ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: ACTING AGAINST REASON? EXPLAINING MINORITY
                         GROUP DECISION MAKING

                         Michael K. Johns, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004

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        This study examines why minority groups choose to employ or not to employ

militant strategies when dealing with the state. It examines four cases in Europe: the

Corsicans in France, the Basques in Spain and the Russian speaking minorities in

Estonia and Latvia. While it is generally assumed that minority groups who are

accommodated by the state remain peaceful and groups who face discrimination are

more likely to use violence, these cases were chosen specifically for the reason that

they have chosen the opposite path.

        Through the use of primary elite interviews, survey data and secondary

sources four hypotheses are tested. The role of economic discrepancy, the

international community, culture and the institutionalization of culture are examined.

The institutionalization of culture is further broken down into three parts: the impact

of geographic isolation, time and repertoires.

        The study finds that while economics appears to be a sufficient condition for a

group choosing violence, it is not a necessary one. The international community,

however, appears to be extremely important. When the international community is

engaged in a country the minority group sees it as an 'ombudsmen' and remains quiet. Conversely, groups ignored by the international community feel isolated and seek to bring attention to their cause. Culture also plays an important role. The culture of some groups is more accepting of violence than others. Groups with cultures that do not accept violence are much less prone to use it than groups who see violence as an acceptable strategy. Geographic isolation appears to be a way for culture to be institutionalized. Groups who must interact with other groups are less likely to use violence than those who remain physically distant. While time appears to have some role, the more important factor appears to be the time period when the group is in conflict with the state. Certain ideologies are acceptable at different times in history, this impacts the groups available choices. Finally, the use of repertoires also appears to be a factor. Once violence is used it is difficult to stop.

Acting Without Reason?
An Examination of Minority Group Decision Making

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Chapter 1- Introduction

What do we know about ethnic conflict? More importantly, what do we not know? The term itself conjures images of war, genocide and oppression. The Twentieth Century will long be remembered not only as a bloody century of international conflict but also internal ethnic conflict as well. There were severe ethnic conflicts on every continent and some form of ethnic conflict in the majority of all countries. One continent that saw more than its fair share of ethnic conflict was and continues to be Europe. Ranging in degree from low level discrimination against minorities in most countries to open discrimination in such cases as the Turk population in Germany, to open terrorism in Northern Ireland to protracted civil war in the former Yugoslavia very few areas were immune from some form of conflict. Ethnic issues remain unresolved today throughout Europe. For example there has been an ongoing open conflict in Moldova, continuing discrimination in a variety of European states directed against the Roma population[1] and there has been growing resentment in countries such as Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands against new minorities. While the world now must face the new 21st Century threat to peace and stability that is international terrorism it still must deal with leftover problems from the last century with ethnic conflict being near or at the top of that list.

While problems remain and there is more worldwide awareness of the problems of ethnic conflict the situation may not be as bleak as it appears. While

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[1] For a full account of the current and past discrimination against the Roma population in Europe see the European Roma Rights Centre's website, http://www.errc.org.

some individual ethnic conflicts have gained world attention, such as the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Kosovo and Northern Ireland in reality the number of active large-scale ethnic conflicts has been decreasing in the past years. Gurr's analysis indicate that since the middle of the 1990's the overall level of ethnic conflict around the world has begun to decrease after a steady increase over the period of the cold war and its immediate aftermath.[2] The end of the cold war brought a spike in the levels of ethnic conflict in Europe mainly due to the tragedy of Yugoslavia. Is it possible that with the advent of 24 hour news reporting that the world has been led to think that ethnic conflict is now worse than it ever was but in reality it is the opposite?

While the answer may be yes that does not mean all of the work is done. Gurr's analysis concentrates on large scale rebellion. There are many shades of conflict below large scale rebellion that can disrupt a society in its present form and also manifest itself into something larger at a later point. While the levels of conflict may be decreasing, the possibility for things to get worse is also present.[3] It is therefore important to remain vigilant and continue to try to understand ethnic conflict, how it manifests itself, where it is most likely and if possible, how to prevent it.

The one generally accepted 'rule of thumb' of predicting where ethnic conflict is most likely concerns the treatment of the minority group by the state. This is the

[2] Ted Robert Gurr (2000) *Peoples Versus States* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press), p.30.

[3] For a list of current and potential ethnic conflicts as of 2002 see Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr (2004) *Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics* (Boulder CO: Westview Press), Appendix pp.198-204.

belief that states which actively try to include their minority groups into the political and social process of a state are most effective in finding peaceful solutions to their ethnic problems. Conversely, states which actively exclude minority groups, or oppress these groups are more like to encounter a more militant response by the minority group. This general belief is rooted in both history and common sense. It makes sense that groups who feel welcomed by the state, whose needs and demands are respected and who generally feel safe within a particular state have little reason to become more militant. Groups who feel excluded or even threatened are likely to see some form of violent opposition as their only way to ensure that their needs will be considered. Much of the basis for current risk assessment is based on this principle as scholars look for groups who are being excluded, who are being repressed or who are having rights denied them and concentrate their attention on those cases.

While many cases can be explained using this model, there are some cases that it cannot explain. There are ethnic groups who have members engaged in militant activity[4] despite the state's active attempt at finding political solutions to the concerns of the minority. Conversely, there are also ethnic groups who have not been fully included in the society. They are either fully or partially denied access to elements of the political or economic spheres of society and any efforts at inclusion by the state are considered unsatisfactory. Despite this unequal treatment, these groups not only actively shun violence but they continue to try to work within a political system that

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[4] In this study militant activity will be defined as any collective action that is outside of the legal system. This includes street violence, severe vandalism, assassinations and other terrorist activities. It is not necessary for the majority of the group to be involved in these activities, only an active segment.

is not welcoming to them. This study is an attempt to understand why these groups have chosen their particular paths to improve their position within the state. Why do some groups resort to violence when it would appear not to be in their best interest to do so? Conversely, what can make a group continue to try to find political solutions when the use of violence by at least a segment of the population, while not justified would be understandable? Specifically the research question for this project is: What factors are or are not present that can cause an ethnic group to choose militant strategies within a state that is attempting to accommodate them or conversely cause a group that appears to be neglected or worse to continue to attempt to work within the traditional political system?

The Cases to be Examined

What cases can be classified as being outside of the accepted theory on ethnic conflict? While there are several, this study will concentrate on four cases in Europe. Two of the cases are groups who have segments of their nationalist movements that employ violence as a strategy to achieve their goals despite attempts by the state to incorporate them into the political system. The other two groups have avoided the use of violence despite the fact that the state has made little or insufficient overtures to them to work within the political system. The Corsicans in France and the Basques in Spain represent the former category and the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia the latter.[5]

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[5] Chapter 3 will provide full histories of each group, this chapter will only provide a cursory description.

Corsica is a small island in the Mediterranean Sea. It has been a part of France since the 18th Century. Due to its strategic location it has been under outside control for almost all of its history. Those who conquered Corsica were more interested in its geo-political importance rather than its people and therefore the Corsicans were historically left alone. As a result the Corsican culture and language have survived. Since the 18th Century there have been elements of a Corsican nationalist movement but the current problems started after the Second World War. The end of the colonial period brought an end to a main source of employment for many Corsicans as military and civil workers in the French empire. It also brought a large number of French settlers from Algeria, known as the *pieds noirs* after France's withdrawal from Algeria. These settlers were given the prime farming land by the French government. Their arrival not only threatened the Corsicans economic future they also disrupted Corsican society and threatened culture and language. The nationalist movement opposed to France's actions became violent during the 1970's with the creation of the Frontu Di Liberazione Naziunalista Corsu, or FLNC. The actions of the FLNC and the growth in the Corsican nationalist movement led the French government to try to find a political solution. The first attempt occurred in 1982 which gave the Corsicans some control over economic interests and Corsican culture. It also gave the two national assemblies (Corsican is artificially divided into a north and south region) special status not given to other regional assemblies. The violence did not cease and another attempt at a political solution came in 1991. More power was given to the

island to promote tourism, the local environment and Corsican language education but again the violence did not end. The most recent attempt by the French government was in the summer of 2003 when a referendum was held on the island which would have radically altered the relationship between France and Corsica. The two regions would have been merged into one national assembly which would have had more rights and responsibilities than any other region in unitary France. The referendum question was defeated by less than 1% of the total vote. While the majority of Corsicans do not support either the nationalists or the radical FLNC, political violence has continued on the island for over 30 years. All attempts by the French government to appease the population have failed and it is unclear what can now be done to end the conflict.

The Basques occupy the land in the north of Spain and the south of France. There are four Basque provinces in Spain and three more in France. The Spanish Basques have used the resources found in the region and their geographic proximity to the rest of Europe to their economic advantage. The region industrialized early and has remained one of the economically advantaged regions in all of Spain. As with the Corsicans, the Basques also have a long history of being under foreign control. Also as with the Corsicans they were left alone linguistically and culturally for a long period despite this foreign influence. Even under early Spanish rule the Basques had a unique set of agreements known as *fueros* that excluded them from military service and created a unique taxation arrangement. The fueros were eliminated in 1841 after the Basques supported the losing side in the Carlist wars. By the end of the 19th

Century disapproval of Spain's treatment of the Basques led to the creation of the Basque Nationalist Party, or PNV. The PNV immediately began to gain support particularly in the rural areas of the region. During the 1930's the Basques once again found themselves on the losing side of a civil war. Under the rule of Franco the Basques suffered severe repression. Franco tried to exterminate the Basque language and culture. Dissatisfied with the PNV's response to this repression a group of young, radical, left-wing Basques broke away and formed the radical Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty, known as the ETA). The ETA advocated a violent response to Franco and were immediately seen as heroes to many Basques. After the death of Franco, Spain tried to incorporate the new Basques regime into its new and democratic society. Many of the fueros were re-established and the Basque government was given substantial responsibilities. Despite these concessions the ETA's activities did not end. The government in Madrid, there has made attempts to both appease the Basques, negotiate with the ETA and at times crack down on the terrorists. While there have been periodic cease fires by the ETA, they remain active and must be negotiate with if any lasting peace is to be found.

Until 1992 the Estonians and Latvians had a history comparable to the Corsicans and the Basques.[6] Apart from the interwar period when they enjoyed a brief brush with independence they had been under foreign control. From 1940 when they were annexed to 1992 when they managed to break away they were under the control of the Soviet Union. During that time many Estonians and Latvians were forcibly

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[6] In this study at times the Estonian and Latvian cases will be examined together. When appropriate the differences between the two countries will be examined.

moved to other areas of the country and non-Estonians and Latvians moved into the region. While both the Estonian and Latvian language were protected, Russian was the lingua franca for the country and the demographic shift threatened both groups' cultural survival. Once they obtained their independence their first order of business was to ensure that their language and culture could never be threatened again. One way to protect their culture was to exclude those who did not share it. Many Russian-speakers[7] who had moved to the region when it was a part of the Soviet Union in search of better jobs now found that they did not have citizenship. Many could not speak the titular language and could not pass the stringent citizenship tests set out in both countries. The Estonians and Latvians had hoped that many of the Russians would simply return to Russian. It became clear early on that this was not to be and under pressure by the international community the citizenship laws were loosened. Despite the easing of restrictions many Russians remain totally outside of the political process. They have not integrated and cannot speak the language and lacking citizenship they lack the ability to vote, hold certain jobs and own land. There is growing dissatisfaction among the Russians in the two Baltic countries over the right to Russian language education and the Russian community is also economically disadvantaged in both countries.

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[7] Throughout this study the term Russians and Russian-speakers will be used interchangeably. The majority of the non-Latvians and Estonians in these countries are ethnic Russians, however there are also Ukrainians, Belorussians and others who speak Russian. The integration policies of both countries do not make a distinction between those who speak Russian and those who are ethnically Russian, so both terms will be used here.

While both the Corsicans and Basques have turned to violence, the Russian communities in both Estonia and Latvia remain peaceful. In fact there has been very little mobilization by the group in any way. They continue to try to work in the political system in the hopes that they will eventually reach equal status with the Estonians and Latvians with whom they have lived with their entire lives. In future versions of this study additional cases will be examined including possibly Northern Ireland and cases in Eastern Europe such as Romania or Moldova.

What Cases are not Included?

Due to the cases that have been chosen for this study the questions can be asked: What groups are not included and why? There are three cases whose exclusion needs to be explained. Most studies on the Baltic states include all three countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Russians in Lithuania are noticeably absent from this study. The reason for their exclusion is simply that Lithuania has done a much better job of integrating their Russian-speaking population than the other two countries.[8] The Russian minority moved into the Baltic states due to the industrialization of the region during the Soviet period but Lithuania was never industrialized to the same level as its Baltic neighbors. As a result the size of the Russian minority is also considerably smaller in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia.[9] From the outset of independence in 1991 the Lithuanian government has

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[8] It should be noted that Lithuania also has a large Polish minority who after some initial difficulties also have integrated in Lithuanian society.

[9] See Thomas Lane (2002) *Lithuania: Stepping Westward* (London: Routledge Press).

approached their minority issues in a very different way compared to the other two. Due to their small size the Lithuanians were more comfortable giving the Russian minority more rights and greater access to the political system. All the Russians were given citizenship as long as they "applied for it, took a loyalty oath, and showed proof of having renounced any other citizenship".[10] This law was amended in 1995 to be even more open and by the end of the 1990's over 90% of the minority community in Lithuanian had received citizenship.[11] Clearly the peace and stability in Lithuania should not be surprising. Therefore while the three Baltic states are linked throughout history and by geography, Lithuania will be severed from this analysis and only the Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia will be considered.

As discussed above for Basque nationalists the Basque country consists of four provinces in Spain and three provinces in France. While the importance of the Basque territory in France will be discussed, the actual Basques in France will not be included in this analysis.[12] While there has been some co-operation between the Basques on both sides of the border it has mostly involved Spanish Basques hiding from the authorities after a terrorist attack or hiding weapons on the French side to be used in a future attack.[13] The Basques in France are considerably poorer than their

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[10] Walter C. Clemens (2001) *The Baltic Transformed* (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Press), p.118.

[11] Ibid.

[12] For a description of the Basques in France please see the analytic summary for the group on the Minorities at Risk Project webpage, http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com.

Spanish cousins. The land where they live lacks the natural resources found in the south and there are very few of them. While there are over 2.6 million Basques in the Spanish provinces, the French Basques number a mere 250 000, representing only 0.4% of the total French population.[14] Due to their extremely small size, lack of political mobilization and their history of avoiding violence (on French soil) the French Basques are not appropriate for this analysis.

The final case that some would question their lack of inclusion is the Catalans in Spain. Like the Basques the Catalans are one of the traditional autonomous regions in Spain. They have had a long history both within and outside Spanish rule. They have their own language and culture and they have also had in the past nationalist organizations who have resorted to violence. The most famous of these groups was Terra Lliure (Free Land in Catalan) which was active in the 1970's and 1980's.[15] The level of violence attributed to this group was never as high as the radical Basque groups and it has not been active since 1992. While the Catalans have concerns over the protection of their language and culture they have chosen more peaceful political strategies to express them. In turn, the Spanish state has been more open to negotiating with the Catalans. There have been efforts by political leaders to use the Catalan language while in the region (a courtesy not given to the Basques in recent

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[13] See for example Reuters (2004) "Two ETA Suspects Held; Arms Cache Found in France" *Washington Post* 4 April 2004.

[14] Luis Núñez Astrain (1997) *The Basques: Their Struggle for Independence* (Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press), p.3.

[15] Minorities at Risk Website.

years) and the state has helped improve the Catalan education programs. In short, the Catalans are not included in this study because their nationalism is not viewed as the same type of threat as Basque nationalism by the Spanish state. As a result the treatment of the Catalans has been historically better than that of the Basques. The relationship between the Catalans and the rest of Spain is more civil with higher levels of trust and co-operation. Most importantly, there is a lack of violence associated with Catalan nationalism. Their behavior can be predicted using the generally accepted theory on ethnic conflict. However, since the Basque movement falls outside of the theory they are included in the study while the Catalans are not.

Importance to the Discipline

Some may question what can be learned by studying the behavior of four small ethnic groups in the far Northeast and Southwest of Europe. Others may question the benefit this knowledge would serve. While the cases are intrinsically interesting, the study serves a much larger purpose. There have been many studies on ethnic conflict and many theories put forward trying to explain and more importantly predict when it will occur.[16] The four cases in this study do not fit nicely into any of those theories' explanations. As discussed above, these groups have followed paths that other groups in similar circumstances have not taken. They have remained outside the general pattern of behavior. By providing an explanation for the behavior of these cases a better understanding of the causes and prevention of ethnic conflict can be developed. Existing theories can be re-tested incorporating the findings of this

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[16] The most important of these theories are discussed in Chapter Two.

study and issues that may not have been considered or not emphasized in other studies may be introduced or re-introduced with greater weight assigned to them. What is learned from the four cases in this study can be the foundation on which other cases can then be tested. The explanations provided in this study can be applied to other cases, both those who fall into the traditional explanations and those that do not.

Regardless of what is discovered about the decision-making of these groups specifically, there are larger issues to consider. This study is an attempt at explaining what factors can lead a group to choose violence or to avoid it. By better understanding this decision making the discipline as a whole is better prepared to create risk assessment models. With better models the possibility of identifying potential 'hot spots' is improved and greater attention can be given those cases by the international community. Potential pre-emptive solutions to these conflicts can be developed and less people will face the possibility of encounter ethnic conflict. If any improvement in the current risk assessment models is gained through an analysis of these four small groups then this study is more than justified to be undertaken.

Research Methods

To answer the questions asked in this study several sources of information will be utilized. Due to the small number of cases studied it would be inappropriate to use large quantitative models. This study will therefore rely heavily on qualitative analysis. By testing the four cases across a variety of hypotheses it is possible to gain a great wealth of information and be confident in the predictions and explanations

that result from the analysis.[17] This study relies heavily on secondary sources for both theoretical and historical analyses. While this study is grounded in the social science tradition it is impossible to understand the groups today without understanding their history. For each of the cases the vast majority of understanding and interpretations of historical events come from secondary sources. The study takes the opinions and interpretations from these sources and synthesizes them into a new understanding of this topic. There does not appear to be any previous single study which has attempted to an answer these questions but there have been many who touch on these issues. By taking the relevant information from past work it is possible to find explanations for each group's behavior.

Secondary sources are insufficient alone to understand questions that are so complex and at times emotional. It is also necessary to understand the opinions and thought processes of those actually involved in decision making. To compliment and periodically refute the analyses from the secondary sources, this study also relies on elite interviews. The interviews for this study were conducted primarily in person throughout Europe. When an in-person interview was impossible, the interview was conducted over the telephone. While it is acknowledged those telephone interviews are not ideal[18], periodically they were a necessity due to either time or budgetary restraints. The information gained in speaking to these particular elites more than

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[17] This technique of increasing the number of events studied qualitatively is discussed in Gary King et al. (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

[18] Sharon Werning Rivera et al. (2002) "Interviewing Political Elites: Lessons from Russia" *Political Science and Politics* Vol.35 No.4, p.685.

compensated for what was lost in not meeting face to face. Access to the elites interviewed was gained through contacts with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's High Commissioner on National Minorities and his staff. While all interviewees were asked some common questions, the actual wording of the questions and the additional questions asked were based on the individual. It was not practical or beneficial to present each individual with a set questionnaire. The reasons for this are two fold. As Aberbach and Rockman note "[i]n elite interviewing, as in social science generally, the maxim for the best way to design and conduct a study is 'purpose, purpose, purpose'".[19] Each elite interview had particular expertise and it was those issues that formed the basis of the interview. There was no point in asking questions that they could not answer with any authority. The second reason the interviews were free-flowing is that "[e]lites especially- but other highly educated people as well- do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions".[20] It became clear that the interviewees were more comfortable discussing some issues rather than others. If the interview questions had been closed the information gathered would have been less and the interviewee may have ended the interview prematurely. Using the open-ended, conversational method put the elites more at ease and allowed them to respond in a manner they were more comfortable with. See the Appendix for a sample question sheet.

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[19] Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman (2002) "Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews" *Political Science and Politics* Vol.35 No.4, p.673.

[20] Ibid, p.674.

To compliment further the primary and secondary data and to account for biases in both the secondary data and the information provided be the interviewees[21], available public opinion results were included in the analysis. There has been a great deal of public opinion gathered in both Latvia and Estonia and this information has been broken down by ethnic group and therefore provides an interesting look at the opinions of not just the elites' views but the general public at large. Similarly, the Basque government has carried out its own public opinion surveys and this data has been incorporated as well.

Unlike the other regions, there has been little or no public opinion sampling done on the island of Corsica. While there was polling done in the run up to the 2003 referendum, there have been no other attempts to survey other political and social issues. Since the French government does not recognize a difference between Corsica and the other regions, survey data is not collected on the island independently.[22] This is indicative of the larger problem of studying Corsica. It proved difficult to arrange interviews with the vast majority of Corsican elites. This is not a problem isolated to this study however. The Corsican elites are hesitant to speak with non-Corsicans and

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[21] As noted by Berry "Interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell the truth". Jeffery M. Berry (2002) "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing" *Political Science and Politics* Vol.35 No.4, p.680. In this study, while it is acknowledged that some subjects may have strong biases they were also often very open and provided answers that would not benefit them politically or socially and should be assumed to be their truthful opinion.

[22] It is possible that other researchers have carried out their own polling on Corsica. This information has not been made public. It was outside the scope of this study to carry out such studies.

many Corsican nationalists are reluctant to be interviewed in a language other than Corsican.[23] Of the four cases, Corsica proved the most difficult in data collection and analysis. While critics may point to the lack of data on Corsica as a flaw in this study, based on the interviews that were carried out and the secondary sources collected it was still possible to include Corsica in the study and provide an explanation as to their decision making. The lack of information available on Corsica may indicate that the discipline has ignored this particular case and any analysis on their behavior, as this study provides, is a positive beginning.

Progression of the Rest of the Chapters

In order to fully examine this issue and to test the relevant hypotheses this study is comprised of seven further chapters. Chapter two is an examination of the relevant literature and sets out the hypotheses to be tested. A project of this scope touches on many issues in this discipline. It is necessary to understand how the discipline has developed, where it came from and where it is going to understand where this project fits. The chapter begins with a review of the main texts in the more abstract issues of ethnic conflict and nationalism. This review helps shape the issues to be discussed. The chapter then sets out the hypotheses to be tested and provides a summary of the relevant literature that led to these hypotheses being chosen. The key literature concerning economic deprivation and discrimination, international

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[23] Dr. John Loughlin, a professor at Cardiff University is one of the few scholars who has managed to meet with many Corsican elites. He re-iterated the problems in finding willing subjects to speak with. To compensate, Loughlin himself was interviewed and he provided invaluable insight into the mindset of the Corsicans he met with. Telephone interview, February 19, 2004.

intervention, culture and the institutionalization of culture are therefore considered.[24]
Each of these hypotheses will be the basis for subsequent chapters in the study.

Chapter three is a thorough review of the histories of the four groups to be
used as case studies. Each of these groups has had an extraordinary past and their
unique histories help explain their actions today. Without understanding the
development of a group it is not possible to fully comprehend why their decision
making today or make predictions concerning their future decisions, particularly in
regards to the use of violence. This chapter looks into the Corsicans' history of
foreign occupation, their unique relationship with the French state and the
introduction onto the island of a large number of outsiders. These outsiders
represented a clear danger to the Corsican language and culture and are partly
responsible for the changes to the Corsican nationalist movement. The chapter also
traces the road towards the creation of not only the Corsican nationalist movement,
but the militant wing of that movement which has been engaged in a continuing
struggle against the French mainland. The chapter's discussion of the Corsicans ends
with the failed referendum of the summer of 2003 which was seen, if successful, as a
potential peaceful political solution to the Corsican conflict. The history of the
Basques begins with their long history of foreign invasion as well. It documents how
until the 19th Century despite foreign control the Basques enjoyed relative autonomy.
How the Basques lost that autonomy is discussed as well as the creation of the first

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[24] As this study is concerned with minority issues, the literature review concentrates
on work associated with ethnic conflict. Some of the work discussed falls outside of
that general field but when appropriate the majority of works cited will relate to
minority groups.

Basque nationalist movement. For the Basques the darkest period in their history was the rise of Franco to power after the Spanish Civil War and in order to understand who the Basques are today it is necessary to understand the levels of repression they faced during this time. The rise of the Basque terrorist group the ETA is discussed as is the various attempts at resolving the Basque conflict through the political process. In order to understand the situation in the two Baltic countries it is necessary to understand both the history of the Russian speakers and the history of the Baltic Republics as well. The chapter provides an understanding into the mindset of the Latvians and Estonians who like the Corsicans and Basques had faced a long history of foreign occupation. Many of the problems faced by the Russians today are due to the Estonian and Latvian efforts to protect themselves from repeating that history. While the Latvians and Estonians represented the oppressed communities prior to 1991, after that point it is the Russian community who felt persecuted. Their treatment from the point of Baltic independence through to today is examined to conclude this chapter.

Chapters four through seven are devoted to testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter two. Chapter four examines the role of economics in explaining ethnic conflict. The level of deprivation between each group and the titular communities is examined. While the Corsicans and Russians in both Baltic countries are considerably poorer than then their French, Estonian and Latvian counterparts, the Basques represent a minority group that is economically better off than the rest of the country. The chapter tests the assumption that changes in economic well-being will lead to

militant activity. The chapter finds that discrepancies in economics may be sufficient in some cases to lead to a militant movement; it is not a necessary condition. It does not appear to be enough to maintain a militant movement after it provides the catalyst for that movement to develop. The chapter provides some evidence that the ethnic division of labor may be a potential factor in the prevention of ethnic conflict based on the Estonian and Latvian cases.

Chapter five is a discussion of the role of the international community in preventing conflict. The cases examined provide an interesting dichotomy for analysis. There are few states in the world who have received more international attention in regards to their minority groups than Estonia and Latvia. Almost from the moment they became independent (and particularly when there was still a large Soviet and then Russian military presence in the region) the various European institutions began to monitor their situation and provide recommendations for changes in their minority laws. When the two countries began the accession process to the European Union this intervention became even more intrusive. This chapter concentrates on the role of two European institutions in the Baltic cases, the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In particular the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities has had an enormous influence on the laws of both countries and so this chapter allots considerable space to an analysis of his impact. The level of international involvement in Corsica and the Basque conflict is the polar opposite to the Baltic. Neither country has been open to the idea of foreign mediators nor outside assistance

and as a result both conflicts have existed in a relative vacuum. Both the Corsican and the Basque nationalists aim at gaining international attention for their causes. One way to raise attention is through terrorist activities. This has resulted in a cycle where these groups have become pariahs in Europe and the possibility of international intervention becomes less likely.

Chapter six provides an analysis of the role of culture in allowing for or repressing violence in a society. This may be the most controversial chapter in the study. In this chapter a description of each group's culture is developed through an analysis of its history, secondary source assessments of its culture and from elite interviews. In each case how this culture views and accepts or rejects violence is then determined. While some may question the validity of these findings, the evidence is compelling. In particular the elite interviews provide an insight into the mindset of the leaders of these groups and the titular communities. While there is obviously some bias in their statements about their culture, their candor in discussing how their culture dictates their view of violence is remarkable. In the case of the Corsicans the concept of a vendetta culture is discussed. This culture, rooted in the particular clan system found on the island dictates that violence is a normal aspect of Corsican life. In the political arena this manifests itself not necessarily into the use of violence by the entire population but rather a lack of abhorrence in regard to violent acts carried out by Corsican nationalists. While the Corsican culture has remained fairly constant for centuries, the Basque culture was radically altered by the repression it faced under Franco. Violence was seen as the only acceptable response to violence. This new

aspect of Basque culture was added to the traditional culture which allowed for easy mobilization of the society. The result was a group who were prepared to defend its culture and itself through any means necessary. Even with the threat of repression removed changing the culture back to not accepting some form of violence has proven difficult. In comparison to the cultures of the Basques and the Corsicans, the Russian-speakers culture promoted non-violence. This was due to both the non-violent influences of the Estonians and Latvians whom they were living among (and who had witnessed the break from the Soviet Union through non-violent means) and a lack of the nationalism necessary to encourage mobilization. This lack of nationalism can be attributed to the early Soviet policies concerning Russians. What has resulted is a new culture that is foreign to Russians living in Russia. This new culture lacks organization and views the use of violence for political means as impractical.

Chapter seven builds on the findings of the previous chapter. It attempts to understand the factors that have led to the cultures found in chapter six to become institutionalized. Three such factors are examined. The first is the role of geographic isolation because groups that interact with others will have their culture altered due to higher levels of intermarriage and cross-cultural dialogue. The new culture in the Russian community, who live predominantly in the large urban centers, particularly in the capitals of the Baltic states show this. The ethnic Corsicans remain isolated not only from the rest of France but they tend to not live in the same areas as non-Corsicans on the island. This has helped preserve their culture and the most militant

Basques, the ones who remain supportive of the ETA are located in the small rural villages. The Basques who live in Bilbao and other larger urban centers interact more with non-Basques and as a result their culture is more in line with the rest of Spain. The second issue that is examined is the length of time the conflict has gone on. The key finding here is that the length of time is less important than the time period when the conflict was developing. The influence of the Marxist anti-colonial movements of Africa on the Corsican and Basque nationalists is discussed. The post-communist world the Russians were confronted with is juxtaposed to the Basque and Corsican examples. The final institutionalization factor is the use of repertoires of violence. Once violence is used it is difficult to stop using it, thus making it eventually part of a group's culture. The impact repertoire choices have made on each group is discussed with particular emphasis on the Basque and Corsican cases.[25]

Chapter eight provides an overview of the study and sums up the key conclusions. It provides an analysis of the future of each of the groups, places the study in a larger context and outlines what future work leads from this study.

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[25] The Russians in Estonia and Latvia have yet to use violence and therefore it is not possible to discuss that as a repertoire choice but the implications of this choice is discussed.

Chapter 2- The Discipline to Date and Hypotheses

Prior to examining the specific case studies to explain why they have acted in the way they have it is necessary to understand the various competing theories put forward by others. This particular work crosses paths with several of the most important theories in comparative politics and international relations. While it builds on and tests some pre-existing theories it also diverges from others and examines the issues in new ways. The main hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent chapters are derived mainly from the pre-existing literature; however they have never been tested together in this particular format. This chapter provides the roadmap for the rest of the study.

Risk Assessment and Ethnic Conflict

There has been a growing demand in both the academic and policy-making worlds for better and more accurate risk assessment models concerning the prediction of ethnic conflict.[26] The reason for this is simple. As discussed in the previous chapter, ethnic conflict has been the cause of great suffering and death throughout history and it continues to plague many areas of the world.[27] Greater emphasis has therefore been placed on identifying the roots of ethnic conflict and creating tools

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[26] The need for greater risk assessment capabilities in the international community has become a priority and is now stated in many international action plans. See for example: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Council).

[27] As discussed in Chapter One, for a list of current trends in ethnic conflict throughout the world please see the Appendix of Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr (2004) *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, 2nd Edition* (Boulder CO: Westview Press), pp.198-204 or Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (2003) *Peace and Conflict 2003* (College Park MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management).

designed to provide 'early warning' on the potential of violent conflict. This is part of a larger emphasis on risk assessment in general. There has been increase attention on early warning models concerning issues such as war, genocide, migration and state failure.[28] Schmid found that all of the various attempts at forecasting ethnic conflict could be classified as either prospective or retrospective in nature. A prospective analysis takes past successful predictions and copies the experimental design, while retrospective analysis looks at historical cases and bases future predictions on the patterns found in the past cases.[29] While this may appear self evident it does illustrate a clear divide in strategy in devising effective risk assessments. If one is to follow a previous successful research design to predict future risk the researcher must be sure that the conditions faced by the original group are the same as the test group. If the conditions faced by both groups do not match then important explanations for their actions will be missed. While the second method allows for different cases to be tested in order to measure the impact of variables on the outcome (since it is already known) it is still susceptible to intervening variables not seen elsewhere. Schmid finds that the majority of risk assessment models follow the second technique and find explanations for outcomes in the past and use these to predict future outcomes.[30]

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[28]   An examination of the risk assessment models not concerning ethno-political conflict is beyond the scope of this chapter. For an examination of the development of these models please see John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, ed. (1998) *Preventative Measures* (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing).

[29]   Alex P. Schmid (2001) "A Comparative Look at Early Warning Indicators" in Hayward R. Alker, Ted Robert Gurr and Kumar Rupesinghe ed., *Journeys Through Conflict* (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield Press), p.292.

This study will also follow this pattern. By explaining why the cases have acted the way they have it will be possible to identify the key variables that can influence the group's decision making either towards or away from violence.

Another way to differentiate risk assessment models is by the data they use to test their theories. In this regard models can rely on either quantitative or qualitative data. In ethnic conflict risk assessment the work of Ted Robert Gurr represents one of the most highly respected quantitative studies. Gurr's work throughout the 1990's and through to today has relied on his Minorities at Risk Project (MAR).[31] MAR is the only major data collection project that uses the minority group itself as the unit of analysis. Currently over 275 groups are actively tracked, while others are monitored and past data on groups no longer considered minorities (such as the Estonians in the Soviet Union) is maintained. To qualify as a minority in the dataset the group must be considered a 'ethnopolitical' group meaning that they must meet one or both of the following criteria: "The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic differential treatment vis-à-vis other groups in society" and/or "The group is the basis for political mobilization and action in defense of its self-defined interests".[32] This means that only groups who are actively mobilized or are specifically targeted by the

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[30] Ibid, p. 293.

[31] Gurr's work using MAR is highlighted by two volumes: Ted Robert Gurr (1993) *Minorities at Risk* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press) and (2000) *Peoples Versus States* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press). Since the second book builds on the first it will be *Peoples Versus States* that is discussed here. For a full list of publications that use MAR please see the Minorities at Risk Website: http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com.

[32] Gurr (2000), p.7.

state are tracked. MAR has two main components, one qualitative and one

quantitative. Each group has a qualitative analysis of its history, current situation and

past mobilization provided. With each coding update the researcher responsible for

the group also provides an assessment of risk. This assessment concerns both the risks

against the group by the state and the risk of continued or future militancy by the

group itself. The majority of the work by the MAR staff is dedicated to the coding of

quantitative data for the extensive dataset. This dataset collects information on all

aspects of the group. Issues such as political and economic discrimination, severity of

protests and militant activities, levels of organization, geographic concentration and

demographic conditions are all examples of the type of data collected. It is through

this data collection that the Gurr risk assessment models were created. Gurr's risk

assessment model is broken into two parts: factors that predict the potential for future

protest and factors that predict the likelihood of rebellion. Using regression analysis

the factors used to predict protest were found to be: Cultural Restrictions,

Government Repression, Democratic Polity, Regime Instability and Support from

Kindred Groups.[33] Rebellion was predicted using the following factors: Past

Persistent Protest, Government Repression, Territorial Concentration, Group

Organization, Regime Instability and Support from Foreign Governments.[34] By using

a regression line a formula could be developed to create a risk score. The higher the

score, the greater the risk. The advantage of this model is that it is easy to identify

[33] Ibid, p.233.

[34] Ibid, p.236.

which groups have the highest potential for risk when compared to all the other groups in the study. There are however some problems with this method of risk assessment. As Scarritt and McMillian note in some regions of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, there is not enough information available to a coder to make accurate coding decisions. Without this information the risk assessment scores are of limited value.[35] Additional concerns involve the weight assigned to each variable and coding accuracy. Many of the variables used in the regression line are nominal, therefore how a variable is coded takes on added importance. Some of the variables, particularly Geographic Concentration can be difficult to determine and a mis-interpretation by the coder can heavily influence the score of the group. One coding error can make a group appear more likely to be involved in conflict than it may actually be in reality, or worse a group who has a higher potential for rebellion could be overlooked because its score was too low.[36] As mentioned, despite these concerns MAR remains the leading data source for ethno-political conflict variables and the risk assessment models that accompany it have been widely accepted.

Risk Assessment models that rely on qualitative analysis are less common but still possible. One successful example is the work of Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld.[37] Tellis et al. created a flow diagram for ethnic conflict that moves through three stages.

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[35] James R. Scarritt and Susan McMillian (1995) "Protest and Rebellion in Africa" *Comparative Political Studies* Vol.28 No.3, pp.323-350.

[36] Michael Johns (2002) "Assessing Risk Assessment: A Baltic Test" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol.8 No.1, pp.105-128.

[37] Ashley J. Tellis et al. (1997) *Anticipating Ethnic Conflict* (Santa Monica: RAND).

The first considers the potential for strife which is based on the political, social and economic conditions faced by the group as well as the cultural distinctiveness of the group. If the group is found to have these factors the next stage is considered which is the chances of moving to the likelihood of strife. In this category issues such as tipping events (a public galvanizing event which helps mobilize the group), external support and the rise of identity entrepreneurs are considered. Once again if the group meets these criteria the final part of the model considers the chances of actual strife. Here the role of the state is considered. When the model is fully considered the preferences for a group can be determined as well as the preferences of the state. Depending on these preferences violence is more or less likely.[38] The advantage of this model is also its greatest disadvantage, it can only be applied to one state at a time. Unlike the Gurr quantitative analysis it is not possible to compare different cases. The process is also time consuming and requires a vast understanding of the cases considered. As with the Gurr model's coding decisions it is imperative that the correct choices are made in the flow diagram based on adequate information in order to ensure that the correct assessment is made.

This analysis will be based on qualitative analysis but will not follow the flow diagram model found in Tellis et al. Rather, specific hypotheses will be tested to determine their importance in explaining why the groups chose to use or not to use violence. It will be retrospective in nature using Schmid's typology. This study will combine the use of specific variables, as found in the Gurr model with the use of

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[38] Ibid, p.10.

qualitative analysis. Due to the small number of cases in this study advanced quantitative analysis is not possible, but this work will identify specific important variables through qualitative analysis that could then be studied quantitatively at a later date with a larger sample.

There have been other studies that have looked at issues in ethnic conflict both quantitatively and qualitatively that have not focused on aspects of risk assessment. Horowitz concentrated his efforts on explaining ethnic conflict in Africa, Asia and parts of the Caribbean.[39] Horowitz examines several explanations as to why conflict occurs. His specific economic explanations will be examined in greater detail below. Horowitz bases his analysis on conflict theory which is concerned with "a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals".[40] Using this definition conflict occurs due to limited resources, whether they be economic, political or social. In order to ensure survival those who would take these resources must either be killed or repressed. As a result people band together around their ethnicity in order to try to maximize the amount of resources they are able to acquire or deny to others. For Horowitz a key aspect to understanding ethnic conflict is the psychological aspects behind them. His work looks at how the elites are able to mobilize the masses around their prejudices and fears of other groups. By examining the symbolism behind ethnic conflicts a clearer picture as to why people will resort to violence over differences in nationality is possible.

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[39] Donald L. Horowitz (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

[40] Ibid, p.95.

Horowitz is therefore interested in issues such as the social hierarchy of groups within a state. Horowitz provides recommendations as to how to avoid violent conflict based on limiting both inter-ethnic competition for power and the psychological fears that accompany this competition. He advocates using the electoral system to encourage inter-ethnic co-operation and believes by not concentrating power in a central government regionally concentrated ethnic groups can have some power over their own affairs. He believes that by interacting with other ethnic groups many of the stereotypes that develop and are used by ethnic elites would no longer be effective. Ethnicity can rip a country apart if steps are not taken to shift the focus away from it. For Horowitz conflict can be avoided only when groups know each other and can find ways of sharing power, thus avoiding direct competition.

Laitin provides a different but relevant opinion on conflict management. It is particularly important to this study as it concentrates on explaining the Russian-speaking community in the former Soviet Union. Laitin is concerned generally with the ability of minority groups to integrate into the society.[41] When the Soviet Union broke apart many Russian speakers found themselves in new countries where they did not speak the titular language. Laitin tracks how the Russians, who instantly became a new minority group, developed their identity. What he demonstrates is that the new state must provide incentives for the minority group to learn the new language and to adapt to the society because without incentives the group will remain marginalized and will develop a very different form of nationalism than those who willingly try to

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[41] David Laitin (1998) *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

integrate. In order to encourage the majority of the group to integrate peacefully (as Laitin points out not everyone will choose to do so, some will leave others will remain outside of the society) these incentives must be directed at both the masses and the political elite. Minority rights are not enough in this regard. Efforts must be made to show minority political elites that there is more power available to them as an integrating force than as leaders of a nationalist group. "Under such conditions, the incentives of elites to engage in ethnic outbidding (demanding ever higher levels of autonomy, and eventually secession) would be reduced, as aspirants for wealth and power in the region would be reluctant to lose the possibility for higher rewards at the political center".[42] While Laitin's theory is similar to Horowitz's in that they both emphasize inter-group co-operation to avoid conflict, Laitin's is unique in that it contends that the state should provide incentives to the minority to encourage cultural integration rather than ethnic cohabitation as advocated by Horowitz.

O'Leary and McGarry provide a more concrete typology of ethnic conflict management and the minority group/majority relationship.[43] They propose that there are two ways a state can deal with an ethnic group within its borders, the first is to eliminate differences, and the second is to manage them. Strategies for eliminating differences include genocide, mass deportations and assimilation, while options for managing differences include federalism, consociationalim and arbitration.[44] Based

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[42] Ibid, p.344.

[43] John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1993) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London: Routledge Press).

on these typologies, the logical reaction by the minority group is easy to determine, if

the state tries to eliminate differences conflict should result, while managing conflict

should result in a peaceful negotiated settlement. While seemingly simplistic this is of

great importance for this study because the cases examined were chosen specifically

because they did not follow this pattern. McGarry and O'Leary provide one potential

explanation for why groups may choose to follow a contradictory strategy. In their

analysis of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland they examine the use of ethnic markers

by ethnic elites. An ethnic marker is how the conflict is framed by the elites in order

to mobilize the masses. In Northern Ireland both sides of the conflict framed the

situation in terms of religion: Protestants versus Catholics. This was the easiest way

to make people on both sides fight, no matter what the state tried to do in terms of

conflict management. O'Leary and McGarry were able to show that religion did not

play a role in the activities of the elites on either side but was an effective way of

presenting the conflict to the public.[45]

Some researchers have applied theories from the field of International

Relations to try to explain ethnic conflict. One interesting example of this is the use of

the Security Dilemma theory by Snyder and Jervis to study civil wars.[46] Put simply if

a group views another group as a potential threat it will be prepare for conflict by

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[44] Ibid, p.4.

[45] Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry (1995) *Explaining Northern Ireland* (London: Blackwell Publishers).

[46] Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (1999) "Civil War and the Security Dilemma" in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder ed. *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press).

making itself as strong as possible. The other side sees this build-up and responds the same way. Therefore by trying to ensure their own safety they are actually making the situation more dangerous. It was found that the security dilemma was more acute in ethnic conflict compared to international conflict because security is threatened at the individual and not at the state level. While none of the cases to be examined here are near the point of open civil war there are aspects of the security dilemma in all four cases. It is interesting to note as well Snyder and Jervis' recommendation for international intervention to break the cycle causing the security dilemma.[47]

A final example of the variety of work being conducted in the field of ethnic conflict is the theory of Ethnic Democracy as described by Sammy Smooha.[48] Smooha contends that there are certain states that appear to be democratic in nature but are not entirely so. While the majority group enjoys all of the advantages of democracy, minority groups are excluded. As with Snyder and Jervis' security dilemma theory, here the majority views the presence of the minority as a threat to the stability of the state and this is the justification for restricting access to democratic institutions. For the minority an ethnic democracy "is an inegalitarian, exclusionary, disintegrative, segregative and alienating force".[49] Since the democratic system works against them, the minority is in a poor position to try to influence change thus preventing a full security dilemma from developing. While the possibility of some

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[47] Ibid, p.27.

[48] Sammy Smooha (2001) *The Model of Ethnic Democracy* (Flensburg: ECMI Working Paper #13).

[49] Ibid, p.82.

form of arms race is not possible, conflict could eventually develop if this model of democracy is used for too long a period. This concept is important in this study for two reasons. The first is that Estonia has been considered a prime example of an ethnic democracy[50] and it could be argued that Latvia would qualify as well. The second reason is that the model of ethnic democracy looks directly at the role the majority can play in ethnic relations. By manipulating the democratic institutions of a state to discriminate against a minority a state can increase the majority's national identification and that of the minority group as well. This study will examine the relationship between the minority and the majority to understand what has caused the minority to act the way they have.

Nationalism

Prior to examining the literature concerned with the hypotheses to be tested in the study it is necessary to look briefly at the literature directly concerning the study of nationalism. Much of the nationalism literature will be discussed in terms of specific hypotheses, but the key arguments in the discipline should be understood before any examination of these cases is begun. Without the power of nationalism this study would not be necessary. All of the groups involved with this study, majorities and minorities are heavily influenced by nationalism and are concerned with the protection and preservation of their particular national identity. Since these competing nationalities are forced to share the same physical space the possibility of conflict always exists. In the Baltic cases this conflict has not manifested itself yet in violence,

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[50] Priit Järve (2000) *Ethnic Democracy and Estonia: Application of Smooha's Model* (Flensburg: ECMI Working Paper #7).

while in Corsica and the Basque Country the nationalist struggles have taken on a more militant nature.

The power of nationalism can be easily explained. Humans appear to have a psychological need to belong to a group. People want to be associated with others to avoid feeling alone and are therefore more attached to their ethnic or national identity[51] than other identities they may have.[52] As Berlin eloquently explains nationalism is "a cry for room in which men can seek to realise their natures, quirks and all, to live lives free from dictation or coercion from teachers, masters, bullies and persuaders and dominators of various kinds".[53] This attachment to their nationality allows for them justify certain activities, such as violence, which they otherwise would not consider. This is why conflict based on nationalism is so dangerous. As Bloomfield and Reilly note:

> What makes this kind of conflict so prevalent, so
> pervasive, so durable, so insoluble, is the way in
> which the issues of the dispute are so emotionally
> charged. They go right to the heart of what gives
> people their sense of themselves, defining a person's bond
> with his or her community and defining the source of

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[51] In this study the terms ethnicity and nationality will be used interchangeably. There is no agreement on what is the difference between the two terms. Some groups such as the Quebecois used to refer to themselves as a national group but began speaking of a Quebecois ethnicity in order to add legitimacy to their goal of sovereignty.

[52] Clark McCauley (2001) "The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic Nationalism" in Daniel Chirot and Martin E.P. Seligman ed. *Ethnopolitical Warfare* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association).

[53] Isaiah Berlin (1990) *The Crooked Timber of Humanity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.259.

satisfaction for her or his need for identity.[54]

How does this powerful ethnic or national bond develop? There is no agreement on this question. There are some who advocate a primordial view of nationalism. This view contends that nationalism in some form has existed for hundreds of years and that it is a part of who we are. Geertz defines primordial attachments as "[that] congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves" and that "[o]ne is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself".[55] A leading proponent of a version of this theory currently is Anthony D. Smith who believes that within all people is an ancient nationalist feeling called the *ethnie*.[56] An ethnie is a collection of "myths, memories, values and symbols" which are shared by a group of people.[57]

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[54] David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly (1998) "Characteristics of Deep-Rooted Conflict" in Peter Harris and Ben Reilly ed. *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators* (Stockholm: IDEA), p.11.

[55] Clifford Geertz (1994) "Primordial and Civic Ties" in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith ed. *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 31.

[56] Smith tries to distance himself from the pure primordial approach seen in the work of Geertz and Harold R. Isaacs (1975) *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press). He does not believe for example that ones ethnicity is embedded in DNA such as hair-color or skin-color. He views his theory as a link between genetic primordialists and modernists.

[57] Anthony D. Smith (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (London: Blackwell Publishers), p.15. See also by Smith (1996) *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*

Each member of the society is linked by their common belief in these myths and memories. Nationalism is seen as a contract between the present and the past who taught them these values and between the present and the future who need to have these values instilled in them. Modern nationalists are therefore guardians of the past for future generations. These memories and values can change slowly over time but the underlying belief that the preservation of the ethnie is paramount remains.

The majority of the work on nationalism views the concept as much newer in origin. Here national identity is not inherent in a person's soul rather it has been constructed over time. Their argument is as follows: there are no ancient ties which unite groups, but there are other factors which cause people to feel affinity toward their ethnic or nation group. Constructivist authors can be categorized into two schools, those who feel that identity is a by product of interaction with others, and those who believe identity is manipulated by elites. Authors such as Anderson believe ethnicity developed through modernization, specifically the use of the printing press. By being able to print in the vernacular, a sense of community developed within the group who could read what was being printed. More importantly, those who were not a part of the group could easily be identified.[58] While not concerned with the printing press specifically, Gellner also believed that modernization was the leading cause of identity formation. Gellner felt that the industrial society and the need for economic growth required that people worked together, and from this need, nationality

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(London: Polity Press) and (1998) *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge Press).

[58] Benedict Anderson (1983) *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Press).

developed. People needed to move from the villages and farms they were accustomed to and move into the larger urban centers and when they got to the cities they tried to find those who were most like themselves. A common language, religion, culture or geographic location was the precursor to national bonds.[59]

Those who fall into the elite-driven school feel that elites are able to draw upon symbols and selective history to shape group identity for specific means.[60] It is their contention that identity can be literally constructed by elites in order mobilize the masses to achieve their goals. As these goals change, the aspects of the identity which are emphasized are changed accordingly. By inventing identity, or to a lesser extent manipulating which symbols and values are drawn upon, the elites have a vast arsenal of tools at their disposal to indoctrinate the masses. Within Eastern Europe, Tismaneanu illustrates how the power of nationalism has greatly influenced how the states have developed since the break from communism. He contends that many ethnic groups have turned to "fantasies of salvation" and other political myths to justify their actions and to mobilize the masses along ethnic or nationalistic lines.[61]

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[59] Ernest Gellner (1983) *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Press). See also Walker Connor (1994) *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) and Leah Greenfeld (1992) *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

[60] See for example Eric Hobsbawm (1990) *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870 (*Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1992) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[61] Vladimir Tismaneanu (1998*) Fantasies of Salvation* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press). To illustrate how damaging this form of nationalism has been in Eastern Europe, compare this analysis to Tismaneanu's previous analysis of Eastern Europe in (1992) *Reinventing Politics* (New York: The Free Press).

While Caplan and Feffer agree with Tismaneanu that Eastern Europe has become a fertile soil for new (in reality old) forms of nationalism to take root, they go farther to say that there has also been a change in strength of nationalism in the west as well.[62] Issues such as regional integration and the demands of greater autonomy for groups within states has caused all groups, both minorities and majorities to revert back to nationalistic demands and strategies easily manipulated by elites.[63]

Hypotheses to be Examined

This study will examine how the theories discussed above are influenced by a variety of factors in the cases studied. An obvious issue that needs to be addressed is the role of economics in predicting ethnic violence. Returning to the work of Horowitz it is possible to see the impact of class struggle in ethnic conflict. Two important issues are addressed by Horowitz in this regard. The first concerns secessionist movements and their level of 'backwardness' compared to those around them and the country as a whole. The author contends that all groups can be divided into one of four groups: backward groups in backward regions, backward groups in advanced regions, advanced groups in backward regions and advanced groups in advanced regions.[64] An advanced region is simply one with a higher economic

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[62] Richard Caplan and John Feffer ed., (1996) *Europe's New Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[63] This is a concept also discussed by Will Kymlicka (2001) *Politics in the Vernacularal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kymlicka attempts to find a solution to the conflicts between majority, minority and immigrant nationalisms in a modern, global era.

[64] Horowitz (1985), p.233.

standard of living compared to a backwards region. Advanced groups enjoy higher

levels of education, more access to higher paying bureaucratic and white-collar

positions. As will be demonstrated later, the Basques in Spain represent an advanced

group in an advanced region while the Corsicans are a backward group in a backward

region. While not secessionist the Russians in Latvia and Estonia are backward

groups in backward regions. Horowitz believes that backward groups in backward

regions are the most likely to be secessionist. These groups conclude quickly that the

society is organized not in their best interest. They demand greater rights but

determine that their needs are not being met therefore these groups will attempt to

secede regardless of economic costs. Advanced groups in backward regions resort to

secession as a last resort and often try to work within the system. These groups

consider their economic interests when choosing a strategy. Advanced groups in

advanced regions see their economic success shared with the rest of the country as a

disadvantage thus leading to calls for separation. Due to their privileged economic

status their potential loss of wealth is a major issue in the decision-making. Finally

backward groups in advanced regions are fearful of economic competition and feel

that they are always at a disadvantage leading them to call for more rights and

protection. As they are already disadvantaged economic considerations are not an

issue for these groups.[65]

  The second economic issue discussed by Horowitz is the role of the ethnic

division of labor. The author finds that societies develops in such a way that some

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[65] Ibid, pp.236-259.

ethnic groups specialize in certain occupations and other groups choose different occupations. For Horowitz when this occurs the possibility of competing ethnic pools of labor is eliminated which prevents conflict. "[W]orkers of different ethnic groups are often steered by helpful friends, patrons, kinsmen, and ethnic associations toward employment in enterprises where members of the same group already have a foothold. Job competition is likely to be intraethnic".[66]

Olzak also looks at issues of interethnic competition. Her focus is on early American competition in large urban centers. Her analysis found that competition "intensifies the salience of ethnic boundaries and promotes spontaneous forms of collective action".[67] She argues that in the face of economic competition people will rally around their ethnicity making it a more important aspect of their lives. This allows for greater mobilization around ethnicity and when the various ethnic groups compete directly with one another for economic advantages conflict is likely. This creates a cycle of violence. Conflict increases the salience of ethnicity leading to a greater emphasis on ethnic boundaries. These ethnic boundaries lead to competition leading to more conflict. Only when ethnicity is removed from the competition equation does conflict subside.

A final theory that needs to be addressed is that of relative deprivation. This theory is most closely attached to the early work of Gurr. Relative deprivation is the

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[66] Ibid, p.128.

[67] Susan Olzak (1992) *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition & Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 208.

"discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction".[68] If there is a discrepancy between two groups as long as that discrepancy remains constant violence is unlikely. It occurs when the gap between two groups change, whether by one group advancing while the other remains constant or vice versa that the gap becomes more noticeable which leads to a greater likelihood of collective violence. Using Rummel's term, this creates the "Gap Principle" in regards to conflict.[69] The Gap Principle states that as long as expectations are reached by both sides in a dispute then peace will remain stable. If one group begins to do better than the other or if a group's expectations are not met, then a gap (either real or perceived) develops and conflict follows. When applied to economics, if one group becomes more affluent while another does not progress, or if a group becomes less affluent while another group remains constant or advances, this increase in the gap between them could cause higher levels of dissatisfaction and eventually lead to violence.

All of these economic theories need to be accounted for and will be studied below. Combined they lead to the first hypotheses to be study:

H1. *The nature of the economic structure of a state and the resulting difference in economic affluence will influence group decision making in regards to choosing militant strategies.*

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[68] Ted Robert Gurr (1970) *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.23. See also Will Moore and Keith Jaggers (1990) "Deprivation, Mobilization and the State" *Journal of Developing Societies* Vol.6 No.1, pp.17-36.

[69] R.J. Rummel (1991) *The Conflict Helix* (London: Transaction Publishers).

A second issue to be addressed is the role of the international community in preventing ethnic conflict. This is an issue that has been somewhat ignored by scholars interested in understanding nationalism and its components. Brubaker for example discusses what he calls a triadic relationship that dominates nationalism in Europe.[70] This relationship is comprised of 1) the naturalizing state (majority nationalism) 2) national minorities and 3) the diaspora. For Brubaker all three of these forces work against each other and pull the state in various directions. What is missing from this analysis is the international community. This fourth factor could also be seen as pulling the state towards certain choices but Brubaker chooses to ignore this particular factor in his analysis.

Those who do incorporate the international community are more often interested in issues of international intervention in terms of other states taking sides in an ethnic conflict. Saideman provides a clear example of this type of study.[71] He examines how states decide whom to support in an ethnic conflict. He finds that domestic factors, such as ethnic ties with one of the participants in a conflict can help predict when a state will intervene and whom they will support if an intervention takes place.[72]

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[70] Rogers Brubaker (1996) *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.55.

[71] Steven M. Saideman (2001) *The Ties that Divide* (New York: Columbia University Press).

[72] Gotlieb also looks at the issues involved in interventions after a conflict has begun. His analysis can be seen as a link between the work of Saideman and the work described below on the role of international organizations as he discusses what

There has been less emphasis on the role of international organizations in preventing ethnic conflict. Schnabel provides one such analysis. The author suggests that there should be an emphasis by the international community on "multilateral and multitrack applications of applied conflict prevention strategies" and that they need to "converge and be harmonized in order to facilitate coordination between different actors".[73] Schnabel notes that historically the international community has been unwilling to become involved in conflict prevention for two reasons, the first being the issue of state sovereignty. Ethnic issues have been seen as an internal matter that other states have been unwilling to interfere with. As most states have their own minority issues they have been less inclined to interfere with others. Secondly states have been busy trying to stop conflicts that have already degenerated into violence. The public is more concerned with ending active conflicts than preventing future ones as the results are easier to quantify.

There has been a general agreement that international institutions can have a particularly useful role on minority issues in Eastern Europe. As Kymlicka notes "Western organizations clearly have the *ability* to impose enormous pressure".[74] As a

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authority IO's have in intervening in ethnic conflicts within a state. Gideon Gotleib (1993) *Nation against State* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press).

[73] Albrecht Schnabel (2002) "International Organizations and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts" in S.A. Giannakos ed., *Ethnic Conflict: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Athens: Ohio University Press), p.230.

[74] Will Kymlicka (2001) "Reply and Conclusion" in Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski ed., *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.370. Italics in the original.

result many case studies that do deal with the international communities' conflict

prevention role have concentrated on Eastern Europe. Due to this regional emphasis

many of the case studies focus on the role of the Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE) and particularly the High Commissioner on National

Minorities[75] or the European Union.[76] In fact much of the literature concerning the

impact of the various international organizations come from the organizations

themselves. The OSCE for example describes the High Commissioner on National

Minorities as a conflict prevention tool that should be active as quickly as possible

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[75] See for example Pál Czáky (2001) "Experiences from Co-operating with the OSCE HCNM" *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* Vol.8 No.1, pp.21-22, Nils Daag (2001) "The OSCE and Conflict Prevention" *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* Vol.8 No.1, pp.23-24, Anders Rönquist (1994) "The Functions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities with Special Regard to Conflict Prevention" in Eckart Klein ed., *The Institutions of a Commissioner for Human Rights and Minorities and the Protection of Human Rights Violations* (Berlin: Arno Spitz), David Chandler (1994) "The OSCE and the internationalization of national minority rights" in David P. Forsythe ed., *Human Rights in the New Europe* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press) and Claus Neukirch "Russia and the OSCE- The Influence of Interested Third and Disinterested Fourth Parties on the Conflicts in Estonia and Moldova" in Pål Kolstø ed., *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies* (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefied Publishers).

[76] See for example Vadim Poleshchuk (2001) "Accession to the European Union and National Integration in Estonia and Latvia" *ECMI Report #8* (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues), Paul Eavis and Stuart Kefford (2002) "Conflict Prevention and the European Union" in Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven ed., *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Also see the edited volume by Michael Keating and John McGarry ed., (2001) *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) which contains several chapters that look at the European Union's (and other international actors) role in controlling nationalism.

"so that ideally there would never be an early warning of imminent conflict, let alone a need to engage in conflict management".[77]

What all of these authors share is the belief that the international community when given the proper resources, the correct mandate and a co-operative government can have a major impact at not only resolving conflicts once they start but can also act to prevent the conflict from beginning in the first place. The evidence indicates that external forces can play as important a role as the internal dimensions of the majority group- minority group relationship. Often the internal relationship is directly influenced by the actions of the international community. The exact role of the international community will be tested in the following chapters. The ability and will of the international community to become involved in the Corsican and Basque conflicts is very different than that of the Russians in the Baltic states. The activities of the international community may be an important explanation for the choices the minority groups have made. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study is:

H2: *Minority groups in states that face pressure by the international community to improve the conditions of the minority group are less likely to be involved in militant activity and vice versa.*

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[77] The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (1997) *The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention* (The Hague: Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations), p.26. For more examples see Walter A. Kemp (2001) *Quiet Diplomacy in Action* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), Sally Holt (2001) "The Activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities January 2001-May 2002" *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* Vol.1, pp.563-589. For the impact of the European Union please see their accession reports for the potential incoming 10 members of the EU found on their webpage http://www.europa.org.

The third major theme to be investigated is the role culture plays in predicting the initiation and continuation (or lack thereof) of violence. It is acknowledged that this is a somewhat contentious topic in the discipline. Few have chosen to use this approach to explain the actions of a group. This is unfortunate since culture "orders political priorities and material objects people consider valuable and worth fighting over".[78] Moreover, culture "offers an account of political behaviour that makes particular actions more or less likely".[79]

It could be said that Clifford Geertz is the leading modern author in this particular form of research.[80] Geertz relied on Kluckhohn who defined culture as:

> 1) the total way of life of a people 2) the social legacy the individual acquires from his group 3) a way of thinking, feeling, and believing 4) an abstraction from behaviour 5) a theory . . . about the way a group of people in fact behave 6) a storehouse of pooled learning 7) a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems 8) learned behaviour 9) a mechanism for the normative regulation of behaviour 10) a set of techniques for adjusting both to the external environment and to other men 11) a precipitate of history.[81]

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[78] Marc Howard Ross (1997) "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis" in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman ed., *Comparative Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.46.

[79] Ibid, p.47. See also Marc Howard Ross (1993) *The Culture of Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

[80] There were other culture based studies prior to Geertz, most notably Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Geertz became the biggest advocate of using culture in his explanation however.

[81] Quoted in Clifford Geertz (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books), pp.4-5.

Using this definition the role of culture in explaining ethnic conflict is clear. How groups react to situations and influences is a result of their culture. It is therefore necessary to understand how a group has collectively learned how to respond. As each culture is unique, only through understanding how that culture deals with conflict can a true understanding of the situation be reached. Geertz believed that through careful observation, what he referred to as "thick description" a researcher would be able to learn the intricacies of a group and therefore interpret what certain gestures, responses or reactions truly meant.[82] Geertz used thick description in his analysis of groups in Indonesia for example and argued that this style of research was a necessary part of any anthropological analysis.

Others have followed successfully in Geertz's footsteps. James C. Scott spent a great deal of time observing villagers in Malaysia to better understand their culture.[83] Through observation Scott was able to understand the culture of these villagers and was able to identify how they reacted to the upper-class. He observed that while appearing respectful and contrite in the presence of a rich land owner they engaged in petty vandalism, theft and private ridicule of these same people in private. This allowed the villagers to feel that they were fighting back against a system that placed them at a disadvantage. Without careful observation this window into this group's culture would have been missed.

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[82] Ibid, p.20.

[83] James C. Scott (1985) *Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Turning more specifically to work on ethnic conflict, Frantz Fanon used his intimate knowledge of the culture of his adopted country Algeria to predict how it could successfully evict the French.[84] While Fanon's work is seen by many as a philosophical call to arms, it is based on an understanding of the culture of the Algerian people. He understood how their culture could be used to effectively achieve their goals. Without the 'thick description' as advocated by Geertz later, Fanon would not have been able to provide such an effective plan.

Ignatieff's work on ethnic conflict also relies on cultural explanations. His work examines how a group's culture develops over time and how it is slow to change. He is able to demonstrate how once something becomes a part of a group's culture it can last for centuries. This can result in conflicts over marginal issues such as the use of a particular alphabet or a feeling of past wrong, real or imagined.[85]

Not all researchers have the time or resources necessary to participate in such thick description of culture. Many have to rely on thin description. This requires the researcher to rely on both the observations of previous researchers and the population itself. While all groups will try to present themselves in the best light possible and all researchers bring their own particular biases into their work it is possible to take primary and secondary information and compare it to historical events to come to an informed conclusion as to how a group's culture has influenced their decisions. In arguing why it is necessary to understand the culture of a group through any means

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[84] Frantz Fanon (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press).

[85] Michael Ignatieff (1994) *Blood and Belonging* (Toronto: Penguin Press).

Katzenstein notes that cultural-institutional contexts "do not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape their behavior. They do not simply regulate behavior. They also help constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate".[86] Culture is such an important component of a person's decision making process it must be accounted for in one way or another. If the ability to directly observe a group is not open to a researcher, they must rely on other sources to understand the situation.

Johnston provides an excellent example of how to examine a group's culture without directly observing it. In his analysis of the development of the strategic culture of Maoist China he outlines a three step process as to how to test for the impact of culture in a group. "The first is to come up with a definition of strategic culture that is falsifiable. The second is to test for the presence of strategic culture in the formative 'texts' of a particular society's strategic traditions. The third is to test for the effect of strategic culture on behavior".[87] This study will use the second and third of these processes in its analysis. It is not necessary to create a falsifiable definition of culture for the groups in question. Through secondary sources and the descriptions of culture by members of each group the definitions of each culture will be developed. It is these individual definitions that will be tested against history to test their validity.

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[86] Peter J. Katzenstein (1996) "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press) p. 22.

[87] Alastair Iain Johnston (1996) "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China" in Katzenstein ed., p. 222.

An interesting analysis of ethnic conflict that uses aspects of culture is Petersen's examination of the role of group-wide emotions.[88] Petersen finds that due to its history a group can begin to develop collective emotions and these emotions dictate how the group will act. His analysis finds that of all the group-wide emotions that could explain changes to a group's culture, resentment provides the best explanation. Resentment comes from feelings of unjust treatment and this sense of injustice develops over time and becomes incorporated into the group's psyche. In using the definition of culture by Kluckhon described above, clearly what Petersen defines as group-wide emotions also can be seen as part of the group's culture.

Kiel also demonstrates the power of culture in explaining group decision-making. Her analysis concerned the culture of the French military prior to the Second World War. As she notes "culture is not merely derivative of functional demands or structural imperatives. Culture has (relative) causal autonomy".[89] Keil was able to demonstrate how the culture of the French military had developed a particular culture that was ill-suited for the changes that were necessary in order to be prepared for the war. Therefore, while there are other structural explanations that contribute to the failure of the French military in order to understand why those structural issues were of such importance the overall culture of the organization needed to be understood. This concept will be incorporated into this study. While other structural explanations

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[88] Roger D. Petersen (2002) *Understanding Ethnic Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[89] Elizabeth Keil (1996) "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II" in Katzenstein ed., p.187.

will be examined, the role of the culture of both the minority group and the majority group in a state will need to be addressed in order to fully understand the structural explanations impact. It may be possible that some groups are more likely to resort to violence due to aspects of their culture while others may look to other strategies.

H3: *In order to predict whether a group will resort to militant activities it is necessary to understand the culture of the group and how accepting that culture is to violence.*

The final area to be discussed is the institutionalization of the culture described above. This will take many forms. The first is an issue that is not addressed in much of the literature, the role of geography. While Gurr's analysis stresses the importance of geographic concentration in predicting ethnic conflict[90], this study will examine the role of geographic isolation. The cases that will be examined provide an interesting comparison to examine this issue. The Corsicans are separated from the rest of France by the Mediterranean Sea and the Basques are a mountain people in the north of Spain. The Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia are intermixed with the titular communities in the large urban centers. This may help explain why violence has occurred in the former cases but not in the latter. While this concept has not been studied at great length elsewhere due to the unique opportunity these particular cases provide it will be studied here.

H4 a. *Groups that are geographically isolated from the majority of the population are more likely to engage in militant activities.*

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[90] Gurr (2000).

Another interesting comparison available for study due to the cases chosen is the importance of time in predicting conflict. As mentioned above the Petersen analysis does incorporate aspects of time. In order for the group-wide emotions to develop a great deal of time must pass. Here Kaufman provides a valuable insight into the question of time.[91] The author dismisses the concept of 'ancient hatred' as argued by Ignatieff, Kaplan and other as an explanation of ethnic conflict.[92] That theory states that the animosity between ethnic groups has built up over centuries and therefore is extremely difficult to end. He sees ethnic conflicts today as new conflicts with ethnic leaders calling on the myths and symbols of past conflicts as rallying cries for actions. Kaufman's theory can be seen as being heavily influenced by the elite theories of nationalism described above. Each conflict is new since the players and issues change but they are rooted in historical myths that are used purely to mobilize the masses. While this may be in fact true, it is argued here that the length of time a conflict has lasted is important. If leaders are able to use history as a mobilizing force, then it can be argued that for the public to be convinced that violence is an option leaders will need some history to root their struggle in. If a conflict is new then enough past wrongs are not available for a leader to weave a persuasive argument around to justify violence. Therefore in some way the conflict it is a continuing

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[91] Stuart J. Kaufman (2001) *Modern Hatreds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). It should be noted that Gurr (2000) also has an aspect of time in its analysis. Many of the factors that are used to predict future protest or rebellion such as levels of protest or repression are based on the recent past (early 1990's). This study will look at the actual length of the conflict as a factor in predicting conflict and is therefore different.

[92] Ignatieff (1994), Michael Ignatieff (1999) *The Warrior's Honor* (Toronto: Penguin Press), Robert D. Kaplan (1993) *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: Random House).

struggle with different players over time. Only in those conflicts that have a long enough history will the possibility of violence be found.[93]

H4 b. *The longer a conflict has existed the more likely violence is to be used.*

The final body of literature that is of value to this study is the field of repertoire choices. When a group chooses to act collectively they have many options as to how to do so. Some choose peaceful political options, while others choose more militant strategies. Over time groups may alter their strategies with some becoming more violent while others abandon their violent tactics.

One way to address this topic is by using a rational choice method to explain group choices. Starting with Olson[94] in the 1960's through Chong[95] in the 1990's there have been attempts at explaining the problems of collective action and how groups overcome these challenges. The key question is how groups overcome the 'collective action problem'. This is the problem that for a group to be successful in collective action the majority of the members must participate in any activity. Since most of the membership must participate the possibility of free riders is always prevalent. With enough free riders (since it is in everyone's best interest not to participate but gain the benefits of the actions of the group all rational people will choose to free ride) the action will fail. More recently Lichbach has addressed the

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[93] Despite Kaufman's emphasis on the modernity of ethnic conflicts, this is in fact a consequence of his argument.

[94] Mancur Olson (2002) *The Logic of Collective Action Revised Edition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

[95] Dennis Chong (1991) *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

issue of why some people choose to become involved in dangerous or illegal activities when the rational choice would be to not participate?[96] As the author notes "[m]ost rebels do not actually rebel".[97] Lichbach sets out what he calls the 'five percent rule' which states that the vast majority of people will never choose militant strategies no matter what their situation. This group constitutes "ninety-five percent of aggrieved people, at least ninety-five percent of the time, in at least ninety-five percent of the places".[98] Lichbach therefore sets out to explain the choices of the remaining 5% of the people, 5% of the time in 5% of the places.[99]

Other authors have been concerned with the cycles of action different groups follow. Tarrow outlines what he considers to be a consistent cycle of collective action.[100] The cycle begins with heightened conflict in all aspects of the society. Next there is a growth in the collective action moving from the cities to the rural areas and from labor groups to other segments of society. Third, organizations develop and begin to work together for common goals. Fourth, new frames are tested and

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[96] Mark Irving Lichbach (1998) *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press).

[97] Ibid, p.16.

[98] Ibid, p.12.

[99] Lichbach sets out four possible solutions to explain how these people come to militant action. The actual solutions are not of importance for this research, only the idea that rational people can decide to act in a militant and theoretically irrational way.

[100] Sidney Tarrow (1995) "Cycles of Collective Action" in Mark Traugott ed., *Repertoires & Cycles of Collective Action* (Durham: Duke University Press) and Sidney Tarrow (1998) *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

developed. Frames are how the organizations project their issues to the public with the goal to make their cause appear to be just and their message appealing to a wide range of people to convince them to join the movement. During this stage many slogans will be tested to see which resonates with the public. At this stage the movement is working within the accepted political and media channels to get its message out.[101] Fifth, the repertoires of contention expand as new types of action are taken, with those that are successful retained. As long as non-violent repertoires are successful they will continue to be used and if violence is tested and found to work it will be kept. Eventually if used enough, violence becomes accepted as part of the routine and is very difficult to change.[102] It is this fifth element of the cycle of violence which is of interest to this study. When or if a group chooses violence is of great interest. Why do some groups never get to the point where violence is tested or maintained for a long enough duration of time that allows for it to become routine? Why do others get to a point where violence is a part of the cycle of contentious politics? As Tilly notes "[the] viability of one of the elements of a repertoire depends on what sorts of things work in a given social or political structure, on what forms of protest have been invented and disseminated in a population and on what grievances a

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[101] For more analysis on framing please see Mayer N. Zald (1996) "Culture, ideology, and strategic framing" and William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer (1996) "Framing Political Opportunity" in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald ed., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[102] Tarrow (1995).

given form is appropriate to express".[103] Based on Tarrow's and Tilly's discussion of repertoires[104] the final hypotheses to be discussed in the study is:

H4 c. *Groups who have never used violence as a form of collective action will not choose to resort to it, while those who have used violence will continue to do so.*

All of the work discussed above has influenced this study. It is clear that there is no consensus on why ethnic conflict begins, what its roots are, why it has remained such a powerful force or how it can be prevented. By examining the hypotheses outlined above this study will attempt to link several of these theories so that a clearer picture of ethnic conflict and the decision making of minority groups can be determined. Without the work of those who have come before this study would not be possible. This study will test these theories through the four case studies and some will be supported while others will be called into question. It is necessary to understand where the discipline has come from in order to go forward, which this study is now able to do.

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[103] Charles Tilly (1987) *The Contentious French* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), pp.1248-1249.

[104] For more analysis of the theories behind Tarrow's cycles of collective action and how repertoire choices are affected by it see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), particularly Part II. For examples of work that tests the repertoire theory please see Mark Traugott (1995) "Barricades as Repertoire" and Marc W. Steinberg (1995) "The Roar of the Crowd" in Traugott ed.

Chapter 3- History of the Cases

The Corsicans- Europe's Black Sheep

Corsica has always been on the periphery. It has always been the exception, always somewhat out of place. It is a small mountainous island in the Mediterranean Sea (8 722 square km). It is a part of France but is closer to Italy (170 km from Nice, 100 from Livorno). It is the homeland of one of the most famous symbols of France, Napoleon Bonaparte, but shares most of its traditions with its island neighbors Sardinia and Sicily (Sardinia is a mere 17 km away).[105] The island, due to its geographic location has historically been of interest to the great military powers of Europe and as a result the island has been invaded and controlled by numerous countries in its history. As Ramsay notes: "[d]uring the past two thousand years the Corsicans have had less than two decades of independence".[106] Despite this constant foreign control, the Corsicans have managed to remain relatively undisturbed culturally. The Corsican language, while understood by fewer people now than in the past, still survives and many of the customs and traditions unique to the island remain.[107] The Corsicans have survived being invaded, bartered, over-managed and

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[105] John Loughlin and Farimah Daftary (1999) *Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Åland Islands Compared* (ECMI Report #5, Flensburg Germany), p.9.

[106] Robert Ramsay (1983) *The Corsican Time Bomb*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.1.

[107] While some linguists dismiss Corsican as a dialect of Northern Italian (see Ramsay 1983, p.3), for the Corsicans it is a unique language and will be treated as such here.

ignored. Through all of this and partially because of it, their uniqueness as a people

has remained a crucial part of their collective identity.

Corsica Prior to French Rule

Prior to the island becoming a part of France Corsica had been under the

control of various Mediterranean powers, such as Romans, Vandals and Pisans. By

far the greatest impact on the island was at the hands of Genoa which controlled it

from 1358-1768. While each successive regime tried to control the population, each

was met with resistance. Moreover, the various cultures never gained a foothold on

the island or its people. Ramsay explains why:

> Since the invaders were usually more interested in
> the island's strategic maritime position than in the
> extraction of wealth from its interior, they were usually
> satisfied with the establishment of key towns . . .
> Conversely, the Corsicans themselves, possibly for
> health reasons, but more likely for defensive purposes,
> became an essentially mountain people.[108]

By separating themselves from the cities and towns the Corsicans were able to

survive and remain relatively autonomous. This became increasingly difficult during

the 18th Century, the fourth century of Genoan rule. It was during the end of this

period that the Corsican nationalist movement truly began and its first hero was born,

Pascal Paoli.

Paoli who is still considered the father of Corsican identity (in Corsican U

Babbu di a Patria)[109] had witnessed his father and brother lead a movement against

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[108] Ramsay 1983, p.2.

[109] Laughlin and Daftary 1999, p.14.

Genoan rule, but felt that the movement lacked direction. During the Corsican uprisings of 1730-1769 Genoa came to require the aid of France to subdue the population. The French arrived in 1747 and stayed until 1753. Paoli went beyond merely calling for the Genoans to also leave the island, he wanted to establish a completely independent Corsica. By 1755 he had begun to organize the island linguistically, culturally and constitutionally.[110] The constitution that Paoli advocated was either heavily influenced by or written directly by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Paoli began to create a Corsican administration and bureaucracy while emphasizing the need to preserve the Corsican language. It was during this time that the first Corsican university was also founded. Paoli's dream of a separate and independent Corsica died in 1768 due to the Treaty of Versailles when Genoa handed over control of the island completely to France. It took until May of 1769 for the French forces to finally defeat the Corsican forces under Paoli and with the arrival of the French and his military defeat, Paoli was forced into exile in Britain where he remained for the next twenty years.[111]

Corsica under French Rule

Immediately upon gaining full control of the island the French re-organized the administration that Paoli had created. The traditional systems of justice and municipal governments were radically transformed. This was significant in that even

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[110] Ramsay 1983, p.4.

[111] Loughlin and Daftary 1999, p.14.

under previous 'foreign' control Corsica had enjoyed relative autonomy.[112] The original plan for Corsica was that it was to be a "pays d'etat" which was to serve as the example to the other regions of France. With the French revolution these plans were eventually abandoned and Corsica was incorporated into the new French republic as one department the same as all the others.[113]

It must be noted that while many modern Corsican nationalists look back to the Paoli period as the birth of the Corsican autonomist movement, the arrival of the French and the annexation of Corsica into the French unitary state were welcomed by the majority of those living on the island at the time. For those who welcomed French rule they felt that it was better to be associated with a world power than to be merely associated with the other Italian islands of the Mediterranean.

When Paoli returned in 1790 he quickly became the President of the administrative council and resumed his efforts to create a sovereign Corsica. The Corsica Paoli returned to was very different than the one he left twenty years earlier. While he was still a popular figure another Corsican was beginning to rise in prominence, Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte was loyal to France and many Corsicans were loyal to Bonaparte. While Bonaparte's initial campaigns against Paoli were military disasters his ability to raise a force to oppose Paoli was indicative of the

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[112] Peter Savigear (1989) "Autonomy and the unitary state: the case of Corsica" in Murray Forsyth ed., *Federalism and Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin Press), p.97.

[113] There was an attempt in 1793 to create two departments on the island but that proved to be inefficient and in 1811 it was returned to a single department. This is how the island was administered until 1975 when the island was again divided into two departments, Haute-Corse in the North and Corse-du-Sud in the south. See Savigear 1983, p.97.

divisions on the island. In one last desperate attempt to secure independence for Corsica, Paoli turned to Britain and King George III whose forces invaded the island in 1794 and was proclaimed by Paoli's administrative body as the King of Corsica.[114] The British influence on the island lasted a mere two years and French control of the island resumed and this time became permanent.

The Corsican people became even more aligned with France due to their pride in their native son Bonaparte. While Bonaparte refused to show any favoritism to the island they saw his accomplishments as their own. He convinced the Corsican people through his memoirs (and not relying on actual facts) that he "had cherished Pascal Paoli's ideals and that he had regretted not having the opportunity to appoint the *Babbu* (Father) to a place of responsibility".[115] While the Napoleonic mystique had an enormous influence in tying Corsica to the mainland the Napoleonic policies also were extremely important. Savigear notes, Bonaparte was the "creator of efficient centralizing institutions and practices, bringing to fruition the unitary state of his predecessors".[116] As a result of these policies Corsica became incorporated into French society and not just loyal to the leader of France. Corsicans showed this integration through large numbers of young Corsicans going to the mainland for their education and many joining the French army and serving in France's colonies. Many saw their best opportunities for economic advancement and prosperity with the

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[114] Ramsay 1983, p.9.

[115] Ibid, p.10. Italics in the original.

[116] Savigear 1989, p.98.

French institutions off of the island and it is possible that this early integration is the foundation for Corsican nationalism. The true understanding that the Corsicans were a part of France yet were distinctly Corsican would have come not from those who remained on the island but rather those who left. One Corsican describes this phenomenon as a "permanent tension all islanders live: the desire to leave the island and the desire to return".[117] As a result there is now a diaspora of between 400-500 000 on the mainland, compared to a population on the island of approximately 200 000.[118]

After Napoleon Corsica and France settled into a pattern of "profound ambiguity".[119] While associating closely with the French state, Corsicans remained linguistically and culturally distinct. The result was the first forms of protest by Corsicans but they did not concern political issues such as autonomy. Rather, the initial voices of dissent starting in the late 19th Century, usually in the form of Corsican journals and newspapers, concerned linguistic and cultural protection.[120] These voices grew stronger after the First World War. It was not until the end of the Second World War after Corsicans had fought in large numbers and felt that their

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[117] Quoted in French and translated by Jaffe 1999, p.35-36.

[118] Helen Hintjens et al. (1995) "The Status of Maritime and Insular France: The DOM-TOM and Corsica" in John Loughlin and Sonia Mazey ed., *The End of the French Unitary State?* (London: Frank Cass), p. 121.

[119] Loughlin and Daftary 1998, p.14.

[120] The current President of Haute Corse Mr. Paul Giacobbi describes the 19th Century nationalist movement as "dignified, idealist and non-violent" in comparison to the movement as it exists today. Telephone interview March 24, 2004.

contribution in both wars was underappreciated did the more radical calls for constitutional changes begin to surface.

Calls for Autonomy and Separation, 1950- Present

As France emerged from the chaos and destruction of the World War II the government began to change French society. Immediately after the war all of French society was in the same position because even though people were happy to have their freedom back, they were in a poor economic position. The 1950's was a period of rebuilding and readjustment and one of the key changes was the abandonment of the colonies. With the end of French rule in regions outside of France the Corsicans who worked in large numbers in the colonies found it necessary to return to Corsica and find new employment. This continued through to the 1960's and eventually it became clear that "there was a rising level of affluence throughout Europe, including France, which had not been matched in Corsica".[121] Corsicans were forced to leave for mainland France to gain employment and many grew resentful of the French government which they felt was ignoring the needs of the island and more specifically the needs of the Corsican people.[122] No issue caused greater unrest on Corsica than the end of French rule in Algeria and the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. Pied noirs translates to black feet and is the term used by Corsicans to describe the French settlers who had been in Algeria since the 1800's. These settlers owned land in Algeria and with the end of French rule wished or were forced to return to France and

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[121] Ramsay 1983, p.31.

[122] Telephone interview with Dr. John Laughlin, February 19 2004.

wanted land to compensate for what they had lost. The French government decided to relocate them in Corsica. These newcomers received preferential treatment by the French government and in total over 17 000 of them arrived in Corsica during the 1960's.

The poor economic standing of the island and the increase in non-Corsicans resulted in the number of people and groups calling for structural change to grow louder and to become more organized. The first of these new organizations was the L'Union Corse l'Avenir that was founded in 1963. Its message called for new rights for Corsicans and was aimed at the young, who were at highest risk for emigration.[123] The supporters of this group and others angry with the current situation aimed much of their displeasure at SOMIVAC (La société pour la mise en valeur d la Corse), a government organization responsible for agriculture whom the Corsicans felt was pro-Pieds Noirs.[124] The L'Union Corse l'Avenir and other organizations of the early 1960's failed to make gains politically and eventually faltered, but the anger of the Corsicans at being treated as a 'colony' remained. As Savigear states, more and more Corsicans held the opinion that France had "lured Corsica's best children away to be educated, to fight and administer for France. The French had come to Corsica, had

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[123] Ibid, p.41.

[124] Savigear 1989, p.99.

treated it with disdain, had used it, built villas on its coastline and dumped 18,000

pied noirs there".[125]

With larger numbers of Corsicans leaving for the mainland and the arrival of

non-Corsicans the economic issues raised in the early 1960's became linked to social

issues. As Ramsay notes "the language issue did not begin to emerge in Corsica until

anxieties arose . . . when ethnically, and therefore linguistically, a rapid dilution of the

Corsican element in the island took place".[126] While the Corsican language had never

enjoyed official status on the island its survival was ensured due to the island's

isolation. When the number of native Corsicans dropped people became concerned

that the language would also disappear and with this greater emphasis on the Corsican

language a renaissance in Corsican culture and society also developed. The old

symbols of Corsica such as the Corsican flag, known as the Moor's Head and

Corsican anthems began to re-emerge.[127] Put simply, the Corsicans began to see the

differences between themselves and those on the mainland; however, the French

government failed to notice or chose to ignore this growing divide.

By the 1970's those angry with Corsica's position within the French state had

organized themselves into two general groups. The first were autonomists who called

on a new relationship with France to ensure Corsica's economic and cultural

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[125] Peter Savigear (1990) "Corsica" in Michael Watson ed., *Contemporary Minority Nationalism* (London: Routledge Press), p.88.

[126] Ramsay 1983, p.67.

[127] Ibid, p.69.

stability.[128] The second were separatists who felt that only through Corsican

independence could Corsican society be truly protected.[129] While both of these groups

were concerned with the protection of the Corsican nation their means of achieving

their goals were very different. While the autonomist tried to influence the state

peacefully through politics, by the 1970's the separatists were willing to use violence

in their repertoire.

One separatist group formed in 1967 was called the Action Régionaliste Corse

(ANC). The first violent incident occurred in 1973 when an Italian boat was attacked

in Bastia harbor. While the ANC did not claim responsibility for this attack the

French government blamed them. In 1975 a standoff between Corsican separatists

and the police at a winery owned by a pieds noir resulted in the death of two police

officers.[130] General strikes periodically shut down the island and protests often

resulted in violent clashes with the result that the government felt that it needed to

take action and decided to ban the ANC in 1975. However, the ANC would soon

become the least of the French government's problems. Two small separatist groups,

the Frontu Paessanu Corsu Di Liberazione and Ghustizia Paolina united on March 22

1973 to form the Frontu Di Liberazione Naziunalista Corsu, known more commonly

as the FLNC. The FLNC announced its arrival at a press conference in the Church of

[128] Interview with Paul Giacobbi 2004.

[129] Laughlin and Daftary 1998, p.15.

[130] Christian Lammert (2003) "Ethno-territorial Protest Movements and the Politics of Accomodation in Centralized and Decentralized Political Systems" *Federal Governance* Vol.2.

Saint-Anthony de Casabianca where Pascal Paoli first declared an independent

Corsica in 1755. The FLNC first major attack was on May 5 1975 when it began a

bombing campaign and by 1976 it had gained national attention.[131] In addition to the

bombing campaigns, organizations with political mandates were formed to replace

the banned ANC such as the Union di u Populu Corsu (UPC) whose members began

to run for office on the island and would soon gain approximately 9-10% of the

electoral vote.

The various Corsican organizations, both clandestine and political, had

difficulty maintaining internal stability and as a result many splinter groups formed

and other groups disbanded. It was clear, however, that there was a large enough

proportion of the population who were either regionalists wanting more rights or

autonomists wanting a new deal with France or separatists who wanted out. By 1982

it was clear that France needed to do something and what resulted was the Special

Statute on Corsica. This statute was France's first attempt at devolving power to a

region and for the fiercely unitary French state the statute was revolutionary. It

granted the regional governments limited decision making. It was also an

acknowledgement that Corsica was in fact not like the rest of France. As Gaston

Defferre, the Minister of the Interior said in 1982: "Corsica has its own specificity, a

cultural identity, a language, a culture, its own traditions and all this must be taken

into account".[132] They would be directly elected by Corsicans by proportional

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[131] Ramsay 1983, p.127.

[132] Quoted in Hintjens et al, 1995, p. 123.

representation. The councils would be responsible for local taxation, tourism, education, environment, housing and culture.[133] Only the legal system, policing and any new issues not outlined by the statute would remain under the control of the Minister of the Interior. The island was still heavily reliant on grants from Paris but it was able to make many of their own decisions. It is important to remember, however, that this agreement was not negotiated between the government and the island, it was given to the island by the government and could be taken back.[134]

While many Corsicans were pleased with the statute, others were angry that it was given to the two regions in Corsica and not to the Corsican people. The autonomists and separatists also grew frustrated with the election results. The existing and powerful clan system (a reminder of its Italian past) remained the dominant force in island politics and only a few powerful families were able to gain power. In 1991 the Minister of the Interior Pierre Joxe provided further autonomy to the regional councils but his attempt at including the term 'Corsican people' was struck down by the French Constitutional Court.[135]

The 1990's was a period of simmering discontent for the Corsican nationalists. Their attempts at breaking the clan system had failed politically and the terrorists began to aim some of their attacks at the clan leaders as opposed to French symbolic targets (such as French owned hotels or post offices). The violence became

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[133] Savigear 1990, p.87.

[134] Savigear 1989, p.103.

[135] Loughlin and Daftary 1998, p.18.

more widespread and the French government tried once again to placate the island by holding a referendum in the summer of 2003 on a new deal with additional powers to the island. One of the key aspects of this new deal was the elimination of the two regional councils and the creation of one Corsican Assembly to be responsible for the entire island. There were to be additional powers to be devolved to the new assembly and more freedom to teach Corsican at higher levels of education.[136] On July 6 2003 the Corsicans voted on the French proposal and rejected it 50.98% to 49.02%. The President of Haute Corsica Paul Giacobbi believes that the people saw that the nationalists were in favor of the proposal and were concerned that if they voted for the proposal they would be supporting the terrorists' agenda, even though autonomists and regionalists were also in favor of the plan.[137] Immediately after the referendum the violence on the island escalated and carried over to the mainland. Corsica presently finds itself basically in the same position that it has been since 1982. The clan system is still in place, the nationalists are still using violence on an almost daily basis, the island is still divided into two regions and France still seems unable to find a solution to deal with its troubled island.

The Basques- A Survivor's Instinct

If the Basques are to be believed as long as there has been a Europe there have been the Basques. They would also have a lot of history to back up this claim. Their

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[136] Elizabeth Bryant "Analysis: Corsica vote tests French plan" *United Press International*, 3 July 2003. In 1996 only 195 out of 14 766 primary school students were in bilingual classes. See Jaffe 1999, p.131.

[137] Interview with Paul Giacobbi 2004.

language is the only surviving language in Europe that existed prior to the Indo-European languages which predominate today.[138] A common Basques fable to illustrate how much older the Basques country is compared to Spain is the belief that Spanish developed as a result of a Basque speaking Latin poorly.[139] The first written record of the Basques dates back approximately 2000 years and those records indicate "that they were already an ancient- or at least not new- people".[140] They have never strayed very far from their rugged, mountainous home. Today the Basques are spread across two countries, Spain and France. In France they are in three provinces (French names in parentheses): Lapurdi (Labourd), Benafaroa (Basse Navarre) and Zuberoa (Soule). In Spain they comprise four provinces (Spanish names in parentheses): Naforoa (Navarra), Gipuzkoa (Guipuzcoa), Bizkaia (Vizcaya) and Araba (Alava). The French provinces are quite small both population-wise and geographically. Approximately 250 000 people live in the three French provinces compared to over 2.6 million on the Spanish side.[141] Over time each of these provinces developed its own unique culture and dialects of the language. While they are all Basque, there are ideological, economical and political differences between the French and Spanish

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[138] Luis Núñez Astrain (1995) *The Basques: Their Struggle for Independence* (Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press), p.9.

[139] Telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, Basque Historian, February 18 2004.

[140] Mark Kurlansky (1999) *The Basque History of the World* (Toronto: Vintage Canada), p.19.

[141] Astrain 1997, p.3. It must be noted that these figures are taken from a 1990 (French) and 1991 (Spanish) census and are for the provinces not for those identifying themselves as Basque.

sides, and even among the provinces on each side of the border. This is particularly true of the provinces on the Spanish side.

Similar to the Corsicans, the Basque region finds itself in an important geographic location and due to its strategic location it has also endured unending attempts at conquest. The Basque region is very mountainous which dissuaded many armies from attempting such conquests in ancient times. It was not until the arrival of the powerful Romans were the Basques defeated but despite their defeat they remained relatively autonomous under the Romans. They learned lessons concerning the need for an efficient road system and the proper organization of towns and cities, but culturally they were never assimilated. With the end of the Roman Empire a new force came to the Iberian Peninsula, the Visigoths, who were far more aggressive against the Basques. The Visigoths arrived around 400 AD and used the Basque territory as a major transportation route and unlike the Romans decided that they needed to actively control the Basques. This decision set off two and a half centuries of war between the two peoples. This war is summarized by Kurlansky who stated that the Basques "won battles and lost battles, but for 200,000 Visigoth soldiers attempting to hold all of Iberia, the Basques were always an insurmountable problem".[142] By 700 AD Muslims became the Basques most immediate threat and as a result the people became aligned with the Catholic church. Historically the Basques were threatened by various invaders or would-be conquerors over the next centuries but each time they survived not just physically but culturally and linguistically.

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[142] Kurlansky 1999, pp.35-36.

Despite their small numbers and isolation they became known as excellent warriors and a people unwilling to be dominated by anyone. This refusal to be enveloped into any foreign culture was matched with an understanding of the need to reach out economically. As they were situated on major trade routes the Basques came in contact with foreigners and developed trading partnerships with many of them and the Basques became known for their abilities in commerce and their entrepreneurial spirit. This paradoxical belief in reaching out economically and looking inward politically and culturally remains an aspect of Basque society today. Eventually in the middle-ages the Kingdom of Navarre came into power over almost all the Basque region. This kingdom had its own political structures and felt free to rule the Basque people as it saw fit. The creation of the Spanish state (with assistance by the King of Navarre) incorporated the Basques into yet another political entity in 1512. While being a part of Spain the Basques as in Roman times were able to maintain autonomy. This lasted until 1841 when that autonomy was eliminated and the current political struggles can be said to have begun.[143]

The Basques in Spain from the 19th Century to Franco

Before 1841 the Basques had enjoyed relative autonomy from the Spanish crown due to the presence of their fueros. These were the Basques statutes and charters that allowed each province to maintain separate administrative records. The Basques fueros also exempted the Basques from paying taxes to Spain and ensured

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[143] Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament and Herri Batasuna party member, Bilbao, February 5, 2004.

that its people did not have to serve against their will in the Spanish military.[144] These agreements were put into writing during the 18th and 19th Centuries although many had been in place for hundreds of years previous. By the middle of the 19th Century disagreement grew about the exact nature of the fueros. The Basques believed the fueros were a fundamental part of their agreement to be a part of Spain but the Spanish centralists contended that they were concessions given by the state and therefore could be rescinded if the state so desired.

From 1833 to 1839 Spain was torn apart in what became known as the Carlist war that pitted the conservative Carlists (named for their choice of Monarch Carlos) against the liberals of Maria Christina.[145] The majority of the Basques supported the traditional conservatism of the Carlists although some of the urban areas believed in the changes called for by the liberals. To rally the Basques to support their side the Carlists declared that if victorious they would guarantee the fueros system, thus maintaining Basque autonomy. The majority of the fighting took place in the Basque country with a Basque raised army playing a key role. In the end however, the Carlists were never able to control the largest city in the Basque region, Bilbao and in 1839 the war ended. The Carlists, and by extension the Basques had lost. The liberals punished the Basques for backing the losing side and in 1841 the fueros were restricted and even what was the Kingdom of Navarre, which had always maintained

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[144] Daniele Conversi (1997) *The Basques, Catalans and Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press), p.45.

[145] While they referred to themselves as liberal many have argued that the ideals of Maria Christina and her followers were far from liberal. See Kurlansky 1999, p.146.

even more autonomy than the other Basque provinces, was placed under the control

of Madrid.[146] With the loss of autonomy many Basques chose to abandon their

ancient lifestyle and modernize and industrialize quickly. Due to the natural resources

of the area, and the Basques' history of ship building in some ways they were

prepared for this massive change in the society. The Basques also developed a way to

produce steel cheaply and efficiently and soon dominated this market as well. The

towns and cities prospered and soon the Basque region was one of the richest areas in

Spain. While the Basques were prepared economically they were not prepared

socially. As Conversi explains:

> Modernisation was not merely an economic matter;
> It infiltrated every level of society. It did not spare
> even the most tightly knit relationships; families were
> broken apart and 'foreign' habits gained ground in
> most walks of life. Industrialization was accompanied
> by proletarianisation and the displacement of Basque
> youth from the countryside to the city.[147]

Beyond the change to the Basques in the region, with the economic boom came an

influx of immigrants both from inside and outside of Spain. This was significant in

that while many foreigners had come through the Basque region throughout the years,

hardly any had stayed. The Basques were not used to cultural heterogeneity and some

felt threatened by it[148] and by 1872 the tensions in the regions grew into what became

the second Carlist war. Once again the Basques were divided between those who

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[146] Ibid, p.152.

[147] Conversi 1997, p.48.

[148] Telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, 2004.

embraced the new society, mostly those in Bilbao, and those wanting a return to the old system. The war lasted for four years, and again the Carlists lost. This time the last of fueros were eliminated and the Basques lost control over taxation and they were required to serve in the Spanish military.[149]

The combination of losing two civil wars, the loss of the fueros and the confidence gained by excelling economically led to a cultural awakening of the Basques by the end of the 19th Century. This awakening was driven by the Basques' equivalent to the Corsican's Pascal Paoli: Sabino Arana. Arana published his first book on the Basque culture in 1892 and two years later he was the editor of a Basque nationalist magazine and had founded a nationalist association. This first organization was banned by the Spanish government as it represented a threat to the state. One year later in 1895 he subsequently founded the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV). Arana was jailed in 1902 and died in 1903.[150] Arana's ideology was simple, he believed that the seven Basque provinces should be united, that the Basques represented a unique nation and that this nation should have control over its own affairs. In order for this to be achieved, they needed their own country. Until Arana the Basques were missing many of the symbols necessary for a country. The Basques knew themselves to be Basque but had never been organized into a single country and therefore had no core to build around. Arana tried to correct this by first deriving a name for the country-in-exile: *Euzkadi*- by combining the

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[149] Kurlansky 1999, p.158.

[150] Astrain 1997, p.28.

Basque words for 'Basque speaking' and 'together'. He also wrote a national anthem, and designed the flag. The Basque flag is designed in the same form as the British Union Jack but with a red background, green diagonal cross and a white cross in the center. Through his magazine and his books he also started to create a published record of the Basque language.[151] Until Arana it was extremely rare to publish in Basque but he believed that if the Basques were to form a country, they would need the legitimacy of a library of Basque language work.

While Arana did not live long enough to see the party he formed start to achieve success the PNV eventually began to grow. It was a party that gained support in the rural areas of the region appealing to those who had not prospered with industrialization and modernization. The Basques at this point split into two groups, those who supported the nationalist cause and those who benefited from the new relationship with Spain and wanted to maintain it. These people were found mostly in the cities, particularly Bilbao. These Basques were comfortable using Spanish as it was the language of business and many urban political issues concerned finance not nationalism. The Spanish socialist party started in Bilbao at the turn of the century and many Basque businessmen began moving to other areas of Spain.[152] While this new middle class grew more closely aligned with other regions of Spain as the 20th Century progressed more and more people outside of the industrial centers were

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[151] Clare Mar-Molinero (2000) "The Iberian Peninsula: Conflicting Linguistic Nationalism" in Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael, ed. *Language and Nationalism in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.94.

[152] To this day one of the largest banks in Spain is headquartered in Bilbao. Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director of Elkarri, February 4 2004, Bilbao.

drawn to the idea of an independent Basque country. If full independence was not a realistic short term goal the return of the Basque's traditional fueros was and the next opportunity the Basques saw to achieve this goal was the birth of the Spanish Second Republic in 1931.

The Basques Under Franco

By 1931 the PNV was an established political party in the Basque region that pushed for Basque independence and a return to more conservative values but the Second Republic was seen by many as radical and socialist in nature. Despite this clash of ideologies, the Basque nationalist leadership, headed by Jose Aguirre believed that there was a greater chance for an independent Basque territory by siding with the republicans and sided against the monarchists. With both the Basque nationalists and the socialists from the cities in support of the republic the Basques became a key power in the fight for control of Spain and this lead to negotiations for greater Basque autonomy. Francisco Franco's first attempt at gaining power was a failed coup in 1934 but his rebels continued to fight the republic. Desperate to maintain control in 1936 an autonomous Basque region of Navarre was declared. The Basques finally had the opportunity to control their own taxation and to promote the Basque language in schools. Sadly for Basque nationalists their dreams of an autonomous Basque region was short lived. Nine months after the region was officially recognized by the Spanish state as being autonomous Franco captured Bilbao, the autonomous statute was reversed and all political parties were banned.[153]

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[153] Conversi 1997, p.77.

Franco's rule was totalitarian but he was especially cruel to the Basques. During the Civil War the Basques had caused some of the stiffest resistance and having a growing nationalist movement in the economic engine of the country was unacceptable and Franco decided early on that to fully control Spain he needed to eradicate the Basque nationalist movement.

For the next decade and a half the Basques were only concerned with survival as they were severely repressed by Franco with any evidence of a person identifying themselves as Basque grounds for imprisonment. The language was banned, as were all Basque cultural activities such as dance and music and the Basque university was closed. Basque books were burnt. Basque street names were replaced, as were Basque names on registries and even tombstones.[154] Between 100 000 and 150 000 Basques were imprisoned and many others fled across Europe. Early attempts at engaging the international community failed due to the Cold War and the resulting Western need to keep Spain onside with the rest of Western Europe. The Basques realized by 1950 that they would not be able to look for international assistance and began to look for alternative ways to fight back.

The 1950's saw the Basques begin to fight among themselves. By this point there was a second mass migration of non-Basques into the region particularly into the larger cities. Through Spanish repression and this influx of non-Basques the number of people who were able to speak Basque dropped to one-third of the

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[154] Ibid, p.81.

Basques.[155] These newcomers were concerned with workers' rights and most were not concerned with the Basque nationalist movement or the Basque's struggle with Franco.[156] As a result, within the Basque region there were three separate groups of people each with their own political agenda. The first group were socialists, many not ethnic Basques and most in cities such as Bilbao. They were very powerful and had their own problems with Franco's regime. The second group was comprised of the very rich industrialists who were both Basques and non-Basques and supported Franco. They wanted a strong relationship with Spain and no outside trade since they were unable to compete in the global market. The only industrialists who were nationalistic were the shipbuilders who relied on foreign markets. The last group were the middle-class and rural Basques who were the nationalists who had suffered the most under Franco and were traditionally supporters of the PNV. The PNV who had been so outspoken prior to Franco had become a muted political force unwilling to violate the rules preventing them from organizing any collective action. As the Basques continued to suffer, the demand for a stronger resistance grew and by 1959 it

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[155] Michael Keating (1993) "Spain: peripheral nationalism and state response" in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary ed., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Resolution* (London: Routledge Press), p.216.

[156] It is important to note that some of the migrants to the Basque region did take up the Basque nationalist cause and have gone on to be 'adopted' into Basque society. Some of the most ardent supporters of the Basque nationalist parties are not ethnically Basque. Interview with Esther Agirre, 2004.

was clear to a small group of young Basques that they could not look to the PNV anymore to lead them so they broke away from the party.[157]

The young nationalists turned away from the conservative nature of the PNV and adopted a leftist, socialistic, even Trotsky-inspired ideology. This ideology developed for two reasons, the first was the group's anger at Britain and the United States for failing to come to its aid, the second being the growing popularity of left-wing politics throughout Europe and later the impact of the third-world resistance groups.[158] The new organization was called Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty, known as the ETA) and apart from their ideology and tactics the ETA was different than the PNV in two other important ways. First, the ETA was not interested in autonomy within the Spanish state, they wanted outright sovereignty. Secondly, any sovereignty for a Basque country would require the three French provinces as well. Their motto being 4+3 = 1, the Basque country was to be indivisible.[159] While the ETA had a political agenda, their methods were to include violent resistance. The first acts of terrorism occurred in 1961 and armed revolutionary tactics were approved by the group in 1964 and complete support for Marxist ideology in 1965. The Franco government repressed the groups' activities severely during the entire 1960's and in retaliation in June 1968 the first person was

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[157] Interview with Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute, February 3 2004, Bilbao.

[158] Conversi 1997, p.90.

[159] Interview with Esther Agirre, 2004.

killed by the ETA.[160] By 1970 there were more killings and trials of ETA members leading to their executions resulting in large protests again the Franco regime by the Basques. The ETA was now seen as freedom fighters and had the support of many of the Basques. In 1973 the ETA carried out its largest terrorist attack, using a car-bomb to execute the President of the Spanish Government who was also Franco's second in command. With each activity the ETA drew more attention around the world, more repression by the Spanish state and more support from the Basques. It appeared that the Basques and Franco were heading for some final epic confrontation until 1975 when Franco died and democracy was restored. Now the Basques and the rest of Spain had to decide what their future would hold.

The Basques after Franco to the Present

It took three years after Franco's death for the Spanish state to reorganize into its current democratic form. By 1976 the Basques were divided once again into three groups each supporting different political organizations; 1) moderate nationalists who wanted to create a new deal for the Basque country within Spain and supported the PNV; 2) radical nationalists who saw the new Spanish state as an opportunity to create an independent Basque country who supported the ETA and the new political party Herri Batasuna and 3) pro-Spanish Basques and non-Basques living in the region who supported either the Socialist Party or the conservative Popular Party

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[160] Astrain 1997, pp.34-35. The person who carried out the first killing was killed himself shortly thereafter becoming the first ETA member to be killed as well.

(PP).[161] Each of these groups had a specific agenda when the new Spanish constitution was being negotiated in 1978.

The Basques were not alone in their demands for a new relationship with Spain. The new government while maintaining that Spain was a unitary state accepted that there were several historical communities throughout Spain and that each should have some rights. This was enshrined in the constitution as the Statutes of Autonomy. This period has been described by some as analogous to an open bar, with each historical group wanting a different drink, or in this case a set of rights. Some groups would only want water, a small number of rights, others wanted coffee and the Basques wanted the most: coffee with sugar.[162] The Basques successfully negotiated to gain back some of the fueros they had lost, the most important of these was the creation of a Basque government and its ability to collect taxes. Rather than Madrid collecting tax and giving part back to the Basques they would give a percentage of their taxes to Madrid. This meant that the Basques were responsible for infrastructure, policing and other social services. The radical nationalists felt the statute did not go far enough and the ETA never recognized it. The ETA's main complaint was Article 155 of the constitution which states that the rights given to the historical regions were given to them by the state and could therefore be taken away. These were not the

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[161] Francesco Letamendia and John Loughlin (2000) "Peace in the Basque Country and Corsica" in Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen, ed. *A Farewell to Arms* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.236.

[162] Interview with Ibon Mendibelzva, Adviser- Press Services, Basque Country Delegation to the European Union, February 10 2004 Brussels.

inherent rights of the groups. By agreeing to the statute the ETA and Batasuna believed that the PNV was no longer interested in Basque independence and were now part of the process they were trying to change. The violence continued through the 1980's and 1990's only interrupted by occasional cease-fires with the first being in the middle of the 1980's. Inevitably with each cease-fire the ETA would break into splinter groups, one of which would resume the terrorist campaign as happened in 1988 when the peace was broken.[163] The violence of the ETA has hindered the PNV and other moderate nationalists from achieving political gains with the Spanish government. The Spanish people see the ETA as a threat and to negotiate with any Basque representative would be seen as supporting the terrorists. As a result support amongst Basques of the ETA has consistently fallen since the death of Franco. While their support slips, their political influence due to their tactics remains. They continue to call for an independent Basque country of all seven provinces and call for the return of Basque prisoners who are currently spread out throughout Spain to prevent greater organization from prison, to the Basque country to serve out their sentences. With the election of the conservative PP party in the 1990's the relationship between the Basques and the Spanish state worsened. The conservative government scaled back some of the rights previously given to the regions and did not follow through on other promises such as the Basques ability to control workers rights. Returning to the

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[163] For an account of the activities of the ETA throughout the 1980's and 1990's please see the chronology for the Basques in Spain on the Minorities at Risk Project website http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com.

analogy of the open bar, the government policy became coffee for everyone: no one was allowed milk.[164]

Despite attempts at reconciliation and the return to an open dialogue the two sides grew farther apart with even the Basque moderates moving towards a hardened line. The situation came to a head in 2003 when the Spanish parliament decided to outlaw the Herri Batasuna party which they claimed is the political wing of the ETA and suspended the Basque autonomy agreements. At the time the HB was the fourth largest party in the Basque region and had 10% support of the people.[165] While this was popular throughout Spain, the terrorism continued through the summer and the PNV has threatened to hold a referendum on further Basque autonomy. The Basques now find themselves in between the ETA and the Spanish state. While the majority of people in the region are concerned about terrorism, the majority also believe that the Spanish government's actions will not help the situation. For most Basques there is now a realization that due to the high number of non-Basques in the region a successful vote for independence is unlikely because even if 50% of the Basques would vote for independence, they are only 34% of the population. What is more important is the belief that they should have the right to decide. 77% of all people in the Basque region believe that this is an inherent right of the region.[166] The Spanish

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[164] Ibid.

[165] Interview with Esther Agirre 2004.

[166] Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government's Office, *Basque Sociometer #19, July 2002.* http://www.euskadi.net/estudios_sociologicos .

government has refused to consider this option, therefore the ETA vows to continue its activities, HB despite being banned speaks out and the PNV has begun to look back to its roots to decide what to do next.

The Russians in Estonia and Latvia- Unwelcome Neighbors

The Republics of Latvia and Estonia are countries on the periphery of Europe. They are not only small geographically (Estonia is a mere 45 200 square kilometers, Latvia 64 600)[167] but also have a low population base (Latvia in 2000 had a population of 2.4 million people while Estonia's population was only 1.4 million). To put their small size in perspective, the country of Latvia is approximately the same geographic size as West Virginia. [168] Estonia's population is comparable to Phoenix, Arizona and Latvia's population is slightly less than Toronto or Havana. After the euphoria of achieving independence passed the Estonians and Latvians began to realize that with sovereignty came responsibility and one of the responsibilities was to decide who would comprise the citizenry of the countries. While the populations of the countries were small, the population of ethnic Latvians and Estonians was even smaller with both countries having extremely large minority groups residing in their territory. The majority of those were either Russian or Russian speakers. The issue of the place of the Russian communities in the Estonian and Latvian societies has been paramount since independence. In order to understand why the Russian issue has

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[167] Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser (1996) *Russians as the New Minority* (Boulder CO: Westview Press), p.95.

[168] Walter C. Clemens (2001) *The Baltic Transformed* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press), p.4.

been so contentious it is first necessary to understand the history of the Estonian and Latvia people.

Estonia and Latvia prior to 1991

There is evidence of Baltic societies dating back to the 6th Century, although most historians believe that the Baltic communities developed 500 years ago.[169] The capital city of Latvia, Riga, was founded in 1209 and Estonia's capital Tallinn is older still. The Latvian language is related to Lithuanian and other Slavic languages and Estonian is part of the Finno-Ugric language group, most closely linked to Finnish and Hungarian. Despite this long history neither the Estonians nor the Latvians have had much control over their own affairs. As Clemens notes the Baltic ethnic groups have historically "lived more as objects- passive victims- than as agents of their own destiny."[170] Smith describes Latvia's history as "[f]rom the early Middle Ages onwards, successive invasions, wars and treaties have ensured the division, partition and colonization of this small country".[171] As with Corsica and the Basque country, Estonia and Latvia are in an important geo-political region. They represent both the division between Europe and Russia as well as the historic trade routes of commerce between the two. The Baltic Sea has been a main shipping route, while Riga was a

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[169] Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik (1996) "Estonia and the Estonians" in Graham Smith ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States* (London: Longman Press), p.129.

[170] Clemens (2001).

[171] Graham Smith (1996) "Latvia and the Latvians" in Graham Smith ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States* (London: Longman Press), p.147.

cross road for land trade and due to this geographic importance and the groups' small size, they have been unable to prevent being under foreign control.

The first of the many invaders to the region were Teutonic knights and monks during the 13th century who forced the population to convert to Christianity. The knights were soon replaced by German industrialists and merchants and the region was under the control of the Germans for the next 300 years. The merchants used the region for trade and treated the Latvians and Estonians as serfs. Despite their second-class treatment the Baltic people benefited from increased educational opportunities, which in turn helped preserve their titular languages and cultures.

Sweden conquered the majority of what is today Estonia and Latvia in the early to mid 16th Century and controlled the region until 1721 when control was passed to Russia as part of the Treaty of Nystad, the peace agreement to end the Great Northern War. Despite the various conquerors of the region the Estonians and Latvians quietly continued to persevere. The University of Tartu was opened in the 1600's and the bible was printed in both Estonian and Latvian prior to the transfer of the region to the Russians. Under the Russians, the German nobility who had controlled the region prior to the arrival of the Swedes were given back much of the authority they once had and by the beginning of the 19th Century Russia attempted to Russify the Estonians and Latvians. Despite their efforts the Estonians and Latvians were influenced by the rise of nationalism that had affected all of Europe at that time, and all attempts at assimilation failed. There were increased demands for education in the titular languages and in what would be a preview of things to come an increase in

the use of folk songs and cultural events to strengthen the resolve of the people and to fight against the state.[172]

Nationalist sentiment increased through the turn of the Twentieth Century and the demands for greater autonomy or even outright independence were growing louder. While the demands grew, the reality was that the small ethnic groups on the edge of the Russian empire were too small to break away on their own; they needed an opportunity to act when Russia was weak. That opportunity came with the combined events of the Russian revolution of 1917 and the First World War. An important part of the Eastern front of the war was in the Baltic region, particularly in Latvia. The Latvian people took severe casualties in both the military and civilian populations and some estimates put the decline in the Latvia population at 33%.[173] The region changed hands throughout the war, eventually falling under German control when the armistice was signed in 1918. With the retreat of the German army back to Germany at the conclusion of the war and the chaos in Russian society due to the revolution of 1917 the region finally saw the opportunity to declare itself independent because of the resulting power vacuum. In 1918 Estonia declared itself independent and Latvia followed in 1919 and by 1920 they, along with Lithuania, had been recognized by the League of Nations as sovereign countries and for the first time in their histories they were in control of their own destinies.

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[172] Kionka and Vetik (1996), p.131.

[173] Aina Antane and Boris Tsilevich (1999) "Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Latvia" in Pål Kostø, ed. *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder CO: Westview Press), p.65.

The Interwar Republics

Today the interwar period is looked to as a shining moment in Baltic history but in reality as Lieven notes the period was characterized by "great economic success, internal political failure, and foreign policy frustration followed by catastrophe".[174] It was an economic success in part due to the region's geographic location and history of commerce with the rest of Europe and both Estonia and Latvia were also very effective in creating wealth through agriculture. By the beginning of the Second World War Estonia's level of wealth was similar to Finland and Latvia was also very competitive. Politically both countries were very unstable but it must be acknowledged that politically Estonia and Latvia fared better than their Baltic neighbor Lithuania whose democratic government lasted only six years before giving way to authoritarianism in 1926-1927. Lieven blames part of the instability of the region on the fact the new polities were too democratic.[175] The constitutions of the Baltic states used a pure 'Proportional Representation' electoral system as well as universal suffrage. The legislatures were given almost complete control, leaving the executive branches powerless to maintain control. In the period between 1919 and 1934, Estonia had seventeen separate governments and Latvia sixteen. In order to end the constant shifts in governments the executives in both countries ended democratic elections in 1934. By 1938 Estonia was moving back towards democracy but due to the Second World War and the resulting changes in the society it never got the

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[174] Anatol Lieven (1993) *The Baltic Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p.61.

[175] Ibid. p.65.

opportunity to complete this transformation. While both countries abandoned democracy, the authoritarianism that replaced it was by no means repressive and was welcomed by many in the population as a stabilizing measure.

What Lieven neglected to discuss in his analysis of the interwar period quoted above was the treatment of minorities. The constitutions of 1918 and 1919 while specifying the need to protect the Latvian and Estonian people, language and culture, were also very open to minorities. Non-Latvians and non-Estonians had the right to become citizens, the right to vote and own property. This openness towards minorities may have been due to the fact that the actual numbers of minorities were quite small and posed no threat to the large majorities in each country.

History, geography and timing were not on the Baltic states' side in the late 1930's. With the rise to power of Hitler in Germany and Stalin in the Soviet Union, Estonia and Latvia soon found themselves surrounded by angry voracious neighbors looking towards expansion. The fate of the Baltic republics was sealed without their knowledge by 1939. Despite non-aggression pacts with Germany and the Soviet Union these countries themselves had agreed by 1939 on the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which was to divide Eastern Europe between them.[176] According to the pact the Baltic States fell under the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. When the war began the wheels were put into motion which resulted in 1940 with the three Baltic states being annexed by the Soviet Union. The fact that the states were annexed and did not join willingly became important once independence was re-established

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[176] David Kirby (1996) "Incorporation: The Molotv-Ribbentrop Pact" in Graham Smith, ed. *The Baltic States* (New York: St. Martin's Press).

because Estonia and Latvia both argue that their current countries are continuations of the interwar republics and not new republics. This distinction deeply impacts the Russian minorities now living in these countries and will be discussed later.

Immediately after the end of the war the Estonians and Latvians felt the oppression of Stalinist Russia. As with the Basques under Franco, the Baltic states were targeted by Stalin for repression with many Estonians and Latvians forcibly relocated to other parts of the Soviet Union and many were murdered. Ethnic Latvians and Estonians in positions of political and social power were removed and replaced with people loyal to the Communist Party and from another ethnic group, usually Russian. With Stalin's death the levels of repression subsided in the region but the successive regimes used the region as they saw fit. Both the Estonian and Latvian Republics became industrial centers and were on the forefront of Soviet technology.[177] One of these technological advancements provided the Baltic republics with their first opportunity to express their displeasure with the Soviet state. The 1996 nuclear power plant meltdown at Chernobyl in the Ukraine provided the region with a suitable issue to organize and protest against. The Chernobyl disaster coincided with Mikhail Gorbachev's loosening of restrictions on the development of small organizations. If the Estonians and Latvians had begun protesting on ethnic grounds during the 1980's the movements would have been destroyed quickly. Instead, the people began to protest on environmental issues which appeared to pose less of a

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[177] Interview with Mr. Mati Luik, Director- Non-Estonian Integration Foundation March 10, 2004 Tallinn.

threat to Soviet stability.[178] When these protests were not stopped they then moved to what Clemens describes as other "safe issues" on which to challenge the state.[179] These issues included the preservation of national monuments and symbols. The Soviet politburo failed to recognize the growing strength of these movements and this inaction provided the momentum necessary to move to the next stage in protests: demands for greater national rights. The leaders of these nationalistic movements were careful to work within the limits Gorbachev placed on Soviet society. They capitalized on concepts such a *glasnost and perestroika* and used the terminology against Gorbachev and the Soviet government. As the movements grew they were also adamantly non-violent which helped gain international support and kept suspicions in Moscow to a minimum.[180] The leaders of what was beginning to be called the 'singing revolution' (due to the use of cultural events such as national song competitions to rally support) were so careful in this policy of staying under the Soviet radar screen that they arranged to have people assigned to clean up garbage anywhere these cultural events and protests were being held to prevent complaints by local authorities.[181]

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[178] Matthew Auer (1998) "Environmentalism and Estonia's Independence Movement" *Nationalities Papers* Vol.26 No.4.

[179] Clemens (2001), p. 45.

[180] Ibid.

[181] Interview with Mr. Nils Muižnieks- Latvian Minister for Social Integration March 17 2004, Riga.

By 1989 Gorbachev acknowledged the Baltic problem and introduced a proposal to alter Soviet federalism in the hopes this would placate the nationalists. This indicated to the leaders of the movements that Gorbachev was weak and they pushed on with greater confidence. The year cumulated on August 23, the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when "one to two million Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians- one sixth to one-third of the total Baltic population- formed a 370-mile human chain from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius".[182] By 1990 the Soviet Army began an attempt to suppress the movements, particularly in Lithuania. As the world watched, the three small Baltic republics refused to back down and on August 20th and 21st Latvia and Estonia declared their independence from the Soviet Union.

The Russians in Estonia and Latvia before, during and after the Soviet Union

It first must be acknowledged that the term 'Russian minority' is a misnomer in the Baltic. Those who have been labeled as such represent a variety of national groups. What they share is the use of the Russian language and therefore Russian-speakers is a more appropriate term. However they are labeled there are two main groups of these non-Latvians and non-Estonians: those who came to the region before the Second World War, and those who came after its conclusion. Some Russian-speakers have been established in Estonia since the 17th Century and these Russians

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[182] Clemens (2001), p.48.

(the vast majority are ethnic Russians) are well integrated into society and have maintained their culture and traditions despite their length of residency.[183]

Those who came after the war arrived for a variety of reasons. For example, due to their geographic closeness to the rest of Europe the region was also home to many divisions of the Soviet army. The combination of military personnel, the need for industrial workers, the relatively higher standard of living in the region compared to the rest of the country and mass deportation led to a major change in the demographics of the region. Table 4.1 illustrates the changing ratio of Estonians and Latvians to Russians over the 20th Century.

Table 3.1 Ethnic Composition of Estonia and Latvia 1935-1989[184]

	Estonia		Latvia	
Year	% Estonian	% Russian*	% Latvian	% Russian*
1935**	87.8	8.2	77.0	8.8
1959	74.6	20.1	62.0	26.6
1979	64.7	27.9	53.7	32.8
1989	61.5	30.3	52.0	34.0

* Russians or Russian speakers
** The census data for Estonia is for 1934

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[183] Interview with Ms. Katrin Saks, Estonian Member of Parliament and former Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs (1999-2002), March 11 2004, Tallinn.

[184] Michael Johns (2002) "Assessing Risk Assessment: A Baltic Test", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol.8, No.1, p.108. Original data on Estonia from Aksel Kirch et al. (1993) "Russians in the Baltic States: To Be or Not To Be?" *Journal of Baltic Studies* Vol.24, No.2, p.174. For Latvia, Peter Zvidrins (1992) "Changes in the Ethnic Composition of Latvia" *Journal of Baltic Studies* Vol.23, No.4, p.364.

When the nationalist movements began many Russian speakers living in the region (excluding the military) supported them because they believed that when independence came they would automatically become citizens of the new states. The Latvian Minister of Social Integration Nils Muižnieks describes what actually happened was that they had "the rug pulled out from under them".[185] With independence the Estonians and Latvians looked to their past for guidance and they found it in the interwar constitutions. The constitution of Estonia for example was clear: Estonia was a land for the Estonians and should protect the Estonian culture and language. Despite their ideological support for independence, there was to be no place in the new Estonia for non-Estonians and it was decided that only those who could prove they or their family had been in the region prior to 1940 would be given citizenship and the rest were expected to return to Russia. This was the most dangerous period of the transition and while independence had been achieved the long term stability of the new states was in doubt. The main issue was the presence of the Soviet military still stationed in the region because no one was sure how the military would react. It took until 1994 for the military issue to be resolved and the political chaos to be stabilized.[186] In that time many of the Russian speakers did

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[185] Interview with Nils Muižnieks, 2004.

[186] Interview with Reinis Āboltiņš Director of the Society Integration Department-Former Advisor to the President, March 18, 2004 Riga. There continues to be issues surrounding the retired members of the Soviet military who refused to leave and require pensions, however this is an issue to be resolved between Russia and Estonia, not the Russian speaking community, interview with Isabelle Poupart, Senior Mission Program Office OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, February 25 2004, Vienna.

choose to leave the region but a large number also decided to stay. For many the Baltic was the only home they knew and Russia was a foreign land far away from their friends and careers.

There are two distinct time periods in the history of Estonia and Latvia since 1991. The first is the period immediately after independence which was full of chaos and nationalist concerns. Out of this period came the first laws on the requirements for citizenship, however, these laws were deemed by many as too restrictive or that they presented too difficult barriers for the majority of the non-Estonians or non-Latvians to pass. This period was marked by some protests by the Russian minority but in general it was not organized enough at that point to effectively argue its position. This is a problem that continues to plague the Russian community in both countries today.[187]

Unlike in Corsica and the Basque country where protests were eventually followed by violence, with the exception of some small and isolated incidents, none occurred in either Estonia or Latvia. The second period started around 1995 when there was a realization that the Russian speakers were not going to leave. With pressure from the international community, particularly Max van der Stoel, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's High Commissioner on National Minorities, slowly the requirements were eased, and programs were

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[187] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, Former Latvian Member of Parliament- Russian activist, March 16 2004, Riga.

implemented designed to ease this process.[188] It was only in 1998 that the Estonian

government began to look carefully into what would be required for the successful

integration of the Russian speaking minority. This process has been difficult and has

faced much adversity. Dr. Aija Priedte, the Director of the National Programme for

Latvian Language Training notes by way of example, the Latvian government still

believes that it should only take 60 hours to learn Latvian to be at a proficient level.

Many in the Russian-speaking population have never tried to learn another language

and to those who are elderly the idea of learning Latvian in any time period is

impossible.[189]

By 2003 the political landscape in the two countries had crystallized. For the

Estonians and Latvians, they are looking to the future and feel that in time the

Russian speaking community will adapt into the society. With the education of young

Russian-speakers there will be more who are able to speak the titular language and

will integrate into society and Estonia believes that by 2007 all of those who want to

integrate will have done so.[190] The Estonian government believes that with the plan in

place and given the fact that "integration is a psychological need", the process will

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[188] Interview with Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human
Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 15, 2004, Riga.

[189] Interview with Dr. Aija Priedite, Director of the National Programme for Latvian
Language Training, March 18 2004 Riga.

[190] Integration Foundation (2001) *Üks Ühiskond, Üks Riik/One State, One Society:
Integration Yearbook.*
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now be more simplistic.[191] The Latvian government believes that by 2008 the

integration process could be finished but admits that the majority of the Russian

speaking population will die out, rather than successfully integrate. In 2002 the

number of non-citizens in the country decreased by 3000 per month, yet only 12 000

people actually integrated. The rest either left the country or died. Currently in Latvia

there are over 498 000 non-citizens left in the country, which is approximately 20%

of the total population.[192]

Many in the Russian speaking minority have a more negative assessment of

the process. Boris Tsilevich notes that the success of integration in Latvia is not

owing to the government but in spite of it.[193] In Latvia there are two key areas of

disagreement. The first is a plan to change the education system to encourage the

teaching of Latvian in Russian schools. The second is that unlike in Estonia, the non-

citizens are not allowed to vote in local elections. Russian activists argue that by not

having a voice in local government they are ignored and their issues are not

addressed. Today in Latvia still only 4% of the civil service is comprised of non-

Latvians while in Estonia there are also continuing problems. Russians in Estonia

were heavily involved in industry and have suffered economically compared to the

Estonians. Additionally there is the problem of Narva. This is a city on the border

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[191] Interview with Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn.

[192] Interview with Eiženija Aldermane, Head of the Latvian Naturalisation Board March 17, 2004, Riga.

[193] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004.

with Russia which is 95% non-Estonian. Here and in parts of the capital Tallinn the

Russians are isolated from Estonian society and do not see the need to learn the

language. Moreover, by not having to learn the language to use in their daily lives,

many find practicing Estonian difficult.[194] In Narva the culture of the Russians is not

threatened and the city council operates in Russian and it is still the Estonians who

are perceived to be the outsiders.[195] In the Russian community there is the belief that

full integration is not possible because even the young who are integrating see the

effects of non-citizenship on their parents and grand-parents and this breeds

resentment and will only lead to continued, long term problems.[196] Many Estonians

fear this resentment as well possibly even more than the non-Estonians. 53% of

Estonians believe that ethnic conflict is a possible or definite threat to security in the

country. This is compared to only 27% of non-Estonians.[197] Currently there are still

100 000 non-citizens in Estonia[198], so clearly there is work remaining before the

process is complete in either country. With Estonia and Latvia's entry into the

European Union and NATO they are closer to their goal of fully rejoining Europe.

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[194] Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

[195] Interview with Katrin Saks, 2004.

[196] Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, 2004.

[197] Richard Rose (2000) *New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press), p. 36.

[198] Interview with Katrin Saks, 2004.

How they resolve their minority issues will go a long way in determining how they

are embraced when they get there.

Chapter 4- Economic Determinants

As discussed in Chapter 2 there has been great interest in the economic factors that may lead to conflict between ethnic groups. Many conflicts involving an ethnic group and a state can be traced back to some form of economic discrimination such as barriers to entry into components of the economy or by giving one ethnic group preference over another. The resulting ethnic tension from these conditions may increase and at times lead to conflict. Conversely, ethnic tension can be lowered or managed if all segments of the society are benefiting economically from the current situation. If people have enough money to survive they will be more content. It is when their economic well being is threatened that group will begin to look for a reason for their economic condition and this is when ethnicity starts to become an issue. Leaders of a minority group can mobilize the people quickly around economic issues by drawing on the group's fear of psychical survival. Whether the economic situation is due to the actions of the majority is not as important as the belief that it is.

The cases in this study provide the opportunity to test the actual impact of economics in determining the actions of a minority group. The cases are each unique in terms of their economic situation compared to the rest of the state. In the Baltic states it will be shown that there has been a clear division of labor between the titular population and the Russian community. However, where there is competition, the Russians are at a disadvantage. The Corsicans were economically neglected throughout most of the 20th Century but recently have been the recipients of government aid. Finally, the Basques are an example of an economically advantaged

community, which has led to competition from non-Basques coming into the region in an attempt to capitalize on their good fortune.

The Basques- Spain's Economic Engine

The Basque region has historically been one of the wealthiest segments of the Spanish state. This is less true today but the difference between the Basque region and the rest of Spain was particularly noticeable after the industrial revolution in the 19th Century. The Basque region was one of the first to industrialize in Spain and also to begin involvement in international trade at an early stage particularly with Britain. The region was a leading producer of coal and steel and was very active in the ship-building industry.[199] With this economic success, however, came the first split in Basque society. With economic success comes immigration and in this case the immigration did not come from other areas across Europe but from other areas in Spain. The first wave of new immigrants came around the turn of the 20th century. The influx of outsiders threatened the traditional Basque way of life and in particular, the Basque language. As discussed in a previous chapter, the Basque community split at this point with the rural Basques becoming more nationalistic and the urban industrialists remaining loyal to Spain. Due to their economic success as a people, the nationalists gained confidence that they could be a viable entity on their own and began to call for more rights within Spain and greater autonomy in their economic affairs. With the newcomers came new ideas and issues. Those who were not Basques

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[199] Interview with Luis Francisco Martinez Montes- Counselor to the Spanish delegation OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna.

did not care about issues of autonomy but wanted greater rights for the workers in the mines and factories. The result was the Spanish Socialist party got its beginnings in Bilbao, the largest and most industrial of the cities in the Basque region.[200] While those outside of the city viewed the newcomers as a threat, those in the urban centers saw them as an opportunity for economic growth and to expand further into the Spanish market. Basques became active in banking and soon became dominant players in this aspect not of Basque society, but rather Spanish society. With their success in the rest of Spain, the industrialists and bankers of the Basque community did not concern themselves with issues such as nationalism. Having access to the Spanish market was imperative and in order to achieve this access they needed to communicate in Spanish and most importantly the Basque region needed to remain a part of Spain. As Medhurst notes: "Basque entrepreneurs were linked to nation-wide financial or banking concerns which dominated the entire Spanish financial system. They therefore had a much closer relationship with the Spanish state and little or no stake in the regional cause".[201] This created an interesting cycle: the industrialists and entrepreneurs continued to make money and create jobs and many of these jobs were taken by people moving into the region. The influx of new immigrants to the region increased the concerns of the nationalists who were becoming almost exclusively

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[200] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director and Spokesperson Elkarri, February 4 2004,
Bilbao.

[201] Quoted in Gershon Shafir (1995) *Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia* (Albany: State University of New York Press), p.94.

located in rural areas and as this pattern continued the Basque nationalist movement became almost exclusively rural and lacked the assistance of the affluent and business elite of Basque society. This ensured that the nationalist movement was to remain a grass-roots movement that was very conservative in nature.[202]

This trend continued during the Franco period. While the Basques were persecuted, the region still continued to industrialize at a greater rate than the rest of Spain. In 1967 for example four of the five Basque provinces were ranked in the top six Spanish provinces in terms of per capita income.[203] Moreover, in terms of disposable per capita income (income after taxes available to spend on other goods) three provinces, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava were ranked first, second and third respectively, with Navarre sixth.[204] With the exception of the ship-building industry (which was more international and did not need protection from the Spanish state, or need access to the Spanish market to compete), many industrialists in the Basque region worked with Franco in order to maintain their profits. By the end of the 1950's the Basque region experienced its second wave of mass migration and it was at this point that the Basques broke into three very distinct groups. The first group was those who sided with Franco and remained loyal to Spain. This group lived predominantly in the large urban centers. The second group was the middle-class who lived in the cities, but also in the smaller towns. This group saw the influx of non-Basques as a

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[202] Ibid.

[203] Milton M. da Silva (1975) "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Basques" *Comparative Politics*, Vol.7, No.2, p.240.

[204] Ibid.

threat but continued to support the traditional Basque political movements that aimed at ending the repression of the Basques and sought greater autonomy. The final group was found mainly in rural areas where unemployment was at is highest. This group of mainly young Basques moved away from the traditional conservative Basque political platform and embraced a more radical, leftist ideology and broke from the PNV to form what would eventually become Henri Batasuna and in its most radical form, the ETA.[205]

After the death of Franco the Basques were able to negotiate a return of their traditional taxation system. This system allowed them to collect tax directly and then send a percentage to the Spanish state and due to their economic condition the right to collect their own tax meant that they were able to control a large amount of money and improve the infrastructure of the region. By the late 1980's Spain faced a severe recession and for the first time the Basque region needed to look to the Spanish state for assistance, particularly in the steel industry. The Spanish state introduced measures that greatly assisted the steel producers and the Basque region was able to pull itself out of the recession more quickly than the rest of Spain.[206] After the steel crises the Basques have managed to remain an economically advanced region in Spain. While it is no longer the case that they alone are the economic engine for the

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[205] Interview with Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute, February 3 2004, Bilbao.

[206] Interview with Fernado Morales- Counsellor Permament Representation of Spain to OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna.

country[207], in most economic indicators, the Basque region outpaces the rest of the country. This is due to the very high levels of industrialization of the region. The Basque statistical agency for 2002 had the Basque Industrial Production Indices rating as 124.7. This is compared to Spain in total at 111.4 and the European Union as a whole's score, 108.6.[208] While the Basque regions GDP was only 47.4 Billion PPS (purchasing power standard) when that is converted to a per capita basis, the Basque regions GDP is 22 936 PPS compared to Spain's 18 583. The Basque per capita GDP was also higher than that of the United Kingdom (22 678), Belgium (22 603) and Portugal (15 372).[209] The Basque region and the province of Navarre specifically have much lower rates of unemployment compared with the rest of Spain, particularly the more agricultural regions in the south. It appears as well that the Basque region has integrated more fully into the European Union economically, to the point that it is highly dependent on trade with the EU in order to sustain itself. This is due to the Basque reliance on the industrial sector which accounts for almost half of all jobs in the region.[210]

One unusual aspect of Basque society currently is that despite the negative role migration has had on the region culturally in the past, today the majority of the

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[207] Ibid.
[208] Basque Statistical Office EUSTAT website, http://www.eustat.es.

[209] Ibid.

[210] Ane Muñoz Varela (1999) "Redefining Euskadi as an Autonomous Community and Participant in the Construction of Europe" in William A. Douglass, Carmelo Urza, Linda White and Joseba Zulaika ed., *Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium* (Reno: University of Nevada Basque Studies Program).

Basques are more open than other areas of the country to non-Spanish immigrants. The Basques have embraced many of the ideals of the European Union regarding the mobility of people. This may be in part due to their long history of dealing with foreigners dating back to the first industrial revolution. Many Basques have lived in other areas of Spain, particularly the large urban centers of Madrid and Barcelona (due to the Basques influence on the Spanish monetary and industrial sectors) and appear to accept now that they are unable to keep outsiders away. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement "It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions and cultures?" 76% of respondents in the Basque region agreed, and only 12% disagreed. The same results occurred when only ethnic Basques were asked the question.[211] When these same people were asked if they found "the presence of people of another nationality disturbing in your daily life?" only 4% responded that they agreed with this statement, while 94% disagreed.[212] Finally when asked if an increase of minorities increases unemployment in the region only 41% agreed while 46% disagreed. This is a much lower response in favor compared to other EU countries such as Greece (85% agreed), Belgium (64% agreed), Germany (61% agreed) and the EU as a whole (51% agreed).[213] In some respects globalization has put the Basques and the Spanish state on an equal playing

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[211] Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government's Office (2003) *Basque Sociometer 21*, Basque government website http://www.euskadi.net/estudios_sociologicos, p.29.

[212] Ibid, p.30.

[213] Ibid, p.33.

field. With globalization comes the threat to the Basque culture and economy *and* to the Spanish culture and economy as well.[214] Many Basque nationalists feel as long as the threat of cultural assimilation is the same for both groups then the situation is more palatable.

Corsica- Economically Neglected

While it is clear that the Basque region has been a strong component in the Spanish economy, historically the same cannot be said of Corsica in its relationship with France. While the French government tries to proclaim the island an economic success story, the European Union has declared it an economically disadvantaged region. While the Basques outpace the rest of Spain in terms of GDP, Corsica not only lags behind the rest of France, it has one of the lowest GDP's in the entire European Union. Corsica's GDP per capita is only 78% of the European Union's average.[215] Of the 196 regions within the European Union, Corsica ranked 143rd based on per capita income.[216] One obvious problem with the Corsican economy is where the majority of the jobs are for the island. While the Basques are heavily reliant on the better paying industrial sector, Corsica has a very small industrial base.[217] Only

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[214] Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5, 2004, Bilbao.

[215] John Laughlin and Farimah Daftary, (1999) *Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Åland Islands Compared*, ECMI Report #5, Flensburg Germany, p.28.

[216] Marianne Arens and Francois Thull (2000) "Partial autonomy for Corsica splits French government" *World Socialist Website*, September 5.

21.8% of the Corsican workforce is in this sector, compared to 75.5% of the workforce who are in the low paying service industry.[218] This is due mainly to the reality of geography because the Basques have been blessed with living in a region flush with natural resources, the Corsicans have not. They have had to build their economy around what they have in most abundance, beautiful scenery. The island is reliant on the tourism industry, and that is an industry where the majority of the workforce must settle for lower paying jobs. As a result the Corsicans economic situation can be described as "dependency on the outside world, low quality employment as well as high levels of unemployment".[219] As of 1998, 95% of all Corsican companies employed less than 10 employees and out of a workforce of approximately 100 000 (out of a total population of 250 000), 15 000 were unemployed and an additional 30 000 were employed in precariously low paying or temporary jobs.[220] While the Corsicans cannot change their geography, they have also been the victims of poor economic planning by the French state as well as by the influx of non-Corsicans, all of which has fueled the conflict between nationalists and the French state.

Ramsay contends that while the Corsicans have always been an economically depressed region compared to the rest of France, it was not until the 1960's that they

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[217] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor, Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE, February 25 2004, Vienna.

[218] Loughlin and Daftary (1999), p.29.

[219] Ibid.

[220] Arens and Thull (2000).

began to realize exactly how much of a discrepancy existed. As he said: "[w]hen 'exiles' returned on holiday from the continent it was obvious to the resident Corsicans that they were enjoying a higher standard of living than that obtainable on the island".[221] The island, as discussed in a previous chapter was greatly affected by the end of the colonial era after World War II. This took away the employment of many Corsicans, who had to return to the island to look for work and while the unemployment rate was always slightly higher on the island compared to mainland France, this did not accurate reflect the situation. Many Corsicans, faced with the lack of suitable employment simply left for the mainland. Some Corsicans claim that despite a birth rate in line with European averages, Corsica was the only Mediterranean island to actual have a decrease in population in the last half of the Twentieth Century.[222]

The emigration of the ethnic Corsicans corresponded with the arrival of the *pied noirs* from Algeria. The arrival of the pied noirs on the island had the same result as the arrival of new migrants to the Basque region during the 1890's and 1950's. As discussed previously, the arrival of a large number on non-Corsicans to the island threw the ethnic balance of the society askew. The Corsicans saw the pied noirs not only as an economic threat, but also a threat to their culture and language. Many of the Corsican nationalists used the arrival of the pied noirs as a rallying point around which to mobilize. While the social impact of the pied noirs was immediate, it took

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[221] Robert Ramsay (1993) *The Corsican Time-Bomb* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.31.

[222] Ibid, p.32.

some time before the true impact on the Corsican economy was to be realized. The French government repatriated the Algerian settlers in Corsica due to the similarity in climate between Algeria and the island. The government encouraged them to purchase land and to continue the farming they had been involved in while they were in North Africa. Many Corsican farmers and land owners were initially happy to sell their land to the new settlers, as the increased demand for land caused prices to climb from 600-800 francs per hectare in 1958 to 8 000- 10 000 francs per hectare six years later.[223] Their enthusiasm for selling their land quickly evaporated when it became clear that the pied noirs were coming in greater and greater numbers, and that they were quickly buying up all of the usable land on the island and by the end of the 1960's the majority of usable land for farming was in the hands of the pied noirs and the ethnic Corsicans had to either work on the farms for the settlers, or they needed to find a different occupation.[224]

Finding a different occupation was difficult as there were very limited options available in terms of opportunities. As Ramsay notes the "secondary sector was virtually non-existent and formerly successful industries, such as forestry products were seriously in decline. Even in tourism, for which Corsica was climatically and scenically well equipped, the island was poorly provided for by way of

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[223] Ibid, p.38.

[224] Loughlin and Daftary (1999), p.16.

accommodation, personnel training and the necessary finances".[225] The tourism industry will be returned to in a moment.

The first effort by the French state to try to improve the economic condition of the island was in 1957 with the creation of the semi-governmental institution known as SOMIVAC. This organization was initially tasked with improving the infrastructure of the agricultural industry in Corsica but unfortunately, the creation of SOMIVAC corresponded with the arrival of the pied noirs and its work became more closely associated with accommodating the new settlers' needs than the native Corsicans. During the early 1960's the French Ministry of the Interior set up DATAR (Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale) which was tasked with trying to improve the economy of various regions in France, particularly through an increase in industrial capabilities.[226]

Demands for greater control over the island's economic policies continued through the 1970's as the economic condition of Corsica became linked with the survival of the Corsican identity. The argument of the nationalists was simple: if the economy remains poor, more Corsicans will be forced to leave the island and eventually there will not be enough Corsicans left on Corsica to protect the language and culture of the group. The French state tried to alleviate some of these concerns with the Special statute of 1982. A key economic concession given to the island was the transferring of control of the tourism industry over to the Corsican themselves.[227]

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[225] Ramsay (1983), p.42.
[226] Ibid, p.45.

As the main source of income to the island it was believed that without control over this sector of the economy no other economic concessions would matter. Even with this provision the island as a whole continued to struggle. As Kofman notes of previous improvements to the tourism industry: "the land of opportunity was not to be the whole island, for only the coast offered the stimulus of rapid growth and large profits".[228] The 1982 statute also created a consultative committee on economic development which gave the Corsican assembly (which had no formal powers) the right to consult the French government on all matters that concerned the island. These powers were enhanced with the 1991 statute that gave the assembly more control over the economy, allowing for medium-term economic objectives to be determined by the assembly.[229]

While the amount of influence the Corsicans have had over their own economic development has increased since the 1960's the island today remains dependent on France for government subsidies for its long term survival. This has had two long term effects on the Corsican conflict. The first is that it has created some resentment and a lack of understanding among the rest of the French population of the Corsican cause. For the rest of the country, they see their tax dollars being spent on people who appear to them to be actively trying to break away from the mainland and this has made any French government attempts at providing more rights to Corsica

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[227] Peter Savigear (1990) "Corsica" in Michael Watson ed., *Contemporary Minority Nationalism* (London: Routledge Press), p.91.
[228] Eleonore Kofman (1982) "Differential Modernisation, Social Conflicts and Ethno-Regionalism in Corsica" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.5 No.3, p.305.

[229] Laughlin and Daftary (1999), p.18.

difficult for the French public to accept.[230] The other affect has been that as money became available to the island through subsidies and improvements in the tourism sector, nationalists who were committed to violence have joined with criminals to gain access to that money. By working with organized crime, the nationalists have lost credibility with both the French and Corsican people and have made it difficult to make a distinction between political violence, and mob-related violence.[231]

Clearly the attempts to improve the Corsican economy through state intervention have failed. Since the arrival of the pied noirs, the French state has been fighting a losing battle to try to convince the Corsican people that it is interested in trying to improve the island's economy and is not interested in assimilating the Corsicans fully into French society. These tactics were "a source of extreme tension within the island community"[232] and have simply not worked. The Corsican nationalists have used the failure of these economic strategies as an argument for greater control over their own affairs and they have been successful in arguing that only they can properly implement an economic policy. They have failed to demonstrate, however, that their economic strategies are any more effective than what has been used before. Corsica must face the reality that there is not much usable land for farming (and most of that is in the hands of non-Corsicans), there is little industry and the EU cannot help them. They must use what they have been dealt and that

[230] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, 2004.
[231] Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), March 24 2004.

[232] Loughlin and Daftarty (1999), p.29.

requires the expansion of the tourism industry. Many of the concerns of regionalists and nationalists today involve the rights of the Corsican Assembly to have control over environmental issues. It is argued that the tourism industry is dependent on the protection of the environment. Therefore environmental issues are in reality economic issues.[233] The economic state of the island is a leading cause of the nationalist movement and the threats from outsiders economically have been framed as threats to Corsican culture. It appears that the future of the conflict will also center around the protection of the only viable source of economic prosperity and until the economy is fully equal to that of France it seems that the nationalists will continue to call for greater autonomy. As long as violence continues on the island and organized crime has a powerful influence, the economy will not improve.[234] This cycle needs to be broken or else Corsica will remain a disadvantaged region of Europe.

The Russians in Estonia and Latvia- Life with the Baltic Tigers

Of all of the post-Soviet societies, the Baltic states are by far the most economically successful. This is due partly to their proximity and historical ties with the rest of Europe but they have also managed to quickly adapt to the western style of doing business. Their success has been so pronounced (more so in Estonia than either Latvia or Lithuania) that they have been dubbed by some as Baltic tigers, a comparison with the Asian tigers of South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore.[235]

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[233] Ibid.

[234] Ibid.

Estonia and Latvia present a very different economic situation in comparison to both

Corsica and the Basque region. First, while Basques and Corsicans have had to deal

with outsiders coming to them and disrupting their economic development, in Estonia

and Latvia it was the Russians who came looking for a better economic future.

Secondly and more importantly, despite continuing economic inequities the Russian

community has not rallied around this issue in either country and the main reason for

this is that the Russians in Latvia and Estonia are not now, nor were they ever

historically in direct competition with the titular communities economically. They

have been employed in different sectors of the economy and therefore have not seen

how the other half lives.

Many of the Russians who came to the Baltic region immediately after the

annexation of Estonia and Latvia were sent there by the Soviet government. They

were sent for two reasons, the first being to try to dilute the ethnic majorities of the

new republics and second, they were sent to fill very specific segments of the

workforce. In Estonia for example many Russian specialists were sent to work in the

electrical plants. These plants were supplying energy to other areas of the Soviet

Union, and it was therefore necessary to ensure that the plants work at top efficiency.

This was accomplished by bringing skilled workers from elsewhere to operate the

plants[236] with some entire towns, such as Sillamae being closed entirely to the

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[235] See for example Walter C. Clemens (2001) *The Baltic Transformed* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press).
[236] Michael Bradshaw et al. (1996) "Economic Restructuring" in Gordon Smith, ed., *The Baltic States* (New York: St. Martin's Press), p.161.

Estonian population with all of the labor brought in from elsewhere around the Soviet Union.[237] Historically, the Estonians and Latvians had been involved in farming and light industry, such as clothes manufacturing. With restructuring under the Soviet command economy, part of the emphasis shifted towards the heavy industry sector where the Russian immigrants found employment. During the Soviet period Russians and Russian speaking migrants were the main ethnic group employed in the machine-building, mining, textile and chemical producing sector.[238] This created a condition that some have referred to as 'internal colonialism' where the labor market became segregated. As Mettan and Williams state: "the crystallization of ethnic identities is considered in the context of the structure of labour markets in a multiethnic context and the emergence of localized cultural division of labour".[239] What is interesting is exactly how specific the migration into Estonia and Latvia during the Soviet period was. The migrants moved almost exclusively into the cities and took up work in industry whereas very few migrants moved to the region to take up agriculture. In 1934 only 8.5% of the rural inhabitants of Estonia were of Russian descent and 7.6%

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[237] Interview with Mati Luik, Director- Non-Estonian Integration Foundation, March 10 2004, Tallinn.

[238] Marje Pavelson and Mati Luuk (2002) "Non-Estonians on the Labour Market" in Marju Lauristin and Mati Heidmets, ed., *The Challenge of the Russian Minority* (Tartu: Tartu University Press), p.91.

[239] Collin W. Mettam et al. (1998) "Internal Colonialism and Cultural Division of Labour in the Soviet Republic of Estonia" *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol.4 No.3, p.92.

of the urban population was Russian. In 1989 the urban level had risen to 39% but the rural level remained at 8.5%.[240]

This cultural division of labor has remained today. There are still some segments of the workforce where ethnic Estonians or Latvians are practically shut out, and vice versa. Another way to examine the cultural division of labor is to look at what languages are needed where the titular and non-titular populations work. In Estonia 98% of Estonians work in a place that requires Estonian. Only 61% of Russians' workplaces require Estonian. 55% of Estonian workplaces require Russian, compared to 86% of workplaces where Russians are employed.[241] In Latvia the numbers are even more striking. Only 13% of Russians work in an environment that requires only Latvian, and only 34% of the workplaces of Russians use both Russian and Latvian. Almost half of the Russians in Latvia, 48%, work in an environment that uses Russian exclusively. 73% of the Latvians work in a Latvian-only environment, with only 18% working in an environment that uses both Latvian and Russian.[242] It is interesting to note that Latvia differs somewhat from Estonia in this regard in that the Russian community has been more effective since independence in gaining access to higher income positions in the business world as opposed to their counter-parts in Estonia. In Latvia, many Russian businessmen have used their connections within

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[240] Collin W. Mettam and Stephen W. Williams (2001) "A Colonial Perspective on Population Migration in Soviet Estonia" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol.27 No.1, p.141.
[241] Richard Rose (2000) *New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press), p.8.

[242] Ibid.

Russia to establish highly successful companies and have become (or at least the

perception in Latvia is that they have become) the nouveux riche.[243] While in Latvia a

small segment of Russians have gained access to the upper strata of the economic

ladder the majority are employed in lower paying jobs such as unskilled laborers.

Russians also have consistently had a higher level of unemployment in Latvia

compared to ethnic Latvians. In 1996 for example 26% of Russians were unemployed

compared with 14% of the ethnic Latvians.[244] In Estonia, Russians also have a higher

unemployment rate and more telling, the average Russian who is unemployed has a

higher level of education compared to the average Estonian.[245] Even those Russians

who gain employment in traditional non-Russian industries now find that in most

cases they will not earn the same level of income as their Estonian or Latvian

counterparts. Table 5.1 illustrates the differences in mean income between Estonians

and non-Estonians in a variety of segments of the economy. Due to the low number of

non-Estonians who have citizenship and are thus excluded from professions such as

police officer or border guard, the average income for non-Estonians in that field is

not reported. Clearly even in areas where the Russians predominate, in most cases

they are not paid equally to non-Estonians. Only in agriculture, where the low

numbers of Russians employed throws off the sample, and also education, where

[243] Aina Antane and Boris Tsilevich (1999) "Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Latvia" in Pål Kolstø, ed., *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder CO: Westview Press).
[244] Ibid, p.136.

[245] Kiara Hallik, ed. (2002) *Integration of Estonian Society: Monitoring 2002* (Tallinn: Institute of International and Social Studies), p.46.

there is demand for teachers capable of teaching the Russian population in both

Russian and Estonian, are the Russians competitive.

Table 4.1 Average Monthly Net Income by Sector in Estonia (in EEK)[246]

Sector	Estonians	Non-Estonians
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	3053	3533
Industry	3767	3508
Energy, Gas and Water	3954	2923
Construction	5323	4027
Transport, Communication	4128	3892
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate	5072	2750
Retail and Services	4141	3387
Education and R&D	3305	3296
Public Administration	4334	3005

Despite these obvious discrepancies, most Estonian and Latvian politicians do

not feel that economics is an important issue for integration and ethnic stability. The

Latvian Minister for Social Integration Nils Muižnieks believes that the fragmentation

of the Russian's economically makes it difficult for the Russian community to use

this as an issue to rally around. Some of the Russians have done very well as

discussed above and this makes it hard for them to sympathize with their less

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[246] Ibid, p.45.

fortunate Russian brethren.[247] The former Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs (and also mentioned by Muižnieks) notes that immediately after independence, when many of the policies were being introduced that impacted negatively on the Russians economically, in fact the economic situation in Russia was much worse than in the Baltics. As a result many Russians decided that it was in their best interests to accept an imperfect situation in Estonia and Latvia rather than to leave for Russia where they would be even more disadvantaged.[248] Illze Brand Kehris goes farther and argues that those Russians living near the Latvian-Russian border see first hand how the Russian economy has struggled and therefore are more pro-Latvian than others who live farther away in the capital, Riga.[249] In Estonia, Muižnieks' counterpart Paul-Eerik Rummo believes that while there are economic issues, these revolve more around the industries the Russians have been historically employed in, particularly in the Russian dominated city of Narva. For him, the integration of the Russians include the modernization of industry, which will increase their productivity and improve the economic condition of the Russians employed in them.[250] Some in Estonia believe, like Kehris in Latvia that most Russians have relatives living in Russia and therefore

[247] Interview with Nils Muižnieks, Latvian Minister for Social Integration, March 17 2004, Riga.
[248] Ibid and Interview with Valdis Birkavs, Former Prime Minister of Latvia March 15 2004, Riga.

[249] Interview with Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 15 2004, Riga.

[250] Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn.

know how much better off they are in Estonia compared with Russia and therefore

they do not complain.[251] However, others disagree. Mati Luik of the Non-Estonian

Integration Foundation believes that due to the large number of Russians around the

world and the fact that most do not have direct attachment with Russia, the Russian

community could leave Estonia and go elsewhere and this will be easier still once

Estonia joins the EU. Estonia is not a large country and requires the Russians to stay

in order to keep their workforce at an acceptable level and therefore, the Estonian

government needs to improve the economic condition of the Russian population for

the sake of the country's economy.[252]

Many of the leaders of the Russian community in both Latvia and Estonia

share Luik's belief. For them, the main issue is not the present economic

discrepancies, but the future ones. In Latvia for example, Boris Tsilevich contends

that with changes to the education system the Russian community will fall further

behind and will be eliminated from economic opportunities due to lack of

qualifications.[253] Tsilevich believes that if this trend continues, large number of

young Russians will take their education elsewhere (in or out of the European Union)

and move to where their skills will be appreciated.[254] In Estonia, this problem has

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[251] Interview with Katrin Saks, Member of Parliament, Former Minister of
Population and Ethnic Affairs (1999-2002), March 11 2004, Tallinn.

[252] Interview with Mati Luik, Director- Non-Estonian Integration Foundation, March
10 2004, Tallinn.

[253] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, Former MP- Russian activist, March 16 2004,
Riga.

already been identified by the government which wrote in an integration report that "non-Estonians seem to be distressed not so much by salaries than limited choices which are contingent on their place of residence . . . as well as persisting variance between the requirements of the local labour market and the professional capacities of non-Estonian employees".[255] Vadim Poleshchuk of the Russian advocacy group the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights believes that if this is occurring now, when the Russians and Estonians have approximately equal education levels, there could be the potential for conflict if the Estonian government's integration attempts fail, and more Russians fall behind.[256]

The long term impact of the integration policies of both Estonia and Latvia on the economic condition of their Russian speaking communities is unknown. What is certain is that without the Russian population, neither country has a workforce capable of maintaining economic growth or continuing the development of the 'Baltic Tigers'. Poleshchuk believes that the Russian community is aware of this and will eventually use their "demographic strength" to force changes in Estonian society.[257] A more interesting question is why they have not used this strength already? Clearly in Estonian and Latvia, economics have not played an important role in mobilizing the Russian communities. Two possible reasons why have been addressed above. The

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[254] Ibid.

[255] Hallik (2002), p.45.
[256] Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

[257] Ibid.

first is the division of labor in the Baltic states with the Russian community simply

not working in the same businesses and sectors as the titular societies and as a result,

some of the discrepancies in income go unnoticed. Second, if a discrepancy in income

was observed, it was less of a concern in the early years after independence since the

economic situation in the Baltic states was far superior to that of Russia. Most

Russians in Latvia and Estonia did the calculus and saw that no matter what their

economic situation was in comparison to those around them, it was better than the

alternative of leaving for Russia. By the time it was clear that the Russian community

would have the option of leaving for other areas outside of Russia (particularly the

EU) most had made the decision that they would stay in the region.

Conclusion

In a previous chapter the work of Susan Olzak was discussed. In review, Olzak

contends that direct economic competition between ethnic groups is a main factor in

ethnic competition and eventually conflict.[258] The cases discussed here seem to

validate Olzak's conclusion only to a point. In the Basque country the nationalist

movements became more organized and eventually violent after the introduction of

migrants to the region. These migrants were in direct competition with the Basques

for land, jobs and wealth. However, the cities where this competition was most acute

were never the breeding ground for the nationalist movement, instead socialism grew

in the cities, while the nationalist movement gained strength in the countryside. In

Corsica the nationalist movement also developed after the introduction of the pied

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[258] Susan Olzak (1992) *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition & Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

noirs and it is here Olzak's theory has the most support. Like the Basques the nationalist movement was centered outside of the cities but this was due to the fact that the non-Corsicans were mainly in the cities and the Corsicans have been forced into the center of the island where their economic prospects are not as great. In Estonia and Latvia, due to the ethnic division of labor, the two groups were never in direct competition and this may explain the lack of violence in that region. The Estonians and Latvians have tended to work in some industries and not others and the same is true for the Russians. This is taken to the extreme in some cases where the Russians work in industries where they do not need to even learn Estonian or Latvian. As more and more Russians gain citizenship and become proficient in the titular language it will be interesting to see if direct competition for jobs changes the levels of conflict.

The other main economic theory to consider is Gurr's theory of relative deprivation. As discussed this theory contends that when a group's economic condition changes in relation to another, conflict can occur.[259] In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, this theory may explain why the Russians remained complacent during the early 1990's. It may be that they perceived their economic situation as improving while those Russians still in Russia saw their situation declining. What the theory cannot explain is why the Russians have not become more militant since that point when their economic condition has remained about the same, yet the Estonians and Latvians are becoming more prosperous? The theory cannot explain the Basque

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[259] Ted Robert Gurr (1970) *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

country in that it has been and remains an economically advanced region in Spain. In

Corsica it can be used to explain the violence after World Ward II when it became

clear that the rest of France began to grow economically and Corsica fell behind.

However, the theory cannot explain why the violence has not stopped. The economic

discrepancies between France and Corsica, and the Corsicans and non-Corsicans on

the island have not changed for many years and the discrepancy has become the status

quo and therefore should not warrant militant activity.

Clearly the economic situation in each of these regions plays an important role

in inter-ethnic relations. However, economics alone does not appear to be enough to

explain the minority groups' activities. The Basques still are very economically

successful, yet violence and conflict remain. The Corsicans have been an

economically poor region for over 50 years and the French government has tried to

encourage the economy of the island through subsidies and autonomy, yet again

violence continues. In Estonia and Latvia, while the Russians are not in direct

competition with the titular communities, they are better off there compared to Russia

and they are aware of discrepancies in income.[260] They also are aware of their higher

levels of unemployment and they are concerned that changes in education and

training will make these discrepancies even greater. Despite all of this, they remain

peaceful. It appears therefore that with the possible exception of the genesis of the

Corsican movement, it is less useful to use economics as an explanation of each

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[260] When asked if they think there are economic inequalities between Estonians and non-Estonians for example, in 2000 68% of non-Estonians responded that there were Fairly Large or Very Large inequalities. Rose (2000), p. 63.

group's decision-making. For these cases economics appears to be a sufficient but not necessary condition in predicting the groups' behavior.

Chapter 5- The Role of the International Community

Can international organizations and foreign states have an impact on a minority group's decisions? The international community attempts to influence both minority groups and states all of the time with in obvious way: these organizations exert influence is in deciding who receives assistance and who does not. Those groups or countries that most closely conform to the guidelines set out by various funding agencies will be those who receive aid. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both employ this method of determining aid. Where money, aid and support from the United States is sent is also determined partially by the willingness of states to embrace democratic ideals. Motivating a group to act based on economic incentives has historically worked in regions such as post-war Europe, Africa and South-East Asia. The cases being examined would not be affected in the same way. Neither the Corsicans nor the French government requires the aid of these organizations. The same is also true for the Basques and the Spanish state. The Baltic states, as will be seen to follow, are somewhat influenced economically but their motivations are for future economic prosperity and not the need for the immediate assistance that comes from the IMF or World Bank.

In examining the cases it is clear that the international community can have a great impact on minority group/state relations. It can do so in two ways, it can act or it can choose not to act. Each is equally effective in motivating a minority group to make decisions relating to the use of violence or its willingness to work peacefully within the political system.

Of the cases examined, the Baltic states provide the most clear cut illustrations of the importance of the international community. In their case the international community has been actively involved in their affairs since 1991[261] and this involvement has led both the Russian speaking minority and the states themselves to alter their behavior and modify their strategies.

Estonia and Latvia- International Attention Overload

Post-1991 Russia and the OSCE

Due to their geographic proximity to the rest Europe and the precarious position they found themselves in relation to Russia, the international community was quick to embrace the new Baltic states after 1991. The first international organization involved in the Baltic States was the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in Europe, the CSCE (later the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE). The CSCE first arrived in 1993. Their presence came in two forms, the first were permanent missions in Latvia and Estonia, and the second were the visits by the High Commissioner on National Minorities.

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[261] This chapter will focus on the impact of the OSCE and EU on Estonia and Latvia. It is important however to note the impact of other international organizations. The Council of Europe had missions in both countries after 1995 and current OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus notes that the Council of Europe was responsible for many of the mandates and policies that shaped the High Commissioner's activities (Interview with Ekeus, February 17 2004, The Hague). Dr. Aija Priedite, Director of the National Programme for Latvian Language Training discussed the role of the UNDP in funding programs to help integrate Russians into Latvian Society (Interview with Priedite, March 18 2004, Riga). See also Alex Grigorievs (1996) "The Baltic Predicament" in Richard Caplan and John Feffer, ed. *Europe's New Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

The High Commissioner position was established in 1993 with Dutch

diplomat Max Van der Stoel taking the position. After agreeing to the position Van

der Stoel found that the position's mandate was extremely vague as to how he was to

decrease ethnic tensions within CSCE countries to prevent future conflict. His exact

mandate resulting from the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit was:

> The High Commissioner will provide 'early warning'
> and, as appropriate 'early action' at the earliest possible
> stage in regard to tensions involving national minority
> issues, which have not yet developed beyond an early
> warning stage, but, in the judgment of the High
> Commissioner, have the potential to develop into conflict
> within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or
> relations between participating states.[262]

The only limitation on the position was that he could not travel to areas where there

were active campaigns of terrorism. He decided that the places where the mandate

allowed him to go and that he could make the greatest impact at that time were

Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary.[263] In Estonia and Latvia the areas he was

most active in addressing were citizenship and language laws. As Bernier notes: "The

High Commissioner made it clear, from the beginning of his involvement, that the

path taken by both countries to secure the 'privileged position' of the core group over

minorities not only ran against international norms, but also disrupted internal social

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[262] Quoted in Wolfgang Zellner (2002) "The OSCE: Uniquely Qualified for a Conflict-Prevention Role" in Paul van Tongeren, Hans Van de Veen and Juliette Verhoven ed., *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p.19.

[263] Interview with Max Van der Stoel, former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 11, 2004, The Hague.

cohesion".[264] It was this danger of a disruption of social cohesion that led Van der Stoel to Estonia and while there was no actual violence, the situation was critical. He felt that two things needed to be done immediately: "calm the Russians down, and change the laws" on language and citizenship requirements.[265] His first trip as High Commissioner was to the Baltic states in January of 1993 and when he returned he produced a list of recommendations to decrease the level of ethnic tension in Estonia and Latvia (as discussed earlier Lithuania did not have many of the problems found in the other two Baltic States). In Estonia the central recommendation was "for the Estonian Government to show a clear intention to reduce the number of stateless persons through naturalization".[266]

The initial response to Van der Stoel's recommendations was not positive. Despite being well received in both countries, neither implemented any of the proposed changes. In June of 1993 the Estonian parliament passed the Law on Aliens which solidified the long term Russian residents of the country as non-citizens and the response in the Russian dominated North-East was a call for a general strike and later to call for greater autonomy. Van der Stoel returned to Estonia and was able to

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[264] Julie Bernier (2001) "Nationalism in Transition: Nationalizing Impulses and International Counterweights in Latvia and Estonia" in Michael Keating and John McGarry, ed. *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.343.

[265] Interview with Max Van der Stoel, 2004.

[266] Walter Kemp, ed. (2001) *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International Press), p.141.

persuade the parliament to add amendments to the legislation which placated the Russian population.[267] In order to reach this agreement the High Commissioner took the highly unusual step (and went against his own mandate which was designed for 'quiet diplomacy') of making a public statement. This statement told of an agreement he had reached with the Russian leaders in Narva that they would respect the ruling of the Estonian High Court on their rights on autonomy and with this agreement public, the Estonian government was willing to make their own concessions.[268]

In Latvia, while Van der Stoel was welcomed by the Russian minority, but there was less enthusiasm for him within the early Latvian governments.[269] Van der Stoel was often ridiculed in the Latvian press and in an unfortunate coincidence the Latvian word for chair is very similar to *Stoel* and many political cartoons and editorials centered on the theme of "we don't need any more chairs in Latvia".[270] Eventually the Latvian government became more accepting of his visits and less skeptical of his intentions.

Fueled by his success in encouraging amendments to the Law on Aliens in Estonia and the continuing threat to peace and stability in the region, Van der Stoel

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[267] Ibid. p.143

[268] Ibid, and Interview with Max Van der Stoel, 2004.

[269] Telephone interview with Anders Ronquist, Deputy Director General Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Former Advisor to High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993-1995, March 24 2004.

[270] Interview with Valdis Birkavs, Former Prime Minister of Latvia, March 15 2004, Riga.

made repeated trips to the two countries over the next few years. Over time the novelty of international attention began to wear off and the reality set in that there was still a great deal of work to be done. At this point the relationship between the states and the High Commissioner changed and Van der Stoel was put in the awkward position of being disliked and considered untrustworthy by both the majority and minority groups. The Estonians and Latvians saw him as an "agent of Moscow" and to the Russians he was not effective in bringing about the necessary changes quickly enough.[271] It is possible that the High Commissioner's effectiveness was in part due to this lack of support by both sides. While both sides claimed he was working for the other, they did have a common bond in their opinion of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner needed to reassure the Russian community that he was listening to their concerns and would bring violations of their rights to the attention of the government but he also needed to constantly remind both the Russians and the Latvians and Estonians that his position was the High Commissioner *on* National Minorities, not *for* National Minorities. This meant that he was not an ombudsman for all of the Russians' concerns and that he was interested in compromises and agreements.

As mentioned, in addition to the Office of the High Commissioner, the CSCE also had permanent missions on the ground in both countries. While the visits of Van der Stoel were high level meetings with the leaders of the two countries, the missions provided the day-to-day interactions with the rest of the population. While the

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[271] Interview with Max Van der Stoel, 2004.

Estonian and Latvian people did not see a difference in the mandates of the High

Commissioner and the missions there were important differences.[272] The missions did

not have to be involved in quiet diplomacy because they were dealing with both large

and small issues and were there to report back to the CSCE Secretariat on the

situation.[273] As Former Deputy Head of Mission in Estonia, Sabine Machl, notes the

missions played more of an ombudsmen role, where they tried to listen to complaints

from all groups. The High Commissioner was more effective in pinpointing specific

problems and providing recommendations at the government level.[274] The different

mandates between the two CSCE bodies at times caused confusion and may have

periodically limited the effectiveness of both, however, in general the High

Commissioner was able to use the missions as a neutral third- party in the country

that understood what each side wanted and were able to assist the High

Commissioner when he made his higher profile visits.[275] The other main function of

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[272] Telephone interview with Stephen Heidenhain, Rule of Law Expert at ODIHR, Warsaw, Mission Member/Legal Advisor Mission to Estonia 1999-2001, March 22, 2004.

[273] Interview with John Packer, Director- OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 19 2004, The Hague.

[274] Telephone interview with Sabine Machl, Senior Mission Program Officer- Central Asia Former Deputy Head of Mission- Estonia 1999-2001, March 23, 2004.

[275] Telephone interview with Neil Brennan, Former Deputy Head of Mission- OSCE Permanent Mission to Latvia, Mission Member- Estonia, Current Deputy Head of Mission- Moldova, March 23, 2004. This was also discussed in an interview with Isabelle Poupart, Senior Mission Program Office OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre Fenruary 25 2004, Vienna.

the permanent missions was to provide a reminder to the Estonian and Latvian people that the issues facing their countries were important and that the world would be watching. As then Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt noted in 1993: "The presence of CSCE officials makes it clear to the governments in Tallinn and Riga that these are issues that are taken seriously by the international community and reassures those in Russia who have a legitimate concern for the rights of their fellow countrymen abroad".[276] While the missions served as a reminder to the Russians that their concerns for their diaspora were important they also served another psychological function because the missions acted as security blanket for the Estonians and Latvians against Russia. Latvia and Estonia believed that with an international presence such as the OSCE on the ground, Russia would be unable or unwilling to act militarily against them.[277]

It was the influence of Russia that was of great concern to the OSCE and the Estonians and Latvians themselves in the early years of the High Commissioner's work. Early on Russia was active in its criticism of the laws enacted against Russian-speakers and this was of great concern since there were former Soviet, now Russian, troops still in the region until 1994. The Estonian Law on Aliens was particularly criticized by both Russian nationalists and the Russian government. Any complaint made by the Russia needed to be addressed in some arena due to its strong military presence but this concern never materialized into a direct threat because "Russian

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[276] Carl Bildt (1993) "The Baltic Litmus Test" *Foreign Affairs* Vol.75 No.5, p.81.

[277] Interview with Dr. Aija Priedite, 2004.

support for its diaspora was strictly confined to diplomatic and economic pressure".[278]

Russia used organizations such as the OSCE as a vehicle to express its outrage at

Estonian and Latvian policies. Russia also used economic boycotts as a way to punish

these states but it never resorted to or threatened the use of violence.

Vadim Poleshchuk notes that the work of the High Commissioner can be

broken down into four phases, with the first of these phases ending on August 31

1994, when the last Russian troops left the region.[279] After this departure, while the

views and opinions of the Russian government remained important, the immediate

concern for conflict was removed. After the troops left, for the most part Russia has

not interfered in the affairs of neither Estonia nor Latvia. As of today the influence of

the Russian government has declined so much that any statements made in regard to

the treatment of Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia is usually made for the

benefit of the Russian electorate and appears not to be directed to the Russian

speakers in the Baltic themselves.[280] While the audience for the message may have

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[278] Claus Neukirch (2002) "Russia and the OSCE: The Influence of Interested Third and Disinterested Fourth Parties on the Conflicts in Estonia and Moldova" in Pål Kolstø ed., National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), p.241.

[279] Vadim Poleshchuk (2001) *Advice Not Welcomed: Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner to Estonia and Latvia and the Response* (Hamburg: The Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace Research Press), p.18.

[280] This is the opinion of Eiženija Aldermane, Head of the Latvian Naturalisation Board, March 17 2004, Riga.

changed, the Russia does continue to speak out on the treatment of Russians in

Estonia and Latvia.[281]

The second period of influence by the High Commissioner was between 1994

and 1997.[282] During the majority of this time the OSCE was still the only large

international organization with a presence in the region. In 1996 the Council of

Europe opened its permanent missions but until that point all international influence

came from the OSCE permanent missions and the visits of the High Commissioner.

In 1994 the High Commissioner was very active in the region visiting both Estonia

and Latvia several times and his main issue of concern continued to be the citizenship

laws which were still very restrictive. Those who had been denied citizenship still

needed to wait a lengthy period and then had to pass a difficult language proficiency

test. During this time the rights of children born in the two countries to non-citizens

were also pressed.[283] At this point the countries were still less than five years

removed from the Soviet Union and still required assistance. The High

Commissioner, with the help of the permanent missions was therefore very successful

in influencing the wording of legislation that was passed into law and in many cases

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[281] See for example Statements by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE at the Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, May 29, 2003 and July 1, 2003 concerning the treatment of Russians in Estonia and Latvia. In the July 1, 2003 statement Russia expresses its hope that the Russian speaking community remains committed to non-violence so that "the tragic experience of Ulster, Kosovo and Macedonia will not be repeated in Latvia".

[282] Poleshchuk (2001), p.18.

[283] See Bart Driessen (1994) "Slav non-citizens in the Baltics" *International Journal on Group Rights*, Vol.2, No.2, pp.132-133 for descriptions of the various legislation.

the missions and High Commissioner's staff were active in actually writing the

legislation that was being discussed passed in the legislature.[284] During this time the

attention of the High Commissioner moved somewhat away from Estonia and more

towards Latvia. Early in the mandate it was the Estonian government that was more

active in passing legislation that angered the Russians (as seen with the Law on

Aliens).[285] After those initial fires were extinguished it became clear that the potential

for conflict was in Latvia where very little progress on the citizenship laws was taking

place. The Russians in Latvia were not organized politically until 1996 and therefore

the government did not have to address many of their issues. In this vacuum the High

Commissioner was left to fight the Russians' battles for them.[286] If not for the vast

amount of energy and political capital expended by the OSCE staff many of the early

changes to the citizenship and language laws would not have occurred.

By the end of this second phase the difficult negotiations on small technical

issues had caused both the Estonian and Latvian governments to suffer what Kemp

called 'Van der Stoel fatigue' and in Estonia the government "argued that as soon as

one issue was addressed, another one was raised and that Estonia was being singled

out for 'violations' that were significantly worse in other countries".[287] The High

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[284] Interview with Falk Lang, Senior Advisor to the High Commissioner (The Baltic States), February 20-21 2004, The Hague.

[285] Telephone interview with Anders Ronquist, 2004.

[286] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, Former Latvian Member of Parliament, Russian Activist, March 16 2004, Riga.

[287] Kemp ed., (2001), p.148.

Commissioner's mandate only allowed him to make recommendations; he did not have any influence to make a country do something it did not want to do and the result was that by 1997 the governments of Estonia and Latvia began to tune Van der Stoel out. He needed to find another way to increase his influence and he found it in the form of another international organization, the European Union.

The EU and the Baltic States

By the middle to late 1990's the Baltic states were at a point in their development when they 1) believed that they did not need the assistance of the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities and 2) were ready to move towards the rest of Europe by joining the European Union.[288] Any thoughts that they could accomplish both wishes evaporated quickly. Due to the history of the High Commissioner in the region he had become the leading authority on minority issues in the Baltic states as well as throughout Eastern Europe and as a result, other international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union turned to the High Commissioner for advice and recommendations.[289] When the various states in Eastern Europe (and Malta) petitioned to join the EU the existing members needed to determine what requirements needed to be met. As in past accession processes issues such as banking, economics, environmental concerns and farm subsidies were all included in the requirements. A new issue that this group of

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[288] This chapter focuses on the role of EU accession in modifying behavior. The Baltic States also were working towards NATO accessions as well during this time. The issues concerning NATO relate more to security matters and are not incorporated into this analysis.

[289] Interview with Falk Lang, 2004.

candidate countries was to be judged on was human rights, with a subsection on the treatment of minorities. As the process developed each country would receive a yearly 'Accession Report' that outlined what changes still needed to be made to meet EU requirements. As the ranking authority the recommendations of the High Commissioner, that up to this point were non-binding, now became part of the accession requirements. Instead of being in a situation where they could now ignore the advice of the High Commissioner, the Estonian and Latvian governments were required to meet the standards that he set out, or risk being shut out of the European Union. The 1999 EU Accession report for Latvia is a clear example of the EU deferring to the High Commissioner and the OSCE in addressing minority rights. Despite the High Commissioner's best efforts and attempts at persuasion, the citizenship laws were still not in compliance with his recommendations. The tests to gain citizenship were deemed too difficult but the Latvian government was unwilling to compromise further until the following section appeared in the 1999 Accession report: "A last issue to be addressed in this context, concerns a further simplification of the citizenship test on Latvian history, and the constitution in accordance with the recommendations made by the OSCE".[290] The Latvians now faced the possibility of being denied access to the European Union and the economic and security stability that went with membership if they did not change their laws to comply with the High

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[290] *1999 European Union Accession Progress Report- Latvia* found on the European Union website, www.europa.org. Also see Michael Johns (2003) "Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights", *East European Politics and Societies* Vol.17 No.4, pp.682-699.

Commissioner's recommendations. The Estonian government faced similar choices in their report.[291]

The pull of joining the EU has shaped politics in Estonia and Latvia since the accession reports began and these reports and the visits by the High Commissioner put these governments in very difficult positions, particularly in Latvia. Due to the complex coalition governments in Latvia the President and Prime Minister could not always be seen as complying with these international organizations. There is a segment of Latvian society, usually supporters of the right-wing For Fatherland and Freedom Party, who do not trust outsiders and believe that Europe cannot or will not understand Latvia's history which drives their current actions.[292] As a way of trying to look independent to the Latvian people while complying with these imposed international standards the usual tactic used by the government was to refuse to act until the last possible moment and then pass the law as mandated.[293]

In Estonia the government was more transparent with the population almost to its own detriment. When a recommendation would come from the EU (as a result of the High Commissioner) the Estonian government would change the targeted law and say that this was necessary to get into the EU. The former Minister of Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs, Katrin Saks, believes this had a negative impact on

[291] *1999 European Union Accession Progress Report- Estonia* found on the EU website.

[292] Interview with Reinis Āboltiņš, Director of the Society Integration Department- Former Advisor to the President, March 18 2004, Riga.

[293] Interview with John Packer, 2004.

Estonians' view of the European Union and contends that Estonian society was moving in the direction of integration anyway and would have supported laws to give citizenship to children for example, but by saying the government had to do this caused resentment.[294] Saks' contention that by being seen as complying too quickly to EU demands has had an negative impact on Estonians' view of the EU is substantiated by public opinion polls in 2000. The *New Baltic Barometer IV* study asked respondents if they were in favor of their country joining the European Union. 48% of ethnic Latvians responded they were either strongly or somewhat in favor of Latvia joining EU. Approximately the same percentage (45%) of Russian-speaking Latvians strongly or somewhat agreed. In Estonia while 49% strongly or somewhat agreed, only 9% fell into the strongly agreed category (compared to 13% of Latvians and 15% of Russians in Latvia). Estonian Russians responded 64% in favor of joining EU with 23% responding that they were strongly in favor. Clearly the Russians in Estonia saw the benefits of EU involvement in their lives more strongly compared to their Estonian counterparts. Table 6.1 illustrates all of the results.

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[294] Interview with Katrin Saks, Estonian Member of Parliament and Former Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs (1999-2002), March 11 2004, Tallinn.

Table 5.1 Public Opinion on joining the European Union in 2000[295]

Question: *What do you think of the idea of this country joining the European Union?*

	Estonians in Estonia %	Russians in Estonia %	Latvians in Latvia %	Russians in Latvia %
Strongly in favor	9	23	13	15
Somewhat in favor	40	41	35	30
Somewhat Opposed	24	14	19	15
Strongly Opposed	15	9	14	16
Difficult to Say	13	13	20	25

Future Impact of the OSCE and the EU

While the OSCE and the EU had a profound impact on Latvian and Estonian society during the chaotic years immediately after independence and then when EU accession was a priority, what happens now? It is not clear what future impact international organizations will have in the region. The current OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Rolf Ekeus believes that there still will be a role for his organization. He contends that now that the Baltic states have been accepted into the EU and eventually NATO they can be secure in their place in Europe and will be more open to concessions and also believes that his office will be able to assist in the integration process through the securing of fund and the providing

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[295] Adapted from Richard Rose (2000) *New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press), p. 32.

of expertise.[296] Others disagree with this assessment. Many in both countries believe that after being accepted by EU the concessions should stop and the High Commissioner has no place interfering in their internal affairs. The current Estonian Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs, Paul-Eerik Rummo, believes that the High Commissioner should not come back and that any work with minorities should be left to the European Union once Estonia is a full member.[297] His counterpart in Latvia, the Minister of Social Integration Nils Muižnieks believes that without the ability to hold the European Union over the heads of countries the leverage of the High Commissioner position may be crumbling and as with Rummo believes that the EU can handle any issues on integration.[298] Even some in the Russian community accept that the time of influence by the High Commissioner may have passed. Vadim Poleshchuk believes that while his recommendations were often circumvented in Estonia by other restrictive laws being passed to replace those changed through the High Commissioners influence, the Russian community still saw the High Commissioner as a voice of reason. This voice he contends will not be listened to in a European Union dominated continent. He contends that "the time of the OSCE and

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[296] Interview with Rolf Ekeus, 2004.

[297] Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn.

[298] Interview with Nils Muižnieks- Minister for Social Integration, March 17 2004, Riga.

Council of Europe is over".[299] In Latvia the opinion is similar. It may be that the job

description of the High Commissioner has changed too much and his influence in

Latvian society so diminished that his demands for change will fall on deaf ears once

EU membership is gained.[300]

If it is true that the OSCE will no longer be effective in influencing the

behavior of Latvia and Estonia, will the EU be capable of it? There are some serious

questions concerning the European Union's interest and capabilities to influence

minority issues in member states. Some in the region have noted that there are similar

minority issues present in other member states and the EU has not tried to influence

them. This was an issue when the High Commissioner was making his

recommendations during the 1990's and also during the accession process. In

response to a recommendation by the High Commissioner in 1997 the then Estonian

Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomas Ilves wrote that the Estonian laws were similar to

those in other current EU and Council of Europe members so it "can therefore not be

argued that Estonian legislation in the present formulation is at variance with

international practice or with practice in Council of Europe states".[301] Katrin Saks

also notes that the size of the minority group in question should not matter in the rest

of Europe. If Estonia is monitored then all other states should also be monitored as

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[299] Poleshchuk (2001) and Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal
Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

[300] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004.

[301] Letter by Tomas Ilves to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 4
June 1997 found on the OSCE website, www.osce.org.

well.[302] The European Union as it is currently mandated does not have an organizational body capable of dealing with minority issues. This is problematic due to the emphasis placed on EU membership by the Latvians and the Estonians and this becomes even more problematic because as the Russian speakers have seen the High Commissioner lose influence in the region they "have big expectations for the EU and could be very disappointed".[303]

The European Union will need to address one common issue in both Estonia and Latvia and an additional issue in Latvia once the accession process is complete. In both countries a determination on the status of the non-citizens needs to be devised. If they are not citizens of Estonia or Latvia but they live within the EU region, what rights do they have and what are they called? The Estonian and Latvian governments contend that they will be "third-party nationals" within the EU and have the same rights as third-party nationals elsewhere. The non-citizens argue that this is impossible because there is no 'third-party' for them to be nationals of. If they have lived in the region their entire life then Russia or the other areas of the former Soviet Union is not their country of origin. In effect they will be stateless people and the EU is not prepared to deal with such a large, well established population of stateless people. They are not refugees yet they are not citizens. In Latvia the problem is worse due to the citizenships laws as written, prevent non-citizens from voting in local elections. Many argue this is an unnecessary law as the Russians pay taxes but are

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[302] Interview with Katrin Saks, 2004. Also see Johns (2003).

[303] Telephone interview with Stephen Heidenhain, 2004.

denied the right to vote. Moreover, the issues decided upon at the local level do not concern national security therefore the Russians could not have an influence on matters of true national importance.[304] EU law states that citizens of EU states have the right to vote in all local elections within the EU as long as they meet the residency requirements. This means that a citizen of France who has lived in Latvia for a long enough period of time will be able to vote in the local elections but a Russian speaker who has lived their entire life in Latvia but has yet to meet the citizenship requirements will not be permitted to vote. If the EU does not work to find an acceptable resolution to this double standard quickly the Russian-speakers may lose faith quickly in the organization.

Corsica and the Basque Country- Left out in the cold

The Lack of International Attention

The majority of the chapter has been dedicated to the influence of international community in the Baltic states. The reason for this is simple; there has been little or no attention by these organizations in either Corsica or the Basque region in Europe. In Eastern Europe minority issues have been tied to the democratization process. John Loughlin describes the network of organizations (the OSCE, Council of Europe, European Union, etc.) as having acted as "a midwife to democracy".[305] This has allowed for international influence on minority issues in the

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[304] Interview with John Packer, 2004.

[305] Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies- Cardiff University, February 19 2004.

east. In Western Europe without the democratization process as a framework international organizations have made less of an impact.

As early members of the European Union, neither France nor Spain were asked to make any changes to their laws concerning minorities in order to gain membership. The European Union currently does not have any institutional body with authority over minority issues. There is a court that handles cases involving Human Rights, but discrimination within states involving citizens or non-citizens does not fall under its jurisdiction. The EU's first attempt at any form of influence on minority issues was the most recent round of accession reports. Prior to the potential entrance of states from Eastern Europe, the EU had refrained from discussing minority rights. Therefore, any changes that could be recommended by an international organization such as the EU or the OSCE do not have the same potential threat behind it. Any changes made by the two states have had to come from inside and both France and Spain have rejected any calls for international assistance or mediation. In Spain for example both the United States based Carter Center and an Irish peace organization have offered to provide their expertise but have been continually refused.[306] It should be noted that many of these attempts by outsiders have been rejected by the Basques as well. Unlike the Catholics in Northern Ireland there is not a large Basque diaspora from which to draw international support. Due to the association of the Basque conflict with the ETA and the resulting violence, the Basques have little sympathy

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[306] Interview with Francisco Martinez Montes, Counselor to the Spanish delegation, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 24 2004, Vienna.

throughout the world and have become somewhat isolated. As a result, any Basques separatists are leery of the international community.[307]

Like the Russians in Estonia and Latvia the Basques do place hope in the European Union as a possible way to break the current stalemate between themselves and the Spanish state. The Basques (and now following their lead the Catalans and other regional groups within Spain) have a permanent mission to the EU where they observe and comment on the EU activities. While Spain's membership in the EU has not paid any dividends for the Basques to this point and that there is nothing currently the EU will be able to do for them, there is still a sense that the new European constitution may provide the mechanisms to increase their autonomy.[308] The EU may be the only forum eventually capable of dealing with the Basque issue not because of the Basques who are seeking more autonomy (e.g. the Basque delegation to the EU) but due to the demands of the separatists in Batasuna and the ETA. While the autonomists are looking for a solution to the problem in Spain, the separatists do not make the distinction between the French and Spanish sides of the border because they believe the Basque problem is an international one involving the Basques, the French

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[307] Telephone interview with Prof. Santiago Petschen, Professor of Political and Sociological Sciences, Universidad Complutense Madrid, February 17 2004.

[308] Interview with Ibon Mendibelzva, Adviser- Press Services, Basque Country Delegation to the European Union, February 10 2004, Brussels.

and the Spanish. If the violence continues it will be a 'European problem' and will need to be addressed by Europeans.[309]

Despite this hope the Basques have a negative view towards the EU. This is counter to the amount of support the EU enjoys in Spain generally and among non-Basques in the Basque region. Table 6.2 is telling in it shows respondents from the Basque region's satisfaction with the European Union by party preference. Those who support either the conservative Popular Party (PP) or the Socialist Party (PSE-EE) have a much higher opinion of the European Union compared to those who support the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) or particularly Batasuna. PP and PSE-EE supporters tend to be either non-Basques living in the region or those who have no interest in Basque autonomy or separation. EAJ-PNV supporters favor an increase in the rights of the Basque people *within* Spain while the supporters of Batasuna support a separate Basque country comprised of all seven Basque provinces in Spain and France. It is also interesting to note the large number of respondents from all political parties who do not know what to think of the European government.

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[309] Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5 2004, Bilbao.

Table 5.2 Satisfaction in the Basque Country with the European Union by Party Preference- May 2002[310]

Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the European Government?

	PP Supporter (%)	PSE-EE Supporter (%)	EAJ-PNV Supporter (%)	Batasuna Supporter (%)
Satisfied	63	48	27	17
Dissatisfied	12	25	38	60
Doesn't Know/Doesn't Answer	25	28	35	23

The split between Basques and non-Basques is confirmed in Table 5.3 which breaks the same question down by how the respondents identify themselves: Mostly Basque, both Basque and Spanish, or Mostly Spanish. What these results confirm is the opinion of the former Batasuna Member of Parliament Esther Agirre that the majority of Basques follow closely what the European Union has been up to, but are either feeling ignored and dissatisfied or have reserved the right to pass judgment at a later time. If after the constitution is ratified the EU continues to ignore the Basque situation then more of the undecided will move to the dissatisfied column. Most Basque autonomists and separatists are of the belief, however, that now that the EU has made changes in Eastern Europe there will be more attention placed on the minority issues of Western Europe.[311]

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[310] Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government's Office (2002) *Basque Sociometer 19*, Basque government website http://www.euskadi.net/estudios_sociologicos, p.31.

Table 5.3 Satisfaction with the European Union on Spanish-Basque Axis- May 2002[312]

Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the European Government?

	Predominantly Basque (%)	Both Basque and Spanish (%)	Predominantly Spanish (%)
Satisfied	25	45	55
Dissatisfied	44	21	15
Doesn't Know/Doesn't Answer	31	34	30

The Corsicans find themselves in a very similar position as the Basques. The French government has made it very clear that the relationship between itself and the Corsicans is an internal matter. France is willing to allow international organizations (such as the OSCE) to come to the island and monitor elections and referendums to ensure they are fair, but it will not allow for any outside mediation or interference.[313] The President of North Corsica, Paul Giacobbi explains the French government's position on the possibility of international assistance to solve the Corsica problem as: "If 200 countries do something one way France would assume that the 200 were wrong and it was right".[314] Despite not having a permanent mission as the Basques,

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[311] Interview with Esther Agirre, 2004.

[312] Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government's Office (2002).

[313] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE, February 25 2004, Vienna.

[314] Telephone interview with interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), March 24 2004.

the Corsicans have had a little more success in using the EU. The EU has helped

shape the Corsican conflict and it is now seen as a struggle over sovereignty. As the

EU increases its 'federalization' of Europe there are opportunities for 'positive sum'

negotiations. Prior to this the conflict was shaped in win-loss terms. There has also

been an opportunity for Corsica to work with the other Mediterranean islands on

issues inside the EU.[315] It has been argued that the European Union's Peace programs

designed for conflicts elsewhere in Europe could be a model for Corsica but that

would require France's capitulation, which is unlikely.[316]

A Future Role for International Organizations in Corsica and Spain?

Clearly at this point the international community has been unable to have an

influence on the Corsica and Basque conflicts. Many involved in the politics of

resolving these conflicts believe that some form of international influence would be

very helpful if not decisive. Paul Giacobbi believes that the influence of an

international organization would help prove to the French people that devolution

would not end the Republic.[317] In the Basque country there are organizations such as

Elkarri, who are trying to raise awareness on the Basque question and are looking for

international assistance in ending the conflict. The hope behind this effort is that it

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[315] Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, 2004. Also see Francesco Letamendia and John Loughlin (2000) "Peace in the Basque Country and Corsica?" in Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona Stephen ed., *A Farewell to Arms?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

[316] Ibid.

[317] Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, 2004.

would not only present possible solutions for the conflict but it could put subtle

pressure on the both the Spanish government and the Basque terrorists to resolve the

problem since the world is watching.[318]

One institution that may play a role in the future could be the OSCE High

Commissioner on National Minorities. Currently, the mandate for the position

prevents the Commissioner from intervening in areas where terrorism is occurring

and thus prevents visits to Corsica and the Basque region. There is some reason for

optimism that this could change as there have been discussions within the OSCE on

changing the mandate to allow for intervention in these regions.[319] While the High

Commissioner admits that some of the tools that were effective in Eastern Europe

would not work in the west there is a growing belief that due to the radical changes

forced upon the incoming EU members "it is time for everyone to live up to the

standards".[320] In a sign of the changing view of conflicts in the west the High

Commissioner in a speech on November 5, 2003 (at an event celebrating the success

of the Copenhagen criteria on minority rights no less) warned: "the standards on

which the Copenhagen criteria are based should be universally applicable within and

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[318] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director and Spokesperson Elkarri, February 4 2004,
Bilbao.

[319] Internal OSCE memo, July 1, 2003. Former High Commissioner Max Van der Stoel believes that the mandate should not be changed because if the mandate is open for changes it could also be changed in other negative ways making the position redundant or powerless. Interview with Max Van der Stoel, 2004.

[320] Interview with Rolf Ekeus, 2004.

throughout the EU, in which case they should be equally- and consistently- applied to all member states".[321] It is unclear if the mandate will be changed to allow the High Commissioner to go to Corsica or the Basque country as well it is also unknown if he could have any influence if he were allowed to go.[322] As the High Commissioner's Legal Advisor on the Baltics Zdenka Machnyikova notes, he may have been too successful in places such as the Baltics in changing legislation. Now other states are leery of his intervention in their affairs.[323]

As for the European Union, there is hope by some that it could become an important player in both the Basque and Corsican conflict. As Espiau notes in reference to the Basque conflict: "The Basque case *is* a European problem. The priority of the citizens of this part of Europe is pacification and normalization".[324] Only time will tell how the EU and the OSCE begin to address these issues if at all. It is clear, however, that many people in both regions expect the EU to become involved and will hold it accountable once it does.

Conclusion

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[321] Speech available on the OSCE website.

[322] Petschen believes that the High Commissioner would not be allowed into Spain even with a change in the mandate, but he would not have an influence if he came, as no one would meet with him. Telephone Interview with Prof. Santiago Petschen, 2004.

[323] Interview with Zdenka Machnyikova, Legal Advisor OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities for the Baltics, March 23 2004, The Hague.

[324] Gorka Espiau (2002) "Spain and the Basque Conflict: Still Looking for a Way Out" in Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven ed., *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing), p. 152.

The influence of international organizations, particularly the OSCE and the European Union cannot be overstated in Estonia and Latvia. The OSCE alone earlier and then with the influence of the EU behind it was able to accomplish many things. It was able to prevent outright violence during the turbulent period after independence when the society was turned on its head and the Russian army was still on the ground. It was able to convince the Estonian and Latvian governments that they needed to make changes to their minority laws and that they had a responsibility to take care of their Russian speaking minorities. They also acted as protective shell for the fledgling countries to make the necessary changes at an acceptable pace without fear that Russia would strike against them. The Russian speaking community was ill-prepared to organize itself in the early 1990's and came to view the OSCE (and later the EU) as negotiators on its behalf. By staying quiet and particularly non-violent they knew that the Estonian and Latvian governments would be induced to make changes in their favor and while at times suspicious of these organizations, they came to rely on them and chose how they would act against the government accordingly. As Latvia and Estonia edge closer to EU accession Russians have grown to see the EU as not only their means to greater rights, but also as their escape valve in case the changes that were made to join EU were not permanent. While the Estonians and Latvians want to protect their own culture and language demographically they need the Russian speakers to stay.[325] Russians have used this threat of peaceful migration, as opposed to violent protests, to gain more influence.

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[325] Interview with Valdis Birkavs, 2004.

The Corsicans and Basques have been left to their own devices by the international community. Organizations such as the EU and OSCE have been unable or unwilling to interfere with established EU members. Due to the violence associated with the two conflicts a vicious circle develops: France and Spain appeal for sympathy to the international community in their fight against terrorism and the Corsicans and the Basques become even more isolated and the response by nationalist groups such as the ETA and the FLNC become more radical and they employ more violent tactics to gain awareness for their cause and to try to force a settlement. Without a change in this cycle there can be no end to the two conflicts and the violence that results. While direct international influence acted to prevent violence in the Baltic states it can be argued that the lack of intervention is both a cause and a result of violence in Corsica and the Basque country. The European Union has seen the impact their influence can have. It will be up to the member states to acknowledge that there are problems outside of Eastern Europe and for them to have the courage to try to influence the established Western European members to the same degree as the incoming members.

Chapter 6- The Role of Culture

Of all the possible explanations for the minority groups' activities discussed, the role of culture is the most challenging. It is difficult to discuss the prevailing culture of a group, let alone make predictions on the activities of a group based on this culture. While it is difficult, it is necessary. When two groups have very different cultures they are unable to understand the actions of each other and there is no starting point for discussion, no room for compromise, no way of seeing eye-to-eye. As Cornell and Hartmann note:

> Human beings live not only in the midst of
> material relationships and sets of opportunities-
> political, economic, social- but also in the midst
> of ideas and understandings. The social world is
> an interpreted world, as much conceptual as it is
> concrete. Interpretations, ideas, and understandings
> are part of culture, and culture is an identity
> construction site of uncommon importance.[326]

What differentiates one group from another is not necessarily the language it speaks or the religion it practices, it is its culture. A culture develops over time based on the specific history faced by the group. If one group has only known war and violence their culture will develop to expect violence but conversely a group never exposed to violence may look for other avenues to prevent conflict. Moreover, the prevailing culture of a group can change over time due to a change in its situation. A peaceful group may become more militant over time depending on their treatment by the state. This occurs when the group's perception of what is right and wrong, proper and

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[326] Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann (1998) *Ethnicity and Race* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press), p.173.

improper changes. This occurs "first in our heads and then in our practices".[327] In short "[c]ulture is sense-making".[328]

What will become apparent is that all of the groups discussed in this study see their specific culture as being a key, if not the main causal factor in predicting why the group acts the way it does. This chapter will demonstrate how different cultures are more or less accepting of violence as means to an end. While the majority of a group may not advocate the use of violence, if the culture of the group allows it, violence can occur. If the culture of a group is to reject the use of violence in all aspects of society, then no matter how angry the group may be at the state, violence will not be considered as an option by any but marginal members of the group. This chapter will examine the culture of each of the groups and provide an explanation about how the group's culture has influenced its relations with the state.

The Corsican identity- An island onto itself

Paul Theroux may best describe Corsica when he says that "it is a French province in name only. Corsica is Corsica".[329] While much of the island has been incorporated with the mainland in terms of economics, education and government, the culture of the Corsicans has never changed. It is still an island that works by its own rules, has its own unique customs and has a culture unlike anything seen in the rest of France. It is this clash of cultures that have led to many of the problems on the island.

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[327] Ibid, p.174.

[328] Ibid.

[329] Paul Theroux (1995) *The Pillars of Hercules* (New York: Fawcett Columbine), p. 135.

The French government appears to not fully appreciate the differences in culture between Corsicans and the mainland and are therefore unable to predict how they will react to proposed changes to Corsican society. The Corsicans have refused to alter their culture to be more in line with not only the rest of France but also the rest of Europe.

One cultural difference between Corsica and the rest of France is the role of traditional clans in the day to day business of the island. These clans, the powerful historical families, wield enormous influence on politics and business. Throughout recent Corsican history the same surnames appear over and over in various government posts and segments of the economy. Each clan remains in power due to the loyalty it demands of those within it. This clan system dates back to the 1880's and is similar to other clan systems found throughout Italy. The clan is "the political superstructure of a cultural infrastructure articulated on a base of family and traditional values".[330] The various clans have historically worked not for the betterment of all Corsicans, rather they have used their power to maintain their clan's stature in the community at the expense of all others. This has lead to competition and electoral fraud politically and the hoarding of resources economically. Many blame some of the economic problems faced by the island (as discussed previously) on the in-fighting and the corruption of the clans. As Jaffe notes the clan use "the culturally valued idiom of kinship to disguise the fact that it does not act on behalf of the

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[330] Alexandra Jaffe (1999) *Ideologies in Action: Language Politics in Corsica* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter Press), p.49.

collectivity, and undermines the already limited potential for collective, solidary behavior".[331]

One of the main consequences of the continuation of the clan system is the acceptance of violence on the island because the clans have been in competition with one another for so long rivalries have developed and over time these rivalries have taken on a violent component. This violence is now seen in business relationships, the prevalence of organized crime on the island and it can be argued in the political arena as well. Quite simply, violence is more accepted in Corsica than in other areas of both France and the rest of Europe. Paul Giacobbi believes that the Corsicans see themselves as a 'mountain people' who are more open to the use of violence within the society. He claims that there is a "tradition of violence" in Corsica that is different than other places.[332] Giacobbi goes further to say that violence is such a common part of Corsican society that when there is an apparent nationalistic terrorist attack it is actually difficult to determine if that attack is for political, economic or personal reasons. By way of example, in July 2003 there were approximately fifty separate bombings in Corsica. Of those, about twenty were directly linked to the FLNC or one of its splinter groups with the rest of the bombings occurring as a result of other non-political disagreements.[333] Violence is a part of doing business on the island. For example, if there are two businessmen who are in competition, Giacobbi contends

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[331] Ibid, p.51.

[332] Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), March 24 2004.

[333] Ibid.

that the prevailing culture of the island allows for the one who is less successful

economically to try to remove the competition by vandalizing the competition. There

is less shame in using violence to succeed than there is in failing in a business.[334]

      Loughlin concurs with Giacobbi's assessment of the Corsican culture. He

believes that the need to maintain honor is the most important characteristic of

Corsican society. The use of violence, particularly the types of violence usually

associated with the terrorist activities of the FLNC and others (bombings, arson, etc.)

are not major violations of the codes of the society.[335] Loughlin also ties this type of

activity to the traditional Corsican society based on the clans for this acceptance of

violence. The competition between the clans has led to the constant need for

retribution by one clan against another. When one clan has been wronged, there is a

loss of honor, which is unacceptable and therefore the clans honor needs to be

regained. This has led to a 'vendetta culture' where one violent act is met with

another and this becomes all the society knows as acceptable behavior.[336] This is

why, for Laughlin, the main nationalist political groups have refrained from

condemning the terrorist attacks. While they may not support them directly and may

wish to find a political solution to the nationalist problem, they do not necessarily see

what the terrorists are doing as not normal. There is no stigma attached to using

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[334] Ibid.

[335] Telephone interview with with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies-Cardiff University, February 19 2004.

[336] Ibid.

violence, so there is no need to condemn such activity because in Corsican society using violence is as normal as negotiating with the state.[337]

The difference in culture between the Corsicans and the rest of the French can be seen in the term *maquis*. During the Second World War the French resistance was know as the maquis and to this day the term refers to a struggle against Nazism. The term means something completely different in Corsica. The maquis refers to those who operate outside of the law. Maquis are similar to Robin Hood in that their actions are criminal but to the people they are considered heroes.[338] Jaffe sees this embracing of criminal activity as a way the Corsicans have dealt with the constant foreign interference on the island. This culture "nourishes a rejection of external authority, and discourages people from recognizing any central authoritative state structure as legitimate".[339] It is based historically on the idea of Corsican pirates who existed during the times of the Genoan occupation. This ancient conception has been updated in modern times, but the idea of embracing those who live outside the law remains. Therefore the Corsican hero has become a person who above all rejects authority and remains true to their Corsican roots. They are seen as "bandits of honor".[340]

The other aspect of culture that needs to be addressed is the French culture and how it impacts its relationship with Corsica. French nationalism is based on the

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[337] Ibid.

[338] Ibid.

[339] Jaffe (1999), p.44.

[340] Ibid.

idea that there are no historical minorities within France. Everyone who embraces the French ideal is French and French nationalism therefore, is ill-prepared to deal with a region that considers itself unique. This culture of 'oneness' has manifested itself into the very strong unitary state.[341] The French government and by extension the French people have been unwilling to work with Corsica and have rushed to judgment on it because their culture cannot tolerate internal division.[342] While it has tried to make improvements recently this clash of cultures has existed for over 200 years and this has lead to growing frustration on both sides. As Jaffe notes the constant misunderstandings between the rest of France and Corsica has led to negative stereotypes against the Corsicans and has led the Corsicans to embrace their own unique culture. A 1989 Le Monde article describes Corsica as "an intolerable island-you forget it for a few months, 55 million people are not by its bedside, and it spikes a fever".[343] Faced with such statements it is not surprising that the reaction of the Corsicans would be "heroic or good-for-nothing, with a slothful or aristocratic soul, bandit or man of law, the Corsican has never succeeded in finding his just place on

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[341] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE, February 25 2004 Vienna. While de Touchet admits that the unitary state and the nature of French nationalism contributes to the problem, he contends that Corsica is more of a "pain than a conflict". Possibly illustrating the idea of a clash of cultures, de Touchet believes that it is the closed nature of Corsican culture that is the main cause of the problems, not the actions of the French government.

[342] Telephone interview with Giacobbi 2004.

[343] Quoted in Jaffe (1999), p.45. Originally published in French in *Le Monde* on March 19, 1989.

the continent".[344] The Corsican culture stresses the need to bind together to protect

traditions and if necessary to embrace violence as a way of achieving goals while the

French culture cannot accept another culture living within its territory. It should not

be surprising therefore that violence has not only occurred but why it has remained

such a large aspect of the conflict between the Corsicans and the French.

The Russians in the Baltic- A learned culture of non-violence and apathy

If the Corsicans represent a culture that not only accepts violence, but also at

times embraces unlawfulness, the Russian community in Estonia and Latvia would

represent the complete opposite. The culture of the Russians in the Baltic states has

been influenced by both the prevailing Russian and Soviet culture and the Baltic

culture in which they have been immersed. The result is a people who lack the

organization to carry out violent acts and even if they could organize to such a degree,

would not consider violence as an option.

The Legacy of Soviet Nationalism

The Russians in Estonia and Latvia as previously stated can be divided into

two broad categories: those who arrived prior to the Soviet annexation, and those who

came afterwards.[345] There is agreement by scholars on the region that the two

categories have different cultures but there is no agreement on what those cultures

are. There are some who argue that the Russians who came during the Soviet period,

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[344] Ibid. The quote is originally by Culioli and is translated from French by Jaffe.

[345] In the interest of space, this chapter will concentrate on the ethnic Russians of the Russian-speaking population. As discusses previously there are many Russian-speakers of Ukrainian and Belarusian decent. The majority are ethnic Russians and therefore will be discussed here in relation to their unique position in Soviet society.

like those who came before, have become completely 'Balticized' due to their everyday proximity with the Estonians and Latvians. Others claim that the Russians who came during Soviet times were influenced by Soviet culture.[346] This is due to the fact that those who came from Russia during the Soviet period came mainly for the economic advantages available in the region. They were able to move freely throughout the Soviet Union due to their advantaged position within the Soviet system. Not only were they the largest ethnic group in the country, they were also the dominant group linguistically, culturally and politically. They were able to find the region that best served their needs and were able to move their with the knowledge that everyone would speak Russian, their children would be able to learn in Russian and more than likely all of the important political figures would be of Russian descent. They also would have been influenced by their interactions (and those of the parents and grand-parents) with the Soviet government's policies on nationalities. It will be argued in this chapter that the Russian-speakers who came during the Soviet period's culture are heavily influenced by both of these factors: the Soviet system and their interactions with Baltic culture. To understand the Soviet influence it is necessary to look back to the nationality policies of the Soviet Union and the unique place the Russian nationality had in this system.[347]

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[346] See Triin Vihalemm and Anu Masso (2003) "Identity Dynamics of Russian-speakers of Estonia in the Transition Period" *Journal of Baltic Studies* Vol.34 No.1, pp.92-116, for their analysis of the competing arguments of Russian-Speakers cultural identification.

[347] For a full discussion of the development of Russian nationalism see Vera Tolz (2001) *Russia* (London: Arnold Publishing).

Nationalism in the Soviet Union

From the earliest days of the Soviet Union its leaders grappled with the nationalities problem. The problem was simple: the Soviet Union was comprised of numerous nationalities, each with its own unique culture, many with its own language. As Slezkine notes: "Lenin's acceptance of the reality of nations and 'national rights' was one of the most uncompromising positions he ever took".[348] To enact the necessary radical economic changes to the society the state needed the co-operation of the various ethnic groups within its border and of all ways of classifying people outside of economics, nationality was the only one that received special attention by the state. Both Lenin and later Stalin divided the various nationalities of the Soviet Union into classes. There were the great, progressive nations, such as the Russians and the Ukrainians, and there were backward nations such as the Tatars. In order to create the socialist society it was necessary to promote the language and culture of the backward societies and through these policies it was hoped that the local intellectuals would be better able to spread the anti-bourgeoisie message and inform the proletariat of what needed to be done. This strategy of appealing to the intellectuals within the titular nationality has been repeated as "every communist regime throughout its history has attempted to gain the loyalty of the intellectuals through a variety of means, be it terror, coercion or co-optation".[349] Co-option came

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[348] Yuri Slezkine (1994) "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism" *Slavic Review* Vol.53 No.2, p.414.

[349] Yitzhak M. Brundy (1998) *Reinventing Russia* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press), p.15.

to be seen by the Soviet government as the most effective way to solve the nationalities question.

While the early Soviet policy on nationality was to try to promote the development and maintenance of the 'backward nations' it also wanted to suppress any form of Russian nationalism. Lenin saw that "the essence of the national problem in Russia was the development of a core-periphery colonial relationship between the Russians on the one hand, and the non-Russians and their homelands on the other".[350] As a result he felt that "Great Russian chauvinism was treated as the state's greatest problem".[351] By 1923 Slezkine argues that the term Russian as a nationality within the Soviet Union "was a politically empty category unless it referred to the source of great-power chauvinism . . . or to the history of relentless imperialist oppression".[352]

By the late 1930's and the beginning of the Second World War (the point where Estonia and Latvia were annexed by the Soviet Union) Russian nationalism was in the beginning of transition and while the Russians were denied the same rights as other nationalities[353], they were becoming more associated with the pan-Soviet nationality. Russian was at least one of the official languages throughout the union, and Cyrillic replaced the Latin alphabet in official documents and in the education

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[350] Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser (1996) *Russians as the New Minority* (Boulder: Westview Press), p.25.

[351] Ibid.

[352] Slezkine (1994), p.435.

[353] For example, there was not a Russian communist party, nor was there a Russian national academy which existed in all of the other nationality based republics.

system. Due to this emphasis on aspects of Russian society, the Russians became an

advantaged segment of Soviet society despite their lack of a specific and unique

national identity and the Russians who left Russia proper for other republics (such as

Latvia and Estonia) could have all of the advantages without the need to organize

around their nationality.

It can be argued that today the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia still

lack the nationalist identity necessary to organize.[354] Their culture became linked to

that of the Soviet Union. Falk Lang, the Senior Advisor on the Baltic states to the

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities describes the Russians who moved

to the Baltic states as the prime example of *homo-Sovieticus*. Without the Soviet

Union they had nothing to base their culture around[355] and with it gone they are

unable to see themselves as Russian because for the past 80 years they have not done

so. Without the ability to organize they have been unable to act.[356] They represent the

clearest example of what Ken Jowitt sees as a consequence of the Soviet period. For

them the political realm was "something dangerous, something to avoid. Political

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[354] Boris Tsilevich, a Russian activist and former Member of Parliament in Latvia notes that the Russian community in Latvia has never looked to nationalism as an option. He believes that they have had to rely on more pragmatic issues on which to rally around. Interview in Riga, March 16 2004.

[355] Interview with Interview with Falk Lang, Senior Advisor to the High Commissioner (The Baltics), The Hague, February 20-21 2004.

[356] Reinis Āboltiņš Director of the Society Integration Department- Former Advisor to the President, March 18, 2004, Riga.

involvement meant trouble".[357] A Russian activist in Estonia describes the Russian community as "like a crowd" unable to mobilize.[358] In this regard it is not that the Russian culture is non-violent, it is merely incapable of rallying the nation due to the Soviet history which forced it to the background and made Russians suspicious of political mobilization.

One aspect of Russian culture that has survived in Russia and may be influencing the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia is its view of sacrifice. There is a sense of fatalism within Russian culture and a view that life at times is difficult. It is a belief held by Solzhenitsyn and others that "it is the suffering of the Russian people that is the essence of their identity. It is through this suffering that the Russian people have advanced to a higher level of humanity".[359] This has allowed Russia (and by extension during its existence, the Soviet Union) to survive famine, war and terrible economic conditions and this has led to a belief that security is the most important aspect of life. As long as one is secure everything else is tolerable.[360] This may also explain the lack of action by the Russian-speakers. As discussed earlier the

[357] Ken Jowitt (1992) *New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p.288.

[358] Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

[359] Gregory Guroff and Alexander Guroff (1994) "The Paradox of Russian National Identity" in Roman Szporluk, ed. *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe), p.87.

[360] Alexei Arbatov (1997) "A Framework for Assessing Post-Soviet Conflicts" in Alexei Arbatov, Abraham Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Lara Olson, ed., *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press), p.20.

Russians who have remained in Estonia and Latvia stayed partially because their economic opportunities are better in the Baltic states compared to Russia. It is possible that they are willing to give up some political and economic rights in order to maintain their basic economic security. Since the Russians also suffered under the Soviet system they were not completely shocked by their treatment at the hands of the Estonians and Latvians. They were willing to tolerate this treatment in exchange for economic stability.[361] This can be illustrated through survey data from the 2000 Baltic Barometer survey. In Estonia when asked if there were economic inequalities between Estonians and non-Estonians, 68% of non-Estonians responded that there were very large or fairly large inequalities.[362] However, when asked to disagree or agree with the statement "Conditions for people like me in Russia are worse than here" 67% of non-Estonians agreed, and to the question "This country offers better chances for improving living standards in the future than does in Russia" 67% also agreed.[363]

Obviously the Russians in Estonia have been influenced by their historical ties with Russia but they have also been influenced by Russian culture to this day. The majority of Russian-speakers prefer to watch television programs produced in Russia

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[361] Interview with Max van der Stoel, Former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 11, 2004, The Hague.

[362] Richard Rose (2000) *New Baltic Barometer IV: A Survey Study* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press), p. 63.

[363] Ibid, p.48. In Latvia the percentages for non-Latvians was 41% and 58% agreeing respectfully.

and prefer to read Russian media sources for information.[364] In Estonia alone in 2000 75% of non-Estonians watched television from the Russian federation 6-7 times a week and 27% read Russian federation newspapers at least once a week.[365]

The Balticization of the Russians

Beyond these cultural ties, the Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia have been heavily influenced by the titular populations as well. It would be impossible for the Russian-speaking community to live among the Baltic people during the Soviet period without adapting their culture to be more in line with the Estonians and Latvians. One of the main aspects of both Estonian and Latvian culture is a rejection of violence. Throughout their histories, both Estonia and Latvia have tried to avoid conflict and they describe themselves as pragmatic people who are similar to Scandinavians and Finns in their belief in non-violent strategies.[366] Lieven describes the Estonians as having the "fundamental quality of restraint, pragmatism, and indeed decency".[367] The most recent and most telling example of this commitment to non-violence was seen in the 'singing revolution' of 1989. Many believe that the

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[364] As Mati Luik, the Director of the Non-Estonian Integration Foundation notes the Russian-speakers reliance on Russian television has been a severe hindrance on integration in Estonia as many Russian-speakers do not have an understanding of issues in Estonia. They only are aware of news from Russia. Interview in Tallinn, March 10 2004.

[365] Rose (2000), p. 62.

[366] See for example the discussion of the Estonians and Latvians use of non-violence in Walter C. Clemens (2001) *The Baltic Transformed* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press).

[367] Anatol Lieven (1993) *The Baltic Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p.20.

Estonians and Latvians' refusal to use violence in their dealings with the Soviet

Union shaped the Russians living in the region to such a point that violence was not

perceived as a viable solution.[368] Due to their interactions both the Estonians and

Latvians and the Russian-speaking populations within their borders now share a

culture that has created a level of patience not found in other areas of the former

Soviet Union.[369] This change is seen in the statement by the Former Deputy Mayor of

Tallinn, Boris Yulegin:

> The Russians who have lived here all their
> lives have changed a lot. They have taken on
> something of the Estonian coolness, restraint and
> habit of hard work- whether they like it or not!
> They do not feel at home when they go to Russia.
> The Russians who come here also sometimes do
> not understand our character and ask us, 'Why
> don't you protest? Why don't you go on the streets?'[370]

The adaptation of the Russian-speaking community to Baltic culture is one of the few

issues that both sides agree on. The current Estonian Minister for Population and

Ethnic Affairs, Paul-Eerik Rummo contends that one of the leading causes for

prolonged peace during the integration process was the embracing by the Russian

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[368] Interview with Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 15 2004, Riga.

[369] Interview with Falk Lang, 2004 and Mati Luik, 2004. The tolerance of the Latvian society and its impact on the Russian-speaking community was also discussed by Former Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs in an interview in Riga on March 15 2004.

[370] Quoted in Lieven (1993), p.178.

community of the Estonian ideal of non-violence.[371] His predecessor Katrin Saks

believes that the Russians have learned from the Estonians to "be tolerant, survive

and integrate".[372] From the Russian-speaking perspective, Vadim Poleshchuk

contends that Estonians and Russians now have the same view of what is involved in

identity and have similar views on adherence to state institutions and practices which

has led to a lack of violence.[373] In Latvia, Boris Tsilevich notes that the Russians

never developed a leader who was willing to be responsible for bloodshed (which

would have contrasted with the singing revolution) so violence was never a viable

option.[374]

A New Russian-Speaking Identity

The Russian-speaking community in Estonia and Latvia finds itself in a

unique position. The majority of them have a culture that is heavily influenced the

heritage of the former Soviet Union and yet they do not share the exact same culture

as those in the Russian federation. They have been influenced by the culture of their

Estonian and Latvian neighbors, yet they have not fully integrated. It does not appear

that a uniform culture can emerge. Those who arrived prior to 1940 are more

influenced by the Baltic culture than those who arrived after the annexation. The

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[371] Interview with Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn.

[372] Interview with Katrin Saks, Estonian Member of Parliament, Former Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs (1999-2002), March 11 2004, Tallinn.

[373] Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, 2004.

[374] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004.

latter group has an identity more closely linked to communism. Their ideological base was taken away from them after 1991 as it was no longer acceptable to be seen as communist. They have adapted to try to survive in this new reality. There appears to be a hybrid culture forming in the region with the Russian-speakers beginning to come to terms with their own unique history. This new cultural awareness is most prevalent among the young Russians in the region.[375] Laitin describes this as "a new form of national identity that blurs the divide between titular and non-titulars".[376] Laitin goes on to describe the new identity as 'russkoiazychnoe naselenie' or the Russian-Speaking population of the Baltic, neither Russian or Baltic but both.[377]

Regardless of how the Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia define themselves, it is clear that their culture has prevented violence from occurring. They have been influenced by the Estonians and Latvians to avoid conflict and were aware that any use of violence would have prevented any advancement of their cause. Even if they had chosen to follow a more violent path, the policies of the Soviet Union in regards to not fostering Russian nationalism has made organizing around this nationality difficult. Combined the result is a new nationality that is prepared to endure hardships and does not think to resort to violence. With the Estonian and

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[375] Triin Vihalemm and Anu Masso (2002) "Patterns of Self-identification among the Younger Generation of Estonian Russians" in Marju Lauristin and Mati Heidmets, ed., *The Challenge of the Russian Minority* (Tartu: Tartu University Press).

[376] David Laitin (1998) *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p.158.

[377] Ibid, p.190. This idea of a new Russian-Speaker in the Baltic identity is also discussed in Vihalemm and Masso (2003).

Latvian cultures also stressing non-violence, patience and pragmatism it is not

difficult to ascertain why the region has been relatively violence free despite the real

(and more importantly perceived) inequalities in the societies.

The Basques- Violence Begets Violence

The culture of the Basques would fall in between the non-violent, dis-

organized culture of the Russians in the Baltic states, and the violence-accepting

vendetta culture associated with the Corsicans. The Basques represent a culture that

radically changed over the course of the 20th Century. While the acceptance of

violence was not an aspect of their culture in the past, it became accepted in the face

of extreme repression. When faced with this repression the Basques were able to draw

upon specific aspects of their cultural past as inspiration and use other aspects for

mobilization.

There are some that argue that there is nothing in Basque culture that makes

them prone to violence.[378] Conversi believes that when the nationalism that developed

in the Basque country is compared to that of the Catalans, there are the same

opportunities for violence to have developed because both had used it in the past and

there were times when "Catalonia was one of the most violent societies on the

continent".[379] The fact remains, however, that Catalonia no longer has violence

associated with it, yet the Basque country does. Therefore, while it may not be

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[378] This was emphasized in an telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, Basque Author, February 18 2004. Mr. Sũarez-Zuloaga did admit that the Basques do have a culture that sees themselves as victims in the past.

[379] Daniele Conversi (1997) *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press), p.222.

inherent in Basque culture, there must be something within Basque culture that allows for it to continue.

Most believe that it was the repression faced by the Basques during the Franco regime which radically altered the culture of the Basques. Kurlansky notes that for the Basques "culture has always been a political act, the primary demonstration of national identity. One of the keys to Basque survival is that political repression produces cultural revival".[380] Franco treated the Basques more severely than the Catalans or any other group in Spain. His goal was the eradication of the Basque culture and specifically the Basque language. This threat to the language had a pronounced impact on the Basques because much of Basque identity is tied to their language. The combination of the threat of having their language taken from them and the actually physical repression they endured (or heard others enduring) was enough to change how the Basques viewed violence. Due to Franco "Basque nationalism was reborn in a thoroughly new shape" and further "a new Basque identity was formed in the process".[381] When the ETA broke from the Basque Nationalist Party and began to employ violence against the state it was seen by the Basque people as a legitimate way of fighting back against Franco. The ETA was seen as something similar to Robin Hood, while their actions were illegal their

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[380] Mark Kurlansky (1999) *The Basque History of the World* (Toronto: Vintage Canada), p.158.

[381] Conversi (1997), p.231.

motives were right and therefore they were embraced.[382] If Franco had not targeted the Basques and their culture to the level he did it is unknown if the Basque culture would have changed to such a point where it would have tolerated being associated with violence. As a result "ETA's violence achieved strong affective support within broad sectors of the Basque population, given the total prohibition on public expression of discontent or of any ideological or cultural manifestations from the official ideology. This state violence, symbolic and physical, provided legitimacy to the political violence".[383]

The ETA used (and continues to use) references from the Basque culture to justify its actions. They have created a mythology that allows violence. An example is the use of the image of the mythical Basque soldier as proof that the Basques have always resisted foreign occupation. The Basque soldier (called Eudari) is thought to have been extremely adept at fighting, was very strong and extremely brave.[384] This is coupled with the myth of the rural farmer and even though the majority of the Basques are urban, the nationalist movement has always come from the villages and

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[382] Interview with Ibon Mendibelzva, Adviser- Press Services, Basque Country Delegation to the European Union, February 10 2004, Brussels.

[383] Alfonso Perez-Agote (1999) "The Future of Basque Identity" in William A. Douglass et al., ed., *Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium* (Reno: Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada), p.63.

[384] Telephone interview with Prof. Santiago Petschen, Professor of Political and Sociological Sciences, Universidad Complutense Madrid, February 17 2004.

their lifestyle is transposed onto the entire population.[385] The idea of Basque strength

is reinforced through the sporting activities enjoyed by the Basques. The majority of

these activities emphasize bravery and brute strength. Bull-fighting was popularized

by the Basques and many other sports emphasize strength.[386] Combined, these myths

and cultural traits were used by the ETA to convince the people that not only were

their goals noble but they were also in line with the Basques' historical culture.

When Franco died it was assumed that the violence by the Basques would

end. The fact that this did not happen indicates the extent to which the Basques

culture had changed. Within the nationalist movement today there is still a latent

acceptance of some of the activities of the ETA and this acceptance is based on their

memory (or in the case of the youth, those most active in the nationalist movement,

what they have been told) of their treatment in the past. This was particularly true

during the transition from Franco, as Perez-Agote notes: "within nationalist circles,

even those for whom the violence was politically incorrect, there was, nevertheless, a

certain sentimental acceptance of it, based on biographical memories".[387] For those

within the nationalist movements there is still the belief that the Basques are facing

repression currently. They discuss the activities of the Spanish army and police and

claim that the Basques continue to have violence forced upon them and their response

is the same as what the ETA used during Franco's time, that violence is an

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[385] Interview with Luis Francisco Martinez Montes- Counselor to the Spanish delegation OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna.

[386] Telephone interview with Petschen, 2004.

[387] Perez-Agote (1999), p.64.

understandable and logical reaction to violence.[388] This reaction to violence is seen in the actions of the terrorist activities of the ETA and also in the growing problem of young urban Basques fighting with both the Spanish and Basque authorities in activities known in Basque as *kale borroka*. The result is a situation where "violence is engendered, materialized, and reproduced as, and within a realm of, violence and terror woven by the rumors of abuse and death circulating within the Basque country".[389] While the ETA's level of support continues to drop and the acceptance of their activities evaporates, clearly there are aspects of the new Basque culture which allows for violence to exist and these continue to influence segments of Basque society. This phenomenon is described by Gorka Espiau as the persistence of the logic of violence within Basque society.[390]

It would be remiss if the role of Spanish culture was not addressed briefly. As with the Corsicans and the French state, it is the competing cultures in the Basque country and Spain which contributes to the conflict. The main aspect of Spanish culture which makes the conflict continue is the belief that the Basque region is a part

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[388] Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5 2004, Bilbao.

[389] Begona Aretxaga (1999) "A Hall of Mirrors: On the Spectral Character of Basque Violence" in Douglass et al., p.117.

[390] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director and Spokesperson Elkarri, February 4 2004, Bilbao. Davis also notes that there is a split in Basque society between what he refers to as 'active' and 'non-national' Basques. These two versions of Basque identity have very different views of the ETA and group mobilization. Thomas C. Davis (1997) "Patterns of Identity: Basques and the Basque Nation" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol.3 No.1, pp.61-88.

of the Spanish state and there is a lack of understanding that minorities exist in Spain and that they may have needs and goals different from those of the Spanish.[391] Another important cultural factor is the lack of willingness to compromise. In Spanish there is no actual word for compromise, to give in while negotiating is seen as weakness.[392] This leads to a psychological impasse in that neither side is in a position where they can effectively negotiate without being seen as losing honor. As a result the situation has evolved to the point where Dr. Ruiz-Vieytez, Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute describes the relationship between the Basque and Spanish people as "completely broken".[393]

The final aspect of the Basque culture which needs to be examined is the role of the Catholic church in mobilizing the Basque people. Even if the violence were to end it is likely that large protests, not seen in places such as Estonia and Latvia would continue to occur. While Catholic, the Basque church has strayed from the traditional positions set out by the Vatican. It has been more militant and more nationalistic. The church in the Basque region has historically been very active in mobilizing the Basques to protest and it is part of the tight social network of Basque culture. The church, along with social organizations and political parties hold great influence on their memberships because the church has used its access to their congregations to

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[391] Interview with Gorka Espiau, 2004.

[392] Ibid.

[393] Interview with Dr. Eduardo Ruiz-Vieytez, Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute, February 3 2004, Bilbao.

shape public opinion and to organize events. Even during the Franco regime the church was "an undercover source for the preservation and dissemination of Basque culture".[394] Many of the protests organized through the church are attended by people of all ages and become cultural festivals with singing and story-telling (thus ensuring that the various Basque myths discussed above continue to be passed down).[395] While not contributing to the levels of violence directly, the strong social bonds demonstrated by the influence of the church illustrate a culture that allows for effective mobilization of its people in a way not seen in the Russians in Estonia and Latvia and allows for the political and social struggle (which currently brings with them the violent struggle) to continue.

Conclusion

What this chapter has illustrated is the importance of culture in predicting political violence and mobilization. If the culture of a group is such that violence is considered a normal response to a disagreement then this will carry over to the political sphere as well. On the other hand, groups whose culture does not tolerate violence will be more likely to remain peaceful no matter what discrimination they happen to face. This chapter has also shown that the culture of a group can change over time but those changes occur slowly.

The cases show three different types of cultures. The culture of the Russians in Estonia and Latvia is influenced by both the titular population with whom they

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[394] Kurlansky (1999), p.237.

[395] Interview with Ruiz-Vieytez, 2004.

interact and the nationality policies of the Soviet Union. This has created a unique new identity different than any others in the region. This culture is both non-violent and unorganized and it maintains aspects of the Russian fatalistic view of life and adds the pragmatism for which the Baltic communities are known. The result is a group that appears almost incapable of resorting to violence. While individual Russian-speakers may be angry by the policies introduced by Estonia and Latvia they have not resorted to violence and no one in the region appears to believe that they ever will.

The Corsicans are a close-knit community based on clan loyalties. This culture promotes the need to maintain honor and as a result a vendetta culture has developed that accepts violence as an aspect of negotiation. The concept of the noble bandit is embraced and those who continue to break the laws and use violence to achieve political goals, while not endorsed by the majority of the population, are accepted and are seen as carrying on the traditions of the community. If violence is accepted as a part of life and by extension politics then it is extremely difficult to end the cycle of violence that has begun on the island. It apparently does not take a great deal of state action to warrant violence and since the state has a responsibility to try to end the violence they will continue to face resistance and the resulting continuation of violence.

The Basques represent a culture in flux. While historically neither adamantly non-violent like the Baltic states nor embracing violence like the Corsicans, their culture was changed due to severe repression. When faced with the possibility of

cultural eradication they began to embrace the need to fight back using any means

necessary and as a result violence became an acceptable part of their culture. Those

spearheading the resistance were able to use aspects of their existing culture to justify

their actions in terms of history. Their cause being noble allowed for the use of

violence and an acceptance of such activity by the community, including those who

did not use it themselves. Now that the severe repression has ended the Basque

culture is once again in transition. There are those who remember the repression faced

by the Basques and see it as continuing today and for them violence is still an

important aspect of their culture. They are willing to tolerate the violence and those

who are involved in it, however, others want to return to the culture of before Franco

when they were still strong but not violent. Currently there are enough Basques who

believe in the former to allow the ETA to attract many young Basques embracing the

romantic ideals of the ETA and continuing to embrace violence. It is unclear where

the culture will go. What is clear is that the Basques are a close-knit community with

a rich culture and deep social bonds led by the church. Even if the culture changes

enough that violence is not tolerated, the Basques have a culture that encourages

collective action, ensuring that the Basque question will continue to be an issue for

the Spanish government.

　　　　While this chapter has been concerned with the actual culture of the groups,

there are other ways the culture can be tested. The following chapter looks at how

culture can be institutionalized within a society and how this has impacted the choices

of these ethnic groups.

Chapter 7- The Institutionalization of Culture

While the preceding chapter discussed the role culture has played in determining whether conflict is likely within a society, this chapter will examine the issue in more detail. The chapter will look at the remaining hypotheses that were outlined at the beginning of this study. When these hypotheses are examined closely it becomes apparent that they all are part of a larger issue, the institutionalization of culture. Beyond the use of repression or other state policies that could affect the culture of a group these are other factors that can play an important role.

This chapter will look first at the role geography has played in refining the culture of the groups. What is of interest is each group's level of geographic isolation. While the Corsicans and Basques have had to deal with an influx of outsiders to their region both groups are still isolated from the majority of the French and Spanish population and there are areas within Corsica and the Basque country (in both cases, rural areas) where they are completely isolated. The Russian-speaking community in Estonia and Latvia is very urban and are concentrated in both capital cities and therefore they have a great deal of interaction with the titular community (with the exception of the Estonian city Narva). The impact of this interaction will be discussed.

The chapter will then discuss the relevant length of the conflicts. Here two additional issues will be discussed. The first is the difference between a conflict that is less than 15 years old in Estonia and Latvia and conflicts in Corsica and the Basque country that date back to the 19th Century. Second when the conflicts evolved will

also be examined. The ETA and the FLNC were heavily influenced by the African anti-colonial movements in the 1960's and as these movements were left-wing by nature these organizations shifted ideologically to that end of the political spectrum. The conflict involving the Russian-speaking community in Estonia and Latvia has occurred in the period after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. This time frame has dictated what ideologies the movements could take and this has affected how the cultures of the groups have developed.

Finally the concept of repertoire choices will be examined. Until a particular repertoire is tried there is no history of it in a culture of a group. While this may appear self-evident the ramifications of this is important. The culture of violence in Corsica is heavily influenced by the fact that they have used this repertoire in the past and it has now been established as part of the process. The same can be said of the violence in Spain. Once the bombings and other criminal activities of the ETA began they are extremely difficult to stop. In Estonia and Latvia violence has never been tried so there is an assumption that it would not work there and this belief, based on no actual evidence, has heavily shaped the culture of the Russian-speaking community.

Combined, these factors are linked with the pre-existing culture of the group and they reinforce it. These factors it will be argued are what make changing a group's culture, either towards a greater acceptance of violence or to move away from a tradition of violence, so very difficult. By understanding the factors that shape a group's culture, the impact of culture on the group's decision making is better

understood and can be used in any analysis of the potential for violence in a society.

The Role of Geographic Isolation

The development of a group's culture can be influenced by where the group lives particularly in comparison to others. The geographic isolation of the Corsicans has directly influenced not only the development of their culture but also has allowed for this culture to be maintained. As Paul Giacobbi notes, two aspects of geography have affected Corsican identity. The first is its geographic location in the Mediterranean where it has been influenced by its neighbors in Sardinia and Sicily and the second is the actual terrain of the island. Giacobbi believes that the mountainous terrain has made the Corsicans more rugged and set in their ways than other societies.[396] Ramsay agrees and adds that the maintenance of the Corsicans "intact social order and culture" is a result of "two internal geographic factors: first, the difficult mountainous terrain of the interior and, second, the swampy and malarial nature of the coastal plains".[397] Ramsay contends that it has proved difficult to administer the entire island and therefore it was necessary to maintain clan control in the interior region where the majority of the ethnic Corsicans lived. This helped keep the culture intact and actually helped infuse it with a survivor's instinct. It must also said that while this has helped in the preservation of a Corsican culture as a whole, geography has also helped splinter the Corsicans into different groups as well. The

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[396] Telephone Interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), March 24 2004.

[397] Robert Ramsay (1983) *The Corsican Time-Bomb* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.1.

mountains and difficult interior terrain made travel difficult during the development of Corsican identity and actually continues to make traveling across the island difficult. The result is that "Corsican geography has thus led to strong forms of internal insularity".[398] This has also reinforced the clan system, which brought with it the vendetta culture that allows for the continuation of violence. While the island has been under French influence since the 1800's the Corsican identity is not much different than when it was under the control of Genoa because both the clan system and reliance on familial ties has remained. This has created a closed society that is difficult for outsiders, even the French, to access.[399] It is this insularity that has been the main cause of conflict between the French state and the Corsicans. The Corsicans refuse to let outsiders truly understand their culture and society but also refuse to abandon this way of life. This has put the French government in a no-win situation[400] because they must try to work around a culture that is not only foreign to their own; but they are also not privy to how the culture operates.

The Corsicans' ability to maintain aspects of their culture despite their reliance on and the influence of the French state is helped by the geographic distance between themselves and the mainland. Being an island they have the advantage of

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[398] Alexandra Jaffe (1999) *Ideologies in Action: Language Politics of Corsica* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter), p.36.

[399] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE, February 25 2004, Vienna.

[400] Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies- Cardiff University Dr. John Loughlin, February 19 2004.

isolation. Even with the influx of non-Corsicans the French state has been unable to have the Corsican institutions take on French characteristics. As John Loughlin notes, while the laws are similar in Corsica to mainland France their enforcement is very different.[401] An example is that Corsicans openly carry firearms, something that would not be tolerated in the rest of France. Other laws, particularly ones involving low intensity violence are ignored or not punished to the same extent as elsewhere in France and as a result the Corsicans are allowed to keep and in fact embrace some of the more violent aspects of their culture. Violence therefore is openly accepted in the society and this carries over to the political arena and the actions of the FLNC.

The Basques also live in a mountainous region. While they are not separated from the rest of the country by water, the Basque region is somewhat isolated geographically from the rest of Spain. It is a 10 hour train ride to Madrid and 11 hours to Barcelona. The Basques have used, as stated previously, their geographic location to their economic advantage and have become more integrated with the rest of Europe than other regions of Spain. This has helped provide the Basques with the confidence to stand up to and fight Franco, leading to the formation of the ETA and the violence that followed and to call for more autonomy.[402]

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[401] Ibid.

[402] Interview with Ibon Mendibelzva, Adviser- Press Services, Basque Country Delegation to the European Union, February 10 2004, Brussels.

The key geographic consideration in the Basque country is the difference between the cities and the countryside.[403] The power of Basque nationalism has always resided in the countryside. Many of the Basques who live in the urban centers such as Bilbao have been more interested in socialist issues, not concerned with nationalist issues. As the waves of immigrants came to the region to find work they settled en mass in the urban centers where they have interacted and inter-married the Basques. The Basques who have remained in the smaller mountain villages, who have no interaction with non-Basques, are more nationalistic and more supportive of both Batasuna and the ETA.[404] Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, the Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute believes that the insular Basques in the villages have an overly romantic view of Basque nationalism and as a result are more willing to accept the use of violence to achieve their goals.[405]

The difference in opinion on the Basque nationalist question between those in the large urban centers where they interact with non-Basques and those who remain in pure Basque villages can be seen in the results of a poll taken by the Basque Sociological Survey Office. Table 7.1 outlines its findings below. It is clear that those

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[403] It is noted that all of the Basque provinces inside Spain have somewhat unique cultures and political leanings. This was brought to the author's attention in a telephone interview with the Basque historian Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, February 18 2004. This is most true of the province of Navarre whose culture is diverging from the rest of the Basque provinces. While interesting, the geographic differences at the provincial level is outside the scope of this research.

[404] Telephone interview with Prof. Santiago Petschen, Professor of Political and Sociological Sciences, Universidad Complutense Madrid, February 17 2004.

[405] Interview with Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute, February 3 2004, Bilbao.

who have the greatest support for independence are those who live outside of the large cities in the Basque country. These people are geographically isolated from not only the rest of Spain, but also from the non-Basques who have come to work in the region. Without being exposed to other cultures, theirs have remained strong and insular. Those Basques in the larger cities have other issues that become more important to them rendering nationalism less of a concern.

Table 7.1. Levels of Pro-independence Feelings by Size of Municipality[406]

Question: With regards to the subject of independence for the Basque Country … what is your personal view?

Municipality Size		
	Small	**Medium**	**Large**
Agree	33%	21%	17%
Would Agree or Not According to Circumstance	39%	30%	32%
Disagree	15%	32%	42%
Don't Know	13%	16%	9%

The Russian-speaking community of Estonia and Latvia present an interesting comparison to both the Corsicans and the Basques. The Corsicans have used their isolation to preserve their culture and resist the influences of other cultures. The Basques are divided between those who have interacted with non-Basques in the large urban centers and those who have remained more nationalistic in the small mountainous villages. Both nationalists and non-nationalist Basques can at least

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[406] Sociological Survey Office- President of the Basque Government's Office (2003) *Basque Sociometer 21*, Basque government website http://www.euskadi.net/estudios_sociologicos, p.71.

benefit from the geographic location of the region as a whole. The Russian-speakers
do not benefit from these advantages. They came to the region at different times from
a variety of areas across the then Soviet Union (and before that, Russia) with the
majority settling in urban areas surrounded by Estonians and Latvians. With the
exception of a few cities (particularly Narva in North-East Estonia) there is nowhere
in either country where they are the overwhelming majority. As discussed in the
previous chapter the Russian-speakers culture has been shaped by their interactions
with the titular society in a way not seen in Corsica and the Basque region. The lack
of geographic isolation may be a key explanation for this cultural influence.

Despite the large majority of Russians in the Estonian town of Narva, it can be
said that the majority of all the Russian-speakers in Estonia live in the capital city of
Tallinn. The same can be said in Latvia where the majority live in the capital of Riga.
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the breakdown of Estonians and Latvians respectively to
Russian-speakers in the major urban areas of the two countries. What is evident is
that not only are the majority of Russian-speakers living in the two capitals but the
Russian-speaking community comprises the majority in most of the other large urban
centers. Since they are the minority as a whole it can be assumed that the rural areas
are almost completely devoid of non-Balts. This high number of Russians in the
urban centers helps explain the dual nature of their identity because they interact in
large numbers with the titular community. Being in such large numbers in the capitals
they are exposed to Estonian and Latvian culture. Conversely, they are in such large
numbers in the cities that they are able to maintain aspects of their old culture. Due to

their demographic strength pure assimilation is impossible but due to their daily

interactions isolation was also not a possibility.

Table 7.2. Ethnic Composition of Estonian Major Cities- 1989[407]

	% Estonian	% Russian	Total Population
Tallinn	46.79	41.55	499 421
Tartu	73.32	21.69	113 420
Narva	4.33	85.45	84 975
Sillamae	3.19	86.43	20 561

Table 7.3. Ethnic Composition of Major Latvian Cities- 1989[408]

	% Latvian	% Russian	Total Population
Riga	36.5	47.3	910 500
Daugavapils	13.0	58.3	124 000
Liepaja	38.8	43.1	114 500
Jelgava	49.7	34.7	74 100
Jurmais	44.2	42.1	60 600

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[407] It is acknowledged that there has been a large migration of Russians out of Estonia since 1989, however it is still acknowledged by Estonians that they are the minority in most of the major cities in the country. Attitat F. Ott et al. (1996) "Ethnic Anxiety: A Case Study of Resident Aliens in Estonia (1990-1992)" *Journal of Baltic Studies* Vol.27 No.1, p.39.

[408] As with the Estonian case, this census data was collected before a large number of Russians left the country therefore it may be assumed that the percentage of Latvians in the cities is higher, particularly in Riga. This does not negate the impact of the size of the Russian minority in each of the cities. Peter Zvidrins (1992) "Changes in the Ethnic Composition of Latvia" *Journal of Baltic Studies,* Vol.23, No.4, p.365.

Ventspils	43.0	39.4	50 600
Rezekne	37.3	55.0	42 500

The result of the combination of lack of geographic isolation in Estonia and Latvia and sizeable minority enclaves in the large urban areas has created a condition that helps prevent conflict. Figure 7.4 shows what Mati Luik, the Director of the non-Estonian Integration Foundation believes is the necessary position of minorities in a state. Minority groups are led towards conflict either when faced with complete assimilation or complete separation. The balance that is found in the demographic make-up of Estonia and Latvia is not found in Corsica (who fall on the segregation side) or the Basque country (who under Franco were on the assimilation side) and as a result has promoted an environment for peace.

Length of Time of the Conflict

Time is an important factor in understanding the influence of culture on a conflict. While certain events can lead to a change in culture, what Laitin refers to as "tipping events"[409], it takes some time for this change to be seen in noticeable action. The longer a conflict continues the positions of the two sides become more entrenched and the more difficult negotiations become. With a prolonged conflict both sides can fall back on historical wrongs in their arguments for more rights or in the case of the state, the necessity to deny some rights to the minority group.

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[409] David D. Laitin (1998) *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Figure 7.4. The Necessary Conditions for Peace[410]

The cases studied here provide interesting examples of the importance of time. The conflict between Corsica and France is very old and the Basque/Spain conflict is also ancient but has been radically altered in the past 75 years. While the Estonians, Latvians and Russians have been living in the same region for over 500 years, the current conflict is relatively new (with some ancient overtones). It will become clear below that not only is the length of time a conflict has existed important, when the conflicts were active also plays a crucial role in understanding why these groups have acted as they have.

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[410] This figure was developed based on an interview with Mati Luik, Director- Non-Estonian Integration Foundation, March 10 2004, Tallinn. It should be noted that not everyone believes that this is true. The Latvian Minister for Social Integration, Nils Muižnieks, believes that geographic proximity leads to violence. For him, the size of the Russian minority in the cities allows for them to isolate themselves from the Latvians and is what has helped prevent violence.

Time is one of the most important aspects of the Corsican case according to John Loughlin. In this regard, the Corsican case is similar to other European cases that have been tied to violence, the Basques and the troubles in Northern Ireland.[411] Corsica finds itself in a continuing violent spiral where the length of time the violence continues is both a cause and a result of the conflict. The French government has been working for over 200 years to try to solve the Corsican problem and as each attempt failed, with the defeat of the autonomy referendum in the summer of 2003 being the most recent example, the levels of frustration on the side of the government and the French people grows.[412] The French have become less inclined to try to find political solutions to the problems because they are resisted by a violent minority who has no interest in finding political solutions.[413] The Corsican nationalists (and many autonomists who are content to remain in France) see the actions of the past 200 years by the French government as a reason for the continuation of the conflict. They recall the historic neglect by the government, the introduction of the pied noirs to the island and the treatment of some Corsican nationalists by the police as an explanation for continued violence.[414] With each failure by the government or each new bombing by

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[411] Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies- Cardiff University, February 19 2004.

[412] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE, February 25 2004, Vienna. De Touchet notes that 6 separate French governments have tried to find a political solution to the Corsican problem. While each has had some success the conflict continues which makes the job of the subsequent government more difficult.

[413] Ibid.

the FLNC the history between the two sides grows. As history lengthens the chances

of an end to the conflict are lowered. The amount of time the two sides have spent

arguing over these issues has increased the levels of frustration on both sides. For

those willing to use violence this frustration leads to more action in their attempts to

finally bring an end to the conflict. Unfortunately, with the new violence the French

government's position hardens and the chances of an end to the conflict, particularly

one that would be acceptable to the autonomists, let alone the separatists, decreases.

The situation is similar to the conflict between the Basques and the Spanish

government because the length of the conflict has helped ensure that it will continue.

The separatists and the ETA frame the conflict as an ancient one with its roots prior to

the Franco regime. For many separatists the conflict dates back either to 1512 when

the region was conquered or to 1841 when Basque autonomy was officially ended.[415]

If this history of the conflict is accepted then the collective memory of the Basque

people is one a "history of invasion" which has created a survivors instinct[416] and the

Franco regime only crystallized this identity. After Franco and his repressive policies

Basque nationalists were hyper-sensitive to any action by the Spanish state that could

be contrived as repressive. As with the Corsicans the level of frustration continues to

rise on both sides as they search for a solution. A segment of the Basque separatists

use violence to maintain pressure on the Spanish government to finally solve a

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[414] Telephone interview with Giacobbi, 2004.

[415] Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5 2004, Bilbao.

[416] Ibid.

problem that has existed since 1512 or 1841 or 1938 or 1978. The Spanish state sees

the actions of the ETA as preventing any peace agreements from being reached and

therefore the length of the conflict is their fault.[417] With both sides blaming the other

for the length of the crises the result is what Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga refers to as a

"poisoned environment".[418] With the continuation of the ETA's bombing campaign

over time the Basques have come to accept living with the radical nationalists and the

shock value or outrage that could have existed has been replaced with quiet

acceptance. Even with less people supporting their activities, the ETA is allowed to

exist because, due to the length of time they have operated, they have become a part

of the landscape.[419]

While the Basque and Corsican questions have been framed as ancient

conflicts, the cases of Estonia and Latvia are seen as very recent. Most view the

situation as dating from the Baltic states' break from the Soviet Union in 1991. If this

is correct then there is less than thirteen years of history to consider. In terms of the

Russian minority this is true because prior to 1991 the majority of the Russian-

speaking minority had always been an advantaged minority. They had no reason to

mobilize around their ethnicity until they became a disadvantaged minority in 1991.

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[417] Interview with Maria Amor Martin Estebanez- Advisor to the Spanish delegation to the OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna.

[418] Telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, Basque Author, February 18 2004.

[419] Interview with Ibon Mendibelzva, Adviser- Press Services, Basque Country Delegation to the European Union, February 10 2004, Brussels.

Time does play a role in understanding why the Latvians and Estonians have implemented the restrictive policies that have caused the problems. As discussed in chapter three the Estonians and Latvians have had a long history of foreign occupation and control and when independence was achieved in 1991 it was seen as an opportunity to protect the titular culture and language. They were willing to sacrifice the rights of the Russian-speakers, even though they had assisted in the independence movement, because of the long period of Soviet control that they had endured. While the Russians had not organized and mobilized around their culture, the Estonians and the Latvians have. The restrictive citizenship policies and the language policies found in both countries as well as their reluctance to change them can be seen as a direct result of the length of time the Estonians and Latvians had to endure threats to their culture.

While they were hesitant to make the changes to these policies, due to the influence of the international community there has been substantial change in a relatively short period of time. Many Estonian and Latvian politicians feel that while there is more work to be done, it's this rapid response to Russian-speakers concerns that has prevented violence from occurring.[420] The Estonian government, as discussed

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[420] Interviews with Aarne Veedla, Counselor to the Minister- Office of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 9 2004, Tallinn, Katrin Saks, Member of Parliament , Former Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs (1999-2002), March 11 2004, Tallinn. Reinis Āboltiņš Director of the Society Integration Department and Former Advisor to the President disagrees believing that the culture of non-violence is the overarching explanation and the amount of time would not affect this predominant culture. Interview in Riga, March 18, 2004.

previously, is convinced that their rapid response will ensure the successful integration of their Russian-speaking minority by 2007.[421]

While many Estonians and Latvians see the successes in a short time period as proof of a peaceful integration of the Russian-speaking minority others see a real threat. They feel that there has not been any violence yet, but that is due to the short amount of time the Russians have faced this situation and after their initial shock and adjustment period ends they will then potentially resort to violence. The Director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, Illze Brand Kehris, sees the lack of integration in the Russian youths as cause for concern. The young are the group with the most advantages in the integration process and if they remain outside of Latvian society then over a longer period of time they may choose other avenues to express their displeasure with the Latvian state. She sees two alternatives if this occurs, they could either leave the country or eventually they could abandon their current culture and become more militant.[422] A Russian activist in Estonian Vadim Poleshchuk agrees. He believes that the attempts at reaching the Russian youth have failed in Estonia and that while currently the disenfranchised Russians obey the laws, in time this could change. If this occurs he warns that Estonia should "prepare for

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[421] Interview with Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn and Estonian Integration Foundation (2001) *Üks Ühiskond, Üks Riik/One State, One Society: Integration Yearbook.*

[422] Interview with Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 15 2004, Riga. Falk Lang, the Senior Advisor on the Baltic States to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities also warns that if frustrations continue to ferment that violence could some day in the future become an option. Interview in The Hague, February 20-21 2004.

some unpleasantness".[423] Finally, Boris Tsilevich, a Russian activist in Latvia notes

that not enough time has passed for the policies implemented by the Latvian

government to fail. The Russians are currently working to integrate with the hope that

once this has been accomplished they will be equal. Tsilevich believes that even when

fully integrated, by the government's standards the Russian-speakers will still be

behind educationally compared to their Latvian counterparts. After putting in all of

the effort to integrate if they are still second-class then problems may occur.[424]

The Importance of the Historical Time Frame

Clearly the length of a conflict is a relatively important determinant pf the

potential of violence. It is also necessary to look at when the conflict occurs as well in

determining the likelihood of violence. Minority groups are influenced by what is

occurring around them and this can dictate what options are open and closed to them.

The Basque nationalist movement was a conservative, peaceful movement until the

1960's. While Franco was the major influence on the change of culture in the

Basques, the time-period when this was occurring can be seen as an important factor

in changing the tactics. A generational gap developed in the Basque movement when

many young Basques were heavily influenced by the Marxist, anti-colonial

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[423] Interview with Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

[424] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, Former Latvian Member of Parliament and Russian Activist, March 16 2004, Riga.

movements in Africa during the 1960's.[425] The ETA took as their model the Algerian struggle against the French during the 1960's. "The experience of Algeria seemed to hold out the promise that violence would pay off and lead the insurgents to victory".[426] The Basques used the writings of Frantz Fanon, the leading writer on the Algerian conflict, as the basis of their actions. Fanon called on the repressed to rise up and use the only means available to them to defeat their colonial adversaries and this was of course violence. Fanon also said that there is the possibility of a split in the nationalist movement because the bourgeoisie from both sides would try to compromise so profits could be maintained.[427] To this day this is the argument of the ETA and Batasuna regarding the PNV who they feel are more interested in maintaining their power than the best interests of the Basques.[428] Since the anti-colonial movement was viewed be many as a noble cause (even though it was Marxist in ideology), by rooting their movement in the same ideology the ETA was able to use violence and still claim moral legitimacy.

The political violence in Corsica began in earnest in the 1970's and there is evidence that it also was influenced by the Marxist ideology of 1960's Africa. First,

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[425] Interview with Luis Francisco Martinez Montes- Counselor to the Spanish delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 24 2004 Vienna.

[426] Daniele Conversi (1997) *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press), p.244.

[427] Frantz Fanon (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press), p.62.

[428] Interview with Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5 2004, Bilbao.

the FLNC was inspired and influenced by the actions of the ETA and the Irish

Republican Army (who also followed the teachings of Fanon).[429] The FLNC saw the

successes of these groups and the acceptance they received and copied them. Second,

the troubles began to escalate in Corsica after the French colonists began to arrive

from Algeria. Militant Corsicans saw what caused France to abandon its colony in

Algeria and tried the same strategy. As a result violence was used and the

nationalists' rhetoric has Marxist undertones.

While the Corsicans and the Basques were able to tap into the Marxist anti-

colonial movements in Africa for strategies in their struggle with the state, the

Russian community in Latvia and Estonia had to operate in a completely different

environment. After 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall a new wave of

democratization hit Eastern Europe. When this happened to be seen as anything that

resembled communist was not acceptable. When the Baltic Republics managed to

break away from the Soviet Union this feeling was magnified. Many of the politicians

who formed the first post-Soviet governments were former Communist party

members but were successful in distancing themselves from their former positions.[430]

For the Russian-speaking community the political views they had long had

socialized into them were now impossible to hold. As discussed previously, Nils

Muižnieks, the Latvian Minister for Social Integration noted that the Russians had the

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[429] Telephone interview with Dr. John Loughlin, School of European Studies- Cardiff University, February 19 2004.

[430] Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004.

"ideological rug pulled out from under them".[431] With the presence of international

organizations in the region it was not possible for the Russians to fall back on the

Marxist ideologies of Fanon which would have called for violence. With such a large

Western presence in the region the Russian-speakers had no choice but to follow the

model of protest that the Latvians and Estonians had followed and this was a model

they were comfortable with. Even if they had wanted to use another, more violent,

option they would have been seen as communist and it would have backfired.[432]

The Use of Repertoires

The final institutionalization of culture that needs to be addressed is the idea

of repertoires. Put simply, groups tend to use the same strategies over and over again

as long as they are successful. Once one repertoire is used and works in some regard

it becomes very difficult to abandon this strategy. Which repertoires are tried is

directly linked to a group's culture.[433] In Corsica once violence was introduced as a

tactic it has proven impossible to end and this is partially due to the fact that people

now rely on this violence as their occupation. The links between political violence

and organized crime are now difficult to determine and as John Loughlin describes,

many Corsicans now are "gangsters by occupation" and they are willing to use

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[431] Interview with Nils Muižnieks, Latvian Minister for Social Integration, March 17 2004, Riga.

[432] Ibid.

[433] Interview with John Packer, Director, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 19 2004, The Hague.

violence politically, economically and socially.[434] Giacobbi believes that even if a political solution were found the violence on the island would continue purely because there are some on the island whose livelihood depends on it.[435]

A similar situation exists in the Basque country. Even with fewer and fewer people openly supporting the activities of the ETA, it continues to exist and is still involved in violent activities. Conversi notes that since "the 1970's, political violence seems to have become an intrinsic feature of Basque society".[436] A pattern in Spain has developed concerning the violence of the ETA where they engage in violent activities, the police crack down on them and the ETA responds to this action with more violence. Both sides continue to use the same repertoires. As a result "once you open the door to violence, you cannot close it".[437]

In the Basque country all sides in the dispute are tied to this repertoire of violence by the ETA. The Basques have had to learn to work within the framework of the ETA, knowing that their actions will impact all political negotiations. The ETA has now tied themselves to their violent activities to such a point that without violence they have little influence in society. Since many are involved in illegal activities tied to the ETA as an occupation they feel they must continue to engage is these activities. Finally, the Spanish government has used the ETA's activities as a

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[434] Telephone interview with Loughlin, 2004.

[435] Telephone interview with Giacobbi, 2004.

[436] Conversi (1997), p.248.

[437] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director and Spokesperson for Elkarri, February 4 2004, Bilbao.

way of avoiding other issues. The government has used the violence of the ETA as an excuse to not negotiate with the Basque government and to avoid other important issues facing Spain. They are able to present themselves as fighting terrorists and therefore their actions are always justified.[438] All sides therefore have found a way to use the violence of the ETA to their advantage making it very difficult for it to ever end.

The case of the Russians in Estonia and Latvia is much different. Having never used violence it is unlikely that they will. Many of the reasons for why they have not used violence have been discussed in the last two chapters but it can simply be said that the non-violent repertoires used by the Russian-speakers have worked to a satisfactory extent and therefore they are likely to be used in the future as well. It will only be when the non-violent tactics completely fail to improve their condition that other alternatives will begin to be examined.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to understand how the cultures of the groups discussed can be institutionalized through a variety of factors. The cases illustrate how certain conditions can take a pre-existing culture and solidify it and as a result the potential for violence or non-violence which could be predicted by a group's culture is made more certain once these factors are taken into account.

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[438] Interview with Maria Amor Martin Estebanez- Advisor to the Spanish delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 24 2004, Vienna.

It is by examining these factors that we can see that the Corsicans who have a vendetta culture that accepts violence have difficulty avoiding violence in the political arena. Their geographic isolation has created an environment where violent acts are not punished to the same extent as on the mainland. The long period of time that the conflict has spanned has allowed frustrations to build to the point where violence becomes seen as a way of finally ending the stalemate. The conflict gained strength during a period when left-wing radical groups could use terrorism and still be seen as noble freedom-fighters. Finally, once violence was used it became linked to organized crime to such an extent that ending the conflict would cause many Corsicans to lose their livelihood, making the chances of an end to the violence remote.

The Basques, particularly the nationalistic ones are isolated in the small villages of the Basque country. There they do not interact with non-Basques making the impact of violent activity seem more remote. They also have endured a long frustrating struggle with the Spanish state and were influenced by African anti-colonial ideology which called on the use of violence. All of this meshed with the Basques' pre-existing culture of survival in response to Franco's repressive policies. Currently all sides in the conflict have found a way to use the ETA's violence to their advantage which also makes any long-term cease-fire very difficult to envision.

The Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia face very different influences on their culture. As discussed above, their culture has been shaped by a lack of nationalism dating back to the Soviet period and their interactions with the non-

violent Baltic people. Their lack of isolation allows them to interact with Estonians and Latvians on a daily basis and this interaction makes using violence more difficult as there is less division geographically between 'them' and 'us'. The Russian-speakers also found themselves being denied rights during a historical period when anything resembling Marxist thought was taboo. They had to operate in an environment that stressed international interventions and compromise and it was clear that any violent response would cost them valuable international support. The Russian-speakers have also only had 13 years of frustration to contend with. It appears that this is not enough time for them to reach such a level of disillusionment that they would be willing to abandon their culture and attempt to engage in more overt militant activities. If their frustration level ever reaches that point they should be very hesitant to cross the line into militancy. As the Basque and Corsican cases show, once the Pandora's Box of violence is opened, it is almost impossible to shut.

Chapter 8- Conclusions and Future Work

So what has been learned in this study? Due to this analysis are we better able to explain why groups act the way they do? Why have these groups chosen their particular relationship with the state? More specifically, why do violent organizations continued to exist in Corsican and Basque society while no violent organizations have developed in the Baltic states? This study has provided compelling evidence to answer all of these questions. This chapter will briefly review the main findings of this study and it will provide a link between the groups studied and the larger field of ethnic conflict. Finally, it will provide a road map based on this study as to what the next steps should be to continue our understanding of the development and persistence of violent groups in Europe and around the world.

The Findings

In Chapter 2 of this study the hypotheses that were to be examined and provided the structure of the rest of the work were presented. To review they were:

H1. *The nature of the economic structure of a state and the resulting difference in economic affluence will influence group decision making in regards to choosing militant strategies.*

H2: *Minority groups in states that face pressure by the international community to improve the conditions of the minority group are less likely to be involved in militant activity and vice versa.*

H3: *In order to predict whether a group will resort to militant activities it is necessary to understand the culture of the group and how accepting that culture is to violence.*

H4 a. *Groups that are geographically isolated from the majority of the population are more likely to engage in militant activities.*

H4 b. *The longer a conflict has existed, the more likely violence is to be used.*

H4 c. *Groups who have never used violence as a form of collective action will not choose to resort to it, while those who have used violence will continue to do so.*

After careful examination during the preceding chapters most of these hypotheses were found to be useful in explaining why the groups have acted as they have. Of all of the hypotheses the first one, economic deprivation, proved to be the least useful. The Russians in Estonia and Latvia are considerably worse off economically than the titular population. There is an ethnic division of labor in both countries which may explain some of the behavior of the Russians but the gap in income is known by the Russians and yet it is not enough to bring them to action. The majority of the Basques are economically advanced compared to the rest of Spain. The most militant of the Basques do live in the more rural areas in the mountains which are less economically advanced, but this is by choice and cannot explain their actions. While part of the nationalism movement was a result of migration of non-Basques into the region the reason for their anger was not in the potential loss of jobs, rather it was the threat to their culture and language.

Only in Corsica can economic factors be seen as directly influencing the

creation of the Corsican nationalist movement and the militant FLNC. The

combination of the end of the French colonial period that provided many Corsicans

with jobs and the resulting arrival of the *pieds noir* from Algeria was perceived as not

only a threat to the Corsican culture and language but also their economic well-being.

Unlike the nationalist Basques who chose to remain in the rural areas, the Corsicans

are concentrated in the less valuable interior of the country out of necessity. The best

farm land was given to the pieds noir, and the valuable coastal region is

predominantly owned by non-Corsicans and as a result the Corsicans must work for

non-Corsicans and remain very much economically disadvantaged. In this case the

militant nationalists have used economics not only as the impetus for their activities,

but also the reason for their continuation. Explaining the actions of only one of the

four groups appears insufficient to conclude that economics play a vital role in

predicting group decision making.

A more promising explanation is the impact of the international community.

The cases in this study show a clear distinction between the groups who received

attention by the international community and those that were ignored. Shortly after

Estonia and Latvia declared their independence from the Soviet Union the

international community became involved in preventing ethnic conflict from breaking

out. At the beginning Max Van der Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National

Minorities and his staff was actively engaged in lowering ethnic tensions, particularly

while the troops from the Russian Army were still stationed in the region. Later, his

recommendations were used as the basis of the European Union's accession reports that for the first time contained chapters concerned with the treatment of minorities. The Russian population in the two countries quickly came to see these powerful European institutions as ombudsmen for their cause and in order to stay in favor with these institutions the Russians could not resort to militant activities. By staying non-violent the OSCE, the EU and other organizations pressured the Estonian and Latvian governments into concessions which on their own the Russian communities would not have been able to force. In comparison to the massive involvement in Estonia and Latvia, there has been little to no involvement in France and Spain. Neither country has been open to international intervention, assistance or mediation and France and Spain see the Corsican and Basque problems as internal matters and not the business of the rest of Europe. The High Commissioner's mandate has prevented his involvement regardless of France and Spain's wishes due to the provision that he cannot become involved in regions with active terrorist movements. The European Union as currently mandated has no provisions to influence member states on minority rights issues meaning both the Corsicans and Basques have felt somewhat abandoned by the rest of Europe. They have seen the changes in Eastern Europe and the international community's attention to the Northern Irish conflict and have grown frustrated knowing that their cause has been ignored. Violence is one way to make sure that their issues make the news but rather than gaining public attention for their cause the violence has only made the situation worse in that the Corsicans and the Basques have become pariahs in Europe. This has created a vicious cycle that has

been difficult to break, however, both the Corsicans and the Basques continue to hold out hope that the European Union will eventually become involved in their situation. Both hope that the new constitution will give the EU authority to mediate in member states but if the international community fails them again it will make finding a peaceful solution to these conflicts even more difficult.

The third hypothesis tested, the role of culture also proved to be extremely valuable. While difficult to specify, it is clear that culture plays a vital role in predicting whether violence will be used or not. The vast majority of those interviewed for this study ranked it as an important explanation for the group's activities and many would rank it as most important.[439] When the history of each group is examined the cultural explanation becomes an even stronger predictor of violence. The traditional clan system on the island of Corsica has led to the development of a 'vendetta culture' and in this culture violence is not seen as completely out of the ordinary and in some cases it is expected. This culture of accepting violence is seen in social, economic and political affairs and thus while the majority of Corsicans do not condone the activities of the FLNC and other militant nationalist groups they are not quick to reject them. If violence is a somewhat accepted part of the society it should not be surprising that on issues as emotionally charged as those associated with nationalism that eventually violence would become part of the equation.

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[439] Those who were interviewed were not asked uniform survey questions so it is not possible to provide statistics. All interviewees were asked in some form what has caused the group to act in a particular way and the majority of the respondents mentioned culture as a leading cause.

While there have always been aspects of Basque culture historically that could be seen as promoting violence it was not until they themselves experienced violent repression at the hands of Franco did Basque culture begin to incorporate an acceptance of violence. Faced with the potential elimination of their language and traditions the Basques began to see violence as the only option left to fight back and when all one knows is violence is understandable that they will eventual turn to violence themselves. The early activities of the ETA during the 1960's were seen as great victories for the Basques. Soon fighting back against Franco through terrorist tactics was seen as not only acceptable but also expected. Unfortunately, this aspect of Basque culture has been difficult to change back even after Franco's death. There are still many Basques who see the treatment of the group by the Spanish government as a continuation of the oppression started by Franco. With the culture of the group changed to accept violence in defence of the group, the terrorist activities continue. As with the Corsicans, many Basques do not condone the activities of the ETA but there are still enough that do not fully reject it to allow for the ETA to function and remain clandestine.[440]

The Russians in Estonia and Latvia have two factors influencing their culture that have made violent protests a non-issue. First, under the nationalist policies of the former Soviet Union Russians were not encouraged to organize around their ethnicity. Early Soviet leaders, starting with Lenin, saw the Russians as a great chauvinist

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[440] It would appear that there are a smaller number of the Basques who continue to accept violence as a part of their culture than Corsicans. There have been more anti-ETA protests by Basques in the past years than seen in Corsica. See the chronologies for each group on the Minorities at Risk Website http://www.minoritiesatrisk.com.

society so while other groups, including eventually the Estonians and Latvians, were encouraged to see themselves as a particular ethnic group and to take pride in that group, the Russians were not. This has left the Russians, particularly those who moved during Soviet times to what is now know as the 'near abroad' with a weak sense of ethnic identity and has left them ill-equipped to organize to a level necessary to become militant. Secondly, the Russian speakers who moved to the Baltic states were heavily influenced by the culture of the titular community and both the Estonians and Latvians pride themselves for having a non-violent culture. The proof behind this pride was the relatively peaceful movement during the 1980's that led to their independence. The Russians, many of whom have lived in the region for more than forty years, could not help but be influenced by the titular culture, which has been adapted into their own. The Russians living in Russia notice a difference in the Russian community in Estonia and Latvia as they are seen to be more placid and more difficult to bring to conflict. This indicates a new culture has developed that has combined the non-violent aspects of the Baltic nations with the lack of national awareness from the Soviet period. The result is a culture that does not see collective action and particularly violence as an option when negotiating with the state.

The fourth hypothesis was broken down into three parts. Each segment on its own would be insufficient to be useful in explaining or predicting behaviour. Together and in conjunction with the third hypotheses they become a valuable tool and can be seen as factors leading to the institutionalization of the culture described in hypothesis three. For example, the level of geographic isolation appears to be an

important factor and due to its isolation from the rest of France the vendetta culture of Corsica has been easier to maintain. While there is obviously a police presence on the island certain violent offences are not prosecuted to the same level in Corsica as on the mainland. This helps reinforce the idea that violence is not as serious an offence as seen in other societies. Their isolation in the interior of the island away from the non-Corsicans also helps maintain the traditions and culture of the group since they are not interacting with others whose values could help change the Corsican values. The same holds true in the Basque country: those who live in the larger Basque cities where there are large populations of non-Basques are the ones who have most rejected the culture of violence developed under Franco. The Basques who live in smaller non-urban centers who have little interaction with non-Basques continue to support the ETA and the culture that does not condone violence in the name of protecting the nation. The Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia are found in the large urban centres in both countries and the majority of Russian speakers live in the two capitals of Tallinn and Riga. For the most part the Russians are surrounded by the titular population.[441] The levels of intermarriage is also growing in both countries. This high level of interaction has increased the influence of the Baltic culture on the Russian community and has made the idea of militant activity less appealing.

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[441] The exception being the almost entirely Russian city of Narva in Estonia. In Narva the lack of activity by the Russians after 1994 can be explained as a mix of a lack of threat to their language and culture due to their overwhelming majority and their proximity to Russia. They see that their standard of living is higher in Estonia and therefore are placated.

In regards to the length of the conflict, there is some evidence that the frustration level is higher in Corsica and the Basque country due to the centuries of conflict between themselves and France and Spain respectively. There is some concern as well that the conflicts in the Baltic states are too new and not enough time has passed to allow for frustrations to reach the point where violence is a possibility. While this may be true, this study found that the length of time a conflict has carried on is less important than the historical time period in which the conflict takes place. Both the Basque and Corsican nationalist movements turned violent in the period after the colonial conflicts in Africa and South East Asia and both groups were heavily influenced by the left-wing militant movements that had won independence for countries such as Algeria and Vietnam. Thus both militant movements became very left-wing, some would say Marxist in ideology and advocated the same armed struggle as described by leaders of those movements. Developing during the 1960's and 1970's exposed the nationalists to a very different ideology than if they had developed earlier or later. The Russian community has been limited ideologically due to the historical time frame it has been forced to operate in. In a post-Soviet society such as Latvia or Estonia it is impossible to turn to Marxist thinkers such as those of the colonial struggle. The Russians needed to convince the Estonians and Latvians that they were not communists and supporters of the Soviet Union and therefore they needed to find a more moderate ideology in which to operate. The Marxist ideology were not acceptable in Eastern Europe in the 1990's which has helped prevent

Russian activists from using it. This lack of an ideology that condones violence has limited the choices available to the Russians.

The final hypothesis that is part of the institutionalization of culture concerns repertoires. It is difficult to prove that the Russians in the Baltic states do not use militant strategies now because they have not used them in the past because this is speculation at best. What is observable is how difficult violence is to stop once it has been used. In both the Basque country and Corsica part of the difficulty in ending the violence is that it has become so much a part of the conflict. There are members of the FLNC and the ETA whose 'careers' involve using violence and it has become a way of life for many and they have been unwilling to give this lifestyle up. In both cases the nationalist groups have taken on aspects of organized crime as they use their knowledge of violence and the intimidation that comes with it to branch out into other areas of crime, including extortion. Partly these activities are used to bankroll the nationalist campaigns but mostly the profits go to the individuals themselves. Breaking this overall cycle of violence has proven difficult for both the French and Spanish authorities.

To review, this study found that in order to predict whether a group will resort to violence the most important factors are the influence of the international community and how the group's culture views violence. This culture is influenced by the level of geographic isolation a group has, the historical time period when the nationalist group developed and possibly by the use of violence in the past. Differences in levels of economic wealth may contribute to a nationalist movement

beginnings and can be used as justification for violence but it is not a necessary condition for a group to chose to use violence or not.

The Future of each Group

Each of the groups discussed throughout this study is at a crossroads in relation to the state. After the defeat of the referendum on greater autonomy during the summer of 2003 it is unclear if France will try again to come to a new agreement with Corsica as this referendum was the culmination of years of negotiations between Corsican and French government officials and represented the best chance for massive changes that could have brought lasting peace and stability to the island. The French government, for this first time, was willing to discuss structural changes to its unitary system. Many of the political leaders on both the island and the mainland invested a lot of political capital during the referendum and its failure indicated to some that the island's problems are not fixable and only embarrassment can come from trying to resolve the conflict. The resulting post-referendum violence seen both on the island and in Nice indicates that there remains a small but dedicated group of nationalists who see violence as their best outlet for collective action.[442] Paul Giacobbi, the President of North Corsica believes that due to this failure, there is little chance of another referendum in Corsica for the next "20 to 30 years".[443] Giacobbi contends that in the wake of the referendum government on the island is now

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[442]   Associated Press (2003) "Separatists in Corsica claim Nice bombings" *International Herald Tribune* 22 July 2003, p.5.

[443]   Telephone interview with Paul Giacobbi, President Haute Corse (North Corsica), March 24 2004.

localized and complex which makes it dangerous and ineffective. Giacobbi's view

corresponds with comments made by the French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in

the wake of the referendum defeat. Sarkozy declared: "The government will respect

their choice, nothing more can be done for that place".[444] Sarkozy went further to say

that in regards to the activities of the FLNC and others that "the age of impunity is

over".[445] Without a political settlement from the French government it will be up to

the Corsican National Assemblies to find solutions and this may require more

inclusion of the nationalist parties in the government.[446] The other consequence of the

defeat of the referendum is that the French state and also Corsican politicians are

unclear as to what exactly the majority of Corsicans want.[447] By rejecting a proposal

that would have provided them more autonomy it is no longer clear if that is the

solution for the island and if only the minority wants outright independence, and the

majority (if only an extremely small one) voted against greater autonomy, why should

future efforts be concerned with autonomy? This is where the Corsican case holds the

potential for greater conflict in the future. If Giacobbi is correct that no new

referendum is coming and that many people who voted no on the 2003 referendum

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[444] Jon Henley (2003) "Corsicans say No to more home rule" *The Guardian*, 7 July 2003.

[445] Reuters (2003) "Corsica Shuns Autonomy, Chirac Airs Regret" *Washington Post*, 6 July 2003.

[446] Ibid.

[447] Interview with Frederic de Touchet, Political Advisor Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE, February 25, 2004 Vienna.

question did so either because they were unhappy with the French government or did not want to side with the FLNC[448] then frustration could build on the island. If in fact the majority of people want greater autonomy (even if they voted against it) then over the next 20 to 30 years people may grow tired of inaction. If this frustration ferments then these people may move ideologically away from being simply nationalists and larger numbers of separatists could develop among the Corsican people. This would impact not only the political system on the island but also the activities of groups such as the FLNC.

There is some reason for optimism in the Basque Country. The majority of the Basques do not actively support the ETA and many Basques see it as a hindrance to any lasting peace agreement. While not supporting the ETA the Basques also felt persecuted by the right-wing government . By banning the separatist political party Batasuna and refusing to negotiate with the Basque government, the PP had created an impasse between the two sides. All Basques, ETA or not, had been painted by the same brush by the government. As a result there was more hostility, no communication and the moderate Basques began to be more nationalist.[449] This culminated with the Basque government's proposed new relationship with the Spanish state in 2003 which called for far greater autonomy than they had ever asked

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[448] Telephone interview with Giacobbi, 2004.

[449] Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director and Spokesperson Elkarri, February 4 2004,
Bilbao.

previously.[450] The relationship between the Spanish government and the Basques had become so strained that it was described by the Basque author and historian Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga as 'poisoned'.[451]

The PP party's hard line with the Basques was portrayed as their own 'war on terrorism'. The PP and the ETA had formed a somewhat symbiotic relationship as the PP used the activities of the ETA as justification for their anti-Basque policies. Due to the violence of the ETA the public throughout Spain supported the measures. The ETA in return used the government's policies as justification for their continued activities.[452] This is why after the tragic terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system in March, 2004 the government was so insistent that it must be the Basques and the ETA specifically that were to blame.[453] The Spanish government's fight against the ETA was popular but its larger war on terrorism and its alliance with the US government was not. When it became apparent that the attack was the work of Islamic terrorists rather than the ETA the backlash by the Spanish people led to the defeat of the PP by the Socialists in the national elections.

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[450] See Eusko Jaurlaritza Gobierno Vasco (2003) *Proposal for the Political Statute of the Community of the Basque Country October 25, 2003* on the Basque government website http://www.euskadi.net/infogv/estatuto_vasco_i.htm.

[451] Telephone interview with Ignacio Sũarez-Zuloaga, Basque Author, February 18 2004.

[452] This concept was described by both Dr. Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez, Director of the Basque Human Rights Institute, February 3 2004, Bilbao and Maria Amor Martin Estebanez, Advisor to the Spanish delegation to the OSCE, February 24 2004, Vienna.

[453] Keith B. Richburg (2004) "Spain Campaigned to Pin Blame on ETA" *Washington Post* 16 March 2004, p.A1.

Out of the tragedy of the Madrid bombings comes some level of hope for Spain with regard to the Basque conflict. First, the public reaction of the Basques in the immediate aftermath of the attack was one of anger directed towards the ETA and it was clear that the public would not tolerate an ETA attack of such magnitude. Second, the ETA had been looking for an opportunity to declare a cease fire in the months leading up to the attack[454] and it appears that they may now choose to unilaterally declare a cease fire. Finally, with the defeat of the PP comes the hope that a Socialist government will be better able to negotiate with all the segments of Basque society. The poisoned relationship has been removed, so there should be a feeling of optimism.[455] This is not to say that with a Socialist government the violence will cease immediately. As former Batasuna Member of Parliament Esther Agirre notes, the Socialists voted with the PP to ban her party.[456] The ETA may try to continue their influence over Basque-Spanish negotiations or risk fading into oblivion. Despite these potential roadblocks the possibility of a negotiated settlement and an end to the violence associated with the ETA is as high now as it has been since the death of Franco. It will require the continuing shift of Basque culture away from the violence of the Franco period and a shift of the culture of the Spanish government to be more open to negotiations and potentially international assistance. The terrorist attack in March 2004 may act as the catalyst for a new relationship between the

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[454] Gorka Espiau 2004.

[455] Maria Amor Martin Estebanez 2004.

[456] Esther Agirre, Former Member of Parliament- Batasuna, February 5 2004, Bilbao.

Basques and the rest of Spain in that it may force both sides to move from their well-established positions and try to negotiate in good faith.

The future for the Russians in Estonia and Latvia is less clear. In March, 2004 the two countries passed their penultimate hurdle to 'joining Europe' by becoming members of NATO. The final step occurs in May 2004 when they will both be admitted to the European Union. By reaching accession Estonia and Latvia have met all of the requirements set out by the EU, including those concerning the treatment of minorities. Clearly from a legal and constitutional point of view the Russians are in a much better position in Estonia and Latvia now compared to even five years earlier but what is less certain is what happens to them after May 2004. As discussed previously the majority of politicians in both countries believe that with accession there is no longer a need for outside recommendations (or even intervention). Most feel that institutions that have been critical in improving the rights of the Russian speaking community are no longer needed. The OSCE High Commissioner is the prime example of an institution that would no longer be needed or welcomed in either country.[457] This causes anxiety among the Russian speakers as they see their most powerful advocate losing their voice in the region.[458] Currently, the European Union is not equipped to handle any future disagreements concerning minorities. It is the belief of some Russian speakers that it will be forced to create new institutions

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[457] As discussed in Chapter 5, this point was most strongly argued by Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8 2004, Tallinn and Valdis Birkavs, Former Prime Minister of Latvia, March 15 2004, Riga.

[458] For example, Vadim Poleshchuk, Legal Advisor- Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

specifically on this issue since not all of the issues in the Baltic have been adequately resolved.[459]

Of the two countries Estonia appears to be closer to successfully integrating their Russian minority. The country has an extensive integration plan which calls for the majority of Russian speakers who want to be integrated and gain their citizenship to do so by 2007.[460] However, there is a difference between integrating to a level high enough to pass state exams and mentally integrating into a society as Aarne Veedla notes that at this point still only 30% of Russians speak Estonian. He believes that it will take another 50 years for the integration process to be fully successful.[461] If it is the goal of the Estonian government to integrate all interested Russians by 2007 and it could take until 2050 before the process is finally complete this leaves a long period of time where a large segment of the Russians in Estonia to remain outside the society and this is where the danger lies for the country. While some Russians will integrate, there will be large numbers who never do and it may be only when all of these people are dead can the society be truly integrated. During this period animosity could grow, particularly if the Russian community remains locked into the lower paying jobs in the country and continue to be denied some political rights. Therefore while Estonia

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[459] This, for example, is the opinion of Boris Tsilevich Former Latvian Member of Parliament and Russian Activist, March 16 2004, Riga.

[460] Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, 2004.

[461] Aarne Veedla, Counselor to the Minister- Office of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 9 2004, Tallinn.

may have weathered the storm when the probability of ethnic violence was high, they are by no means completely free of that possibility.

Latvia is a more potentially dangerous situation. There are several pressing issues in the country that must be resolved before the majority of Russians will be able to successfully integrate. The Latvian government has taken a harder line with regard to the Russian minority compared to Estonia and this has resulted in a more disgruntled population. The main issue that needs to be resolved is allowing non-citizens to vote in local elections.[462] John Packer notes the rest of the world is moving towards allowing non-citizens to vote in local elections while Latvia is one of the few holdouts. For Packer this indicates a lack of trust by the Latvian government towards the Russian non-citizens and if there is no trust on behalf of the government what incentive is there for the Russians to try to integrate?[463] This could widen the divide between the non-citizen Russians and Latvia, particularly when non-citizens from other EU countries will be able to vote in local elections but the Russians will not.

The Russian-speakers in Latvia have shown a willingness to engage in minimum collective action around the issue of education reform in larger numbers than other issues in the past and they have managed to gain some concessions from the government due to these protests and campaigns.[464] Tsilevich also contends that

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[462] As discussed previously this is already the case in Estonia.

[463] John Packer, Director, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 19 2004, The Hague.

[464] Illze Brand Kehris, Director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies, March 15 2004, Riga.

the issue of educational reforms is the one issue that could lead to very high tensions between the two sides.[465] If the Latvian government continues its hard line approach on issues that appear to have relatively simply solutions then there is the possibility of violence (even though this study has shown the factors that have prevented it in the past and make it less likely presently). As Packer notes in regards to Latvia: "it won't take a lot of violence to change how people act".[466] The first few years as a part of the European Union will be crucial in determining the future relationship of both Estonia and Latvia and the Russian minority, particularly those who remain non-citizens.

Future Work

In many ways this study has led to more questions than actual concrete answers. This study has addressed the importance of the role of the international community, economics, culture and the institutionalization of that culture in explaining the groups' decision making there are other factors that could be and should be examined.

One such issue is whether or not being indigenous to a region increases the possibility of violence. While many have been there several generations, the Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia moved from other areas of the Soviet Union, while the Basques and the Corsicans are native to their regions. It is possible that the sense of homeland is an important explanation for why some groups choose to

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[465]   Interview with Boris Tsilevich, 2004.

[466]   Interview with John Packer, 2004.

employ violence.[467] In order to address this topic would have greatly lengthened this study and was therefore outside of its scope. This would also be a very difficult factor to effectively analyze. Despite the difficulties in examining the issue further it may be an important explanatory variable and should be studied in the future.

A second issue that needs to be addressed is if the findings of this study carry over to other regions outside of Europe. The history of Europe is unique and therefore some of the findings in this study may not prove to be as important elsewhere throughout the world. However, the importance of the international community in particular may be of increased importance within Europe. The level of involvement in the internal relationship between the states of Eastern Europe and their minority groups by institutions such as the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the European Union are unprecedented. This has influenced not only the minority groups directly affected (such as the Russians in Estonia and Latvia) but also those ethnic groups within Europe who did not receive the same level of intervention (the Basques and Corsicans). While economic issues were only partially able to explain the groups' activities, in other regions around the world they may also play a more significant role. To test these findings therefore, future work should examine minority groups in Africa or Asia and test the same hypotheses. It could also be possible to stay within Europe and test the hypotheses further as well. The cases chosen for this study were selected because they appear to lie outside the normal pattern of minority group/state relations. Based on the findings of the study other cases can be re-

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[467] This theory is seen most predominantly in the work of Anthony D. Smith as described in Chapter 2.

examined as well. While other theories may have explained why the majority of groups act how they do, the importance of the issues discussed above may have been overlooked.

The final example of further work that results from this study is the need for a more in-depth understanding of group culture and its ability to predict violence. This study attempted to understand the cultures of the various groups through elite interviews and secondary research. The results appear compelling as the descriptions of the groups' cultures by elites corresponded with what others had derived. While people have a natural tendency to look more favorably on their own culture which can result in somewhat biased answers to questions regarding their culture, this does not mean that their opinions are without value. At worst their answers illustrate how the groups' culture is portrayed by elites and this shapes the relationship between the two sides. At best, their answers provide a clear insight into the background of a group which outsiders could not derive on their own. Further analysis should be done however to incorporate other methods to ensure the best possible understanding of how a group's culture is developed. This could involve 'thicker' description and observation or possibly quantitative analysis based on survey results.[468] All of these methods would enhance the understanding of culture but due to time and financial restrictions they were far outside the scope of this study. Due to the finding in this study that culture and the institutionalization of that culture is a leading explanation

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[468]   Past attempts at quantitative coding of culture has proven difficult, as seen in the Minorities at Risk Project. Tracking changes to culture has proven even more difficult.

for the groups' choices this is therefore an issue that should be studied further with a variety of methods so that it can be further understood.

Final Remarks

There are other larger ethnic groups in Europe than the Basques in Spain. There are more violent conflicts than the Corsicans. For many Estonia and Latvia are small, unimportant countries on the northeast tip of Europe. While all of this may be true it does not discount the importance of the findings of this study. The patterns identified in the pages above indicate that accurate assessments of ethnic group behavior can be made if the right factors are considered. Corsica and the Basque country are as far away from Estonia and Latvia as possible while remaining in Europe and yet patterns of behavior were identified common to all. For example, the international community appears to have an enormous role in preventing ethnic conflict throughout Europe. It has always been assumed that there was a powerful role for the international community but these cases show the impact of both intervention and a lack of intervention. This study has shown that groups that are not receiving international attention are aware that others are and this is influencing their behavior.

This study also showed the importance of understanding the culture of a group as all four appear to have group-wide traits. These traits make violence either more or less acceptable and for groups where violence is more accepted, it may take less provocation for them to resort to violence. For groups whose culture shies away from violence it will take substantially more for them to resort to militant actions. It is acknowledged that a culture foreign to one's own generally and that cultures view of

violence specifically can be very difficult to accurately observe and analyze but this study indicates that it is worth the effort. It requires an understanding of the group's history in order to identify if and when a culture could change. It requires understanding the biases of those who have been asked to describe their own culture in regards to violence. It also requires trust in other scholars who have come to their own conclusions on a group's culture. Taken together it is possible to come to a reasonable understanding of the culture and how violence is viewed within it. There may come a day when culture may be easier to analyze. With vast resources and careful polling and statistical analysis it may be possible to turn a group's culture into numerical values. Until that day however, this study has shown that any knowledge of culture is better than nothing and it is imperative that it must be considered in any analysis of a group's decision making. Culture is the filter through which all groups operate. This culture is influenced by outside forces and can change and become institutionalized. Resorting to or avoiding violence goes through the filter as do all other factors. By accounting for the role of culture and how the group views that culture allows scholars to begin to understand the thought process that leads a group, or individuals in that group, to a specific point. Knowledge of a group's culture can not only help explain how they got to that decision, it can also help predict where they will go from there. This takes a great deal of time and patience, but the results appear to be well worth the effort. While small, these four groups have shown us a great deal into what can cause ethnic violence, and more importantly, what can prevent it. Better risk assessment is possible based on the findings of this study. What

has been learned through these groups can now be used and tested elsewhere in the

hope that ethnic conflict and the pain and suffering that goes with it can be avoided in

the future.

Appendix- Sample Interview Questions

Interview with Paul-Eerik Rummo, Estonian Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs, March 8, 2004 Tallinn
Length of Interview: 1.5 hours

Prepared Questions:

1) How successful in your opinion has the integration of the Russian minority been?

2) What role did the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities play in this process?

3) Please talk about the difficult choices between adhering to the European Union accession requirements and protecting Estonian society.

4) What will the relationship be between Estonia and the High Commissioner be once Estonia gains EU membership?

5) What is the relationship between the government and the Russian minority currently?

6) What concerns you more, the Russian dominated city of Narva or the large number of Russians living in Tallinn?

7) How important is continued economic success to the relationship between Estonians and Russian Estonians?

8) Was the possibility of violence ever a real concern?

9) What role does culture play in the level of co-operation and integration?

10) How was the integration process handled differently in Estonia compared to Latvia?

Subsequent questioned asked as a result of previous answers

1) How will EU membership change integration strategies?

2) Why have Russian-based political parties done so poorly in recent elections?

3) Do you look to any countries in particular for a model of inter-ethnic co-operation?

4) How will the free movement of migrants within the European Union impact Estonia society?

5) How often do you discuss ethnic issues with your Latvian counter-part?

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