change over time, and should therefore be

given a chance in the group, (particularly in a noncompetitive context where the goal of winning does not preclude the chance to let someone develop) a second 6 (Target Characteristic: Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on participants' justifications that referenced personal development. While again no interaction effect was found between goal condition and target characteristic, a main effect was found for personal development justifications across the six target characteristics, $F(5,995) = 87.76, p < .001, \eta^2 = .31$. Personal development justifications were similarly infrequently used when the target was excluded because of his ethnicity, gender or his hair length (justifications for all three characteristics rounded to 0%). In contrast, a greater number of participants used personal development as a justification for their judgments when the target was excluded because of his aggression, shyness, or lack of soccer ability (5%, 27%, and 41%, respectively). This result suggests that personal development concerns become more salient when speaking about a target's personality or skills than when speaking about physical or group membership traits represented by gender, nationality or hair length.

Coupled with the above results for group functioning justifications as well as acceptability of exclusion judgments, exclusion based on gender, nationality, and hair length are evaluated as unacceptable because there is no clear link to group functioning concerns, whereas exclusion based on aggression is justified because the link between aggression and group functioning is very salient. Finally, exclusion based on shyness and lack of ability present a more complex story in that participants can link the traits to potential reductions in group functioning, but also seem to judge that the targets can change if given a chance.

In order to assess differences for the use of justifications for different exclusion judgments, the data file was split by participant judgment, and justifications were re-analyzed using independent samples t-tests. Because the data was split by participants' exclusion acceptability judgment, and given that few participants accepted exclusion of a target based on ethnicity or hair length, analyses of justifications for these targets were not analyzed. Given that 12 t-tests were run, the Bonferroni adjustment was utilized to correct for type-1 error inflation (from .05 to .004).

First, for all analyses comparing the proportion of participants' citing moral justifications for their judgments, it was found that those who viewed exclusion as unacceptable were more likely to use moral justifications. This was not the case however when evaluating an aggressive target, in which 13% and 17% of those indicating that exclusion was acceptable and unacceptable, respectively justified their judgment with moral concerns (see Table 4).

Contrast the above results with the finding for group functioning justifications, in which only ability based exclusion revealed a difference in justifications, with those judging exclusion as acceptable overwhelmingly justifying their judgment with group functioning concerns (79%) while those finding ability based exclusion unacceptable only infrequently employing group functioning reasoning in their justifications (15%) $t(197) = 12.55, p < .001$.

Finally, participants were found to utilize personal development justifications differently depending on their judgment of the acceptability of exclusion only when evaluating shy and bad soccer playing targets. Specifically, and in both target conditions, participants utilized more personal development justifications when they viewed the

exclusion as unacceptable (shyness: 30%, ability: 60%) than when they viewed it as acceptable (shyness: 3%, ability: 9%) shyness: $t(197) = -6.60, p < .001$; ability: $t(197) = 10.24, p < .001$.

Because there was such a discrepancy in participants' utilization of personal development justifications across shy and aggressive targets, a paired samples t-test was run on the questions that inquired explicitly about participants' beliefs in the changeability of shyness and aggression, respectively. Interestingly, when asked explicitly, there were no differences between judgments of the changeability of aggression and shyness, suggesting that while aggression is believed to be changeable, it is perhaps at the same time perceived to be less the group's responsibility to assist the target in making the change than it is the target's responsibility to make the change her or himself.

CHAPTER V

Discussion

This study investigated the nature of adolescents' judgments about peer exclusion given systematic variation of both the group's goals (competitive or noncompetitive soccer club) as well as the target's characteristics (gender, nationality, hair length, soccer ability, aggression, and shyness). Drawing on domain theory (Smetana, 2006) and the peer relations literature (Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006), this study provides further insight into the considerations that influence exclusion judgments.

Social Domain Theory

Two main findings from this study contribute to Social Domain Theory research: 1) target characteristics contributed to evaluations of exclusion as legitimate or unfair; and, 2) the use of justifications varied by the target characteristics.

Social Domain theory posits three domains of social knowledge (Moral, Conventional, Personal). Given that social exclusion is a multifaceted issue, judgments about exclusion allow for the study of coordination of domain considerations. In short, this study was an attempt at systematically adjusting the salience of negative group functioning concerns in a social exclusion situation (e.g., "He will ruin the group"). It was reasoned that the more salient the negative group functioning concern, the less impact the moral concerns for exclusion would influence the exclusion acceptability judgments (e.g., "he will feel sad if you exclude him"). It was expected that when negative group functioning concerns were salient, exclusion would be seen as acceptable. Conversely, when negative group functioning concerns were not salient, exclusion would be seen as unacceptable.

Target hair length was utilized as an arbitrary exclusion characteristic, thought to be devoid of any associations that would evoke group functioning concerns, regardless of whether the group was competitive or noncompetitive. In other words, exclusion based on hair length served as a baseline where only moral concerns were expected to be salient. Indeed, most participants found exclusion based on the length of one's hair to be unacceptable, and they overwhelmingly justified these judgments with moral concerns (e.g., "It's not fair, you don't know if he will be good at soccer/fun to be around"). These responses suggest that participants evaluated exclusion based on hair length as arbitrary.

In contrast, target soccer ability was utilized as a definitional exclusion characteristic, thought to fully evoke group functioning concerns, particularly in the competitive context. In other words, exclusion based on a target's lack of soccer ability served as an exclusion situation in which conventional, rather than moral considerations were highly salient. Judgments and justifications were supportive of this expectation, with exclusion based on lack of ability seen as more acceptable in competitive than noncompetitive contexts. Additionally, participants who accepted exclusion did so largely because of group functioning considerations (e.g., "He will ruin the group"). As expected, these responses suggest that participants evaluated exclusion based on lack of ability as nonarbitrary, which stands in contrast to hair length based exclusion.

With these two characteristics as reference points, it was possible to evaluate whether the characteristics used in prior research would be evaluated similarly across context. For example, it was thought that different contexts would evoke differential stereotypical responding based on target characteristics. One hypothesis was that stereotypical conceptions of female soccer ability would relate more strongly to exclusion

judgments in competitive than in noncompetitive contexts. Consistent with expectations, only in competitive contexts was there a negative relation between stereotypic perceptions of females' soccer ability and exclusion acceptability. That is, the less soccer skill attributed to females, the more acceptable it was seen to exclude.

This result adds to a growing body of literature that demonstrates contextual variability in the use of information (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Killen et al, in prep; Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). In this study, "information" also includes stereotypic conceptions of individuals based on group membership. Not only does this study demonstrate that stereotypes are invoked in support of a judgment, but that stereotypes are invoked narrowly rather than generally. That is, stereotypes seem to be invoked that are relevant to group functioning considerations (e.g., ability stereotypes for competitive contexts). This study adds to prior studies that show similar effects with information about peer crowd affiliation, such as the Jocks, Preppies, and Dirties (Horn, 2003; Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999). In this study, while the ambiguity of the context was not manipulated, target information and group goals were varied. With these manipulations, it was possible to determine whether certain stereotypes were more or less salient in different contexts. In noncompetitive contexts, stereotypic conceptions of ability were not as salient as they were in competitive contexts.

Stereotypes serve in part to reduce the cognitive load in situations that are marked by ambiguity (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). When evaluating whether exclusion based on gender is acceptable, ability stereotypes serve to increase (or decrease) the relevance of the characteristic. It should be noted that despite the function stereotypes serve for those who use them, there are real and often negative consequences that result

for their use (Horn, Killen, & Stangor, 1999; Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Future studies could assess the motivational underpinnings of stereotyping, toward the end of identifying mechanisms upon which stereotype-reduction interventions might prove efficacious. One construct that may relate to the propensity to utilize stereotypes may be need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This construct may allow for a further identification of the distinction between stereotype use and awareness, with those who possess a high need for closure more likely to use a stereotype in an ambiguous situation than those without a high need for closure. If links between stereotype use and need for closure existed, then there would be a motivational mechanism that could be targeted for intervention in an attempt to reduce the propensity to utilize stereotypes in ambiguous situations.

One reason to intervene to reduce the propensity to stereotype given ambiguous situations would be so that individuals can search for group goal relevant information. For example, rather than working with the assumption that a female is no good at a task that is required for a group's effective/efficient functioning, one could allow that female to demonstrate her competence. If she turns out to be bad at the group-relevant skill, then exclusion may be evaluated as legitimate. If she is good at that skill, then exclusion may be evaluated as illegitimate. Whether she is good or bad though, the inherent bias created by stereotypic assumptions of competence would be reduced, ideally replaced by a new motivational orientation that directs one to directly measure rather than assume relevant competencies.

The finding that moral reasons were used equally for why it was seen as wrong to exclude based on group membership (nationality, gender) and an arbitrary characteristic

(hair length) suggests that any negative stereotypes that were activated were either: 1) not salient enough to warrant exclusion; or, 2) were salient enough but were disguised given self-presentational concerns. The latter interpretation is not favored, given that steps were taken to reduce any concerns for self-presentation (i.e., ensuring anonymity and confidentiality of responses). Despite this, the results may nevertheless be a result of a conscious attempt to downplay the role that stereotypic conceptions of groups plays in one's judgments. Conceptual replications with information about peer crowd affiliation (e.g., Jocks, Preppies) would allow for a stronger conclusion as to whether concerns for self-presentation were driving the results. For instance, if it were shown that adolescents did not approve of crowd membership-based exclusion, then it would suggest that the results in this study reflect the adolescents' concern with the predictive value of group membership information rather than a concern with withholding biased responses. On their own, group membership characteristics do not allow for an assessment of how well the target will fit with the group, unless there are "relevant" stereotypes associated activated during the exclusion decision. This study provides further confirmatory information that adolescents reject this type of exclusion, waiting for more information about the target before concluding that exclusion is warranted.

That group functioning considerations were so heavily utilized when ability and aggression-based exclusion was evaluated suggests that this information was seen as relevant to an exclusion consideration. Further conceptual replication with different group goals (e.g., to be disruptive) and exclusion contexts (e.g., nonathletic, social, academic) would provide further support for the contention that group functioning considerations become more salient when a target doesn't fit well with the group's goals.

Finally, informational assumptions (Wainryb, 1991) seem to have played a role in exclusion judgments. Where Park and Killen (2010) found that descriptions of targets as either shy or aggressive made group functioning considerations salient, this study failed to replicate that finding. Instead, when considering exclusion of a shy individual, many adolescents rejected exclusion in favor of inclusion because they believed that shy individuals could become less shy if given a chance. When considering this type of exclusion, informational assumptions about the changeability of shyness may have served to reduce the salience of any group functioning considerations that may have been evoked with this characteristic. From a target-group fit account of exclusion judgments, it seems as though shyness is irrelevant to an exclusion decision given the assumption that shy individuals can become less shy.

It is curious then that even though adolescents acknowledged that aggressive individuals have the capacity to become less aggressive over time, they still accepted exclusion. It may be that group functioning concerns were more salient when an aggressive target was being considered as compared to a shy target. A prediction based on this target-group fit account warrants further study: exclusion will be seen as less acceptable if an aggressive target promises to become less aggressive in order to be included. In this case, as with shyness-based exclusion, what was previously considered a relevant characteristic from a group goal perspective may become less relevant given the ability of the target to change. Note that the type of change should matter, such that exclusion of a shy person who promises to become more rather than less shy might be seen as more acceptable than an exclusion of a shy person who promises to become less shy.

Peer Relation

The overarching prediction based on a Social Domain theoretical account of social exclusion (Killen & Stangor, 2001) was that exclusion would be seen as acceptable if the adolescent could identify a way in which the target would reduce the group's ability to achieve its goal. As an example, it was hypothesized that exclusion of shy targets would be evaluated more negatively in competitive than noncompetitive contexts, because only in the latter context would shyness negatively affect the group's ability to achieve its goal (e.g., "It's okay to exclude because shy people will make the group less fun"). In the competitive context, it was expected that adolescents would have trouble figuring out why a shy target would make it difficult to achieve the group's goal. As a result, adolescents in the competitive goal condition were expected to reject exclusion of a shy target as unfair (e.g., "It's not okay to exclude because he might be good at soccer"). It is worth noting that the above expectations were identical in form for aggressive targets (e.g., "you shouldn't exclude them from a competitive team because they could be good at soccer").

Contrary to expectations, there was no contextual variation in judgments for either shyness or aggression-based exclusion. That is, while shyness-based exclusion was evaluated as less acceptable than aggression-based exclusion, the acceptability judgments did not depend on whether the exclusion took place in a competitive or noncompetitive soccer club. In short then, this study successfully replicated, but was unsuccessful in extending past findings given the lack of interaction between personality characteristics and group goals.

Might this be an artifact of the context used (soccer), or the target characteristics used? Indeed, aggression and the externalizing symptoms that are associated with the personality trait are socially salient (Hymel, Rubin, Rowden, & LeMare, 1990) and the justification data suggests that this target's behavioral propensities overwhelmed any and all group goal considerations (e.g., "He will ruin our chance to have fun/ability to win because he is always getting into fights"). But if it were the concern over others' welfare that was overwhelming context effects, then why was shyness-based exclusion not evaluated contextually? Shyness, like aggression, is socially salient, but the internalizing symptoms associated with this profile do not have similar implications for others' welfare (Rubin, Burgess, & Coplan, 2002). As with aggression-based exclusion, the justification data allowed for further inquiry into the reasoning behind the judgment. In contrast to aggression-based exclusion, justifications for shyness-based exclusion suggested that the lack of differentiation between contexts was driven in part by adolescents' belief in the changeability of this personality trait (e.g., "It's not okay to exclude because he could become less shy").

It is important to note that this differential use of 'changeability' justifications between aggressive and shy targets was not a result of a differential belief in the ability of shy and aggressive people to change how they act. When asked explicitly, adolescents were largely supportive of the notion that both aggressive and shy targets could change (i.e., become less aggressive and shy, respectively). This suggests then that aggressive targets evoke different concerns than do shy targets. Indeed, the justification data bears this out, in that participants give greater weight to conventional (e.g., "He will ruin our ability to have fun/win tournaments") than personal development considerations (e.g.,

“He may become less aggressive”) when evaluating an aggressive target. One interesting implication of these results is that aggressive targets may be the victims of a double standard. That is, the group in question is asked to assist the shy individual in becoming more outgoing, while the aggressive individual is left to change on her or his own before interacting with the group.

Beyond the finding that adolescents ask groups to help shy but not aggressive individuals change, there was an unexpected effect of stereotypic conceptions of shy individuals on exclusion judgments. Across group goals, participants who accepted shyness-based exclusion did so largely because of the belief that shy individuals would not engage with the sport as would their non-shy counterparts (e.g., “He will not run after the ball”). This finding is interesting given that the peer relations literature typically considers shyness in situations that rely on social interaction. In a sport context, an activity mediates social interaction, thus potentially reducing the group’s concerns with shyness as well as the shy individual’s motivation to withdraw from interaction. Indeed, some support has been shown for the latter relation between athletics and reductions in shy individuals’ anxiety (Findlay & Coplan, 2008).

Whether the above results are specific to an athletic context or represent a more general orientation to shy individuals, justification data once again provides powerful evidence that helps to explain social judgments. This study then extends past research in the peer relations literature by showing that aggressive and shy targets are evaluated very differently. Adolescents overwhelmingly accept exclusion of an aggressive target given their concerns with group functioning, while overwhelmingly rejecting exclusion of a shy target given the belief that shy individuals can change. While many have tried to

intervene on behalf of aggressive children by focusing on training for the child in question, (e.g., Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group, 2002) this study suggests that a focus on the peer group's perception of the aggressive individual may be in order. As with the increased use of stereotypical conceptions of individuals in ambiguous situations, it seems that adolescents are ready to use past information about an individual's aggression to predict whether they will negatively impact group functioning. Behavior change may become more full if groups allow an aggressive individual to show that they are ready to act appropriately. If, upon inclusion the aggressive individual regresses back to aggressive behavior, then the group has the legitimate right to exclude. If the aggressive individual does not regress back to aggression, and is consistent with group goals in other ways, then they have no legitimate right to exclude.

Participant personality traits

It was expected, and revealed that individuals who reported being more hypercompetitive were more likely to accept exclusion of a target described as not good at soccer in the noncompetitive context. While the relation was significant, it was small in magnitude. It may be that self-reports of one's propensities are not as stable as other measures, or that the relation between these variables is small compared to other considerations. Indeed, multi-informant and multi-method (observation, survey, interview) studies would undoubtedly further clarify the extent to which hypercompetitiveness relates to exclusion acceptability ratings. From the point of view of relevance of characteristics to group goals, hypercompetitive individuals may find ability considerations more salient in the noncompetitive context than those who do not self-report a hypercompetitive drive, which is consistent with the results.

Participant Demographics

It was expected that female participants and participants in the ethnic minority would evaluate exclusion of females and Brazilians as less acceptable than males and ethnic majority adolescents. These results were expected based on females and ethnic minority participants' potentially greater experience with arbitrary forms of exclusion. Results revealed that not only did females evaluate gender and nationality-based exclusion as less acceptable than their male counterparts, but that they evaluated all forms of exclusion as less alright. Contrary to expectations, there was no effect of participant ethnicity on exclusion judgments.

Future research should begin to look beyond these demographic variables and utilize measures that more directly assess the variables thought to drive these effects (e.g., experience with arbitrary forms of exclusion). With a measure of the actual variables thought to relate to exclusion judgments, it will be possible to more thoroughly interpret null and significant effects. Null effects may, for instance, point to a lack of influence of the personal experience variables on exclusion judgments, or may result from a result of trying to measure personal experience through proxy measures such as one's demographic status. In contrast, with direct measures it would be possible to verify whether significant effects of demographic variables on exclusion judgments were a result of personal experience with arbitrary forms of exclusion or some other variable.

11th grade participants were more accepting of gender and ability-based exclusion than were 7th graders. This finding adds to a growing body of literature that reveals similar increases in group functioning considerations in social exclusion judgments (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002). This finding stands in contrast to

developmental findings from studies that utilize peer crowd affiliation as a criterion for social exclusion (e.g., Jocks and Preppies; Horn, 2003). While peer crowd membership is highly salient for adolescents, (Brown, 1990) this switch in age related findings is argued to result in part from a differential need for group functioning relevant stereotypes in each situation. In the peer crowd manipulation, stereotypes about individuals from those groups are required to justify exclusion, whereas in the ability manipulation, the group functioning relevance is inherent in the characteristic. Grade differences in the acceptability of gender-based exclusion cannot be explained by group functioning considerations, or by stereotypic conceptions of ability, given that no grade differences were found in justifications or in stereotype knowledge. Future research may elucidate this grade difference by employing less explicit measures of associations such as the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).

As with gender and nationality demographic variables, it would seem interesting and worthwhile to try to identify the mechanism behind this differential focus on group functioning considerations. Does it result from an accumulation of experience in groups? If so, then it should be possible to separate age and experience components of this relation, to verify whether these effects are due to maturation or experience. It is of interest to note that if it were experience with groups that was found to qualify these age effects, that this would suggest a shift in perspective taking that results from experience with groups. Given the dearth of perspective taking measures that reveal variance in later childhood, adolescence and later stages of life, the development of a measure of group perspective taking may be of interest.

Limitations and Future Directions

Experience with exclusion & Perspective taking. If you have been excluded, does your perspective change on what is most salient to an exclusion decision? Note that this is the first consideration that might not relate to objective relevance of characteristics and group goals, in that perspective taking just shifts the salience of different considerations. As mentioned in the introduction, exclusion judgments in a group context involve multiple considerations (harm to the target, group functioning considerations) that may shift in salience depending on one's perspective. With exclusion experiences, the salience of psychological harm to the target may increase relative to group functioning considerations. In this data set however, the relation between exclusion acceptability judgments when focusing on a bad soccer player indicated that those who had experienced more exclusion in the past were more accepting of exclusion than were those who self-reported less exclusion experience. While largely speculative, this result may have been driven by a self-presentational bias in that those who reported more exclusion experience may have been more at ease or had more fully resolved the exclusion experiences than those who did not report experiencing exclusion. Whatever the reason for the relation, future research should assess the predictors with more than one reporting method, given that multi-method studies provide a more thorough picture of the phenomenon in question.

One alternative would be to assess the participants' sociometric status, providing more reliability in participant scores on a measure of school-wide peer affiliation. With sociometric status data, it would be expected that those who were more well liked would be more inclined to take the group's goals into account when judging the acceptability of

exclusion than those who were less well liked, but that this relation would be mediated by one's ability to judge others' mental states.

Yet another option would be to include not only a measure of exclusion experience, but also a measure of inclusion attempts in order to qualify exclusion experience. In this study, there were many individuals who reported a few or no exclusion experiences, leaving it unclear whether these individuals are those who are uninterested in social interaction (Rubin, 1982), or popular individuals. Again, these data were thought to be critical from the perspective of a perspective taking account of exclusion acceptability in that it was thought that those individuals who had experienced exclusion might be more likely to reject exclusion given their knowledge of how it feels to be excluded (i.e., moral concern for the target may have increased in salience). Slightly orthogonal to this prediction is the possibility that individuals who get excluded from competitive groups may be better prepared to take the group's perspective, and therefore may more readily condone exclusion for legitimate reasons.

Peer Relations Correlates of Exclusion Judgments. While sociometric status provides a measure of likeability, perceived popularity provides a measure of individuals' perceptions of how the peer group perceives a target individual. Including both measures of sociometric popularity and perceived popularity may allow for a more fine grained distinction of peer group members. There seem to be a number of coherent expectations that derive from the interaction between perceived popularity and likeability ratings. One of these expectations is that peers who are proactively aggressive will disregard group functioning (conventional domain) considerations in favor of personal choice (personal domain) considerations. This differential focus on personal choice may result in the

acceptance of exclusion of a particular disliked target over a range of group goals, even if the target fits well with the group (e.g., “even though she is good at soccer, I don’t like her and think we should exclude her”). To the extent that this type of proactively aggressive peer can be distinguished compared to others in her social milieu through her lack of sociometric popularity and high levels of perceived popularity, the use of both measurement tools will serve to advance both the peer relations evidence base as well as **Social Domain theoretical conceptions of exclusion**. In contrast, a peer who is rated as sociometrically popular may show a greater consideration of group functioning (conventional domain) than personal choice (personal domain) considerations. This may result, in comparison to a proactively aggressive peer, in a more contextualized understanding of exclusion (e.g., “Just because you don’t like her doesn’t mean we shouldn’t let her in. Look at how good she is at soccer. We want to win, remember?”).

Socially withdrawn children (sociometrically and perceived unpopular) present yet another interesting possibility for linkages to Social Domain theoretical conceptions of exclusion. To the extent that socially withdrawn youth also score high on measures of rejection sensitivity (Romero-Canyas, Downey, Reddy, Rodriguez, Cavanaugh, & Pelayo, 2010), they may prioritize moral considerations for harm to the target over group functioning (conventional domain) or personal choice (personal domain) considerations (e.g., “I don’t care if including her will make it harder to win the tournament, she will feel bad and I don’t want her to feel bad”).

Stereotypes. To the extent that individuals had stereotypes about ability of certain groups (i.e., females are bad at soccer, Brazilians are good) it was expected that they would shift their judgments of the acceptability of excluding individuals belonging to

those groups. The reason behind this expectation was that a stereotype might build up more relevance of the otherwise irrelevant characteristic. In particular, two main expectations derive from this account of how stereotypes may influence exclusion acceptability judgments: 1) stereotypes about likeability should be most salient in the noncompetitive context, and 2) stereotypes about ability should be most salient to the competitive context. The inclusion of Brazilians and females was purposeful, serving as examples of two typically different ability stereotypes: females are often considered to be inferior in ability when compared to males; while Brazilians are often considered to be superior in ability when compared to Americans. Indeed, the relation between gender and nationality stereotypes and exclusion acceptability was found to be significant in the expected direction. Finally, and surprisingly, many participants revealed stereotypes about shy individuals (e.g., “they won’t go for the ball”). Not surprisingly, these stereotypes were used to justify exclusion.

One potential direction for future research would be to employ a less explicit measure of stereotyping susceptibility, such as the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) that makes use of latency responses as an index of ease of associating certain traits with certain descriptors. Use of this type of measure, may provide greater reliability and validity when attempting to measure individuals’ ethnicity, gender, or personality-based stereotypes.

Interactions between stereotypes, involvement in groups, and HCA

Similar to the above concerns with the ability to validly and reliably assess one’s stereotypes in an explicit manner, the extent to which it was possible to find a relation between stereotypic conceptions of groups and one’s level of hypercompetitiveness or

involvement with competitive activities will be limited in part by the quality of the measure of stereotyping. In addition to this concern is the more general concern with measurement error, and future research may benefit by recruiting parent report of activities in which their children engage. Additionally, collecting a cross-validation sample would seem to be of some utility in attempting to document through confirmatory factor analytic methods the existence of the one-dimensional factor structure proposed by the HCA scale authors (Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczur, & Gold, 1990).

Contextual Variations. The fact that the participants were only asked to evaluate an athletic context limits the scope of this study, as there are many groups that require vastly different types of individuals to function effectively (e.g., shyness on a debate team may be very problematic, whereas it may not be a concern in soccer). Future studies should assess more than one context to assess the robustness of the ability effect across contexts. In addition to attempting replication across a diverse set of group contexts, future studies should consider making less salient the aggressive personality characteristic. Instead of describing the aggressive target as having a propensity to get into fights, the aggressive target could be described as hypercompetitive. This shift in description might allow for the identification of personality traits that are evaluated contextually based on group goal.

It remains important to assess younger children's capacity to integrate information in an exclusion context, to see whether the ability to consider multiple perspectives is consistent with other studies (Shaw & Wainryb, 2006). Shaw and Wainryb (2006) have shown that beyond the age of 6, children begin to coordinate the transgressor's unfair request with the victim's response (resistance, compliance, or subversion). It is expected

that at around this age, children will likewise take into account the group's goals as well as the target's characteristics when making an exclusion decision. Additionally, it will be important for future studies to inquire as to the participant's perception of how the target will feel about the exclusion, as this will clear up any ambiguity in how individuals understand exclusion and its effects on the excluded. Young children, for example may understand the desires of the group members, but they may not find them to be sufficient justification to exclude someone because of concerns for psychological harm to the target of exclusion.

Related to the perception of information, this study sought to extend our knowledge of how it is that adolescents use contextual information, as well as whether person information interacted with context. There are numerous legitimate reasons to exclude individuals from groups, and it is hoped that this study has provided more insight into how it is that context affects those judgments. Much more effective than the "exclusion is bad" orientation to socialization of children and adolescents then may be a more nuanced orientation that acknowledges group functioning concerns. This new orientation might align more closely with the notion that some forms of exclusion can be justified on, if not prudential grounds ("I don't want to include her because she hits") then group functioning grounds ("She keeps messing up our game"). If nothing else, this adjusted orientation to social exclusion may resonate more with children and adolescents (Killen, Breton, Ferguson, & Handler, 1994), potentially resulting in a greater openness to other considerations on the part of children and adolescents.

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Overview of Survey: Exclusion Scenario

Overview of Survey: Exclusion Scenario

Group Goals (b/t)	Description	Target Characteristics (w/in)	Description Some only want to include...
Competitive	Group plays for prizes	Aggressive	people who do not get into fights
		Shy	people who are outgoing
		Female	boys
		Brazilian	people who are from America
		Long Hair	people who have short hair
		Soccer Ability	people who are good at soccer
Noncompetitive	Group plays for fun	Aggressive	people who do not get into fights
		Shy	people who are outgoing
		Female	boys
		Brazilian	people who are from America
		Long Hair	people who have short hair
		Not Good at Soccer	people who are good at soccer

Evaluated on a 6-point Likert scale, from 1 = very not okay to 6 = very okay.

Table 2: Overview of Survey: Dependent Measures

Overview of Survey: Dependent measures

Evaluation of Characteristic	Some only want to include people who are from America. Okay or not okay? Why is this okay or not okay?
Evaluation of Characteristic + Ability	A Brazilian wants to join who is <u>better</u> than most of the current members. Do you think it would be okay for the club to exclude him?
Evaluation of Characteristic + No Ability	A Brazilian wants to join who is <u>worse</u> than all of the current members. Do you think it would be okay for the club to exclude him?

Table 3: Overview of Survey: Justifications

<i>Overview of Survey: Justifications</i>		
Coding Category	Subcategory	Definition and Examples
Moral	Prejudice/Stereotyping/ Discrimination/Fairness/ Harm/Equity	<p>Appeals to the wrongfulness of prejudgment, including references to stereotyping & discrimination, and the concerns of fairness, equity, & (harm to/protection of others). Recognition/acknowledgment of stereotype coupled w/ rejection.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <p>“The team is <i>jumping to conclusion</i> that he wouldn’t be an asset to the team <i>without even getting to know him</i>”</p> <p>“<i>It doesn’t matter</i>, they can pull it up. Hair <i>doesn’t matter</i> in sports”</p> <p>“This is the <i>stupidest/crappiest/craziest</i> reason to exclude someone”</p> <p>“It is not okay to stereotype”</p> <p>“Exclusion based on where someone is from/hair length/ability/etc...is discriminatory and not fair”</p> <p>“If you would put others at risk, you shouldn’t be a member”</p> <p>“He could hurt other people” (<i>this refers to hurting people outside the group of interest</i>)</p> <p>“All activities should be available for all ethnicities/genders/hair lengths/etc...”</p> <p>“How would you feel?”</p> <p>“If you want to play, you should play”</p> <p>“Ability is not something you can control” (<i>does this mean prejudgment, or unfair to exclude based on something not controllable? If unsure, then code here</i>)</p> <p>“It’s not fair/not okay to exclude someone”</p>

Social Conventional	Group Functioning (w/out Stereotype Use)	<p>Appeals to group concerns - general.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <p>“If Joe is bad [at soccer], he should not play on a competitive team, regardless of where he’s from”</p> <p>“That would make the team look bad”</p> <p>“Don’t have a violent person because the team won’t win”</p> <p>“Maybe he should practice more before he tries to join”</p> <p>“If Joe is too good or too bad, then the group might not have fun”</p> <p>“They shouldn’t be allowed in b/c they might get in trouble”</p> <p>“He might hurt/get into fights with the group members”</p>
	Group Functioning (Stereotype Use)	<p>Appeals to group concerns - utilization of a stereotype about a group. Stereotype = extend group membership/personality trait beyond itself.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <p>“If they are shy, they will not run after the ball/stand around”</p> <p>“You should exclude a female because they are bad at soccer”</p> <p>“If they are aggressive, they will play well”</p>
	Conventions/Traditions (From Park & Killen, 2010)	<p>Appeals to others’ opinions on whether to exclude (source of conventions must be explicit), including societal norms/conventions.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <p>“My parents say that it is not alright to exclude a child”</p> <p>“There is no rule that says you cannot have girls on the team”</p> <p>“His friends may exclude him if he plays with her”</p> <p>“Boys and girls teams are separate. That’s just how it is”</p> <p>“Girls and boys soccer is different. That would be like mixing softball and baseball”</p>

Psychological	Personal Choice	Appeals to individual/group preferences. Focus on the personal choice of the excluder. Unemotional claims, no reason given for why it is their choice. Examples: “If they don’t want the kid to join, it’s okay. It’s their club”
	Personal Development (Park & Killen’s Prosocial code – 2010, based on Nucci’s conceptions of the Personal)	Appeals to the potential for the target to change. Examples: “Maybe being active in soccer will take his anger away” “Maybe being active in soccer will make him better”
Prudential	Safety	Appeals to the need for safety (harm to/protection of self). Examples: “His hair could get pulled and he could get hurt” “Well if your bad at it than you shouldn’t play because it can be dangerous” analogy “I took the scissors away because she was running with them” “I excluded him because he kicked himself” “you don’t want to make yourself look bad”
Uncodable		If the referent or interpretation is confusing, code here. Examples: “I like Doritos and brown sugar, but not when mixed together”

Table 4: Summary of Hypotheses & Analysis Plan, Organized by Question Order

Focus	Hypothesis & Analysis
Target Characteristic X Context	<p>1. Competitive context: Exclusion based on harmful aggression and a lack of ability will be seen as the most acceptable reasons to exclude. <i>(Justification: A target's harmful aggression and lack of ability will be seen as more likely to pose a risk to the group's competitive goals than will a target's shyness, nationality, gender, or hair length)</i></p> <p>a. Conduct a 2 (context: Competitive, noncompetitive) X 6 (target characteristic: harmful aggression, shyness, hair length, gender, nationality, lack of ability) Repeated Measures ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor.</p> <p>b. Conduct follow-ups on the main analysis to assess the interaction effect of context with target characteristic.</p> <p>2. Noncompetitive context: Exclusion based on harmful aggression and shyness will be seen as the most acceptable reason to exclude. <i>(Justification: A target's harmful aggression will be seen as the only characteristic likely to pose a threat to the group's noncompetitive goals)</i></p> <p>a. Conduct a 2 (context: Competitive, noncompetitive) X 6 (target characteristic: harmful aggression, shyness, hair length, gender, nationality, lack of ability) Repeated Measures ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors.</p> <p>b. Conduct follow-ups on the main analysis to assess the interaction effect of context with target characteristic.</p>
Justifications	<p>3. Participants will use more group functioning justifications when faced with exclusion based on a lack of ability in the competitive context than when faced with exclusion based on a lack of ability in the noncompetitive context. <i>(Justification: Domain justifications are expected to be driven by the extent to which the participant sees a fit with a target's characteristic and a group's goal)</i></p>

- a. Conduct a repeated measures ANOVA on acceptability of excluding based on ability with context as the repeated measure.
4. Across contexts, participants will use more moral – characteristic irrelevant justifications when faced with exclusion based on gender, nationality, and shyness.
(Justification: Domain justifications are driven by the extent to which the participant sees a fit with a target’s characteristic and a group’s goal)
- a. Conduct three repeated measures ANOVAs on acceptability of excluding based on gender, nationality, and shyness with context as the repeated measure.
- Hypercompetitiveness 5. The more hypercompetitive one is the more acceptable they will find exclusion based on a lack of ability across contexts.
(Justification: The more meaning one puts on competition, the more likely they will be to accept exclusion based on ability considerations across contexts).
- a. Conduct a Factor Analysis on the Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (HCA) items and save factor scores for each participant. Conduct Regressions on the acceptability judgments given a target’s ability with HCA score as a predictor variable.
- Involvement in competitive activities 6. Competitive context: The more a participant is involved with competitive activities the more acceptable they will find exclusion based on harmful aggression and a lack of ability.
(Justification: Those who have been involved in competitive group activities will focus on the group perspective more readily than those without experience in competitive group contexts).
- a. Conduct 2 Regressions on the acceptability judgments given a target’s harmful aggression and lack of ability with experience with competitive contexts as the predictor.
- Perception of changeability of traits 7. The more one believes that personality is changeable the less acceptable they will find exclusion based on harmful aggression and shyness.
(Justification: Those who perceive the ability to

change will consider past behavior as irrelevant to a current exclusion decision)

- a. Conduct Regressions on the acceptability judgments given a harmfully aggressive and a shy target with perception of changeability as the predictor.
- Stereotypic conception of groups
8. Competitive context: The more one believes that a group is good at soccer the less acceptable they will find exclusion based on the knowledge that the target is a member of the stereotyped group.

(Justification: Perception that a group can be categorized through ability will help support the relevance of that trait for an exclusion decision in a competitive context in which ability is helpful from a group goals perspective).

 - a. Conduct 4 regressions on the acceptability judgments given the different decision rules with stereotypic conception of ability based on each group as a predictor, respectively (e.g., regression on acceptability of gender exclusion with gender stereotypes about ability as a predictor).
 9. Noncompetitive context: The more one believes that a group is competitive the more acceptable they will find exclusion based on the knowledge that the target is a member of the stereotyped group.

(Justification: Perception that a group can be categorized through competitiveness will help support the judgment that a member of that group should be excluded, as competitiveness is not the group goal in the noncompetitive condition).

 - a. Conduct 4 regressions on the acceptability judgments given the different decision rules with stereotypic conception of competitiveness based on each group as a predictor, respectively (e.g., regression on acceptability of gender exclusion with gender stereotypes about competitiveness as a predictor).
- Hypercompetitiveness by Stereotypic conception of groups
10. Those who are hypercompetitive and who believe a group to be bad at an activity will accept exclusion based on information about one's group membership.

(Justification: The more meaning one puts on

competition and group membership, the more likely they will be to accept exclusion based on a target's group membership across contexts).

- a. Conduct a Factor Analysis on the Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (HCA) items and save factor scores for each participant. Conduct Regressions on the acceptability judgments given a target's group membership with HCA score and stereotypic conception of groups as predictor variables.
- Age of Participant
11. Older participants will be less willing to exclude based on nationality and gender than will younger participants.
(Justification: Older participants are less willing to make use of stereotypes in ambiguous situations)
- a. Conduct two Univariate ANOVAs with age as a fixed factor and acceptability of exclusion based on nationality and gender as dependent measures.
12. Older participants will be more willing to exclude based on harmful aggression and shyness than will younger participants.
(Justification: Older participants are more concerned about group functioning considerations than are younger participants)
- a. Conduct two Univariate ANOVAs with age as a fixed factor and acceptability of exclusion based on aggression and shyness as dependent measures.
-

Table 5: Hypercompetitiveness Attitude (HCA) Scale Component Matrix

HCA Item	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Q1	0.504	-0.131	-0.412	-0.225
Q2 (R)	-0.067	0.824	-0.215	0.158
Q3 (R)	0.001	0.837	-0.25	-0.06
Q4 (R)	0.601	0.061	0.114	0.388
Q5	0.605	0.163	0.071	-0.4
Q6	0.676	-0.088	-0.232	0.322
Q7	0.465	-0.127	-0.157	0.584
Q8	0.717	-0.001	0.131	-0.178
Q9 (R)	0.097	0.322	0.789	0.215
Q10	0.719	0.102	0.198	-0.347

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 6: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments, by Target Characteristic and Acceptability Judgment (Proportions)

Justification	Nationality		Hair Length		Shyness		Gender		Lack of Soccer Ability		Aggression	
	OK (2)	NOT OK (198)	OK (4)	NOT OK (196)	OK (20)	NOT OK (179)	OK (30)	NOT OK (170)	OK (75)	NOT OK (124)	OK (174)	NOT OK (26)
Moral	0	87	0	92	5	50	8	85	3	18	13	17
Group Functioning	0	1	0	2	23	10	3	5	79	15	77	58
Personal Development	50	0	0	1	3	30	0	0	9	60	2	15
Stereotypes	0	9	0	0	45	6	17	2	0	0	1	0
Social Conventions	0	1	0	1	0	0	44	4	0	1	1	0
Personal Choice	50	0	0	1	15	0	16	2	0	0	1	0
Prudential	0	0	75	1	0	0	5	1	4	2	0	2
Unelaborated	0	2	25	4	10	4	7	1	4	4	5	8

Note: Proportions may not add up due to rounding. Numbers in brackets represent the number of participants judging the respective type of exclusion as acceptable or as unacceptable.

Table 7: Mean Table for the 2 (Sex: Male, Female) X 2 (Grade: 7th, 11th) X 2 (Nationality: Majority, Minority) X 2 (Context: Competitive, Noncompetitive) X 6 (Target Characteristic: Gender, Nationality, Shyness, Hair length, Aggression, Lack of ability) ANOVA.

Target Characteristic	Group Goal	Grade	Sex	Ethnicity	Mean	SD	N
Gender	Competitive	7th	Male	Minority	1.79	0.89	14
				Majority	2.38	1.51	8
				Total	2.00	1.15	22
		Female	Minority	1.44	0.58	25	
			Majority	1.78	1.30	9	
			Total	1.53	0.83	34	
		Total	Minority	1.56	0.72	39	
			Majority	2.06	1.39	17	
			Total	1.71	0.99	56	
	11th	Male	Minority	2.80	1.23	10	
			Majority	3.00	2.00	5	
			Total	2.87	1.46	15	
		Female	Minority	1.92	1.16	12	
			Majority	1.91	1.45	11	
			Total	1.91	1.28	23	
		Total	Minority	2.32	1.25	22	
			Majority	2.25	1.65	16	
			Total	2.29	1.41	38	
Total	Male	Minority	2.21	1.14	24		
		Majority	2.62	1.66	13		
		Total	2.35	1.34	37		
	Female	Minority	1.59	0.83	37		
		Majority	1.85	1.35	20		
		Total	1.68	1.04	57		
	Total	Minority	1.84	1.00	61		
		Majority	2.15	1.50	33		
		Total	1.95	1.20	94		
Noncompetitive	7th	Male	Minority	1.89	0.88	19	
			Majority	2.50	1.69	8	

		Total	2.07	1.17	27	
	Female	Minority	1.47	0.84	19	
		Majority	1.27	0.47	11	
		Total	1.40	0.72	30	
	Total	Minority	1.68	0.87	38	
		Majority	1.79	1.27	19	
		Total	1.72	1.01	57	
11th	Male	Minority	3.63	0.92	8	
		Majority	2.25	1.89	4	
		Total	3.17	1.40	12	
	Female	Minority	2.00	1.19	18	
		Majority	2.60	1.65	10	
		Total	2.21	1.37	28	
	Total	Minority	2.50	1.33	26	
		Majority	2.50	1.65	14	
		Total	2.50	1.43	40	
Total	Male	Minority	2.41	1.19	27	
		Majority	2.42	1.68	12	
		Total	2.41	1.33	39	
	Female	Minority	1.73	1.04	37	
		Majority	1.90	1.34	21	
		Total	1.79	1.15	58	
	Total	Minority	2.02	1.15	64	
		Majority	2.09	1.47	33	
		Total	2.04	1.26	97	
Total	7th	Male	Minority	1.85	0.87	33
		Majority	2.44	1.55	16	
		Total	2.04	1.15	49	
	Female	Minority	1.45	0.70	44	
		Majority	1.50	0.95	20	
		Total	1.47	0.78	64	
	Total	Minority	1.62	0.80	77	
		Majority	1.92	1.32	36	
		Total	1.72	1.00	113	
	11th	Male	Minority	3.17	1.15	18
		Majority	2.67	1.87	9	
		Total	3.00	1.41	27	
	Female	Minority	1.97	1.16	30	

				Majority	2.24	1.55	21
				Total	2.08	1.32	51
			Total	Minority	2.42	1.29	48
				Majority	2.37	1.63	30
				Total	2.40	1.42	78
		Total	Male	Minority	2.31	1.16	51
				Majority	2.52	1.64	25
				Total	2.38	1.33	76
			Female	Minority	1.66	0.94	74
				Majority	1.88	1.33	41
				Total	1.74	1.09	115
		Total	Minority	1.93	1.08	125	
			Majority	2.12	1.47	66	
			Total	1.99	1.23	191	
Nationality	Competitive	7th	Male	Minority	1.36	0.50	14
				Majority	1.25	0.46	8
				Total	1.32	0.48	22
			Female	Minority	1.24	0.52	25
				Majority	1.00	0.00	9
				Total	1.18	0.46	34
		Total	Minority	1.28	0.51	39	
			Majority	1.12	0.33	17	
			Total	1.23	0.47	56	
		11th	Male	Minority	1.10	0.32	10
				Majority	1.20	0.45	5
				Total	1.13	0.35	15
			Female	Minority	1.17	0.39	12
				Majority	1.36	0.67	11
				Total	1.26	0.54	23
		Total	Minority	1.14	0.35	22	
			Majority	1.31	0.60	16	
			Total	1.21	0.47	38	
		Total	Male	Minority	1.25	0.44	24
				Majority	1.23	0.44	13
				Total	1.24	0.43	37
			Female	Minority	1.22	0.48	37
				Majority	1.20	0.52	20
				Total	1.21	0.49	57

		Total	Minority	1.23	0.46	61
			Majority	1.21	0.48	33
			Total	1.22	0.47	94
Noncompetitive	7th	Male	Minority	1.63	1.01	19
			Majority	1.25	0.46	8
			Total	1.52	0.89	27
		Female	Minority	1.11	0.32	19
			Majority	1.00	0.00	11
			Total	1.07	0.25	30
	Total	Minority	1.37	0.79	38	
		Majority	1.11	0.32	19	
		Total	1.28	0.67	57	
	11th	Male	Minority	1.63	1.41	8
			Majority	1.00	0.00	4
			Total	1.42	1.16	12
Female		Minority	1.06	0.24	18	
		Majority	1.30	0.67	10	
		Total	1.14	0.45	28	
Total	Minority	1.23	0.82	26		
	Majority	1.21	0.58	14		
	Total	1.23	0.73	40		
Total	Male	Minority	1.63	1.11	27	
		Majority	1.17	0.39	12	
		Total	1.49	0.97	39	
	Female	Minority	1.08	0.28	37	
		Majority	1.14	0.48	21	
		Total	1.10	0.36	58	
Total	Minority	1.31	0.79	64		
	Majority	1.15	0.44	33		
	Total	1.26	0.70	97		
Total	7th	Male	Minority	1.52	0.83	33
			Majority	1.25	0.45	16
			Total	1.43	0.74	49
	Female	Minority	1.18	0.45	44	
		Majority	1.00	0.00	20	
		Total	1.13	0.38	64	
Total	7th	Minority	1.32	0.66	77	
		Majority	1.11	0.32	36	

			Total	1.26	0.58	113	
Shyness	Competitive	11th	Male	Minority	1.33	0.97	18
				Majority	1.11	0.33	9
				Total	1.26	0.81	27
		Female	Minority	1.10	0.31	30	
			Majority	1.33	0.66	21	
			Total	1.20	0.49	51	
	Total	Minority	1.19	0.64	48		
		Majority	1.27	0.58	30		
		Total	1.22	0.62	78		
	Total	Male	Minority	1.45	0.88	51	
			Majority	1.20	0.41	25	
			Total	1.37	0.76	76	
Female		Minority	1.15	0.39	74		
		Majority	1.17	0.50	41		
		Total	1.16	0.43	115		
Total	Minority	1.27	0.65	125			
	Majority	1.18	0.46	66			
	Total	1.24	0.59	191			
Shyness	Competitive	7th	Male	Minority	2.14	0.95	14
				Majority	1.38	0.52	8
				Total	1.86	0.89	22
			Female	Minority	2.00	0.91	25
				Majority	1.56	0.88	9
				Total	1.88	0.91	34
		Total	Minority	2.05	0.92	39	
			Majority	1.47	0.72	17	
			Total	1.88	0.90	56	
		11th	Male	Minority	2.20	1.40	10
				Majority	2.20	0.45	5
				Total	2.20	1.15	15
	Female		Minority	2.00	0.74	12	
			Majority	1.73	1.01	11	
			Total	1.87	0.87	23	
	Total	Minority	2.09	1.06	22		
		Majority	1.88	0.89	16		
		Total	2.00	0.99	38		
Total	Male	Minority	2.17	1.13	24		

			Majority	1.69	0.63	13
			Total	2.00	1.00	37
		Female	Minority	2.00	0.85	37
			Majority	1.65	0.93	20
			Total	1.88	0.89	57
		Total	Minority	2.07	0.96	61
			Majority	1.67	0.82	33
			Total	1.93	0.93	94
Noncompetitive	7th	Male	Minority	2.74	1.41	19
			Majority	2.00	0.76	8
			Total	2.52	1.28	27
		Female	Minority	2.11	1.15	19
			Majority	1.91	1.04	11
			Total	2.03	1.10	30
		Total	Minority	2.42	1.31	38
			Majority	1.95	0.91	19
			Total	2.26	1.20	57
	11th	Male	Minority	2.25	1.58	8
			Majority	1.75	0.50	4
			Total	2.08	1.31	12
		Female	Minority	1.89	1.18	18
			Majority	1.90	0.74	10
			Total	1.89	1.03	28
		Total	Minority	2.00	1.30	26
			Majority	1.86	0.66	14
			Total	1.95	1.11	40
	Total	Male	Minority	2.59	1.45	27
			Majority	1.92	0.67	12
			Total	2.38	1.29	39
		Female	Minority	2.00	1.15	37
			Majority	1.90	0.89	21
			Total	1.97	1.06	58
		Total	Minority	2.25	1.31	64
			Majority	1.91	0.80	33
			Total	2.13	1.17	97
Total	7th	Male	Minority	2.48	1.25	33
			Majority	1.69	0.70	16
			Total	2.22	1.16	49

		Female	Minority	2.05	1.01	44	
			Majority	1.75	0.97	20	
			Total	1.95	1.00	64	
		Total	Minority	2.23	1.13	77	
			Majority	1.72	0.85	36	
			Total	2.07	1.08	113	
11th		Male	Minority	2.22	1.44	18	
			Majority	2.00	0.50	9	
			Total	2.15	1.20	27	
		Female	Minority	1.93	1.01	30	
			Majority	1.81	0.87	21	
			Total	1.88	0.95	51	
		Total	Minority	2.04	1.18	48	
			Majority	1.87	0.78	30	
			Total	1.97	1.04	78	
Total	Male	Minority	2.39	1.31	51		
		Majority	1.80	0.65	25		
		Total	2.20	1.17	76		
		Female	Minority	2.00	1.01	74	
			Majority	1.78	0.91	41	
			Total	1.92	0.97	115	
		Total	Minority	2.16	1.15	125	
			Majority	1.79	0.81	66	
			Total	2.03	1.06	191	
Hair Length	Competitive	7th	Male	Minority	1.86	0.77	14
				Majority	1.25	0.46	8
				Total	1.64	0.73	22
			Female	Minority	1.24	0.44	25
				Majority	1.22	0.67	9
				Total	1.24	0.50	34
			Total	Minority	1.46	0.64	39
				Majority	1.24	0.56	17
				Total	1.39	0.62	56
		11th	Male	Minority	1.20	0.42	10
				Majority	1.40	0.55	5
				Total	1.27	0.46	15
			Female	Minority	1.25	0.45	12
				Majority	1.36	0.50	11

			Total	1.30	0.47	23	
			Total	Minority	1.23	0.43	22
				Majority	1.38	0.50	16
			Total	1.29	0.46	38	
Noncompetitive	7th	Total	Male	Minority	1.58	0.72	24
				Majority	1.31	0.48	13
				Total	1.49	0.65	37
			Female	Minority	1.24	0.43	37
				Majority	1.30	0.57	20
				Total	1.26	0.48	57
		Total	Minority	1.38	0.58	61	
			Majority	1.30	0.53	33	
			Total	1.35	0.56	94	
		11th	Male	Minority	1.68	1.20	19
				Majority	1.63	1.06	8
				Total	1.67	1.14	27
	Female		Minority	1.63	0.83	19	
			Majority	1.09	0.30	11	
			Total	1.43	0.73	30	
	Total	Minority	1.66	1.02	38		
		Majority	1.32	0.75	19		
		Total	1.54	0.95	57		
	Total	Male	Minority	1.75	0.89	8	
			Majority	1.50	0.58	4	
			Total	1.67	0.78	12	
		Female	Minority	1.22	0.43	18	
			Majority	1.30	0.67	10	
			Total	1.25	0.52	28	
	Total	Minority	1.38	0.64	26		
		Majority	1.36	0.63	14		
		Total	1.38	0.63	40		
	Total	Male	Minority	1.70	1.10	27	
			Majority	1.58	0.90	12	
			Total	1.67	1.03	39	
		Female	Minority	1.43	0.69	37	
			Majority	1.19	0.51	21	
			Total	1.34	0.64	58	
	Total	Minority	1.55	0.89	64		

			Majority	1.33	0.69	33	
			Total	1.47	0.83	97	
Total	7th	Male	Minority	1.76	1.03	33	
			Majority	1.44	0.81	16	
			Total	1.65	0.97	49	
		Female	Minority	1.41	0.66	44	
			Majority	1.15	0.49	20	
			Total	1.33	0.62	64	
		Total	Minority	1.56	0.85	77	
			Majority	1.28	0.66	36	
			Total	1.47	0.80	113	
	11th	Male	Minority	1.44	0.70	18	
			Majority	1.44	0.53	9	
			Total	1.44	0.64	27	
		Female	Minority	1.23	0.43	30	
			Majority	1.33	0.58	21	
			Total	1.27	0.49	51	
Total		Minority	1.31	0.55	48		
		Majority	1.37	0.56	30		
		Total	1.33	0.55	78		
Total	Male	Minority	1.65	0.93	51		
		Majority	1.44	0.71	25		
		Total	1.58	0.87	76		
	Female	Minority	1.34	0.58	74		
		Majority	1.24	0.54	41		
		Total	1.30	0.56	115		
	Total	Minority	1.46	0.76	125		
		Majority	1.32	0.61	66		
		Total	1.41	0.71	191		
Aggression	Competitive	7th	Male	Minority	4.14	1.46	14
				Majority	4.38	1.41	8
				Total	4.23	1.41	22
		Female	Minority	4.56	1.16	25	
			Majority	4.33	0.71	9	
			Total	4.50	1.05	34	
		Total	Minority	4.41	1.27	39	
			Majority	4.35	1.06	17	
			Total	4.39	1.20	56	

	11th	Male	Minority	4.40	0.84	10
			Majority	4.60	0.89	5
			Total	4.47	0.83	15
		Female	Minority	4.75	0.97	12
			Majority	4.55	1.44	11
			Total	4.65	1.19	23
		Total	Minority	4.59	0.91	22
			Majority	4.56	1.26	16
			Total	4.58	1.06	38
	Total	Male	Minority	4.25	1.22	24
			Majority	4.46	1.20	13
			Total	4.32	1.20	37
		Female	Minority	4.62	1.09	37
			Majority	4.45	1.15	20
			Total	4.56	1.10	57
Total		Minority	4.48	1.15	61	
		Majority	4.45	1.15	33	
		Total	4.47	1.14	94	
Noncompetitive	7th	Male	Minority	4.68	1.16	19
			Majority	5.00	0.93	8
			Total	4.78	1.09	27
		Female	Minority	4.79	0.85	19
			Majority	4.45	1.04	11
			Total	4.67	0.92	30
		Total	Minority	4.74	1.00	38
			Majority	4.68	1.00	19
			Total	4.72	1.00	57
	11th	Male	Minority	5.00	0.93	8
			Majority	5.00	0.82	4
			Total	5.00	0.85	12
		Female	Minority	4.28	1.27	18
			Majority	4.60	0.84	10
			Total	4.39	1.13	28
Total		Minority	4.50	1.21	26	
		Majority	4.71	0.83	14	
		Total	4.58	1.08	40	
Total	Male	Minority	4.78	1.09	27	
		Majority	5.00	0.85	12	

			Total	4.85	1.01	39	
		Female	Minority	4.54	1.10	37	
			Majority	4.52	0.93	21	
			Total	4.53	1.03	58	
		Total	Minority	4.64	1.09	64	
			Majority	4.70	0.92	33	
			Total	4.66	1.03	97	
Total	7th	Male	Minority	4.45	1.30	33	
			Majority	4.69	1.20	16	
			Total	4.53	1.26	49	
		Female	Minority	4.66	1.03	44	
			Majority	4.40	0.88	20	
			Total	4.58	0.99	64	
		Total	Minority	4.57	1.15	77	
			Majority	4.53	1.03	36	
			Total	4.56	1.11	113	
	11th	Male	Minority	4.67	0.91	18	
			Majority	4.78	0.83	9	
			Total	4.70	0.87	27	
		Female	Minority	4.47	1.17	30	
			Majority	4.57	1.16	21	
			Total	4.51	1.16	51	
		Total	Minority	4.54	1.07	48	
			Majority	4.63	1.07	30	
			Total	4.58	1.06	78	
	Total	Male	Minority	4.53	1.17	51	
			Majority	4.72	1.06	25	
			Total	4.59	1.13	76	
		Female	Minority	4.58	1.09	74	
			Majority	4.49	1.03	41	
			Total	4.55	1.06	115	
		Total	Minority	4.56	1.12	125	
			Majority	4.58	1.04	66	
			Total	4.57	1.09	191	
Ability	Competitive	7th	Male	Minority	2.86	1.10	14
				Majority	2.25	1.28	8
				Total	2.64	1.18	22
			Female	Minority	3.56	1.33	25

		Majority	3.28	0.67	9	
		Total	3.49	1.18	34	
	Total	Minority	3.31	1.28	39	
		Majority	2.79	1.10	17	
		Total	3.15	1.24	56	
11th	Male	Minority	3.90	1.79	10	
		Majority	3.60	2.07	5	
		Total	3.80	1.82	15	
	Female	Minority	3.67	1.44	12	
		Majority	3.55	1.75	11	
		Total	3.61	1.56	23	
	Total	Minority	3.77	1.57	22	
		Majority	3.56	1.79	16	
		Total	3.68	1.65	38	
Total	Male	Minority	3.29	1.49	24	
		Majority	2.77	1.69	13	
		Total	3.11	1.56	37	
	Female	Minority	3.59	1.34	37	
		Majority	3.43	1.35	20	
		Total	3.54	1.34	57	
	Total	Minority	3.48	1.40	61	
		Majority	3.17	1.50	33	
		Total	3.37	1.44	94	
Noncompetitive	7th	Male	Minority	3.21	1.58	19
		Majority	1.88	1.13	8	
		Total	2.81	1.57	27	
	Female	Minority	2.95	1.43	19	
		Majority	2.36	1.03	11	
		Total	2.73	1.31	30	
	Total	Minority	3.08	1.50	38	
		Majority	2.16	1.07	19	
		Total	2.77	1.43	57	
	11th	Male	Minority	3.38	1.69	8
		Majority	3.25	2.22	4	
		Total	3.33	1.78	12	
	Female	Minority	2.56	1.42	18	
		Majority	2.50	1.51	10	
		Total	2.54	1.43	28	


		Total	Minority	2.81	1.52	26
			Majority	2.71	1.68	14
			Total	2.78	1.56	40
	Total	Male	Minority	3.26	1.58	27
			Majority	2.33	1.61	12
			Total	2.97	1.63	39
		Female	Minority	2.76	1.42	37
			Majority	2.43	1.25	21
			Total	2.64	1.36	58
		Total	Minority	2.97	1.50	64
			Majority	2.39	1.37	33
			Total	2.77	1.48	97
Total	7th	Male	Minority	3.06	1.39	33
			Majority	2.06	1.18	16
			Total	2.73	1.40	49
		Female	Minority	3.30	1.39	44
			Majority	2.78	0.98	20
			Total	3.13	1.29	64
		Total	Minority	3.19	1.39	77
			Majority	2.46	1.12	36
			Total	2.96	1.35	113
	11th	Male	Minority	3.67	1.71	18
			Majority	3.44	2.01	9
			Total	3.59	1.78	27
		Female	Minority	3.00	1.51	30
			Majority	3.05	1.69	21
			Total	3.02	1.57	51
		Total	Minority	3.25	1.60	48
			Majority	3.17	1.76	30
			Total	3.22	1.66	78
	Total	Male	Minority	3.27	1.52	51
			Majority	2.56	1.64	25
			Total	3.04	1.59	76
		Female	Minority	3.18	1.44	74
			Majority	2.91	1.38	41
			Total	3.08	1.42	115
		Total	Minority	3.22	1.47	125
			Majority	2.78	1.48	66

Total	3.07	1.48	191
-------	------	------	-----

Table 8: Participant breakdown

Demographics		Grade		
		7th Grade	11th Grade	Total
Male	African-American	17	11	28
	European-American	17	9	26
	Hispanic-American	7	4	11
	Mixed	7	3	10
	Other	2	0	2
	Total	50	27	77
Female	African-American	27	17	44
	Asian-American	1	1	2
	European-American	20	21	41
	Hispanic-American	10	2	12
	Mixed	6	7	13
	Other	0	3	3
	Total	64	51	115

Figure 1: Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic and Group Goal



Note: Error bars represent 95% CI

Figure 2: Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic and Group Goal




Figure 3: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments (Okay to Exclude)





Figure 4: Justifications for Exclusion Acceptability Judgments by Target Characteristic (Not Okay to Exclude)



APPENDICES

Appendix A: IRB Approval



0101 Lee Building
College Park, Maryland 20742-5125
301.405.4212 TEL 301.314.1475 FAX
irb@deans.umd.edu
www.umresearch.umd.edu/IRB

December 18, 2009

MEMORANDUM*Application Approval Notification*

To: Dr. Melanie Killen
Cameron B. Richardson
Human Development

From: Joseph M. Smith, MA, CIM *MS*
IRB Manager
University of Maryland, College Park

Re: **IRB Application Number:** 09-0812
Project Title: "Evaluations of Exclusion in Competitive and Noncompetitive Contexts"

Approval Date: December 18, 2009

Expiration Date: December 18, 2010

Type of Application: Initial

Type of Research: Non-Exempt

Type of Review for Application: Expedited

The University of Maryland, College Park Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved your IRB application. The research was approved in accordance with the University IRB policies and procedures and 45 CFR 46, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects. Please include the above-cited IRB application number in any future

Appendix B: Assent Form

ASSENT FORM

Project Title	Evaluations of Exclusion in Competitive and Noncompetitive Contexts
Why is this research being done?	This is a research project being conducted by Professor Melanie Killen at the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you are either an 8 th or 11 th grader. The purpose of this research project is to understand how adolescents think about social exclusion. We are interested to know more about how adolescents' think about social exclusion because social exclusion can affect the quality of relationships with others your age.
What will I be asked to do?	The procedures involve a trained research assistant coming into your school to administer the survey. The survey will last 20-25 minutes. Specifically, you will be asked to evaluate whether different exclusion scenarios are acceptable or unacceptable. You will be asked to explain why you thought that a certain form of exclusion was acceptable or not. You do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish to.
What about confidentiality?	We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, we will store all files under lock and key, and will only allow trained research assistants to access the files. The surveys are anonymous (the surveys will not include identifying information on them), and the surveys will be destroyed upon project completion.
What are the risks of this research?	There are no foreseeable risks of participating in this study.
What are the benefits of this research?	This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results will help the investigator learn more about how it is that adolescents think about their social world. We expect that, in the future, other people will benefit from this study through improved understanding of what it is that adolescents see as acceptable and unacceptable reasons for exclusion.
Do I have to be in this research?	Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. Participation is not a course requirement. You may choose not

May I stop participating at any time?	to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify. If you are disturbing other participants, you may be asked to stop participating. In this situation, you would be asked to leave the classroom until the administration is over.
--	--

Project Title	Evaluations of Exclusion in Competitive and Noncompetitive Contexts	
What if I have questions?	<p>This research is being conducted by Professor Melanie Killen in the Department of Human Development at the University of Maryland, College Park. If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Professor Melanie Killen at:</p> <p>3304 Benjamin Building, COLLEGE PARK, MD 20742-1131 OFFICE #: 301-405-3176</p> <p>If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742; (e-mail) irb@umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678</p> <p>This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.</p>	
Statement of Age of Subject and Assent	<p>Your signature indicates that: the research has been explained to you; your questions have been fully answered; and you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research project.</p>	
Signature and Date	NAME OF SUBJECT	
	SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT	
	DATE	

Appendix C: Noncompetitive Version

University of Maryland**SURVEY**

This is a survey designed by the faculty and students at the University of Maryland. This survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us know.

Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask!

Today's date: _____

Your age in years (e.g., 10): _____

Gender (CIRCLE ONE): Male Female

Ethnicity: _____

SCHOOL NAME: _____

Thank you! Please turn the page!

University of Maryland**SURVEY ABOUT PEER GROUPS**

This is a survey designed by the faculty and students at the University of Maryland. This survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us know.

Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask!

Today's date: _____

Birthday: Please write the month, and year you were born

(e.g., July, 1999): _____

Your age in years (e.g., 10): _____

Gender (CIRCLE ONE): **Male** **Female**

Ethnicity: _____

SCHOOL NAME: _____

Thank you! Please turn the page!

INTRODUCTION:

You are going to read about some things that kids do who are about your age. Then you will answer some questions about these kids. We are interested in finding out what you think about the types of decisions that kids make. There are no right or wrong answers. This is not a test and we do not put anyone's name on any reports about the project.

When you see this type of line on the form:

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

...this means that you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer to the question.

For example: Do you think it would be okay or not okay to sleep in late on the weekend?

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

So just tell us what you think about the stories by filling out this form!

THANK YOU!

A group of kids decide to form a noncompetitive soccer club. There are many other soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to be able to have the most amount of fun playing together.

They come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to exclude based on each rule.

1. Girls cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

2. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude girls?)

3. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl even if she was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

4. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl if she was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

5. People who are from Brazil cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

6. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people from Brazil?)

7. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

8. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

9. People who are anxious and shy cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

10. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people who are anxious and shy?)

11. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who is anxious and shy even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

12. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who is anxious and shy if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

13. People who have long hair cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

14. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people with long hair?)

15. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person with long hair even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

16. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person with long hair if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

17. People who get into fights cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

18. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people who get into fights?)

19. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who gets into fights even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

20. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who gets into fights if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

21. People who are bad at soccer cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

22. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people who are bad at soccer?)

In this section you will be asked to select the best option based on your experiences and knowledge of yourself. Please circle one option.

23. Winning in competition makes me feel more powerful as a person.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

24. I find myself being competitive only in situations that call for competition.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

25. I compete with others only if they are competing with me.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

26. I am okay with losing in athletic competition.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

27. When my competitors receive rewards for their accomplishments, I feel envy.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

28. I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest or conflict.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

29. If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the edge in competition, I will do so.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

30. I really feel down when I lose in athletic competition.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

31. In school, I am okay with doing as well on tests as others students.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

32. Failure or loss in competition makes me feel less worthy as a person.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

33. I have been excluded from competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

34. I have been excluded from competitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., debate, music, science, mathematics).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

35. I have been excluded from noncompetitive athletic group activities (i.e., playing soccer or basketball for fun).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

36. I have been excluded from noncompetitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., going to the movies, playing together on the weekend, joining a choral/musical group).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

37. I have excluded someone from an activity before.

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

38. If you have excluded someone before, why did you exclude him or her?

39. I have been involved in competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

40. I have been involved in competitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., debate, music, science, mathematics).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

41. I have been involved in noncompetitive group activities (i.e., Going out to movies, playing together for fun, joining a group that gets together for fun)

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

In the following section, please select the best option based on your beliefs. Please circle one option.

42. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Americans?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

43. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are girls?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

44. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are aggressive?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

45. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Boys?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

46. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Brazilians?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

47. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are shy?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

48. When it comes to soccer, how good are Americans?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

49. When it comes to soccer, how good are girls?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

50. When it comes to soccer, how good are people who are aggressive?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

51. When it comes to soccer, how good are Boys?

1 2 3 4 5 6
NOT AT ALL VERY

52. When it comes to soccer, how good are Brazilians?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

53. When it comes to soccer, how good are people who are shy?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

54. People can't really change what kind of personality they have. Some people have a good personality and some people don't, and that can't change much.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

55. No matter who somebody is and how they act, they can always change their personality.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

56. No matter how often someone gets into fights, they can always change their behavior.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

57. No matter how anxious and shy someone is, they can always change their behavior.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

Appendix D: Competitive Version

University of Maryland

SURVEY ABOUT PEER GROUPS

This is a survey designed by the faculty and students at the University of Maryland. This survey helps us to find out what students think about peer groups and friendships. There are no right or wrong answers and this is not a test. We will not tell anyone your answers and if you do not want to finish the survey please let us know.

Please fill in the information on this page and then turn the page.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask!

Today's date: _____

Birthday: Please write the month, and year you were born

(e.g., July, 1999): _____

Your age in years (e.g., 10): _____

Gender (CIRCLE ONE): **Male** **Female**

Ethnicity: _____

SCHOOL NAME: _____

Thank you! Please turn the page!

INTRODUCTION:

You are going to read about some things that kids do who are about your age. Then you will answer some questions about these kids. We are interested in finding out what you think about the types of decisions that kids make. There are no right or wrong answers. This is not a test and we do not put anyone's name on any reports about the project.

When you see this type of line on the form:

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY	NOT	SORT OF	SORT OF	OKAY	VERY
NOT	OKAY	NOT	OKAY		OKAY
OKAY		OKAY			

...this means that you will be asked to circle the number that matches your answer to the question.

For example: Do you think it would be okay or not okay to sleep in late on the weekend?

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY	NOT	SORT OF	SORT OF	OKAY	VERY
NOT	OKAY	NOT	OKAY		OKAY
OKAY		OKAY			

So just tell us what you think about the stories by filling out this form!

THANK YOU!

A group of kids decide to form a competitive soccer club. There are many other soccer clubs in their area, but they want to establish their own rules to have the best shot at winning the local tournament's first prize trophy.

They come up with the following rules. Please indicate how okay or not okay it is to exclude based on each rule.

1. Girls cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

2. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude girls?)

3. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl even if she was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

4. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a girl if she was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

5. People who are from Brazil cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY
------------------------------	---------------------	---------------------------------	-------------------------	-------------	----------------------

6. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people from Brazil?)

7. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

8. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person from Brazil if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

9. People who are anxious and shy cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

10. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people who are anxious and shy?)

11. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who is anxious and shy even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

12. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who is anxious and shy if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

13. People who have long hair cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

14. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people with long hair?)

15. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person with long hair even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

16. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person with long hair if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

17. People who get into fights cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

18. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people who get into fights?)

19. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who gets into fights even if he was better at soccer than most of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

20. Do you think it would be okay or not okay for the club to exclude a person who gets into fights if he was worse at soccer than all of the current members? (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

21. People who are bad at soccer cannot be members. (circle one).

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY NOT OKAY	NOT OKAY	SORT OF NOT OKAY	SORT OF OKAY	OKAY	VERY OKAY

22. Why? (Please write 1-3 complete sentences explaining what makes it okay or not okay to exclude people who are bad at soccer?)

In this section you will be asked to select the best option based on your experiences and knowledge of yourself. Please circle one option.

23. Winning in competition makes me feel more powerful as a person.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

24. I find myself being competitive only in situations that call for competition.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

25. I compete with others only if they are competing with me.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

26. I am okay with losing in athletic competition.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

27. When my competitors receive rewards for their accomplishments, I feel envy.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

28. I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest or conflict.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

29. If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the edge in competition, I will do so.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

30. I really feel down when I lose in athletic competition.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

31. In school, I am okay with doing as well on tests as others students.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

32. Failure or loss in competition makes me feel less worthy as a person.

1	2	3	4	5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	NEITHER DISAGREE NOR AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

33. I have been excluded from competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

34. I have been excluded from competitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., debate, music, science, mathematics).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

35. I have been excluded from noncompetitive athletic group activities (i.e., playing soccer or basketball for fun).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

36. I have been excluded from noncompetitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., going to the movies, playing together on the weekend, joining a choral/musical group).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

37. I have excluded someone from an activity before.

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

38. If you have excluded someone before, why did you exclude him or her?

39. I have been involved in competitive athletic group activities (i.e., soccer, basketball).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

40. I have been involved in competitive nonathletic group activities (i.e., debate, music, science, mathematics).

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

41. I have been involved in noncompetitive group activities (i.e., Going out to movies, playing together for fun, joining a group that gets together for fun)

1	2	3	4	5
NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS

In the following section, please select the best option based on your beliefs. Please circle one option.

42. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Americans?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

43. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are girls?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

44. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are people who are aggressive?

1	2	3	4	5	6
NOT AT ALL					VERY

45. When it comes to soccer, how competitive are Boys?

54. People can't really change what kind of personality they have. Some people have a good personality and some people don't, and that can't change much.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

55. No matter who somebody is and how they act, they can always change their personality.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

56. No matter how often someone gets into fights, they can always change their behavior.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

57. No matter how anxious and shy someone is, they can always change their behavior.

1	2	3	4	5	6
VERY STRONGLY DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	VERY STRONGLY AGREE

Appendix E: Pilot Study

Purpose

In order to refine and test the feasibility of the survey, a pilot study was conducted at a university in a large Mid-Atlantic city in the fall of 2009.

Participants

Participants were 51 undergraduate students (42 Females).

Procedure

The procedure involved was identical to that described above. Participants were told that they would receive a point for participation, and that they would be given alternate means by which to receive that point if they decided not to participate. Further, participants were told that: 1) they could ask questions at any time during the administration; 2) their answers would be confidential and anonymous; 3) their participation was strictly voluntary; and, 4) they could stop at any time. Additionally, they were instructed to fill out the survey as completely as possible and that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions. A quick description of the purpose of the survey was relayed to the participants (including a request to include comments on anything confusing or poorly worded), and they were then asked to begin the survey. The survey took approximately 20 minutes to complete.

Results

The pilot study was used to assess whether refinement of aspects of the instrument was needed. Most participants responded to all items, and informal analysis of the Justification questions suggested that the coding system would not require any

refinement. Further, participants did not comment about confusions in wording or presentation of the scenarios.

A brief quantitative assessment of the major hypotheses (table 4) revealed support for the hypotheses. Specifically, participants evaluated the *Context* (Competitive, Noncompetitive) differently. As expected, when the target was described as not being good at soccer, participants were more accepting of exclusion in the competitive context than in the noncompetitive context. As described in Park and Killen, (2010) aggression was seen as the most acceptable reason to exclude, and, as expected, this finding was replicated across the competitiveness of the context. Finally, and as expected, participants were more accepting of exclusion based on lack of ability in the competitive context than in the noncompetitive context, while a decision rule to exclude based on hair length was evaluated as similarly unacceptable across competitive and noncompetitive contexts.

REFERENCES:

- Abrams, D., Rutland, A., & Cameron, L. (2003). The development of subjective group dynamics: Children's judgments of normative and deviant in-group and out-group individuals. *Child Development, 74*, 1840-1856.
- Abrams, D., Rutland, A., Ferrell, J. M., & Pelletier, J. (2009). Children's group nous: Understanding and applying peer exclusion within and between groups. *Child Development, 80*, 224-243.
- Banerjee, R. (2000). The development of an understanding of modesty. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 18*, 499-517.
- Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of race evaluations from ages 6 to 10 and adulthood. *Psychological Science, 17*, 53-58.
- Behne, T., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Unwilling versus unable: Infants' understanding of intentional action. *Developmental Psychology, 41*, 328-337.
- Bigler, R. S., & Liben, L. S. (1993). A cognitive-developmental approach to racial stereotyping and reconstructive memory in Euro-American children. *Child Development, 64*, 1507-1518.
- Bigler, R. S. & Liben, L. S. (2006). A developmental intergroup theory of social stereotypes and prejudice. In R. Kail (Ed.), *Advance in Child Development and Behavior* (pp. 39-89). Elsevier.

- Blackhart, G. C., Nelson, B. C., Knowles, M. L., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Rejection elicits emotional reactions but neither causes immediate distress nor lowers self-esteem: A meta-analytic review of 192 studies on social exclusion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13*, 269-309.
- Blair, K. S., Newman, C., Mitchell, D. G. V., Richell, R. A., Leonard, A., Morton, J., & Blair, R. J. R. (2006). Differentiating among prefrontal neural substrates in psychopathy: Neuropsychological test findings. *Neuropsychology, 20*, 153-165.
- Bodenhausen, G. V., & Wyer, J. R. S. (1985). Effects of stereotypes on decision making and information-processing strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48*, 267-282.
- Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: In-group love or out-group hate? *Journal of Social Issues, 55*, 429-444.
- Brown, B. B. (1990). Peer groups and peer cultures. In S. S. Feldman & G. R. Elliot (Eds.), *At the Threshold: The Developing Adolescent*, (pp. 171-196). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brown, B. B., Mory, M., & Kinney, D. (1994). Casting adolescent crowds in a relational perspective: Charicature, channel, and context. In R. Montemayor, G. R. Adams, & T. P. Gullotta (Eds.), *Personal Relationships During Adolescence* (pp. 123-167). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Bussey, K. (1999). Children's categorization and evaluation of different types of lies and truths. *Child Development, 70*, 1338-1347.

- Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 1015-1026.
- Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. *Psychological Bulletin, 112*, 155-159.
- Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group (2002). Using the fast-track randomized prevention trial to test the early-starter model of the development of serious conduct problems. *Development and Psychopathology, 14*, 925-943.
- Crystal, D. S., Killen, M. & Ruck, M. (2008). It is who you know that counts: Intergroup contact and judgments about race-based exclusion. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 26*, 51-70.
- Davis-Kean, P. E., Huesmann, L. R., Jager, J., Bates, J. E., Collins, W. A., Lansford, J. E. (2008). Changes in the relation of self-efficacy beliefs and behaviors across development. *Child Development, 79*, 1257-1269.
- Dodge, K. A. (1980). Social cognition and children's aggressive behavior. *Child Development, 51*, 162-170.
- Fein, G., Johnson, D., Kosson, N., Stork, L., & Wasserman, L. (1975). Sex stereotypes and preferences in the toy choices of 20-month-old boys and girls. *Developmental Psychology, 11*, 527-528.
- Findlay, L. C., Coplan, R. J., & Bowker, A. (2009). Keeping it all inside: Shyness, internalizing coping strategies and socio-emotional adjustment in middle childhood. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 33*, 47-54.
- Fu, G., Evans, A. D., Wang, L., & Lee, K. (2008). Lying in the name of the collective good: A developmental study. *Developmental Science, 11*(4), 495-503.

- Fu, G., Lee, K., Cameron, C. A., & Xu, F. (2001). Chinese and Canadian adults' categorization and evaluation of lie- and truth-telling about prosocial and antisocial behaviors. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32*, 720-727.
- Fu, G., Xu, F., Cameron, C. A., Heyman, G., & Lee, K. (2007). Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies. *Developmental Psychology, 43*, 278-293.
- Gest, S. D., Rulison, K. L., Davidson, A. J., & Welsh, J. (2008). A reputation for success (or failure): The association of peer academic reputations with academic self-concept, effort, and performance across the upper elementary grades. *Developmental Psychology, 44*, 625-636.
- Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1464-1480.
- Hayden-Thomson, L., Rubin, K. H., & Hymel, S. (1987). Sex preferences in sociometric choices. *Developmental Psychology, 23*, 558-562.
- Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior. *The American Journal of Psychology, 57*, 243-259.
- Helwig, C. C., Zelazo, P. D., & Wilson, M. (2001). Children's judgments of psychological harm in normal and noncanonical situations. *Child Development, 72*(1), 66-81.
- Hinkle, D. E., Wiersma, W., & Jurs, S. G. (2003). *Applied Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (5th ed.). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

- Horn, S. (2003). Adolescents' reasoning about exclusion from social groups. *Developmental Psychology, 39*, 71-84.
- Hymel, S., Rubin, K. H., Rowden, L., & LeMare, L. (1990). Children's peer relationships: Longitudinal prediction of internalizing and externalizing problems from middle to late childhood. *Child Development, 61*, 2004-2021.
- Killen, M. (2007). Children's social and moral reasoning about exclusion. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16*, 32-36.
- Killen, M., Breton, S., Ferguson, H., Handler, K. (1994). Preschooler's evaluations of teacher methods of intervention in social transgressions. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly: Journal of Developmental Psychology, 40*, 399-415.
- Killen, M., Crystal, D., & Watanabe, H. (2002). Japanese and American children's evaluations of peer exclusion, tolerance of difference, and prescriptions for conformity. *Child Development, 73*, 1788-1802.
- Killen, M., Henning, A., Kelly, M. C., Crystal, D., & Ruck, M. (2007). Evaluations of interracial peer encounters by majority and minority US children and adolescents. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 31*, 491-500.
- Killen, M., Lee-Kim, J., McGlothlin, H., & Stangor, C. (2002). How children and adolescents evaluate gender and racial exclusion. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 67*.
- Killen, M., Margie, N. G., & Sinno, S. (2006). Morality in the context of intergroup relationships. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 155-183). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

- Killen, M., Pisacane, K., Lee-Kim, J., & Ardila-Rey, A. (2001). Fairness or stereotypes? Young children's priorities when evaluating group exclusion and inclusion. *Developmental Psychology, 37*, 587-596.
- Killen, M., Richardson, C. B., Kelly, M. C., Crystal, D., & Ruck, M. (2010). European-American children's and adolescents' evaluations of interracial exclusion. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 13*, 283-300.
- Killen, M., Richardson, C. B., Kelly, M. C., & Jampol, N. S. (2010). Attributions of intentions and fairness judgments regarding interracial peer encounters. *Developmental Psychology, 46*, 1206-1213.
- Killen, M., Richardson, C. B., Kelly, M. C. (2010). Developmental Perspectives. In J.F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination* (pp. 97-114). Washington, DC SAGE.
- Killen, M., Sinno, S., & Margie, N. G. (2007). Children's experiences and judgments about group exclusion and inclusion. In R. Kail (Ed.), *Advances in Child Psychology* (Vol. 35, pp. 173--218). New York: Elsevier.
- Killen, M., & Stangor, C. (2001). Children's social reasoning about inclusion and exclusion in gender and race peer group contexts. *Child Development, 72*, 174-186.
- Killen, M, Stangor, C., Price, B. S., Horn, S., & Sechrist, G. B. (2004). Social reasoning about racial exclusion in intimate and nonintimate relationships. *Youth & Society, 35*, 293-322.

- Kindermann, T. A. (1993). Natural peer groups as contexts for individual development: The case of children's motivation in school. *Developmental Psychology, 29*, 970-977.
- Kohlberg, L. (1963). The development of children's orientations toward a moral order: I. Sequence in the development of moral thought. *Vita Humana, 6*(1), 11-33.
- Lee, K., Cameron, C. A., Xu, F., Fu, G., & Board, J. (1997). Chinese and Canadian children's evaluations of lying and truth telling: Similarities and differences in the context of pro- and antisocial behaviors. *Child Development, 68*, 924-934.
- Leslie, A., Knobe, J., & Cohen, A. (2006). Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: Theory of mind and moral judgment. *Psychological Science, 17*, 421-427.
- Leslie, A., Mallon, R., & DiCorcia, J. (2006). Transgressors, victims, and cry babies: Is basic moral judgment spared in autism? *Social Neuroscience, 1*, 270-283.
- Levy, S. R., & Dweck, C. S. (1999). The impact of children's static versus dynamic conceptions of people on stereotype formation. *Child Development, 70*, 1163-1180.
- Magimairaj, B., Montgomery, J., Marinellie, S., & McCarthy, J. (2009). Relation of three mechanisms of working memory to children's complex span performance. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 33*, 460-469.
- McKown, C., & Weinstein, R. S. (2003). The development and consequences of stereotype consciousness in middle childhood. *Child Development, 74*, 489-515.
- Nucci, L. P. (1981). The development of personal concepts: A domain distinct from moral or societal concepts. *Child Development, 52*, 114-121.

- Nucci, L. P., Camino, C., & Sapiro, C. M. (1996). Social class effects on Northeastern Brazilian children's conceptions of areas of personal choice and social regulation. *Child Development, 67*, 1223-1242.
- Nucci, L. P., & Turiel, E. (1978). Social interactions and the development of social concepts in preschool children. *Child Development, 49*, 400-407.
- Nucci, L. P., & Turiel, E. (1993). God's word, religious rules, and their relation to Christian and Jewish children's conception of morality. *Child Development, 64*, 1475-1491.
- Nummenmaa, L., Peets, K., & Salmivalli, C. (2008). Automatic activation of adolescents' peer-relational schemas: Evidence from priming with facial identity. *Child Development, 79*, 1659-1675.
- Park, Y., & Killen, M. (2010). When is peer rejection justifiable? Children's understanding across two cultures. *Cognitive Development, 25*, 290-301.
- Park, Y., Killen, M., Crystal, D. S., & Watanabe, H. (2003). Korean, Japanese, and US students' judgments about peer exclusion: Evidence for diversity. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 27*, 555-565.
- Parker, J. G. & Asher, S. R. (1987). Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk? *Psychological Bulletin, 102*, 357-389.
- Perkins, S. A., & Turiel, E. (2007). To lie or not to lie: To whom and under what circumstances. *Child Development, 78*, 609-621.
- Peterson, C. L., Danner, F. W., & Flavell, J. H. (1972). Developmental changes in children's response to three indications of communicative failure. *Child Development, 43*, 1463-1468.

- Pett, M. A., Lackey, N. R., & Sullivan, J. J. (2003). *Making Sense of Factor Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Piaget, J. (1932/1965). *The moral judgment of the child*. New York: Free Press.
- Putallaz, M., & Gottman, J. M. (1981). An interactional model of children's entry into peer groups. *Child Development, 52*, 986-994.
- Raine, A., Lencz, T., Bihrlle, S., LaCasse, L., & Colletti, P. (2000). Reduced prefrontal gray matter volume and reduced autonomic activity in antisocial personality disorder. *Archives of General Psychiatry, 57*, 119-127.
- Ramsey, P. G. (1995). Changing social dynamics in early childhood classrooms. *Child Development, 66*, 764-773.
- Real, K., & Rimal, R. N. (2007). Friends talk to friends about drinking: Exploring the role of peer communication in the theory of normative social behavior. *Health Communication, 22*, 169-180.
- Repacholi, B. M., & Gopnik, A. (1997). Early reasoning about desires: evidence from 14 and 18-month-olds. *Developmental Psychology, 33*, 12-21.
- Romero-Canyas, R., Downey, G., Reddy, K. S., Rodriguez, S., Cavanaugh, T. J., & Pelayo, R. (2010, July 12). Paying to belong: When does rejection trigger ingratiation? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0020013.
- Rose-Krasnor, L., Rubin, K. H., Booth, C. L., & Coplan, R. (1996). The relation of maternal directiveness and child attachment security to social competence in preschoolers. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 19*, 309-325.

- Rubin, K., Bukowski, W., & Parker, J. (2006). Peers, relationships, and interactions. In W. Damon & R. Lerner (Eds.), *Handbook of Child Psychology* (pp. 571-645). NY: Wiley Publishers.
- Rubin, K. H., Burgess, K., & Coplan, R. J. (2002). Social withdrawal and shyness. In P. K. Smith & C. Hart (Eds.), *Blackwell's handbook of child social development* (pp. 329-352). London: Blackwell.
- Rutland, A., Killen, M., & Abrams, D. (2010). A new social-cognitive developmental perspective on prejudice: The interplay between morality and group identity. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5*, 279-291.
- Ryckman, R. M., Hammer, M., Kaczur, L. M., & Gold, J. A. (1990). Construction of a hypercompetitive attitude scale. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 55*, 630-639.
- Ryckman, R. M., & Libby, C. R., van den Borne, B., Gold, J. A., & Lindner, M. A. (1997). Values of hypercompetitive and personal development competitive individuals. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 69*, 271-283.
- Ryckman, R. M., Thornton, B., & Gold, J. A. (2009). Assessing competition avoidance as a basic personality dimension. *The Journal of Psychology, 143*, 175-192.
- Shaw, L. A., & Wainryb, C. (2006). When victims don't cry: Children's understandings of victimization, compliance, and subversion. *Child Development, 77*, 1050-1062.
- Smetana, J. G. (1981). Preschool children's conceptions of moral and social rules. *Child Development, 52*, 1333-1336.
- Smetana, J. G. (1983). Social-cognitive development: Domain distinctions and coordinations. *Developmental Review, 3*, 131-147.

- Smetana, J. G. (1985). Preschool children's conceptions of transgressions: The effects of varying moral and conventional domain-related attributes. *Developmental Psychology, 21*, 18-29.
- Smetana, J. G. (1988). Adolescents' and parents' conceptions of parental authority. *Child Development, 59*, 321-335.
- Smetana, J. G. (1995). Morality in context: Abstractions, ambiguities, and applications. In R. Vasta (Ed.), *Annals of child development*. London: Jessica Kingsley.
- Smetana, J. G. (2006). Social-cognitive domain theory: Consistencies and variations in children's moral and social judgments. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 119-154). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Smetana, J. G., & Asquith, P. (1994). Adolescents' and parents' conceptions of parental authority and personal autonomy. *Child Development, 65*, 1147-1162.
- Smetana, J. G., Kelly, M., & Twentyman, C. T. (1984). Abused, neglected, and nonmaltreated children's conceptions of moral and social-conventional transgressions. *Child Development, 55*, 277-287.
- Sobel, D. M., & Kirkham, N. Z. (2007). Bayes nets and babies: infants' developing statistical reasoning abilities and their representation of causal knowledge. *Developmental Science, 10*, 298-306.
- Song, M. J., Smetana, J. G., & Kim, S. Y. (1987). Korean children's conceptions of moral and social-conventional transgressions. *Developmental Psychology, 23*, 577-582.

- Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. *Psychological Science, 18*, 587-592.
- Tajfel, H. (1978). *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*. London: Academic Press.
- Theimer, C. E., Killen, M., & Stangor, C. (2001). Young children's evaluations of exclusion in gender-stereotypic peer contexts. *Developmental Psychology, 37*, 18-27.
- Tisak, M. S., & Turiel, E. (1984). Children's conceptions of moral and prudential rules. *Child Development, 55*, 1030-1039.
- Turiel, E. (1974). Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development. *Child Development, 45*, 14-29.
- Turiel, E. (2006). Thought, emotions, and social interactional processes in moral development. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 7-35). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Turiel, E. (2008). The development of children's orientations toward moral, social, and personal orders: More than a sequence in development. *Human Development, 51*, 21-39.
- Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest in ingroup favoritism. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 9*, 187-204.
- Wainryb, C. (1991). Understanding differences in moral judgments: The role of informational assumptions. *Child Development, 62*, 840-851.
- Wainryb, C. (1993). The application of moral judgments to other cultures: Relativism and universality. *Child Development, 64*, 924-933.

- Wainryb, C., Shaw, L. A., Langley, M., Cottam, K., & Lewis, R. (2004). Children's thinking about diversity of belief in the early school years: Judgments of relativism, tolerance, and disagreeing persons. . *Child Development, 75*, 687-703.
- Wainryb, C., & Turiel, E. (1994). Dominance, subordination, and concepts of personal entitlements in cultural contexts. *Child Development, 65*, 1701-1722.
- Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. *Science, 311*, 1301-1303.
- Woodward, A. L. (2003). Infants' developing understanding of the link between looker and object. *Developmental Science, 6*, 297-311.
- Zelazo, P. D., Helwig, C. C., & Lau, A. (1996). Intention, act, and outcome in behavioral prediction and moral judgment. *Child Development, 67*, 2478-2492.