

ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: CIVILIAN CONTROL, GOOD ADVICE AND SERVICE MANAGEMENT: THREE ELEMENTS OF U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AFFECTED BY THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

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Studying the effects of organizational change on civil-military relations sheds light on the essential tension between the need to increase military effectiveness (security) while at the same time maintaining the democratic ideal of military subjugation by the polity. Keeping that in mind, the questions posed in the following research ask, what are the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 on U.S. civil-military relations? Has it enhanced or eroded civilian control? Has it given civilian leadership more tools to keep the military department-dominated Department of Defense (DOD) in check? Has it enhanced military advice? In a before and after case study comparison, change in civil-military relations as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation will be analyzed in three issue areas, a) resource

allocation, b) operations, and c) personnel policy. Dividing the cases by issue areas serves to artificially extricate resource allocation, operations and personnel policy from the larger Defense structure and from each other. Doing this will not only allow a more isolated study of the processes involved in each of these areas, but it will also allow the analysis to differentiate the organizational functions, processes, or decision-making of one issue area from another. Much of the analysis to date covers a broad sweep of DOD functions and does not differentiate the civil-military relationships from one issue to another.

The results of the analysis show that there were observable improvements in the three measures of civil-military relations with the enactment of the legislation. The enhancement of civil-military relations was mitigated, however, by a number of factors and was highly dependent on the type of issue through which civilians and the military interacted (whether personnel, operations or resource allocation). The research was able to isolate civil-military relations by issue type to determine independent effects of the GNA legislation.

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GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

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To my cousin Jess

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My parents may actually read this. My dad, for example, read my Master's thesis, so he may read this too. That's not why I would like to acknowledge my mom and dad, though. They have supported every one of my endeavors, large and small. Throughout my life, they have let my intellectual curiosity run rampant and so they are essentially to blame for the work contained here! But while you *must* blame them, keep in mind that they are the kind of people who have generous hearts, caring deeply about others and this world we share. They are my moral center.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
Chapter 1: The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and Civil-Military Relations	1
Introduction.....	1
Previous and Current Research in Civil Military Relations.....	9
Methodology	31
Remaining Chapters.....	41
Chapter 2: The Context of the Goldwater Nichols Act: Department of Defense Organizational and Statutory Changes	43
Organization Prior to the National Security Act of 1947: The Push and Pull of Unification	45
National Security Act of 1947 and the 1949 Amendments	56
Reorganization from the Korean War to Goldwater-Nichols	59
Reagan and the Goldwater-Nichols Act	68
The Goldwater-Nichols Provisions.....	70
Chapter 3: DOD Resource Allocation Process: Before and After Goldwater- Nichols .	78
Introduction.....	78
Definitions.....	81
The Pre-PPBS Budget Process.....	83
Pre-Goldwater-Nichols PPBS	87
Goldwater-Nichols & PPBS	101
GNA and Civil-Military Relations in the PPBS process	114
Conclusions.....	117
Chapter 4: DOD Operations: Before and After Goldwater-Nichols	120
Introduction.....	120
Definitions and Background	123
Civil-Military Relations in Military Operations Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act	127
Civil-Military Relations in Military Operations After the Goldwater-Nichols Act ...	147
Conclusions.....	171
Chapter 5: DOD Minority Integration: Before and After Goldwater-Nichols	177
Introduction.....	177
Background.....	179
Definitions.....	192
Civil-Military Relations and Minority Integration Prior to Goldwater-Nichols.....	194

Civil-Military Relations and Minority Integration After Goldwater-Nichols	213
Conclusion: Did Goldwater-Nichols Affect Civil-Military Relations in Minority Integration?	228
Chapter 6: Conclusions	232
Military Advice.....	233
Civilian Control	235
Service Management.....	237
Assumptions.....	239
Theory Revisited.....	241
Last Words	252
Appendix A.....	256
Appendix B	258
Reference List.....	259

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5-1. Percent of Positions Opened to Women Before and After Policy Changes	190
Table 5-2. Trends in Secretariat Personnel Strength and Military Personnel Proportion.....	228
Table 6-1. Civil-military Measures by Issue Area.....	232
Table 6-2. Descriptions of Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations.....	244

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Measures of GNA Changes and Measures of Civil-Military Relations.....	32
Figure 4-1. Time line of cases analyzed	132
Figure 4-2. Theater Command and Control in Vietnam.....	134

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BNSP	Basic National Security Policy
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command (Also, USCENTCOM)
CINC	Commander in chief
CINCENTCOM	Commander in chief, U.S. Central Command
CINCPAC	Commander in chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNO	Chief Naval Officer
CoS	Chief of Staff
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPR	Chairman's Program Recommendations
DADT	Don't Ask, Don't Tell (the Pentagon's policy on gays)
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DOD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance document
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
FARA	Federal Acquisition Reform Act (of 1996)
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
IPL	Integrated Priority List
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPAM	Joint Program Assessment Memorandum
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Also called COMUSMACV)
MOOTW	Military operations other than war
NCA	National Command Authority
NME	National Military Establishment (precursor to Department of Defense)
NSC	National Security Council
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OOTW	Operations other than war
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAC-III	Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (Army's Anti Theater Ballistic Missile)

PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBE	Planning Programming Budgeting Execution System
PPBS	Planning Programming and Budgeting System
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
TBMD	Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
THAAD	Theater High Altitude Area Defense
UNISOM	Operation Provide Relief (United Nations in Somalia)
UNITAF	Operation Restore Hope (United Nations Task Force, Somalia)
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USFORSOM	U.S. forces in Somalia
VCJCS	Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
WPD	War Plans Division
ZZB	Zero-based budgeting

1

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and Civil-Military Relations

[The Goldwater-Nichols Act] is one of the landmark laws of American history. It is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.

-Les Aspin

Introduction

In October 1986, Congress passed a bill that would dramatically reorganize the Department of Defense (DOD). Not since the National Security Act of 1947 had the American defense establishment experienced such a drastic change in its structure. The legislation was the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Among its many provisions, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the operational command structure to be more centralized with an empowered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The chairman was made the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council, and secretary of defense. The act created the position of vice-chairman and shortened the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense, to the unified commanders.

Passage of the act was fraught with controversy. James Locher, the senior Senate Armed Services Committee staff member in charge of the reorganization effort, recalls how the Joint Chiefs reacted during a February 1986 meeting in the “Tank”—the Chief’s conference room at the Pentagon:

“As the bill is drafted,” [Army Chief of Staff] Wickham thundered, “it would leave uncertain who within the Army would be responsible for giving advice on operational matters. Would it be the chief or would it

now be the secretary? The upshot of this confusion would be an erosion of the chiefs' authority to provide military advice." Now in full stride with righteous indignation powering his words, Wickham signaled the coming of a lengthy harangue (Locher 2002, 3-4).

Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee were determined to reform an ailing military organization that had experienced what they considered to be too many unnecessary operational failures since World War II. Theirs was an uphill battle. The current military leadership was adamantly opposed to reorganization and Congress was divided on the issue.

The aging Republican luminary and rising Democratic star made an attractive political combination, and they rarely faced such long odds on a defense issue. Seldom were their allies so few and their adversaries so numerous and powerful. Not only were Goldwater and Nunn confronting the Pentagon, they also were fighting off Capitol Hill colleagues, military associations, defense contractors, veterans groups, retired officer and noncommissioned officer associations, and others who sat in the military's corner for one reason or another. Goldwater and Nunn's fight against DoD antireformers and their horde of allies made for a David-and-Goliath battle on the Potomac (Locher 2002, 5).

At the time, the military services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—controlled the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), dominated the unified and specified commands, circumvented the authority of the defense secretary, and provided self-serving advice to civilian leadership (Locher 2002, 9). Goldwater and Nunn believed that in order to enhance the military's operational effectiveness, the service's longstanding ascendancy over military affairs must be diminished.

Proponents of reorganization like Nunn, Goldwater, and others, focused on enhancing the efficiency of the military's command structure. General Edward Meyer, Army (Ret.), argued that the United States in 1986 was under international strategic conditions that made quicker decision-making and a more responsive defense

organization mandatory. He said, “If we are to be secure, we must provide for our security in a way which can adapt to this change” (Meyer 1986, 54). The structure of the defense department was not, according to Meyer, adaptable. To exacerbate this problem, by 1986, the Chiefs jobs were increasing in number and complexity. Since their roles and responsibilities were diffuse, their ability to focus on any one thing was challenging:

The explosion of lawmaking and regulation-writing in the ‘70s has greatly complicated the development of a coherent defense posture. Additionally, the time available to each individual Chief to direct his Service has been severely reduced, owing to the ever-increasing demands of appointed and elected officials. The “growth industry” of congressional staffs has also created a larger burden for the Service chiefs, as they seek to provide adequate responses to the mountain of Congressional queries. The Chiefs have even less time for strategic reflection or attention to the responsiveness of the JCS system (Meyer 1986, 54).

As this quote by General Meyer indicates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure was particularly targeted as inadequate for producing coherent and strategically relevant advice to civilian leadership—both in the executive and legislative branches of government. A 1985 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report concluded that defense secretaries wanted more integrated advice from the JCS system on defense planning, resource allocation, and execution of military operations. The report recommended that the Chairman of the JCS, not the corporate JCS, be made principal military advisor to the president and secretary of defense (Odeen et al. 1985).

The CSIS report echoed the outcome of a 1982 study organized by the Chairman of the JCS, David C. Jones entitled *The Chairman’s Special Study Group* (also known as the Brehm Report, named for the director of the group). In effect, the Chairman’s report argued that there was no unified military advice in national strategy, force development, roles and missions, or budgetary matters. The report states,

The JCS generally have been seen by civilian leaders as unable to provide useful Joint advice on many issues. Joint Staff work often comes across as superficial and predictable, and of little help in resolving issues. The JCS and the Joint Staff do not have a significant role in setting objectives or in resource allocation. (Brehm 1982).

The Brehm report argued that the Chiefs were unable to achieve a joint perspective because they were unable to rise above their services' interests.

Opponents of defense reorganization focused on the effect it would have on civil-military relations, particularly with respect to how JCS reform would rearrange the command structure. The opposition was led by the military. It was suggested that increasing the strength of the Chairman of the JCS would erode civilian control. Though this opinion was common among the JCS Chiefs and highest ranks of all services, Navy leadership was the most inimical. The Chief Naval Officer (CNO), Thomas Hayward, at the time stated,

I have grave reservations that reorganization [of the JCS] along the lines proposed would not move toward a more effective joint organization but would rather be the first, dangerous step toward a general staff which the Congress clearly has not supported in the past, and which I do not support now (U.S. House 1982, 100).

Admiral Hayward's argument was not a new one. During the defense reorganizations of the 1940s and 50s, concerns about creating a more organized, effective, and influential joint staff and chairmanship seemed too much, for too many, like the Prussian general staff model.¹ MacKubin Owens explains the origin of this opposition:

¹ The politically conservative Committee on Civil-Military Relationships of the Hudson Institute published a report in 1984 entitled *An Analysis of Proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization*. It spelled out how the proposed changes to the command structure of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would create a "Prussian"-type system or national general staff that would eradicate a "balanced point of view" that the current corporate system provided.

The proposed reforms that place the JCS in the chain of command...affect civilian control of the military. Advocates of JCS reform usually ridicule this concern, but the issue of civilian control of the military has been of constant concern throughout the history of the Republic. By strengthening the Chairman (or creating a chief of a national general staff) and placing him in the chain of command, reformers would give more power to a single U.S. military officer than has ever been given before.... Would not an independently powerful Chairman have great incentive to be a lapdog for a President or Secretary of Defense and to voice support for egregious policies in order to keep his position? To give the chairman power independent of the corporate JCS seems to invited the extremes in a way the present system does not: to increase the threat to civilian control of the military on the one hand; or to render the highest ranking American military officer a political toady.... Despite the claims of the advocates of reform, the political-ideological problems with JCS reorganization are serious and represent a real threat to the subordination of the military to civilian control (Owens 1985-86, 103-4).

Skeptics have since claimed that the military chiefs were somewhat less concerned about the traditions of civilian control and providing good military advice than they were about losing their control over military affairs, particularly their control over resource allocation. Lederman wrote,

In addition to the Navy, elements of the other services opposed reform because having a centralized military authority to filter the services' budgetary requests and to evaluate the services' policies would reduce the services' clout in the budgetary and policymaking process. It would be harder for a service to claim to Congress that its budgetary request merited full funding if a strong chairman had already recommended, by virtue of his professional military judgment, reducing that service's budget (Lederman 1999, 57).

Though the military chiefs' critiques of the legislation were arguably reminiscent of a turf war, their fears of losing a control they had maintained for decades was warranted. The legislation certainly had a centralizing and unifying effect on military decision-making.

Furthermore, concerns about civilian control and the adverse impact on military advice were not new and had their foundations in previous reorganization attempts.²

Although all three major defense reorganization efforts of the last century were responses to new strategic imperatives, the effects on civil-military relations can hardly be ignored. In the text of the Goldwater-Nichols Conference Report, the impact on civil-military relations is obvious as the intents of the legislation are listed:

... (1) to reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority; (2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense; (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to them; (4) to ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commanders was fully commensurate with the responsibility to accomplish their missions; (5) to increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning; (6) to provide for the more efficient use of defense resources; (7) to improve joint officer management policies; and (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve management and administration of the Department of Defense (U.S. House 1986, 3).

There are several points in the text worth highlighting. As noted above, the biggest organizational change that the Goldwater-Nichols Act³ (GNA) brought about was the power shift to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Prior to the GNA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a whole acted as a corporate body and the chairman had minimal influence on decision outcomes—the power was really held by the Chiefs. After GNA, the Chairman was endowed with hierarchical power, becoming the individual who presided over and determined the JCS agenda. This move was intended to improve advice

² During the 20th Century, there were three major defense reorganizations: the National Security Act of 1947, the Defense Reorganization act of 1958 and Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. There were additional organizational changes in between these years that will also be discussed. While the United States military had reorganized several times prior to 1947, it was in 1947 that the modern U.S. military organization was created.

³ The Goldwater-Nichols Act will often be referred to as “GNA” throughout the text.

to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and Secretary of Defense, while at the same time increasing civilian control over the national security decision-making process.

Prior to the GNA, the service chiefs governed the JCS and unanimity was required in its advice to the President and/or Secretary of Defense. As a result, advice had great potential to be diluted to the least common denominator due to interservice rivalry. The services could collude on advising any course of action that may or may not have been the best course of action. Strong service chiefs could enervate weak secretaries of defense and, as a result, military advice to the Executive had great potential for being ineffectual—as it often was. The 1985 Senate Armed Services Staff Report concluded, “Any [defense reorganization] scheme must also provide protection for a weak Secretary of Defense who must confront strong military leadership” (U.S. Senate 1985, 44).

While the office of the JCS Chairman was given this power, its responsibilities also expanded to include, among other duties, assisting and advising the President and Defense Secretary on strategic planning, programming and budgets, and military training and education. Alone, this provision of the GNA had significant potential to change the way top civilian and military leaders interacted.

Another change that would also seem to have a direct impact on post-GNA civil-military relations was making the acquisition, auditing, information management, inspector general, and legislative/public affairs functions the exclusive responsibility of the service secretariats—the civilian heads of each military department—while strictly prohibiting the military headquarter staffs—the military heads of each department—to “establish or designate” any of these functions (U.S. House 1986, 97). This established a

new civilian control mechanism among the services that, no doubt, affected the civil-military relationship at that level.

With the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) becoming law in late 1986, the congressional debates were essentially put to rest, but anxiety about how the legislation would impact civil-military relations remained. Though it seems logical that the passage of GNA affected the relationship between top civilian and military leaders, it is not clear from a review of the literature, just how or to what extent the relationship changed, or was influenced. In fact, even today there are those who argue that the structural changes made by the legislation have put civil-military relations dangerously out of balance. Whether this is true or not is difficult to determine because most civil-military studies do not specifically address the empirical impact of GNA. Likewise, few GNA outcome studies have focused exclusively (or even partially) on the civil-military relations aspect of organizational change; instead, they are more engaged by the debates on operational effectiveness (e.g., Have wars been fought more efficiently since GNA was passed? Are operational decisions made more accurately and effectively?).

After the GNA became law, a slew of new research, writing, and opinion pieces have been committed to the widening of civilian-military cleavages, with a few still claiming that centralization of the JCS under Goldwater-Nichols remains a dangerous menace to civil-military relations in general and civilian control, specifically (Dunlap 1992 and 1996, Luttwak 1994, and Previdi 1988 and 2004, Reynolds 2004).

Understanding how the GNA has affected the civil-military relationship can shed light on these concerns that continue to percolate nearly two decades after the legislation was enacted.

For these reasons, the following research poses the questions: What are the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 on U.S. civil-military relations? Has it enhanced or eroded civilian control? Has it given civilian leadership more tools to keep the service-dominated Department of Defense (DOD) in check? Has it enhanced military advice? The framing of these questions alludes to the concern that civil-military relations in the early 1980s were the major catalyst for the debates and ensuing passage of the act. In fact, defense reorganizations in the United States have predominantly resulted from the desire to fight wars more effectively. Studying the effects of organizational change on civil-military relations sheds light on the essential tension between the need to increase military effectiveness (security) while at the same time maintaining the democratic ideal of military subjugation by the polity. The civil-military literature to date wrestles with this tension.

Previous and Current Research in Civil Military Relations

While reviewing the civil-military literature, it becomes evident that there has been little academic attention devoted to the effects of Goldwater-Nichols on civil-military relations. The following review is delineated by those studies and theories relevant to the United States case in particular (and democratic systems in general), as well as to the issue of civil-military command structure. The civil-military literature is vast and theoretically rich, but as Peter Feaver notes, it is also lacking:

One of the weaknesses in the civil-military relations literature is that there are relatively few efforts to systematically compare explanatory factors or to identify the conditions under which one set of factors has more explanatory leverage than another. Even where different sets of factors are pitted against each other, it is rare for the analyst to do more than give rough comparable weights to one or the other (1999, 224).

One rationale for attempting an investigation of the effects of GNA on civil-military relations is to ameliorate some of the methodological problems associated with this type of research. Because this specific relationship has not been empirically tested, this review covers and critiques the broader issues found in the civil-military relations literature. To date, however, it should be noted that much of this scholarship has focused on just one aspect of civil-military relations—civilian control, arguably the most crucial of the civil-military measures.

Feaver claims that because the policy implications of instituting a specific type of civilian control are so important, normative theory is often the central focus in studies of civil-military relations (1999, 216). Although normative studies tend to be picked out as the most important and informative ones, the vast majority of the civil-military literature is empirical and descriptive. As a result, normative studies and theories generally have an ample supply of empirical work to draw on. This is not true, however, for the American case. Feaver continues, “area studies specialists have long noted the centrality of civil-military relations is a central preoccupation in most area studies subliteratures, except those dealing with the United States and Western Europe” (1999, 217). This literature review draws on the most influential and pertinent studies that are both theoretical/normative and empirical/descriptive. It will show not only where an analysis of GNA and civil-military relations fits, but also where there is need for more theory and analysis.

The Cold War and civil-military relations theory. Civilians and civilian government controlling the means of war and violence is a theme that can be traced back to Madison, Hamilton, and other founders of the American political and social system.

Richard Kohn (1975 and 1988), a scholar of the founding of the American military, claims that the proper civil-military balance in the U.S. should be the complete domination of the military by civilian government. That is the way it was conceived by the founding fathers, and that is the way it should be now. To this end, the military model conceived by the founders was the maintenance of a small professional military during peacetime and temporary conscription to augment the professional force during times of war.

Despite the civil-military values chartered and put into practice by the founders, the Cold War greatly altered the expected course of American civil-military relations (Gibson, 1998). The result in universities and other institutions was a spate of new research addressing the phenomena of a large standing military when there were no physical wars to be fought. America's new civil-military reality had to be understood. It was at this time in history that some of the most important studies trying to better understand civilian control began to emerge. For example, Louis Smith's *American Democracy and Military Power* (1951) provided a historical context to understand the American type of civilian control over the military. Smith's conclusion was that the tradition of a small peacetime military to maintain control would no longer work—adjustments to the founders' original assumptions would have to be made. While very comprehensive and enlightening with respect to the institutions, principals, and practices of civilian control, the book was only intended to describe the “basic principles and enduring problems” of American civil-military relations and not the details of the relative effects of organization (or any other variable) on civilian control. Both descriptive and normative, Smith's work acted as a sort of watershed between the old modes of thinking

about civilian control—where, for example, state militias were believed to balance out the national military—to a realization of new necessities under the Cold War. Perhaps one of his more relevant conclusions for contemporary DOD research is that, because old forms of subjective control⁴ are no longer tenable given the new international security environment, the defense secretariat must be more skilled and knowledgeable with full executive and congressional support. This theme was studied empirically by Christopher Gibson in 1998, and is discussed below.

Lasswell (1950), Ekirch (1956), and Millis (1958), all contemporaries of Louis Smith, were also concerned with the lack of demobilization after WWII and also concluded that the civilian control models and methods of the past would no longer be useful. These books were all historical and normative, describing changes in U.S. civil-military relations and trying to make sense of the emerging reality. They were written to warn the reader about the adverse effects of peacetime military strength on federal governance and civil liberties, but their arguments were not based on empirical work. Consequently, their work lacked the theoretical basis for others to build on.

Huntington and civilian control. It was in this international, political, and academic atmosphere that Huntington boldly declared, “The United States Constitution, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, does not provide for civilian control” (1957, 163). In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argued that the constitutional provision of separation of powers with respect to national defense and the fostering of “direct access of the military authorities to the highest levels of government” actually posed threats to civilian control. Huntington meant that the Constitution, instead of providing for

⁴ See footnote 6 for a definition of subjective control.

“objective”⁵ civilian control, only offered a tradition of “subjective”⁶ control. Both are ways to control the military, but they are diametrically opposed in the way civilian control is carried out.

Huntington was the first to address the civil-military dilemma created by the Cold War and to theorize legitimate solutions to it. He posited that the dilemma of maintaining a large, experienced, and relatively idle military could be remedied by giving the military enough autonomy to determine its own policies—policies that are defined narrowly by civilian authority. This objective civilian control, otherwise called “professionalizing the military,” meant that civilians would relinquish certain controls, such as operational/battlefield plans and decisions. The effect would be to assure that the military remains politically “sterile and neutral” relative to all other legitimate civilian groups (Huntington 1957, 84). *The Soldier and the State*’s normative theory of civilian control has dominated civil-military relations since it was written. It is still one of the main texts used by the military itself to teach soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that professional militaries do not intervene in politics (Gibson 1998, 36).

The limits of Huntington’s theory. Though Huntington’s theory has provided the foundation for generations of civil-military studies, most of the civil-military scholars today agree either revisions or an alternative to Huntington are needed. As Gibson (1998) and Finer (1962) point out, Huntington’s claim that military professionalism is the way out of the Cold War civil-military dilemma is tautological. “Militaries that are

⁵ Huntington’s objective control is, simply, increasing military professionalism—providing a sphere under which the military has a relatively large degree of dominion, with little interference from civilian control.

⁶ A simple definition of subjective control is making the military more civilian-like and/or keeping the military organizational structure weak in comparison to other controlling entities. An example of subjective control would be when the president or secretary of defense appoints a high-ranking general who is a personal friend or who is friendly to the president’s political views. This is different than Huntington’s

professional do not interfere in politics and militaries that do intervene in the political process are unprofessional—no substantial argument for causality is offered” (Gibson 1998, 36). Furthermore, Huntington’s theory was, in most ways, Cold War-specific, working under the premise that there was a constant and serious external threat.

Not long after *The Soldier and the State* was published, Finer (1962) argued that Huntington’s theory was weak with respect to the link between so-called “professionalism” and the actual motivation inhibiting military intervention. Huntington claimed that there is no motivation for intervention, so long as military professionals are focused on their job—to be “technicians in the management and organization of violence.” Finer counters by stating that this very professionalism may actually lend itself to direct civil-military conflict. First of all, military professionals may actually believe themselves to be servants of the state, and not the servants of the people (or of their elected or otherwise represented leadership). Finer cites numerous examples, including Von Seeckt and Gröner of the Weimar Republic, Sir Arthur Paget of the Irish Mutiny at the Curragh, and U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, where loyalty to the state superseded obedience to the legitimate leadership. General MacArthur once said,

I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who *temporarily* exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government rather than to the country and its constitution which they are sworn to defend (in Taylor 1952, 354).⁷

Finer makes the point that the military motivation of non-intervention is not necessarily explained by professionalism. There are numerous cases where military intervention

objective control because the criteria for holding a military leadership position are less about professionalism (Huntington’s objective control mechanism) than about loyalty.

⁷ Italics added for emphasis.

begins with the military adhering strictly to one of Huntington's main components of professionalism: social responsibility.

Huntington also claims that expertise is another component of professionalism. Paraphrased, this means that if the military is given a specific realm of control then military personnel will be busy perfecting their skills, abilities, and knowledge about that realm, keeping them too busy (and even uninterested) to interfere in politics. Military expertise leads to professionalism through this singularity of interest. The problem with this theory is that it does not account for what Finer calls "military syndicalism." Military leaders begin to feel that they are the only ones with enough information, knowledge, and experience to make accurate decisions regarding force structure, organization, personnel, etc.—decisions that should actually be made by civilian authority. This certainly has become a more pertinent factor as the means of war have become increasingly technical and technology-driven and the distinction between what is strategic and what is operational is less discernable. For example, whose opinion should weigh in more heavily regarding the fate of the MV-22 Osprey? Should it be the voice of the Marine Corps who view it as vital to their war fighting capabilities, or civilian leadership who is necessarily more concerned about the vehicle's safety and the cost to taxpayers?

Giving military leadership its own sphere of autonomy, while indeed creating professionalism, may not actually inhibit intervention into politics. It may, to the contrary, facilitate it. As Gibson (1998) points out, professionalism as envisioned by Huntington, may actually increase the military officer's political savvy. With the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols and the subsequent linkage of promotions to joint duty

assignments and higher educational attainment, Huntington's military professionalism has been turned on its head.

Both Kohn (1994) and Luttwak (1994) agree. The line between proper civilian control and improper military intervention is not an easy one to walk and many military critics claim that, more and more, military "professionals" are not even bothering to try. They claim that organizational changes, particularly with Goldwater-Nichols, have made it easier for officers to ignore Huntington's recommendations about non-intervention. Luttwak writes that not only does the military enjoy autonomy over force planning as a direct result of Goldwater-Nichols, but it has also increased its ability to directly impact strategic decisions, decisions that should be made, without question, by elected leaders.

It is not necessarily always apparent, however, when the norm of non-intervention has been broken by the military. This is one of the main problems with the civil-military relations literature today. Kohn explains:

Civilian control is not a *fact*, but a *process*, that varies over time and is very much 'situational,' that is, dependent on the issues and the personalities, civilian and military, involved at any given point... Just where the line defining civilian control and proper civil-military relationships lie has never been...determined with clarity... While we cannot always draw such clear distinctions between civilian and military roles, most of us can sense when something is wrong... Like pornography, we can't always define it, but each generation surely knows it when it sees or hears it (1994, 16-17).

As Gibson, Kohn, Luttwak, and many other voices in today's civilian control debates claim, the military, like other interest groups, actively participates in the political process, seeking to influence policy where and when its interests are at stake. Huntington's theory, while still influential (particularly in its normative claims), cannot fully explain nor provide a model for today's civil-military relationship. Any theory of civilian control

developed for the post-Cold War environment will have to confront the ambiguity of situational civilian control that Kohn describes.

To sum up, the main problems with Huntington's theory for today's civil-military relations are in his causal claims. First of all, there is no real explanation of a causal link between the different indicators of professionalism (his main control mechanism) and the non-intervention motivation and behavior of military leadership. For example, the autonomous sphere of influence given to the military as a means to temper its intervention into politics has grown since the end of the Cold War. Is this because the military demands a larger sphere of influence or because civilians are less adroit in dealing with the military, or for an entirely different reason, or for many reasons combined? Does this mean that today's military leadership is less professional? Another problem in Huntington's theory is that professionalism, as he defines it, may actually increase the military leadership's ability to successfully intervene into politics. If indicators of professionalism can actually increase the military's ability to successfully intervene into politics, then serious doubt is cast on Huntington's causal claims that professionalism increases objective civilian control. So, if objective control and professionalism are not enough to explain variation in civilian control, then what other explanation is missing?

Janowitz and civilian control: An alternative to Huntington. One of the most important alternatives to Huntington's normative theory is found in Morris Janowitz' *The Professional Soldier*, written in 1960 and updated with a new, extensive prologue in 1971. A sociologist, Janowitz' approach to and purpose for the study of civil-military relations were different than Huntington's in *The Soldier and the State*. Janowitz was

interested in understanding the changing socialization and skills of the officer corps—he wanted to know who these people were, how they got to be that way, and what they did as agents of the state. A tremendous research undertaking, *Professional Soldier* synthesized the data extracted from over a hundred intensive interviews of colonels/naval captains and one-star flag officers, and hundreds of historical samples of generals and admirals over four different time periods. The book also provided a reanalysis of the 1954 Pentagon Staff Officer Questionnaire.

Janowitz rejected Huntington's notion that there was an absolute division between military and political spheres. He recognized that the American military was becoming more and more politicized, with a more constabulary role in international security. The result was a normative model advocating subjective control of the military. Janowitz saw that there were competing forces within the military itself and that civilian leadership, no matter how factional or discordant, could maintain control by playing these forces off of each other. Doing this would not only ensure that control would stay in the hands of civilians, but it would also ensure a more efficient and effective military. Janowitz, like Huntington, believed that professionalism was necessary for civilian control, but focused more on civilianizing the military as a means to maintain that control (the very opposite of what Huntington prescribed). Intrusive and active civilian leadership would infuse societal norms into the military.

Variables explaining civilian control and theoretical revisions. Though Janowitz presented a very enlightening and enduring perspective of what it meant to be a professional soldier both socially and politically, that vision falls short in explaining the new challenges to civilian control in the post-Cold War domestic environment. There

have been numerous studies building on the civilian control theories of Huntington and Janowitz, but all of them, as Finer (1962) asserts, whether they build on the virtues of subjective or objective civilian control, must at some point confront the problem of how civilians are able to have any control over militaries at all.

What exists in the military ethos that will allow it to be subjected to control by an outside force? In the pursuit of an answer to this question, Huntington's and Janowitz' concepts of military professionalism began to be more carefully examined, critiqued, and redefined. For example, in 1988, Hendrickson found that civilian control is a deeply rooted ethic in the U.S. military and that organizational changes meant to increase subordination have had no real effect. At the time in which Hendrickson did his research, the Cold War influence on the civil-military balance was still in effect. Following Huntington's functional imperative of external threat (Desch's 1999 and Dauber's 1998 argument as well), these conclusions, though probably derived with a spurious explanation, make sense. Whether or not civilian control was a well-established ethic among professional soldiers could not be adequately tested during a time when this imperative overshadowed all other motivations of military subordination.

Contrary to Hendrickson, Desch, and Dauber, there are some who claim that the Cold War had no effect at all on maintaining tighter civilian control. Bacevich argues that there were civil-military conflicts during the Cold War and that any claim that the post-Cold War era's civil-military balance is worse than ever before is a misreading of history (1998, 450-51). The research of the following chapters will attempt to address the issue of civilian control outside of the context of Huntington's functional imperative, so Hendrickson and Bacevich's conclusions can, to some extent, be tested.

Rather than the disposition of the military, some scholars have focused on personality as the main indicator of civilian control. For example, analyzing the French case, scholars attribute the resolution of the civil-military crisis during the Algerian war directly to de Gaulle (Meisel 1962). Some scholars of the U.S.-case point to Clinton's lack of military experience and his personal dislike of the military vis-à-vis General Powell's popularity and political deftness as indicators of decreased civilian control. It seems intuitively evident that personality plays some role, but as Desch (1999) points out, it begs the question of why certain personalities are elected or come into power at particular times in history in the first place.

A new group of civil-military theorists and researchers have started with Huntington's concepts and re-contextualized them using more robust and better-defined theories. For example, Feaver (1998) takes this nebulous notion of "professionalism" in military ethos and devises a principle-agent model of civil-military relations. He was concerned that traditional civil-military theories only explained changes in civilian control as a result of external factors, such as external threat to the state (Huntington) or broad ideological shifts within the society (Janowitz). What was missing was an account of the "microfoundations" of the civil-military relationship through which these external factors would have their anticipated consequence (1998, 29). Feaver's model characterizes the civil-military relationship as a system of intrusive civilian monitoring and of military shirking (non-compliance with civilian orders). The model provides a method to link the development of factors external to civil-military relations—such as the end of the Cold War, presidential personality, DOD organizational changes, etc.—to changes in patterns of civilian control.

Other theorists claim that the civil-military literature does not focus on the correct questions about civilian control. Avant (1998) claims that there are several issues that most civil-military relations theories have not examined. For example, instead of describing change in the civil-military relationship as the result of a systemic change, she turns the question on its head by asking, has change in the international system caused contention about a society's goals, doubts about the effectiveness of previous policies, etc. Avant claims that these intervening factors may have a more direct impact on the civil-military relationship and focusing on them, instead of on systemic changes, will provide a much more descriptive explanation of current mechanisms of civilian control. Furthermore, this type of framework may put the current debates about whether or not there is a crisis in civilian control into a better context.

Other theorists claim that the right questions are being asked, but that the civil-military concepts are not being modeled correctly. For example, Feaver (1996) claims that a civil-military relations model, which attempts to rectify the theoretical problems of Huntington and Janowitz, should treat civilian and military spheres as analytically distinct. Schiff (1997), developing a theory of concordance among military, political leadership, and citizen spheres, disagrees. She claims that a cooperative relationship among all three elements of the civil-military relationship does not preclude separation. She concludes that the absence of military intervention into the domestic/political sphere may be most explained by concordance among all elements of a society. Feaver retorts, "Separating the civilian and military spheres in theory does not rule out greater or lesser convergence in practice. But if the spheres are not at least analytically distinct, the theory is no longer about civil-military relations" (1996, 170).

Other critiques of past research claim that Huntington's theories are not descriptive enough. The claim is that a new theory of civilian control should not just be able to document relations between civilian rulers and military subordinates, but it should explain the ways in which civilians actually control the military. It should "transcend the concept of professionalization" and analyze how the indicators of professionalism actually relate to the way in which civilians maintain control (Feaver 1996). The research that follows, while not explicitly designed for theory development or falsification, will certainly meet Feaver's requirements. Through the utilization of case studies and investigation of processes and interactions, these theoretical issues will be addressed.

Hypothesis testing on civilian control models. The civilian control literature has, more recently, moved beyond theory making to theory testing. Two studies stand out as examples of trying to account for changes in civilian control. The first, discussed above in the methodology section, is Desch's book, *Civilian Control of the Military*. The theory funnels down to a simple 2 x 2 matrix demonstrating that civilian control is strong when domestic security threats are low and international security threats are high. It is at its weakest when domestic security threats are high and international threats low.

Desch himself admits that the model is not a causal one—that there is merely a correlation between structure of the international system and civilian control. For all other cases, where external and domestic threats are either both low or both high (indeterminate threat), he adds a unique explanatory variable—military doctrine. Military doctrine, Desch explains, plays an important role in subverting civilian control when the threat environment is indeterminate. The Powell Doctrine is cited as an example in the

U.S. case. The issues of command structure modification and specifically Goldwater-Nichols are raised, but dismissed as significant factors in helping to even partially explain the apparent shift in civilian control after the Cold War. Desch states, “George Bush had little trouble bending the military to his will when it came to prewar and wartime strategy” (1999, 34).⁸ While this may be so, what Desch fails to consider is the time it takes members of such a large organization to change behavior, attitude, and social interactions as a result of the major organizational shift. His conclusions may be true, but dismissing command structure as a viable independent variable without analysis of intervening variables is not thoroughly convincing.

What Desch gives up with his spartan structural theory is any kind of depth that may actually lead to an examination of causal variables. His case studies focus only on outcomes (not process) and his explanation of civilian control during times of indeterminate threat environments raises more questions than it answers. For example, how is military doctrine formulated in the first place and why and under what circumstances will it have an impact on civilian control? The Powell doctrine is cited as an example of diminishing civilian control, but it has never really been proven that it had any impact on civilian control whatsoever. Desch’s attempt to capitalize on Huntington’s theoretical strengths and to ameliorate his weaknesses is only partially achieved. The following research will attempt to more finely explore the factors beyond structure that are absent in Desch’s analysis.

Other research by Christopher Gibson (1998) and Gibson and Snyder (1997) demonstrates that the main factor in determining civilian control is a growing experience differential between civilians and military leaders. In short, military experience among

⁸ To clarify, Desch is referring to George Bush, Sr., not his son, George W. Bush.

top civilian leaders has waned over the past couple of decades, but military influence into national security decision-making by top military leaders has increased as a consequence of the structural changes enacted by Goldwater-Nichols. Military leaders have increased their professional preparation and, thus, influence in the political sphere. Like Avant (1994) and Feaver (1998), Gibson and Snider (1997) also employ a principal-agent model. The model is one of the first to isolate an independent variable, showing a causal relationship between it and civilian control. While some minor criticisms have been leveled against Gibson's and Snyder's work, the model is compelling. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of their work is that it does not explain why or how the military elites have had some success in controlling issues that are less about military professionalism, such as the gays in the military and women in combat debates. These were cases where military leadership did not have more knowledge, education, or experience, yet its opinion either prevailed or garnered major concessions from civilian superiors.

Also, their research does not take into account command structure as a separate independent variable, but it does look at the effect of Goldwater-Nichols on promotions. That, the researchers claim, has had a profound effect on the political education and experience of military officers, which, in turn, has had a major effect on diminishing civilian control.

Though these most recent efforts to understand the nature of civilian control of the U.S. military have fixed some of the problems of Huntington and Janowitz, they are still univariate and under-theorized. At a minimum, the study of civil-military relations in general and civilian control specifically should make evident the intricate and complex nature of the relationships involved. With the exception of Desch, no studies have

attempted to model civilian control using a multivariate model and no studies have tried to empirically determine whether or not command structure has any effect on civilian control under any structure. Many scholars admit that command structure could have some influence on civilian control but the hypothesis as such has never been tested. The most direct assessment of the relationship between command structure and civilian control comes from Previdi (1988) in *Civilian Control Versus Military Rule*. His claim is that Goldwater-Nichols weakens the presidential role as commander-in-chief. But his work was published only two years after GNA was enacted. Any behavioral consequence as the result of organizational change hardly had time to fully manifest itself. Previdi's work also took on a Cold War historical perspective, so the issue of Huntington and Desch's functional imperative could not be extricated. A newer, more empirical examination is needed. This gap, both methodological and substantive, in the civilian control literature with respect to command structure is where the following research will fit.

Bureaucratic models and the Department of Defense. Fundamentally, the research that follows is descriptive, asking the questions, *what* are the results of statutory changes on a large organization. Nevertheless, this research may add to the knowledge about how change in a bureaucratic system affects the way agents of those bureaucracies interact. Several recent civil-military studies have utilized a new institutionalist⁹ approach in understanding the changing civil-military dynamic (Gibson & Snider, 1997, Gibson, 1998). The neo-institutionalist argues that the structure and process of politics is a derivative of broad elements of social life. The elements include the physical

⁹ New institutionalism's theoretical foundations are found in *Bringing the State Back In* by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985.

environment (climate, geography), ethnicity, language, culture, economic conditions (class), ideology, technology, demography, religion, and so on (March & Olsen 1984, 735). As a new-institutionalist, Gibson theorizes that changes in civil-military relations are a function of broad social structures, rules, and norms. In order to understand how individuals and groups arrive at a given policy, those structures, rules, and norms must be understood (Gibson 1998, 82). For example, the theory proposes that the structural changes brought about by the GNA would affect the decision-making process of the players involved, and ultimately change the policy outcomes of those parts of the institution where the decision-making process was altered (Gibson 1998, 82). So, borrowing the inference and direction of causality from neo-institutionalism, structural and subsequent normative changes brought about by the GNA should have some level of influence on measures of civil-military relations.

A fundamental assumption of institutional theory is that agents of an institution will act in ways that will enhance their institutional power. Thus,

...we should expect that military organizations will be responsive to civilian goals when military leaders believe that they will be rewarded for that responsiveness. Whether military leaders will expect to be rewarded or not will depend on how civilian leaders have chosen to set up and monitor military organizations (Avant 1994, 2).

Goldwater-Nichols changed the monitoring structure by which military leadership expect to be rewarded. Gibson operationalizes rewards as a system of monitoring. He claims the ways in which civilians choose to manage the military and interpret the statutes delineating that management will determine how relations between civilian and military leaders will play out (Gibson 1998, 84). Micromanagement of the military by civilian authority leads to mistrust among military leaders. Mistrust may have a decided

effect on the way military agents offer advice. Mistrust may also solidify an “us vs. them” attitude among top military leadership and thus decrease civilian ability to use interservice rivalry to control and get accurate information from the military. Many point to the Kennedy administration as exemplary in micromanagement compared to the Reagan administration as exemplary in under-management of the military. The theory posits, however, that while under-monitoring by civilians provides military agents incentives/rewards, civilian mistrust of military increases.

Bureaucratic theory, like institutionalism, may also offer expectations of how measures of civil-military relations have been affected by the passage of Goldwater-Nichols. As Krasner writes,

In recent years, analyses have increasingly emphasized not rational calculations of the national interest or the political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic politics...Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible for political leaders to control the organizational web which surrounds them. Important decisions result from numerous smaller actions taken by individuals at different levels in the bureaucracy who have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and personal objectives. They are not necessarily a reflection of the aims and values of high officials (1972, 159).

In terms of the civil-military puzzle, one scholar explains that bureaucratic politics dominates the budgetary, acquisition, and procurement process. He asserts that the services, “are key acquisitional competitors...they use weapons to stake claims...They engineer threats, strategically choose requirements, limit oversight, select and distort data, and skip and collapse acquisition stages to create political momentum and proscribe less desired alternatives” (Lebovic 1994, 839-40). Such an acquisition process could not be further from the security ideals of stated national defense goals.

Even former Chief Naval Officer, Admiral Zumwalt admitted the presence of bureaucratic politics as an element in the Navy budgetary process. He wrote:

...for the last quarter-century or more there have been three powerful “unions,” as we call them, in the Navy—the aviators, the submariners, and the surface sailors—and their rivalry has played a large part in the way the Navy has been directed...Whichever union such a commander comes from, it is hard for him not to favor fellow members...It is hard for him not to think first of the needs of his branch, the needs he feels most deeply, when he works up a budget (1976).

The bureaucratic model is compelling in painting the services and other units within the Pentagon as sophisticated political players in the political game of increasing their budgets, or stated another way, protecting and enhancing the life of their organization. In the 1950s, the Army attempted to acquire Jupiter missiles positing that there was a fundamental theoretical link between the goal of artillery and the goal of ballistic missiles. Had the Air Force not blocked the Army’s maneuver, the acquisition would have undermined the Air Force’s ballistic missile jurisdiction. In a post-GNA example from the early 1990s, the Navy decided to change its mission for attack submarines to include such duties (among others) as gathering intelligence and transporting special operations units. These functions were already being performed on battleships and aircraft carriers, but the Navy attempted to make it look like a new mission requiring additional funding.

Despite the seemingly robust arguments the bureaucratic model offers in understanding interservice rivalry over defense appropriations, it does not answer all questions. For example, it does a poor job of explaining why the services sometimes reject new missions and weapons, are willing to compromise, and are often willing to accept their share of available and often-dwindling resources. Bureaucratic politics seems

to be in play to a much greater extent prior to the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, particularly in the acquisitions and procurement processes among the services. It seems a reasonable assumption that since the acquisitions, auditing, and comptroller functions under the GNA were to be performed by the civilian service secretaries, who have weaker organizational affiliation, and not the service headquarter staff, that interservice rivalry would diminish. The structure under which the rivalry flourished was changed.

A third model also provides yet another explanation of how civil-military relations in the form of good advice and refereeing interservice rivalry could change due to GNA restructuring. Because more emphasis was put on graduate education and “jointness,” and promotions were tied to joint experience in the post-GNA period, military officers increasingly began to be politically savvy in the civil-military arena. They have become what Weber described as the technical specialists in large organizations. According to Weber, technical experts are able to control their bureaucracy because they are the only ones who understood how and why it works (1964, 337-38). Gibson (1998) and Feaver (1996) call this “asymmetry of information.” Feaver states,

The military agent's status as an expert on the management of violence confers significant informational advantages over civilians on matters ranging from tactics to logistics to operational art. Likewise, crucial aspects of military behavior and even predilections may be unknown to civilians. For instance, the civilians cannot know for certain whether the military is inclined to coup nor can it know if the spirit of its orders are being carried out. Moreover, as the operation of the military moves closer to combat, civilians are at an even greater informational disadvantage. Because of their informational advantage over superiors, subordinates tend to propose policies that benefit their own interests rather than the interests of the superiors (1996).

Huntington makes a similar claim. He wrote, "...the problem of the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician" (1957, 20). Military expertise includes an understanding of complex budgeting, force structure, and weaponry issues that few short-term civilian appointees have. The military is, therefore, at an advantage in terms of influencing policy on military-specific issues. Influence can take the form of *de jure* prerogatives, expert advice, political bargaining and/or force at different levels or about different kinds of issues – internal military issues, broader military institutional issues, intermediate issues of concern to a specialized segment of society, or broadly across all segments of a society (Colton 1979, 83-112).

Feaver adds, however, that civilians have an equal but opposite area of expertise - political expertise or "competence" that their military subordinates do not possess.

Gibson disagrees stating that the evidence shows otherwise. He writes,

Secretary McNamara defied the military on numerous occasions, and in general did not defer to their moral or technical competence. Conversely, in recent years, because of both domestic and international forces, the military component within the DOD has become increasingly powerful, often prevailing over their civilian counterparts. With the principals (Congress and the President) divided over many issues, the ascendant military "agents" have been prevailing more often than in the past. This trend has been helped by the military's ability to control technical and operational debates while not yielding in strategic and political debates (Gibson 1998, 88).

Gibson's thesis is that there have been normative changes in the military organization itself that have made graduate and political education and experience increasingly important among the officer corps. With the emphasis that the GNA placed on joint experience, it is possible that an even greater incidence of technical specialization among an increasingly savvy officer corps is present. Therefore, assurances

of good military advice are likely to diminish in favor of parochialism in the post-GNA time frame, despite the structures put in place to curb it.

Methodology

The following research examines the changes that defense reorganization under the GNA have imposed on civil-military processes, comparing the same or similar processes before and after the legislation was codified and put into practice. This research poses the following questions:

- What is the impact of the GNA on the measures of civil-military relations: good advice, service management and civilian control?
- Specifically, what are the processes in these three measures that have been negated, created, or left unchanged as a result of the GNA? For example, if GNA did increase interservice harmony, then how is that harmony expressed?
- What are the specific institutional, normative, or structural changes imposed by the GNA that can be linked to good advice, service management, and civilian control?
- Does the type of issue on which civilian and military leaders are interacting have an effect on the relationship between the GNA changes and civil-military relations? For example, is the effect of GNA more or less apparent and/or acute when the civil-military interaction is about personnel policy as compared to military operations?

Definitions. There are several ways to define civil-military relations, as indicated in Figure 1-1, below. The measure of civil-military relations is narrowed in this research to just three:

- Civilian control is defined simply as civilian policy preferences prevailing over military policy preferences, if and when differences are manifest.
- Service Management is the ability of civilian institutions (both executive and congressional) to resolve interservice rivalries and/or differences of opinion. This includes full disclosure of differing opinions among military leaders and the subsequent ability of those leaders to play the services off of each other. A single,

powerful Chairman of the JCS has the ability to filter out any alternative opinions among the service chiefs when providing advice. Maintaining interservice rivalry and keeping military opinions divergent is one way to diffuse military strength. A single-minded, uniform military is much harder to control. One of the questions this research will need to answer is whether or not the military is more single-minded after, compared to before the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols.

- Good advice is defined as the ability of civilian leadership to get non-parochial, candid advice from military leaders. It does not refer to the technical accuracy of the information and advice (i.e. intelligence), but the intent to be accurate. In other words, the measure of good advice refers to the process through which civilians get information on which to base policy. If that process is marred by organizational loyalty and parochialism, etc., then the advice is considered to be poor or disingenuous.

Figure 1-1. Measures of GNA Changes and Measures of Civil-military Relations

Relevant Changes imposed by GNA	Measures of Civil-military Relations
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strong Joint Chief of Staffs Chairman <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Principal military advisor ▪ New responsibilities ▪ Creation of Vice Chairman ▪ Increased size of the Joint Staff, controlled by Chairman 2. Secretariat controls new functions, prohibiting military staff to conduct these functions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ acquisition ▪ auditing ▪ comptroller ▪ information management ▪ inspector general ▪ legislative affairs ▪ public affairs ▪ responsibility for R&D 3. More authority given to the unified combatant commanders (CINCs) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Direct all subordinate commands during military operations ▪ Direct all joint training and logistics under command ▪ Organize and employ forces under command 	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Civilian control: Civilian control of policy preferences—or undue military influence in civilian sphere of decision-making 2. Service management: Ability of civilians to resolve, or use interservice rivalries 3. Good advice: Sound, ingenuous and expeditious military advice to civilian leadership </div> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Sociological civil-military gap 5. Transparency of military function: substantive and detailed, external oversight over policy and spending by civilian authority 6. Transparency: Public legitimacy, allowance for public scrutiny where secrecy does not undermine public accountability 7. Informed national debate – role played by civilian experts in government, media, political parties and by independent critics (e.g., research institutes)

There is some unavoidable overlap among the selected measures of civil-military relations. Often civilian control is a function of how much information leadership has to decide policy. This information, in some cases, could be in the form of military advice provided to civilian leadership. Similarly, service management itself could be a type of civilian control. Nevertheless, these measures are more often different than similar and will be treated as such throughout.

These three measures of civil-military relations are chosen because they are well-debated issues prior to the writing of the legislation and therefore have specific, attendant expectations that can be tested. They are also measurable across different issue areas. In addition, these three measures are, in themselves, important concepts. Obtaining good advice, refereeing undue service influence and inter-service rivalry, and maintaining civilian control are vital functions that democratic leadership must perform as stewards over the state's means of defense. Even if ultimately the nation's security is not diminished by defense reorganization, there is still a danger to the democratic process if reorganization jeopardizes the government's ability to govern, control, use, and hold accountable the military in the name of the populace.

As the creators of the Goldwater-Nichols act understood this dilemma, two of the overriding purposes of the legislation were to increase civilian control and to enhance advice coming from the military. Broadly speaking, most studies to date give Goldwater-Nichols high marks in achieving these aims—the measure of those goals being successful military operations. Many, for example, attribute successes in the Gulf War directly to the changes in civil-military relations that the GNA instituted. Gibson (1998) argues, however, that the legislation has decreased civilian control. By way of the new

institutions GNA created, one of the mechanisms civilian institutions traditionally used to maintain control was diminished: interservice rivalry. A broad definition of civil-military relations includes the notion that civilian leadership can secure full disclosure of differing opinions among military leaders. The problem that opponents of further JCS unification saw was that a single, powerful JCS Chairman would filter out any alternative opinions when giving advice to a Defense secretary, president, or to congressional leadership.

Maintaining interservice rivalry and keeping military opinions divergent is one way to diffuse military strength. A single-minded, uniform military is not only much harder to control, but the structure of that unity is a departure from way civilian leadership interacted with the military in the past to get information, make decisions, etc. As Gibson notes, “By design, the [GNA] fostered interservice harmony, which politically empowered the military, and facilitated a more united expression of preferences” (Gibson 1998, 8).

Although interservice rivalry may have been one means of civilian control, it was also often a roadblock to effective and efficient decision-making—decreasing the military’s ability to supply good advice. So, while the GNA does not explicitly state that the management of the services by civilians is one of its objectives, congressional reports prior to the act’s passage indicate the service-centeredness of the Defense Department needed to change. For these reasons, good advice, service management, and civilian control are the measures of civil-military relations analyzed in this research.

Alternative Explanations of Change in Civil-Military Relations. The effects of Goldwater-Nichols on civil-military relations do not occur in a vacuum. There are other explanations and theories for change in the selected civil-military measures besides

defense reorganization. It may be the case that under some of these conditions, GNA may have more or less effect on civil-military relations, or it may be the case that effect is indeterminate because various factors are acting on civil-military relations simultaneously. In some cases, these factors may override, intervene, or mediate the effects of Goldwater-Nichols' defense reorganization on good advice, civilian control, and service management. These other factors are:

- Personality of civilian and military leadership (Meisel 1962, Millis 1958, Herspring 2005).
- Change in the international environment—external threat (Andreski 1968, Lasswell 1941, Desch 1999, Huntington 1957) or the external vs. internal orientation of the military (Desch 1999)
- Subjective control: Maximizing civilian power (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1971) or weak or divided civilian authority (Feaver 1997b, Avant 1998, Desch, 1999, Gibson 1998) or weak civilian institutions—(Huntington 1957)
- Objective control: Maximizing military professionalism (Huntington 1957)
- Organizational culture or the political sociology or ethos of military leadership (Nordlinger 1977, Janowitz 1971, Hendrickson 1988)
- Pressure of fiscal strictness (Campbell 1990)

In many cases it may be necessary to explore these variables as having independent effects on good advice, civilian control, and service management.

Research Propositions. As the previous two sections illustrated, the current civil-military relations debates and theories and the unresolved empirical questions resulting from the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation provide researchers with a range of hypotheses to be tested. As such, the following three propositions to be tested are based on assumptions either derived from the civil-military literature or from the actual Goldwater-Nichols legislative debates.

The first proposition is a test of assumptions put forward by Feaver about the costs of monitoring whether or not military leadership is doing as it was ordered by civilian authority. Feaver (2003) explains that there are costs to monitoring the military,

and there are dangers that the military will not do as told when the monitoring is considered by the military as unnecessarily intrusive. This being so, it is reasonable to assume that on issues that do not concern the physical security of American borders or threats to democratic institutions, the military will have more latitude in obeying or disobeying civilian leaders.

- *Proposition #1*: The type of issue on which civilian and military leaders interact will have a moderating effect on the relationship between reorganization under Goldwater-Nichols and each measure of civil-military relations. The issue areas analyzed will be resource acquisitions, operations, and personnel policy. Specifically, this moderating effect will mean that in the post-GNA time period, civilian control will be stronger during operations and comparatively weaker during decisions about personnel policy.

The second proposition is derived from work done by Christopher Gibson. He found that “the structural changes brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Act...accelerated the trend of increased military expertise in the political-military realm” (Gibson 1998, 146). Considering this, it is appropriate to test if there is a decrease of civilian control in the Post-GNA time period.

- *Proposition #2*: With the emphasis on jointness, the creation of a powerful Joint Staff, and operational control of the combat forces assigned to the unified and specified combatant commanders, or CINCs (all creations of the GNA), a new technical expertise is developed among military leadership which creates a power imbalance in favor of military preferences (individual, service, or military parochialism), diminishing good advice and civilian control particularly in operations and resource allocation, but comparatively less in personnel policy (as per the assumptions tested in propositions #1).

The third proposition is derived directly from arguments made by opponents of the Goldwater-Nichols act. For example, General John Wickham, Army Chief of Staff at the time GNA was being debated and major opponent of creating a powerful Chairman of the JCS, said that the legislation would cripple the JCS and strip the chiefs of their proper authority (Locher 2002, 3). In fact, the legislation was designed to decrease the power of

the chiefs vis-à-vis the chairman so that a more joint perspective in military planning could be carried out. Detractors of the legislation argued that to the contrary of what the writers of the legislation were trying to do, interservice rivalry would actually increase: “Increased powers for the Chairman of the JCS would undermine civilian control of the military, intensify inter-Service rivalries, and lay the foundation for a national general staff, thus denying the nation the benefit of balanced points of view” (Lemnitzer 1984, ii). Neither side provided empirical proof that interservice rivalry would increase or decrease, but the *prima facie* argument that says creating a strong chairman to oversee service competition for roles, missions, and monies will decrease rivalry is certainly more logical. As such, the following proposition is put forward to be tested:

- *Proposition #3*: Because the Goldwater-Nichols Act solidified power in the hands of the chairman, alternative opinions among the chiefs are less likely to be heard and interservice rivalry is more likely to diminish. Increased military oversight by civilian leadership, as a result of newly made statutory controls under the GNA creating a strong chairman, will have an effect on military compliance.

Case study comparison. In a before and after case study comparison, change in civil-military relations will be analyzed in three issue areas, which are actually functions performed by the Defense Department: a) resource allocation, b) operations, and c) personnel policy (in the form of minority integration waves). Though these three cases do not provide an exhaustive definition of what DOD is or does as a federal agency, they do provide a rich assortment of functions, from high-stakes operations to low-stakes personnel policymaking, to medium-stakes resource allocation, which touches on the subject of the public trust. Not only do they provide an assortment of military functions, they also provide a range of issue areas in which civil-military relations may vary. The

array included in these cases should provide interesting contrasts among what are considered core functions within DOD.

Military operations are unique to DOD and as such are interesting, but using them as a case study for civil-military relations is virtually compulsory since they represent the *raison d'être* of the organization. Military operations are the outcome of virtually all Department of Defense functions, from recruitment and retention to planning, equipping and training. For these reasons alone, it is important to explore the effects of GNA on civil-military relations in operations, but additionally, operations and the ability of the military to perform operations are at the heart of what is both difficult and essential in maintaining a good civil-military balance. Civilians and democratic institutions are to be protected *by* the military and *from* the military's overwhelming advantage in coercive power—this is the puzzle and imperative of civil-military relations in a democracy (Feaver 2003, 1). The very use of the military to defend freedoms and democratic ideals is itself a paradox that must be vigilantly studied, even in democracies, such as the United States, that have robust traditions of military subservience to civilian control.

That said, civil-military relations during operations only provide a limited analysis of the relationship. While operations provide the most important civil-military case to study (because the stakes relevant to the outcome of the relationship are undoubtedly the highest), it is not, thankfully, the most frequently performed function of the organization. The civil-military dynamic in resource allocation is chosen as another issue because it is another core military function and it occurs with predictable regularity. As one of the largest expenditures in the Federal budget, the DOD budget requires but often fails to achieve heavy scrutiny by civilians—the only authority that is directly

answerable to a voting populace. The military provides advice to civilians about how to apportion tax revenue allocated for defense, but they are at least one step removed from that responsibility to the people. Furthermore, the process of resource allocation has, at certain times pre- and post-GNA, engendered competition among the services and provides an excellent case study to compare the assertion of civilian control over a process where the military has informational advantages.

The third issue area is probably the weakest in terms of providing abundant and comparable cross-GNA incidents of civil-military relations. Labeled “personnel policy,” the issue area is actually more narrowly defined in this research as minority integration (the integration of Blacks, women, and homosexuals). It is included because it provides a low-stakes contrast to the other two cases. It also demonstrates an interesting civil-military tension between the democratic ideals of openness, opportunity, and having a socially representative military on the one hand and conservative ideals inherent in old and closed organizations that value traditions and traditional values, on the other. Additionally, in the post-GNA time period it is decision-making in personnel policy that is often cited as an example of civil-military relations being out of balance. So, including it as a case study for contrast may uncover whether or not civil-military relations in certain issue areas are part of a larger civil-military trend or can be considered more as discrete examples of good or bad civil-military relations.

In general, these three issue areas were chosen because they all involved a high degree of civil-military interaction (compared to training, for example), and an adequate amount of transparency and division of labor in the civil-military relationship (compared to strategic planning, for example). Finally, the cases were chosen because they are

broadly representative of a host of other DOD functions. As such, conclusions about the civil-military relations in these three areas can be analogous for the civil-military relations in other issue or functional areas within DOD.

These three issue areas establish the framework for the case study analysis—to analyze similarities and dissimilarities in the same types of processes before and after GNA—the demarcation line between the pre- and post-analysis. Dividing the cases by issue area serves to artificially extricate resource allocation, operations, and personnel policy from the larger Defense structure and from each other. Doing this will not only allow a more isolated study of the processes involved in each of these areas, but it will also allow the analysis to differentiate the organizational functions, processes, or decision-making of one issue area from another. To simplify, civil-military relations—whether pre- or post-GNA—may be different for resource allocation than for operations or personnel policy. Much of the analysis to date covers a broad sweep of DOD functions and does not differentiate the civil-military relationships from one issue to another.

Comparative analysis and Process Tracing. The following chapter provides an analysis of the statutory changes that took place with Goldwater-Nichols, determining which statutory changes would have a likely effect (whether intended by the legislation or not) on the selected measures of good advice, service management, and civilian control. Once the linkages are made, a process tracing method is used in the subsequent chapters to gather information about the three issue areas. This is done in order to compare the decision-making and procedural processes in each case before and after Goldwater-Nichols. In some cases the effects of the change may be immediate and in

other cases it may be evident that functional changes occurred sometime after codification of GNA.

Process tracing has been used by political scientists in determining organizational decision-making (George, 1979). Though traditionally used by historians, this method abandons the “black-box” method of investigating decision-making by actually focusing on the decision processes themselves and what catalysts in the process actors respond to (George & McKeown, 1985). The assumptions behind process tracing are: 1) humans are limited in their ability to perceive and process information, and 2) decision-making is a social exercise that can be traced. Based on these assumptions, the content of decision-making as a social enterprise will “reveal much about the attention focus, the decision rules, and the behavior of actors” (George & McKeown 1985, 37), and thus is observable for the researcher.

Data. Process tracing relies heavily on archival research. Therefore, data will be drawn from government documents, memoirs and biographical information, and secondary sources. Interviews will also be conducted when the archival research is inadequate.

Remaining Chapters

The next chapter is an overview of U.S. defense reorganizations and the statutory changes the Goldwater-Nichols act made to DOD’s command structure. It provides the background to subsequent chapters 3 through 5, which contain analyses of civil-military relations before and after GNA enactment. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of civil-military relations in DOD resource acquisition. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of this relationship during operations, and Chapter 5 contains an analysis of personnel policy.

Chapter 6 presents a summary of the results and provides a conclusion of the research's place in the civil-military literature.

2

The Context of the Goldwater Nichols Act: Department of Defense Organizational and Statutory Changes

The Pentagon badly needed reform. The military bureaucracy tied itself in knots since World War II and lost outright the Vietnam conflict and three lesser engagements...Decision making had become so convoluted, fiefdoms so powerful and inbred, lines of authority so confused, and chains of command so entangled that the military hierarchy had repeatedly failed the nation. Third-rate powers and terrorists had humiliated America. Tens of thousands of troops had died needlessly. Unprecedented levels of defense spending were not making the nation more secure. Goldwater and Nunn were resolved to fix this dysfunctional system.

-James Locher

A description of Defense reorganization over the past century is not only a useful tool in contextualizing this research, but necessary in tracking change over time. This description and analysis will demonstrate certain patterns of defense reform debate and/or implementation that seem to repeat from reform to reform, often without resolution. They are the same patterns that were in place prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Organizations within the federal government (and without) reorganize for many reasons, such as increasing efficiency, meeting new or different constituency needs, responding to systemic changes, etc. In this way, defense reorganization is not unique. But, what sets defense reorganization apart is the civil-military imperative of control over the state's means of violence. So, when patterns of defense reform repeat without resolution it is important to ask what these patterns are and what effects they can have on the civil-military balance. At every reform debate the following patterns are evident:

- Change occurs as a result of external pressures on the military. External pressures are not unique to military organization, but the stakes are.

- Pressures such as war, national tragedy, gaps in security, etc. place certain urgency on improvement in the reorganization effort.
- Critiques of service parochialism are a part of every reform and/or reorganization debate. The criticism focuses on the services' traditional spheres of responsibilities and their lack of unity across the range of DOD functions. Instead of a single department, DOD is critiqued as a conglomeration of departments working separately.
 - Called “unification” in earlier years and “jointness” later on—the point was to prevent redundancy and/or excess by reducing this parochialism. At each reorganization junction the military services struggled to varying degrees of success against change. It was felt that changes came at the expense of the services' autonomy.
 - There was a predominance of service influence in reorganization debates/outcomes and less of a unified defense perspective.
- There was always concern for or debate about civilian control. Would the ensuing change to organization increase or decrease civilian control? The reorganization outcomes tended to apply mechanisms that enhanced control.

Under the current Bush administration, reform is a central theme in Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's agenda. Many argue that Rumsfeld, particularly since 9/11, has stopped the growing military predominance that was allowed to take root during the Clinton administration's strained civil-military relationship. The arguments against too much military control in the face of a weak civilian counterpart have been less frequent during the Bush/Rumsfeld administration. Civil-military relations problems still exist, however, as the most recent defense reform has illustrated. Thomas Ricks describes the response of the military's top leadership to Rumsfeld's agenda:

The military now appears so wary of Rumsfeld that officers perceive slights where none may have been intended. The generals are especially peeved by what they believe is a pattern of moves by Rumsfeld to reallocate power from the military to himself (Ricks 2001, A1).

The buzz now is that there is too much civilian control, too much civilian micromanagement, and too much demoralization among servicemembers and the officer

corps as a result. As MacKubin Owens writes, “Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception among U.S. officers that Rumsfeld wants to surround himself with ‘yes-men,’ and that dissent will not be tolerated. Many refer to him as Robert Strange McNamara II (Owens 2004, 17).

This chapter is divided into 2 parts. The first consists of background on defense reorganization from 1947 to Goldwater-Nichols. This background not only informs the analyses of the following chapters, but it also shows trends leading up to the passage of the GNA. The second part delineates the statutory and organizational changes that Goldwater-Nichols established.

Organization Prior to the National Security Act of 1947: The Push and Pull of Unification

Defense reorganization and the attendant debates of the 20th Century were not just born out of the Second World War’s operational weaknesses, though that is often where analyses begin. Trask and Goldberg write, “After almost every war the U.S. government has found the wartime military arrangements defective and carried out reforms” (1997, 3). World War II was no exception to this rule. The difference however was that a global war represented new organizational challenges; challenges that many felt would be better met with a unified military (Legere 1988, 188-97).¹⁰

But even as early as the Spanish-American war, the need for closer ties between the two independent military services—the Army and Navy—became strategically apparent (Legere 1988, 55-56). As Davis notes, the fact that the United States acquired

¹⁰ After the war General Marshall concluded that warfare had become so complex that unification of the military, rather than mutual cooperation among military departments, was necessary (Parlier 1989, 8-22).

possessions overseas and began to have enduring strategic interests well away from its coastline, made it imperative for the Army and Navy to work more closely towards the nation's defense (1972, 4-5). As a rule, these two military agents were reluctant to organize in such a way to facilitate jointness.¹¹ The Navy in particular was not used to organizational centralization, and jointness was seen as a centralizing force. Nonetheless, in 1903 the Joint Board was created that "linked" the Navy's General Board and the Army's General Staff. The Board, considered a precursor to the organization of the Joint Chiefs, was formed so that the Army and Navy could confer, discuss and reach conclusions about all matters that required cooperation between them (Davis 1972, 6-7). Though there was no apparent controversy about the creation of this Board, its function was suspended in 1913 by President Wilson after one of its more secretive recommendations was leaked to the press.¹² The Board's function was curtailed almost out of existence (Davis 1972, 10).

The War Plans Division (WPD)¹³ reassessed the Board's usefulness in early 1919, after the end of the First World War during a time when both military departments were undergoing reorganization. As a part of the reorganization effort, joint agencies were also reorganized (Legere 1988, 69-70). Legere writes,

¹¹ There are many reasons for this. First of all, Davis notes that the Army and Navy departments disagreed completely about how to divide the responsibilities of protecting new U.S. possessions (Davis 1972, 5). Parlier notes that a more centralized organization meant redundant functions would be lost by either the Army or the Navy. By the end of World War II, for example, the Navy was worried it would lose its air functions to the Air Force and its Marines to the Army (Parlier 1989, 8-23). Additionally, individual servicemembers identify with their service, not with the military overall—any loss of individual service distinctiveness has always been viewed as unacceptable.

¹² In response to strained relations with Japan, in May of 1913, the Joint Board recommended that President Wilson send a precautionary dispatch of Naval forces to the Pacific. Apparently the manner in which the information was provided was doggedly pursued by the Board and disgruntled Wilson (Davis 1972, 10). Additionally, the press reporting of the Board's recommendations caused alarm about the security situation in the Pacific that the President was trying to avoid (Davis 1972, 10 and Legere 1988, 58-9).

¹³ The War Plans Division was an arm of the War Department's General Staff, an Army organization.

Although by 1919 there was still no general agreement even on the wisdom of unity of command in operations, the succeeding seven years witnessed considerable progress in the direction of a single defense department, a proposal never seriously considered before World War I. In part this movement was but an offsprung of the agitation for a separate air force, but other more positive factors contributed, among them the reorganization and activity of the Joint Board (1988, 69).

In a study they conducted in May of 1919, the WPD recommended that not only should the Joint Board be reconstructed, but that the membership of the Board should include the Chief of Staff, Director of Operations (renamed Deputy Chief of Staff in 1923) and Director of War Plans for both the Army and the Navy.¹⁴ Though the Board still served in its 1903 capacity of having no executive function, it was now able to originate studies on its own, not having to wait for a referral from the War or Navy Secretaries (Davis 1972, 15).¹⁵

With reference to the main themes of this research, it was during this second life of the Joint Board (1919-1943) when the questions of interservice rivalry and getting good military advice become relevant. First of all, as historical records show,

Matters known to be controversial were sometimes withheld for considerable periods until informal discussion disclosed a hopeful basis for compromise. Much of the business that might properly have been handled by the board was accomplished by direct agreement between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Not only were some urgent cases so handled, but occasionally the two service chiefs thought it wiser to settle a controversial issue privately than to allow the points of disagreement to be amplified by intensive discussion within the Joint Board (Davis 1972, 25).

¹⁴ For the Navy these officers were the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of the Plans Division.

¹⁵ The Joint Board in its original constitution consisted of eight officers, four from each service. The officers assigned to the board were assigned by *name* and not by office. Also the board was designed to respond to requests from the service leadership of either the Army or Navy, or both, but not to develop discussions or research independently.

When the Chiefs' beliefs and/or service traditions made compromise impossible on certain issues, the Board deferred to higher authority, in some cases directly to the President. Unless a decision was operationally essential, however, the Board tabled these discussions indefinitely with no recourse to higher authority. These tabled discussions tended to be about definitions of the Services' spheres of responsibility¹⁶ in certain missions or areas – a reoccurring point of contention throughout the remainder of the 20th century.¹⁷

The Joint Board had been functioning for over 32 years when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. By this time, 1933, the Board was the chief formalized provision for the two military secretaries to coordinate issues that were of joint interest. Davis contends that Joint Board was *not* the first step in a plan that would bring the services under a single organization. On the contrary, it was a coordination mechanism that would enable the services to remain autonomous. He writes,

Perhaps with rare exception...the officers engaged in the work of the Joint board had hardly thought of it as a means of drawing the two armed forces into ever closer integration. Rather it was a means of reaching such agreements as were necessary in the field of joint action and procedure—necessary, it might be said, to provide sufficient coordination to allow the two services to continue to operate autonomously in all major essentials. When appearing at Congressional hearings on the advisability of planning the services under a single military department, Army and Navy spokesmen commonly pointed to the existence of the Joint Board as proof that a sufficiency of coordination was being achieved (Davis 1972, 28-9).

¹⁶ I use the term military department and military service, or the services, interchangeably. They refer to the Army, Navy and eventually the Air Force.

¹⁷ See also Legere (1988, 69-85) for specific examples of Army-Navy conflict. Further accounts are a part of public record, particularly congressional hearings debating the creation of a separate Air Force. General Marshall, for example, is on record as criticizing the two services for being jealous and too conservative on air power jurisdiction, thus impeding the development of military aviation (U.S. House 1925, 292-93).

Maintaining independence with a direct line to the President remained the central theme in early defense reorganization designs by the services, particularly after the end of World War II.

As a result of maintaining interservice independence, informal coordination was common among senior officers in each organization. Davis writes that,

...such cooperation was not necessarily less effective. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in particular, were almost compelled by their duties to consult freely and to explore each other's opinions in an intimate way (1972, 29).

There was also a similar, informal, affiliation between the War and Navy Secretaries.

As war escalation in Europe and Japan's more direct threat necessitated not only a better-defined U.S. foreign policy, but also a more concerted military organization, three different joint organizations came into being (Legere 1988, 208-230). An informal Joint Staff called the War Cabinet,¹⁸ comprised of the War, State and Naval Secretaries, the Chief of Staff, CNO and Chief of the Army Air Corps met with Roosevelt on a regular basis, at the President's request. The Secretaries of War, State and Navy met separately and regularly, again informally, in an exchange ideas and information. Neither of these two groups kept formal minutes. The Standing Liaison Committee, the third group, was instituted in 1938 and consisted of the Under secretary of State, Chief of Staff, and CNO. Though meeting minutes were kept on their activities, consisting mainly of coordinating activities in Latin America, they met irregularly and infrequently. These three organizations and the Joint Board served as precursors to not only statutory changes in

¹⁸ According to testimony of then Secretary of War Stimson, the War Cabinet "...was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group." *Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board*, 1944, p. 219.

defense jointness and the Joint Chiefs of Staff but gave military leadership practice before they were forced by edict to cooperate.

Though there was a semblance of joint activity among the Army and Navy as the war in Europe was underway, the effect of having no single, corporate military body and the general insufficiency and absence of interservice coordination was deadly. The attack on Pearl Harbor showed the limits of voluntary jointness.¹⁹ There was a clear need for a more substantial joint body to meet the challenges of an impending all-out, world war. So, just two and a half months after the Pearl Harbor attack, a newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) held its first meeting, February 9, 1942. The JCS creation superceded the Joint Board and the latter was summarily dismantled.²⁰ This is somewhat ironic because it was the Joint Board that existed by Executive Order, whereas the JCS's legal status wasn't formalized until the National Security Act of 1947, nearly six years after it began to perform its functions. The JCS charter, drafted late in 1942, was never signed by Roosevelt.

JCS beginnings were inauspicious. Even through mid-1943, the Navy, avoiding centralization of any kind, stymied efforts by the Army to plan and/or organize a unified

¹⁹ In the Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pear Harbor Attack (79th Cong., 2nd Sess, 1946), it came to light that not only did interservice rivalry impair the success of any concerted military operation, but so too did interservice respect for jurisdiction. LTG Short and Admiral Kimmel, the two commanding general officers of the Pacific arena (Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, respectively), were on very friendly terms with each other. They regularly golfed and dined together. But as Legerer notes, "Excellence of personal relations was no substitute for the supremely effective liaison required to make mutual cooperation a halfway satisfactory method of regulating joint relations in a critical outpost" (1988, 205). In testimony, Short said, "as a senior admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out." Similarly Kimmel, noted, "when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them" (Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, GPO, 1946, Part 27, 194, and Part 22, 406).

²⁰ Though the Joint Board generally ceased to function as it had, it still existed on paper. It was not until August 22, 1947 that the President approved its official dissolution.

military command. Parochialism, territoriality and continued mistrust were ever present in most joint planning efforts. Many have argued that the fatal flaw of the new JCS, was in its 2 x 2 make-up. With four general officers of equal rank—two from the Army and two from the Navy—the mandated unanimity was sometimes impossible to attain. Deep-seated Army-Navy competition and distrust extended to command unity in the war theatre too.

Of the fledgling JCS, the senior British military liaison in Washington, Field Marshall John Dill wrote, “The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington” (in Larrabee 1987, 17). And Britain’s Air Marshal Sir John Slessor wrote of Army-Navy competition, “The violence of interservice rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their war effort” (in Locher 2002, 20-21). Despite this, the JCS provided the president with a more integrated military voice that was heretofore disjointed and parochial. As then Secretary of War Stimson stated, “...The Joint Chiefs of Staff was an imperfect instrument of top-level decision. Certainly it represented a vast improvement over anything that had existed before, and on the whole it was astonishingly successful, but it remained incapable of enforcing a decision against the will of any one of its members” (Stimson and Bundy 1947, 515-16).

During the years between the creation of the “unofficial” JCS and the National Security Act of 1947’s passage by Congress, the issue of civilian control over a metamorphosing military was, if not central to the discussion of organizational change, always lurking at the periphery. The possibility of losing control served for some as an excuse to unify and for others as a threat to keep the military divided or at status quo.

For example, in October of 1945 the JCS Special Committee on Reorganization Report was forwarded to Eisenhower. Each Chief provided his view of unification as an addendum to the Report. It was the Navy, under CNO Ernest King with the agreement of Admiral Leahy (Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief²¹), who wrote that a single armed service would create such a large and complex organization that no single Secretary could competently manage it, thus eroding civilian control (Legere 1989, 296). Congress, for a different reason also preferred a more diffuse military—one that they could manipulate piecemeal. Many in Congress feared that a single military organization under the executive branch would keep them out of the loop.²²

Despite the attempt to keep civilians in charge, the reality was that during the war, Roosevelt granted the Joint Chiefs unprecedented powers over political, diplomatic, and economic matters traditionally and constitutionally designed for civilian management (Huntington 1957, 323). Moreover, the unfettered operational style of the newly formed JCS, using closed/secretive proceedings not unlike the Supreme Court, magnified its power. The effect was that the new Chiefs, as recognized war heroes, “wanted their new exalted status institutionalized. Not only did they want to become a permanent body with vast duties, they wanted to report only to the president” (Locher 2002, 21-22).

To take a step back, the important aspect of civil-military relations to note here is that prior to the 1939 Executive Order legalizing the Joint Board’s direct access to Roosevelt, the Chiefs had to go through their secretaries (Secretary of War or Navy) to gain access to the President. After the 1939 decree and continuing with the 1942 creation

²¹ Admiral Leahy was one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors. Army Chief of staff George Marshall made the comment that Leahy served less as the JCS’s Chairman and more as the President’s Chief of Staff.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs' chains of command were effectively removed from departmental control (Larrabee 1987, 17). They had direct and personal access to Roosevelt. Huntington writes, "the military ran the war" (1957, 315).²³

There was an almost complete lack of civilian voice in wartime planning below the president. The Navy and War secretaries were not invited to attend the President's meetings with the JCS. The secretaries were not on the JCS papers distributions list. In fact, according to Roosevelt's Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, they had no formal strategic responsibility concerning the war at all (Stimson and Bundy 1947, 414-415).

Though Roosevelt, as Eliot Cohen writes, "exercised a directive, forceful control of a kind that most members of the defense establishment today would find unusual" (1995, 46), he was the chief of a ponderous military structure. Ernest May writes,

In theory the machinery was under his control and supervision. In fact the immensity of the war panorama as well as the burden of Roosevelt's other concerns as President meant that his control could be only partial and somewhat indirect in its working. The relative independence of the theatre commanders, the central position and influence of the planning staffs, the wide powers and public respect enjoyed by his chiefs of staff—all these factors placed real limits on the Commander in Chief's independence of action which had not existed during the pre-war period (151, 1960).

In addition, Roosevelt's leadership style welcomed considerable candor from top military leadership (Herspring 2005, 23-51). As a result, military advice to the president was unfiltered and unfettered. Admiral Leahy unabashedly said in 1945 hearings before Congress, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the present time are under no civilian control whatever" (U.S. Senate 1945, 521). Not even congressional purse strings could tip the

²² This had local political relevance too. So long as the Executive was less able to constrain the Services under one umbrella, Congress in a case-by-case way could work directly with each service and their technical services and bureaus on money and job issues of interest to local constituents (Locher 2002, 25).

²³ Only on two occasions did Roosevelt disagree with the decisions of his Chiefs. On those two occasions it was not to civilian leadership that Roosevelt deferred, but to the British (Huntington 1957, 322).

balance towards civilian control. A member of Congress at the time noted, “General Marshall...virtually dictated the budgets” (in Huntington 1957, 325). Huntington explains that during World War II the empowered Joint Chiefs performed numerous functions that should have been performed by a balance of civil-military leadership above the service level and below the President; but the only leaders functioning at that level were the Joint Chiefs.²⁴ He continues,

The problem arose because the United States came out of World War II with an organized military unit at this level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in addition to performing professional military functions, discharged policy-strategy and administrative-fiscal functions. The absence of any significant civilian institution at this level left no effective restraints on the Joint chiefs (Huntington 1957, 429).

The plans for reorganization put forward by different military entities reflected the desire among military leaders to maintain this power even during peacetime. Truman, unwilling to battle the Navy and the well-respected Navy Secretary Forrestal, to create a fully unified military service under a single, operational Chief of Staff, as he wanted, compromised considerably by signing the National Security Act of 1947 into law. The Act was a lesser form of unification, where the Army, Navy, and newly created Air Force would act independently under a unified structure of the National Military Establishment (NME). This structure was not, by law, an executive department, but a broad framework for organizing the nation’s defense institutions. In place of a single Chief, the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as it existed during the war was codified in law. As Eisenhower wrote about the new Defense structure,

²⁴ Huntington proposes that the organization of civil-military relations provides for activities in three functions: a) professional military functions, which include providing the military expertise needed to implement national policy; b) the administrative/fiscal function, which includes advice on budgets, procurement, construction, etc.; and c) the policy/strategy function, which includes military and fiscal perspectives on such things as force levels (Huntington 1957, 428).

The three service departments were but loosely joined. The entire structure...was little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units. Few powers were vested in the new secretary of defense. All others were reserved to three separated executive departments (Eisenhower in Cole et al., 1979, 11).

The new organization not only lacked cohesion horizontally—across the Services and other newly created national security organizations²⁵—but it also lacked cohesion vertically. Defense historians Trask and Goldberg write,

By creating the National Military Establishment instead of an executive department, and by placing three executive departments—Army, Navy and Air Force—under the secretary of defense, it effectively compromised the latter's position and power. The secretaries of the military departments retained all of their powers and prerogatives subject only to the authority of the secretary of defense to exercise "general direction, authority, and control." This deliberately imprecise language reflected the reluctance of Congress to place wide powers in the hands of the secretary of defense and his staff and plagued the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, throughout his incumbency, causing him to request changes that became the 1949 amendments to the act (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 8).

The new Secretary of Defense would be powerless against the fortified insularity and sectarianism of the services, which still maintained the balance of power within the new institution. Though the precedent was set for a civilian to have oversight above the level of the services, the wording of the new legislation was too ambiguous to define the Secretary's relationship to the services as superior. For example, the military department secretaries could appeal any decision that the new secretary of defense made directly to the president even though they were no longer members of his cabinet (Lederman 1999, 16-17). The new secretary would have to find a way to make the new NME work, despite the weakness of his office. Truman offered the first Secretary of Defense title to former

²⁵ Other organization renamed or established by the Act were the National Security Resources Board, the National Security Council, the War Council, Munitions Board and Research Development Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Also, the National Security Act was the statutory basis for the establishment of the unified and specified commands, also called combatant commands.

Secretary of War Robert Patterson, only to be declined. So, with an element of poetic justice perhaps, Truman extended the offer to the man who created the position, James Forrestal, who accepted the job.²⁶

National Security Act of 1947 and the 1949 Amendments

Forrestal, as Secretary of the Navy, was a principal in designing the new National Military Establishment (NME). He was always a fierce opponent of military unification and, ironically, pressed Congress to allot the would-be office of the Secretary of Defense minimal power. When Forrestal took on his new role he had, “no office, no staff, no organization chart, no manual of procedures, no funds, and no detailed plans” (Reardon 1984, 58). It was no surprise that within months he found carrying out his new duties entirely unworkable. Trask and Goldberg write,

It became apparent to Forrestal and his assistants that OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] could not remain the small policymaking office he had envisaged, and that they could not rely on the military services for a high degree of voluntary cooperation and coordination. All the military services tended to resist or evade OSD control over their activities; their self-interest demanded as much autonomy and freedom of action as possible. Moreover, the continuing interservice rivalry had been compounded by the creation of the Air Force, making it even more difficult for Forrestal to get the services to pull together as a team. Effective direction of the NME required an OSD that could deal with these issues (1997, 12).

He believed that the overall concept of his NME was sound, but felt that there were some organizational flaws that needed to and could be fixed (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 14).

These included a larger joint staff, a chairman to head the JCS, a personnel board, more undersecretaries, the service secretaries to be excluded from National Security Council

²⁶ Forrestal, initially opposed to unification but seeing it as inevitable, helped shape the compromised legislation. His plan was to make the best unification plan for the Navy (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 11).

meetings, and more statutory power given to his office. Forrestal lobbied Congress for a commission to study these problems (Locher 2002, 26).

The Hoover Commission, created to analyze the organization of the executive branch, not just defense, established a National Security Act of 1947 task force to address some of Forrestal's concerns. The Eberstadt Task Force, as it was called, concluded that no centralized civilian control of the military existed and that the JCS was "virtually a law unto themselves" (Hoopes and Brinkley 1992, 345). Congress took the Hoover Commission's recommendations into account in amending the act of 1947.

The amendments of August 1949 established the Department of Defense as a new executive arm of government, and not an "establishment" with an unclear organizational chain of command. Because of its executive status, the power of the Secretary increased relative to the power of the services. The three military departments no longer had cabinet-level positions and so their secretaries and chiefs of staff no longer had direct access to the president, except when approached by the president as a member of the JCS. It is important to note, however, that the 1949 Act did allow them to circumvent the president and make recommendations directly to members of Congress. Also, the position of Chairman of the JCS was established to preside over the JCS. But as Huntington notes, Congress agreed to create the office "only when it was surrounded by strict safeguards and had its powers narrowly defined" (1957, 422). Against recommendation from the Hoover Commission and Truman himself, Congress curtailed the command authority of the Chairman—both over matters of the JCS and the services. In JCS Proceedings, he had neither vote nor veto. In the same vein, Congress would not

allow the Joint Staff cap to be removed, as Truman wanted, though it was raised from 100 to 210 members (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 14-20).²⁷

After the 1949 amendment, the Defense Department was a slightly more unified and civilian-controlled organization—but only slightly. As with the National Security Act of 1947, a service-centered organization was the result. The same arguments about unification and/or merely creating a more streamlined defense structure were overridden by the self-serving military departments. But, as some scholars have noted, a self-serving military department does not necessarily oppose organizational changes to enhance proficiency and resourcefulness.

High-minded goals for enhancing operational readiness and managerial efficiency are the norm throughout the military leadership. However, the non-operationality of these motives creates a number of consequences: an absence of definitive parameters for guiding optimal decision making, honest and intense disagreement over various courses to effective defense, the sometimes indiscriminate use of “national security” justifications for marginal programs, and others (Clark 1984, 268).

In the context of military organization it is simplistic to conclude that interservice rivalry is solely a function of competition and parochialism. Military leadership over the course of the many defense reorganizations has not solely focused on maintaining the integrity of any particular organization, but it has also been interested in a range of goals not driven by service parochialism, such as patriotism, reducing casualties in war, operational readiness, etc. For example, one of the reasons the Navy and Air Force fought over airpower jurisdiction at the end of World War II was because each felt their

²⁷ It should be noted here that Congress is also an essential part of the national security structure. While the Department of Defense was being organized, so too were the congressional oversight committees responsible for military oversight. As part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees of both chambers merged to become the Armed Services Committees. This reorganization was due to the realization that a unified armed force was coming. It was not, however, until 1949 that the Appropriations Committees merged their Army and Navy subcommittees. It was the FY 1950 when Congress saw the first total defense budget (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 15-17).

capabilities superior in carrying out U.S. air strategy. In October 1949, Navy leadership testified before the House Armed Services Committee that they believed strategic bombing served no useful purpose and was morally wrong (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 17). When the services deem interservice disputes to hold zero-sum payoffs, however, the clashes have been notable.

After the 1949 amendments, for example, the Air Force and Navy fought a turf war over strategic air power: who would carry nuclear bombs—Navy aircraft taking off from a new super carrier, or the Air Force’s new long range B-36 Bomber? Fighting for a diminishing piece of the military budget to be able to build their new technology, the two services openly fought. After the Navy lost its carrier and after what is now called the “Revolt of the Admirals,” CNO Louis Denfeld was relieved of duty and the Navy’s secretary John Sullivan resigned. Clearly, the post-war reorganization efforts were not entirely successful—neither inter-operationally nor in terms of civil-military relations.

Reorganization from the Korean War to Goldwater-Nichols

It became apparent early on that the Chiefs’ roles as heads of their services often conflicted with their roles as members of the JCS. As Trask and Goldberg claim, allegiance to their service prevailed when questions were raised about budgets, roles and missions, etc. (1997, 18). Denfeld’s objection to the JCS recommendation to scrap the Navy super carrier is a good example of this.

The Chiefs’ dual responsibilities often put them in almost untenable positions. The Chief of Staff of the Army, for example, as a member of the JCS is the Executive’s principal military advisor on the “*integration* of domestic, foreign and military policy.”

But, when testifying before Congress, he is his service's head. General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff from 1955-59, sums up the conflict:

The hearings on the defense budget are usually the most difficult for the Chiefs, as they raise inevitably the issue of their divided responsibility toward the Executive and Legislative branches of the government... Very shortly a Chief of Staff will find himself in the position either of appearing to oppose his civilian superiors or of withholding facts from the Congress (in Rearden 1984, 17).

The new Department of Defense structure showed other weaknesses too, particularly during the Korean War.

Organizational efficiency and coordination was a mixed bag after the 1949 amendment. On the positive side, Truman, in 1952, established the National Security Agency (NSA) under the Secretary of Defense, which was an attempt to coordinate communication intelligence. Similarly, the Defense Supply Management Agency was put into place to standardize and integrate supply across the services. And by 1952 the Marine Corps became a *de facto* fourth service. The Commandant of the Marine Corps became a member of the JCS by route of the Mansfield-Douglas Act and though his participation in JCS was at first for purposes only relating to the Corps, by the late 1960s he was involved in most JCS discussions and decisions.

Interservice rivalry over budget apportionment waned after the start of the Korean war. Between 1950 and 1953 DOD's budget nearly quadrupled (from about 12 billion in FY50 to 43.6 billion in FY53) and troop sizes more than doubled, leaving less reason for the services to fight over programs and money (Korb 1976a, 102).

Despite these advances, Eisenhower took office in 1953 critical of the lack of clear command structure and unity within and civilian control over the newly fashioned Defense Department. He wrote, "When military responsibility is unclear, civilian control

is uncertain” (in Lederman 1999, 21). Appointing Nelson Rockefeller to chair a committee reviewing DOD organization, Eisenhower’s reform focus was on empowering the Secretary and trying to ameliorate the problems associated with Service Chief’s dual responsibilities. He had much more success with the former than the latter, as the Rockefeller committee did not fully respond to the president’s desire for JCS reform, solely focusing on strengthening the secretary’s role (Locher 2002, 27-28).²⁸ The end result was Reorganization Plan No. 6, enacted by Congress in June of 1953.²⁹

The Reorganization Act established several key innovations, all of which were designed to increase civilian control. The first was the closure of several offices and boards³⁰ and placing the responsibilities of them into the office of the Secretary of Defense, at the same time allotting the Secretary six new assistant secretaries to manage the new work. Additionally, the Secretary was given power to stipulate the functions of these new assistants and indeed over all members of the Defense Department, including the officers assigned to the Joint Staff. These additional powers to the office allowed the Secretary to more closely monitor and control the military services. To emphasize civilian control, Eisenhower submitted a statement with the Reorganization Plan to Congress that said, “no function in any part of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, should be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense” (Trask & Goldberg 1997, 21).

²⁸ Trask and Goldberg note, there was strong opposition in Congress to making any radical adjustments to the JCS structure (1997, 21).

²⁹ This Defense Reorganization act was so named because it was one, the sixth, of many executive branch reorganization plans to clear Congress in 1953.

³⁰ These were the Research and Development Board, Munitions Board, Defense Supply Management Agency and the Office of the Director of Installations.

Civilian control was tightened elsewhere too. In addition to the Reorganization Plan, Eisenhower amended the Key West Agreements to make the department secretaries the executive agents over the unified commands, replacing the service chiefs. Cole et al. write,

...the President directed that authority to appoint executive agents for unified and specified commands be transferred from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, who would name the secretary of a military department to act in this capacity for each command (although the Secretaries would be authorized to delegate this responsibility to the military Chiefs of their Services). This change, according to the President, would strengthen civilian control by fixing responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials (1995, 22-23).

This meant that the services were no longer in charge of determining to whom the unified commanders would report—they would report to their designated civilian service secretary.³¹ Civilian leadership was also given responsibility for producing efficiency reports (performance appraisals) for those military personnel assigned to OSD, a duty that was previously performed by military agents. In contrast to the emphasis on civilian control, the Chairman of the JCS was given authority to manage the joint staff (Trask & Goldberg 1997, 21-23).

The modifications to civilian control and command structure relationships represented only a part of the changes that Eisenhower wanted to make to the Department of Defense. He particularly wanted reform in the JCS, where he felt the chiefs could not behave in a corporate manner when difficult decisions were at stake (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 23). During his 1958 State of the Union Address, he listed Defense reform as his top priority. This was in part due to the public and hostile rivalry among the services,

³¹ The executive agents were designated as follows: Army for Far East, Caribbean and U.S. European commands; Navy for Atlantic, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean commands; and Air

particularly the Army and Air Force over new missile systems jurisdiction, and criticism of DOD competitiveness in the wake of the Soviet's launch of *Sputnik* (Locher 2002, 28).³²

Eisenhower pressed hard for a more unified military, a stronger Defense Secretary, more direct lines of command from the President to unified commands, and a stronger Chairman of the JCS. In a special message to Congress April 3, 1958 the President said,

...[S]eparate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we are involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service (quoted in Borklund, 1968, 68).

Force for Alaskan, U.S. Northeast, U.S. Air Forces, Europe and Strategic Air commands (Cole et al. 1995, 23).

³² Excerpts from his 1958 State of the Union address attest to these problems: Eisenhower said, "I now place before you an outline of action designed to focus our resources upon the two tasks of security and peace...They are imperative...The first need is to assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining the security of the nation...Some of the important new weapons which technology has produced do not fit into any existing service pattern. They cut across all services, involve all services, and transcend all services, at every stage from development to operation. In some instances they defy classification according to branch of service. Unfortunately, the uncertainties resulting from such a situation, and the jurisdictional disputes attending upon it, tend to bewilder and confuse the public and create the impression that service differences are damaging the national interest...Recently I have had under special study the never-ending problem of efficient organization, complicated as it is by new weapons. Soon my conclusions will be finalized. I can state its main lines in terms of objectives: A major purpose of military organization is to achieve real unity in the Defense establishment in all the principal features of military activities. Of all these, one of the most important to our nation's security is strategic planning and control. This work must be done under unified direction. The defense structure must be one, which, as a whole, can assume, with top efficiency and without friction, the defense of America. The Defense establishment must therefore plan for a better integration of its defensive resources, particularly with respect to the newer weapons now building and under development...Another requirement of military organization is a clear subordination of the military services to duly constituted civilian authority. This control must be real; not merely on the surface...Finally, to end inter-service disputes requires clear organization and decisive central direction, supported by the unstinted cooperation of every individual in the defense establishment, civilian and military" (Eisenhower 1958).

As in previous reforms, the majority of the President's measures were passed, but modified by Congress. Most notably, Congress reserved the right to call on any service secretary or military chief for direct Defense-to-Congress consultation, without having to go through the Defense Secretary.³³ Also, a compromise on the size of the JCS staff was made between Eisenhower's no-ceiling limit and the 1953 staff size of 210 officers. Congress, comparing Eisenhower's new JCS organization (including more power to the Chief of the JCS) to the Prussian General Staff, rescinded the JCS Chief's managerial responsibilities that were granted in 1953, and capped the JCS staff at 400.

Results of the Reorganization Act of 1958 were:

- Strengthening the Defense Secretary's authority;
- Establishing greater civilian and central control over the military departments;
- Elevating the status of JCS chairman by eliminating the prohibition on his having a vote in JCS decisions;
- Doubling the size of JCS staff;
- Establishing unified and specified commands;
- Creating and stipulating the number of assistant secretaries for the Secretary of Defense;
- Creating a position of director of defense for research and engineering.

In the time between the 1958 DOD reforms and the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in 1986, no major reorganization efforts were put before Congress. Locher (2002, 29) speculates this is because even a strong military leader (and hero) in Eisenhower could not unify and reform the military, and so others learned not to try. Though major statutory changes to defense structure did not take place, organizational reform continued

³³ According to Borklund, Eisenhower viewed this as "legalized insubordination" (1968, 70). Eisenhower did not want the service chiefs to be able to by-step the Secretary of Defense's authority to appeal directly to Congress. Members of the House Armed Services Committee rejected Eisenhower's amendments to their bill and sent it to the Senate without those provisions. Once the bill reached the Senate, it was modified even more to allow Congress time to oppose functions that the Secretary of Defense proposed for one or all of the Services, thus further diminishing Executive control over the military. For a succinct

to be a focal point for subsequent administrations.³⁴ In fact, even before taking office Kennedy formed a committee to study defense management and administration. The resulting Symington committee report proposed the most radical changes to defense organization compared to any other proposal previously or to date.³⁵ But with McNamara coming in as Kennedy's Defense Secretary, the report's recommendations were never heeded. McNamara believed the National Security Act and its numerous avatars gave him enough management authority to fix the Pentagon himself.

McNamara had a decided impact on defense organization and on crafting a new and expanded role for the defense secretary. For example, he sought to economize the number of DOD agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, which consolidated most of the Defense Department's intelligence functions (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 32). He created the Defense Supply Agency, which was a consolidation of Armed Forces Supply Support Center, the Military Management Agency, and the Consolidated Surplus Sales Offices (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 33). He merged several assistant secretary positions, creating new ones and he merged the Army's Strategic Army Corps with the Air Force's Tactical Air Command to create a new joint combatant command, the U.S. Strike command (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 33). Perhaps his most identifiable innovation, McNamara instituted the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS)

discussion of the sometimes-indistinct division of powers related to defense policy see Reed in *The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis* (Clark et. al 1984, 230-49).

³⁴ Trask and Goldberg suggest that the relative quiescence in defense reform legislation over this time period was partly due to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, when both military and civilian planners were preoccupied with operations over organization (1997, 34).

³⁵ The report "provided for all appropriations to be made to OSD rather than to the military services. It abolished the separate military departments but retained the military services with chiefs reporting directly to the secretary of defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be superseded by a military advisory council chosen from retired senior officers and presided over by a chairman of the joint military staff who would be the principal military adviser to the president and the secretary of defense. Military forces would be placed under four unified commands—strategic, tactical, continental defense, and reserve and civil defense." The

as a way to provide a more analytical approach to Pentagon planning and budgeting. Despite McNamara's impact, the obvious tactical and organizational failures in Cuba, Vietnam, and elsewhere continued the focus on command and organization failure.

Nixon came into office appointing yet another group of individuals to study defense organization. The results of Nixon's Blue Ribbon Panel were similar to the Symington Committee's recommendations. Trask and Goldberg write,

The organizational recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel fared little better than had those of the Symington committee. Not a single major recommendation was adopted. Since the National Security Act of 1947, change in the defense establishment had been incremental. Even the 1958 reorganization had incorporated only limited requirements for organizational changes thanks to resistance by Congress, JCS, and the military departments. The panel's proposals encountered similar opposition from the same quarters and developed no strong support in either the White House or OSD (1997, 34).

Major recommended changes, such as restructuring OSD into three categories under three deputy secretaries (operations, management, & evaluation), were bypassed for three, easier and less controversial changes that did not affect the defense organization at all.³⁶

Aside from the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations, organizational change during the Nixon administration, when Melvin Laird was Secretary of Defense, came directly from congressional authorization. From 1969 to 1971 the number of assistant defense secretaries was increased from 7 to 9. After 1973 and until Carter was elected president, none of the three Defense Secretaries (Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld) sought organizational change. Jimmy Carter and his Defense Secretary did.

report also recommended the elimination of the assistant secretaries and fusion of all OSD functions into two under secretary positions – administration and weapons (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 32).

³⁶ These three changes were the creation of the Defense Mapping Agency, a net assessment office, and an enhanced public affairs role (accepted in DOD as a change, but no demonstrable changes were made).

Not to break with tradition, Carter directed the Defense Department to study organization. One result of this directive was the Steadman report (a.k.a. the *National Military Command Structure Study*) which repeated the advice that so many other reports had: the JCS structure did not work and needed to be reformed, the unified commands were weak vis-à-vis the service command structure, management was too layered, and indistinct chains of authority, responsibility, and accountability limited good military advice to the president and his cabinet.

Though Secretary Brown did a great deal more than his three predecessors in redesigning Defense to run more efficiently, he did little more than consolidate certain functions and reduce the number of agents reporting to him directly. Furthermore, he initiated no changes to organization based on the DOD study he initiated. This is partly because of Carter's weak military standing. Herspring writes,

No major changes occurred in military culture during the Carter administration. As they had previously, the Chiefs used their friends on the Hill to counter the president's attempts to eliminate or reduce the budget for programs they considered critical. They even went so far as to publicly challenge the president, arguing as General Meyer did that the United States had "a hollow Army." Once they had decided that the president would not pay any attention to them, the chiefs felt no compunction about taking the debate to Congress, which also had responsibility for national security affairs. By the end of his administration, Carter had alienated the Chiefs and the rest of the U.S. military to the degree that only 1 percent of military officers later stated that they preferred him over Reagan (Herspring 2005, 264).

Besides Carter's alienation of the military, Brown initiated no major restructuring because his DOD study, while producing five critical reports, did not begin until late 1977 and was not complete until 1980, when Reagan took office.

Reagan and the Goldwater-Nichols Act

Though Reagan came into office supporting a stronger military, he and Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger broke with tradition in pointing to organization as a main obstacle in creating a better military.³⁷ Reagan's campaign platform barely mentioned reform and, in fact, criticized the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and OSD's planning and budget analysts as intrusive and uninformed with respect to reorganization. Not only did Reagan and Weinberger *not* seek reform, to the contrary, they were supportive of the highly service-centered military (Locher 2002, 31).

Since the Executive did not seem to take an interest in Defense reorganization, Congress took up the task, against Weinberger's advice. Weinberger, in charge of exacting ever-larger defense budgets from Congress, felt that concentrating on reform would run contrary to this main task. It was not Congress, though, that put major reform high on the agenda, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones. In 1981, General Jones gathered an independent group of retired military officers and created the Chairman's Special Study group to study JCS reform. A year later, in a closed House Armed Services Committee session to discuss the defense budget, Jones stated,

It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars and weapon systems; we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and the full warfighting capability. We do not have an adequate organizational structure today (in Locher 2002, 34).

Jones' statement started a series of events that would culminate in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.

³⁷ To recap, that tradition included the Hoover Commission, the Rockefeller Committee, the Symington report, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, and the Steadman Report, all of which pinpointed JCS and major defense organizational reform as necessary.

By June of 1983, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staffed its own review of defense reorganization, and not to be outdone, Reagan established his own Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (named the Packard Commission) in 1985. The Commission was asked to examine defense management policies and procedures, budgeting, procurement, legislative oversight, and organizational arrangements among OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders the services and Congress (Trask and Goldberg 1997, 42). Over time, Reagan began to favor reform, despite his Defense Secretary's position, and even issued Executive Order 12526 in 1986 to implement recommendations made by the Packard Commission (Lederman 1999, 74). These changes included improving communications between the JCS Chairman, Defense Secretary, and combatant commanders, increasing combatant commander authority, and improving national security planning and budgeting.

The real breadth of analysis needed for change did not come solely from the Packard Commission, but from the SASC report as well, authored by James Locher III. Locher's report, completed in October of 1985 and titled, *Defense Organization: the Need for Change*, made 91 recommendations on defense organizational reform. According to one scholar, some of the 91 recommendations were so radical that reorganization opponents were so busy building cases against the most extreme and unrealistic recommendations that the more moderate proposals took less effort to pass (Lederman 1999, 71-72). Within a year, a confluence of reform initiatives, buoyed by the Packard Commission recommendations and a Center for Strategic and International Studies publication recommending JCS reform, pushed both houses of Congress to pass

defense reform bills resulting in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433).

The Goldwater-Nichols Provisions

There were dozens of provisions in the GNA that strove to achieve the following 8 objectives:

1. Strengthen civilian authority
2. Improve military advice to civilians
3. Clarify the Commander in Chiefs' (of the unified and specified commands, a.k.a. CINCs) responsibilities for the unified commands
4. Ensure the CINCs' authority are commensurate with their responsibilities
5. Increase attention to strategy and contingency planning
6. Economize defense resources
7. Improve joint officer management policy
8. Enhance DOD's management and administration

These objectives were seen as minimally necessary to strengthen defense capabilities (U.S. Senate 1985, iv). This research is focused on the first two of these objectives as well as the management of interservice rivalry/service-centeredness, which though a goal of GNA, was not listed as an overt objective. The analysis in this section will illustrate which GNA provisions were designed to achieve these three objectives.

Provisions related to assuring civilian control. The issue of civilian control was of major concern at the outset of the congressional meetings in 1983, but the direction to go—to have more or less civilian

Civilian control
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bureaucratic control of senior officers• Statutory, executive, or congressional subordination of military leadership's means to promote a particular national policy

control—stirred debates. It is hard to imagine, but there were advocates of giving the military more control. Senator Goldwater was one of these advocates. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he said,

The question is, can we, as a country, any longer afford a 207 year-old concept that in military matters the civilian is supreme? Now, I realize the sanctity of the idea of the civilian being supreme. It is a beautiful thing to think about. The question in my mind is, can we any longer afford to allow the expertise of [the professional military]... to be set aside for the decisions of the civilians whose decisions have not been wrapped in war. We lost in Korea, no question about that, because we did not let the military leadership exercise military judgment.³⁸

Despite Goldwater's opinion, most of these debates focused on the power of the Defense Secretary vis-à-vis the power of the service chiefs. Most in Congress agreed that the Secretary's "real authority is not as great as it seems and his vast responsibilities are not in reality matched by commensurate powers" (Kester 1985, 187). The creation of a weak Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the National Security Act of 1947 was never really "fixed" by the various reorganization acts that sought to increase the balance of power in favor of the Secretary. This is in part because the service secretaries statutorily existed prior to the creation of OSD, and because a weak OSD was the result of a compromise by the services to allow greater unification.

The service secretaries have traditionally acted as strong advocates for their service, regardless of OSD's agenda. Because of this, a direct hierarchical relationship between the secretary and the services had not been clear. GNA fixed that. There were three changes that GNA made which changed the relationship between the secretary and the services. The first was clear language that solidified the chain of command with the secretary as the "sole and ultimate power with in the Department of Defense" (See GNA,

Title I, Chapter 4, § 131). This not only was meant to change the relationships between OSD and the service secretariats, but it solidified OSD's *de jure* command over all DOD agencies. Title III of the act states that the Secretary shall assign responsibility for the overall supervision of each Defense Agency and Field Activity to a civilian officer within OSD.³⁹

The second change was making the chairman of the JCS the principal military advisor to members of the National Command Authority.⁴⁰ Congress clearly delineated the chairman's role to be the secretary's main, non-parochial, independent advisor, and to act authoritatively as the ranking member of the JCS. This not only provided the secretary with real power, it was also an attempt to close the civil-military divide by having the two work closely together.

As a corollary to the first change listed above, the third GNA change outlined the responsibilities of the service secretaries vis-à-vis OSD. The GNA's wording was clear about the subordination of the service secretaries to the defense secretary. It states that the secretary of any given service is responsible for all aspects of running his or her service, subject to "the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense."⁴¹ Furthermore, GNA made it mandatory for the service secretary to inform the defense secretary prior to submitting recommendations to or speaking before Congress.

³⁸ This is Goldwater's opening speech during the Senate Armed Services Committee's first hearings to consider reorganization, July 28, 1983.

³⁹ This does not apply to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or National Security Agency (NSA). (See PL 99-433, Title III, § 192 (a)(3)).

⁴⁰ The National Command Authority (NCA) refers to the President and Secretary of Defense and their authorized alternates.

⁴¹ This includes recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, maintaining, building and repairing equipment and buildings, etc. Furthermore, the statute explicitly states that the service secretaries are responsible *to* the Secretary of Defense for all aspects of policy formulation including such activities as coordinating with other services, control of the services' intelligence activities, implementations of the services' budget, etc.

In addition to the statutory subordination of the service secretaries, the GNA states that a service secretary cannot be appointed to the office “within 10 years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.” This further promotes a “civilianizing” influence in the service secretaries themselves.

The analysis of the next 3 chapters will trace the defense decision-making processes pre- and post-GNA and compare them to determine if there were changes in civil-military relations due to the statutory and consequent organizational changes initiated by the legislation. I expect to find that because of the Chairman’s notable increase in authority and power, civilian control is diminished.

Provisions related to getting good advice. Referring to the pre-GNA JCS, former

JCS Chief General David Jones said that the advice provided to civilian leadership was not useful, timely, or very influential. Former Secretary

<p style="text-align: center;">Good Advice</p> <p>Civilian leaders enact budgets, reorganize the organization, define roles and functions, influence promotions, fire commanders, and deploy troops, among other duties. In order to perform these duties, the military must give the civilian leadership accurate, useful and ingenuous advice.</p>

of Defense James Schlesinger provided testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee to that effect. He said,

The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised. The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is less important not to rock the boat...the proffered advice is

generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of the forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure (in U.S. Senate 1985, 159).

There were two main statutory changes that improved military advice. The first was to make the chief of the JCS the principal military advisor. Before GNA, the military departments were perceived to be the essence of the Department of Defense (and to a lesser degree, still are). Headquartered in Washington DC and armed with experience and staff resources, they were able to wield heavy influence in Congress, OSD, and the Joint Staff. By comparison, the Unified and Specified commanders—located anywhere *but* the Pentagon—had more field knowledge but were dependent upon the military services for supplying staff to their commands. Making the JCS Chairman both the Secretary’s chief military advisor as well as the “overseer” of the Specified and Unified Commands (at the secretary’s will) decreased the way in which the military departments controlled military advice to OSD and Congress.

Additionally, all duties that the JCS performed as a corporate body were transferred to the Chairman. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation gave him full authority and responsibility over the JCS and also provided him a Vice Chairman to help manage the joint staff. The need for these changes overcame the fear among policymakers of creating a General Staff after the Prussian model. The fear of a too-powerful military organization at the top, had kept the Chairman virtually powerless during previous reorganization junctures.

The second change related to advice-giving is found under Title V of the GNA, where the Secretariat’s powers are delineated. There is a provision that allows each service Chief of Staff to act independently of the service secretary on matters regarding

the JCS. These two provisions were explicitly for the purpose of getting good military advice. The argument was that as long as there was some independence among the services and between the military HQs and secretariats, sound and objective military perspectives could develop somewhat free of mandatory “party-lines” or undue command influence.⁴²

The analysis of the next three chapters will trace the military advisory process pre- and post-GNA and compare them to determine if there were changes in the nature and quality of advice given to civilian authority to make operational, budgetary, and personnel decisions. Evidence suggests that military advice on at least operations has improved.

Provisions related to management of the services. Prior to GNA, the CINCs had “full operational command” over their forces. But, as noted above, their ability to command was routinely undermined by the

Managing the Services
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ability to organize defense to meet the needs of U.S. National Security, as defined by civilian leadership goals• Creating a more joint force (more efficient)

influence and command responsibilities that the military services retained. As Lynn and Posen (1985-86, 83) write, the services dominated the CINCs in three ways:

- The service chiefs were in the operational chain of command and were in the position to transmit orders to the CINCs. As such, they had a dominant role in military operations.
- The service chiefs exerted influence through control of the administrative chain of command. Within each unified and specified command, there is a component command who, for all matters other than operations, must reports directly to their service department, circumventing the CINC.
- The unified and specified commands, prior to the Defense Reorganization act of 1958, had a military department that acted as their administrative agent. Though Eisenhower tried to abolish this relationship, a strong association remained after

⁴² The House Armed Services Committee bill wanted to merge the service secretariats with the military headquarters but the GNA enactors chose to maintain the separation for this purpose.

1958. The specified commands consisted of Air Force Agents, the Navy mostly controlled the Atlantic and Pacific Commands and the Army had a strong influence over the remaining commands (European, Southern, Readiness⁴³ and Central).

The GNA was enacted to change these relationships. It took the military departments out of the chain of command completely. In fact, the act states, “The commander of a combatant command is responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command” (Chapter 6 §164 (b)(1)), leaving the Chairman of the JCS out of the chain of command too.

The GNA vastly expanded the authority and responsibility of the CINCs in relation to the services. Section 164 (d) of GNA gives the CINCs authority over subordinate commanders in their command. It states that all commanders in a given specified or unified command are “under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command.” Under subsection (d)(4) the act also stipulates that the service component commanders must advise the CINC of all communications between that service commander and “all elements of the Department of Defense.” This is a somewhat oblique reference to the change that departmental commanders could no longer bypass nor ignore their CINC and report directly to their service commander, as was done before GNA.

Another important change that rebalanced the relationship between the CINCs and the services was the addition of combatant command budget allowance. The CINC is

⁴³ Readiness is no longer a specified command. The U.S. Unified Command plan has changed since 1958. There are now 9 Unified and Specified commands: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Joint Force Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Strategic Command. See Appendix A for a full description of these commands.

now allowed to propose a budget to fund joint exercises, force training, contingencies and selected operations (§166 (a)).

Besides changing the service vs. Combatant Commands power balance to improve efficiency in operations, the GNA also changed the nature of a service-defined organization by pushing jointness among officer training and experience. As the first part of this chapter demonstrates, since the creation of DOD in the 1940s, there has been a trend towards jointness and against service-centeredness.

In a congressional precursor study to the GNA entitled, *Defense Organization: the Need for Change* (U.S. Senate 1985), researchers found that military officers did not want joint assignments and those that are assigned to joint duty are among other things, “pressured or monitored for loyalty by their services.” Title IV of the GNA attempted to fix the management policies that created disincentives to joint experience among the officer corps, in the realm of selection, education, assignment, and promotion. The increase and amelioration of joint officer management practices as well as the change in operational chains of command among the combatant commands gave civilian leadership a better grip on managing the services.

In the next three chapters I will trace this service management pre- and post-GNA and compare it to determine if there was a change in the ability of civilian leadership, mainly within OSD, but also Congress, to manage service influence and control over operational, budgetary, and personnel decisions.

3

The DOD Resource Allocation Process: Before and After Goldwater-Nichols

The lack of discipline in the resource allocation process causes chronic program instability and encourages budgetary gamesmanship—the resources required to execute DOD programs exceed available funds by at least 25 percent.

-Clark A. Murdock, Center for Strategic and International Studies

DOD has two core competencies—winning wars and getting money from Congress.

-Anonymous senior defense official

Introduction

One of the 8 GNA objectives was to economize department of defense spending—specifically, to “provide for more efficient use of defense resources.” As General David Jones wrote in a November 7, 1982 *New York Times Magazine* article, DOD budgeting processes produce a defense budget “that is derived primarily from the disparate desires of the individual services rather than from a well-integrated plan.” He also wrote that civilian leaders are “reluctant to push hard for changes, either because they thought they could not succeed or because they did not want to expend the necessary political capital, which they believed was better spent on gaining support for the defense budget.” Jones’ theory was that DOD reform opponents feared that an admission to organizational problems would undercut their advocacy for an increased budget.

There are several parts to the GNA that address this DOD resource objective. Besides the general strengthening of the OSD, the first reference in the GNA to budgetary issues is in the creation of a DOD Comptroller. This office was created to advise and assist the Secretary in exercising budgetary and fiscal powers, supervising and

directing budget estimates, etc. A second reference to budgetary matters is under Sec. 109, Management Studies of OSD, where the Secretary “shall conduct a study” of OSD’s organization and functions. The matters to be included in the Secretary’s study are whether or not the organization of OSD is structured to exercise civilian control of, among other things, program and budget development. The study was also to determine whether or not the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS⁴⁴) should be revised to so that there is a match between strategic planning and available resource allocation. Studies should also determine if there was enough oversight of the PPBS system. In the *New York Times Magazine* article, General Jones was critical of the PPBS process, stating that it resulted in a lack of meaningful priorities and a demand for “greater force capabilities than the budget constraints would allow.”

Under Title II § 153 (a)(2) of the GNA (Military Advice and Command Functions) it notes that the JCS Chairman will prepare strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective. Also under § 153 are several references to the JCS Chairman providing advice to the Secretary on resource allocation and budgeting. This was put in place to aid in aligning overall strategic objectives with the activities of the unified and specified combatant commands (referred to hereafter as CINCs, or occasionally as warfighters).

The most notable initiatives to improve the PPBS and acquisition process⁴⁵ were published by the Packard Commission in 1985. Some of those initiatives were

⁴⁴ Now called the Planning Programming Budgeting Execution System or PPBE.

⁴⁵ The PPBS and acquisitions process are distinct. The former provides the process of how to buy, the latter what to buy. DOD acquisitions are subordinate to the PPBS process, and are neither described nor analyzed in this chapter.

implemented with the enactment of the GNA and later more initiatives were put into operation with the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA). Changes in function are offered in many locations throughout the GNA, but the fundamental change to the resource allocation process that the GNA introduced was the empowerment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide an independent and alternative PPBS option to the Secretary—an opinion other than those coming from the services. Through this shift in power, the Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs)⁴⁶ were given a voice in defining resource requirements necessary to their operational missions. It made the CJCS responsible to integrate these requirements, to set priorities and to link the resource requirements to readiness (Lewis et. al. 2001, x).

Because the services were directed to respond to CINC demands and because this power shift in DOD budgeting seemed to undermine the service-centered orientation of DOD, each service redesigned its budgeting process and to some extent the organization of its headquarters to comply with and manage the shift. Furthermore, there was a rapid evolutionary process of JCS responsibility over DOD resourcing because of noted operational successes, such as the 1991 Gulf War. Many in Congress claimed success in war meant Goldwater-Nichols was the correct decision-making model. So, JCS PPBS responsibilities that were based on GNA's design were expanded (Lewis et. al. 2001).

Beyond operational success, though, there is evidence to suggest that the change in resource allocation decision-making also enhanced civilian control, good advice and service management. In this chapter is outlined the pre- and post-GNA PPBS⁴⁷ processes.

⁴⁶ The Commanders-In-Chief are now called Combatant Commanders, or COCOMs.

⁴⁷ Defense Secretary Robert McNamara installed PPBS during the Kennedy presidency. It was and still is a cumbersome and convoluted system. As Secretary Rumsfeld noted in a Town Hall Meeting at Scott AFB, Illinois, April 18, 2002, it is “an antique, and it works poorly.” However, as Murdock, et. al. write, though

In comparing the processes pre- and post-GNA and linking statutory changes with changes in process, the demonstrated effect the GNA legislation had and has on civilian control, good advice, and service management will be elucidated. Some of the questions this chapter will answer are who controls the budgeting process? Does the Secretary get good and enough information to give to the President for submitting a budget to the Congress? What is the relationship among the measures of civil-military relations—e.g., if civilian control increases, does good advice increase or decrease?

Definitions

Resource allocation, financing, Planning-Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), etc. can specify different things, but they are all part of the why, how, when and with whose permission DOD annually spends taxpayer money. In 2003-2004, the U.S. government employed approximately 3 million people—2.3 million military and 636,000 civilian personnel—to run the Department of Defense.⁴⁸ It managed hundreds of facilities on over 46,875 square miles of land (an area larger than Switzerland). And in 2003, 368 billion dollars were spent on Defense, approximately 20% of the U.S. federal budget. The DOD budget has hundreds of program elements and thousands of line items. The numbers of actors involved are various, often with competing interests (President, Congress, services, contractors, etc.). It is a management nightmare.

Even so, from a public policy perspective, it is just as important, if not more so, that the process of spending taxes earmarked for defense are held to the same levels of

it “rewards incrementalism, consumes enormous resources and often locks the Secretary into narrow channels for making his biggest decisions...[I]t does provide an integrating process across the Defense Department, and it does produce decisions” (38). McNamara’s resource allocation may be cumbersome, but it is still used, despite Rumsfeld’s critique, in much the same way it was during the 1960s.

⁴⁸ This does not include military contract personnel. As of mid-2004, there were 20 thousand private military industry contract workers in Iraq alone doing the work of soldiers (Singer, 2004).

transparency and accountability as any other public resource allocation. This is not merely for the sake of high-minded democratic notions, but also because “sound fiscal management of the entire security sector is essential if a country is to have effective, efficient and professional security forces that are capable of protecting the state and its population against internal and external threats” (Ball 2002, 1).

For purposes of this research, the definition of resource allocation is limited to the PPBS process.⁴⁹ The PPBS outcome is the resource allocation decision by the Secretary of Defense. It is the Secretary’s main tool to control the department’s agenda.

The PPBS process was initiated to shift DOD’s agenda from a service-specific orientation to a DOD-integrated orientation. The PPBS system is a dual-tracked, hierarchical, funneled, and chronological process. It is dual-tracked because the services on the one hand and the OSD and Joint Staff on the other, synchronize, but separately proceed through each PPB step. It is hierarchical because the services respond to OSD and Joint Staff decisions. It is funneled because the beginning or planning stage addresses broad strategic options and those options are funneled into narrower programming and budgeting opportunities and realities. Finally, the PPBS is chronological in that planning occurs before programming, which occurs before budgeting, all within a strict timeline.

PPBS and the GNA. Goldwater-Nichols specified that the acquisitions process, which is subordinate to the PPBS process, be placed in the hands of civilian leadership,

⁴⁹ I do not include the effects of GNA on civil-military relations in the defense acquisition process because one year after GNA was passed Congress passed the Acquisition Reform Act (ARA—a response to the Packard Commission findings) that further enhanced civilian controls in the acquisition process. Interestingly, the ARA legislation was drafted rather independently of GNA despite overlap in desired outcomes (such as increasing civilian control over acquisitions). In fact GNA drafters asked ARA drafters that the legislation wait a year so that DOD could implement GNA first (Lewis et al. 2001, 13 and 17).

both at the OSD level and at the service secretariat level.⁵⁰ Furthermore, it gave the CINCs more control over defining their operational requirements and aligning resource management based on those requirements. This meant that the military services who were formally in charge of defining and supplying their own operations were, under the GNA, subordinate to the CINCs on all matters that were considered to be joint. The CINCs' representative at DOD is the Chairman of the JCS who reports directly to the Secretary.

The Pre-PPBS Budget Process

From the creation of DOD in 1947 to 1961, the budgeting system remained unchanged (U.S. Senate 1961, 4-5). The budgeting steps would begin a year before the President submitted the budget to Congress. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the administration traditionally imposed a strict cap on the DOD budget. Under Truman, that cap was set at no more than a third of the federal budget and under Eisenhower the cap was no more than 10 percent of GNP.⁵¹

After the president imposed the ceiling and the budget passed through Congress, the Secretary would divvy up the budget among the services. Until 1961, this allocation was relatively static at 47 percent for the Air Force, 29 percent for the Navy and 24

⁵⁰ Prior to the GNA, acquisitions, auditing, comptroller, informational management, inspector general, legislative affairs and public affairs were all under direct military control. These functions after the GNA enactment were moved to the jurisdiction of the service secretariats. Even at the service level, the civilians were made to be in control of anything related to budgeting.

⁵¹ Both Truman and Eisenhower were fiscal conservatives. Korb (1977, 335) notes that both presidents maintained a balanced budgets with strict DOD caps despite the ever-increasing international security threat. For example, Truman's defense budget request dropped 8 percent from fiscal year 1950 to 1951. At the end of FY 1949, while Congress was in the process of approving the FY50 budget, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb and the communists took over China. Truman's defense budget request dropped by 8%, not because world events allowed for fiscal restraint—they didn't—but because federal revenues dropped. Likewise, Eisenhower barely responded to the Soviet launching of Sputnik with a 5.6% defense budget increase, despite the fact that Congress and the American people expected more.

percent for the Army (Korb 1977, 335).⁵² Like today, the services were supposed to prepare their budgets based on the national military strategy. Back then, this document was called the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP),⁵³ and was developed by the NSC. In practice, however, the BNSP was a watered-down policy developed to appease all interested parties. It was ineffectual as a budgeting guide (Taylor 1959, 82-83).

The services, as a result, budgeted and organized in a manner suiting their own organizational interests and goals. The budgets that each service submitted to the Secretary invariably reflected the perception that the Army or Navy or Air Force, alone and individually, was responsible for national security. Consequently, each service's budget always exceeded the presidential caps. It now seems implausible, but the Secretary was limited in his ability to make the services work together and acquiesce to those caps. Since he had no real statutory power to get the service chiefs to comply, he used an array of methods—from commanding to coaxing to using pep talks (Korb 1977, 335). When these tactics didn't work, the secretary had to resort to more drastic measures that were even less related to the national military strategy. An example is the FY55 budget when Secretary Charles Wilson decided on a DOD-wide 10 percent reduction in personnel in order to conform to Eisenhower's budget caps (Ridgway 1956, 278). Another example is when Secretary Wilson's replacement, Secretary McElroy appealed to Congress in 1959 to help him choose which service's surface-to-ground missile system

⁵² This distribution was altered during the Korean war.

⁵³ Later, in 1955, the JSOP – Joint Strategic Objectives Plan – was also to be used for budgeting purposes. The JSOP was developed based on the BNSP and assessed international threats and prescribed the means by which BNSP would be met jointly. Because of service-centrism, and a service control of the defense department, it was never actually a joint document but consisted of 3 separate plans – a plan developed by each service, with little or no overlap (Korb 1977, 335).

to cut in order to stay within budget—the Army’s Nike-Hercules or the Air Force’s BOMARC (Enthoven and Smith 1971, 15).

The pre-PPBS system had a significant impact on civilian control of, getting good advice about, and managing the services’ rivalry over the way DOD resources were allocated. Civilian control over a strategic policy was lacking. Though the NSC developed a national strategy document that was intended to produce a joint DOD organization from the top, the reality was that the services spent their share of the budget in the manner they wanted. The real impact of this spending was that the civilian-controlled policy direction was at best only loosely followed. The Secretary spent most of his time finding compromises that served the services, not dictating policies that served national security and the public interest (Salazar 1996, 7-12).

The initial floundering of the Navy’s Polaris program is a good example of this lack of civilian control. In an effort to balance out the Air Force’s domination of the U.S.’s strategic arsenal, the Army and Navy sought to expand their roles in the nuclear triad. Four months into the 1957 fiscal year, the Navy was given the Polaris⁵⁴ program—a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system. The Navy’s initial enthusiasm for expanding its strategic role was dashed by the fact that no additional funding was associated with the new role. The Polaris system had to compete with the Navy’s blue water programs for a piece of that 29 percent of the DOD budget. Even though the SLBM program was defined by civilian leadership as an important and urgent element of the U.S. strategic arsenal, the Navy declined to fund it as needed (Korb 1977, 336).

⁵⁴ The Polaris was replaced by the Poseidon and Trident systems in the 1980s and 1990s. These missile systems were submarine launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs.

Pre-PPBS budgeting also lacked a mechanism for exacting good military advice. The service chiefs in the JCS were above all, advocates for their service. Neither joint nor integrated planning or decision-making resulted from the budgetary planning process. Because of this, the Secretary was disadvantaged in being able to differentiate among the competing programs that would or would not meet national security needs. Secretary Wilson's 10 percent across-the-board reduction in personnel and Secretary McElroy's entreating congressional advice on missile program cuts are good examples of this. In neither case was a decision based on sound military advice.

Pre-PPBS also lacked necessary service management. A weak Secretary had few options in making the military departments link their budget outlays to the President's national security strategy. Instead, the services organized themselves based on traditions and/or self-defined priorities. For example, the Army allocated funding to support a larger number of divisions than could be equipped. The Air Force and Navy funded their favorite projects but neglected other programs that were just as important—programs that were often joint.

According to a Joint DOD/GAO Working Group on PPBS, there were six main weaknesses in the pre-1961 DOD budgeting process (U.S. Senate 1985, 484-85).

1. Budget decisions were not based on military planning;
2. There were redundancies of military activities across the services;
3. The services prepared their budgets in a virtual vacuum, not accounting for the activities of one another;
4. There was a lack of long- and mid-term planning. Budget decisions were focused almost exclusively on the subsequent fiscal year;
5. A culture of entitlement among the services led to systematic disregard of program effectiveness or responsiveness to national security needs;
6. The secretary had an insufficient information base from which to make good planning and budgetary decisions.

Planning was being done with little regard to cost and budgeting was done with little regard to planning (U.S. Senate 1985, 485). All of these weaknesses impacted the civil-military relations at the time, on both a macro- and micro-scale.

Pre-Goldwater-Nichols PPBS

The PPB system was brought into use during the Kennedy administration by Secretary of Defense McNamara to fix these budgeting weaknesses. It was a product of the Rand Corporation's research in defense management.⁵⁵ The goals of this system were mostly quantitative—to develop a cost-benefit budgeting system that reduced waste and redundancy, and to organize budgeting around the functional missions of the military. Its creator wrote that PPBS provides,

. . . the Secretary of Defense and his principal military and civilian advisors a system which brings together at one place and at one time all of the relevant information that they need to make sound decisions on the forward program and to control the execution of that program. . . . Budgets are in balance with programs, programs with force requirements, force requirements with military missions, and military missions with national security objectives (Hitch 1965, 25-26).

Since McNamara implemented PPBS, there were several adjustments to the original process. Nixon's defense Secretary Laird established the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), which provided closer oversight of major acquisitions programs and major milestones in defense budgets (Ferrara 1996, 111). Under Laird there was also a movement towards decentralization in decision-making. Of his role in these budgetary assessments, Laird wrote that there are

. . . many decisions that should be made by the Services Secretaries and they should have the responsibility for running their own programs. I have no business being involved in how many 20mm guns should go on a

⁵⁵ Rand had used the PPB system to analyze high-level defense planning since the 1950s. McNamara recruited 2 well-known Rand analysts to implement a DOD-wide PPB System—Charles Hitch and Alain Enthoven (Korb 1977, 336).

destroyer. That is the Secretary of the Navy's business. I must let the Services take a greater role (Laird 1969, 34).

The Carter administration attempted to identify marginally performing programs by establishing a zero-based-budgeting (ZZB) system.⁵⁶ Additionally, Carter's Defense Secretary Brown established the Defense Resources Board, replaced later by the Defense Planning and Resource board, which was an attempt to keep an eye on the combined programming and budgeting phase of the PPB system (U.S. Senate 1985, 486-7).

There were also procedural changes in congressional oversight, such as the creation of the Congressional Budget Office that influenced the way the budgets were derived, and the revision of the congressional budget calendar making October 1st the start of the fiscal year, not the first of July.⁵⁷ Also, Members of Congress and Senators had individual influence over DOD budgeting. Congressman George Mahon from Texas, for example, chaired the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for almost 30 years from (1949-1978). He was said to have noteworthy sway over the distribution of defense resources, "scrubbing" the budget vigorously for efficiency and "questioning the basic rationale and justification for a variety of weapon programs" (Blechman 1990, 23). Though interesting, these individual influences were the exception to the rule. Congressional mechanisms for oversight, whether formal or informal, existed pre- and post-GNA. So, in terms of looking systematically at the effects of change, the relevance of individual influence is small at best.

⁵⁶ In general, a ZZB budget starts with no authorized funds. Each program to be funded must be justified every time a budget is submitted. ZZB was discontinued under Reagan.

⁵⁷ These were a couple of major provisions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The change in the budget calendar made it more possible to pass appropriation bills before the programs were to be implemented.

Despite the tweaking of the PPB system prior to 1986, these changes were minor compared to the more drastic changes implemented by GNA. Until the GNA enactment, the PPB system remained somewhat static. In fact, the SASC arrived at this conclusion in 1985 stating that no attempt to radically alter the resource allocation process had been attempted (U.S. Senate 1985, 486). There were, however trends towards amending the PPB system that pro-change planners capitalized on as they wrote the GNA into law. For example, there was a need for the “warfighters” (CINCs) to have input in the PPBS process and to have the military chiefs to be able to respond to those needs.

Planning. The PPBS is divided into 3 parts: planning, programming, and budgeting. The planning, and longest, phase began with the submission by the JCS to the Secretary, its review of military threats, national commitments, and broad requirements to run DOD activities.⁵⁸ The OSD produced a draft guidance document based on the JCS plan,⁵⁹ which was reviewed by the CINCs. Based on CINC review, the OSD issued the guidance document to the military services. This document largely delineates missions each service is to accomplish as well as a single-number budget ceiling (U.S. Senate 1985, 490).

Numerous reports and studies indicate the pre-GNA PPBS planning phase was seriously flawed. The relevant flaws for this research are 1) the inability of the JCS to provide strategic advice and planning [issues related to military advice]; 2) the inability of the JCS to devise military strategy [issues related to military advice] and 3) a lack of service consensus on planning [issues related to managing the military services].

⁵⁸ This document was originally called the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan or JSOP. By 1985, however, the JSOP was replaced by the Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and the Joint Strategic Planning document, both of which were submitted to the Secretary.

In the planning phase, the Joint Chiefs as a group are to advise the Secretary in the creation of a military strategy by defining national security objectives, how the military should meet the given set of national security objectives, and the constraints on meeting those objectives. Built into the DOD system created in 1947 was the fact that most planning was focused on resource allocation *by service*, and maintaining jurisdictional military programs irrespective of real world events or national security imperatives (U.S. Senate 1985, 495). This is all exacerbated by what Liddell Hart describes as a weak strategic tradition in U.S. military instruction. He wrote, “in all our military training...we invert the true order of thought—considering techniques first, tactics second and strategy last” (1944, 129).

It can be argued that not until World War II was a grand strategy necessary. But, the closest thing to a grand strategy that U.S. policymakers developed after World War II was nuclear. But even the existence of a consistent nuclear strategy during this time period is subject to debate:

[B]y any reasonable definition of the word, this country has never *had* a strategic nuclear doctrine. Or, perhaps more precisely, the United States has had a strategic doctrine in the same way that a schizophrenic has a personality. Instead of a single integrated and integrating set of ideas, values, and beliefs, we have had a complex and sometimes contradictory *mélange* of notions, principles, and policies (Friedberg 1982, 56).

Much of military reform since 1947 was to increase interservice integration, but even in the broadest sense, U.S. strategy lacked cohesion. The documentation put forward by the JCS during the PPBS planning phase was assumed to be a cohesive guide for OSD’s use, but Admiral Zumwalt, former CNO, described it otherwise:

⁵⁹ As Korb notes, however, during the Kennedy administration the OSD ignored the JCS strategic plan (1977, 337).

I found this particular document to be almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions always were in the process of being falsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal (1976, 334).

In this regard, the way DOD was organized to produce a cohesive and affordable strategy was not effective in providing good advice.

Much of the problem of the military providing good advice stemmed from lack of policy and fiscal guidance from the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In some respects, military leadership was unable to provide good advice because they did not receive proper guidance on which to base that advice. The Steadman report, published under the Carter administration, spelled out the inadequacy of civilian leadership in providing strategic principles to the military in the PPBS process. The report noted that in the absence of a guiding strategy, military planners must prepare their own. In 1982, General Jones concurred with this assessment, in his testimony before the SASC,⁶⁰ but added that OSD guidance was so demanding, “that developing truly coherent programs to carry it out is impossible even under the most optimistic budget assumptions.”

Perhaps the weakest element of the planning phase was the almost complete disconnect between strategy building that was to inform the programming and budget cycle, and realistic fiscal guidance (U.S. Senate 1985, 498). After the Joint Chiefs submitted their strategic planning documents beginning the planning cycle, the Secretary drew up a draft defense guide and delivered it to the CINCs, the State Department, the NSC staff, and OMB to solicit feedback. Based on that feedback, the OSD developed a

⁶⁰ Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, December 16, 1982, pages, 19-20.

final version of the *Defense Guidance*, which is the chief output of the planning phase. It was designed to be the blueprint for the subsequent programming and budgeting phases.

Contained in the *Defense Guidance* are the fiscal “chaperons” that set not only ceilings on the total budget for each service, but as Lawrence Korb writes, “build fences around the major program areas” so that the services cannot shift funds willy-nilly away from less “glamorous” or more joint programs (1977, 342 and 346). As of 1985, however, these fiscal guidelines provided by OSD to the services were sparse, single-page documents (U.S. Senate 1985, 490). The budget ceilings were structured less around strategic planning and more around the economy’s condition and the administration’s fiscal planning.

Besides regaining civilian control over the process, one of the main reasons McNamara implemented the PPBS was to make sure that budgets were derived from both fiscal constraints and national security imperatives. The result of this relationship *not* happening was that there was a considerable and growing gap between 1) the budget the military claimed it needed to maintain U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, and 2) what military capabilities were funded by Congress yearly. Not only did the Senate Armed Services Committee arrive at this conclusion (U.S. Senate 1985, 498-500), but so did an independent study published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) the same year. In the CSIS report, Odeen et al. wrote:

Joint military planning is not constrained by realistic projections of future defense budgets. Consequently, the primary JCS planning documents are fiscally unrealistic and therefore largely ignored in the programming and budgeting process. Instead, national military force planning results from loosely coordinated, parallel dialogues between OSD and each of the individual service departments. This often results in disparate plans that do not optimize the potential contribution of each military service to national strategic objectives (1985, 38).

Despite the improvement that the PPBS structure brought to DOD budgeting, the same problems that existed prior to its implementation still existed. Namely, since there was a real lack of overarching strategic planning that could develop into a single military strategy, the services were there to fill the vacuum.

According to the 1985 SASC report the services preferred an ambiguous grand strategy. This allowed each military department to utilize its own, more specific, global strategy that justified maintaining service-specific programs, end-strengths, budgeting priorities, etc. This caused two obvious problems in the PPBS. First it created an “objectives-force mismatch” (U.S. Senate 1985, 496). And secondly, it caused defense planning to be focused on inputs, to the near exclusion of output functions.

An objectives-force mismatch meant, in effect, there was not a direct connection between a national security strategy and a military strategy. Richard Betts describes the issue succinctly.

Keeping national and military strategy in discreet compartments can become an excuse to avoid making real strategy. Such a split makes one part much the same as policy and the other much like doctrine and operations. This leaves open the gap between policy objectives and military plans—the gap that should be bridged by strategic calculation for exactly how to use force to produce a desired political result rather than just a military result (2001, 23).

While treated in this chapter as causing unsound planning and budgeting, the grand view of this problem presents more serious possibilities. Civilian and military leadership failing to realize a grand strategy is what Hart and others warn of. Lack of this strategic and integrated calculation can result in operations driving and not serving policy (Betts 2001, 23). In the context of civil-military relations, it means that a military budget, operation, or organization can surpass, in scope and size, its own *raison d’etre*—a

purpose designed by and for civilians. With respect to resource allocations it means that taxpayer money can turn into bloated or mismanaged budgets. This is bad enough, but there are more serious consequences if there is an objectives-force mismatch when the country is deploying its forces for war.

Alluded to in Admiral Zumwalt's quote above, one of the main reasons a grand strategy could not be developed was because of the relationship of the individual members of the JCS and OSD to the CINCs and the services. Service-centered programming and budgeting took place in this power vacuum that led to, among other things, congressional micromanagement when funding service-specific line items. Les Aspin is quoted here.

Last year [1984], Congress changed the number of smoke grenade launchers and muzzle boresights the Army requested. We directed the Navy to pare back its request for parachute flares, practice bombs, and passenger vehicles. Congress specified that the Air Force should cut its request for garbage trucks, street cleaners, and scoop loaders. This is a bit ridiculous (*Cong. Rec.* 1985, 25350-4).⁶¹

This nearly-mandated congressional micromanagement only exacerbated the objectives-force mismatch. How were members of the Senate and House committees to know how many grenade launchers were needed for the Army to fulfill U.S. military objectives when a) the strategy-resource allocation link was never made in the first place and b) it is not the job of Congress to advise the military on such a micro-level?

Service-centrism in PPBS led to what General Jones referred to as a lack of emphasis on the output side of defense organization. Examples of outputs of defense are its capabilities, i.e. readiness, crisis management preparedness, joint warfare, etc. Inputs

⁶¹ U.S. Senate, Senator Nunn of Georgia speaking on congressional oversight of national defense, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, 1 October 1985, pp. 25350-4.

in the defense program are procurement decisions, end-strengths and end-strength policies, budgets, and anything that is program-oriented. “The Service Chiefs and their Service staffs devote most of their time to Service programs and budgets—the input side of defense management” (Chairman’s Special Study Group 1982, 6). The CINCs, on the other hand, are responsible for output management (war fighting) but they had little influence on the PPBS process. Furthermore, the Defense Resources Board, created in 1979 to oversee DOD’s cross-service resource allocation process, was dominated by representatives of the services (U.S. Senate 1985, 503). The result of the services planning around their own strategic world views was that the military has a more input- than output-orientation. This has a decided impact on the remaining PPBS elements of planning and budgeting.

A weak strategic planning tradition, a JCS structure that did not promote consensus and allowed the services too much influence on the PPBS process, the emphasis on programming and budgeting to guide planning (and not the other way around), planning not based on fiscal constraints, and an inadequate planning organization all contributed to a planning failure vicious cycle. In essence, civilian decision makers, both in the OSD and in Congress were not only not getting good advice about how to plan for and fund DOD, but the organizational relationships within the Defense Department provided incentives for the services to have too much influence on the PPBS agenda. A poor planning element in the PPBS process gave rise to problems during the programming phase.

Programming. The next phase of the PPBS is the programming phase. What was originally envisioned in this phase was that the services would respond to the *Defense*

Guidance document, established from the planning phase, to create their Program Objective Memoranda or POMs. The POM, in layman's terms, is the document which lays out how any given service will organize and procure resources for itself (i.e. how it will fund its programs), given its tight fiscal constraints on the one hand and broadly mandated objectives on the other. "The challenge of this phase is for the Services to effectively apply a fiscal constraint to the largely non-fiscally constrained guidance from the planning phase and generate an acceptable proposal for how they want to assign the available dollars to programs" (CNO N6 2004).

According to the 1985 SASC report, however, "POM development begins much earlier [than during the programming phase] as the services receive projections of future requirements from their major commands and other institutional 'claimants'" (490). In other words, the resulting documented advice of the planning phase is largely ignored as the services chart their own program objectives based on internal priorities.

Once the Program Objective Memoranda or POMs are written, they are delivered to the JCS and OSD. The Joint Chiefs of Staff critique the various program objectives and, based on that critique, produce the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) that feeds back into OSD's overall review of the POMS. The POMs are then reviewed by the Defense Resources Board (DRB)⁶² to ensure fulfillment of the *Defense Guidance* and to reduce duplication of efforts among the three services. The Office of Management and Budget (as a member of the DRB) and the CINCs also comment on the program objectives and/or specific programs. All of these agencies provide feedback to the OSD so it can produce program decision memos (PDMs). These memos are provided to the services as guidance as they begin their budgeting phase.

As described in the preceding planning section, the majority of the JCS influence in the PPBS process existed in the planning phase. In fact, not until the creation of the DRB were the Joint Chiefs of Staff involved in the programming phase at all (Salazar 1996, 12). In the pre-GNA defense organization, getting good advice, maintaining the most effective balance in civilian control, and managing service-centeredness in PPBS planning was difficult and often ineffective.

Civilian control. During the McNamara era, the planning process virtually ignored JCS input. McNamara's token meetings with the JCS during the planning phase were either a means to get the Chiefs on board with the Secretary's strategic vision or to divide, and thus nullify, the JCS influence (Korb 1977, 337). Besides battling a powerful OSD, the service chiefs were overloaded with work and too deadlocked with conflicting interests to be very effective in this phase of the PPBS. The chiefs' responsibilities prior to the enactment of GNA were:

- To be administrator of his service
- To be joint administrator of the JCS (advisory and planning responsibilities)
- To be administrator of various defense agencies
- To be the chiefs in the chain of command for military operations

A chief's numerous responsibilities precluded him from devoting too much time to any one. Even after the McNamara period and the advent of the DRB brought the service chiefs into the programming process, the JCS staff was still too small, was still overburdened with work, and still lacked the necessary organizational elements dedicated to the resource allocation process to be effective in giving needed military input into the programming phase (Salazar 1996, 12). Demonstrably, there was no lack of civilian control in the programming phase. In fact, there was arguably an overextension of

⁶² See Appendix B for a list of the DRB members.

civilian control, which decreased effectual military advice. This problem is discussed in more detail in the chapter's conclusion, below.

Managing the services. Subsequent defense secretaries were successful in decentralizing the programming phase and putting the proper civilian control mechanisms into balance, but the phase was still hindered by service parochialism. For example, Defense Secretary Harold Brown (Carter administration) noted that the chiefs, as both service administrators and members of the JCS, too often sided with the needs of their service during the planning phase. So, there was no cross-service compromise and no cross-service programming elements within the defense organization. Secretary Brown argued that the chiefs' focus in the planning phase, as members of the JCS, seemed to be which weapons to procure for their service and not how to reduce redundant programs nor how to provide more joint programming. As the defense secretary, Brown therefore had to rely on non-military and non-parochial members of his own staff to determine what the proper balance and integration of programs should be (Brown, 1983, 209-14).

In general, military advice during the planning phase was not adequate. This is not solely because of service parochialism, but also because there was little connection between the JCS (military) and OSD (civilian) documents that originated from the planning phase to inform the programming phase. Because there was no synthesis in the advice between military and civilian leadership, planners were often in a state of confusion.

The planner who compares the guidance issued by OSD with that put forth by the JCS is understandably confused about the premises on which plans should be based...[P]rogram managers can never by (sic.) certain about the status of their programs (Korb 1977, 344).

Also, the Joint Chiefs didn't actually make a *joint* programming recommendation. The "joint" output of the programming phase, the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum or JPAM,⁶³ was merely "a compilation of the POMs of the individual services" (Korb 1977, 344). Each service, therefore, developed a proposal sent to OSD on *how* to pay for its programs for the next 6 years. Once this was done, the Secretary issued the Program Decision Memoranda or PDMs and the budgeting phase began.

Military advice. Getting good military advice during the programming phase was compromised. Even after civilian control was put into balance with military control, the standard operating procedures during this phase, such as effectively keeping the CINCs and JCS out of the loop, precluded the military elements of DOD from providing adequate advice. In addition to the organizational obstacles to getting good advice, the willful lack of coordination among the services reduced the effectiveness of military advice in this phase. In effect, the Secretary's Program Decision Memoranda (PDM), the programming phase output, lacked the necessary military input that would reduce waste and redundancies but would also more effectively link the DOD budget with military objectives—reasons McNamara instituted the PPBS system in the first place.

Budgeting. The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Based on the Secretary's PDM, the services work up a budget estimate. These estimates are given to the OSD. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director jointly review the estimates. The OMB and Comptroller (OSD) work on the budget before submitting it to the White House. Though the review of the services' estimates are supposed to be merely technical, changes to what any given service prescribes have potential to effect programming issues for that service. If the

⁶³ Formerly, the Joint Forces Memorandum or JFM.

Comptroller and OMB representative cannot work out problem budgetary items with the service, the final decision goes to the President at the time the budget is submitted to him. It is customary for the President to meet with the JCS and Secretary before finalizing his budget for submission to Congress. After the McNamara era, the chiefs had more success in reversing some decisions that OMB or the comptroller made with the service budgets (Korb 1977, 343).

Budget execution oversight. The budgeting phase of the PPBS is problematic, mainly for reasons already discussed in the planning and programming sections above—by the time the process gets to producing budgets, so much is already wrong, that it is almost irrelevant to try to fix budgeting alone or even first. The DOD emphasis on budgeting as a means to planning produces problems, but in analyzing civil-military relations the most important discussion is finding the proper balance between civilian leadership (oversight of the services as they execute their budgets) vs. OSD micromanagement.

According to Odeen et al. in the CSIS study, the lack of adequate accounting and management information systems makes program evaluation difficult. They write,

Department of Defense financial reports provide a mass of data, but the financial information in these reports is often inconsistent, incomplete, and untimely. The source of many of these shortcomings is the department's reliance on accounting systems that operate almost exclusively on an obligational basis. Under this system, an economic event is measured when the resources are "obligated," that is when contracts are awarded or orders placed—an emphasis that is understandable in terms of the department's fiduciary responsibilities. Obligation-based data, however, inhibit the evaluation of program effectiveness and management performance by focusing attention on the time of the commitment, with little monitoring of the actual delivery or the effective use of the resource acquired (1985, 42).

Some organizations in DOD have good program evaluation, such as recruitment and retention, and many high-profile weapons systems also face heavy execution oversight. Overall, however, DOD had neither a formal (and visible) evaluation process for the majority of their systems, nor civilian leadership scrutinizing the execution of the budget (U.S. Senate 1985, 504-5). Congress sets aside a chunk of the federal money it controls for the military, not by program, but into a small number of broad accounts,⁶⁴ which has hundreds of line items each. The PPBS process works to put together a budget, but not to control the programs the budget funds.

Because there was little attention to program evaluation (execution oversight), there was no feedback into the subsequent years' PPBS process. This resulted in reinventing planning and programming documents every year, and program progress and change not being measured. This problem made it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to determine which programs should be cut, which ones needed to be fixed, or which ones were working and should be kept. The lack of execution oversight decreases the ability of the President and Congress to manage DOD spending in a way fitting with the public trust (Odeen et al. 1985, 42).

Goldwater-Nichols & PPBS

The question to answer here is what did the GNA change and how did those changes affect civil-military relations in the PPBS process? The GNA affected the defense resource allocation process both directly (i.e. provisions specific to PPBS) and indirectly (i.e. provisions not specific to PPBS but impacted the PPBS nevertheless). The biggest effect GNA had was in empowering the Chairman of the JCS to bring a more

⁶⁴ In the pre-GNA PPBS process there were five areas that Congress funded: Personnel, Operations and

joint perspective into military planning, and thus military budgeting. The Chairman became the steward of a joint military perspective. This change also had a notable impact on the three measures of civil-military relations: getting good advice, service management, and civilian control.

The Goldwater-Nichols act was intended to change the civil-military balance in order to increase civilian control. It was concluded in the formulation of the act that civilian control would increase proportionate to the improvement of military advice to civilian leadership. Ironically, improvement in military advice came through increasing the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in some ways, decreased civilian control and oversight.

It is important to note at the beginning of this description and analysis that process and decision-making changes in the Department of Defense take place over time and not immediately after statutory changes take place. This is true for any organization, but common sense suggests that there is a positive relationship between the length of time change occurs and the size of an organization. Though the GNA was enacted in 1986, some of the structural changes envisioned by its enactors did not occur until a year or many years later.

Specific statutory changes in GNA affecting PPBS. In effect, the PPBS process was not changed significantly by the legislation, but the relationships among the people and agencies participating in, and the papers generated for the PPBS process did change. The most significant change, as noted above, was in the chairmanship of the JCS and the expanded size and role of the JCS staff. Ten new resource-related responsibilities were assigned to the Chairman and his staff (Locher 2001, 108). Though the GNA increased

the size of the Chairman’s range of responsibilities, it also gave him much greater control, power, and range of options in completing those responsibilities. In general, this had the effect of military planning becoming much more joint (Roman and Tarr 1998, 106-7). Specifically, there are 3 provisions in Section 153 of the GNA that increased the CJCS’s advisory role in the PPBS process. These are:

- Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.
- Advising the Secretary on the priorities of the requirements identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands (aka CINCs).
- Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals to greater conform to the needs of the CINCs.

These statutes directly stimulated the evolution of a new agency and a new organizational

Post-GNA planning phase

The main outcome of the planning phase is the Secretary’s strategic plan, as defined in the Defense Planning Guidance document (DPG). The DPG is responsive to the President’s National Security Strategy, OMB’s fiscal guidance, and the Joint Chief’s National Military Strategy (which is derived from the National Security Strategy). The DPG also outlines specific guidance with respect to programs that the Secretary wants the services or other DOD agencies to fund in their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). The Chairman of the JCS influences the outcome of the DPG through the Chairman’s Program Recommendations (CPR). In the CPR, the Chairman recommends priorities for the DPG regarding planning for programs that are joint. Source: Lewis et al. 2001,5-6.

process. These were the creation of the Joint Requirements Oversight council (JROC) and the establishment of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process used to support the decision-making of the JROC (Sullivan 2002, 35).

In order to assist the CJCS in his newly created advisory responsibilities, the JROC was formed. The advice the JROC was to give was the degree to which the defense budgets created by the military departments conformed to the CINCs operational needs. Also, the JROC was to make sure that the joint operations capabilities and

interoperability among the services were briefed to the Secretary before the budget guidance was issued. Its role in the PPBS process was mostly intervening with advice during the planning and programming phase so that a more accurate joint perspective would be a part of the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA—generated during the planning phase) and Chairman’s Program Recommendations (or CPR, which, as noted above, is the CJCS alternative to service POMs⁶⁵ during the programming phase) (Owens 1994, 55-57).

The JROC consists of the vice-chiefs of each military service staff⁶⁶ and the Vice Chairman of the JCS (VCJCS) chairs it. Its main work is to order, receive and review the

Post-GNA programming phase
 The Secretary issues the DPG in the fall or early winter and the services respond by submitting their Program Objective Memoranda the following spring. The Secretary and the Joint Staff review the services POMs. The Joint Staff’s review is contained in the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), which evaluates, among other things, how well the services respond to the needs of the CINCs. OSD reviews the CPA and the POMS in tandem to identify problems or disparities between the two documents. These problems are brought before the Defense Resource Board for resolution. The outcome of this resolution is published in the Program Decision memorandum (PDM). Source: Lewis et al. 2001,7.

recommendations of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (eight working groups, described briefly below). The JROC takes the recommendations and briefs them to the CINCs out in the field, gathers and integrates input from the CINCS

about the recommendations,⁶⁷ and reports the result of its fieldwork to the service Chiefs and the CJCS. The Chairman uses this, among other inputs during the programming phase of PPBS in making his recommendations to the Secretary (Lennox 1996, 3-4).⁶⁸

⁶⁵ The JROC and CPA were not functionally linked until the mid-1990s with new legislation.

⁶⁶ Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vice chief of Staff of the Army, and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Director of J-8 is also a member.

⁶⁷ It is noteworthy that JROC interactions with CINCs include, as a regular, yearly process, face-to-face exchanges with general officers at the 4-star level (Owens 1994, 57).

⁶⁸ It should be noted that the JROC’s activities evolved over several years. The JROC came into its own in 1994 under the VCJCS, Admiral William A. Owens, the third VCJCS who served with General Shalikashvili. It wasn’t until Admiral Owens and General Shalikashvili that the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments process was enacted and that the work of JROC was integrated into the PPBS process.

This is significant because this is the first time that the CINCs had direct input into the PPBS process. In the pre-GNA PPBS process, the Secretary's office (OSD) was the only entity that was providing any cross-service integration and was at a disadvantage in doing so. As noted in sections above, when the service budgets derived from the PPBS process did not conform to levels mandated by the secretary, it was OSD or even Congress that made, sometimes arbitrarily, decisions about which programs to cut and which to keep. Now, the CINCs can intervene their advice in the programming phase.

Post-GNA budgeting phase

Though the budgeting phase technically begins *after* the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) is received by the services, the services have already begun their budget write-ups and generally have to revise them after the PDM is published. Their budgets are submitted to the Comptroller and then budget hearings are held. If a program is high-profile or represents an important program area as outlined by the Secretary, then decisions may be made about its budget by the Defense Program Review Board. After all of this is done and all decisions are made, the outcome or Program Budget Decisions become what the President submits to Congress. Source: Lewis et al. 2001,7-8.

After the services publish their Program Objective Memorandum, the CINCs can review and submit comments on them in the form of an integrated priority list (IPL)⁶⁹ to the Joint Staff who then submits the comments to the Secretary. Though the CINCs finally have access, it is

often the case that they have neither the staff nor the time to engage in the JWCA process (Kolakowski 2004, 4-7).

Effect on civil-military measures. Some examples over the past decade and a half suggest that redundancies in service programs have been cut or at the very least, there has been some shifting in funds across service lines resulting in compromises not resembling

Admiral Owens also expanded the council by meeting more often –some reports estimate approximately 10 hours per week (Blaker 1996, 19), making more decisions and increased communication with the CINCs. Also see *Defense* 1996, Issue 2, page 4. No author cited in article.

⁶⁹ IPLs are the formal documents that the CINCs use to communicate shortfalls, operational requirements and any other concern. Annually IPLs are submitted to the Secretary, copying the CJCS and the services. See CNO headquarter website, <http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/N6E/PPBS/ppbsprocess/Planning/IPL.htm> for further information.

zero-sum negotiations. The result of JROC handling cross-service integration of PPBS is that there was a shift of certain responsibilities from civilians within OSD, to military leadership. Effectively, there was less civilian control over budgetary nuances, but better military advice to the Secretary and better management of service centrism. The JROC recommendations “called for by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, have grown teeth, in effect emerging as a true alternative to the separate service programs—and to the simple adding up of those programs that constitutes existing Defense budgeting” (Blaker 1996, 19).

The theory behind the JROC process, that one insider observing it noted, is that the individual vice-chiefs can and sometimes do act as a corporate entity and not solely as representatives of their service. This is a notion that McNamara rejected when instituting the PPBS process. Evidently, the discussions at its meetings can be very heated, as JROC members consider their corporate responsibilities as well as their role as vice chief for their service (Blaker 1996, 19). And according to General Shalikashvili, the decisions are not derived from voting, but from consensus resulting from debates (2001, 39).

One controversial example of JROC influence in DOD budgeting is its decision to compete Army and Navy theater ballistic missile defense systems—Army’s THAAD vs. Navy upper tier (TBMD).⁷⁰ In a 16 February 1996 DOD News Briefing about the Ballistic Missile Defense program (BMD), Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Moorman was asked by Secretary Perry to explain the JROC’s role in prioritizing BMD budgeting.⁷¹ Moorman explained that JROC “considered both the Army and the Navy program together and the concept of sharing the mission.” This allowed the JROC to

⁷⁰ THAAD stands for Theater High Altitude Area Defense—the Army’s theater ballistic missile defense system and TBMD is simply, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.

recommend buying fewer missiles, reduce cross-service duplication of effort and to reduce cost. Decreasing redundancy meant that there would be one BMD program that both Army and Navy would share. General Moorman sums up the process through which this decision was derived:

Let me summarize where we are from my perspective. The JROC reviewed this program... We reprioritized theater missile defense. In the near term we bought insurance by plussing up PAC-III and Navy upper tier... In dollars and cents, the ultimate result was saving a little over \$2 billion in the FYDP. I believe it was an excellent example of not only the services working together in this unique body called the JROC, but also once we got a uniform view, and excellent example of the acquisition and requirements communities working together to handle a very vexing problem.

Another example of the expanded presence of the JROC into cross-service oversight is their congressionally-mandated role in missile defense program oversight in early 2003. As part of the SASC's National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003, it was stipulated that the JROC "review annually the cost, schedule and performance criteria for all Missile Defense Agency programs and assess the validity of the criteria in relation to military requirements."⁷² In this case, the JROC was not necessarily playing referee among competing service opinions, and missile defense programs, but was asked to be an integrated voice for the services' interests.

Though the JROC decision-making process has successfully cut across service jurisdiction since GNA was enacted, and particularly after its role expanded in the mid-

⁷¹ This DOD briefing comes after a statement by General Luck, Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, taking exception to JROC action in decreasing monies allocated for the THAAD system (as reported in the *Washington Times*, December 11, 1995).

⁷² The Senate Rpt.107-151, National Defense Authorization Act for FY03 states, "In testimony to the committee on March 7, 2002, the committee chairman asked each of the military service chiefs whether he had been consulted on the Department's missile defense budget for fiscal year 2003; each responded that he had not. The committee is concerned that under the new Missile Defense Agency organization, the military services have not been afforded the opportunity to provide the proper guidance and advice on the missile

1990s, problems of program duplication are still an issue. General Peter Pace, sixth and current VCJCS, said at the January 2003 Precision Strike Association Winter Roundtable,⁷³ while JROC has vastly improved on interservice rivalry, there is still room for improvement in PPBS and other areas of DOD planning. He said,

First of all, the JROC...that I've inherited, has evolved very well to the point where we do a very good job of grading the services' homework... It's been a short time that a council has existed. So in the intervening years, they have put together a process that ensures that instead of each service buying gear independent of the others, that today's process fully requires that each service come in and present their idea to get a JROC stamp on its forehead, and that's good. But it's not really enough. The reason it's not enough is that we need to catch them, and get out in front, because we are supposed to be their leaders. What the JROC must do, I think, is develop a joint concept of operations—the umbrellas—for the way we're going to fight in the future. Then that allows the services to look at those capabilities we're going to need, and see what gaps there are, see what overlaps there are, and then work with us to fill those gaps and erase the overlaps.

Though VCJCS (Admiral) Owens oversaw the JROC's much expanded statutory power, he was disillusioned with its power to counterbalance service gaming in protecting their institutional interests (Coss 2004, 7). After resigning with only serving one term as Vice Chief of the JCS, he was quoted in a December 9, 1996, *Defense Week* article as saying, "I would not have the services do requirements any more. They can't do them...they have not been able to see systems and equipment in a joint perspective." Locher agrees with Owens' perspective stating that there have been some positive effects on the resource allocation process, but overall, "services continue to fund Cold War systems...and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has rubber-stamped the services' choices" (2001, 112). Locher said in an interview with the author that the JROC

defense budget." In this light, the JROC was given the responsibility to ensure that DOD components were able to provide advice to the SASC on the issue of ballistic missile defense in the budget.

in private meetings has become what the Joint Staff was prior to GNA—I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine (Locher 2005).

JWCA. The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment is the only organizational structure that integrates planning in DOD's resource allocation process. The JWCA process "was created to assist the JROC in the integration of issues and assessment of capabilities that cut across services and functional areas (Lewis et al. 1998, ix). The JWCA process does not focus on organization, but on function. The process through which analytical information is provided to the JROC is based on 11 functional areas:

- Strike
- Land and littoral warfare
- Strategic mobility and sustainability
- Sea, air, and space superiority
- Deter/counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Command and control
- Information warfare
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Regional engagement/presence
- Joint readiness
- Combating terrorism

General Ralston, VCJCS from 1996-2000 explained in a statement before the SASC, March 10, 1999, that the JWCA team consists of "warfighting and functional area experts" from all areas of DOD—the Joint Staff, Unified and Specified Commands, the services, OSD and other DOD agencies, civilians, and servicemembers. Each of the 11 teams is tasked to assess areas where there are programmatic redundancies as well as areas where there is a deficiency in capability.

The question remains, how has the JROC-JWCA affected civil military relations in PPBS? This agency and process have enhanced military advice by including the voice of the "warfighters." Whether or not this voice is being integrated at an appropriate level

⁷³ See <http://www.precisionstrike.org>, for more information about the Precision Strike conferences. Also, see http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/vice_chairman/vc_speech_index.html for a link to General Pace's speech.

is hard to distinguish, but it is undeniable that the CINCs now have at least some access to the PPBS process. Nevertheless, a Rand study finds that that voice is still being drowned out by service parochialism. It reports:

These early insights into the JWCA process reveal that the concept of jointness has not really taken hold in the DoD. The largest challenge the CJCS and the Joint Staff face is extending “jointness” into the services’ investment strategies. Doing this requires challenging the traditional service prerogatives; in some cases, programs and resources will need to be redirected. The insight suggests that the current Joint Staff activities have yet to seriously challenge and break the service “rice bowls” (Lewis et. al. 1998, 44).

At the very least, though, there has been improvement compared to the pre-GNA period.

The Secretary has both an enhanced CJCS as well as the CINCs to directly request information that can act as a counterbalance to information provided by the services. The quality of military advice has improved as a result, but critics agree, it could be better.

For example, James Locher, in a 2005 interview with the author, stated that the GNA changes have allowed the CINCs into the resource allocation process but one of the main documents of that process—the IPLs—have become political devices of the services. The services negotiate their programs with the CINCs (Locher 2005). Nevertheless, prior to GNA, the services determined what the CINCs needed and planned accordingly. After GNA was enacted, they had competition.

General statutory changes in GNA effecting PPBS. Besides the specific provisions in GNA related to resource allocation, there were other less-direct provisions affecting PPBS and resource allocation in general, which had an impact on civil-military relations. These were:

- Empowering the Chairman
- Redefining the distribution of power between the Chairman and Joint Chiefs
- Creating a Vice Chairman and enlarging the Joint Staff

- Improving strategic planning
- Creating the J-8 Directorate

Empowering the Chairman. First of all, GNA increased the role of the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the PPBS process by changing his relationship to OSD and other members of civilian defense leadership. Section 151(b)(1) of the GNA designates the Chairman, not the JCS as a whole, as the principal military advisor to the president, NSA and secretary. This single provision has caused more debate and stirred the ire of those afraid of the development of a general staff than most of the GNA's other provisions. One military insider believes that the consequences of this particular provision on civilian authority are disturbing.

The duties of the commander in Chief demand that he receive a range of alternatives when confronted with matters of national security. Limiting the diversity of advice offered to responsible civilian authority facilitates decisionmaking but reduces the practical exercise of civilian control" (Bourne 1998, 103).

Redefining the distribution of power between the CJCS and Joint Chiefs. In addition to creating the principal military advisor in one person, a major process change was instituted which redefined the relationship between the members of the JCS and the CJCS (Section 151 (d)(1) and (2)). Notably, after the GNA passed, the chiefs' individual opinions became subordinate to the Chairman's.⁷⁴ This is consequential to the PPBS process because prior to GNA, the CJCS had only a moderating role among the chiefs,

⁷⁴ The exact wording is rather explicit. It reads: (d) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman. (1) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. (2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

with very little official power to compel the chiefs in any particular policy direction. In fact, he had virtually no corporate power to affect the PPBS process. After GNA, the advice coming from the JCS was no longer watered down by least-common-denominator decision-making. And the CJCS, with input from the CINCs, became the main military voice furnishing advice to civilian leadership.

Creating a Vice Chairman and enlarging the Joint Staff. The position of Vice Chairman (VCJCS) was created to assist the CJCS when absent or unable to execute his duties. The VCJCS was made to outrank every member of the military except the Chairman. In addition to this new office, the Joint Staff size increased considerably and was placed subordinate not to the JCS as before GNA, but to the Chairman, himself. Increasing the size of the Joint Staff and giving the Chairman an assistant in managing and running it in his absence appreciably increased his power within DOD. The GNA also stipulated that the Chairman and the Vice Chairman could not be from the same military service, thus creating another check to service-centrism.

Improving strategic planning. Another statute made the CJCS responsible to assist the president and Secretary in providing “strategic direction” and “strategic planning” for the military. As discussed in the pre-GNA section, Congress found that military planning lacked a logical link between strategy and resources. So, to bring more attention to strategic planning the legislation stipulated that the President had to submit a national security strategy report annually. The CJCS was made responsible to not only help with strategic planning, but he was responsible to make those plans conform to the resource levels projected by the Secretary. As the 2004 CSIS report notes, much of the responsibility of crafting operational plans that was, prior to GNA, left to the service

staffs is now tasked to the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary for Policy, and the CINCs (Murdock 2004, 16).

Having new agents control the making of strategy from the top down (from the President to his agents) meant that there was greater civilian control. It also meant that with the Under Secretary for Policy assisting the Secretary, “the jealous guarding of the contingency planning by the Joint Chiefs” was less of a problem (Locher 1996, 14). Military advice and civilian control were essentially enhanced with the improved institutional arrangements and relationships, but as the CSIS report concludes, neither the National Security Strategy nor the National Military Strategy establishes a clear set of priorities for making “trade-offs among competing resource demands” (Murdock 2004, 16). Advice improved overall after GNA, but there were still shortcomings in that advice with respect to resource allocation.

Creating the J-8 Directorate. Once GNA was enacted, the responsibilities of the Chairman expanded dramatically. Admiral William J. Crowe, the first JCS Chairman under the new Goldwater-Nichols provisions, saw the need to reorganize the internal structure of the JCS in order to carry out his and his staff’s new roles (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1988, 75). The directorates within the Joint Staff were reorganized and expanded to include 3 new directorates: J-6 (Command, Control and communications); J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate; and J-8 (Force Structure, Resource and Assessment). The creation of the Force Structure, Resources and Assessment directorate (J-8) provided the Chairman with an analytical staff allowing him to wield much more influence over the PPBS system specifically and as a result, DOD’s resource allocation, in general (Salazar 1996, 15).

The J-8, or the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment component of the Joint Staff, provides resource requirements analysis for the Chairman and the JCS. It also analyzes service budgets and programs and represents the CINCs in the PPBS.⁷⁵ Before GNA, the work that the J-8 directorate currently is tasked to do was done within the purview of the services. J-8 is the main directorate in the Joint Staff that does the work by JROC and the JWCA process. The Requirements, Assessment and Integration Division of the J-8 directorate houses the JROC secretariat and is the Vice Chairman's main staff in tapping into the PPBS process. The Program and Budget Analysis Division staff is the JCS Chairman's main source of financial information that feeds into his CPA (Salazar 1996, 15-18). The creation of the J-8 dramatically empowered the Chairman and Vice Chairman in carrying out their resource allocation responsibilities. With the creation of the J-8, a large enough staff was available for the first time to provide the kind of analysis that the Chairman needed to carry out his new mandate.

GNA and Civil-Military Relations in the PPBS process

One of the nine objectives of Goldwater-Nichols reform was to provide for a more efficient use of resources. According to one of the authors of the legislation, the effect of GNA in the efficient use of resources is "barely acceptable, if that—a grade of D" (Locher 2001, 111). General Shalikashvili disagrees. He stated in a National Defense University Symposium in 1996 that the JROC leaders "have enabled us to pay far greater attention to requirements to integrate them better and to influence programmatic issues at the highest levels of the Department of Defense"(Roberts 2003). He gave the

⁷⁵ This and more information about the Joint Staff Directorates can be found on the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education website: <http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil>

performance of GNA's overall effectiveness in resource allocation a "B," but only because he believed the JROC would continue to make progress.

Beyond the effectiveness of GNA in improving the resource allocation process, two other objectives relevant to civil-military relations were to increase civilian control and to improve military advice. Though it was not listed as an explicit objective, the GNA legislation also had the desired effect of keeping service parochialism in greater check. In assigning new resource allocation responsibilities to the CJCS's bailiwick, a more joint and independent budget perspective came into focus (Locher 2001, 108).

Civilian control and getting good advice. "The basic changes which Goldwater-Nichols made in the relationships between the key players in the national military command structure have profoundly affected civilian control" (Bourne 1998, 102). Through understanding and analyzing the effect of the way relationships and processes changed under the new legislation, it becomes apparent that there is sometimes a trade-off between civilian control and getting good advice. As the power of the Chairman increased, the secretariat reduced in size and the Joint Staff began to drive some of the research, analysis, and decision-making that had previously been accomplished within OSD (Bourne 1998, 103).

Overall, however, the new structure that GNA created, particularly in enabling the Chairman to structure the way the Joint Chiefs, the Joint staff, agencies, and anyone under his command operated and related to others, gave more power to the Secretary of Defense to operate, plan, and budget for his department based on the president's National Security Strategy. One of the main problems the Defense secretaries had prior to GNA was that they did not have an independent military source advising them in the resource

allocation process, which tipped some of the resource allocation decision-making power in favor of the services:

The natural consequence has been a heightening of civil-military disagreement, an isolation of OSD, a loss of information critical to effective decisionmaking, and, most importantly, a political weakening of the Secretary of Defense and his OSD staff. The overall result of interservice logrolling has been a highly undesirable lessening of civilian control of the military (U.S. Senate 1985, 620).

After the legislation, with an independent military advisor close to the Secretary, it has put service control more in check. Though there is clear evidence to support the notion that the nature of civilian control has changed since GNA, “No evidence exists to suggest that civilian control of the military, properly understood, has atrophied” (Owens, 1994-95, 83).

Managing service centrism. The ability to manage the services’ control over the PPBS process increased after GNA. In a very broad sense, getting good advice was derived from reorganizing the structure of military leadership so that a joint perspective could finally be realized. The JROC gets its information on which to base decisions from two key sources—the eight committees in the JWCA process and the CINCs. Evidence of a decrease in service power vis-à-vis other DOD agents in the PPBS process is that the services have taken to dispatching “action officers” to the CINCs out in the field prior to the JROC visit, in order to lobby the commander to that services’ perspective (Lennox 1996, 5). This is a complete role reversal from the days when the CINCs had very little influence on PPBS in general, and in fact, had to appeal to the service chiefs to supply their activities. While the Department of Defense remains an agency divided into three, still-powerful military departments, there is a good evidence to suggest that since GNA was enacted, there has been a move to squash service parochialism through the more joint

perspectives offered to the Chairman through JROC and JWCA. Evidence also suggests more reform is needed to continue that trend in the PPBS process.

Conclusions

The effect of GNA on who controls the PPBS is not the subject of many studies. In fact, most of what researchers develop are models of defense spending (e.g. Mintz 1988; Fischer and Crecine 1981; Ostrom 1978). These study outcomes, not the process of DOD decision-making in resource allocation.

Defense planning and budgeting is an important tool in defining civil-military relations. On an abstract and normative level, there *should* be a process for the civilian oversight of military expenditures. But how much is enough? As Feaver writes, the introduction of the PPBS by McNamara, gave civilians a greatly increased capacity to monitor and oversee military policy compared to the system before the Cold War (Feaver 1997a, 11-13). It wasn't, in fact, until the National Security council was established that there was even any interagency oversight of DOD decision-making. But given Huntington's civil-military framework, was the pre-GNA PPBS too intrusive?

The enactment of GNA had an effect on the way civilian leadership monitored and controlled resource allocation (i.e. diminished oversight), but it also had a positive effect on improving military advice—an obvious non-zero-sum tradeoff. The GNA, in effect, increased what Huntington would describe as the military's sphere of objective control, which harmonizes civil-military spheres of influence. Objective control, summarized by Feaver, is “give the military autonomy and the military will do what civilians have asked them to do” (1997a, 7). Most have argued that since GNA, there has

an improvement in the civil-military relations. This argument extends to the PPBS process.

The resource allocation process continues to be scrutinized. According to a 2004 CSIS report, there are still problems with interoperability and redundancies across the services and across missions. And the poor strategic planning problems that the GNA enactors sought to ameliorate are still problems today. “Strategic planning, essential in a world of finite resources and shifting priorities, is poorly connected to program decisions and budgeting” (Murdock et al. 2004, 8), despite the effort Rumsfeld made in 2003 to improve strategic planning. In addition to improving strategic direction, the CSIS report asserts that the CINCs need to be further integrated into the PPBS process, by building Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment directorate capacities into each of the combatant commands (Murdock et al. 2004, 76). In other words, the CINCs have access to the PPBS process, but not the capacity to fully participate. Even the most optimistic agree that the Goldwater-Nichols act started, but did not finish the transformation of the Pentagon’s resource allocation process.

This chapter precedes the following two, Operations and Personnel, because it is in the resource allocation process where the military force and its programs are planned and funded. There is overlap among these 3 substantive areas. For example, planning the force in the PPBS process overlaps with personnel policy—how many and who to recruit or what is the balance between reserve/guard forces vs. active duty, etc. Similarly, there is overlap between PPBS and operations. The way the government plans and funds the military logically overlaps with contingency planning. Or, once the military is deployed, the way operations are managed and the way those operations are funded interact. So,

while there are no actual demarcation lines among resource allocation, operations and personnel issues, they are divided here for analytical purposes. The next chapter moves beyond planning and budgeting to look at how GNA affected civil-military relations in military operations.

4

DOD Operations: Before and After Goldwater-Nichols

But I believe that history has shown us that, by giving up some of their service prerogatives, the service chiefs got back much more than they gave up as Joint Chiefs. And if you look at the most recent war in Iraq, I believe that the capabilities and capacities of the U.S. military on that battlefield were finally the realization of the dream that was the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and going through Desert Shield-Desert Storm, when we were de-conflicted, up until Iraqi Freedom, when we were in fact fighting joint and combined. We had to be forced into that mode.

-General Peter Pace, VCJCS

In Vietnam, the air war was directed in part by the theater commander in Vietnam, in part by the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces in Hawaii. U.S. Army and Air Force units in Europe have difficulty communicating because their systems were developed separately and are not interoperable. Because the Navy and Air Force use different refueling equipment, tanker aircraft of one cannot refuel fighters of the other without an equipment change. Until recently, even that option was not available. Each service has its own model of transport helicopters, and crews are generally not cross-trained.

-Secretary Harold Brown

Our Army should never be put under the necessity of humoring and yielding irretrievable ground to the inevitable minority of malcontents or of permitting governing principals to be influenced by voices from the lunatic fringe, even those which have been elected to Congress.

-S.L.A. Marshall in *Men Against Fire*

Introduction

Five of the Goldwater-Nichols (GNA) objectives were directly related to the management of military operations. These were:

- To improve military advice;
- To clarify the responsibilities of the CINCS for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their command;
- To ensure that the authority of the CINCs is commensurate with their responsibilities;
- To improve the formulation of strategy and contingency planning;
- To enhance the effectiveness of military operations.

In a nutshell, Congress wanted the Department of Defense to reorganize in order to improve the handling of military operations to include changing command structure, and

integrating and unifying operations under a more centralized command—unification, centralization, and integration. As James Locher writes, some [GNA] objectives were more important than others. Congress gave priority to fixing problems in the Defense Department’s operational responsibilities over others (2002, 437-38). This makes sense, as the military’s prime mission is to prepare and engage in war and other operations.

Unification, centralization, and integration are three aspects of defense reorganization that have been attempted since the National Security Act of 1947. Unification has technically been achieved by having all DOD components under a single organization; but as Korb explains, unification in the department existed as a confederation than as a more preferable federal system (1976b, 175-76). Before Goldwater-Nichols, bringing about coordinated military operations was still difficult for the Secretary of Defense.

Centralization was a method of administration more than an actual reorganization—where should certain decisions be made—at the top, or in a more delegated manner? As was apparent in the resource allocation process, Defense secretaries could choose more or less centralization in the way they ran their department. But in planning and deploying for military operations, the stakes are much higher. The theory is that the way a Secretary runs the department during war, whether more or less centralization, can have an impact on the success of the operations during that war. Two opposing examples are Secretaries McNamara, who ran a highly centralized DOD, and Laird whose management style was more participatory (U.S Senate 1985, 79).

Though unification and centralization are essential to the discussion of Defense organization and civil-military relations, it is really in mission integration where the

detailed effects on military operations, namely the decision-making processes and elements of control, can be observed. The Senate Armed Services Committee report on why the defense organization needed to change states that the problems sustained by lack of mission integration among the services results in a decrease in military effectiveness and capabilities (U.S. Senate 1985, 81-82). The report cites the botched Iranian hostage rescue mission, the seizure of the *Pueblo*, and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada as evidence of operational deficiencies resulting from “the failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command” (1985, 7).

Goldwater-Nichols is often cited as the main reason for military successes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. General Colin Powell and others credit the changes made in the Goldwater-Nichols act for operational successes in Panama and Desert Storm. Katherine Boo wrote, “Goldwater-Nichols helped ensure that [Desert Storm] had less interservice fighting, less deadly bureaucracy, fewer needless casualties, and more military cohesion than any major operation in decades” (1991, 31). William Perry in a 1995 speech honoring Senator Nunn said, “[GNA] dramatically changed the way that America’s forces operate by streamlining the command process and empowering the Chairman and the unified commanders. These changes paid off in . . . Desert Storm, in Haiti, and today in Bosnia” (in Locher 1996, 15). General Shalikashvili wrote,

Today, we often take the post-Cold War successes of our armed forces for granted. From Haiti to Bosnia, to the Taiwan Strait, to Liberia, to the skies over Iraq, they have achieved great success at minimal cost in nearly fifty operations since Desert Storm. Quality people, superior organization, unity of command, and considerable skill in joint and combined operations have been central to that achievement. All these factors owe a great debt to the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act (1996, 1).

Because of these attributable successes, Goldwater-Nichols is often used as an exemplar of effective governmental reorganization efforts. For example, CSIS President John Hamre, in a statement before Congress on the 9-11 Commission recommendations said that the intelligence community needs a “Goldwater-Nichols type of reform” (2004, 4).

However successful GNA has been in fixing the processes in the Defense Department that led to operational failures, the question remains, what has been the effect of the legislation on civilian control, military advice, and service management in military operations? Has military advice to civilian leadership been enhanced? Has civilian control diminished? Has Goldwater-Nichols been able to stem service parochialism in the realm of operations?

Definitions and Background

Before beginning a description and analysis it is necessary to delineate the various meanings of military operations. There are debates in the military about how these definitions should be handled in military doctrine. This research, however, is not an exercise in defining what the military considers an operation or operations other than war. The definitions laid out below are merely for the purpose of characterizing the parameters of military operations in this research from a layperson’s perspective.

The cases used in the following section that describe and analyze the effect of GNA on civil-military relations in military operations span the range of combat and non-combat operations and preparing for those operations. These are simply war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). War is combat. MOOTW, while focused more on deterring wars and/or promoting peace, may or may not include combat (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001, I-2).

In general, the military services, themselves, do not plan or perform operations—at least, not at the strategic level. According to U.S. Code, the services’ missions are to organize, train and equip their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines respectively, for use in operations that are governed by the Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs, officially renamed Combatant Commanders). Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols act, the services were independent agents working together in a loose confederation to perform military operations. The National Security Act of 1947 was instituted in order to stem service autonomy and the lack of interoperability and cross-service communication that existed before, up to, and during World War II. But one does not need to go as far back as the Army-Navy rivalry during the Spanish-American War or the lack of Army-Navy communication prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor to find examples of operational insularity across the Department of Defense. Post-World War military operations are full of remarkable illustrations.

During the Korean war, Marine pilots, against the authority of Air Force commanders, rescued Marines they felt the Air Force had abandoned. During the 12 years U.S. troops were in Vietnam, the services ran five separate air wars but only one significant joint operation. During Desert One,⁷⁶ “there were four commanders at the scene without visible identification, incompatible radios and no agreed-upon plan, not even a designation location for the commander” (Kyle 1990, 283). In the Beirut barracks bombing, the Marine Corps Commandant blamed the attack on the theater commander (European Command) who was in charge of the Marine detachment’s operations, and the theater commander blamed the Marine Corps from which, he said, the detachment

⁷⁶ Desert One or Operation Eagle Claw is the name given for the Iranian hostage rescue mission.

received most of its support.⁷⁷ In Grenada, Commander James Metcalf had difficulty getting the Army and Navy to even support the operation (Boo 1991, 31 and Besson 1998, 17-20). These are just a few examples of problems with mission integration under pre-Goldwater-Nichols conditions.

Grenada, or Operation Urgent Fury, was used as a definitive example, particularly among those pushing for defense reform, of a military poorly organized for conditions of modern war. Though Urgent Fury was largely a success in that its objectives had been met, most agreed there had been too many major problems for such a small operation. These included a lack of accurate maps and intelligence, casualties resulting from accidents and fratricide, lack of interoperability in communications among the services, inappropriate tactics, and rumors of breakdowns in discipline (Lovelace 1996, 6-7).⁷⁸ Sam Nunn, writing about Operation Urgent Fury, claimed that despite the overall achievement of goals, “the U.S. armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada” (1985, 15). Urgent Fury provoked continued unrest and was one instigating factor in the move to reform and reorganize the

⁷⁷ Huntington elaborates, “One of the most peculiar, frightening things was the problem of pinning down responsibility for what happened. In the end the President said it was really his responsibility, which meant that it was no one’s responsibility, and that, in fact, is an extraordinary conclusion. It was obviously reinforced by the fact that a Marine detachment was at the Beirut airport, the commander of which had to report up through this very complicated chain of command to the Sixth Fleet and then to European Command headquarters to General Bernard W. Rogers, SACEUR. General P.X. Kelly, Commandant of the Marine Corps said, “I am chartered by law to organize, train and equip the U.S. Marine Corps. We hand forces over to the operational command for its use” (Huntington 1986, 3).

⁷⁸ William Lind of the Military Reform Institute wrote of Operation Urgent Fury, “The United States required seven battalions of troops, plus elements of two other battalions, to defeat fewer than 700 Cubans and a Grenadian army that hardly fought at all. Only about 200 of the Cubans were troops; the remainder were construction workers with some militia training. The overwhelmingly superior U.S. forces took three days to defeat the Cuban defense and about another five days to secure the entire island” (Lind 1984, 2-5). Beyond critiquing the performance of Army special ops units, Lind also cites poor military planning and the resolve of the JCS to use all four services [“just as in the Iran hostage rescue mission”] (Lovelace 1996, 51).

Department of Defense. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in testimony before Congress said,

...in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation (in U.S. Senate 1985, III).

Here, Secretary Schlesinger touches on one of the three measures of civil-military relations analyzed in this study: good advice. Because the Joint Chiefs had to come to a consensus prior to the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, and did so with no single authority among them to referee and compel compromise, joint guidance to the President on military operations was “a system of marriage agreements, truces and watered down advice” (Locher 1988, 148).

Locher defines two types of military advice: informal and formal. Generally speaking, informal military advice prior to Goldwater-Nichols was adequate. This was advice the civilian leadership sought out from the Chairman or any member of the JCS on an individual basis (1988, 148-150). Formal advice was the “official” advice that was the result of what the JCS worked through in their meetings together. Formal advice was poor and virtually ignored and as a result did not play much of a role in Defense decision-making (Locher 1988, 150). Since the only good advice coming from the military was from individuals who were also representing a vested interest in their service, there was a complete lack of joint perspective. This lack of jointness is one of the most cited reasons why U.S. forces suffered many near or complete operational failures since World War II.

Compare the above examples to today's operational environment. In a January 20, 2005 American Forces Press Service report, Brigadier General Carter Hamm, commander of the Joint Task Force-Olympia in Mosul, Iraq, said

When I joined the Army, you seldom even saw a member of another service. Now I have platoons go out, and they may have a Navy SEAL with them, an Air Force Forward air controller and a Marine air proving air cover. And the young lieutenants and sergeants think that's normal.

The General's comment gets to the heart of how operations are performed in the post-GNA military.

Though there are abundant studies, reports, memoirs, and other references discussing the effects of the GNA legislation on military operations, those studies do not analyze the effects of the legislation on civil military relations: getting good advice, managing the services, and maintaining civilian control. In the previous chapter about resource allocation, it became apparent that, despite the new decision-making processes introduced over the past 20 years, service perspectives still wield considerable power over planning and budgeting decision-making. This is not the case with military operations. In fact, civil-military relations by many measures were enhanced by Goldwater-Nichols.

Civil-Military Relations in Military Operations Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act

Most of the reforms instituted in the GNA were not new concepts and had been attempted in previous reorganization attempts. For example, many of the GNA provisions related to changing the relationships among the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman, and the Secretary were aggressively pursued by Eisenhower after he was elected president. Eisenhower wanted to enhance civilian control by empowering the Secretary and the

civilian secretariats of each military department. He also wanted to improve the efficacy and accuracy of military advice by shifting command responsibilities away from the Joint Chiefs to the unified commanders. Eisenhower felt this was necessary because the National Security Act of 1947 left the roles and missions division of labor among the services ambiguous. Shortly after the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, Secretary Forrestal attempted to clear up the resulting roles and missions muddle by gathering the Joint Chiefs in Key West, Florida in March of 1948. The result of this meeting was a document delimiting which service would be the executive agent over what military function. This document, the "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (otherwise known as the Key West Agreement) remained in force until Eisenhower's reorganization attempts (Canan 1992, 10). In his Reorganization Plan No. 6 letter to Congress, Eisenhower explained that the Key West provisions were outdated:

The provision of the Key West agreement, under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff designate one of their members as an executive agent for each unified command, has led to considerable confusion and misunderstanding with respect to the relationship of the [JCS] to the Secretary of Defense, and the relationship of the military chief of each service to the civilian Secretary of his military department (U.S. Department of Defense 1978, 151-2).

He directed the Secretary of Defense to fix this confusion by delineating the operational command from the President down through civilian leadership in each military department. Again taken from his Reorganization No. 6 letter to Congress, he wrote that the Secretary would designate an executive agent from one of the services for each unified command. With this new relationship, the chain of command begins with the President, and then goes to the Secretary, then to the civilian head of each military department (U.S. Department of Defense 1978, 152), circumventing the JCS.

Eisenhower's continued efforts to push Defense reform beyond Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 culminated in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which demonstrated a shift in his views on how to increase civilian control over the operational chain of command. Rockefeller's standing advisory committee issued recommendations to Eisenhower just prior to his state of the union address in 1958. One of these recommendations proposed "running the chain of control from the President through the Secretary of Defense (and Joint Chiefs of Staff) directly to commanders of each unified force, rather than through the service Secretaries" (Eisenhower 1963, 244).

This recommendation was basically the same line of command that was enacted in Goldwater-Nichols years later, but with one major exception—the position that the Chairman of the JCS held with respect to the service chiefs. Eisenhower wanted to enhance the Chairman's executive position by, among other provisions, giving him the equivalent of an independent vote on decisions derived during meetings (Parlier 1989, 40-61). Unfortunately Congress disagreed when enacting the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act by circumscribing the Chairman's authority over JCS proceedings to the extent that some of his responsibilities were diminished even over the gains made in the 1953 reorganization plan. In particular, his unqualified authority to manage the joint staff was redefined with the Congressional⁷⁹ addition of the words, 'on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs' to the act's text (Lynn 1985, 175). Eisenhower's vision of having an independent leader of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was never realized.

⁷⁹ Major congressional opposition over increasing the Chairman's power came from the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson (Democrat) who had been a member of Congress beginning in 1914 and the Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee from 1931-1941. In Eisenhower's memoirs, he said that Vinson wanted to maintain control of the military himself, but Vinson in testimony spoke of the possibility of a Prussian General staff with the creation of a powerful and independent Chairman. He feared the erosion of civilian control and therefore struck down Eisenhower's provisions to

As a result of the 1958 act redrawing the command lines from the President through the Secretary (being advised by the JCS) to the CINCs, an attempt to avoid service control was not realized because the JCS remained bound to their service agendas, traditions and indoctrination. William Lynn describes the situation succinctly:

[T]he service chief's power and stature within the joint arena, the defense department, and before the Congress, derive primarily from the resources and personnel that he controls as the military leader of his service. Moreover, in formulating joint positions, a service chief relies on the staff that works exclusively and directly for him—the service staff, which itself has strong incentives to ensure that important service interests are not sacrificed in the joint forum. Since the 1953 and 1958 reforms did nothing to alter these organizational realities, they had little effect on the character or content of JCS decisionmaking (1985, 177).

Civilian control over the chain of command lost out over the service chiefs retaining control over the formal advice offered by JCS to the Secretary. What Eisenhower worked to prevent was left in tact—the CINCs remained bound to service whims.

In an April 3, 1958 speech, Eisenhower proclaimed, “I have often seen the evils of diluted command... Forces must be assigned to the command and be removed only by central direction—by the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief—and not by orders of individual military departments” (Eisenhower 1963, 251). Though the 1958 act divided the operational vs. administrative function of the military—the former to be governed by the CINCs, the latter by the services—the change was merely cosmetic. After all, in operational settings, component commanders did (could) not forget that they were funded, supplied, equipped, and promoted by their service chief and not the CINC under which they were taking orders. General David Jones explains, “my chief had much

enhance the chairman's power (Parlier 1989). He put up a similar fight in 1949 during that year's defense reorganization for the same reason – fear of creating a general staff.

more influence on me and my command than did the joint system” (U.S. Senate 1983-84, 142).

Though much of the above discussion focuses on civilian control in operational matters, it becomes increasingly clear that the concept of civilian control is closely related to the other two measures of civil-military relations—getting good advice and stemming service parochialism. And even more so than in resource allocation, it seems that good advice and managing the services are highly and inversely correlated. As service parochialism decreases, good advice increases, and visa versa.

The issue of interservice rivalry or “servicism” is central to the discussion of defense reorganization. The other two variables, in a way, hinge on it. If the services are able to wield much of the power they did before the Department of Defense was established, and if they have managed to dodge many of the legislative fences that were meant to trammel their authority over resource allocation and operations, then civilian control is insufficient and military advice will not necessarily reflect the good of the whole nor the needs of national defense.


In the years since Eisenhower’s attempt to reorganize the military command structure, there were a number of new realities that affected the way military operations could effectively be performed. First of all, technological advances in air power and the services’ subsequent vying for the air piece of the military’s strategic triad made selecting a single air force impossible. After the Key West agreement, there were essentially two armies (Army and Marine Corps), two transportation forces (Navy and Air Force) and four air forces (Dyche 1990, 4-20). The situation was also true for U.S. strategic forces and who would be the lead service in procuring, advancing and using new nuclear

technologies. Beyond the technology debates, though, the security environment was changing. Eisenhower recognized that the military had to be more prepared to respond to a nuclear threat that could come with little warning (Bell 2004, 3).

During the years between the 1958 act and Goldwater-Nichols legislation, there were numerous reports commissioned by each administration with consistent conclusions about the need to reform the JCS and the relationships among civilian and military leadership and the operational command. While Congress largely ignored these reports (with the exception of the Packard Commission and the CSIS reports), they could not so easily disregard the equally consistent deficiencies of the U.S. armed forces engaged in operations abroad.

Cases used in the analysis. Below, six cases of military operations are analyzed—three before Goldwater-Nichols was enacted and three after. The case selection reflects operational successes and failures pre-and post-GNA, large and small operations pre-and post-GNA, pre- and-post Cold War operations, and variation in personalities of military and civilian leadership. Figure 4.1 represents these cases on a timeline.

Figure 4-1. Time line of cases analyzed




Good advice, service management and civilian control during the Vietnam War. It is not difficult to find studies of operational problems and command structure failures during the Vietnam War. The focus of this section, however, is not on operational failure

per se, but on civil-military structures leading to some kind of outcome—who was in control of what decisions, what roles did the services and the JCS make in those decisions and how well was the advice getting to civilian leadership? In general, how did the organizational structure of the Defense Department affect these processes?

Service Management. One of the clearest examples of service parochialism was the command structure during the Vietnam War. Due to the covert, incremental and (anti-) insurgent nature of U.S. involvement and type of conflict in Vietnam, the command structure “was not the hierarchical one used in World War II and Korea but an autonomous application of forces by the various military services” (McNamara 1994, 101). The theater commander was CINCPAC (or Commander in Chief, Pacific Command), but in early 1962 the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established that was essentially an operational headquarters that could direct combat operations (Moymer 1978, 98-99). This is important to note because MACV was essentially an Army-run organization and its commander, General Harkin (who would be replaced by General William Westmorland in June 1964), felt that the Vietnam conflict was basically an insurgency movement, which favored a land war of which the Army should be in charge (Moymer 1978, 99-100). MACV needed airpower, but the Pacific Air Forces did not want to relinquish command of their forces to MACV and decided instead to transfer operational command of its 13th Air Force aircraft to the 2nd Air Division (the 2nd Air Division eventually became the 7th Air Force). In sum, “the three service components existed at two different command levels” (McNamara 1994,101). See Figure 4.2 for an overview of the operational chain of command. The MACV Commander, General Westmoreland, described this command structure and its consequences:

Creating a unified command for all of Southeast Asia would have gone a long way toward mitigating the unprecedented centralization of authority in Washington...Instead of five commanders...CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam, there would have been one man directly answerable to the President on everything. Although that kind of organization might have created ripples within the service-conscious Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs traditionally fall in line when the Commander in Chief speaks. Such an arrangement would have eliminated the problem of coordination between the air and ground wars that was inevitable with CINCPAC managing one, MACV the other (Westmoreland 1976, 411).

Figure 4-2. Theater Command and Control in Vietnam⁸⁰



⁸⁰ The organizational chart is taken from (Lane 1981, 111) and the map from (Sbrega 1990, 412). Dashed lines on the map refer to administrative lines of command and unbroken lines refer to operational lines of command. The numbers on the map refer to the following: 1. Commander of Military Assistance, Vietnam (MACV) is also the commander U.S. Army Vietnam. 2. MACV was responsible for route I air war in North Vietnam. 3. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) was responsible for Rout II, III, IV and VIB air war in North Vietnam. 4. Pacific Air Forces were responsible for route VI and VIA air war in North Vietnam and Laos (McNamara 1994, 102). The map in this figure shows the major air bases and 4 tactical zones.

Just as the overall command of the war was divided into two competing structures, command of airpower used during the war was even more convoluted. The Air Force deployed its 7th Air Force Command, but also the Strategic Air Command (SAC) “attached” B-52 units to MACV headquarters. MACV did not command SAC aircraft, but only nominated targets for SAC bombers. The SAC Commander in Chief actually coordinated targeting activities not with MACV, but with the CINC of the Pacific Command (McNamara 1994, 103-104).

The Navy component operational chain of command went from the CINC of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC) through the Pacific Fleet Commander (CINCPACFLT) to the 7th Fleet commander to Task Force 77. Commanders of the Air Force’s 7th Division coordinated air activities with the Navy’s Task Force 77 through their component commanders. The division of labor between Air Force and Navy components was decided by dividing up North Vietnam into seven areas of which four would be operated by the Navy from aircraft carriers and the remaining three by the Air Force. On an ad hoc basis, however, command of the Navy’s Task Force 77, was transferred to MACV for operations in South Vietnam (McNamara 1994, 107), which increased confusion about who controlled which airpower components, when, and for what purpose.

The Army maintained an almost absolute control over helicopter assault operations and denied repeated requests from the Air Force to share its command. This became a problem because, as General Momyer notes, “the large number of aircraft sorties and the absolute necessity to counter enemy ground fire during helicopter assaults demanded unified planning and control” (1976, 92).

Over time, the separate command structure of the air campaigns became unsustainable. In 1968, General Westmoreland proposed that one individual should command the air assets supporting the ground forces in the northernmost region of the war (I Corps⁸¹). At the time there were 3 air operations in the area, each with their own control system: the 1st Marine Air Wing, the 7th Air Force, and Navy aircraft outside of MACV's jurisdiction⁸² (Webb 1993-94, 89-91). Westmoreland's proposal was vehemently opposed by the Marine Corps leadership who did not want to see that zone's amphibious force stripped of the control over its air resources (Webb 1993-94, 92). The Marine Corps also argued that it was not doctrinally sound. The single manager plan was implemented despite Marine Corps opposition with General Momyer as commander early in 1968. Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Leonard Chapman took the issue to the Joint Chiefs. The JCS split their opinion about the necessity and legality of the single airpower manager for I Corps—the Chairman of the JCS and Air Force Chief of Staff were in favor and the Chief of Staff of the Army⁸³ and Chief Naval Officer were opposed. The opinions were forwarded to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for review. Eventually the joint management system was settled by OSD and it proved to be one of the more efficient command structures in Vietnam but nevertheless remained a sore spot for the Marine Corps (Trest 1986, 68).

⁸¹ The Marine Corps controlled I Corps. The other 3 corps were controlled by the Army. With the Tet Offensive and the defense of Khe Sanh, the Army Corps moved North and coordination of all of the individually commanded units became problematic. In some cases multiple units attacked targets separately while other targets were ignored (Pearson 1995, 22).

⁸² There was also a division of South Vietnamese Army aircraft operating in the same area.

⁸³ The Army Chief opposed Westmoreland's proposition because he feared the it would set a precedent that would allow Air Force to eventually take over Army helicopters (Pearson 1995, 22).

At play here, beyond the obvious turf battle, is the legacy of the Key West agreement that protected the integrity of the service component command vs. unified command structures. The language of that agreement is as follows:

Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the Service component commanders...Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the Service components or other subordinate commands” (in U.S. Senate 1985, 308).

Guided by this precedent, service component commanders during the Vietnam War “became powers with whom the multiservice commander conducts negotiations as equals more than as subordinates” (Cushman 1986, 3-58).

A service-centered control of command during operations was absolutely contradictory to what Eisenhower had intended in his attempts to reorganize Defense. There was no counterbalance to the power that the services had in conducting and controlling activities during military operations. Part of this problem was that the services indeed fought to maintain command and control of their resources, but the other part was that the service chiefs wielded substantial influence over operational commanders whom they appoint, promote, and supply. The CINCs did not have the authority, even during operations that they commanded, to override service prerogatives, especially when a) service command and control influence was protected by *de facto* practices and, given the Key West agreement, was protected by statutory authority and b) operational commanders are wholly dependent upon their service for the resources they need to carry out their operations (U.S. Senate 1985, 307). The Senate Armed Services Committee asked all six CINCs if the Key West decisions “overly” restricted the authority over the service-component commanders under their chain of command. Five of

the six CINCs not surprisingly said no, but the CINC of the Pacific Command responded thusly:

Although this [Key West] organization is intended to optimize wartime employment of combat forces furnished by the Services, it does go to some length to protect the integrity of the individual Service operations within multi-Service operational commands. In doing so, it places certain limits on the authority of the unified commander that could affect efficient operations (combat or otherwise) (U.S. Senate 1985, 308).

Civilian Control and Getting Good Advice. Many (both in and outside of military circles) would argue that there was too much civilian control during the Vietnam War. Military leadership differed with the President about the purpose and conduct of the war. For example, military leadership wanted to call up the reserves, but Johnson would not, and in fact capped ground forces at just over half a million. Military leadership also favored an all-out aggressive air war, while Johnson favored a gradual approach that he hoped would force the North Vietnamese to negotiate rather than fight (Desch 1999, 27-28).

The difference in the advice the Joint Chiefs gave and the direction Johnson took in the war became so obvious that on August 27, 1967 the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigation subcommittee questioned McNamara on why the President refused JCS advice on a multitude of strategic issues. McNamara's response to the committee amounted to a public repudiation of the Joint Chiefs handling of the war and sparked a reaction that nearly ended in the resignation of the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff. The incident was widely publicized.

Some argue that Johnson's frequent contravention of military advice, when he approved and disapproved bombing targets for example, was *not* overly intrusive into military affairs and that, in fact, the mistakes made in Vietnam emanated from a

decidedly weak civilian control (Cohen 2002, 185). In one of the most detailed and articulate studies of Vietnam's air war, Mark Clodfelter (1989), argues that Johnson's so-called interference into target approval is overstated—he approved most of the military's selections anyway. Eliot Cohen continues from that fact and explains that on those occasions that Johnson did not approve a target it was because he feared Chinese retaliation—a reprisal he felt the military either misunderstood or underestimated.

The argument against [Johnson and McNamara's] style of civilian leadership would be infinitely stronger if one could adduce evidence that Johnson's professional military advisors had a better idea of how to fight the war. That they supported the war we know. That they favored waging it more aggressively we also know. But one searches in vain for evidence that they had any strategic concept other than more intense bombing or the dispatch of even more men to the fighting front (Cohen 2002, 177-78).

It is argued that too much latitude over military operations and developing a war strategy was afforded to General Westmoreland during the years he served as commander of the MACV. His lack of training and incorporating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) into the overall war strategy was of notable concern, but he was never called to task for it. In fact, as Cohen points out, McNamara's and Johnson's scrutiny of the way Westmoreland handled the war focused more on the "level of effort being made, not on its fundamental direction" (2002, 181-84). The additional example of General John Lavelle, commander of the Seventh Air Force, also exemplifies a lack of civilian control. He essentially changed the rules of engagement (rules formed by civilian leadership) from a "protective reaction strike" (engaging the enemy after being fired on) to one of preemption (U.S. Senate 1985, 39). Though this activity did not last long, it did involve the falsification of reports by Lavelle's staff.

The issue of civilian control in Vietnam War operations is not a clear one. While many have argued Johnson micromanaged the war (i.e. bombing target approval, setting rules of engagement, limiting numbers of sorties, etc.), others point to Johnson's hands-off approach to Westmoreland's command as an example of too much military control over policy. Perhaps the issue is not that the civilians did or did not micromanage or that the military did or did not shirk its statutory responsibilities. A more reasonable explanation is that there was a leadership vacuum (Cameron 1989, 67-70). Johnson should have continuously oriented the military on political objectives. Since he did not, he left the military to resort to its own objectives—win the war by increasing its intensity.⁸⁴ The civilian leadership's lack of strategic formulation, its inability to pick the right generals and to elicit working dialogues with them contributed to this vacuum. These problems coupled with the compartmentalization of the command structure meant the individual services vied for their share of command⁸⁵ and were not a unified force in service under a unified, civilian-derived strategy. Though the services had more leeway to operate the war, it does not necessarily follow that there was a willful lack of civilian control. There was clearly a problem with organization.

Creating interservice rivalries has always been a rudimentary type of civilian control. Though there seems no evidence to support the notion that Johnson and OSD were playing the services off of each other, the result was still the same—diffused power.

⁸⁴ For example, lack of strategic direction and oversight of MACV conduct on the part of the Johnson administration allowed the military to use the doctrine of search and destroy. This was, in essence, a national military strategy. Its goal was to kill communist communities/forces before they could recruit and enlarge. The result of this doctrine was that it focused on civilians, villages, and people, disrupting the security of the Vietnamese people and destroying any chance for nation building by U.S. involvement. The overall goal of "freeing" South Vietnam became impossible (Avant 1994, 69-71).

⁸⁵ Luttwak writes, "Each service and almost every one of its branches and subbranches had to have its fair share of the extra war funds and extra war promotions. For the services, any participation in the war meant

The short-hand theory is that the services are too busy staking and expanding their claim on Defense missions and resources to become dangerously political and intrusive into civilian decision-making. Regardless of the intent, however, the services were competing for a share of operational command in Vietnam. Though civilian control may not have been in serious jeopardy during the Vietnam War, the lack of a unifying force to control service rivalry perpetuated servicism and decreased good advice:

...inter-service rivalry creates a lack of objective analysis, emphasizes expediency to gain resources, and weakens the ideal of anonymity, discretion and military subservience. Such a situation is not compatible with the military role of advising on military security policy. Inter-service rivalry reflects a perceived need to emphasize self-preservation because of a lack of trust and confidence in political institutions. The weakness of the Secretary of Defense and corporate JCS in developing and recommending...priorities for national strategy has furthered the perception that the services must fend for themselves (Cameron 1989, 69-70).

This was certainly the case in Vietnam. As Admiral Moorer said in testimony about his experience in Vietnam before the House Armed Services Committee,⁸⁶ “here was a conflict wherein the personnel were never really sure of what the national objectives were.” As was the case in resource allocation, military planners found it difficult to provide accurate advice in the PPBS process when they functioned in a strategic vacuum.

With civilian control out of balance, getting good military advice fell short. First of all, getting advice up the chain of command, through the various command ports that existed, proved unworkable. As one analyst writes, during the Vietnam War, “commanders had limited, disjointed, and uncoordinated access to the Johnson administration” (Winters 1999, 18). While the argument is often made that stovepiped

some expansion, and for their officers, a tour in Vietnam was certainly ‘career enhancing’ even if it was only for six months and far from combat” (1984, 24).

lines of communication stifled access to good advice, there was also the problem with the way the military leadership was organized with respect to generating good advice. The 1985 U.S. Senate report *Defense Organization: The Need for Change* argues that the JCS had habitually paid excessive deference to service interests (163). This meant that service interests were balanced out to the detriment of potentially more effective alternatives. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services committee both James Schlesinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that the services demand their “cut of the action” (U.S. Senate 1985, 163). In Vietnam, this was disastrous. Luttwak writes:

By 1968 there were 110 generals and admirals actually in Vietnam...All were eager to help win the war by well-made plans and clever schemes, but none was empowered to decide—everything had to be mediated, compromised, and ‘sold.’ Such procedures are perfectly appropriate in the management of a well-established and very secure business corporations. Amidst the urgencies of war, they were tragically inappropriate (Luttwak 1984, 28).

Previdi argues that the way military leadership was structured makes it “easy for distorted information to get to the president and the secretary of defense (Previdi 1988, 125). The result in the case of Vietnam is that the JCS failed to tell their civilian leaders that the war could not be won with the strategy those leaders had selected (Previdi 1988, 94).

Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission (Eagle Claw). Another example where command and control structures failed was during the Iranian Hostage Rescue mission, otherwise known as Operation Eagle Claw or Desert One. The mission was a decided failure for numerous reasons, but the command and control issues demonstrate specific civil-military problems. The obstacles encountered during the operation were not necessarily related to civilian control or good advice, however. According to Admiral Holloway in

⁸⁶ Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee, 98th Congress. 1st Sess. June 14, 23 and 29, 1983, p. 110 and 224.

the JCS-commissioned *Special Operations Review Group Report*, civilian control by the President was not a problem. He wrote “command and control was excellent at the upper echelons” (Holloway 1980, 3). Carter had put Brzezinski in control of the operation and that control was unquestioned (Flynt 1995, 5-9). Brzezinski’s team included the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General David Jones whose role was to consolidate military advice. Command relationships at lower levels, however, “were not clearly emphasized in some cases and were susceptible to misunderstanding under pressure” (Holloway 1980, 3).

The most damaging criticism leveled at the operation was that the services were adamant about participating. Brzezinski presented his view on the operation to the Senate Armed Services Committee: “One basic lesson is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force used. Every force wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration” (U.S. Senate 1985, 361). Paul Ryan in his book *Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed* recounts Major General John Singlaub on a 1982 BBC program answer an interviewer question about the use of all services during Eagle Claw. Singlaub stated, “There were some political considerations. I think that an effort was made to get all of the services involved” (Ryan 1985, 132). Even in the more conservative Holloway report there is criticism about the use of Marine Corps pilots for long-range missions vis-à-vis using the more logical Air Force option. He wrote,

During this period, USAF pilot resources included 114 qualified H-53 pilots...96 were current in long-range flight and aerial refueling. These USAF pilots, more experienced in the mission profiles envisioned for the rescue operation, would have probably progressed more rapidly than pilots proficient in the basic weapons system but trained in a markedly different role (Holloway 1980, 35).

Essentially, the report explains that both Air Force and Marine Corps pilots would have had to learn new skills to fly the helicopters from the aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea to a refueling location 600 miles outside of Tehran. The Air Force pilots would have had to learn how to fly a slightly different helicopter; The Marine Corps pilots would have had to learn a very different mission type. Based on a study the military concluded nearly two decades prior to Eagle Claw, the military knew that “learning new and vastly different complex mission skills is far more difficult than transitioning to an aircraft of similarly design and performance characteristics” (Holloway 1980, 35). Secretary Schlesinger concurred with Holloway’s findings in a May 6, 1980 *New York Times* article where he wrote, “...the helicopter link could have been strengthened by drawing on proved equipment and on experience” (A27). Given this knowledge prior to the operation, why were Marine Corps helicopter pilots used?

According to the 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee report, the Marine Corps had no other role in Eagle Claw. Marine Corps helicopter pilots were not chosen for their clear advantage in mission success (because there was no absolute advantage), but more probably because they would not have otherwise participated (U.S. Senate 1985, 362).⁸⁷

To be sure, the services’ desire to put their mark on any given operation was only one of many problems with the operation and why it resulted in not only failure but also the deaths of several servicemembers and the loss of military equipment and intelligence.

⁸⁷ This is minimizing the issue slightly. The U.S. Marine Corps did have a skill set advantage over the Air Force in that the former were more experienced in flying rescue missions. Even so, it was quite clear that Air Force pilots, with much more experience flying longer missions that required refueling, would have been the better choice given the operational parameters (see Schlesinger’s article in the May 6, 1980 *New York Times*, A27).

The operation itself was unusually complicated: There was no centralized command and communications were poor, and in some cases non-existent, because of excessive secrecy (Cogan 2003, 214); a reluctant-to-use force President Carter put strict limitations on the operation's scale;⁸⁸ the military had to rely on CIA intelligence and arrangements once the special operations units arrived near Tehran; and the helicopter pilots hit a major dust storm before reaching their refueling point. All of these and other factors led to operational failure, but most would agree that failure hinged on the helicopter issues and the lack of a unified command structure. Many historians and military analysts agree that total failure could have been avoided, or at least reduced, if the military would not have been so reliant on service compartmentalization. As with the Vietnam case, this compartmentalization "was nothing more than the fracturing of the force along principally service lines" (Flynt 1995, 44). There were thirteen different military elements utilized in the mission and four major commanders in control of those elements representing all services but the Navy.

As one military historian writing about Operation Eagle Claw notes, with Goldwater-Nichols everything changed. "Goldwater-Nichols spelled the end of the large independence that the various branches of service had enjoyed" (Cogan 2003, 216). The implication is that the lack of command unity had a direct impact on the operational outcome.

Operation Urgent Fury: Grenada. Grenada represents a case that was, unlike the two cases outlined above, an operational success. This success was, to some extent, the result of lessons learned from Eagle Claw. However, *like* the previous two cases, it

⁸⁸ Secretary of State Cyrus Vance disagreed with the use of force to extract the hostages and in general disagreed with Brzezinski. The decision to use force in Eagle Claw was no exception. Vance resigned in

represents troubles with command and control derived from service centrism. But there seemed a qualitative difference between the service centrism of Eagle Claw compared to Urgent Fury. In Eagle Claw, the services pushed for inclusion in the operation, even when alternatives may have proved more effective. Though there were rumors of this happening in the planning process of the Grenada operation (see the Report to the Congressional Military Reform Caucus: The Grenada Operation, otherwise known as the Lind report), there is evidence to suggest the decision to use both the Army and the Marine Corps for ground units was made out of expediency.⁸⁹

Overall, the problems with Urgent Fury, as with the Iranian hostage rescue mission, were related to the compartmentalization of the forces operating. The direct result of this phenomenon in Grenada was that intelligence and communications were severely limited. The southern Army units could not communicate with the northern Marine Corps units, for example, which was not problematic until the units operated in close proximity. Given that fact, it is not surprising that there were reported cases of casualties due to friendly fire.

The inability of the services to communicate, due to the lack of interoperability of equipment, was one of the most cited problems during the operation. When wanting to coordinate Naval gunfire, for example, the Army units on the ground were unable to communicate with the Naval crafts offshore. In a telling anecdote, “one Army officer was so frustrated in his efforts to communicate with the Navy ships that he used his AT&T

protest over Carter’s decision to rescue the hostages.

⁸⁹ The rumor of kowtowing to service demands comes from the fact that the CINC of the Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) had originally planned for the operation to be done entirely by a Marine Amphibious Unit. After JCS review of this plan, it was decided that the Marines should take the Northern half of Grenada and the Army the Southern half. The JCS argued against the Lind report stating that the CINCLANT, himself, decided that there were not enough Marine units to complete the mission (Schemmer 1984, 12-14).

calling card to place a call on an ordinary civilian pay telephone to his office at Ft. Bragg in an attempt to coordinate fire support” (U.S. Senate 1985, 365). This is one among many seemingly outrageous stories of restricted communications among the services. The problems with interoperability in radio communications led to needless civilian and servicemember casualties⁹⁰ (Cole 1999, 58).

Despite the fact that Urgent Fury was deemed a mission success, the operation failed to convince Congress that interoperability and a unified command could be self-imposed. The 1985 Senate report sums it up:

The lack of understanding on the part of very senior commanders in all Services about the capabilities, assets and tactics of the other Services resulted in serious shortcomings [during the Grenada operation]. Far more attention must be paid to joint operations because employment of force by the United States in all but the most unusual circumstances will be joint (U.S. Senate 1985, 370).

The Grenada operation was viewed in Congress, especially among those fomenting the reorganization effort, as evidence that a major operational disaster could happen if the Defense department was not reorganized to reflect the growing need for more command unity. Many, including some in the military, felt that Grenada was successful because of the use of overwhelming force and some luck.

Civil-Military Relations in Military Operations After the Goldwater-Nichols Act

As the following analysis will demonstrate, there was indeed an impact on civilian control, getting good advice, and diminishing service centrism with the passage

⁹⁰ The Grenada conflict resulted in over 100 dead and 530 wounded: 19 killed and 116 wounded U.S. troops; 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 captured Cuban troops; 45 killed and 358 wounded Grenadian troops; and 24 killed Grenadian civilians (Cole 1997, 6).

of the Goldwater-Nichols act. Much of the Goldwater-Nichols debates related to these measures focused on the position of the Chairman of the JCS. The act attempted to fix the following problems:

- JCS advice was of dubious value;
- Unanimity among the JCS members was required on the one hand but on the other hand, the service chiefs were unable to produce objective advice because of their dual-hat responsibilities;
- Servicemism prevented the JCS from addressing contentious issues.

Goldwater-Nichols made the chairman, and not the JCS as a whole, the *principal* military advisor, under no authority other than the president and the secretary to provide that advice any way he wants. The exact wording of the act is,

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense...

In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of-
(A) the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
(B) the commanders of the unified and specified combatant (U.S. House 1986, 15).

The question, however, of whether measures of civil-military relations have increased or decreased as a result of the GNA provisions, is still under debate. For example, some have successfully argued that after the Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, civilian control actually diminished. A newly independent JCS Chairman now controls the means and production of military advice. He has the authority to prevent dissent and the ability to impede alternative advice by either not offering some opinions to the President or Secretary, or by advocating for or against certain options. Before the GNA, he had no such authority.

While the Chairman's increased power may (or may not) have an effect on civilian control, it should have the effect of increasing the quality of advice. Because advice is no longer based on service logrolling, lowest common denominator bargaining, and service-centrism, that advice can represent a more unified or more objective perspective. Just as with civilian control, though, the closer scrutiny of data available indicates advice was not necessarily (always) enhanced under the GNA legislation. In his article "Welcome to the Junta," Charles Dunlap speaks to the chairmanship of Colin Powell and its effect on advice and control. He writes,

As the military's spokesman, General Colin Powell acquired unprecedented influence. Powell, a Vietnam veteran whose popularity far exceeded the President's, opposed—with noteworthy finesse—some of Clinton's key military policy proposals. Considered the consummate soldier-politician, Powell aggressively advanced his views to numerous audiences, including public ones (342).

But as Lederman argues, the Chairman "occupies an ambiguous position" with respect to giving advice (1999, 90). Is he an advocate for the CINCs, or a dispassionate arbiter between CINC and service requests and requirements? Also, whether or not advice has gotten better or worse to some extent depends on the nature of the dissent among the Joint Chiefs. For example, General Jones in testimony before Congress explained how the JCS "spent an entire afternoon arguing over which Service should provide the attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo" (Lovelace 1996, 16). Such a case is evidence that Congress was right in declaring the JSC as unable to provide concise, useful, timely and above all, integrated advice. But not all disagreement among the top military ranks is trivial. Dissent and the generation of alternatives during a high-stakes operation, for example, can be a good thing. In theory, it can arm the President and Secretary with enough information to make better decisions.

Though effects of the legislation on civilian control and good advice are debatable, passage of the act, one can argue more defensibly, marked the decline of the service chiefs influence in operations. Lederman points to the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan as a case in point. The JCS Chairman, Henry Shelton, was ordered not to inform the chiefs of the attack until just before it happened, supposedly to decrease intelligence leaks (Lederman 1999, 91). With the numerous provisions in the GNA that enhance the Chairman's power vis-à-vis the individual military departments, some argue that the "Service Chiefs are further discouraged from challenging him" (Lovelace 1996, 18). Formal JCS meetings and collaborations seemed to have decreased in importance since Goldwater-Nichols was passed. After retiring, U.S. Marine Corp Commandant Carl Mundy sent a letter to the Chairman expressing his concern about the loss of service influence in joint matters (Mundy 1995, A1).

Strengthening the Chairman's role directly impacted good advice and civilian control but indirectly impacted service parochialism. Expanding CINC authority more directly targeted the problem of service control over policy. The act strengthened the CINCs' authority in relation to the service chiefs' authority by delegating the following command functions (taken from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, U.S. House 1986, 24-25).

The CINCs:

- have authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
- can prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;
- can organize commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
- will employ forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
- will assign command functions to subordinate commanders;

- will coordinate and approve those aspects of administration and support and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and
- can exercise authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff: suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.

The act also directed the services to assign all of their forces to a CINC, except for the personnel needed to carry out the services' statutory functions (U.S. House 1986, 25).

The chain of command ran from the President to the Secretary to the CINCs (with Chairman acting as advocate for the CINCs), placing the services very conspicuously outside of the chain of command.

The services, ever adept at finding ways to assert their authority, have yet maintained a strong influence over command structures. The services' statutory authority over their own personnel has been very effective; despite efforts of Congress otherwise, the services maintain primary influence over servicemembers. Congress envisioned that "the subordinate commanders [will] perceive the combatant commander, rather than officers in the Military Departments, as the superior whom they serve" (U.S. House 1986, 123). Ambiguity in the act, however, makes every servicemember obligated to their service for promotion, assignments, basic or officer training, etc.⁹¹ So, while, yes, the CINCs can hire and fire someone under their command, soldiers remain loyal to their Army, Sailors to their Navy, and so on. In sum, Davis and Shapiro note that, "Goldwater-Nichols ostensibly took the Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman out of the operational chain of command, but in reality, all three, by virtue of their position and proximity to the Washington power structure, exercised a great deal of

⁹¹ Not to mention the fact that it is the services that provide their own brand of military programming. According to Lovelace, "Decades of Service indoctrination causes senior officers assigned to combatant commands to remain predisposed to respond to the desires of their services" (1996, 25).

influence, sometimes in opposition to the desires of the joint theatre commander” (1996, 26).

Criticism aside, on balance all three civil-military variables seemed to have been enhanced by the GNA, but with limits. In writing the official report to Congress about the conduct of the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Cheney stated that all members of the JCS provided excellent advice, and that the Goldwater-Nichols act strengthened the Chairman’s ability to ensure the CINCs’ needs were met in conducting the war (U.S. Department of Defense 1992, xxv). If civilian control waned since GNA enactment, Presidents and Secretaries have not complained.

Below is an analysis of operations post-Goldwater Nichols. These operations were chosen because they represent both success and failure, small and large scale. The following section will outline civil-military relations during three operations: Panama (Just Cause), Iraq (Desert Shield/Storm), and Somalia (Continue Hope or UNOSOM II). The cases are chosen because they represent variation on many factors: time since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, presidential power (Bush vs. Clinton), success (Panama a narrow success, the Gulf War a clear success, and Somalia a failure), and scope of operations (medium-, large-, and small-scale).

Operation Just Cause (Panama). Though most would point to Operation Desert Shield/Storm as the first test of Goldwater-Nichols, Operation Just Cause (Panama) preceded the U.S.-Iraq conflict in Kuwait by less than a year. Grenada’s Urgent Fury and the Panamanian Just Cause are often weighed against each other because of comparable scope, scale, geography, and chronology. The comparison is apt for a pre- and post-GNA analysis for these reasons. It is important to note, however, that there were many factors

that distinguish the Grenada and Panama operations that are exogenous to the new command and control systems put in place by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation—differences which influenced the successful outcome of U.S. operations in Panama. One of the main variations was the waning authority of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the region. The U.S. had a freer hand at intervening than they had since the start of the Cold War. Additionally, Panama was more important to U.S. strategic interests than Grenada and, in fact, was the location of the U.S. Southern Command's base (USSOUTHCOM). The U.S. had regularly interfered—politically and militarily—in Panamanian politics since the turn of the 20th Century.⁹²

Another difference was the amount of planning time afforded the Just Cause operation compared to Urgent Fury. The latter was planned in just that way—urgently, within a few days. Just Cause (called Blue Spoon prior to the actual use of force), had been in the planning stages for months as the U.S. government carefully watched Noriega's consolidation of power, increasing corruption, and harassment of U.S. citizens and military personnel. George Bush signed orders on 17 December 1989 to have troops invade Panama at 1:00am, 21 December. Noriega surrendered 13 days later on 3 January 1990.

The major command and control apparatus that Goldwater-Nichols impacted demonstrated that instead of having to create some kind of *ad hoc* assembly of command or personnel units for an *ad hoc* operation, an already organized Joint Task Force (JTF)

⁹² U.S.-Panamanian relations became controversy-laden as early as 1846 when the Colombian government (called New Granada at the time), gave the United States exclusive transit rights in what is now Panama. Half a decade later, in 1903, the U.S. Navy aided the Panamanian revolt against Colombia by keeping Colombian troops from moving against the Panamanian rebels. Two days after Panama declared independence from Colombia, Roosevelt authorized *de facto* recognition of the new government (Bailey 1980, 272-273 and 493).

structure was in place to plan and provide a command structure to the operation. The CINC, General Maxwell Thurman (Army) for the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and his subordinate commanders (most notably General Carl Stiner who was put in charge of conducting Just Cause), were already in place and had rehearsed several months prior to the invasion (Brown 1996, 65). Centralization at the command level under a CINC with equal parts responsibility and authority, and the enhanced power of the new JCS chair under Colin Powell meant that command authority was not watered down by service parochialism:

Rather than asking Thurman to cobble together a force of equal parts from each service—a frequent practice in earlier operations—the new Chairman, General Colin Powell, USA, supported Thurman’s decision to place an Army general in charge of a predominantly Army task force. The 22,000 soldiers would be augmented with 700 sailors, 900 marines, and 3,400 airmen (Cole 1999, 60).

Additionally, the chain of command that was put in place by the Goldwater-Nichols act simplified communication to the Secretary of the Defense and President—which increased good advice up and control down the chain of command. In the Panama case, Stiner reported directly to CINC Thurman who reported to Chairman Powell who reported to the Secretary Cheney and President Bush (Cole 1999, 60). With the Chairman’s new statutory powers, he no longer had to consult the Joint Chiefs on operational matters. This change in the command structure served, if not to enhance “good” advice given to the president, at least to economize the advice (which is in itself an improvement). It was under Powell’s advice that Bush decided to invade Panama.

On Sunday, 17 December, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, briefed the president and his closest advisors on the situation in Panama. After a review of the events, General Powell made his recommendation...to use military force to remove Noriega from power and a large-scale operation

was needed to do it. President Bush inquired about the need for large forces. Powell responded that overwhelming force was necessary to reduce the risk to those involved. A smaller operation only reduced the chances of success without reducing the risk to U.S. forces involved (Ratcliff 2002, 86).

However the economy of the advice, there is some indication in the early planning of an invasion of Panama that the accuracy of that advice was not ideal. After Noriega stole the election it was expected that a coup would take place. When the Bush administration asked USSOUTHCOM for information about the coup, General Thurman was unable to provide it:

Thus, during the most critical hours of the coup, American soldiers in Panama waited for guidance from Washington about what assistance they were to render to the coup. Yet, Washington was paralyzed by insufficient, and, oftentimes, conflicting information from the scene, which was necessary to form a decision. As a result, Noriega narrowly survived the coup and exacted immediate vengeance on the plotting officers, who were tortured and executed for their efforts (Ratcliff 2002, 85).

Part of the problem was that Thurman had just replaced Woerner and Woerner's staff—Woerner being significantly more knowledgeable about the situation than the incoming Thurman and *his* staff.

Civilian control of military operations in Panama was established early. General Thurman was the replacement for General Woerner in the Summer of 1989, months prior to the start of Just Cause. Woerner publicly testified about his opposition to the Reagan administrations' policies in Panama. And though there are accounts that Woerner argued with Secretary Cheney about an increase of aggressive activities against the Noriega regime (most notably in Bob Woodward's *Commanders*) there are other, personal, accounts indicating Woerner would have subordinated his opinions and commanded Just Cause to the administration's liking (Jackson 1991, 6-7). Nevertheless, a general who

shared the administration's political-military vision in Panama—General Thurman—replaced Woerner before operations began.

Another difference between Urgent Fury and Just Cause was the fact that Bush, in concert with Cheney and Powell shaped clear objectives for Just Cause during the planning phase. So, once the operation was underway Powell was able to ensure Thurman's military objectives were in support of, and in line with, Bush's stated U.S. diplomatic and political goals. Powell's interjections included telling Thurman to quicken the drive to the Marriott hotel to prevent the taking of American hostages and to quickly install the legally elected officials in order to avoid claims that the U.S. would establish a military occupation of Panama (Cole 1999, 61). Another example of civilian control/chain of command involved U.S. military reaction to Noriega taking refuge in the Vatican's Apostolic Nunciature to avoid capture. Besides surrounding the Nunciature and searching all persons and vehicles entering and leaving, U.S. forces played amplified rock music 24-hours a day. Whether the music was intended to induce the Vatican's representative to eject Noriega or to mask conversations between the U.S. and Noriega, the diplomatic community made it clear to Bush that such tactics were not acceptable. As a result, Powell ordered Thurman to stop the music and it was stopped.

Under Goldwater-Nichols, command and control was solidified under a single command and the chain of that command was short and linear from the President down. Civilian control and good advice were enhanced by the new GNA command relationships and the ability of the CINC to work with the Chairman facilitated a conduit for providing good advice to civilians. Many credit the changes instituted from Goldwater-Nichols as

one of the main factors in the operational success⁹³ of Just Cause. The JCS Historical Office records the success of the operation directly attributable to the GNA legislation:

The transmission of guidance on Panama contingency planning from the national command authorities to General Thurman and General Stiner reflected changes enacted by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. That act made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—instead of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff—the chief military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Council. Thus, during the planning for BLUE SPOON, Secretary Cheney worked through General Powell. This practice eliminated the time-consuming deliberation within the Joint Chiefs of Staff that had been needed to win their approval. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also made the Joint Staff directly responsible to the Chairman instead of to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was no longer necessary to delay operational planning decisions to allow for coordination and staffing with the services in preparation for JCS approval. During the planning for BLUE SPOON, General Kelly, and commanders and planners in Fort Bragg and Panama briefed the Chairman frequently, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff rarely (Cole 1995, 72-73).

By all accounts of Just Cause, the Goldwater-Nichols act had corrected some of the command and control problems that had occurred in prior operations. Even if operations in Panama were imperfect, the centralized military authority and strategic planning (by civilian authority) were measurable improvements over the comparable Urgent Fury.

Operation Desert Storm (Iraq). Though thousands of troops were deployed in Panama, most look to Desert Storm as the first real test of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. One of the first indications that service influence was waning was when Secretary Cheney dismissed the Air Force Chief of Staff, Michael Dugan. In a 10-hour interview with a *Washington Post* reporter, Dugan discussed the type of air strategy the U.S. would engage in if the U.S. went to war to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Thirty-six hours

⁹³ Operation Just Cause was not without its problems. The focus of the analysis here, however, demonstrates a reduction in the command and control problems evident in earlier cases, such as in Grenada. Many of the problems documented in the Panama case resulted from interoperability of equipment, for example, with far fewer command and control deficiencies.

later, Dugan was no longer the Air Force Chief. As Katherine Boo explains it, “what really peeved Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Powell was not what Dugan said, but that he said anything at all. Dugan was playing by pre-Goldwater-Nichols rules” (Boo 1991, 35). The incident is not, of course, the first time a general officer has spoken out of line and been reprimanded—recall Douglas MacArthur in Korea. In fact, Boo is correct in implying there is something different about Dugan’s penalty in the post-GNA era. Regardless of his so-called impropriety of providing U.S. air strategy to the public, a debatable fact in itself,⁹⁴ the Air Force Chief of Staff had no formal power to run an air campaign anyway. An also ruffled national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said “Gen. Dugan is not in the chain of command and he does not speak for the administration” (McGrory 1990, A2).

This is just one case where civilian control seems obvious from the outset. Likewise, civilian leadership seems to have clearly dictated the initial use of force. A study developing an Allison-like bureaucratic model of the waging of Desert Storm argues a somewhat reluctant Bush was pushed to war by his hawkish National Security Advisor Scowcroft and ultra-hawkish Secretary of Defense Cheney, while Chairman Powell held out for sanctions and non-military means that would otherwise force Hussein’s hands (Holland 1999, 223-4).

As alluded to above, the issue of control is complex. Though civilian control seems evident during Desert Storm, the Bush administration was known for being very permissive of military influence on military policy and running the war (Cimbala 1995). Most of the alarmist civil-military relations literature touting a loss of civilian control

⁹⁴ McGrory notes that Cheney had virtually announced the same strategy in public anyway, but in more “Pentagon” friendly terms—in other words, less bluntly, but publicly nevertheless (1990, A2).

were drawn from the Bush administration and early Clinton years (see Luttwak, Kohn and Weigley for examples). But, being permissive is not necessarily the same thing as being weak or lacking control. Is civilian control dangerously weak because Bush and Cheney had management styles that were less autocratic? On the one hand, President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and NSA Scowcroft did not have personalities nor experience that could easily be overpowered by a subordinate—even one as politically savvy and charismatic as Chairman Powell. And on the other hand, Powell was one of the least hawkish in the administration and one of the most reluctant to go to war of those giving advice in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In fact, according to one account, Powell was willing to wait up to two years to see if economic sanctions would work before entering a war about which he had serious reservations. He also acted the good soldier and kept this opinion within the confines of presidential discussion, unlike Dugan (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 130-131). So, even if permissive, civilians were at least in control of the decision to go to war.

Many have argued that control seems to have waned as the war began. Cheney interacted little, if at all, with CENTCOM CINC, General Schwarzkopf, except through Powell (Cohen 2002, 192). After Bush committed to the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, Schwarzkopf was somewhat free to run the war as he saw fit. There were only two notable incidents of the assertion of civilian control. The first was the cessation of bombing on Baghdad after hundreds of civilian casualties resulted from an aerial attack of a supposed military target. The second involved the prevention of Iraqi missile attacks on Israel. The Bush administration feared retaliation by Israel would disband the coalition—one that was comprised of Arab nations that would be unwilling to take sides

with Israel over Iraq. The result was that the military begrudgingly started what they deemed a “fruitless” air campaign to find and destroy mobile SCUD launchers, but only after Cheney chastised Powell:

The defense secretary rarely got angry in public; he was too self-contained and composed for that. Cheney’s was a cool, icy, disciplined anger, not a hot, shouting rage. But after the briefer ticked off the modest number of Scud sorties, Cheney erupted. “Goddamn it, I want some coverage out there. If I have to talk to Schwarzkopf, I’ll do it,” Cheney exclaimed, according to one of Powell’s aides who attended the session. “As long as I am secretary of defense, the Defense Department will do as I tell them. The number one priority is to keep Israel out of the war” (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 234).

In both cases, Chairman Powell, played intermediary between civilian demands and the military’s proclivity to shirk issues they felt were militarily inconsequential.

Despite Powell’s more dovish stance prior to U.S. operations in Kuwait and Iraq, most argue his advice was instrumental in deciding when to end the war (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 414). Cohen writes, “General Powell made the recommendation, arguing that the president’s victory conditions had been fulfilled...By all accounts, the political leadership went along with Powell’s recommendation; Powell reported that Schwarzkopf, with whom he had just spoken, agreed with it” (2002, 194).

There is a great deal of controversy over the ending of Desert Storm, all of which hinges on the Chairman’s heeded advice. Critics have argued that at the very least the war should have continued another 24-48 hours to ensure the Republican Guard was destroyed. Others claim the U.S.-led coalition could have achieved a “total victory” by driving into Iraq and taking Baghdad (Cline 1998, 363). Powell’s advice to end the war when it did had a unique military perspective:

The morality of continued offensive action became very questionable for many. In a White House meeting, General Colin Powell reportedly termed

continuing the war as 'unchivalrous.' The issue of proportionality increasingly began to be raised. Although frontline troops were unlikely to use Powell's terminology, anecdotally there seemed to be such a sentiment developing among them. It would probably be fair to judge continuation of the war to be at least morally suspect among both a number of troops and their officers (Cline 1998, 370).

But beyond questions of morality, there is further evidence to suggest Powell and Schwarzkopf were well aware of the political improbability of keeping the coalition together if the scope of the war was expanded to include the toppling of the Hussein regime (Record 1993, 125 and Cline 1998, 370-4). There is substantiation to the notion that Schwarzkopf and other commanders on the ground disagreed with Powell on the advice to limit the war. Many at CENTCOM felt there was more to be done.

Schwarzkopf is quoted as saying,

Frankly, my recommendation had been... to continue the march. I mean, we had them in a rout and could have continued to wreak great destruction on them. We could have completely closed the doors and made it in fact a battle of annihilation. ... There were obviously a lot of people who escaped who wouldn't have escaped if the decision hadn't been made to stop where we were at that time (Record 1993, 125).

These examples of the start, administration, and end of the Gulf War demonstrate the ambiguity of civilian control and its relationship to advice. In these instances Powell's advice was both taken (when to end the war) and not taken (when to start the war), which indicates a) that even if civilian leadership was permissive, it was still in control; but b) that advice funneled through Powell may have diminished recommendations made by CENTCOM. That funneling could have reduced the decisions Bush and Cheney had with respect to ending the war, thus reducing civilian control.

Besides being related to advice, civilian control is also a function of operational stakes. This is only apparent post-GNA because of the coincidence of the end of the Cold

War. As such, it is hard to compare pre- and post-GNA civilian control in large-scale operations. This is because the stakes of civilians losing some ground to military control were considerably lower in the Gulf War than in Vietnam, for example.⁹⁵ The civilian control stakes in Vietnam were high—risking war with China if bombs were dropped in the wrong places, high casualties, no clear exit strategy, etc. In Iraq, the Cold War rivalry was non-existent, the potential for a prolonged quagmire-like war with overwhelming political costs were low (i.e. a low death toll), international disapproval was nearly zero, the battle space was isolated, and the enemy poorly equipped. There was simply less need for a McNamara or Johnson-like control over operations. One can conjecture that had stakes been higher, Bush and/or Cheney would have asserted more direct control. Certainly when it came to the possibility of Israel being drawn into the conflict, Cheney engaged considerable control.

But the permissive style of the Bush presidency during operations was also a function of the new command and control structures that allowed Bush and his decisionmakers a more efficient means of getting information on which to base decisions. With the creation of a “super” chairman, Bush and Cheney could delegate a lot of operational oversight. As Katherine Boo writes, “Bush stood back because he could. Under Goldwater-Nichols, his chief military advisor had been transformed from peripheral to pivotal...In the old days, such advice could have been transmitted only in a hailstorm of interservice memoranda and command-level compromises” (Boo 1991, 35).

While civilian control during the Gulf War represents a complex set of issues, service parochialism is, by comparison, less complicated. Implementation of the

⁹⁵ Michael Desch has developed a theory that partly explains the give and take of civilian control over the military during times of low internal and low external threats. He notes that there has been a weakening of

Goldwater-Nichols considerably stemmed, but did not entirely eliminate Service influence over operations. Though there were plenty of documented interservice skirmishes,⁹⁶ Schwarzkopf's command of the war avoided unnecessary deployments within his command (Eberhardt 2001, 119). The JCS was cut out of the operational loop almost completely—Schwarzkopf did not hold discussions with any member of the JCS outside of Powell (Eberhardt 2001, 111). Powell and Schwarzkopf acted as the main (in most cases, *sole*) military advisors on the conduct of Desert Storm. A study employing Allison's bureaucratic model concludes that the Goldwater-Nichols act integrated the services at the component commander-level and above, but fared poorly at integrating the services below that level (Carpenter 1995, 69-72). So, integration of the commands under Schwarzkopf needed improvement, but there was little doubt as to who controlled the operation. A good example of the diminishing power of the services to assert control is when Marine Corps Commandant Al Gray attempted to alter CENTCOM's use of Marines by appealing directly to both Cheney and Schwarzkopf. His attempts, that before the GNA legislation would most likely have ended favorably for the Commandant, failed because the final decision about when, how, and to what extent Marines would be used were decided by the CINC (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 172-177).

civilian control in both Russia and the United States since the end of the Cold War (Desch 1999).

⁹⁶ Despite a single commander in control of operations, each service more or less fought its own war. As Gordon and Trainor write, "Doctrinal differences among the services still exist and are frequently papered over. The services that depend most on support from their sister services—the Army is a prime example—champion jointness, at least as long as their central role is preserved. Services capable of semi-autonomous action, like the Air force, tend to go their separate ways. While the differences among the services are often an asset, it is not enough to let the services fight as they see fit. An effort must be made to harmonize their plans and operations" (1995, 473). And Holland writes, "Under the surface of the seemingly smooth transitions, the separate military services were engaged in a battle over the nature and direction of the plan, the composition of the actual military operation, and the nature of the command structure of the military force. While the air force felt that the air war alone could force Saddam to withdraw, this view was challenged by Powell and Schwarzkopf" (1999, 224-5).

As noted above, getting military advice is another murky issue particularly because of the hands-off approach Bush and Cheney took with respect to control. As Powell and Schwarzkopf were the main advisors to civilian leadership, the relationship between the two becomes the focus of how military advice was filtered up the chain of command. For example, there are differing accounts about whether Powell filtered or did not filter information from Schwarzkopf. The case of the Gulf War is a clear example of the Chairman of the JCS wielding a great deal of power and influence over the flow of information in and out of OSD and the White House. But structurally, the flow of information had been vastly economized by GNA changes. Under Powell, information was sharp and quick and most civilian authorities approved of the change even if it did mean the breadth of advice was sacrificed. After Desert Storm, Cheney publicly noted his pleasure with post-GNA military advice, stating it is a “significant improvement over the lowest common denominator” advice prior to the legislation (Locher 200, 109-10). And while the arguments may continue about the diminished capacity of broader military advice under the leadership of a powerful chairman, it was a civilian Congress that restructured the way advice was formulated:

The empowerment of Powell was not a coincidence, but exactly what congress called for in passing the Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation. Congress was fed up with the inability of the pre-1986 Joint Chiefs to provide national, as opposed to service oriented, professional military advice...It anticipated that the chairman of the JCS would take the lead in strategy formulation (Cimbala 1995, 105).

Overall, Goldwater-Nichols appears to have an effect on the three measures of civil-military relations. Though less clear is the effect on overall control (mainly because of the interactive effect of personality and management style of the command authority), the effect on quelling interservice rivalry and streamlining advice is significant. The control

and advice complexities are also apparent in the analysis of U.S. operations in Somalia, despite changes in administration, type of conflict, scale and scope of the operation.

Operation Continue Hope or UNOSOM II (Somalia). The final operation discussed here is unique for a number of reasons. It is a military operation other than war. It is a watershed event. The operation's history spans two different presidents, Bush and Clinton and to some extent, two different JCS Chairmen, Powell and Jeremiah.⁹⁷ And, like many other operations under the Clinton administration Somalia was fairly small and operated not solely by a U.S. led military, but by a coalition force. In the case of Somalia, U.S. troops were committed to a United Nations mission (as opposed to NATO in Bosnia, for example, or a more U.S.-led U.N. mission during the Gulf War). There are two overwhelming civil-military aspects about the Somalia operation. First, a single command authority was lacking and secondly, the relationship that Clinton had with the military had an impact on getting good advice and civilian control.

When the U.S. involvement in Somalia began, it was under the Bush administration and was a humanitarian mission to feed a starving population. U.S. troops became involved in Somalia at three separate stages: Operation Provide Relief (UNISOM I) to provide humanitarian assistance—August-December 1992; Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) which was a combined humanitarian and limited military assistance mission—December 1992-May 1993; and Operation Continue Hope (UNOSOM II a.k.a. USFORSOM) which was a peace *enforcement* mission—May 1993-March 1994. The three separate missions represented changes in UN-initiated tactics to provide stability to the region so that the humanitarian effort could continue. The

⁹⁷ Admiral Jeremiah, Vice Chief under Powell was the interim Chairman until Shalikashvili took over on October 25, 1993.

missions also represented changes in U.S. commitment. The final phase, UNOSOM II, saw a decrease from 28,000 U.S. troops (38,000 coalition troops) during UNITAF to only 4,500 troops. It also saw what is considered the bloodiest battle in the history of UN peacekeeping missions—the downing of Army aircraft by Somali guerillas and subsequent combat that resulted in nearly a hundred U.S. and over a thousand Somali casualties (Allard 1995, 13-20).

The U.S. commander for UNOSOM II was an Army Major General Thomas Montgomery who served as both the Deputy Force Commander under Turkish Lieutenant General Cevic Bir for the UN coalition, and Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM), subordinate to the CINC of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General Joseph Hoar. The U.S. deployment was divided between mostly logisticians and a small “quick reaction force” (QRF) of 1,300 combat troops. Montgomery commanded all of these troops until the addition of 400 elite soldiers (Rangers and Delta Force) joined UNOSOM II under the independent command of Major General William Garrison⁹⁸ (Winters 1999, 5-7).

All of these facts—the change in administrations, change in missions, a confluence of personalities, etc.—increased the complexity of civil-military relations during the operation. The Somalia case is also distinctive because the issue of civilian control is turned on its head. It is often reported that the military was left on its own to run a mission it did not particularly want. But the argument is not as easy as Clinton and Aspin simply not leading or willfully ignoring military advice, as many critics have suggested. Of major contention is Defense Secretary Aspin’s denial of Montgomery’s

⁹⁸ MG Garrison was in the chain of command under CINC of Central Command as well, but was otherwise acting independently in Somalia.

request for tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and gunships, which according to critics is one of the reasons for mission failure. The case is more complex, however, and functions here as an exemplar of what the Goldwater-Nichols act attempted to ameliorate but could not: bad advice and maintaining a balance in civilian control even under difficult circumstances.

To begin with, there was a certain lack of strategic direction from the Clinton administration towards a *military*—as opposed to a political—policy in Somalia. Cohen argues that civilians abdicated authority to the military. He writes in *Supreme Command*,

Deferring to a zealous United Nations high commissioner—an American—neither the president nor the secretary of defense regarded American forces operating in Mogadishu as forces fighting a low-level war...in which some effort should be made by national authority to harmonize ends and means (2002, 201).

The Clinton administration was not necessarily disinterested,⁹⁹ but had inherited a Bush policy that had become increasingly complex as Somalia became a more hostile environment for troops deployed there. Also, with a turnover of presidents, mid-operation, most of the Somalia experts had been working for Bush. The Clinton team had yet to do their homework on Somalia. According to one source, a change in administration precedes a steep learning curve: “Everything gets taken away. There is no

⁹⁹ Arguing disinterest is a hard case to make—Somalia was part of the Clinton presidential platform and once President, Clinton actually met with the U.N. Secretary General in 1993 to discuss Somalia. Also, Secretary of State Christopher, Ambassador to the U.N. Albright and Secretary of Defense Aspin were all involved in policy formation. On the other hand there is no clear evidence Clinton *was* interested in the military (as opposed to the political) policy in Somalia. Though a Somalia policy was part of Clinton’s campaign platform, once in office, his focus was on working with the United Nations to find a political solution. In September of 1993 Clinton changed the direction of U.S. policy in Somalia to phase out the military hunt for Aidid with little support from the U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Gahli. Some have argued that Boutros-Gahli was equivocal in order to stall budding U.S. efforts to pull the military out. Whatever the relationship to the U.N. leadership, the change in U.S. policy went on without seeking advice from or informing the JCS Chairman Powell. This is the crux of the controversy over Secretary Aspin’s denial of Montgomery’s request for equipment because Aspin was following a non-escalation policy while the military was merely asking for cover in an increasingly hostile environment (Beech 1996, 37 and Winters 1999, 21-23).

pass down material...Robert Oakley was the most knowledgeable guy around, but he had been Bush's guy. So no one talked to him until after the October firefight" (Norton 2002, 175).

Clinton was not completely without a Somalia staff and besides, even if the White House staff was somewhat under-prepared to adequately assess Somalia military policy, the argument can be made that Clinton, as newly instated commander in chief, could have and should have sought advice from military leadership who *were* knowledgeable about Somalia operations. But Clinton and many members of his cabinet did not have a good relationship with military leadership, especially during the first year of the new administration when Operation Continue Hope was underway.

The Clinton-Powell compromise policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell notwithstanding, Defense Secretary Aspin was perhaps an even more unpopular civilian and not well respected by his military subordinates and by Colin Powell¹⁰⁰ in particular (Norton 2002, 179). This aspect of civil-military relations is not directly addressed by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, but as the theme of civilian control is, it is problematic that under the GNA's strong chairman model Aspin felt Powell was insubordinate and Powell thought Aspin was a poor Defense Secretary (Drew 1994, 320). How can civilian control stay in balance under these conditions and in the case of Somalia, how did it effect operations?

When the relationships between the President, Secretary of State, and the top military advisors are less than ideal, there is an obvious negative effect on military

¹⁰⁰ According to Stephanopoulos, Clinton advisors saw Powell as a potential threat to Clinton's reelection campaign in 1996. Because of this Clinton advisors collected information and documentation that could be used against Powell just in case he ran for office. This adversely affected the kind of relationships

advice. Aspin's denial of Montgomery's military equipment request provides an example of the breakdown in advice and civilian control. The request came some weeks after Task Force Ranger, a special operations force, supplemented the logistical troops already deployed there. The increase in the number of troops and the new request for more equipment was contrary to the direction both the administration and the military wanted to go in Somalia (Allard 1995, 58). Montgomery's original request for tanks/fighting vehicles, artillery, helicopters, and gunships was sent to CENTCOM where it was significantly modified (Winters 1999, 9-10). CENTCOM took almost everything off Montgomery's list and before the request got to Aspin's desk, nothing was left on it but tanks (Gellman 1993, A1). Aspin was not alone in wanting to avoid what the military saw as "mission creep,"—an increase of U.S. commitment to a more offensive rather than defensive posture. Powell endorsed the winnowed-down request from Montgomery, but when Aspin did not approve it,¹⁰¹ there was no argument from the Chairman (Norton 2002, 179). In a White House press briefing on October 7, 1993, Aspin explained that yes he received advice from the military, but that advice he was getting was mixed:

General Montgomery had made a request that for some additional armor of four tanks and about fourteen Bradley fighting vehicles, plus some artillery. He made that request. General Hoar looked at the proposal. He scrubbed it, took out the artillery part and sent the proposal forward. General Powell and I discussed it on several occasions. I found that the views in the Pentagon were kind of mixed on the issue as to whether we ought to grant that. And I think they were mixed for good reason. We were, at that time, talking about a withdrawal of our presence in Somalia...In addition, we were already looking at the possibility, also, of deploying forces to Bosnia. We had just increased the forces in Somalia less [than] about a month earlier with the Rangers...All in all, the decision was deferred at the time that it came to my attention. I did not—the

envisioned by writers of the Goldwater-Nichols act that should develop between presidents and their military advisors (Stephanopoulos 1999, 195-97).

¹⁰¹ Aspin's denial took place 10 days prior to the October 3rd attack on the Rangers. It is debatable whether or not the tanks would have arrived in time to make any difference (Norton 2002, 179).

presentation of that data was—the presentation of the need for that mission was in protecting the logistics supply lines... We did not think of it in terms of any use as a possible rescue operation as we saw it might have been used on Sunday... Had I known at that time what I knew after the events of Sunday, I would have made a very different decision... I made the decision as best I could with the information and the knowledge that I had at the time (White House 1993).

The Somalia case corroborates Cohen's argument that "in the host of small wars since [Desert Storm], military 'advice' has not really been 'advice' at all, but something different: a preparation of options, and sometimes a single option for the civilian leadership" (Cohen 2002, 200).

Military advice, limited by the military itself as Cohen alludes to in this quote, decreases civilian control particularly during times when there is less or little military experience among a president and his cabinet and staff. In Somalia, information and advice *were* getting to the Secretaries of Defense and State, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and the National Security Advisor, but there is no clear evidence that Clinton had any significant understanding of the dangers the troops were facing in Mogadishu. Also, based on a recounting of historical and memoir data, it is not clear that he and his staff tried to blend the political/diplomatic mission with the military operation into a single, coherent plan. It is clear, however, that Somalia policy was under the purview and control of the Clinton cabinet, but the interaction between that control and the necessary military input (the advice) was lacking. The GNA structure that limits the dissemination of military advice predominantly to and from the Chairman meant that the Secretary of Defense's poor relationship with Powell affected the use and credibility of military advice among civilian leadership.

Given the limitation of military advice under the strained circumstances, and relationships of key Somalia players, the lack of parallel U.S. political and military goals, and lack of experience by the civilian command authority, one can easily argue that while Goldwater-Nichols may have ameliorated some of the command and control weaknesses of military operations, not all contingencies had (or could?) be measured. And two of those contingencies are a *laissez-faire* president and disagreement among the top two Department of Defense officials. According to one scholar,

It strains credulity to believe Congress intended for the Commander in Chief to be uninformed when one of his nine combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense disagreed on a force protection issue. Worse, did Congress and the Presidency (at the time of Goldwater-Nichols enactment) want the President to be uninformed when the Chairman and the Secretary disagreed on an important operational issue (Winters 1999, 23)?

Aspin was under no statutory obligation to take any dispute he had with Powell or any other military leaders to the president. Whether or not Clinton's knowledge, attention, opinion, or decision would have made a difference in Somalia is debatable, but the fact remains that under conditions of poor interpersonal relationships, advice and control can be diminished. Though qualitatively different than under the Bush administration, there was a level of permissiveness to civilian control. The lack of civilian assertiveness, for whatever reason, can wreak havoc on advice, and the consequences, as in Somalia, can be significant.

Conclusions

Maintaining control, getting good advice, and keeping service-centrism in check during military operations were clearly affected by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation—more so in operations than in the resource allocation process described in the previous chapter. In general, producing more coordinated military operations was easier for the

post-GNA secretary of defense. And after analyzing the details, there is some evidence to suggest that operations under bipolarity or high-stakes, (such as expanding the scope of the operation exponentially—war in Vietnam expanding to war with China, for example), necessarily involves a higher degree of civilian oversight. Personality of key actors is also a variable factor in determining the balance of civil-military relations during operations. The Clinton-Powell and Aspin-Powell relationships are post-GNA examples of how personality and interpersonal relationships can undercut the structures enacted in the legislation to ensure healthy civilian control and the receipt of good military advice. Another factor affecting proper civil-military exchange is what Cohen describes as an evolution in the nature of military involvement in politics. The historically self-enforced subjection of military opinion to civilian leadership has eroded, he argues. The result is that military opinion and/or advice is often unfiltered or is directed outside of the chain of command altogether, either toward Congress or the general populace:

Indeed by the turn of the twenty-first century it was the norm for military officers to leak to the press their opposition to government policy involving the use of force. This is a far cry from the outraged but dutiful muteness with which the chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy accepted President Roosevelt's decision to invade North Africa in 1942, against their explicit and firm advice (Cohen 2002, 200).

Deliberate military leaks prior to the Gulf War, during the Kosovo war, and other operations reflect a military using tools at their disposal to subvert the traditionally agreed upon barrier between what civilian leadership controls and decides and the how the military forms and provides opinions and advice.¹⁰² Feaver, Kohn, Cohen, Gelpi,

¹⁰² A 1999 *Washington Post* article illustrates this point in a discussion about the, then-current, Kosovo operation. The Joint Chiefs "complained about what they saw as the lack of a long-term vision for the Balkans and questioned whether U.S. national interests there were strong enough to merit a military confrontation. 'I don't think anybody felt like there had been a compelling argument made that all of this was in our national interest,'" said one senior officer knowledgeable about the deliberations. Led by Gen.

Previdi, Holsti and a host of other scholars point to the use of media and other tools as evidence of a growing civil-military gap, a gap that can dislodge measures put in place by congressional legislation meant to enhance civilian control. But despite the moderating influences of personality, the structure of the international environment, and other factors, Goldwater-Nichols has gotten high marks for enhancing operations.

One clear effect was the way Goldwater-Nichols decreased servicism (service parochialism). By deleting the services from the chain of command during operations, the inevitability of including all services in any given operation regardless of need was dramatically reduced. After Goldwater-Nichols, the CINCs made the decisions about the makeup of troops to be trained and deployed. Furthermore, the Chairman has the statutory power to mitigate rivalry among the service chiefs. Even during phase three of U.S. efforts in Somalia (UNOSOM II) when command authority was needlessly split between U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Special Operations command (SOCOM), servicism played virtually no role in deployment decisions.

The GNA legislation has also affected behavior of the chiefs. According to Roman and Tarr (1998), the JCS behavior has changed as a result of the chairman's new role. First of all, the service chiefs have become advisors to the chairman. Secondly, because the chairman now holds the upper hand in his relationship with the chiefs it works in the chiefs' interest to labor with and not against the chairman. Consequently, a

Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders challenged in particular the 'domino theory' being pressed in interagency discussions by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. 'Losing' Kosovo, she and her allies in the discussions maintained, would lead to wider destabilization in the Balkans that sooner or later would damage U.S. interests in Europe – so better to act before it was too late" (Graham 1999, A1). It is not the military leadership's role to determine what is in the nation's interest nor is it their role to challenge policies and grand strategies.

more collegial attitude persists in JCS meetings. General Robert Herres, former JCS Vice Chief, put this into practical terms. In an interview he said,

In the three years of Goldwater-Nichols there hasn't been a dissenting piece of advice provided. I think the significance there and one of the interesting things about the new system is that it requires a Chief, if he does disagree with the advice of the chairman, to make his own case. So it's now a little bit different from as before, disagreeing in the participatory process of developing *corporate* advice. When you disagree now, you're going to have to defend your views in the face of potential criticism (in Roman and Tarr 1999, 104-105).

Thirdly, the chairman has been able to shape the way the JCS members interact, which is yet another factor that has diminished interservice rivalry. Powell writes, "I stopped putting out fixed agendas for the JCS meetings...As a result, the chiefs did not come to my office loaded with positions that they felt they had to defend...Since we no longer voted, they did not have to go back to their bureaucracies and defend a vote" (Powell 1995, 448). The overall result of diminishing servicemism is the improvement of military advice:

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and its subsequent implementation by Admiral Crowe and Generals Powell and Shalikashvili have transformed the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. The influence of service parochialism has receded and has been supplanted by jointness...Civilian decision makers, virtually unanimously, have told us that the military now provides higher quality and more timely advice (Roman and Tarr 1999, 109).

Yes, advice is better after GNA but as the Somalia case demonstrates (and to a lesser extent the Gulf War), it is dependent on a number of factors, including the willingness of civilians to listen to, and the chairman to incorporate, dissent into the advice. The effect of the legislation on civilian control is a mixed bag too. On the one hand civilian authority can shirk its responsibilities by granting the military too much control. This seems to be the case particularly when stakes are low or when the

probability of high casualties or an expanding mission scope are low. Civilian authority in operations can also be undercut by a military increasingly brazen in using alternate methods of getting its point across—such as using the media or overstating force requirements.

Under the current Bush administration, there are continued concerns about the health of civil-military relations, but the specific crisis literature has diminished since the early 2000s and the end of the Clinton era. The old arguments about civilians exercising too much control that were common under Secretary McNamara's reign are resurfacing under Rumsfeld. Though a civil-military rift has existed since George W. Bush started his first term, it is more significant now that U.S. forces are deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some military watchers claim that the animosity that Rumsfeld has engendered among the ranks is unprecedented (hard to imagine given the animosity apparent towards Clinton). For example an April 10, 2004 *Army Times* article suggested Rumsfeld should be dismissed for the crimes committed by soldiers against prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Unlike under Clinton, where the military demonstrated an amount of disdain for the president's lack of military credentials and his seeming lack of knowledge about and interest in military affairs, the military's relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld is specifically related to his method of control, which is nearly absolute. In a recent *National Review Online* editorial, even MacKubin T. Owens (professor at the Naval War College) warns of a disastrous relationship in the making:

When it comes to civil-military relations, Rumsfeld's attempt to reassert civilian control of the military is certainly proper, but there is a real danger that the cost of Rumsfeld's approach will be a dispirited and demoralized uniformed military. Right now, the perception among officers is that Rumsfeld wants to surround himself with "yes-men" and that dissent will not be tolerated. This is a recipe for disaster (Owens 2005).

Based on the results of the preceding analysis, it becomes apparent that as a defense secretary is in the midst of waging a war, surrounding himself with advisors who tell him what he wants to hear, may not be the best way to get the kind of advice GNA creators envisioned. It is well known, for example, that Rumsfeld has rejected very concerted military advice on force levels needed to win a war in Iraq and that he was in a stalemate with the Army over the organizational placement of its civil affairs troops. In both cases he did not agree with the advice the military was offering. In sum, the Goldwater-Nichols changes were able to fix some problems in civil-military relations, but the success of the act on that count is somewhat dependent upon the willingness of the actors themselves to participate. The Rumsfeld regime could provide another interesting example for future study of the necessary interplay between getting good advice and maintaining control.

5

DOD Minority Integration: Before and After Goldwater-Nichols

It's important for us to remember that what we are asked to do here in the Department of Defense is to defend the nation. The only reason we exist is to be prepared to fight and win wars. We're not a social welfare agency. We're not an agency that's operated on the basis of what makes sense for some member of Congress' concern back home in the district. This is a military organization. Decisions we make have to be taken based upon those kinds of considerations and only those kinds of considerations.

-Dick Cheney, March 26, 1992 kicking off the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Military Women

Military service has a special character and role under American revolutionary constitutionalism as a public institution concerned to protect and defend rights-based constitutional institutions (of which the military is one). Accordingly, as the African American struggle makes abundantly clear, military service in the United States cannot be cordoned off from the larger struggles of rights-based justice under American constitutionalism. It is not and never has been a bystander to these struggles, but itself has been, by its nature, crucially involved in some of the nation's most disgraceful rights-denying exclusions and its most significant steps taken to remedy such constitutional evils. The claim that, by its nature, it must be immunized from civilian principals of constitutional analysis cannot reasonably be extended to rights-denying exclusions which, by their nature, compromise the very legitimacy of the role of the military under American rights-based constitutionalism. We must, rather in each case inquire whether a ground for exclusion uncritically enforces a conception of national identity inconsistent with the demands of American constitutionalism.

-David A. J. Richards in *Women, Gays and the Constitution*

Women in combat is no longer an argument. There is no rear area.

-Major Mary Profit, commander, civil affairs team attached to Stryker battalion in Mosul, May 2005

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the civil-military measures of good advice, civilian control, and service management during changes in personnel policies—specifically, policies related to the integration of Blacks, women, and homosexuals. In one sense, studying the decision-making of changes in personnel policies is less grave than a comparable analysis of resource allocation and operations where national security, the public trust, billions of dollars, lives, and so on, are at stake. In another sense, the less tangible themes of equality, justice, social evolution, military cohesion, etc. make

studying personnel policy at least interesting, if not important in informing our understanding of the security/openness balance difficult to maintain in democracies. So, though lives and billions of dollars are not ostensibly at stake, the values inherent in a rights-based society very much are.

High-minded democratic notions aside, the U.S. military is legally permitted to practice discrimination in its hiring policies based on a number of factors, such as height, weight, educational attainment, mental and “moral” qualification, and physical ability, among others. This discrimination is largely necessary based on the military’s unique range of jobs; however, the military necessity argument ceases to be clear-cut as discrimination touches on social policy writ large. Social policy can refer to a number of issues, but for this chapter I isolate the subject to minority integration.

Integration of the military, whether based on race, sex, or sexuality, has always closely preceded or followed policies and/or trends present in the general population. The questions at the heart of integration events are who should establish such social policy—should the military be left to evolve into it, as their qualified hiring base changes? Should a social policy be defined and enforced at all? Should civilian leadership be wary of compelling what is often referred to as “social experimentation” on the military?

There are no definitive answers. For example, with the establishment of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973, the Assistant Secretary of Defense noted that it was the people’s and not the Pentagon’s business to delineate the social composition of the military (in Binkin, et al. 1982, 4). This view demonstrates a change from the unwillingness of the services to fully integrate Blacks following Truman’s Executive Order to do so. During each integration process military leadership and culture made

change difficult. But it is not simply the case, as will be shown, that the military has been particularly traditional or “backward” with respect to integrating minorities, though that element does present itself too. It is at least as often the case that military leadership simply prefers autonomy to determine how and when to implement changes, as determined by military manpower needs.

There have been relatively few integration events to provide a pre-post Goldwater-Nichols (GNA) analysis, as compared, for example, to numbers of operations or budget productions. During the pre-Goldwater-Nichols period, the integration of Blacks and women were addressed. After Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, the integration of homosexuals and further integration of women into combat occupations were addressed.

Background

Provided here is a brief overview of the minority integration events over the past 60 years. The integration of Blacks into the military followed World War II, but it was not until Truman demanded full integration by executive order that it took place—and even then, it was years before the services were fully desegregated. Though there were steps taken during the Roosevelt administration to look at black integration in the Army and Navy (Binkin et al. 1982, 19), the issue was not taken up until Secretary of War, Robert Patterson appointed a board, chaired by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, to formulate an integration plan. His instruction to the committee was to,

...prepare a policy for the use of the authorized Negro manpower potential during the postwar period including the complete development of the means required to derive the maximum efficiency from the full authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency (MacGregor 1981, 153).

The Gillem committee's conclusions were based on 2 principles: a) that Blacks were constitutionally afforded the right to serve and b) that the Army was obligated to use every soldier effectively (MacGregor 1981, 154). The committee's conclusions, however, were equivocal. The report's overriding objectives left it up to interpretation as to how and when integration would occur. Those objectives were as follows:

The Initial Objectives: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the postwar period. The manpower potential to be organized and trained as indicated by pertinent recommendations.

The Ultimate Objective: The effective use of *all* manpower made available to the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to antecedents or race. When, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national security. The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, intermediate objectives. Between the first and ultimate objective, timely phasing may be interjected and adjustments made in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this undetermined date (U.S. War Department 1946, 12).

Also, many of the report's eighteen recommendations were interpreted by some as maintaining segregation (a separate-but-equal type of policy) and by others as endorsing full integration (Gibson 1946, 1). Though the main policy focus—whether to desegregate or not—was not explicitly delineated (or at least easily understood), the report was crystal clear about the need to base a decision on “the attainment of maximum manpower efficiency in time of national emergency” (MacGregor 1981, 160). So, while opinions about integration vs. segregation ranged widely, the overarching goal was military efficiency. The report concluded that the military would take full advantage of qualified

manpower available, no matter the race, but the emphasis was on “qualified” with much less regard to equal representation and/or opportunity.¹⁰³

The Navy and Marine Corps went through similar investigations of their segregation policies. The Navy’s policy was considered the most progressive. In the last year of World War II, the Navy began desegregating specialized and officer training schools, Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service units (WAVES), recruit training centers, and units in the auxiliary fleet. This was done in part because a system of maintaining two equal Navies—one Black, one White—was not feasible, neither as a social policy¹⁰⁴ nor as a practical organization of manpower (MacGregor 1981, 166-69). The Marine Corps had the least progressive policy, preferring to wait and see if they would be forced to integrate. Theirs was a more “equal-but-separate” policy, after the Army model. Brigadier General Gerald Thomas, Director of the Plans and Policies Division, recommended to Marine Corps Commandant Vandegrift not to follow the Navy

¹⁰³ Equivocal as they were, the policy recommendations the Gillem Board made were progressive and left many in Congress and the military scurrying to find ways to avoid the slippery slope towards complete desegregation. Though the military’s primary focus may have been on finding a policy that would let the military perform its duties efficiently, it cannot be ignored that there was extreme discomfort among many career servicemembers that opening up the military to Blacks would weaken the institution. A survey taken during World War II demonstrated a pervasive disappointment among White officers after learning they were being assigned to Black units. They felt they were given an inferior assignment (Lee 1966, 185). In fact, all-Black units did perform poorly, on average, compared to all White or mixed units. But historians such as Eli Ginzberg et al. (1959) and Ulysses Lee (1966) conclude, the poor performance is related to training, leadership and readiness issues that can be overcome. Segregation itself was an important barrier to the success of all-Black units. Ginzberg et al. state, “The Army...was greatly handicapped in making effective use of the Negro manpower. Segregation interfered with the optimal training and assignment of Negroes with high potential; it led to a serious imbalance of skills and aptitudes in Negro divisions; and it was reflected in serious weaknesses in the leadership of Negro units. In the face of the handicaps which they brought with them into the Army and the barriers which they encountered once they were in uniform, the remarkable finding is that the vast majority of Negroes performed satisfactorily, not that they accounted for a disproportionate number of ineffectives” (1959, 124-25). Ginzberg also notes that Black performance during World War II compared to White performance, given equal educational backgrounds, was equivalent (Ginzberg 1959, 5-6).

¹⁰⁴ MacGregor explains that as the Navy segregated its undereducated and unskilled sailors into labor battalions, there was an increase in racial clashes. The Navy was the first service that understood that segregation and racial tensions were causally related. Beyond that, however, the Navy also recognized that skilled Blacks were underutilized because of segregation policies. So, though the Navy’s race policy

integration model as it was “devised to appease the Negro press and other interested agencies than to satisfy [the Marine Corps’] own needs” (MacGregor 1981, 171).

The varying integration and/or segregation policies across the military departments were dissimilar, but showed one commonality—the services understood that a race integration policy should first conform to service manpower needs. But despite both the Gillem Board’s conclusions that enlistment criteria should eventually be merit- and not race-based, and the growing inefficiencies in maintaining varying degrees of separate but “equal” integration policies, the services under the newly created National Military Establishment stalled their already sluggish integration efforts. The inefficiencies became most evident in the newly created Air Force:

The Air Force was a new service in 1947, but it was also heir to a long tradition of segregation. Most of its senior officers, trained in the Army, firmly supported the Army's policy of racially separate units and racial quotas. Despite continuing objections to what many saw as the Gillem Board's far too progressive proposals, the Air Force adopted the Army's postwar racial policy as its own. Yet after less than two years as an independent service the Air Force in late 1948 stood on the threshold of integration. This sudden change in attitude was not so much the result of humanitarian promptings by service officials...Nor was it a response to civil rights activists...Rather, integration was forced upon the service when the inefficiency of its racial practices could no longer be ignored. The inefficiency of segregated troops was less noticeable in the Army where a vast number of Negroes could serve in a variety of expandable black units, and in the smaller Navy, where only a few Negroes had specialist ratings and most black sailors were in the separate Steward's Branch. But the inefficiency of separatism was plainly evident in the Air Force (MacGregor 1981, 270).

Though military necessity was clearly a factor in this effort, nothing short of an international crisis (the Cold War forthcoming) was enough to compel integration. So, Truman stepped in. During the 1948 election year, he signed Executive Order 9981 and

seemed enlightened by comparison, there was a strong element of economics involved in the decision to desegregate (1981, 166-69).

created an advisory committee—the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, otherwise known as the Fahy Commission. The President’s political agenda, black servicemembers’ aspirations, growing acceptance of racial integration among the general population, and perhaps most importantly, the start of the Cold and Korean Wars eventuated the full integration of Blacks into the military.

The same year that Truman signed his Executive Order 9981 (actually a month and a half prior to 9981) he also signed a Congressional bill that integrated women into the military.¹⁰⁵ Women’s military service was practically non-existent prior to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. As Treadwell writes, “every succeeding war had its Molly Pitchers,” (1953, 3) but it wasn’t until World War II that the women were deployed in great numbers.

Though it is arguable that women are fully integrated in today’s military, there are at least two integration events prior to, and a series of events after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols that inform this analysis of civil-military relations. The first pre-GNA event takes place during the development of the post-WW II military, where integration takes on a “separate but equal” attempt at organization. The second “wave” of integration culminates in the 1978 integration of women into the regular military. Finally, efforts to get rid of the combat exclusion take place during the first half of the 1990s.

World War II is generally recognized as the first major breakthrough for women's military participation. Once selective service became law in 1940 (a first during peacetime), and women’s participation in the war was beginning to appear inevitable, civilian and military leadership were being pressured to provide some kind of process for inclusion. In 1941, Congresswoman Edith Rogers introduced a bill to establish the

Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). After World War I many women in the Nurses Corps suffered health problems as a result of their service but did not receive military benefits because they did not have any legal military status. Rogers' bill was an attempt to prevent this from ever happening again. Congresswoman Rogers testified,

In the beginning, I wanted very much to have these women taken in as a part of the Army I wanted them to have the same rate of pension and disability allowance. I . . . realized that I could not secure that. The War Department was very unwilling to have these women as a part of the Army (in Treadwell 1953, 18).

The bill was as an attempt "to have the women *in--not--with* the Army" (Holm 1992, 22). Both the War Department and Congress were opposed to the idea of a permanent military status for women.¹⁰⁶ The resulting WAAC bill was a compromise that provided for a small but highly qualified auxiliary corps of women.¹⁰⁷ With little support, it was sent to the Bureau of Budget to languish (Binkin and Bach 1977, 7). It remained on hold until Pearl Harbor was attacked. The bill was approved May 14, 1942. The Navy, with the Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES), the Marine Corps with their Women's Reserve force, and the Coast Guard with the SPARs (Semper Paratus, Always Ready), followed suit. A more substantial bill establishing the Women's Army Corps (WAC) in 1943 eventually outclassed the 1942 bill.

What is notable is that each female component was earmarked as a temporary organization (Binkin and Bach 1977, 7). Their establishment was often compromised

¹⁰⁵ This bill was called the Women's Armed Services Integration Act.

¹⁰⁶ There were stories coming from overseas that the British were utilizing women in their military and that the Chinese and Russians were even employing women in combat. The force of change seemed somewhat inevitable but the U.S. military waited until the need to employ women was imminently necessary—then Pearl Harbor was attacked (Binkin and Bach 1977, 6-7).

¹⁰⁷ Holm states, "[T]his notion that women should be of high moral character and technical competence while no such standards were used for men set the tone for the double standards that were to characterize the women's programs for the next forty years" (1982, 22).

because of opposition within Congress, the War Department and the top leadership of each military organization. So, while women's organizations, congresswomen, and other societal elements lobbied for a permanent status of these components, ultimately, women were permitted to serve as auxiliaries of the armed forces because they were needed by the military. During war, utilizing women in non-combat positions freed up more men for the front lines.

The real test of women's integration came after the war when their auxiliary "manpower" was deemed to be no longer necessary. Military personnel levels were at just over 12 million in 1945 and dropped to 1.4 million in 1948 (Binkin and Bach 1977, 10). After the war, there was a great deal of opposition to continuing the role of women in the military, despite their widespread use during the war at bases in the U.S., in Europe, and in the Pacific theater.¹⁰⁸ Morden writes, "these and other objections were overcome by Cold War developments, the Army's inability to raise an all-volunteer force, and the determination of a small but powerful group of men and women," (1990, 61), including General Eisenhower. Additionally, with the draft law lapsing early in 1947, there was some concern that not enough men would enlist to maintain projected end-strengths (Binkin and Bach 1977, 10).

As a result, in 1948 the development of Public Law 625—The Women's Armed Services Act—established a permanent, but separate, military status for women, instituting a ceiling of women at 2% of the total enlisted population. Major General Jeanne Holm writing about the passage of P.L. 625 states, "The Integration Act did not

¹⁰⁸ General MacArthur is recorded in Treadwell's history as saying, "I moved my WACs forward early after occupation of recaptured territory because they were needed and they were soldiers in the same manner that my men were soldiers. Furthermore, if I had not moved my WACs when I did, I would have had mutiny . . . as they were so eager to carry on where needed" (1953, 423).

slip through the Congress easily. Its final passage was due more to the prevailing military manpower philosophy than to concerns about women's right to serve" (Holm 1992, 113). Though most military men and veterans were opposed to integration, many of the highest ranked civilian and military officials testified to Congress on the bill's behalf: Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Generals Eisenhower and Bradley, Admirals Denfeld, Nimitz (Chief of Naval Operations) and Radford, Air Force Generals Spaatz, Vandenberg, and Eaker and Marine Corps General Vandegrift, to name a few (Holm 1992, 116).

During the years 1948-1967 women's role in the military actually regressed (women averaged about 1.2% of total military personnel). Their basic training lapsed. For example, they no longer received bivouac training, weapons familiarization training, and they were no longer allowed to fire small arms. Holm writes,

[E]xcept for the uniforms and the marching, the indoctrination programs more closely resembled ladies' finishing schools than military programs....All basic training programs were heavily sprinkled with courses to enhance feminine appearance and bearing (1992, 181).

It wasn't until the late 1960s that these policies were readdressed. In 1966, the Pentagon established a task force to reassess the role of women. Binkin writes,

[A]lthough couched in terms of military personnel requirements, the Pentagon study was also prompted by pressures brought by many women officers, emboldened by the feminist movement that was becoming a force in American society (1993, 5).

The decade of the 1970s was a time of rapid and significant change in attitudes and policies regarding women in the military. With the force of the feminist movement as at least one catalyst in recognizing imbalances in military policy, military women began to initiate litigation against discriminatory treatment. For example, in 1973 the Supreme Court struck down a very significant law that reserved certain dependency

benefits for male military personnel only. In 1976 women were allowed into the military academies. And finally in 1978 the separate women's services were abolished and women were integrated into the regular military branches. Also in 1978, services were directed by President Carter to double the number of women in their ranks.

Perhaps the most significant impetus for this second integration effort was the fact that the military moved in 1973 from conscription to an All Volunteer Force.¹⁰⁹ In the post-Vietnam recruiting era, the All Volunteer Force was unable to recruit enough qualified men. Binkin suggests, "the all-volunteer force might not have survived had it not been for the influx of highly qualified women" (1993, 8). Also, with the Equal Rights Amendment clearing Congress, the Secretary of Defense preempted a possible external push to expand the role of military women by creating a task force to prepare contingency plans to "offset possible shortages of male recruits after the end of the draft" (Binkin and Bach 1977, 14). The contingency plans for each military branch soon became action plans. The Army and Navy, by the end of the 1970s, exceeded the stipulations set forth by the Secretary's task force.

The first real exposure that women, the military, and the public received of female soldiering was the 1983 Grenada invasion. In total, there were 170 women who participated in the Grenada experience. The 1989 Panama invasion included approximately 800 female soldiers, one of which was given a disproportionate amount of media coverage. Captain Linda Bray led her small corps of male soldiers to take a secured dog kennel. There was debate among those who cared, inside and outside of

¹⁰⁹ The number of female enlisted (active component) accessions went from 12,995 (1.8% of total) in 1972 to 41,345 (13.3% of total) in 1979. The female (active component) enlisted end-strength went from 31,863 (1.6% of total) in 1972 to 131,021 (7.5% of total) in 1979 (Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness).

government and military circles, as to whether Captain Bray's foray into the dog kennel constituted combat. Regardless of the conclusion of the debate, there was a renewed effort on the part of female members of Congress to lift what they saw as an artificial ban (Enloe 199, 219).

Though Grenada and Panama were important first steps for women, the Gulf war was the first major test of the All Volunteer Force and many expected it to be *the* test case for the expanded use of female servicemembers. Seven percent of the total deployed force were women (this is the average of less than 7% active duty women and more than 13% female reservists) (Binkin 1993, 19). The media portrayed female combatants as professional. Perhaps as a direct result, the American public finally took the role of female servicemembers seriously. To a large extent, women were also taken seriously by their male counterparts and as Binkin notes, "[women] won virtually unanimous respect among their male military commanders" (1993, 21).

It is not surprising then that Congress, particularly congressional women, swiftly reacted to the new public acceptance regarding women playing greater combat roles. Rep. Pat Schroeder (D-Colorado) sponsored legislation to lift the combat ban on women in the Air Force, and Rep. Beverly Byron (a member of the Military Personnel Subcommittee), who was previously opposed to lifting combat restrictions, proposed that the Schroeder amendment cover the Navy.

The result of the legislation was interesting. It passed the House swiftly and quietly without debate. As a May 22, 1991 *Washington Times* article notes, congressional members curtailed discussion about the bill to avoid offending feminists on the one hand and military command on the other (1). The Pentagon, not surprisingly,

responded positively to the new legislation. Pentagon spokesman Pete Wilson in a September 16, 1991 issue of *Inside the Navy* said, “our view about the legislation is it's beneficial, it's a good thing, we support it because it gives the Department of Defense the authority to make these decisions” (1). Again, the rhetoric points to the Defense Department as being less interested in the democratic ideals of an egalitarian society (if interested at all) and more concerned about conserving control over its personnel policies.

Though the legislation seemed on its way to becoming law, it stymied in the Senate Armed Services Committee with the lobbying efforts of the Eagle Forum, the Coalition for Military Readiness, some military leadership, and selected male and female servicemembers. The result was that the Senate was neither willing to turn over the combat exclusion decision to the Defense Secretary nor was it willing to merely open select combat skills and positions to women. To investigate further, a 15-member Presidential commission was formed to study the issue and make recommendations.¹¹⁰ Many of the Presidential commission's recommendations (concluded in November of 1992), such as maintaining restrictions on women in combat aircraft, have since been overridden.

During 1992-1994 there were many laws that expanded combat specialization opportunities for women. The 1992 and 1993 Defense Authorization acts repealed combat aircraft exclusion laws. In 1993, Secretary Aspin wrote a memorandum, which stated, “Two years ago, Congress repealed the law that prohibited women from being assigned to combat aircrafts. It is now time to implement that mandate and address the

¹¹⁰ As the Senate Armed Services Committee made their commission recommendation, Senators Kennedy and Roth amended the commission bill to include the removal of combat flying restrictions using the language of the original House bill. Though the final bill was passed, the Pentagon used the establishment

remaining restrictions on the assignment of women” (Harrell et al. 2002, 2). This pushed the services to integrate women to the fullest extent U.S. Code would allow, particularly in the Navy.

In 1994, the combat vessel restriction was lifted and the risk rule, which was enacted in 1988 and barred women from battlefields where there was a “risk” to exposure of direction combat, was rescinded. This risk rule directive, from Secretary Aspin, carried with it several stipulations that precluded the military from changing occupational standards, using quotas, or other methods¹¹¹ to shirk the spirit of the change in policy—the nearly complete integration of women into all but a few direct combat occupations. The result was that more occupations and more units were open to women for the first time in the history of the U.S. military. See Table 5.1.

Table 5-1. Percent of Positions Opened to Women Before and After Policy Changes

Service	Positions Open (%)	
	Before April 1993	After Law, Policy Changes
Army	61.0	67.2
Navy	61.0	94.0
Air Force	97.0	99.7
Marine Corp	33.0	62.0
DoD Total	67.4	80.2

Source: Harrell et al. 2002

The final integration effort discussed here, taking place in the first months of the Clinton administration, was directed at sexual minorities. The result of the effort was the

of the Presidential Commission as a reason to delay admission of women into competition for combat flying.

¹¹¹ Additionally, “combat” was clearly and more narrowly defined by Secretary Aspin in a 13 January 1994 memorandum. Combat was, “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect” (Aspin 1994).

compromise “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass” policy (DADT), which unsuccessfully married the civil rights concerns of the Clinton administration and the military necessity concerns of JCS Chairman, Colin Powell. Interestingly, there has been a resurgence of interest in the policy recently. On April 4, 2005 seven minority members of the House Armed Services Committee entreated their chairman, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-California), to review DADT, stating, “In light of the military’s personnel strains resulting from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe it is necessary to evaluate the policy’s effect on military readiness.” This letter comes a month after the introduction of the Military Readiness Enhancement bill, the purpose of which is to,

...amend title 10, United States Code, to enhance the readiness of the Armed Forces by replacing the current policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, referred to as ‘Don't Ask, Don't Tell’, with a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

It is no wonder the policy is being reviewed—few were happy with the policy to begin with.

The issue of gays in the military in 1992 came at an interesting point in history. First of all, Clinton was a new, non-majority elected president and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, was powerful, publicly popular, and well seasoned in national politics. Secondly, there was no war, cold or hot, and no need to increase the size of the military. Thirdly, the military had just been deployed for Desert Storm and with a decisive win, had overcome its tenacious unpopularity following the Vietnam War. So, when Clinton declined Powell’s advice to hold off on this particular campaign promise and announced an end to the military’s gay ban, it is no surprise (except perhaps to the President himself) that military leadership did not fall in line. In fact, military leadership

used every means at their disposal (including ranking members of Congress) to oppose a presidential order—to the point, many have said, of insubordination.

Definitions

Personnel policy can be defined many ways. Restricting the definition to minority integration ignores a great deal of other personnel issues, such as base force reductions, recruiting policies (including the use or ending of conscription), joint officer management, military family policies, military pay, use of the Selected Reserves and National Guard forces, educational incentives and benefits, etc. All of these fit under personnel policy, but are not included in the analysis. Limiting the cases to minority integration provides a parameter by which a comparative analysis can be made in a relatively simple manner. Surveying all personnel policy changes prior to and after the Goldwater-Nichols act would substantially increase the scope of the analysis and detail would be sacrificed for breadth. An analysis of minority integration provides an exemplar of many personnel policies, which, at the root consider elements of civil rights and population representation vs. military necessity balance. This balance is often the focus of civil-military relations.

Unlike civil-military relations in resource allocation and operations, policies put in place to change personnel structures are somewhat more complex. First of all, these decisions involve more peripheral but very active players outside of the executive and legislative branches of government. For example, in all integration cases lobbying efforts play at least some role in influencing members of Congress, members of the military, and/or members of the Executive. This is not to say that societal elements do not play a

role in resource allocation or operations, but there is less influence in the civil-military dynamic.

Consider, for example, the lobbying efforts of Black, female, gay, or conservative military organizations to intervene among Congress, the President, and military leadership prior to decisions to integrate. There is simply no comparable experience in the civil-military relations of resource allocation or operations. By nature, the inter-workings of these latter two realms of the military are more shielded from media or public interest group attention. Another example would be to compare minority integration negotiations to the civil-military transaction between, for example, President Johnson and the military to restrict bombing targets, or between the Secretary and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in negotiating the line items in any given year's defense budget. In both operations and resource allocation, the immediate players control information access and understand the process to a far greater extent than outside elements do. This is not the case with minority integration efforts, which in many cases may epitomize civil rights issues in the country at large. In most cases, these outside parties viewed their group's integration in the military as one part of a larger social movement.

Civil-military relations in personnel issues are also more complex because integration itself is tangential to the work the military does. Operations are the core function of the military and resource allocation directly impacts that core function. Whether or not a soldier or sailor, airman or marine is black, female, or gay does not essentially impact the military's ability to perform its national security function. It may, some argue however, have an impact in the minds of other non-black, non-female or non-

homosexual servicemembers and that impact *may* affect how well a unit functions. At the point between “may” and “does” is where an analysis of civil-military relations in personnel changes deviates from the parallel study in operations and resource allocation.

At what point, at what cost should the military conform to societal norms (whether conforming is to keep segregation, as with Blacks, or to integrate, as with gays), when its purpose is the actual, physical aspect of national defense? What does one have to do with the other? The integration of Blacks in the military preceded the full integration of Blacks in the general population. The integration of homosexuals in the military is well behind compared to the general population, and the integration of women is somewhere in between. The significance of the civil-military relationship is found somewhere in the question of why inclusion of minorities in the armed forces matters in the first place. This is a somewhat more theoretical than practical question and serves here only to demonstrate the complexities of an analysis of civil-military relations in minority integration issues. How important is it, after all, that civilian leadership has control over the military’s social policy, so long as the military successfully and efficiently defends the United States or U.S. interests? Though this question is only tangential to the main analysis, the asking of it is central to understanding how civil-military relations in minority integration are different than they are in resource allocation and operations.

Civil-Military Relations and Minority Integration Prior to Goldwater-Nichols

Racial integration is not merely a case of Truman against the military, as Desch suggests in his book *Civilian Control of the Military*:

Civilian efforts to improve the status of black Americans in the military gave rise to another conflict. Despite considerable de facto integration during the war, it was not until Truman's Executive Order 9981 of July 1948 that civilian leaders undertook a sustained effort to end racial segregation in the military. Truman's motives were largely political: he needed black support in the 1948 elections...Military leaders resisted integration for fear that it would undermine unit cohesion (Desch 1999, 26-27).

In fact, the forces pushing for and against integration included more than President Truman and military leadership—Congress was heavily involved as were a number of special interest organizations. As nothing ever happens in a vacuum, it is relevant to note that at the same time the military was undergoing integration it was also undergoing unification under a single department and Secretary. This meant that each service not only had different needs, but also different policies and judgments about how to integrate (or keep separate) their black enlisted members and officers. It meant too that since roles and missions were simultaneously being determined, racial integration was not necessarily the highest priority. Additionally, Truman's integration effort took place during an election year and part of his campaign included passing a selective service bill. The passage of the selective service bill is germane to analyses of both civil-military relations and integration because the Air Force and Navy were able to recruit enough high-quality volunteers, leaving the Army to absorb the majority of the less-skilled black inductees (Herspring 2005, 70). This caused interservice conflict¹¹² during a year that was already full of it:

[Army] staff particularly resented the different standards adopted by the other services to determine the acceptability of selectees. The Navy and Air Force, pleading their need for skilled workers and dependence on

¹¹² Earlier that year, in March was the Key West meeting where Secretary Forrestal tried to get the services to agree on a distribution of roles and missions. Another attempt to find accord occurred in Newport, RI in August, a month after Executive Order 9981. The following Spring the Navy lost its super carrier and later in October was the Revolt of the Admirals.

volunteer enlistments, imposed a higher minimum achievement score for admission than the Army, which, largely dependent upon the draft for its manpower, was required to accept men with lower scores. Thousands of Negroes, less skilled and with little education were therefore eligible for service in the Army although they were excluded from the Navy and Air Force. Given such circumstances, it was probably inevitable that differences in racial policies would precipitate an interservice conflict. The Army claimed the difference in enlistment standards was discriminatory and contrary to the provisions of the draft law which required the Secretary of Defense to set enlistment standards (MacGregor 1981, 325).

The Air Force eventually compromised and agreed to increase black enlistment to ten percent,¹¹³ but the Navy stood firm on its entrance requirements. Without equivalent entrance standards across the services, it meant that the Navy would get a larger proportion of those with high aptitudes and the smallest proportion of Blacks—the opposite being true for the Army (MacGregor 1981, 324-26).

With the services arguing over entrance standards and interpreting integration in ways best suiting their manpower needs and organizational goals, desegregation was stalling and it was the Secretary's responsibility to keep the services on task. He was unsuccessful. For example, Forrestal did not push the Navy to readdress its entrance standards in order to balance out the low-aptitude inductee distribution across the services. He found, instead, no evidence that any of the services were unduly discriminating in the selection of their enlistees (MacGregor 1981, 325). His lack of success in pushing the services to fall in line with the president's intent was in part due to his initial opposition to military unification and centralization in the first place.

MacGregor explains:

¹¹³ Based on the Gillem Board's findings, a 10 percent racial quota was established. The logic was that since Blacks represented 10 percent of the population, they should also represent 10 percent of the military's ranks. Instead of this percentage being a recommendation of a lower-limit, it was interpreted to designate the 10 percent as an upper-limit. The subsequent Fahy Committee recommended the quota's removal.

Forrestal soon discovered that certain problems rising out of common service experiences naturally converged on the office of the secretary. Both by philosophy and temperament he was disposed to avoid a clash with the services over integration. He remained sensitive to their interests and rights, and he frankly doubted the efficacy of social change through executive fiat. Yet Forrestal was not impervious to the aspirations of the civil rights activists; guided by a humane interest in racial equality, he made integration a departmental goal. His technique for achieving integration, however, proved inadequate in the face of strong service opposition, and finally the President, acting on the basis of these seemingly unrelated motives, had to issue the executive order to strengthen the defense secretary's hand (1981, 292).

The president was under increasing pressure from a potentially significant constituency to make the reforms happen. A black special interest group was formed by A. Philip Randolph called the League for Non-Violent Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation. Randolph informed the president that if he wasn't going to push desegregation, the League would ask Blacks to refuse to register under Truman's new selective service law (Herspring 2005, 70), legislation that was Truman was intent on passing (MacGregor 1981, 309-314). With the services applying the Gillem Board's ambiguous integration standards and a Secretary unwilling to exercise what little power he had to compel the service chiefs otherwise, Truman understood he would have to intervene.

Only days after Executive Order 9981 was signed, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley publicly stated he was opposed to making the Army an agent of social change and that desegregation in the Army will only come when it was a fact in the American populace (Dalfiume 1969, 172). The Chief of Staff eventually apologized to a receptive Truman, but the event gave the president an opportunity to clarify his order's intent to desegregate, which was not wholly apparent in the wording of the order and which left room for the Army to keep its "separate but equal" posture. Because of their more

stringent accession standards, the other services, as noted above, were able to exert somewhat more control over their integration policies compared to the Army.

Though it was true that the Army stalled on full integration, the delay was due in part to civilian entities—the Secretaries of the Army, Kenneth Royall¹¹⁴ and Gordon Gray. Using Desch’s model to dichotomize the conflict as a civil-military one is overly simplistic. It is not hard to understand how one of Truman’s own appointees, Kenneth Royall, would be one of the foot-draggers on implementing the President’s integration policy, however. First of all, the Democratic platform from which Truman was elected heavily emphasized civil rights, much more than Truman himself highlighted in his political appointments (MacGregor 1981, 291-309). Secretary Royall stalled on integration in part because of the quality issue discussed above, but also because it was his observation that despite the Fahy Committee’s findings to the contrary, the Army was in fact providing equal opportunity to Blacks (Herspring 2005, 71-72). It could also be the case that he was reflecting the attitude among the military leadership of the service he represented, which believed Blacks had under-performed as a whole during both world wars (Herspring 2005, 71).

A further example of this split in civilian control that continued the Army’s stall in implementing full integration was early in 1950 when Royall’s replacement, Gordon Gray, agreed to finally drop the ten percent racial quota (as the Fahy Committee recommended and wanted to enforce), only on the condition that Truman would allow its reinstatement if “a disproportionate balance of racial strengths” ensued (MacGregor

¹¹⁴ Secretary Royall retired from the Army as a Brigadier General and was the final Secretary of War before the 1947 National Security Act eliminated the position. He was also the first Secretary of Army under the new, unified military establishment. These two positions would be essentially the same except for the creation of the Secretary of Defense which was supposed to be the Secretary of the Army’s superior.

1981, 374). Truman agreed and left it to his subordinates to make sure the services, particularly the Army, would fall in line with the new integration policy. The Fahy Committee, less optimistic than Truman about the services' compliance, had recommended a watchdog group be established to ensure conformity to the integration policy, particularly by the Army and Marine Corps which many committee members doubted were ever going to fully yield to the new policy (MacGregor 1981, 375-79).¹¹⁵

In the end, Truman dismissed the committee and to some extent ended his commitment to integration. Congress, balanced between those opposing integration and those opposing segregation, was ineffective in filling the power vacuum. The result was that the services were left to police their own integration efforts. MacGregor writes:

[T]he demands of congressional progressives and obstructionists tended to cancel each other out, and in the wake of the Fahy Committee's disbandment the services themselves reemerged as the preeminent factor in the armed forces racial program. The services regained control by default. Logically, direction of racial reforms in the services should have fallen to the Secretary of Defense. In the first place, the secretary, other administration officials, and the public alike had begun to use the secretary's office as a clearinghouse for reconciling conflicting demands of the services, as an appellate court reviewing decisions of the service secretaries, and as the natural channel of communication between the services and the White House, Congress, and the public....The Personnel Policy Board or, later, the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel might well have become the watchdog recommended by the Fahy Committee to oversee the services' progress toward integration, but neither did (MacGregor 1981, 379-80).

In the end, it was not Truman's Executive Order nor the Defense Secretary compelling that order, but military manpower needs of the Korean War that brought a *de facto* end to

¹¹⁵ Fahy Committee members had good reason to be doubtful. MacGregor notes, "by July 1950, the last month of the Fahy Committee's life, the Army had added only seven more specialties with openings for Negroes to the list of forty published seven months before at the time of its agreement with the committee." Also, "the Army had disbanded the staff agency created to monitor the new policies and make future recommendations and had transferred both its two members to other duties" (1981, 375).

racial segregation (Astor 1998, 394-95). With Army size doubling within five months of the start of the war, racially segregated units became impractical. MacGregor writes,

The integration of the United States Army was not accomplished by executive fiat or at the demand of the electorate. Nor was it the result of any particular victory of the civil rights advocates over the racists. It came about primarily because the definition of military efficiency spelled out by the Fahy Committee and demonstrated by troops in the heat of battle was finally accepted by Army leaders. The Army justified its policy changes in the name of efficiency, as indeed it had always, but this time efficiency led the service unmistakably toward integration (MacGregor 1981, 428).

By the end of October 1954, Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, announced there were no more segregated units in any of the military organizations. To describe the integration event as the military falling into line with civilian command mischaracterizes the civil-military relationships and military necessities throughout the integration event. Also, to characterize the integration of Blacks as a civilian-military give-and-take excludes evidence that civilian leadership, from the president down to the service headquarters, had varying degrees of "buy-in" to the integration process itself.

Civilian control, good advice and service management during the integration of Blacks. The three measures of civil-military relations are more interrelated in the case of minority integration compared to operations and resource allocation because the services have always exercised more control over their personnel policies. How compliant the services are to the desegregation standards set by the Executive Order and to the interpretation of that order by the Fahy committee are measures of both civilian control and service management. The issue of getting good advice is less substantial because, though input from the services about how racial integration would affect effectiveness,

performance, unit cohesion and various other factors¹¹⁶ was sought, the bottom line was that integration would happen regardless of military advice.

Civilian control and service management were a mixed bag. Driven by outside demands, the president rescinded responsibility of seeing that the services completed their integration efforts. Truman's personality and leadership style play a significant part in his control of the military in general and his control of the military's compliance with integration policy specifically. There were numerous cases of insubordination during his two-term presidency—the Revolt of the Admirals and MacArthur's defiance during the Korean War to name just two. Though he asserted presidential power by firing Admiral Denfeld and General MacArthur, on both occasions he waited until the latest possible hour and attempted resolution through subordinates before doing anything. This signified indecisiveness to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who felt that on the one hand strong civilian leadership was necessary to assert control over the military but on the other hand, limited and public criticism of the president was a becoming a permissible way to assert influence over policy outcomes (Herspring 2005, 82-84 and Betts 1977, 141). General Bradley, for example, was not reprimanded for his public criticism of the president's integration policy. This brings to mind Clinton's lack of leadership in the Somalia operation where, in the absence of a definitive and decisive civilian policy, the military was given a great deal of latitude to determine the course of events. Also, Clinton and Truman delegated much responsibility down the chain of command and expected their

¹¹⁶ The Army's leadership based its arguments against desegregation on the fact that segregated black units underperformed during WW II. The fact remained that the limited number of mixed units performed well, but "insistence on the need for segregation in the name of military efficiency was also useful in rationalizing the prejudice and thoughtless adherence to traditional practice (MacGregor 1981, 428). Beside this fact, the president was not necessarily looking for advice on whether or not or even how fast to integrate. Even if advice was sought, it was most likely based on faulty or biased (and unrealistic) reasoning anyway.

subordinates to ensure the military was in step with stated policy. When the subordinates proved ineffective in doing this, the services, with greater vested interests in defining and managing integration at their own pace, provided the details to the discharge of that policy. There is some similarity of this behavior in the case of gay integration, as shown later in this chapter.

There are two other factors relevant to civilian control of the racial integration policy. First is the fact that the Fahy Committee, more than any other organization or power center at the time, held the services to the standard set forth in the Executive Order's intent—complete desegregation. Though this was a presidential-appointed committee, Truman disbanded it when committee members expressed concern that the Army and Marine Corps may not ever become compliant to the Executive Order without continued policing. The effect of the President disbanding the committee, the only power at the time willing to commit the services to desegregation, was to put the power back into the hands of the services. Though, in the balance, the service secretariats held a great deal of power with respect to determining the policy of desegregation, in the case of the Army, Secretary Royall was openly antagonistic to Truman's policy. Royall's replacement, Gordon Gray was more pliant, but exacted a deal with Truman that if the "social experiment" failed, the Army could design its integration how it wanted. This is hardly the height of presidential control over military policy. Herspring writes, "the idea of any service going to the president and agreeing to carry out his instructions 'on one condition' was unheard of" (2005, 83). In addition, since the two secretaries of defense¹¹⁷ overseeing the fledgling desegregation efforts were basically ineffectual in compelling integration, the services were able to stall the effort. MacGregor writes, "[Secretary]

Johnson had done nothing to enforce the Executive Order in the Army and his successor achieved little more. Willing to let the services set the pace of reform, neither secretary substantially changed the armed forces' racial practices” (1981, 396). The fact that Truman’s’ own civilian subordinates did not pursue compliance with the policy meant that he either *could* not or *did* not want to expend the political capital necessary to enforce his own Executive Order.

Secondly, Congress, while divided over integration, became a sounding board for the leadership of the military services to oppose the integration policy, thus splitting civilian authority—the executive and legislative—on the issue. This occurs again with the Clinton policy on the integration of gays in the military during the 1990s, as will be discussed below. Starting under the Truman administration, this congressional tool changed the nature of military compliance to civilian control. Herspring explains:

No longer a bilateral affair between the president and the military, civil-military relations had evolved into a three-way interaction that would make such relations stormier and more difficult to control. Henceforth, the president would have greater difficulty when trying to change military culture (Herspring 2005, 84).

In conclusion, analysis of civilian authority to control compliance and to manage the services approach to compliance with desegregation policy was weaker than a mere glance at the outcome of racial integration proves. In the case of race, most in-depth historical accounts point to the increased manpower needs of the Korean War (military necessity) and the Fahy Committee as the main causal factors in ending racial segregation. To a large extent, the integration of women follows a similar pattern in that military necessity, and not necessarily civilian command, hastened the process towards greater integration (Devilbiss 1990, 31).

¹¹⁷ James V. Forrestal was the secretary until March 28, 1949. He was replaced by Louis A. Johnson.

Women's integration. There are two gender-related integration efforts prior to the Goldwater-Nichols act—the establishment of an auxiliary women's corps after World War II and women's gradual integration into the regular military during the 1970s. In both cases, the civil-military relations are focused on congressional activism vs. military compliance as well as the overwhelming manpower needs, particularly of the Army. Also, the political milieu of the mid-Twentieth Century provided a cultural climate that prompted the military to be more accepting, even if begrudgingly, of a more diverse recruiting pool. To some extent the question of women's integration was not so much a matter of whether, but of when and under what conditions.

Unlike the integration of Blacks, the integration of women was more evolutionary. The first major legislation after World War II was Public Law 625, the Women's Armed Services' Integration Act of 1948. The act severely limited women's role in the military on the one hand, but provided women with a permanent status on the other. There was no real civil-military conflict over the passage of this initial act. This is most likely because the act stipulated that a) The various women's military organizations¹¹⁸ would not supplant nor have dominion over men (so the military leadership had nothing to lose in terms of military culture); b) A majority in Congress, the president, major military leaders, and the U.S. populace were generally supportive of a permanent status for women; and c) There was a perceived military need to increase

¹¹⁸ By 1949 there were nine separately administered women's military groups: The Army Medical Specialist Corps, the Air Force Medical Specialists Corps, the WACS, WAVES, WAF and Women Marines. There were also three Nurse Corps, one each for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is a bit of a misnomer to describe the WAF as a separate corps. In fact, the acronym stands for Women in the Air Force. Women in the Air Force were actually part of the Air Force—there was no separate corps (Holm 1992, 109, 122).

manpower. The actual wording of P.L. 625 stated that one of its objectives was to assist in filling personnel requirements to “lessen the need for a peacetime draft.”

Though there was no overt conflict between civilian leadership (either in the White House or Congress) there is evidence that suggests there was opposition to a permanent status for women coming from within the military ranks in the form of non-official testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) (Holm 1992, 116). The off-the-record statements made to members of the HASC were apparently so intense that the committee only initially passed the Reserves portion of the bill. It took testimonies of the highest-ranking members of all services, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Forrestal in support of the legislation to get the full bill passed. And with little or no regard for social mores, each military leader argued for passage underscoring military need. CNO Nimitz testified that women

...are as important to the efficient operation of the Naval establishment during peacetime as they were during war years...The Navy’s request for the retention of women is not made as a tribute to their past performance. We have learned that women can contribute to a more efficient Navy. Therefore, we would be remiss if we did not make every effort to utilize their abilities (in Holm 1992, 117).

Once the act was passed into law, complete authority was given to each service secretary to determine how the law would take effect (Devilbiss 1990, 9). This was an important addition to the act since it gave the services, albeit under the control of the secretariat umbrella, total control to define women’s utilization—even concerning the issue of combat. There was never any debate in the 1940s about whether combat jobs would be open to women; rather, there was debate about whether or not there was a statutory need to keep women *out* of combat jobs—as it was a given that women should and would not be anywhere near combat. Nevertheless, during the Senate hearings it was

decided to explicitly delineate women's non-combat role. The act states that women may not "be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships and naval transports." According to Holm's history, the Navy's representative at the hearings argued against including such explicit language, that though the Navy wasn't intending on assigning women to combat ships, it didn't feel it was necessary to codify the exclusion in the law (Holm 1992, 118). This is, again, the reoccurring attitude among military leaders—that it is within their prerogatives to define their own institutional design, norms, and culture.

But for the onset of war in Korea, it is hard to imagine the creation of permanent status for women would not have received more opposition from military leadership. If there had been no personnel shortages, there may well have been civil-military conflict more comparable to the integration of Blacks. On the other hand, the Women's Armed Services Integration act was itself a misnomer. Women were not fully integrated until nearly three decades later in 1978 when the separate women's organizations were abolished and women were subsumed into the regular military services.

This second integration effort prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols saw the addition of a new civilian interloper into the decisions of military culture—the courts. Female servicemembers were beginning to use the civilian courts to sue the services for unfair personnel policies. In 1975 for example, the Defense Department dropped its pregnancy discharge policy because federal courts were leaning heavily towards ruling for the women who were filing suit against the services for discriminatory practice (Yarbrough 1985, 48 and Binkin and Bach 1977, 44). Similarly in 1973, the Supreme Court in *Frontiero v. Richardson* decided 8-1 in favor of the female Air Force officer

challenging the Air Force's denial of dependency benefits to married women officers—benefits that were not denied to men (Binkin 1993, 6).

The court cases were part of a larger social movement. Scholars have suggested that the final integration effort in 1978 was due, in large part, to the fact that the military fully expected ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, which stated simply that equality will not be denied or abridged by the United States on account of sex. Binkin and Bach note, “The armed forces did not wait for the states to ratify the ERA before instituting changes. Many were initiated by the services, either because they perceive a genuine need or because they saw the handwriting on the wall” (1977, 14).

Throughout the 1970s many blatant discriminatory personnel policies were withdrawn and slowly women were being integrated into the broader military scope (i.e. they were not just seen as auxiliary units). But the civil-military conflict was not so much focused on whether integration was going to happen at all but on how far it would go. For example, much of the ERA worry among military leadership centered on women's role in combat and whether or not ratification meant women would be part of a draft. The latter was decided without much debate when Nixon allowed the draft law to expire. Equal rights legislation and the end of the draft were two parallel realities the military was faced with. Holm describes their consequences:

The need to expand the numbers of women for the all-volunteer force in the seventies coincided accidentally, but fortunately, with the national drive for women's legal and economic equality. This convergence precipitated the first major overhaul of service laws and regulations since the creation of the WAAC in World War II. It resulted in stunning reversals of policies long regarded as inviolable...In the end, the services' own personnel management needs propelled many of the changes. The need to recruit ever-growing numbers of people and to absorb them into the military work force required greater flexibility in selection, training,

and utilization. Separate, dual systems simply were too wasteful and cumbersome to meet the services' needs (1992, 261).

So, it was clear to everyone both in and out of military service that women were becoming permanent fixtures, but when Carter came to office he pushed the services beyond the simple notion of permanent status. He brought with him two complementary ideals of increasing the role of women in the military and ensuring that the new All Volunteer Force (AVF) was a success. For Carter, an increased female role meant lifting combat restrictions and more than doubling the number of women already serving. For the services, it was too much, too quickly. The crux of any civil-military conflict was on determining the proper place and proportion of women's presence.

There is evidence to suggest that during the 1970s the services, in providing advice to Defense leadership, derived elaborate ways to limit the number of non-combat job specialties that could be open to women. For example, in its 1976 report entitled, *Women in the Army Study*, the Army created a "formula for limiting the number of women as a function of a unit's proximity to the battlefield" (Binkin 1993, 12).¹¹⁹ The Navy and Marine Corps maintained that based on shipboard assignments and their requirements for rotation base, only 55-75 percent of non-combat jobs could be open to women (Holm 1992, 255). And the Air Force claimed there were inadequate facilities for women—men and women, for example, were not allowed to share dormitory space connected by a hallway (Holm 1992, 256).

Despite bad and biased advice from each military service about the expedient level of women's integration, Carter and his Defense Secretary Harold Brown pushed for

¹¹⁹ Holm writes, "The number of positions available to women was systematically reduced until the total reached 50,4000, a number more acceptable to the Army leadership. An exercise designed to come up with

reform. It was their intent to ensure the AVF's success—they were certain that increasing female enlistment would offset recruiting shortfalls. During this time there were a number of studies devoted to examining the extent and limit of women's role in the Army. For example, the 1976 Women in the Army study was published a month before Carter was inaugurated.

In the same time frame, 1975-1977, the Army launched a series of experimental field studies to test the effect on performance of units that had various proportions of female soldiers, ranging from 0-35 percent. With these tests, called MAX-WAC and REFORGER,¹²⁰ Army leadership hoped to find at what percentage of mix women would begin to negatively impact unit performance (Morden 1990, 371-72). As the studies showed no adverse impact at any percentage, Defense Secretary Brown and President Carter pushed the services to double their number of enlisted women.¹²¹ There was still opposition. Morden writes,

Though his own statistics and studies proved otherwise, the DCSPER [Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel] believed a higher content of women would dilute the Army's ability to perform its missions. He told the assistant secretary, "We should err on the side of national security until such time as we have confidence that the basic mission of the Army can be accomplished with significantly more female content in the active force" (1990, 375-76).

Though this belief among the top Army leaders persisted, it did not stop the military from dropping all women's auxiliary groups and achieving full integration (the question of

a preconceived tolerable strength level, this was a classic example of a decision in search of a rationale" (1992, 257).

¹²⁰ MAX-WAC was formerly called, Women Content in Units Force Development Test and REFORGER stood for Return to Forces, Germany.

¹²¹ It is relevant to note that the Army's Chief of Staff directed the commander of the U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, Major General Julius Becton, to analyze the methods and results of the MAX-WAC. Becton added an addendum to the report that illustrated that the units could not support more than a content of 20 percent women. General Becton recommended tests under more "realistic conditions" be carried out (Morden 1990, 372).

combat still open for debate). The confluence of women's expanding societal roles (including the looming passage of the ERA), more and more court cases forcing the military to reckon with its own discriminatory policies, the stark military manpower needs of the fledgling AVF and a progressive pro-ERA president coming to office, the WAC was disbanded and women became fully integrated into the military units open to them.

Despite the fact that women's integration was finally permanent, there continued to be civil-military conflict over the issue—particularly in terms of military compliance with the perceived need of a larger female presence in order to insure the AVF's success.

As Holm notes

Throughout the 1980s, the issue of military women continued to generate tensions and open conflict between appointed civilian officials and military leaders. On the one hand, civilian officials, committed to strengthening the armed forces in a period of shrinking resources, sought to expand the utilization of women as a means for meeting overall military personnel requirements while resisting pressures to restore the peacetime draft... The tradition-bound military leadership, on the other hand, mistrusted the motives of political appointees, especially in matters of military personnel policy. When it came to women, the military instinctively defended the status quo, and on numerous occasions even sought to reverse the trends (1992, 382).

With a socially conservative Ronald Reagan resoundingly defeating Carter, a champion of women's rights and advancement, the military was poised to challenge the outgoing Secretary's plans for increasing female recruitment. About a month after Reagan's swearing in, the Army's Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the DCSPER announced they were planning on cutting back female recruitment (Holm 1992, 388). Again, as they did during the Carter administration, Army officials claimed women's participation led to a degradation of unit performance. Most of the claims to

that effect were wholly unsupported by the conclusions of the various studies undertaken during the 1970s (Holm 1992, 390). Some have suggested the Army's more dubious reason for undercutting women's achievements was to destabilize the AVF enough that Congress would be forced to reinstate the draft. Senator Proxmire (D-Wisconsin), a longtime government and military spending watchdog declared,

Women have made the All-Volunteer Force successful to date. So maybe what lies behind the Army's change of policy is the simple decision to restrict women recruits, accept the inevitable shortfalls in manpower levels, and then justify a return to the draft (in Dudney 1982, 44).¹²²

During the same time period, another study commissioned by OSD,¹²³ reanalyzed women's role in the military. The conclusions of this most recent report echoed previous ones in that it showed women were not damaging military readiness, but it added an important caveat that put more power within the services reach to determine, internally, their own personnel policies. The report stated that the services' methodologies for computing end-strength needs and accession goals were "reasonable" (U.S. Department of Defense, 1981). Holm explains that, in fact, these so-called reasonable methodologies were "essentially elaborate data manipulations designed as rationale for supporting predetermined female ceilings and for keeping women out of mainline operational functions" (1992, 394). In other words, the advice provided to civilians about how to utilize female personnel in achieving end-strength was, to some extent, disingenuous. This did not escape OSD's notice, however. When providing data for this report, OSD concluded that the services (in particular the Army) failed to verify the presence of

¹²² Reagan had wanted to increase the military by ten percent. He was told by his top military advisors that the ten percent goal was unreachable and that for the first time since the start of the AVF, all services failed to meet their recruitment goals. They pushed him to reinstate the draft (Breuer 1997, 134).

¹²³ The study, entitled *Background Review—Women in the Military* was published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, October 1981.

women's direct effect on readiness and mission execution (Holm 1992, 394). The Army entreated DOD *again* for time to study the case further—MAX-WAC, REFORGER and many other studies notwithstanding. DOD allowed the Army to pause its female recruitment until the matter was settled but, DOD added, the pause will cease if the Army “failed to meet its total recruiting, end strength, or quality goals” (U.S. Department of Defense, 1981).

It was clear that the new Reagan administration and both Secretaries Weinberger and Carlucci were committed to a voluntary military comprised of both men and women despite the services' advice to the contrary. By 1982 the Secretary of Defense officially ended the pause in female recruitment by declaring that women were vital to maintain readiness and quality (Devilbiss 1992, 19). This settled the issue, but the women-in-combat debate, raised by Carter, would not be raised again for another decade.

Advice and control during women's integration. In terms of the two civil-military measures of getting good advice and service control, there is a clear trend during the second wave of women's integration of the military providing bad advice and to a limited extent, subverting civilian control by either using a series of stalling techniques or by simply interpreting what compliance of the policy meant.

This was particularly true for the Army. The Army stalled compliance with the effort by the Carter administration to double its female enlisted by 1983 and literally paused its female recruitment after the Reagan administration took over, thinking the incoming Republican administration would allow the military much more latitude to determine its personnel policies than the outgoing Democratic one. When these policies bumped up against the Reagan administration's manpower goals, the civil-military

conflict over control of women's continued integration ensued with the military eventually losing. The tactics used by Army leadership were commissioning study after study, ultimately delaying decisions, hopefully in order to find evidence or a new executive leadership that would support maintaining, limiting, or even curtailing the current proportion of women. Both during the integration of Blacks and women, the military used this stall-by-study technique to delay compliance. Also for both the Blacks and female integration waves, internal policies (accession policies for Black integration and job classification policies for female integration) were used successfully to temporarily limit compliance. In the end, however, the military necessity argument overruled all other arguments—Reagan wanted to expand the size of the military and he needed women to do it.

Civil-Military Relations and Minority Integration After Goldwater-Nichols

During the post-Goldwater-Nichols period, there are two personnel integration efforts—increasing women in combat and rescinding the ban against homosexuals. When taking a first look at these two issues, it appears that there is more overt civil-military conflict compared to integration waves prior to GNA. It also appears there is a comparable amount of the military's assertion of unsolicited advice, both directly to OSD and the President, as well as through Congress. The organizational differences instituted by GNA that could be linked to having an effect on these civil-military measures are the increased power of the Chairman of the JCS and the fact that the service chiefs, being put outside of the operational chain of command, were more focused on their organizational

role. Also, the secretary and service secretaries were empowered by GNA to assert more influence and control over their respective services.

Women in combat overview. The civil-military controversies of women in combat precede gay integration controversies. The first Senate bills introduced in 1947 establishing women's permanent military status did not contain specific combat exclusion language and in fact, the combat issue was not seriously discussed during legislative hearings (DeCew, 1995, 61-63). The exclusion amendment first appeared in the House hearings and was later added to the bill. When the bill was sent back to the Senate, there was no discussion of the combat exclusion amendment and conference report records show there was no clear rationale behind its addition (DeCew 1995, 62). In 1956, the combat exclusion became codified in Title X of the U.S. code (Culler 2000, 16). In 1978, Carter attempted a repeal of the combat exclusion but in congressional hearings the Navy and Marine Corps "scuttled" the effort (Culler 2000, 18). In 1988, the Department of Defense adopted a policy called the Risk Rule, which provided a DOD-wide standard for determining which units were close to combat. The rule excluded women from assignment to non-combat units if there was a risk of exposure to "direct combat hostile fire, or capture" (Government Accounting Office 1998, 2). Each service determined how to apply the risk rule.

The first break in the combat exclusion trend came in 1991 when the 1992 Defense Authorization Act annulled the prohibition against Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps women to serve aboard combat aircraft (Government Accounting Office 1998, 2). There was opposition in Congress to the repeal and though the aviation combat exclusion was annulled in fact, the committee agreed that the repeal would not take effect until a

Presidential Commission would be appointed to study it and issue an informed decision about whether or not the aviation ban should remain lifted. The following year Congress repealed naval combat ship exclusions (Government Accounting Office 1998, 2). Despite the progressive trend toward allowing women into more military specializations that had previously been unavailable, the ground combat exclusion remained and its legal status was fortified by George Bush's Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, which recommended not only ground and but also aviation combat assignments remain excluded.

In 1993, blatantly ignoring the recommendations of the previous president's Commission, Secretary of Defense Aspin directed the military to open up aviation and naval combat vessels to women (Porter and Adside 2001, 35). He also replaced the 1988 Risk Rule with a clearer definition of what constituted ground combat. He also directed the services to open up an additional 260,000 jobs previously excluded to women. And though the same ground combat exclusion has been the law for nearly a decade, changes in modern combat, exemplified during multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, has forced the Army to define its own women in combat policy, claiming that the 1994 definition of ground combat is outdated.

Civil-military relations and women in combat. There was largely no civil-military relations breakdown with the easing of combat restriction rules. This is not to suggest, though, that the military's voice was absent in the repeal of the combat exclusion laws—in fact, in the hearings prior to the 1992 Defense Authorization Bill, the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified *en masse* against repeal of the aviation exclusion. Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono testified to Sam Nunn, “I do not want you to change the law, nor do I want

Congress to direct us to make any policy changes that would inhibit the policy that we have now” (in Francke 1997, 231). But it was, perhaps, the testimony of the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill McPeak that exposed military opinion on the matter as biased. When asked by Senator William Cohen if he had to choose between a less qualified male pilot and a qualified female pilot to send to combat, General McPeak admitted he would chose the man (Francke 1997, 231-32). If not good, the advice was at least genuine.

More important to the research at hand is that the Goldwater-Nichols act did not play much of a role in getting good advice, managing the services, and maintaining civilian control. This is most likely because the newly empowered Chairman did not chime in on either side of the issue. With respect to the initial cancellation of the aviation combat restriction, civilians were clearly in control—the issue being mostly driven by congressional actors.¹²⁴ In fact, besides those members of Congress involved, it was civilian entities with vested interest who mounted expert campaigns to support their positions. Both sides found military, both active-duty and retired, willing to testify on behalf of, or against repealing the aviation combat exclusion, but the military itself did not initiate the campaign on either side. And while there were minor civil military skirmishes, they occurred mostly at lower administrative levels (Francke 1997, 238-40).

When Clinton came to office and focused on lifting the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps combat aviation ban against women, military leadership was more focused

¹²⁴ Women in combat legislation was not supported by the Bush administration—in fact he was opposed to it (Culler 2000, 93). The legislative decision came down to repealing combat aviation restrictions but only after thorough investigation. When Bush’s commission finished this investigation, the President did not even endorse the recommendations before passing it off to Congress. Because the Commission report came out near the Presidential elections that Clinton won, most understood its recommendations carried no weight.

on Clinton's repeal of the gay ban. Where JCS Chairman Colin Powell was quiet about women in combat, he was notoriously assertive in opposition to lifting the gay ban. It has been suggested that the military leadership was less concerned about allowing women in combat planes and ships than they were about repealing the restrictions against homosexuals—so that is where their energies went, and Powell's in particular. Naval Captain Georgia Sadler is quoted as saying, "the big personnel issue at the time was the homosexual one...the other stuff on women sort of slid along with no one paying attention" (interviewed by Culler 2000, 93). While it is not entirely true that the women in combat issue went by unnoticed, it does point to the notion that military leadership, feeling attacked by the new President's socially experimental agenda, was willing to be selective in its battles. In the case of women in combat, not just the President, but public opinion was squarely in favor; so putting energy into fighting it may have meant losing ground on the gay front.

Another factor exogenous to civil-military leadership clashes that empowered civilians on women in combat was the Navy's public relations campaign in the wake of the Tailhook scandal (taking place in 1991). Lawmakers, such as Congressman Schroeder (D -Colorado) skillfully linked restriction on women's roles in the services to sexual harassment. Some have suggested that this tactic "cowed" the Navy into lifting combat restrictions (Donnelly 1994, 59). Whether the connection between harassment and job restrictions is causal or not, it was hard for policymakers to deny there was patent bias against women in the Navy's aviation community.¹²⁵ So, whether genuinely

¹²⁵ It has also been argued that Chief Naval Officer at the time of Tailhook, Admiral Frank Kelso, had been relatively more proactive in protecting the rights of Navy women. In 1990 the Admiral had quickly responded to sexual misconduct against a female midshipman at the Naval Academy, ordered a study on the progress of women in the Navy and after Tailhook relieved two commanding officers for making fun of

interested in expanding women's roles or not the Navy, under leadership of CNO Kelso, did not object to Aspin's policy on the assignment of women to "surface combat ships, all combat aircraft squadrons, all afloat staff and units of the Naval Construction Force" (Breuer 1997, 188).

Though Congress had lifted the combat restriction for aviation jobs in 1991 (pending the Presidential Commission finding which was debunked by the Clinton administration), the Air Force was not going to comply unless forced. It was only a week before Aspin announced the lifting of the aviation combat restriction that Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak issued the infamous comment that he'd rather fly with a less-qualified man than a qualified woman (Lancaster 1993, A1). So, while the more compliant Navy was going in the direction of opening up more job specialties (and more combat-related jobs) to women, the Air Force was doing the opposite. According to several *New York Times* pieces mid-1993, the Air Force announced a plan to stop training female aviation students on high-performance training aircraft, a move that would preclude women from eventual training on combat aircraft.

Inconsistent policies on women in combat aviation forced Aspin to set a more definitive policy. On April 8, 1993 he sent a memo to the all Service Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The intent was unequivocal: "effective immediately...the services shall permit women to compete for assignments in...aircraft engaged in combat missions." It also required the Army and Marine Corps to "study opportunities for women to serve in additional assignments, including but not limited to

Member of Congress Pat Schroeder (Breuer 1997, 166-67). Even so, it is hard to deny the obvious tactic. As an April 12, 1993 *New York Times* editorial remarks, the Admiral "wants to expand the role of women, first by opening up the number of shipboard jobs and eventually by allowing women to serve in combat.

field artillery and air defense artillery.” Later that year, Congress’ 1994 Defense Authorization Act repealed the naval combat ship exclusion. The Act also required the Department of Defense to notify Congress if it planned to open any more combat positions to women (Government Accounting Office 1999, 2). After a the policy was set, the Air Force leadership had no recourse but to accept the ruling and fall into line, which it did.

The civil-military conflict over the repeal of ground combat positions previously denied to women was more intense than the repeal of the aviation and naval vessel job ban. During the following January of 1994, newly appointed Secretary Perry rescinded the Risk Rule and created a new definition of ground combat. This definition barred women only from those units below the brigade level¹²⁶ that engage in direct ground combat or collocate with units that do (Harrell and Miller 1997, xvii). Changing the ground combat definition took the Air Force and Navy out of the women-in-combat spotlight, to be replaced by the Army and Marine Corps.

It was the Clinton administration’s intent to open more combat positions to women, as was characterized by the complete disregard shown to the Bush Commission’s recommendations on women’s assignments. In line with that trend, and the trend put forward by Aspin’s April 1993 memo, Army Secretary Togo West notified Defense Secretary William Perry on June 1, 1994 that he wanted to open up several job specialties to women that were previously closed, to include, combat engineer, air defense artillery, special operations aircraft, and field artillery. Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon

There may be a public relations motive here; the admiral's initiative could sweeten the aroma that's sure to rise from the Navy's final report on the 1991 Tailhook convention” (A16).

¹²⁶ A brigade is comprised of battalions containing approximately 3,000 – 5,000 ground combat units divided into companies. Battalions form part of divisions, armies, or corps.

Sullivan only learned about West's intent after the memo to Perry was leaked to the press. According to an aide, Sullivan "hit the roof" (Breuer 1997, 195). A July 27, 1994 *New York Times* article reports,

The highly charged issue has led customarily collegial Army leaders to criticize each other for the way the matter has been handled. Senior generals have challenged their civilian leaders, arguing that civilians with little or no combat experience have let their idealistic goals interfere with military effectiveness (Schmitt 1994, A12).

Secretary Perry essentially told West and Sullivan to reach an agreement on their own—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force had all submitted their women-in-combat plans weeks before with little internal conflict (Schmitt 1994, A12). West faced extreme opposition from Sullivan and was virtually forced to withdraw his original recommendations to Perry (Desch 1999, 31 and Breuer 1997, 194-95). The compromise plan allowed women to be assigned only to air defense artillery battalions and helicopters that fly cover for tanks (Schmitt 1994, A12).

In the end, nearly 260,000 positions had been technically opened to women. But, according to a 1997 RAND report, women filled only a small fraction of those open to them (Harrell and Miller 1997, 12). There were numerous reasons for this, such as lack of interest on the part of women in non-traditional positions, the relatively small number of women in the pipeline for these jobs, naval berthing shifts, etc. The RAND report cites the Navy as having the most successful policy integrating women under the new policies and the Army as engaging in off-the-record assignment policies which stunt women's career opportunities (Harrell and Miller 1997, 13). Harrell and Miller write,

Both male and female focus-group participants and command personnel told us that Army women's integration into newly opened units has been restricted unofficially. Reportedly, some local commanders resist having more than a few women in these units, and thus send "surplus" women to

work elsewhere. Second, some local commanders will not assign women to certain newly opened units because they have made their own interpretations of the collocation restriction and concluded that some assignments that are officially open to women should be closed (1997, 13).

This is an example of how policy decisions can be interpreted, implemented or *not* implemented at levels below the watch of decisionmakers, both civilian and military. Though Goldwater-Nichols empowered the civilian service secretaries to have more oversight and control over their military branch, there were still compliance problems.

The most recent incidents of non-compliance to the 1994 ground combat policy have occurred during deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and again involve the Army. The incidents provide a more surprising example of a military organization defining its own policy with much less regard for civilian-driven policy than its own, obvious military manpower needs during times of heavy deployment.

For a decade the ground combat policy has remained in tact. But during recent deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, in a remarkable about-face, the Army is integrating women into fighting units (Tyson 2005, A1). Less than a decade before, the same Army that used unofficial means to restrict women from near-combat jobs is doing it again for the opposite purpose. Political conservatives, such as those who would have sided with the Army during times of trying to limit women's military role, are now the whistleblowers against the institution. For example, MacKubin Thomas Owens writes,

The U.S. Army is quietly making a radical change in its personnel policy that may well see the 3rd Infantry Division redeploy to Iraq early next year with mixed-sex support companies collocated with combat units. The move violates not only Defense Department regulations, but also the requirement to notify Congress when such a change goes into effect (2004, 24)

Elaine Donnelley, President of the Center for Military Readiness writes,

...Does the President know what the Army is doing? On the issue of women in land combat, it seems no one is in charge. High-level civilians are circumventing law and policy, members of Congress are being misled and decorated generals seem to have lost all perspective. ...[A] four-page Army document--which is described as "unofficial" but is being implemented anyway--actually changes the wording and meaning of the Pentagon's collocation rule. It also alters the "gender codes" of 24 of 225 Army positions--mostly mechanics--in a typical forward support company (FSC), opening up 10% of these previously all-male positions to women. This arbitrary change in status...clearly violates current Defense Department rules. FSCs differ from transportation and other support units that come and go intermittently. All soldiers are at risk, but FSC personnel are trained to operate in constant proximity with land combat troops that engage in deliberate offensive action against the enemy (Donnelly 2005, 247)

A March 2005 message from the Army Secretary, Chief of Staff and Sergeant Major rebut the claim the Army is in noncompliance with the 1994 DOD combat directive:

Much of the public discussion on women in combat has been characterized by portrayals of how women have served in the Army in the past, the dangers women face in combat zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and their assignment to the new Brigade Combat Team Units of Action. Recent operations in the War on Terrorism consistently show that any Soldier, whether performing combat or support missions, may be exposed to combat hazards. Moreover, within the new Brigade Combat Team Units of Action women are assigned to subordinate companies, such as the Forward Support Companies of the Brigade Support Battalion, and serve in dangerous combat support missions. This is consistent with both DOD and Army policy and is unchanged from past practice (Preston, Schoemaker and Harvey 2005, 3).

At the point of contention is the single word "conducting." The supposed change to the Army's policy¹²⁷ states that women are barred from units, which routinely collocate with those units *conducting* a combat mission. By adding the word "conducting" it implies a mix-gender support company can collocate with combat units at times when they are not conducting combat. There is enough anecdotal evidence, as supplied by the *Washington*

Post and *New York Times* and other media sources, to believe the Army is not in compliance with the intent of the 1994 women-in-combat policy. Either that, or it simply may be the case that engaging in war in Afghanistan and Iraq means it impossible to define combat in a way to protect soldiers (whether male or female) who are not in ground combat units. Or perhaps, it is some of both. The only clear intent decipherable from the Army's action is one of military necessity.

In response to the Army's move, on May 18, 2005 the House Armed Services Committee debated an amendment to the DOD ground combat directive that would have closed nearly 22,000 jobs to women. The bill would have essentially barred Army women from units that provide forward support to direct combat units near the front line. Army officials provided testimony that such an amendment would undermine morale. Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Richard Cody said passing the amendment would send "the wrong signal to the brave young men and women fighting the global war on terrorism" (Moniz and Stone 2005, A1). Retired General Gordon Sullivan also submitted a letter to the committee opposing the amendment. A compromise amendment (attached to the 2006 Defense Authorization bill) was passed that backed off removing women from forward support units, but it requires the Rumsfeld to report to Congress what positions have been opened to women since the advent of the 1994 policy.

Civil-military relations and women in combat. Within 10 years the Army has shifted its women-in-combat policy and it is appropriate to ask if the changes instituted in Goldwater-Nichols are at all relevant to the civil-military disputes apparent in those policy debates. Ten years ago the Army fought its civilian leader, Togo West, who tried

¹²⁷ The policy stems from a January 23, 2005 internal Army paper, entitled the Women in Combat Point Paper out of the Secretary of the Army's office (Scarborough 2005, A1).

to radically modify the Army policy barring women from all combat and many near-combat specializations. If Goldwater-Nichols were to have any effect at all it would have been in strengthening the service secretaries, backed by a powerful Defense Secretary vis-à-vis a supposedly less powerful service chief of staff. The powerful service secretary could then compel the services to implement policy changes. But West was only minimally successful in exacting compliance from General Sullivan. It is difficult to make the case that Goldwater-Nichols enhanced civilian power and military advice under these circumstances.

Army leadership now—civilian and military in tandem—appears to be bordering on non-compliance on the women-in-combat policy. In this latter case, the difference is that the military is deployed. Military necessity seems to trump compliance to a policy that may have made sense immediately following the Gulf War when troops were minimally deployed, but doesn't make sense now when the vast majority of Army personnel over the last three years have been deployed at least once. While there seems to be no effect with the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols on civilian control, getting advice, or service management, the military services still wield a great deal of power in determining personnel policies. When civilians do assert some control, the results are mixed (the military was more compliant with civilian aviation combat policy, for example, than with a ground combat policy). Analyzing the civil-military conflict over the gay ban may add more insight.

Gays in the military. The difference in involvement of the Chairman of the JCS during the process of women's integration into combat jobs vs. gay integration, which occurred at approximately the same time, was stark. While there was virtually no

involvement of the Chairman in the former, he was heavily involved in the latter. The difference probably stems, in part, from the way the incoming president Bill Clinton formed policy decisions. Allowing women in combat was a forgone conclusion, for example; to sanction it, all Clinton needed to do was to overturn the results of a lame-duck Presidential Commission, the recommendations of which were not endorsed even by the president who commissioned it! Lifting the ban on gays, on the other hand, was done by Executive Order.¹²⁸ Also, as mentioned above, of the two personnel issues facing the military—gay integration and women in combat—the latter appeared to be more tolerable of the two.

Even before Clinton was inaugurated, the Joint Chiefs threatened to resign if such a policy were foisted on them. They continued to leak their opposition to the press throughout the controversy (Morganthau et al. 1993, 52). The Chairman, General Powell was the most vocal. During a January 12, 2003 speech at the Naval Academy, Powell told the midshipmen that if they found the new policy lifting the ban on gays so completely unacceptable that “it strikes the heart of your moral beliefs, then I think you have to resign” (Lancaster 1993, A10). Powell never backed down from his public and private opposition and as a result, was labeled by the press as recalcitrant, defiant and rebellious (Herspring 2005, 341).

In response to claims that he was insubordinate, Powell countered that he had every right to speak up. His spokesman issued the following statement:

I'm bothered by the notion that there are legitimate differences between the chairman and the president . . . which are characterized as

¹²⁸ The policy, initiated under Carter's Department of Defense and implemented, by DOD Directive 1332.14, under President Reagan, banned gay military personnel outright (Belkin 2003, 108). Since the policy was put in place, in 1982 until 1993 approximately 14,000 gay military personnel were discharged under this directive (Lawrence 1993, 187).

insubordination...The chairman, as the principal military adviser to the president . . . has not only a duty but a right and responsibility to express his views and opinions (in Lancaster 1993, A10).

The Chairman understood his authority and responsibilities as newly defined by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is arguable, however, that Powell was abiding by the law's intent by going public with his advice. And it begs the question about whether providing advice includes provoking opposition against the commander in chief if the President doesn't ask for, like, or use that advice. Both Democratic and Republican congressional opposition to lifting the ban bolstered Powell and the chiefs' opposition. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, pushed Clinton for a compromise; otherwise, he argued, Congress could and would undermine Clinton's Executive Order by writing law reinstating the ban.¹²⁹ As Korb points out, "the constitution makes the president the commander in chief, but it gives Congress the power to raise and support armies...and to make rules for the governance and regulation of the land and naval forces" (Korb 1996, 296). Congress could write legislation banning homosexuals in the same manner it wrote laws that prevented women from flying combat planes.

Military leadership proved very skillful at fighting the President. Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos, in his book *All Too Human*, explained when the Chiefs met with Clinton late January at the White House to discuss a compromise policy that Clinton realized he "did not hold the balance of power in the room" (1999, 123). On the surface there should have at least been a stalemate. There were six military officers and six civilian officers and at least two of the civilians, Clinton and Aspin, were the legal

superiors to every single military leader present. But, of course, statutory power may not translate into power to compel, coerce or even convince—this was clearly the case for Clinton. Stephanopoulos continues, their message to the president was clear, “Keeping this promise will cost you the military. Fight us on this and you’ll lose—and it won’t be pretty” (1999, 123).

The GNA’s intent was to improve military advice and civilian control. But the barrage of military opinion in opposition to the President’s plan and the notion that the President felt he was in a position of weakness before the Chairman and the service chiefs indicates that, at least under Clinton’s specific circumstances, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation failed in its design to empower the President. Moreover, a serious precedent of waning control was being set. According to Drew,

A senior military official said that the Chiefs had come very close to insubordination on the gays issue and that Clinton should have established his authority over them at the outset. The fact that he didn’t worried a number of people. It gave the impression that Clinton saw the military as another constituency to be wooed, one he was afraid to be tough with because of his own vulnerabilities. This was a potentially dangerous situation (1994, 48).

The danger was that if the military could coerce concessions on issues that were very important to Clinton, they could potentially have power on a wider range of issues, thus tipping civil-military control in favor of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs. In the case of dropping the gay ban, the military, with help from Congress was able to move Clinton away from an Executive Order to a compromise policy—the result of which was the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy—a policy deemed unconstitutional by a Federal court in 1994.

¹²⁹ The House passed a resolution opposing Clinton’s policy on withdrawing the gay ban so he knew he had little chance of support there. Also Nunn held the Family and Medical Leave Act over his head, telling

Conclusion: Did Goldwater-Nichols Affect Civil-Military
Relations in Minority Integration?

Any change in the civil-military relations of good advice, managing the services, and civilian control experienced during these integration waves would focus on changes in the power of the secretary (and secretariats) vs. the services. While this is generally true for civil-military relations in general, it is especially true for control of personnel policy, which has traditionally been managed by the services themselves. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the power of the service secretaries vis-à-vis the service chiefs was regarded as being at a disadvantage. Korb writes,

Except in rare cases, the service secretaries play a very small part in the major areas of the service policy-making process. The initiatives and positions are developed by the service chief and his military staff, and the secretary usually contents himself with acting as a spokesman for these services positions (Korb 1976b, 4).

Because the service secretaries became dependent upon the service chief and his headquarters staff, the service secretaries could potentially posed a threat to civilian control (U.S. Senate 1985, 387). This was partially due to the fact that personnel strengths of service secretariats experienced erosion over time, but there was a concurrent increase in the proportion of military personnel assigned to the secretariat over the same period. See Table 5.2.

Table 5-2. Trends in Secretariat Personnel Strength and Military Personnel Proportion

	1950		1960		1970		1980		1985	
	Personnel Strength	Percent Military								
Army	1040	11.5	869	17.4	789	17.2	359	32.5	368	31.8
Navy	1665	25.3	1739	22.0	1313	30.2	807	34.9	806	32.1
Air Force	452	32.1	536	40.9	484	37.8	320	43.4	304	43.8

Source: U.S. Senate, 1985, 391-392.

Clinton if he pushed to end the gay ban, he'd lose both (Herspring 2005, 341).

The GNA legislation specified the responsibilities of the service secretaries as clearly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. This fact could explain why Forrestal was weak compared to the Army secretary during the integration of Blacks. It doesn't, however, explain why the Army secretary was weak and failed in getting the Army Chief of Staff to comply with opening up more combat positions to women. In fact, the opposite should have been the case, because though Goldwater-Nichols delineated the relationship between the secretary and the service secretaries as hierarchical, it simultaneously empowered the latter by limiting the number of both deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs on the service staffs and reduced the size of the military headquarters staffs by 15 percent (including general and flag officer positions) (Locher 1996, 16). But while the act provided more definition and statutory power to the service secretaries, GNA also took the chiefs out of the operational chain of command, allowing them to concentrate on their role as advocate for their service. So, while the size of their staffs decreased relative to the civilian secretary's staff, the chiefs' responsibilities were more focused.

Civilian control, managing the services and getting good advice. Analyzing personnel policy cases has the potential to highlight pre/post GNA changes in civilian control in particular because the services have always had more jurisdictional control in this area. As a result, when civilian policy attempts to make a change there is potential for more conflict. When policy change was driven by civilians, whether leadership in the White House or Congress, and there was no pressing military manpower necessity, the military would often balk and/or use every method at its disposal to undermine or delay change. These methods included commissioning studies to prove change was damaging

to readiness, dividing civilian institutions (such as pitting the White House against Congress or a service secretary against the Secretary), or interpreting policy in such a way as to circumvent the intent of the policy. It was also the case, however, that when the Congress itself was divided on the issue, that neither the military nor the White House could use it as a means to enhance its control over the result of the debate.

It cannot be concluded, based on the analysis, that civilian control on the various integration waves was either stronger or weaker as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols changes to the Defense Department's organizational structure. There were too few points of comparison to find enough variation across presidential types, international security threats, and other factors that have a substantial impact on military decision-making. For all cases examined here, with the exception (perhaps) of gays, it was the military manpower needs that compelled change in the integration of minority groups in the end. And even in the case of gays, the current deployment status of the military could push the military to revise that policy too.¹³⁰

Getting good advice is also a mixed bag. This was a particularly difficult measure to analyze because in these cases of minority integration, civilian leadership didn't always ask for advice. To some extent, the military may have been viewed by civilian leadership as antagonistic to the integration waves. In the case of Blacks and women in

¹³⁰ According to a recent study, the number of Don't Ask, Don't Tell discharges has decreased since Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have begun and in fact, discharges of this kind have always decreased during times of war (Frank 2004, 4). This said, the services are not permitted to use stop-loss policies to delay the discharge of a servicemember who is found to be in violation of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy (Burrelli 1996, 10). Servicemembers *have* been discharged under this policy during the current Iraq and Afghanistan deployments (Frank 2004, 4). Aside from deployment issues, the military has spent more than \$200 million in training costs to replace those discharged under Don't Ask, Don't Tell (Government Accountability Office 2005). Based on military need and costs, it is reasonable to assume the military will eventually reassess the feasibility of this policy. Representative Martin Meehan (D-Massachusetts) has sponsored a bill entitled the Military Readiness Act of 2005, which would rescind the Defense Department's homosexual policy.

combat, commissions were appointed to review the facts. In other words, the services themselves were not trusted with being objective enough to determine what the facts were. So, when the Secretary of Defense or President asked the military directly for recommendations, it was usually in the form of asking how and when the integration would get done, not whether or not it *should* get done—though this is often the question to which the services were responding.

Though much of the analysis about the effect of Goldwater-Nichols on the civil-military relations of personnel policies is inconclusive, two things can be deduced. First in all cases, military necessity trumps any civil-military interaction. Secondly, the services still have both formal and informal institutional power to define and defend their personnel policies.

6

Conclusions

At the beginning of this investigation, the following questions were asked. What are the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 on U.S. civil-military relations? Has it enhanced or eroded civilian control? Has it given civilian leadership more tools to keep the service-dominated Department of Defense (DOD) in check? Has it enhanced military advice?

There were observable improvements in the three measures of civil-military relations with the enactment of the legislation. The enhancement of civil-military relations was mitigated, however, by a number of factors and was highly dependent on the type of issue through which civilians and the military interacted (whether personnel, operations or resource allocation). The preceding research was able to isolate civil-military relations by issue type to determine independent effects of the GNA legislation. What follows in this conclusion is an attempt to integrate the results of each analytical chapter and place them into a broader civil-military perspective. The following matrix, Table 6-1, provides an overall key of the results, with change as a result of GNA defined in terms of a continuum of a decrease, to mixed, to an increase in measures of civil-military relations by issue type.

Table 6-1. Civil-military Measures by Issue Area

	Military Advice	Civilian Control	Service Management
Resource Allocation	Mix	Decrease-to-mix	Mix-to-increase
Operations	Mix-to-increase	Mix-to-increase	Increase
Minority Integration	Mix or indeterminate	Indeterminate	Indeterminate

Military Advice

As Table 6-1 shows, there is no unqualified trend of improved military advice across, or even within issue type as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Beginning with resource allocation, results were mixed. The GNA created a larger joint staff, a powerful Chairman and a Vice Chairman of the JCS. Through the office of the Vice Chairman, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process were created. No longer were the services the sole experts on resource allocation with respect to joint operations. And for the first time the warfighters had a regulated manner to have their input interjected into the resource allocation process. Advice, as a result, was more integrated and represented a more joint perspective—this had the potential to reduce redundancies. However, the impact of the legislation on advice comes down to two simple conclusions: first, a process is in place that could potentially reduce redundancies, integrate information, and improve advice; and second, since the JROC is still principally controlled by service prerogatives, much of that potential is lost.

Table 6-1 indicates military advice in operations is mixed to improved. Military advice in operations did improve quantitatively—the flow of information had been vastly economized under Goldwater-Nichols—but there is still a question about its qualitative improvement. The analysis demonstrated that the quality of advice is highly dependent upon the manner in which the relative parties work together to be receptive to and/or provide that advice. For example, during Desert Storm, Powell and Schwarzkopf were the main advisors to civilian leadership, and the relationship between the two becomes the focus of how military advice was filtered up the chain of command. Accounts about

whether or not Powell filtered information from Schwarzkopf are examples of how the Chairman wields a great deal of power and influence over the flow of information in and out of OSD and the White House. The first Bush administration was an exemplar of very congenial interpersonal civil-military relations, but under less than ideal congeniality between the top civilian and military leaders, the issue of advice is complicated even more.

Analysis indicates that when the relationships among the President, Secretary of Defense and the top military advisors are less than ideal, there is greater potential for military advice to be negatively impacted. The analysis also showed that there is a decrease in civilian control during times when there is less or little military experience among presidents and their cabinets and staff. For example, in the Somalia case, information and advice *were* getting to the Secretaries of Defense and State, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and the National Security Advisor, but there is no clear evidence that Clinton had any significant understanding of the dangers the troops were facing in Mogadishu. The Clinton case in particular demonstrates that a lack of trust among the civil-military players can greatly diminish the openness needed for quality advice to flow.

Military advice during minority integration is mixed at best. The only time analysis of civil-military relations in personnel issues resulted in anything conclusive was during the period when there was no overwhelming military necessity at play. But in general, advice plays a very limited role in minority integration overall. In the post-GNA period, just as in the pre-GNA period, civilian leadership did not often seek advice about integration issues. When advice *was* provided it was often unsolicited—the case of Colin

Powell providing his opinions to Congress and the press about whether or not the ban on homosexuals should be lifted is the most striking example. As a general rule, however, military necessity as the cause of change in the civil-military relations of personnel policy seems to trump all other causal factors—whether those changes were in the structures of advice, civilian control, or service management. The only cases where military necessity was not the major force in minority integration were during the post-GNA timeframe—the women-in-combat and gay integration waves, under Clinton. The results of these two integration efforts lead to mixed, if not inconclusive, results in whether or not advice was improved. Both military and civilian leadership conceded defeat on some level—military leaders lost more ground on women and civilian leaders lost more on gays. Complicating any conclusion about these two cases, however, is the fact that they occurred at the same time. The military was willing to lose ground on the women-in-combat issue in order to put the bulk of their political capital against Clinton's efforts to drop the gay ban.

Civilian Control

As with advice, there was some measurable increase in civilian control during operations and resource allocation, but Goldwater-Nichols has not been an overwhelming success in this area. Critics of GNA had argued that the legislation actually decreased civilian control, but under scrutiny, that claim does not hold up. At worst, the legislation was a wash in this regard. And, as mentioned previously, if civilian control waned since GNA enactment, civilian leadership has not complained. While the analysis may not indicate a clear waxing or waning of civilian control, it does show the measure is highly dependent on other factors.

First of all, civilian control does seem to be a function of operational stakes—the probability of high casualties or the probability of expanding the mission scope. Given the intervening condition of operational stakes, the GNA legislation had little effect on control. Operations under bipolarity or high-stakes necessarily involve a higher degree of civilian oversight. When the operational stakes are low, there are more examples of civilian authority either shirking control (as in Somalia) or asserting objective control and letting the military do its job with less monitoring (as in Desert Storm). For example, the stakes of civilians losing some ground to military control were considerably lower in the Gulf War than in Vietnam, except when there was a danger Israel could be drawn into the former. At that point, Secretary Cheney asserted considerable control—control over a military headed by the most powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in U.S. history, Colin Powell. This conclusion leads to another—leadership style is also relevant in determining civilian control.

The real GNA change to civilian control was in creating new command and control structures that allowed decisionmakers a more efficient means of delegating operational oversight and of getting information on which to base decisions—and subsequently, to take control. So, for example, the Bush/Cheney defense leadership was noted for its short and clear chain of command, inclusiveness of the military perspective, and broad respect for the military leadership (Herspring 2005, 329-30). By comparison, Clinton was perceived by the military as an indecisive and amoral leader who neither understood nor respected military culture (Blumenthal 2003, 63). The result was that a permissive Bush/Cheney could still wield control when necessary, but a permissive and sometimes inattentive Clinton and his cabinet were less successful. This may be partially

due to what Cohen describes as an evolution in the nature of military involvement in politics. The historically self-enforced subjection of military opinion to civilian leadership has eroded (Cohen 2002). Under a Bush presidency where military opinion was sought and listened to, this erosion was much less pronounced compared to the Clinton presidency where civil-military relations were more antagonistic. This assertion of the military into the political sphere is discussed in great detail by Peter Feaver as a system of monitoring payoffs in a strategic principal-agent relationship. This is discussed in more detail, below.

In resource allocation, post-GNA civilian control is mixed at best, with some evidence of a decrease in absolute measures of civilian control. The result of JROC handling cross-service integration of PPBS is that there was a shift of certain responsibilities from civilians within OSD, to military leadership. Effectively, there was less civilian control over budgetary nuances, but better military advice to the Secretary and better management of service centrism. This is a classic case of subjective control of the military where organizations within the military are, to a limited extent in resource allocation, monitoring each other. Though, the JROC is still apparently bound by the traditions of servicism, some progress has been made in reviewing cross-service redundancies. This has the overall effect of increasing control, broadly, but there is a measurable decrease in civilian monitoring.

Service Management

As Table 6-1 shows, of the three measures of civil-military relations, service management has had the most notable success under GNA changes, particularly in

operations, but also, to a lesser degree in resource allocation. As with civilian control, the effect of Goldwater-Nichols on service management in personnel decisions is indeterminate. One of the more interesting outcomes of this research was that service management was a much more complex concept than either a) a process of simple arbitration of interservice conflict; or b) a unified civilian perspective against unified service leadership. In fact, service management was often a combination of these concepts. Managing the services often meant civilian leadership had to contend with the prerogatives of single service headed by a highly skilled manager—so, it was rarely an “us against them” scenario, but more commonly an “OSD against the Army” or “OSD and the Air Force against the Navy.” The military, in resource allocation, rarely presented a unified front of any kind.

The analysis led to the conclusion that Goldwater-Nichols considerably stemmed, but did not entirely eliminate the services’ influence over operations. For example, during Desert Storm, Schwarzkopf’s command of the war avoided unnecessary deployments within his command. The service chiefs were cut out of the operational loop almost completely. By deleting the services from the chain of command during operations, the inevitability of including all services in any given operation regardless of need was dramatically reduced. After Goldwater-Nichols, the CINCs made the decisions about the makeup of troops to be trained and deployed. Furthermore, the Chairman has the statutory power to mitigate rivalry among the service chiefs. Even during phase three of U.S. efforts in Somalia (UNOSOM II) when command authority was needlessly split between U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Special Operations command (SOCOM), servicism played virtually no role in deployment decisions. The GNA

legislation has also affected behavior of the chiefs as advisors to the chairman. The chairman now holds the upper hand in his relationship with the chiefs. It works in the chiefs' interest to labor with and not against the chairman.

Service management in resource allocation post-GNA was mixed but slightly improved. A larger joint staff, creation of the VCJCS, JROC and JWCA process meant that the services had less control, not being the sole experts on resource allocation, particularly with respect to anything joint. This had the additional benefit that advice was more integrated and represented a more joint perspective.

Assumptions

In the course of this research, three proposals were put forward for testing. The results are discussed here.

Proposal 1. It was conjectured that the type of issue on which civilian and military leaders interact—whether resource allocation, operations, or personnel—would have a moderating effect on the relationship between changes in command and control functions brought about by Goldwater-Nichols and each measure of civil-military relations. The analysis presented in this work supports this proposition. Going down each column of Table 6-1, it is notable that GNA had varying impact from resource allocation through personnel policies. It is also notable that the civil-military effect on personnel policy is largely indeterminate. This is an important result because it presents an argument that outcomes of civil-military relations are influenced by issue area (i.e. whether they take place during operations, resource allocation or personnel policies, etc). Other research analyzing civil-military relations should take this into account.

Proposal 2. It was proposed that under GNA a new technical expertise is developed among military leadership, which creates a power imbalance in favor of military preferences diminishing good advice and civilian control particularly in operations and resource allocation, but comparatively less in personnel policy. The facts presented in this dissertation do not bear this argument out. The only area where there has been any traceable decrease in civilian control is in resource allocation—but results in that area are mixed. In all other cells (referring to Table 6-1), the research indicates civilian control measures have mixed results, but tending towards more increases in these measures, not less. In direct response to those who propose the civil-military balance favors the military after Goldwater-Nichols, the analysis shows that change has largely favored civilian leadership, or minimally there has been no or indeterminate effects. This conclusion should not be confused with a normative conclusion that current civil-military balance favor civilians, however. In other words, the research here merely compares pre- and post-GNA civil-military relations but does not propose that the current balance particularly favors either the military or civilian leadership. Based on the analysis here, it is apparent that the military services, in general, still wield varying degrees of influence over their departments and in some cases may be at an advantage over civilians in the three measures of civil-military relations. The problem with making a broad conclusion about the state of civil-military relations—irrespective of organizational restructuring—is that establishing a baseline is difficult. Enactors of GNA argued that there was not enough civilian control. GNA detractors argued that if there was not enough control that surely empowering the Chairman of the JCS tipped the balance of power dangerously in favor of the military. So, what is the baseline value of control? Goldwater-Nichols did

have some effect on civil-military relations but whether or not the legislation went too far or not far enough is tangential to the main questions posed in this research.

Proposal 3. Finally, it was hypothesized that because the Goldwater-Nichols Act solidified power in the hands of the Chairman, alternative opinions among the Joint Chiefs are less likely to be heard and interservice rivalry is more likely to diminish. Of the three measures of civil-military relations, service management seemed to have increased more measurably under the GNA structures. However, while this hypothesis may be supported for service management in operations, it is not necessarily supported for service management in personnel policymaking. This makes sense. Personnel policy is still essentially managed by the services themselves, with varying degrees of civilian oversight. Though indeterminate, this conclusion is still useful because it indicates that, on the one hand, the services still define the structure by which the vast majority of DOD functions are performed, but, on the other hand, unification of the entire defense establishment, started in 1947, continues to evolve. More important though, is the indication that civil-military relations continue to be affected by the continuing struggle between unification and maintenance of distinct service identities.

Theory Revisited

Civilian Control. Though the focus of this research is an analysis of the effects of Goldwater-Nichols on civil-military relations, results are relevant to the broader civil-military literature. New and enduring theories, research and opinions about U.S. civil-military relations are based on the fundamental premise of civilian control. The military corollary to this is that “military leaders prefer poverty with autonomy to wealth with dependency” (Betts, 1977, 8). All studies attempting to understand, model or set

standards for civil-military relations contend with the problem of control. Gregory Foster explains why:

...Considering the many instruments of coercion available to the state (the military, police, internal security and paramilitary forces, intelligence services, and the like), it is absolutely essential that the possession of such coercive means in the hands of those in power be given the authority and legitimacy that can only be conferred by the civilians who represent the people and deliberate on their behalf and that the use of such instruments be subject to rigorous restraint and justification (Foster 2005, 96).

Bearing this in mind, the question then is whether there is any legitimacy to the idea that the United States is in any danger of this loss of civilian control or that any loss could equate to a diminishing of democratic ideals or democratically produced policies, or a higher propensity to resort to armed conflict—all dangers inherent in a civil-military imbalance. Most U.S. civil-military studies do not seriously consider dangers to broad democratic ideals but focus more on foreign and strategic policymaking and if, when, and how to use military force. Many have argued that loss of civilian control would, at a minimum, have no effect on engagement in war. For example, Huntington (1957) and Betts (1991) argued that there is a natural caution on the part of military officers compared to civilian leadership on the question of whether or not to initiate the use of force. If true, then it follows that it is not likely the United States will be more war prone under less or decreasing civilian control.

Some prudence may be warranted, however, as one scholar recently found that military conservatism is simply a product of strong civilian oversight. In general, Sechser contends, when military officers have the authority to initiate use of force, they tend to do so at substantially higher rates than civilians” (Sechser 2004, 770). He continues,

My conclusions should not be misinterpreted to mean that military officers in the United States are more aggressive than their civilian counterparts.

There is overwhelming evidence elsewhere to suggest that U.S. officers are at least as cautious as civilians about recommending military action and perhaps even more so. I do not dispute this evidence. Rather, I suggest that cautious and conservative militaries are more likely to be found in states with strong civilian control. When civilian authority disappears, some of this caution disappears along with it. The observation that top U.S. officers tend to be wary of military action is therefore entirely consistent with the findings of this study (Sechser 2004, 771).

Even if Sechser's findings cannot be definitively verified, his conclusions could lead to the assumption that civilian oversight and active assertion of control may have unforeseen effects on military behavior—in other words, it is probably safer to assert control even when civilian oversight may be considered intrusive. Though the stakes are higher for the decision to go to war, this assumption holds for other aspects of civilian oversight. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation was marginally successful in increasing civilian oversight and control in operations but less successful, and conceivably unsuccessful, in increasing this control in the area of resource allocation, despite the fact that it was one of the main objectives of the legislation (and in fact, was listed *first* in the list of overall objectives). A somewhat more vigilant approach to civilian control may be warranted in view of the potential stakes associated with less control. While continued precaution is necessary, so too is the understanding of what influences the balance in civilian control. Many recent studies point to exogenous factors, most notably the end of Cold War, as changing the nature of civil-military control.

Considering the results of most recent civil-military studies that emphasize the impact of the Cold War and its conclusion, it is hard to determine if the results of this dissertation bode well for the current status of civilian control. The majority of current analyses concludes that civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War are more strained. The results of this dissertation do not *prima facie* concur with this finding,

though the points of comparison are different (a pre/post Cold War comparison vs. a pre/post defense reorganization comparison). As mentioned above, at worst, the GNA legislation did not change the balance, but at best, some measures of civil-military relations were enhanced, most notably service management. Feaver provides a list of civil-military relations indicators that he argues have come into full effect after the Cold War. This list is summarized in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2. Descriptions of Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations

Civil-Military Relations Indicators	Examples
Military insubordination	Military stance on gay integration
Excessive military influence	Military decides post-Cold War drawdown
Military scandals	Tailhook, Aberdeen sexual harassment, Flinn adultery case
Military disrespect of civilians	Disrespect shown to Clinton when visiting U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt

Source: Feaver 2004, 189

What is notable about this list is that most of these indicators do not make sense in describing the Bush/Rumsfeld relationship to the military. Does a crisis model make any sense anymore? It is likely that with a second G.W. Bush term, more studies will surface employing different interpretations of long-term civil-military relations, with decreasing emphasis on a crisis of control and increasing attention to what the best balance is, given: a) the variation across internal and external threat environments (e.g. global terrorism abroad and in the United States); b) the effects on civil-military relations of changes in military training and ethos (and if and why change is occurring); and c) new or sustained *causes* of a civil-military gap (not just the *effects* of the gap). The civil-military relations literature is still somewhat limited by Cold War imperatives, though there is substantial movement towards a new paradigm.

Peter Feaver's theory will most likely enjoy a great deal of longevity despite the emphasis on post-Cold War civil-military relations. One cannot find a contemporary analysis of civil-military relations without reference to Feaver's principal-agent model. His body of work is an attempt to provide an alternative to Huntington and Janowitz and most critics agree that he has minimally achieved that goal. Borrowing from the economic principal-agent theory, Feaver explains ubiquitous and subtle forms of U.S. military insubordination to civilian leadership as a function of a system of civilian monitoring and the military's ability and willingness to "shirk" (do something contrary to what civilians have authorized or ordered). Feaver's civil-military theory explains that military shirking in the post-Cold War era is due to the coincidence of two processes. The first is the increase of civilians' intrusive monitoring of the military, which is a result of the decrease in monitoring costs after the Cold War. The second process is military shirking—a result of a growing sociological civil-military gap (Feaver 2003, 225). He explains the theory simply:

Civilians recognize the need for instruments of violence, so they establish the military institution and contract with it the mission of using force on society's behalf...The military may share the civilians' desire not to lose on the battlefield, but it would also prefer not to be subject to interference by civilian authorities. Moreover, it may not share identical preferences with the civilians on all policy questions and so may seek to manipulate the relationship so as to prevail in policy disputes. In short, the military has the ability and sometimes also the incentive to respond strategically to civilian delegation and control decisions...But civilians retain the ability to punish shirking if they discover that it is going on. Thus, the military decision whether to work or shirk is shaped by how negatively those in the military view what civilians are asking them to do and their expectation of the likelihood and severity of any punishment that might come their way should they shirk. The process is iterative over time. As the external environment changes, for instance as threats to the state emerge or disappear, the civilians must revisit the problematique and make changes in the monitoring profile as needed (Feaver 2003, 57-8).

Given these theoretical expectations, Feaver's model provides a compelling explanation of why Goldwater-Nichols was enacted in the first place—because the old form of military monitoring by way of maintaining interservice rivalry was a) having a negative impact on military advice and b) was incurring too many financial costs (e.g. creating new and redundant technologies across service lines). Feaver's theory also explains how the strengthening of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under GNA created a new monitoring system, with a different payoff structure (Feaver 2003, 161-62). "The Joint Staff would watch the services closely and could provide a strong warning if the services colluded or shirked in untoward ways" (Feaver 2003, 83). Adding to this, Deborah Avant, the first to use principal-agent theory in modeling civil-military relations, proposed that the military would be responsive to civilian control when military leaders expected rewards for their responsiveness. "Whether military leaders will expect to be rewarded or not will depend on how civilian leaders have chosen to set up and monitor military organizations" (Avant 1994, 2). The post-GNA services, while having to respond to a new monitoring technique (the Joint Staff), have been caught shirking—for example, the Army recently using women in combat or the individual services marketing themselves to the CINCs in the resource allocation process. It makes sense that as military leadership is functioning under a new monitoring environment, it would find new ways to assert individual compared to joint prerogatives.

So, it is understandable *why* agents shirk, but what is new in the civil-military relationship that gives agents more ability to shirk? Gibson (1998) and Feaver (1996) provide an explanation. Feaver calls it "asymmetry of information" but it is a variation on a theme of Huntington. Because subordinates have informational superiority, they can

submit policy options that will benefit their own interests, and not the interests of their superiors. Huntington wrote, "...the problem of the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician" (1957, 20). Feaver elaborates:

The military agent's status as an expert on the management of violence confers significant informational advantages over civilians on matters ranging from tactics to logistics to operational art. Because of their informational advantage over superiors, subordinates tend to propose policies that benefit their own interests rather than the interests of the superiors (1996).

Gibson (1998) explains that the structural changes brought about by Goldwater-Nichols accelerated military expertise. This occurred at the same time that there was a measurable decrease in military experience among decision-making civilians (not just presidents and their cabinet members, but members of Congress too). He concludes that there is a positive relationship between professional preparation and influence in decision-making that now favors the military. To some extent this can help explain why Clinton was relatively unsuccessful in putting forward a large part of his military policy, and why more recently there has been conflict between Rumsfeld and his military subordinates.

Service management. Feaver's model essentially takes the service management measure of civil-military relations and calls it monitoring—an institutional check. Based on Feaver's theory, an institutional check works as such only when subunits are in conflict. The foregoing analysis indicates that the services, as subunits within the defense organization, were also sometimes in collusion. It stands to reason, then, that the GNA replaced a faulty institutional check with a different and relatively untested one—the Chairman and his staff as monitor. This change in institutional check, based on the results of this dissertation, seemed to have worked. Of all of the measures of civil-military

relations, there has been a more identifiable increase in service management, particularly in operations.

While Feaver, Avant, and Gibson's models set up expectations about how and why the services will and need to be monitored, traditional bureaucratic theory explains the ways military organizations "shirk." Morton Halperin, for example, postulated ways that the services could maneuver around compliance to an executive decision (Halperin 1974). These are:

- *Cosmetic, not real changes.* The example of Black integration, the "separate-but-equal" system of integration, was a cosmetic change. The Army's non-official means of keeping women out of some military specializations is a post-GNA example of cosmetic changes.
- *Civilians say one thing, the military does another.* Lavelle's changing of the rules of engagement during Vietnam is an example of this. There are fewer examples of this type of overt shirking in general—whether before or after the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
- *Delay.* There is more evidence of the military delaying before GNA and less so after. For example, the military used stall-by-study techniques for Black and female integration waves.
- *Obey letter, not spirit of law.* The Army has recently been accused of defining combat strictly, but not applying the definition as strictly in its deployment of women in forward positions in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
- *Insist on a personal hearing.* The military insisted on meeting with Clinton on the issue of gay integration.
- *Suggest reconsideration.* The Army's request of a "womanpause" in the early Reagan administration is an example of reconsideration.
- *Go to Congress and/or the public.* The integration of gays in the military is a good example of the military seeking to split civilian leadership.

Besides providing a description of how agents do not comply with command authority, bureaucratic theory defines decision processes as a competitive struggle for control of policy between government principals and their agents. Policies are derived from the

negotiations among these bureaucracies. An agent's actions are viewed as a product of loyalty to organizational interests (Newmann 2004). Use of the bureaucratic model for civil-military relations has focused mostly on the inter-agency conflict—referenced throughout this dissertation as interservice rivalry. The assumptions of the bureaucratic model do explain interservice rivalry, for sure. According to Halperin,

Organizations have considerable freedom in defining their missions and the capabilities they need to pursue these missions. The organization's *essence* is the view held by the dominant group in the organization of what the missions and capabilities should be. Related to this are convictions about what kinds of people with what expertise, experience, and knowledge should be members of the organization (Halperin 1974, 28).

Organizational essence does establish assumptions that can be made about how service leaders will behave when they interpret their organizational essence as being under attack, but the principal/agent model established by Feaver and Avant provides a more dynamic model of how changes in bureaucratic structures—Goldwater-Nichols, in this case—can enhance or diminish measures of control, service management and advice. The bureaucratic model has performed poorly at explaining a convergence of interests among the services, or how a particular issue, such as women in combat, can in one instance be considered anathema but in another a necessity. In the case of women in combat, for example, does organizational essence change because of deployment status? Why was the Army's organizational essence under attack in the mid-1990s with the prospect of opening up more combat-related jobs to women, and how has that organizational essence changed to include women in combat in today's deployed Army? The explanation of this may not, in fact, hinge on a bureaucratic model, but on how organizational essence is defined by dynamic changes in military doctrine (Clemens 1992).

Military advice. The question of advice is under-studied as a distinct measure of the civil-military relationship. Most studies subsume explanations of advice within the overall structure of civilian management and military subservience. Goldwater-Nichols creators clearly saw the need for advice to be improved, and the legislation focused on both efficiency and quality. Efficiency was improved by the change in command structure—a structure that provided fewer channels through which advice would be distributed up to civilian authority. Quality was improved because the Chairman of the JCS changed the nature of lowest-common denominator corporate decision-making—advice was not watered down due to necessary compromise among the chiefs. To some extent, the analysis contained in this dissertation bears these conclusions out: military advice as a measure of civil-military relations has shown signs of improvement. Also, civilian leadership appears happy with the changes in both the efficiency and quality of advice. But results of this dissertation also indicate post-GNA military advice is not the huge success that post-Desert Storm analysis suggests. What this dissertation doesn't address is why, with such startling changes in the structures of providing advice, has the improvement not been more considerable. There is an element in the understanding of the advice provision that needs further investigation.

Missing is a closer examination of the relationship of advice to political neutrality. Political neutrality has always been a debated, but very important, aspect of the civil-military relationship. Currently, however, it is discussed only in terms of a growing civil-military cleavage (Kohn, Luttwak, Weigley). The “gap” literature substantiates the existence of a disparity (and perhaps a growing disparity) between civilian and military cultures. Given this, it is important to understand how advice from

what appears to be an increasingly partisan and Republican organization is affected, particularly when the advice civilian leadership seeks may go beyond the realm of merely operational (tactical) expertise into opinions about strategy. The deceptively simple question could (and should) be asked, what *is* political neutrality from the military's perspective? Consider the question of how the United States should foment a "war" against militant Islamic terrorism, with a goal of, if not winning, at least securing the homeland from a catastrophic attack. If the military is asked by civilians to weigh in on U.S. strategic options, is there an effect if the advice is not apolitical, is not ideologically neutral, not religiously neutral, or not culturally neutral? The question is apt because there is evidence to suggest neutrality does not wholly exist in any of these areas among military leadership (Kohn 1994, Feaver 2003, and Feaver and Gelpi 2004). The civil-military relations literature does not consider this question adequately, if at all.

If the "gap" precludes the military from providing neutral advice (a big *if*, because the appropriate research questions have neither been asked nor pursued), then what can one reasonably conclude about the quality of that advice outside of purely operational matters? This issue was most noticeably at play during the integration efforts described in the preceding chapter (the stall-by-study methods, for example—an indication that there were temporal but systemic biases against expanding the presence of Blacks and women). But there are also anecdotes suggesting the military can provide biased advice on operational matters too—overstating force requirements, for example, to make a policymaker's decision to use force have higher political costs. Political neutrality or non-neutrality may hinge on why the military departments are organized in the manner that they are. For example, Martin Cook explains that advice may be grounded in the

military's cultural and professional self-image as defined by the Cold War. So, for example,

...the military has a significant resistance to embracing OOTW¹³¹ missions in general. This resistance is couched as disinterested "professional military advice." In fact, however, it relies on expanding the scope of claimed military expertise to include estimates of public support for the military and the clarity of the exit strategy...The particular constellation of training, force structure, equipment, and missions for which the U.S. military has been structured in recent decades reflects a particular historical and strategic environment, within which they were highly functional. But if the emerging international order is to bear little resemblance to that environment in the foreseeable future, clearly the military will need to rethink (or be forced by civilian superiors to rethink) its self-understanding and its view of its purposes in order to render professional military advice effectively to political leaders contemplating such missions (Cook 2002-3, 25).

With the relationship between advice and political neutrality under-theorized, any conclusion about changes in the civil-military measure of advice will necessarily be deficient.

Last Words

For nearly 20 years, the military command structure has been functioning under the Goldwater-Nichols changes. Now there are calls for further and/or different reforms—a Goldwater-Nichols II. Most who study defense reform agree that the GNA changes of the mid 1980s were a reaction to military failures in Iran, Grenada, and Beirut during a time when the United States was in a predictable, yet dangerous dyadic Cold War with the Soviet Union. The strategic environment today is drastically different and reorganizers base the need for organizational change on a strategic environment requiring coalition operations, nation-building, homeland defense, counterterrorism, defense

¹³¹ Operations other than war.

against weapons of mass destruction, and other types of complex strategic decision-making that the Pentagon is ill-equipped to deal with (Murdock et. al. 2004, 17-19).

The same arguments of all of the previous defense reforms remain: the military must reorganize to fight better or differently; the military must reorganize to increase efficiency. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the report *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* repeats the same message of previous defense reorganizations—too much waste, redundancy and not enough attention paid to strategic decision-making:

One of the continuing criticisms of the modern American military establishment is the continuing imbalances in the tooth-to-tail ratio,¹³² with redundancies and unnecessary bureaucracy often claiming resources that could be better employed at the operational end of the organization. These duplicative procedures and often overly large headquarter staffs have created a wasteful bureaucracy that is bogged down in protracted coordination processes. In the Executive branch, this has led to too little strategic thinking—and instilled an excessive attention to details, and sometimes unimportant ones at that (Murdock et al. 2004, 19).

Some critics of defense reform claim the military, while realizing the need to reform, is still functioning under wrong strategic assumptions. Retired Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor, a vocal expert in defense reform, responds to the current reorganization buzz, “I see no direction other than pouring money into a range of programs with their roots in the Cold War” (in Ricks 2004, A6). Macgregor was not only referring to what he considered outdated weapons procurement, such as the Army’s Stryker vehicle, the Air Force’s F-22 fighter, and the Marine Corps V-22 rotor transport, but he believes military culture, battlefield models, and command structures are not in line with today’s international hazards (Ricks 2004, A6 and Hodge 2004, 3).

¹³² Tooth-to-tail ratio is a military budgeting term used to describe resources allocated to combat troops (teeth) vs. administration, logistics and other support costs (tail).

Defense reform must surely fix this strategic-organization mismatch, but in doing so, there must be consideration of how the new international strategic environment may also define a new civil-military relationship. According to Rod Lyon, the “terrorism age” poses new civil-military challenges for democratic regimes:

- States must counter threats that are transnational and asymmetrical;
- Dealing with terrorism may lead to civilian and military differences in the way use of force is approached and applied;
- States must redefine *appropriate* roles and missions of a military whose main foe employs the use of terrorism (Lyon 2004, 3).

Given the way militaries are organized to fight (still largely defined by the Cold War), how responsive can they be to the new security threats posed by international terrorism? If the nature of risk that terrorism poses cannot so easily and clearly be addressed on a battlefield, as terrorism expert David Rapoport (2004) argues, then how will civil-military reigns of control over security and strategic decisions be affected? This civil-military/terrorism crossover demonstrates an underdeveloped area of analysis both in the civil-military as well as the terrorism literature.

Putting this deficiency into the larger perspective of the civil-military challenges faced by a largely deployed force fighting oftentimes unconventional wars under internal restructuring pressures, Frederick Kagan writes,

It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded. They must be persuaded not merely of the shocking awfulness of American power, but of the desirability of pursuing the policies the U.S. wishes them to pursue. And they must not be driven away from the pursuit of those policies by the horrors and opportunities presented by a chaotic, lawless vacuum created by our precision weapons. To effect regime change, U.S. forces must be positively in control of the enemy’s territory and population as rapidly and continuously as possible. That control cannot be achieved by machines, still less by bombs. Only human beings interacting with other human

beings can achieve it. The only hope for future success in the extension of politics that is war is to restore the human element to the transformation equation (Kagan 2002, 27).

Determining how this can be done is a uniquely civil-military affair, one in which the skills of both sides must be balanced.

So, while reform is on the mind of military analysts, it would be prudent of them to consider the lessons learned from the Goldwater-Nichols experience. Whenever there are major command structure changes in the Department of Defense, it is necessary to project the effects of those structural changes on civilian control, service management and getting advice.

Appendix A

The following is taken verbatim from the following Department of Defense website:
<http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/deploy/info/commands.shtml>.


Unified Combatant Commands

A Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission and is normally organized on a geographical basis. The number of unified combatant commands is not fixed by law or regulation and may vary from time to time. The current unified commands are:

1. **United States Central Command.** The U.S. Central Command is the unified command responsible for U.S. Security interest in 25 nations that stretch from the horn of Africa through the Arabian Gulf into Central Asia.
2. **United States European Command.** The mission of the European Command is to support and advance U.S. interest and policies throughout the assigned area of responsibility; provide combat ready land, maritime, and air forces to Allied Command Europe or U.S. unified commands ; and conduct operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners.
3. **United States Joint Forces Command.** U.S. Joint Forces Command has a unique mission. While unified commands may be categorized as geographic or functional , the Joint Forces Command forms a hybrid. Their main effort goes to the functional role as the chief advocate for jointness and leaders of U.S. military transformation. They also apply a powerful effort supporting other commanders in chief, our own Atlantic Theater, and emerging domestic U.S. requirements.
4. **United States Northern Command.** The U.S. Northern Command debuted in October 2002. The new command is responsible for homeland defense and also serves as head of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, a U.S.-Canada command. The command takes the homeland defense role from the U.S. Joint Forces Command. JFCOM's Joint Task Force–Civil Support and related activities now report to NORTHCOM.
5. **United States Pacific Command.** The U.S. Pacific Command enhances security and promotes peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crises and fighting to win.
6. **United States Southern Command.** The mission of U.S. Southern Command is to shape the environment within our area of responsibility by conducting military to military engagement and counter-drug activities throughout the theater to promote democracy, stability, and collective approaches to threats to regional security. The command will, when required, respond unilaterally or multilaterally to crises that threaten regional stability or national interests, and prepare to meet future hemispheric challenges.
7. **United States Special Operations Command.** In April 1987, the Defense Department established the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Special Operations Command is primarily responsible for providing combat-ready special operations forces to the geographic combatant commands in support of U.S. national security interests. The Command is not limited to a specific geographic area of responsibility but must respond wherever the President or the Secretary of Defense directs in peacetime and across the complete spectrum of conflict.
8. **United States Strategic Command.** The mission of the U.S. Strategic Command is to deter military attack on the United States and its allies, and should deterrence fail, employ forces so as

to achieve national objectives. Their responsibilities include: providing intelligence on countries and other entities possessing or seeking weapons of mass destruction; providing support to other combatant command commanders; developing a Single Integrated Operational Plan that fully satisfies national guidance; monitoring the readiness of SIOP committed forces; and commanding, controlling and employing assigned forces.

9. **United States Transportation Command.** The U.S. Transportation Command is the single manager of America's global defense transportation system. USTRANSCOM is tasked with the coordination of people and transportation assets to allow our country to project and sustain forces, whenever, wherever, and for as long as they are needed.



Appendix B

Defense Resources Board

Deputy Secretary of Defense —Chairman
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics)
**Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence)**
**Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and
Personnel)**
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
**Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Affairs)**
**Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Policy)**
General Counsel
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Office
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
**Associate Director of OMB, National Security and
International Affairs**
By Invitation:
Chief of Staff of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
National Security Council Staff Representative

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