

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: EROTIC LANGUAGE AS DRAMATIC ACTION IN
PLAYS BY LYLY AND SHAKESPEARE

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This study closely examines the language of desire in the dramatic works of John Lyly and William Shakespeare, and argues that contemplative and analytical speeches about desire function as modes of action in their plays. Erotic speeches do more than express desire in a purely descriptive or perlocutionary capacity distinct from the action of the play—they incite, circulate, and create eros for characters, exposing audiences to the inner workings of the desiring mind and body. For many of Lyly's and Shakespeare's characters, words come to *constitute* erotic experience. My approach to dramatic language draws from the work of cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson who argue that our basic conceptual system, according to which we think, speak, and act, is metaphorical in nature. My focus on primary metaphors, which are based on sensorimotor experience, foregrounds the interdependence of erotic language and early modern notions of embodiment. Since language, thought, and action are all subject to this embodied metaphorical system, conceptual metaphors allow Lyly and Shakespeare to

dramatize the often invisible, paradoxical, and potentially unknowable experience of erotic desire.

My understanding of language as dramatic action derives from a theory about the attribution of human motives that Kenneth Burke, in *The Grammar of Motives* (1945), called dramatism. Burke uses five key terms to address human motivation—Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose—and I in turn use each of these terms to make sense of erotic desire on the early modern stage. I begin my study by exploring conceptual metaphors of physical motion that characterize desire as an action rather than a state of mind. In my second chapter, I investigate metaphors of permeability that dramatize erotic desire as a rupture between “agents” and their “scenes,” between self and world. My third chapter analyzes “purpose” and “agency”—the ways characters *make* intimate relationships—by exploring metaphors in which eros is conceptualized as a dynamic process of creation.

EROTIC LANGUAGE AS DRAMATIC ACTION
IN PLAYS BY LYLLY AND SHAKESPEARE

by

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	ii
<u>Introduction</u>	1
“Things untold are undone”: Erotic Language as Dramatic Action	
<u>Chapter 1</u>	24
“I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do”: Desire as Act	
I. The Name of Action	25
II. “My desire... did spur me forth”	30
The Event Structure Metaphor	
III. “Entrapped in love”	36
Metaphors of Desire in Lyly	
IV. “Our raging motions”	52
Metaphors of Desire in Shakespeare	
<u>Chapter 2</u>	79
“More than all the world”: Intimacy and the Scene-Agent Ratio	
I. Where is Silvia?	81
Containment and Permeability	
II. “A petty world of myself”	90
Permeability and Desire in Lyly’s <i>Endymion</i>	
III. Binding the Void	109
Erotics of the Scene in <i>Antony and Cleopatra</i>	
<u>Chapter 3</u>	141
“Love’s use”: Agency and Purpose of Erotic Desire	
I. Subject, Object, Instrument	141
II. The Means and Ends of Erotic Desire in Lyly’s <i>Campaspe</i> . . .	146
III. “You lie, in faith”	180
Making Marriage in <i>The Taming of the Shrew</i>	
<u>Conclusion</u>	202
The Success of Failure and Beyond	
Appendix A: Desire Metaphors in Lyly and Shakespeare	208
Appendix B: Erotic Language in Plays by Lyly	211
Appendix C: Erotic Language in Plays by Shakespeare	247
Bibliography	284

Introduction

“Things untold are undone” Erotic Language as Dramatic Action

For Shakespeare’s Troilus, erotic language is dramatic action. Things happen to him as he speaks these lines:

I am giddy. Expectation whirls me round.
Th’imaginary relish is so sweet
That it enchants my sense. What will it be
When that the wat’ry palates taste indeed
Love’s thrice-repured nectar? Death, I fear me,
Swooning destruction, or some joy too fine,
Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness
For the capacity of my ruder powers.
I fear it much, and I do fear besides
That I shall lose distinction in my joys
As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps,
The enemy flying.

*(Troilus and Cressida 3.2.16-27)*¹

While awaiting Cressida in the orchard, Troilus experiences giddiness and “sweet” pleasure, followed by fear, first of a “joy too fine” and then of “losing distinction in [his] joys.” His desire for Cressida “whirls” and “enchants” him even as he stands alone onstage, arguably doing nothing at all except talking to himself, or perhaps to us. Troilus undoubtedly is different at the end of his soliloquy than when he began: his initial giddiness gives way to, or is supplemented by, fear—fear of a very particular kind of loss. Speaking his desire, even to himself, is enough to change him, and change is the surest marker of action. But how does this change occur, and what can it tell us about the workings of erotic desire on the early modern English stage?

¹ All quotations of Shakespeare’s plays are from *The Complete Pelican Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Orgel and A.R. Braunmuller (New York: Penguin, 2002).

These questions begin to address the relationship between erotic language and desire that is the focus of my dissertation. In this study, I argue that erotic speeches do more than express desire—they incite, circulate, and create desire for characters and for audiences. My dissertation analyzes some of the richest and most potent erotic language in plays by John Lyly and William Shakespeare. I discuss the advantages of examining Lyly’s language alongside Shakespeare’s later in this introduction; for the moment, suffice it to say that although they wrote for different types of theaters and only partially-overlapping audiences, both dramatists created characters who speak erotic language at considerable length and in extraordinary depth. For such characters, words *constitute* erotic experience. While Troilus waits for Cressida to appear in the orchard, erotic language acts on him and it alters him. It even objectifies him: Eros is the subject of his action verbs. It is “expectation” that “whirls [him] round”; “imaginary relish” that “enchants [his] sense”; and his “joys” are what “charge on heaps.” Desire is happening *to* Troilus, whose only “I” in the soliloquy governs verbs of being (“I am giddy”), of feeling (“I fear”), and of loss (“I shall lose...”). It might be argued that he is merely imagining future events, but is not the act of imagining itself a source of drama in the present? The prospect of future pleasures is enough to create present-tense fear (“I *do* fear”) and even present-tense pleasure (“th’imaginary relish *is* so sweet / That it *enchants*”). By imagining, conceptualizing, and articulating his erotic desire, Troilus experiences its terrors and joys through the action of speaking.

My study of the interplay of erotic speech and action responds to longstanding critical questions about the relationship between linguistic representation and erotic desire, both on and off the stage, within and beyond the early modern period. Most

theorists have conceived of this relationship in terms of lack, emphasizing the gap between language and the erotic experience it struggles to name. As Judith Butler puts it, “language is bound to founder on the question of desire.”² The failure of language to approximate or represent erotic desire lies at the core of the psychoanalytic narratives that have been the touchstone for several generations of scholarship on early modern desire.³

According to Butler,

Desire guarantees a certain opacity in language, an opacity that language can enact and display, but without which it cannot operate. We can’t trust language to give us a clear picture of desire, because they’re bound up together. No exposition of desire can escape becoming implicated in that which it seeks to clarify.⁴

My study of erotic language shifts emphasis from what Butler calls the “exposition of desire” to erotic desire understood semantically and performatively. Although erotic desire can function in a purely descriptive, expository, or perlocutionary capacity distinct from the action of the play, it also can become a mode of dramatic action, provoking the desires of characters onstage and exposing audiences to the inner workings of the desiring mind and body. Even though Troilus’s speaking situation arises from a certain kind of lack—of Cressida’s physical presence and of the sexual release he anticipates—his words still create a dynamic erotic experience as he speaks them. By shifting our attention away from the failures of language, my dissertation asks, what can words *accomplish* for characters who experience erotic desire? My approach to the study of Shakespeare’s and Lyly’s language emphasizes the potential of Troilus’s words to create

² See Butler’s essay “Desire,” in *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, 2nd ed., edited by Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 369-85, 370.

³ Two foundational studies are Janet Adelman, *Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest* (New York: Routledge, 1992), and Valerie Traub, *Desire and Anxiety: Circulations in Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁴ Butler, “Desire,” 369.

sexual desire and even pleasure, foregrounding the question, what does erotic language *do* on the early modern stage?

My theoretical and methodological approach to the study of erotic language is indebted to two critical traditions that share an emphasis on the dramatic and active properties of language: dramatism, a theory of human motives developed by Kenneth Burke in *A Grammar of Motives* (1945), and the work of cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who also study the connections between language, thought, and action. Later in this introduction, I will address the ways in which Kenneth Burke's dramatism has shaped the argument and the structure of my dissertation. Although his *Grammar of Motives* predates the field of cognitive linguistics by a few decades, Burke's focus on the dramatic properties of language—not simply the expressive but the creative potential of words—is a basic feature of most cognitive approaches to language.⁵ Dramatism and cognitive linguistics both provide essential tools for my study of the mechanics of Shakespeare's and Lyly's speeches, from the grammar of their verbs to the entailments of their metaphors.

Because cognitive linguistics emphasizes the interdependence of linguistic structures, the embodied mind, and lived experience, it opens up new ways of understanding how Lyly's and Shakespeare's words dramatize the often invisible, inward, and deeply embodied experience of erotic desire. Desire itself is understood differently in cognitive theory, which breaks away from Lacanian models in which desire

⁵ The field of cognitive linguistics developed in the 1970s out of research on the connections between language and extra-linguistic phenomena (its cognitive and communicative contexts). The website of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association provides a basic history of the field (see Suzanne Kemmer, "About Cognitive Linguistics: Historical Background," *ICLA* [2002], <http://www.cognitivelinguistics.org/cl.shtml>). For a comprehensive survey of the field, see William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, eds., *Cognitive Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

is believed to be a product of the fragmentation of the self. Cognitive theory instead posits that desire plays a fundamental role in the emergence and formation of the self. As Mary Thomas Crane writes, “a cognitive approach...emphasizes a feeling of presence (rather than lack) as the basis of the self.... Desire is seen to be bound up with the emergence of both consciousness and thought... [r]ather than a Lacanian scenario of desire emerging from a sense of loss in the mirror stage that is intensified by the acquisition of language.”⁶ My own work draws from this cognitive approach to desire in two ways. First, I treat language as constitutive of erotic desire, exploring the potential of words to create eros and conjure the beloved, rather than marking a lack, loss, or absence. Second, my analysis of language aims to understand the way characters experience eros *by analyzing how they conceptualize it*. Language, according to cognitive theory, is a product of cognition—thus, to study erotic speech is to access how a character conceptualizes desire.

It may seem odd or even counter-intuitive to consider erotic experiences such as desire, pleasure, or fantasy, in cognitive terms. Is eros really a cognitive event, something we “conceptualize”? Given all of the body parts that are involved in erotic experience, is the *mind* the place where love or lust or desire are experienced? According to many of Shakespeare’s and Lyly’s characters, yes, it is. Shakespeare’s Berowne tells Rosaline of his “wooing mind” (*Love’s Labors Lost* 5.2.413), and Helena tells us in the opening scene of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* that “Love looks not with the eyes but with the mind” (1.1.234). Any number of Shakespeare’s sonnets debate this point. Lyly’s love-struck nymph Telusa first feels the pangs of erotic desire as “new conceits”

⁶ See Mary Thomas Crane, *Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 95-96.

that “breed in thy mind” (*Galatea* 3.1.1-2).⁷ Of course, the mind does not operate in isolation from the body, particularly when we consider all of the early modern notions of embodiment according to which the body and the mind relate reciprocally, both to one another and to the outside world. Recent scholarship on humoral theory has illuminated the interpermeability of the early modern body, mind, and world, all of which were composed of the same four humors. Connected at the most basic level of material substance, the desiring body and mind were one and the same. Gail Kern Paster describes the mind-body connection as “psychophysiological”; emotional, mental, and psychic experiences were inextricable from the physical body and the world that contained them.⁸ Love in particular was understood in material terms, sometimes as a humoral imbalance but even as a physical disease. Robert Burton devotes the third of three sections that comprise *The Anatomy of Melancholy* to the subject of “Love melancholy,” detailing the physical causes, symptoms, and potential cures for the illness.⁹ Different medical tracts from the period locate lovesickness in various parts of the body (the liver, the eyes, and the heart are among the most common), but most agree that the disease circulated throughout the body and brain, emphasizing its power to afflict the mind.¹⁰

⁷ All quotations of Lyly’s *Galatea* are from *The Revels Plays John Lyly Galatea and Midas*, ed. G.K. Hunter and David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

⁸ Gail Kern Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 19.

⁹ See Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, especially the Third Partition, “Love melancholy.” (Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicholas K. Kiessling, and Rhonda L. Blair, vol. 3 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994].)

¹⁰ Burton notes that “the Symptoms of the minde in Lovers, are almost infinite, and so diverse, that no Art can comprehend them” (148). For a comprehensive study of lovesickness in the early modern period, see Mary Frances Wack, *Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: The Viaticum and its Commentaries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990). Early modern medical accounts of lovesickness include Jacques Ferrand’s 1610 tract, *A treatise on lovesickness*, trans. and ed. Donald Beecher and Massimo Ciavolella (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), and the English translation of André Du Laurens’ *A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight* (1599). I am grateful to Ian Frederick Moulton for pointing out a passage from *A Discourse* in his seminar paper for the Shakespeare Association of America meeting (Boston, 2012) in which Du Laurens details love’s physical movement throughout the body: “Love

Although our understanding of the scientific underpinnings of the mind-body continuum has changed considerably during the last four hundred years, their connection is still understood to be as rich and complex as it was in Lyly's and Shakespeare's day. The reciprocal relationship between body and mind also lies at the core of contemporary cognitive theory. Paster has noted the similarities between early modern humoral theory and more recent cognitive theories of the embodied mind: "such an emphasis on the biological functionality of the passions sounds strikingly like the interest of modern cognitive science in the evolution of the emotions."¹¹ According to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the first of the three major findings of cognitive science is that "the mind is inherently embodied... in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the commonalities of our bodies and the environments we live in."¹² Lakoff and Johnson emphasize the role of our physical and spatial orientation in the world as a primary source for our cognitive patterning. When Troilus talks of anticipation as a force that "whirls" him, he conceptualizes erotic desire in physical and spatial terms. To experience erotic "expectation" as a physical force that can send one's body into frenzied motion is to conceptualize desire as an action, and perhaps more significantly for Troilus's particular experience, it is to conceptualize oneself as a separate entity vulnerable to desire's whims and subject to its power.

therefore having abused the eyes... and passing without any perserverance in this sort through the veines unto the liver, doth suddenly imprint a burning desire to obtaine the thing, which is or seemeth worthie to be beloved, setteth concupiscence on fire, and beginneth by this desire all the strife and contention: but fearing her selfe too weake to incounter with reason, the principal part of the minde, she posteth in haste to the heart."

¹¹ Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 18.

¹² See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 3 and 6. According to Lakoff and Johnson, thoughts are embedded in our basic sensory experiences: "An embodied concept is a neural system that is actually a part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, therefore, sensorimotor inference" (20).

Of course the best evidence for the profound interdependence of erotic and conceptual experience is found in the language of Lyly's and Shakespeare's characters. Troilus's speech provides a telling example of the role of cognition in the experience of erotic desire and even pleasure. He spends many of his lines detailing his fear of the sexual pleasures that await him, and although we might expect him to be frightened of their intensity or sheer force, it is their *nuance* and *refinement* that scare him the most. He worries about pleasures that are "too fine, / Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness / For the capacity of my ruder powers" (21-23). While the intensity of his impending orgasm is the source of some trepidation (Troilus does use the word "potent" in his account), it is the acuteness of his pleasures (his joys will be "too *subtle-potent*") that unnerves him, because he may not have the requisite perceptual and conceptual acuity to process them. Put another way, Troilus is afraid of his inability to *conceive of* his pleasure. It is as though his conceptual system is too coarse a sieve to capture the fine grain of the "joys" that await him, dooming them to be lost to him forever. According to Troilus, it is our ability to *process* erotic experience mentally that grants us access to it—action and contemplation are both vital ingredients in erotic experience. Not only is erotic pleasure potentially meaningless and inaccessible without the ability to make sense of it, but Troilus's conceptual failing is akin to "death" (20) and "destruction" (21). The stakes are high for Troilus (as they are for Bassanio and Romeo), whose words do more than narrate erotic experience. They engender fear and pleasure, they "whirl" and "charge on" him: they make eros happen by *making erotic meaning*.

As Troilus's fears become more pronounced, so do the connections he draws between cognitive and erotic experience. He ends his speech by naming a new fear, the source of which is found in Troilus himself rather than in the pleasures that await him:

I do fear besides
That I shall lose distinction in my joys
As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps,
The enemy flying. (24-27)

To be overwhelmed by such powerful sexual pleasures constitutes for Troilus not an ecstatic fantasy but a nightmare; sexual release becomes a threat both to his sense of self and to his cognitive faculties. At risk in the loss of “distinction” is not only the power to discriminate—to identify, isolate and define each joy—but to distinguish himself from Cressida amidst lovemaking. Such “distinction” is, then, profoundly physical and embodied; at the same time, its loss jeopardizes for Troilus access to, and knowledge of, erotic pleasure. Although his fear may seem hyperbolic or unwarranted, maintaining distinction is crucially his means of experiencing eros.

This is also the means by which Lyly and Shakespeare dramatize eros: by shaping a character's desire into words, they give it distinction, what Shakespeare's Theseus calls “a local habitation and a name” (*A Midsummer Night's Dream* 5.1.17). Although Theseus's account of language appears quite static—words are where “things unknown” are housed, where they are fixed, captured, and pinned down—his story of how poetic language is produced is extraordinarily dynamic:

The poet's eye, in fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes... (5.1.12-17)

A few lines earlier in his speech, Theseus compares poets to lovers, showing how lovers share in the kind of “frenz[ied]” imaginative activity he ascribes to the poet. The words of lovers are as dynamic as are Theseus’s verbs: erotic language “bodies forth” erotic experience (and even sometimes an absent beloved), and it “turns” unknown fears, fantasies, and pleasures “to shapes.” Because language is our window into conceptual and inward experience, the language of erotic desire on the early modern English stage *must* be active and dramatic.

A close look at the “shapes” which comprise Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s erotic language reveals this language to be conspicuously metaphorical. Both playwrights make use of rich, complex conceptual metaphors to dramatize erotic desire. The study of metaphors that enable us to conceptualize our everyday experiences in language is the work of cognitive linguists. George Lakoff defines “metaphor” as “*a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system*.” The term *metaphorical expression* refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping (this is what the word *metaphor* referred to in the old theory).¹³ Take, for example, the “argument is war” metaphor: the features of wars are mapped onto the experience of argument.¹⁴ In this instance, war is the “source domain” because it is being used to conceptualize, or “profile,” the more abstract “target domain” of argument. Mapping across domains creates a whole host of entailments that allow us to generate novel metaphors about arguments as war (e.g., “she attacked his thesis” and “I had to defend my side”). Lakoff draws a sharp distinction between metaphor and a

¹³ George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” *Metaphor and Thought*, 2nd Ed, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), cited from http://www.ac.wvu.edu/~market/semiotic/lkof_met.html.

¹⁴ See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), for a more extensive discussion of the “argument is war” metaphor and its entailments.

metaphorical expression. The former is crucially *not* a feature of language. Instead, a metaphor is a way of conceptualizing (not articulating) experience. A metaphorical expression is the linguistic counterpart of metaphor. According to Lakoff and Johnson, “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.”¹⁵

Conceptual metaphor theory can help us understand how Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters experience, think about, and talk about erotic desire. Lakoff and Johnson emphasize the power of metaphors to structure our experiences of the target domains they elaborate. So, for example, characters who tap into metaphors of desire as a physical struggle experience desire as a physical struggle. Troilus’s speech exemplifies this metaphor: his anticipation is a physical force that “whirls him,” and his joys are armies “that charge on heaps.” This is to conceptualize sexual desire and pleasure as physical struggles and Troilus as victim. Because Troilus conceptualizes desire as a struggle, his metaphors deploy the elements from this source domain. Both the content and the structure of each source domain shape our experience of the target. The skeletal structure of the source domain, according to Lakoff and Mark Turner, is known as a “schema.”¹⁶ Each schema has slots, which stand for participants in the schema, or elements that are to be filled in. In the example of desire as a physical struggle, the slots would include an aggressor, a victim, a physical encounter, perhaps a weapon, some kind of motive, etc. Each of these slots profiles the participants of the desire domain. The metaphor itself constrains us to assign particular roles (e.g., aggressor, victim) and

¹⁵ Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 3.

¹⁶ See George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), especially “Part II – The Power of Poetic Metaphor.”

relations between the roles (e.g., the aggressor attacks/ destroys/“charge[s] on” the victim), even though these may not be necessary parts of the target domain or pertain to other metaphors. Desire as a journey does not have a “victim” slot.

Recent work on conceptual metaphor theory suggests that lived, physical experiences produce our most basic metaphors. Joseph Grady identifies a special class of metaphor called “primary metaphors,” or deeply entrenched metaphorical patterns, which are based on experiential correlations.¹⁷ Grady discusses the cross-cultural definition of “coldness” as “lacking in emotion.” Languages ranging from Latin to Chinese to Old Irish associate coldness with indifference. There is, unsurprisingly, a similar association between heat or warmth and aroused emotion. Grady’s primary metaphors are based on our physical experiences, not on shared features between source and target domains. That is, we feel warm when we experience affection, or any extreme emotion such as love or anger. Moreover, extreme emotion *causes* the change in body temperature. So, while other instances of metaphor may be considered correlations, there is a class of primary metaphors that have causal relationships.

Because it is both abstract and physical, conceptual and experiential, erotic desire is a particularly interesting object for scrutiny using conceptual metaphor theory. Conceptual metaphor theory would have it that complex ideas and emotions are understood in terms of tangible, physically-based source domains, such as temperature and motion. But temperature and motion, to name only two, are key ingredients in the experience of desire (especially the early modern caloric analysis of desire, according to which the heat generated during lovemaking made for a better chance of conception).

¹⁷ Joseph Grady, “Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration,” *Journal of Pragmatics*, 37 (2005): 1595-614.

When we feel erotic attraction, our body temperatures rise, our blood circulates more quickly. We get butterflies in our stomach (another metaphor) and our pulse accelerates. We sweat. Our mouths water. Our bodies move, stiffen, swell. Hence the relationship between physical source domains and the target domain of erotic desire is especially complex. Sometimes we use a particular metaphor because of correlations or shared characteristics between the two domains. At other times, we rely on primary metaphors to elaborate an experience of desire, revealing how difficult it is to abstract desire from the physical sensations it generates in our bodies.

My study of erotic language in Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays is, at its core, a study of the principal erotic metaphors that they employ. In the appendices to my dissertation, I chart the entailments of, and the relationships among, some of these playwrights' more prominent metaphors, along with examples of erotic language from their plays. Because conceptual metaphors emerge in language, because they are fundamental features of cognition, and because they are embodied, analyzing such metaphors foregrounds the connections between erotic language, thought, and action on the early modern English stage. Alongside the work of cognitive linguists, my understanding of erotic language as dramatic action derives, as I have noted, from Kenneth Burke's dramatism. While Burke does not treat the subject of erotic desire in particular, he does focus on the attribution of motives, a topic closely related to desire in all of its forms. Desire – for power, for survival, for closeness or contact – is a fundamental human motive. Burke begins by posing the question, "What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?", a question which

establishes the strong linguistic component in his survey.¹⁸ Investigating the ways we linguistically attribute motives, Burke develops his grammar according to five key terms that situate human motivation: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. His terms give us a cognitive and linguistic scheme for analyzing (respectively): what happened, in what situation the action occurred, who acted, by what means the action was performed, and the reason behind the action. All of this falls under the rubric “dramatism” because “it invites one to consider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from the analysis of drama, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action.”¹⁹ Since I argue that the language of desire has a dynamic and kinetic power in early modern drama, often changing the course of a play’s action and its audience’s response, Burke’s work is extremely apt.

Burke’s dramatism emphasizes the ability of words to *do*—to create action, to make meaning, to constitute experience. His study of language derives from drama but it also extends beyond its bounds. Debra Hawhee writes about Burke’s tendency “to figure verbalizations as acts themselves.”²⁰ Burke’s approach to language illuminates the erotic experience of characters like Lyly’s Phao, who can hardly distinguish between erotic language and love in the first place. Upon falling in love with Sappho, Phao tells himself,

Let thy love hang at thy heart’s bottom, not at the tongue’s brim. Things untold are undone; there can be no greater comfort than to know much, nor any less labour than to say nothing. But, ah, thy beauty, Sappho, thy

¹⁸ Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), xv. Hereafter cited as *GM*.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, xxii.

²⁰ See Debra Hawhee, “Language as Sensuous Action: Sir Richard Paget, Kenneth Burke, and Gesture-Speech Theory,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92, no. 4 (2006): 331-54, 342. Hawhee refers to Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes Toward History*, 1st ed. Vol. 2. (New York: The New Republic, 1937), 1e, 2: 249.

beauty! Beginnest thou to blab? Ay, blab it, Phao, as long as thou blabbest her beauty.

(2.4.28-34)²¹

Phao's astounding reason for holding his tongue is that "things untold are undone." The words "untold" and "undone" are increasingly problematic in the context of Phao's speech because, while he struggles over the question of telling Sappho his feelings, he is telling himself in this speech, and telling us. It seems, therefore, that he *is* "doing" whatever it is that one does when "blabb[ing]" these feelings. What does Phao mean by "undone"? Is it his hope that keeping his feelings secret will make them untrue, or not real, for him as well as for his beloved? But Phao does not say that things untold are *untrue*—he says they are *undone*. What is clear from this line is that, for Phao, "to say" is to act; he makes a powerful connection between saying and feeling, between "blabbing" and loving.

The connection that Phao explores is representative of the erotic language in much of Lyly's drama. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the language of desire is spoken and explored more exhaustively by Lyly's characters than by any others in the sixteenth century.²² Almost all of his plays are about erotic desire, and almost all of them have been characterized at one point or another as un-dramatic.²³ To date, most scholarship on Lyly's drama has characterized his plays as largely allegorical, interesting mostly for their euphuistic style and for their commentaries on Elizabeth's court but generally lacking in dynamism. G.K. Hunter has observed that Lyly's comedies "depend

²¹ All quotations of Lyly's *Sappho and Phao* are from *The Revels Plays John Lyly Campaspe and Sappho and Phao*, ed. G.K. Hunter and David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

²² Compelling evidence for this claim may be found in my very lengthy Appendix B, which lists examples of erotic language from Lyly's plays.

²³ See for example Mary Beth Rose, *The Expense of Spirit: Love and Sexuality in English Renaissance Drama* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), who describes Lyly's "view of sexual love as abstract and impersonal, polarized, static, emotionally simple, and morally predictable" (35). For "undramatic," see 26.

on a much more static and passive mode of contemplating and analyzing the conflicting emotions of love.”²⁴ While I agree with Hunter’s claim that contemplation and analysis comprise a good portion of Lyly’s drama, my dissertation challenges his characterization of these activities as “static.” My study of Lyly’s dramatic language reveals that erotic contemplation, even analysis, can be vibrant, frenzied actions on a stage. The active language of anticipation and fantasy, insinuation and confession, permeates Lyly’s plays as they dramatize a variety of erotic experiences. Lyly’s *Campaspe* and *Sappho and Phao* stage the overpowering desires of monarchs who struggle to maintain control and authority when burdened by the oppressive weight of love. In *Galatea*, *Love’s Metamorphosis*, *The Woman in the Moon*, and *Mother Bombie*, Lyly explores the confusions and misdirections of erotic desire by dramatizing disguised identities and changing attitudes toward chastity and sexuality. Lyly’s *Endymion* is one of the few early modern plays that dwells and remains in the realm of erotic desire. It is not hard to see why David Bevington describes it as “uneventful” twice in his introduction to the Revels Plays edition of *Endymion*, since after five acts of so-called drama, the play ends more or less where it began.²⁵ So what makes *Endymion* dramatic, besides the fact that it is, generically, a drama? What happens to Lyly’s hero? Or to pose a more apt question for this dissertation, what does he *do* in the play? The answer must be that Endymion desires. He does not attain, he does not marry, he does not really even court or seduce. He solely, and fiercely, wants. Wanting is the main event, the protagonist’s primary action, in Lyly’s play. And as in so many others of Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays, the hero’s desire is dramatized through speech.

²⁴ G.K. Hunter, introduction to *Galatea* in *The Revels Plays John Lyly Galatea and Midas*, 3-25, 15.

²⁵ See Bevington’s introduction to the Revels Plays *Endymion* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). First the play is “seemingly uneventful” (21) and then progresses to “largely uneventful” (52).

My emphasis on the active properties of Lyly's erotic language contributes to recent work by scholars such as Kent Cartwright, who calls for a reassessment of Hunter's claim about the static nature of his plays. "Although Lyly's plays have been treated by modern critics as static and intellectual dramas of ideas," Cartwright argues, "*Galathea* generates emotional and visceral delight from not exactly ideas, but a pleasurable 'confusion' that displays theatrical values one expects from popular plays."²⁶ Cartwright's study of theatricality and dynamism in *Galathea* is a marked departure from much of the scholarship on desire in Lyly's plays. Earlier criticism of Lyly's work tends to focus more on his prose works than his drama, and it is mostly occupied with close formal analysis of allegory and euphuism in his drama.²⁷ Ruth Lunney's 2011 collection of essays on John Lyly (the first compilation of its kind) offers some useful categories for the types of scholarship typical of Lylyan studies over the past half century.²⁸ She divides her edition into four parts: "Lessons in Wit," which studies the *Euphues* books as Lyly's contributions to humanist education; "Courting the Queen," which focuses on the political aspects of Lyly's plays; "Playing with Desire," which considers the subject of love in several of his works; and "Performing Lyly," which contains essays on theatricality and theater history. Only two of the eight essays in the section on "Playing with Desire" were published within the past decade, and many of these contributions focus on Lyly's portrayal of desire as it illuminates an earlier formal or literary tradition (Ovidian myth, Petrarchanism) or a historical feature of the early modern world, most

²⁶ Kent Cartwright, "The Confusions of *Gallathea*: John Lyly as Popular Dramatist," *Comparative Drama* 32 (1998): 207-39, 208.

²⁷ Examples include G.K. Hunter, *John Lyly: The Humanist as Courtier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), and Peter Saccio, *The Court Comedies of John Lyly: A Study in Allegorical Dramaturgy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

²⁸ See Ruth Lunney, ed., *John Lyly*, The University Wits Series (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2011).

often the court and the figure of Elizabeth I.²⁹ While such scholarship is important to our understanding of Lyly's political and literary contexts, my aim in this study is to focus attention on what Lyly's language can tell us about the experience, and the theatricality, of erotic desire itself.³⁰

To date, there exists no full-length study that pairs Shakespeare's and Lyly's plays. My dissertation aims to fill this critical gap, and perhaps more importantly, my intention is to make use of the rich variety of linguistic resources that each playwright brings to bear on the drama of erotic desire because such analysis alters our understanding of both playwrights. Lunney writes that "Lyly's claim to critical attention has rested largely on his reputation as the playwright who introduced the comedy of love to the English stage, providing an example for Shakespeare and others to follow."³¹

Generally speaking, when scholars pair Lyly and Shakespeare together, the words "example" and "influence" are usually close behind.³² Critics have long suggested that

²⁹ One of the only full-length studies on John Lyly's drama from the past twenty years, Michael Pincombe's *The Plays of John Lyly: Eros and Eliza* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), studies the connections between each of John Lyly's plays and the Elizabethan court.

³⁰ I situate my work among recent scholarship on erotic desire in *Galatea* and in *Love's Metamorphosis* that studies the dynamics of homoerotics, gender, and sexuality in these two plays. See Denise A. Walen, "Constructions of Female Homoerotics in Early Modern Drama," *Theatre Journal* 54, no. 3 (2002): 411-30; Mark Dooley, "The Healthy Body: Desire and Sustenance in John Lyly's *Love's Metamorphosis*," *Early Modern Literary Studies* 6, no. 2 (2000): 3.1-19; and most recently, James Bromley, "The onely way to be mad, is to bee constant": Defending Heterosexual Nonmonogamy in John Lyly's *Love's Metamorphosis*," *Studies in Philology* 106, no. 4 (2009): 420-40.

³¹ Lunney, *John Lyly*, xxiv.

³² See Leah Scragg, *The Metamorphosis of Gallathea: A Study in Creative Adaptation* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), for a representative example. Maurice Charney has written at length about Shakespeare's influence on Lyly. According to Charney, the period between 1590-1595, when Lyly was writing *The Woman in the Moon*, "was also a period of great creativity for Shakespeare, especially in comedy. Whatever we may think of the specific parallels between Lyly and Shakespeare—and *Love's Labor's Lost* is certainly in the style and manner of Lyly—the larger relation may perhaps best be understood, in Bond's phrase, as a 'reciprocal influence.' If Lyly learned from Shakespeare how to extend and liberate a female role by all the devices of wit, quick changes of temperament, and lunatic rhetoric, Shakespeare must have been impressed by Lyly's beautiful control of feminine values in the love debate" (Maurice Charney, "Female Roles and the Children's Companies: Lyly's Pandora in *The Woman in the Moon*," *Research Opportunities in Renaissance Drama* 22 [1979]: 37-43, 42). Charney refers to R. Warwick Bond's *The Complete Works of John Lyly*, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 232.

Shakespeare turned to Lyly's comedies as models for his own early plays about love. There are a number of advantages to these studies of Lyly's creative influence on Shakespeare. For one, they contextualize Shakespeare's dramatic language. They also bring Lyly's plays in closer relation with those of a conventionally "popular" playwright, thus affirming Kent Cartwright's claim that Lyly's plays had popular theatrical value in their own right. A disadvantage to any study of influence is, of course, that it privileges the plays of the later dramatist over those of the earlier. If Lyly's plays are considered alongside Shakespeare's primarily because of influence, Shakespeare becomes the destination and Lyly is reduced to a glorified pit stop on the Bard Highway.

My reading Lyly alongside Shakespeare, Shakespeare alongside Lyly, is neither teleological nor strictly comparative. Some chapters of my dissertation do devote more attention to Shakespeare's plays than to Lyly's, but others emphasize Lyly's drama; either way, I examine both playwrights' erotic language at length because they both use the same essential metaphors to dramatize erotic desire. Such metaphors often exceed the particularities of individual authors or genres because they are fundamental to erotic experience. Thus, my study of a single erotic metaphor has led to some unconventional pairings of plays; for example, I analyze early Lylyan comedy in tandem with late Shakespearean tragedy. I also have found it useful to introduce secondary literature eminently familiar in Shakespeare studies into my readings of Lyly's plays, even though this is uncommon in Lyly studies. Guided by the five terms of Burke's pentad and the conceptual metaphors they marshal, I turn to theoretical models inspired by philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Giordano Bruno, Emmanuel Levinas, Gaston Bachelard, Stanley Cavell, and Gilles Deleuze. Their thinking offers new ways to understand Lyly's genius

for staging the dynamic experience of erotic desire while they make for fresh insights into Shakespeare's erotic language, too.

Each of the succeeding chapters explores a basic conceptual metaphor of erotic desire in Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays, and each of these metaphors is derived from the terms of Kenneth Burke's dramatisic pentad. Chapter 1, which focuses on Burke's term "Act," considers primary metaphors of physical motion that characterize desire as an action rather than a state of mind. This chapter provides a survey of fundamental physical metaphors found in several of Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays (some of which I explore in greater depth in later chapters), and it introduces the ways such metaphors dramatize the dynamic features of erotic experience. I begin by considering the meaning of "act," along with its relationship to physical motion, according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Burke's *Grammar*, exploring the ways erotic desire may be conceptualized as different degrees of action. Although some characters experience desire as idleness or stasis that acts upon them, desire is often conceptualized as a stirring, literally "moving," experience, even a physical struggle. To study the various entailments of the "Desire as Act" metaphor (e.g., the object, the *telos*, and the force of erotic desire), this chapter analyzes language from several of Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays but it focuses on metaphors of physical stillness and motion in *Galatea*, *Othello*, and *Measure for Measure*.

Kenneth Burke analyzes the five terms of dramatism individually but also in dialogue with one another, and I take my cue from him in my own analysis of erotic language. Hence my second and third chapters relate the terms from Burke's pentad to one another by pairing them in what he refers to as "ratios." In Chapter 2, I investigate

metaphors of permeability and containment that dramatize erotic desire as a rupture between “agents” and their “scenes,” what Burke refers to as the “scene-agent ratio.” I focus on speeches by Shakespeare’s Valentine and Lyly’s Endymion, and on language in *Antony and Cleopatra*, in which characters conceptualize their lovers as identical to their scenes. I also bring to bear different theories of place (or “scene”) as they have been articulated by Aristotle and Gaston Bachelard, but also by early modern cosmologists such as Francesco Patrizi and Giordano Bruno—each examines changing relationships between self and world. The stakes of erotic desire shift when characters open themselves to their beloved as place. Valentine imagines Silvia as the “day for me to look upon” (*Two Gentlemen of Verona* 3.1.181), Antony sees Cleopatra as “thou day o’ th’ world” (*Antony and Cleopatra* 4.8.13; emphasis mine), and Endymion falls in love with the very moon in the night sky. Intimacy with a beloved as “scene” means that characters make themselves vulnerable to the world. This precipitates a degree of exposure that can even be painful, as when Endymion longs for Cynthia to “see every vein, sinew, muscle, and artery of my love” (*Endymion* 2.1.49-50). With their personal boundaries so fiercely compromised, lovers risk displacement from their own secure sense of self, but they also gain access to new forms of intimacy—with the distant moon, or the “demi-Atlas of this earth” (*Antony and Cleopatra* 1.5.23), or even the unfathomable expanse of “oblivion” (*Antony and Cleopatra* 1.3.90) and “vacancy” (*Antony and Cleopatra* 1.4.26).

Finally, Chapter 3 explores the ways characters *make* intimate relationships, via the metaphor “desiring is creating.” Burke’s terms “agency” and “purpose”—the means and ends of erotic desire—guide this chapter’s analysis of erotic language, in which eros

is conceptualized as a dynamic process of creation. Burke's understanding of "agency" (how we desire) leads me to consider the role of erotic instruments as a means of mutual creation and love-making. In Lyly's *Campaspe*, the instrument of Apelles' erotic relation with his model is painting. Lyly's lovers are transformed not only by pigment, brush, and canvas, but also by the dynamic process of artistic creation itself. Shakespeare's lovers in *The Taming of the Shrew* employ fictions and lies to make their marriage. The instrument of storytelling allows Petruchio and Kate to build a private world together that turns out to be artful and poetic; the friction of their words ignites the creative and erotic charge of their intimate world. In both *Campaspe* and *The Taming of the Shrew*, language itself becomes an instrument that lovers craft and refine as their very means of desiring.

My dissertation concludes with three appendices that gather and organize representative erotic language from Lyly's and Shakespeare's dramatic works. Appendix A provides a chart of prominent erotic metaphors in plays by Shakespeare and Lyly. Presenting metaphors in this format reveals relationships among them—where they overlap and correlate, where they diverge and conflict—along with their entailments. Appendices B and C list specific examples of erotic language from Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays, respectively. I define "erotic language" broadly for this purpose, including speeches that describe, evaluate, and enact erotic desire, along with speeches about sexual activity and courtship. Such language is spoken by characters who are in the throes of erotic experience, but also by their witnesses. I aim to uncover the extraordinary richness and variety of erotic language in Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays. Readers may discover a good deal of overlap between plays and authors—similarities are

found at the micro-level of particular locutions, but perhaps more significantly, at the macro-level of metaphorical structure. Taken together, the three appendices illuminate the connections between metaphorical language and thought that dramatize erotic experience in Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays.

Chapter 1

“I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do” Desire as Act

He eats nothing but doves, love, and that breeds hot blood, and hot blood begets hot thoughts,
and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.

Troilus and Cressida (3.1.119-21)

What happens if we, like Paris in my epigraph, think of love as an action? In *Troilus and Cressida*, Paris traces the genealogy (what Pandarus calls the “generation” [3.1.122]) and the course of Troilus’s love, beginning with eating doves and ending with hot deeds. Actions (eating and “hot deeds”) bracket the apparent states (hot blood and hot thoughts) that we might typically equate with erotic desire. Humoral psychology is of considerable importance to Paris’s diagnosis, but perhaps not quite so important as action in this conceptualization of love. Of course, not all of Shakespeare’s characters are of Paris’s mind. In *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Julia wonders about “know[ing] the inly touch of love” (2.7.18), evoking a mental or inner life that is as active as Paris’s presumably physical “hot deeds.” For Shakespeare’s Troilus, the difference between hot thoughts and hot deeds comprises “the monstrosity of love... – that the will is infinite and the execution confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit” (*Troilus and Cressida* 3.2.75-77). How does the early modern stage accommodate an infinite will or a boundless desire? How does it dramatize the “enraged affections” of Shakespeare’s Beatrice, which her uncle describes as “past the infinite of thought” (2.3.95)? How does it overcome what for Troilus is the mutual exclusivity between “the desire” and “the act” of love?

In this chapter, I argue that Lyly's and Shakespeare's characters often understand desire as an act. I begin by considering what it means to act, according to Aristotle and Kenneth Burke, and then canvas the ways desire may be conceptualized as different degrees of action. Next, I introduce the event structure metaphor, a useful vehicle for studying the active qualities of language that dramatizes desire. In section three, I survey metaphors of action and movement in Lyly's plays, looking most closely at their development in *Galatea*. Finally, section four investigates these metaphors in Shakespeare's plays, focusing specifically on *Measure for Measure* and *Othello*. By studying dynamic metaphors of desire across Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays, we can begin to appreciate the ways that erotic language itself functions as a kind of dramatic action.

I. The Name of Action

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
 Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
 Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
 Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:
 Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
 Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
 Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
 Though winning near the goal – yet, do not grieve;
 She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
 For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!

-John Keats, "Ode on a Grecian Urn" (11-20)¹

These lines have much to say about the experience of desire, about the sweetness of an "unheard melody" and the conviction that we can sustain desire, either through artistic representation or by withholding satisfaction. For as long as the "bold lover" is

¹ See *A Longman Cultural Edition John Keats*, ed. Susan J. Wolfson (New York: Longman, 2007), 358-60.

unrequited, he will escape the pain of loss or regret. Always and unbearably close to his beloved, never enjoying her but persistently wanting her, he is both a potential and an actual lover. What does it mean to be a lover in Keats' poem? How might we define desire as it is depicted on the urn? The lover "winning near the goal" is in motion, and his pursuit of "bliss" exemplifies desire as an action: a deliberate movement towards a goal. Love promises permanence at the cost of bliss: "though thou hast not thy bliss, / For ever wilt thou love." "For ever" because the lover is fixed within the marble of the urn, untouched by time and impervious to change, eternally performing the same action. The next stanza continues to depict "happy love" as both an act and a state: "For ever panting, and for ever young; / All breathing human passion far above" (27-28). Both "for ever panting" and far from "breathing human passion," love tremors with vigor and yet is almost lifeless at the same time. As for Keats's lover, he both acts and is acted upon, he loves and he is in love.

The commonplace expression, "falling in love," assumes that love is a state into which we fall, not an action we take. Being "in love" appears to correspond with the *scene* for an act, rather than the act itself. So understood, love provides an environment in which other acts (wooing, sex, etc.) may occur. At stake in this conceptualization of desire are questions of agency, choice, and control. The scene of desire is only occasionally within a lover's control; because she is situated within its confines, she cannot very well govern it. To consider desire as a scene, then, is to absolve lovers of much of the responsibility for controlling desire. Desire contains us, not we it.

We may, however, conceptualize desire and love not as scenes but as acts. According to Kenneth Burke, "whereas the scientist beginning with 'the object' explains

abstraction, generalization, classification as a process having to do with *nouns*, a dramatist stress upon act suggests an origin in *verbs*.”² Of Aristotle’s six elements of tragedy, Burke notes that “action” or plot is preeminent. For Aristotle, action is the very soul of tragedy:

Tragedy is a representation not of human beings but of action and life. Happiness and unhappiness lie in action, and the end [of life] is a sort of action, not a quality; people are of a certain sort according to their characters, but happy or the opposite according to their actions. So [the actors] do not act in order to represent the characters, but they include the characters for the sake of their actions.³

Not only is living itself an act, but, Aristotle writes, the *telos* of life is action. Happiness, the goal of life, is something we do, not something we simply feel. The same may also be said of desire.

Up to this point, I have suggested that there are at least two distinct conceptualizations of desire: as scene and as act. Desire as scene is static to the extent that it corresponds to a state of being; desire as act is obviously active. Burke pays particular attention to the dialectic of acts and states, which he refers to as the *actus-status* pair. For Burke, there is quite a lot of overlap between these terms, as is so often the case with binary relations. Grammatically, we tend to describe our state of mind or emotion in the terms of “being” or “essence,” which Burke reminds us is not a “demonstrative noun, but a *verbal* noun, the most abstract and general form of the most abstract and general act.”⁴ Here, as elsewhere, Burke is making his way toward a complex theory of action, one in which passivity, or *status*, is always deeply indebted to action. Even seemingly static uses of language, such as simple description, have active


² Burke, *GM*, 249.

³ *Ibid.*, 241.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 249. “Being” as a kind of action is evident in Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” soliloquy, where he identifies being as a choice and a kind of action (*Hamlet* 3.3.58-90).

properties. Burke calls to mind our descriptions of personality: when we try to describe someone's essence (what Burke calls *quiddity*, or “whatness”), we often use the expression “he has a way with him.” This is to acknowledge that “a thing's *essence* or *quiddity* can become identical with its principle of *action*.” A person's unique, often unspeakable essential quality goes beyond substance; it is a “way,” a process – a kind of action.⁵

Burke's analysis of the *actus-status* pair reveals the interconnectedness of “static desire” and “active desire.” What emerges is a theory in which desire is situated on a continuum of activity, with *status*/scene at one end and *actus*/act at the other:




Of course, there is still more to interrogate about desire as act. In particular, what might a purely or absolutely “active” conceptualization of desire look like? The image of the lover on Keats' urn offers an example. That the lover moves “near the goal” suggests that his desire is an action he takes. The same lover, forever leaning in for his kiss, moves permanently toward an unattainable target. Such is desire, driving toward its object and driven to weariness, both moving and moved. When Burke discusses Keats' ode in an appendix to *The Grammar of Motives*, he notes the way that Keats presents us with a form of thought “in terms of an *eternal present*.” There is, Burke writes, “a quality of *suspension* in the erotic imagery, defining an eternal prolongation of the state just prior to the fulfillment – not exactly arrested ecstasy, but rather an arrested pre-

⁵ *Ibid.*, 249. Here Burke notes that Shakespeare “has a way with him.”

ecstasy.”⁶ And yet Burke’s notion of an arrested pre-ecstasy, a frozen piece of history, somehow takes place in “an eternal present,” and is therefore continuously happening, again and again.

This “eternal present” calls to mind Aristotelian “entelechy.” Although Aristotle never explicitly defines it, he describes “entelechy” in his *Metaphysics* as a type of motion in which the end, or completion, is always present. For his part, Burke defines entelechy as “having its end within itself.”⁷ The Greek word *entelechia* translates literally as “having the *telos*, or goal, inside” (translators conflate the word “entelechy” with a host of English words, including “action” and “actuality”). Aristotle contrasts entelechy with other forms of movement. Ordinary movement, writes Aristotle, may be exemplified by the process of weight-loss – body parts move toward thinness but are not yet thin. As an incomplete process, this is not an action. Aristotelian action accounts for processes such as happiness, understanding, seeing, and thinking, where “at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood.”⁸ As we will see in examples from Lyly and Shakespeare, desire often approaches but rarely achieves entelechy. Characters in their plays range in their expressions of desire from the scenic (falling “in love”) to various degrees of active (struggling with desire) to occasional conceptualizations of desire as entelechy, as depicted below:



⁶ Kenneth Burke (“Appendix A: Symbolic Action in a Poem by Keats” *GM*, 447-63), 449-50. Burke refers to G. Wilson Knight’s characterization of this image in Keats as “a stillness suggesting motion, what might be called a ‘tiptoe’ effect:” Burke, 450 n1. See G. Wilson Knight, *The Starlit Dome: Studies in the Poetry of Vision* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), 295.

⁷ Burke, *GM*, 262.

⁸ Aristotle, *The Works of Aristotle Vol. VIII: Metaphysica* 2nd ed., trans. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928), 1048b 22.

Just as the “eternal present” complicates the *actus-status* pair, so too does “incipient action,” a concept Burke borrows from I. A. Richards. Richards defines incipient action as the impulse to act, prior to any overt action taking place; he argues that art often generates this impulse within an audience.⁹ Where erotic desire is conceptualized as an impulse to act, we might situate it somewhere in the middle of our continuum, perhaps closer to *status* than *actus*. But Burke points out that it is difficult to separate impulse (or “attitude,” as Burke more frequently terms it) from act:

Note, however, that the concept of *incipient* acts is ambiguous. As an attitude can be the *substitute* for an act, it can likewise be the *first step towards* an act. Thus, if we arouse in someone an attitude of sympathy towards something, we may be starting him on the road towards overtly sympathetic action with regard to it.¹⁰

This is to make incipient action proximate to entelechy. As “the *first step towards* an act,” an incipient action already contains at least a measure of its *telos*. The ambiguity Burke identifies in this passage rings true of desire.

II. “My desire... did spur me forth”: The Event Structure Metaphor

Burke’s description of an incipient act as “the *first step . . . on the road*” towards an act conjures up a traveler. This is to conceptualize desire as a path, characters as travelers, and plays as surroundings. I comprehend desire in these terms probably for the same reason that Burke does – we can talk about desire only if we can ground it.

Metaphor allows us to conceptualize (and therefore to express) our ideas in concrete, graspable ways. In the following sections, I survey Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s metaphors

⁹ Richards writes about incipient action in his chapter, “Attitudes,” in *The Principles of Literary Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). Richards places a higher value on incipient action than on overt action as a reaction to art. Incipient action, he argues, allows for contemplation and analysis before overt action is taken.

¹⁰ Burke, *GM*, 236.

of desire as physical stillness and motion. Although there are many different metaphors that characters can access to conceptualize their desires, particular dramatic circumstances (for example, character or situation) determine specific metaphors. The deployment of any one metaphor will highlight certain features of erotic desire and occlude others. Unsurprisingly, both Lyly and Shakespeare use especially complex metaphor blends. For example, Romeo's desire is at one moment a war and at another a gastronomic delight –sometimes these overlap so closely that it is hard to unravel one metaphor from another, and impossible to extricate them from the experience itself. Because of such complexities, any analysis of metaphors (especially metaphors of desire) in Lyly and Shakespeare will be incomplete.¹¹ In this chapter I concentrate on the basic metaphor structure that undergirds conceptualizations of desire in general: the “event structure metaphor.”

In “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” Lakoff notes that “various aspects of event structure, including notions like states, changes, processes, actions, causes, purposes, and means, are characterized cognitively via metaphor in terms of space, motion, and force.”¹² Some of the basic entailments of the event structure metaphor include mapping changes as movements, causes as forces, and difficulties as impediments to motion. For example, the metaphor of desire as a physical struggle associates the changes brought on by desire as physical conflicts and the desirer as either an impediment to motion or as an aggressor. Force proves central to any dramatization of the experience of erotic desire. When Lyly's Phao asks the witch Sibylla for her help in

¹¹ For a general picture of the scope of Lyly's and Shakespeare's metaphors of desire, see Appendix A, where I chart what I deem the most prevalent metaphors in their plays, along with their entailments.

¹² Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor.” Lakoff's description of the event structure includes all the aspects of Burke's pentad.

wooing Sappho, the old woman imparts the unsettling advice that “women strive because they would be overcome. Force they call it, but such a welcome force they account it that continually they study to be enforced” (*Sappho and Phao* 2.4.105-8). The force of desire is sometimes active and aggravating, and at other times, passive and immobilizing.

Lakoff’s event structure metaphor is based on the same premises as Burke’s dramatism: both emphasize motion and tension as primary forces in all events, and both foreground language as the site where these tensions are played out.

There are two primary branches of the event structure metaphor—the Location Event-Structure and the Object Event-Structure metaphors—and each produces different metaphors for erotic desire in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays. The Location Event-Structure metaphor maps all aspects of events (actions, causes, difficulties, purposes, etc.) according to our experience of motion in space. This branch of the event structure metaphor is especially relevant for a study of desire as action, because it leads characters to experience love in terms of movement, often as a journey from one location to another. A sampling of this metaphor’s submappings follows:

States Are Locations (interiors of bounded regions in space)
 Actions Are Self-propelled Movements
 Purposes Are Destinations
 Freedom Of Action Is The Lack Of Impediments To Motion.¹³

These submappings illuminate the correlations between physical motion and personal agency that distinguish so much of the erotic language in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays. For example, the “States Are Locations” metaphor, which enables us to conceptualize abstract states of being (emotional and mental states, moods, etc.) as bounded regions in space, often leads to passive conceptualizations of love. On the continuum of action

¹³ See Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 179, for a complete list.

outlined in the previous section, the “States Are Locations” metaphor is what allows characters to experience erotic desire as a scene they inhabit. Unsurprisingly, Lakoff and Johnson’s first linguistic example of this mapping is the expression, “I’m *in* love.”¹⁴ According to the location branch of the event structure metaphor, physical stillness typically results from a challenge, blockage, burden, or a lack of freedom. Physical motion, for its part, gives us a way to conceptualize progress, change, and even our own freedom of choice. Metaphors of stasis and movement are the ways we place ourselves on the continuum of erotic action, allowing us access to different degrees of agency in erotic experience.

The second branch of the event structure metaphor is the Object Event-Structure Metaphor, which maps the features of events in terms of the transfer, movement, and attainment of objects. Some of its submappings are:

Attributes Are Possessions
 Changes Are Movements Of Possessions (acquisitions or losses)
 Causation Is Transfer of Possessions (giving or taking)
 Purposes Are Desired Objects.¹⁵

Because this metaphor objectifies the features of an event, rather than locating them as points along a path or journey, it is often found in conceptualizations of sexual fulfillment, marriage, or other means of possessing the beloved. The stakes of imagining the beloved as an object to be acquired, rather than a physical location to be reached, are explored later in this chapter, and in the following chapter of my dissertation, which considers the effects of conceptualizing one’s lover as a place.

¹⁴ Ibid., 180. Other examples include “She’s *out of* her depression” and “We’re *far from* safety.” See the chapter on “Events and Causes” (170-234) for a fuller analysis of the event structure metaphor.

¹⁵ Ibid., 196.

Both branches of the event structure metaphor speak to fundamental aspects of erotic desire, particularly its agency, its causes, and its *telos*. This chapter's analysis of *Galatea*, *Measure for Measure*, and *Othello* will reveal the ways that characters in Lyly's and Shakespeare's plays are constantly gauging these facets of their erotic experience. Causation is one of the most vexed aspects of desire for many characters (Shakespeare's *Othello* is notoriously preoccupied with "the cause" [5.2.1 and 3]) because it entails ethical questions of personal responsibility, agency, and purpose. For the self-loathing Angelo in *Measure for Measure*, gauging the cause of erotic desire is a matter of assigning blame: "Is this her fault or mine?" (2.2.162). At stake for Angelo are not only questions of personal agency, but also more fundamental questions about his own evil and sinful nature. If Angelo tries to locate a cause for erotic desire, Lyly's *Galatea* dramatizes an erotic attraction with no apparent cause at all. Unlike the nymphs who have been struck by Cupid's arrows (a clear source for their longing), the source for Galatea and Phillida's erotic attraction is unnamed. Neptune criticizes the girls for falling in love with one another "where there can be no *cause* for affection" (5.3.141; emphasis mine), implying that "no cause" is tantamount to a lack of purpose. Purpose and directionality are also crucial to erotic experience in Lyly's *Galatea*, whose love-stricken characters conceptualize desire through the domain of hunting. Lakoff and Johnson identify the hunting metaphor as a submapping of Object Event-Structure—"Achieving A Purpose Is Acquiring A Desired Object"—which privileges pursuit and possession over physical motion that lacks a specific *telos*.¹⁶ Even Aristotle's conceptualization of *entelechy* is guided by the event-structure metaphor, since the primary metaphor

¹⁶ Lakoff and Johnson discuss the "extensive special-case substructure" of this submapping on pp. 197-98, which includes the metaphor, "Trying to Achieve A Purpose Is Hunting."

“Causation Is Action To Achieve A Purpose” lies at the core of our most basic experiences of teleology. According to Lakoff and Johnson, “Aristotle... took this metaphor as a truth. Causes conceptualized according to this metaphor are what Aristotle called *final causes*, that is, causes constituted by purposes, either the purposes of a person or purposes conceptualized as being in nature.”¹⁷

Because the event structure metaphor maps causes, changes, and purposes as types of physical motion—forced movements to and from locations, or movements and exchanges of possessions—it enables characters to see the “event” of erotic desire as a dynamic and active experience. Even when their desire stymies them completely—when they are passive, subdued, immobilized by its force—eros is still an action. Because desire is most often conceptualized in terms of motion and stasis, these metaphors guide my analysis of the plays in the following sections. Physical motion sometimes takes the form of struggle, and at other times, of chaos. Stasis partakes of inertia, of imprisonment, and in some cases, of death. These metaphors never operate in isolation from one another; often, they collapse together. Death may be the ultimate example of stasis, but it is often likened to chaos, an extreme form of motion.¹⁸ Especially in the cases where metaphors of stillness and motion collapse, erotic language begins to exceed its own bounds, spilling into paradox, action, and entelechy.

¹⁷ Ibid., 218. Lakoff and Johnson devote a chapter of their study to the metaphorical underpinnings of Aristotle’s philosophy—his metaphysics and also his definition of metaphor. See Chapter 18, “Aristotle,” in *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 373-90.

¹⁸ See section IV of this chapter for the death/chaos relation in *Othello*.

III. “Entrapped in love”: Metaphors of Desire in Lyly

Lyly’s characters frequently activate metaphors of stillness (or idleness, the form that stillness most regularly takes in Lyly) when they are in the throes of desire. The women in Lyly’s *Midas* at first identify love as the remedy for idleness, and then immediately change their minds and decide that love is its cause. Midas’s daughter Sophronia tells her ladies-in-waiting that “there are other things to keep one from idleness besides love; nay, that there is nothing to make idleness but love” (3.3.25-27).¹⁹ Idleness in this account is probably not meant to evoke a physical stillness such as a trance or a sleep. But in Lyly’s *Endymion*, the idleness that Sophronia gestures toward is represented as a staggering, physically felt event. When the love-struck Corsites realizes he cannot lift the sleeping Endymion, he asks:

Have my weak thoughts made brawnfallen my strong arms? Or is it the nature of love or in the quintessence of the mind to breed numbness, or litherness, or I know not what languishing in my joints and sinews, being but the base strings of my body? Or doth the remembrance of Tellus so refine my spirits into a matter so subtle and divine, that the other fleshly parts cannot work whilst they muse?
(*Endymion* 4.3.19-26)²⁰

Corsites’ experience is far from peaceful or soothing, neither is it perfectly still. His suspicion that his arms are “made brawnfallen” by his desire for Tellus suggests that his desire feels more like a downward pull than a complete stillness. Even his numbness entails motion, since love “breed[s]” it throughout Corsites’ body. Idleness and atrophy are events in Corsites’ account: they languish, they breed, they muse, they fall. In short, these stilled and passive experiences of desire are pieces of drama in their own right. Not the staged action of Corsites trying to lift his sleeping friend, but Corsites’ *language*

¹⁹ All quotations of Lyly’s *Midas* are from *The Revels Plays John Lyly Galatea and Midas*, eds. G.K. Hunter and David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

²⁰ All quotations of Lyly’s *Endymion* are from *The Revels Plays John Lyly Endymion*, ed. David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).

dramatizes the force of his “weak thoughts” as they bear down on his “strong arms.” In contrast to the numbness and idleness in Corsites’ account, we see versions of more mobile desire earlier in the play. Epiton, Sir Tophas’s page, recalls the origins of his master’s desire, when “love crept into his mouth before he could close it, and there kept such a tumbling in his body that he was glad to untruss the points of his heart and entertain love as a stranger” (*Endymion* 3.3.154-57).²¹ Epiton’s depiction of love as a creature that enters a scene, as the subject of the sentence instead of its verb, corresponds to a special class of metaphors known as ontological metaphors.

Lakoff and Johnson define these metaphors as “ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities or substances.”²² Such metaphors allow us to talk easily about abstract events, to identify them as subjects or objects, and to understand them in relation to one another. Lakoff and Johnson use the example of inflation, reminding us that it is not a substance or entity, but rather an experience of rising prices. But we talk about and conceptualize inflation by turning it into a noun, allowing for sentences such as “inflation caused our country’s economic problems,” and “we studied the effects of inflation in our class.” Apparently, it is easier to conceptualize experiences, ideas, and emotions when we turn them into nouns.²³ When we refer to something like desire as a noun, we assign it agency. We can blame desire for our miseries. We can speak lines

²¹ In Lyly, “creeping” lust often immobilizes the desirer. One of the courtiers in *Midas* describes his friend’s eyes as “stitched on” his beloved’s face, and his thoughts as “gyved to her beauty” (2.1.67), because the “untemperate humour of lust [had] crept into the king’s court” (72-73). This suggests that lust initially creeps into the mind or body of the desirer, only to stop him in his tracks. Lust is only active until it finds a body to inhabit and afflict, a body which suffers passively as a result.

²² Lakoff and Johnson, 25. Ontological metaphors often take the form of personification, but also include objectification.

²³ This practice of turning abstract experiences into nouns has become so regular in the English language that many grammar guides provide a separate category for “abstract nouns” (e.g., “freedom” or “happiness”).

like “love crept into his mouth before he could close it” and so protest that *love* did it, not he! After all, Sir Tophas was asleep.

Ontological metaphors also allow characters to position themselves as direct objects in sentences about desire. When “desire” is the subject, characters are on the receiving end of its transitive verbs; they are governed, grammatically as well as emotionally, by erotic desire. Ontological metaphors allow them to conceptualize desire as an entity that beats down on them, subdues them, imprisons them. Such metaphors also enable characters to restore their subjectivity by conceiving of a desire that they can dominate, quell, overmaster. Within the domain of motion and stillness, ontological metaphors add elements of force and struggle. This in turn provides Lyly with a powerful way of capturing in miniature a variety of political and social power struggles in his plays.

Desire in Lyly’s *Campaspe* is bound to be deeply embedded in the experience of physical struggle, since the cast of desirers includes a king, a lowly painter, and a prisoner. The play opens as Alexander the Great meets and falls in love with Campaspe, a captive from the newly conquered Thebes. A conqueror who finds himself attracted to his captive, Alexander’s desires are predictably onerous. When he reveals his desire for Campaspe to his confidante Hephestion, his friend’s response is laced with metaphors of political and sexual struggle. Hephestion asks him if he has become Campaspe’s “subject” and “captive.” “Shall it not seem monstrous to wise men that the heart of the greatest conqueror of the world should be found in the hands of the weakest creature of nature – of a woman, of a captive?” (2.2.61-65).²⁴ Here and elsewhere, the mapping of

²⁴ All quotations of Lyly’s *Campaspe* are from *The Revels Plays John Lyly Campaspe and Sappho and Phao*, eds. G.K. Hunter and David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

physical struggle onto desire has overt misogynistic and political overtones. Hephestion goes on to remind his king that he has “a camp to govern, not a chamber” (68), indicating that Alexander’s political power and manly *virtu* are at stake in his desire for Campaspe. But for his rival Apelles, the struggle for Campaspe’s love entails a shift from metaphors of conquest to those of nature and art.

Apelles’ desire for Campaspe betokens not only a struggle for self-control, but a struggle to obtain a woman who has caught the prince’s eye. Once his desire for Alexander’s captive is aroused, Apelles launches into a soliloquy riddled with metaphors from the physical struggle domain: “O Campaspe, Campaspe, art must yield to nature, reason to appetite, wisdom to affection” (3.5.20-21). The metaphor of physical struggle offers Apelles a way to conceptualize his internal conflicts as well as the social obstacles he faces. In the same soliloquy, Apelles conceives of his desire as “against” the natural order of things, since he wishes to preempt the prince’s choice. He tells himself, “thou mayst swim against the stream with the crab, and feed against the wind with the deer, and peck against the steel with the cockatrice; stars are to be looked at, not reached at; princes to be yielded unto, not contended with” (3.5.39-43). As a resource for metaphor, it turns out that the physical struggle domain is neutral, or at least very accommodating. It enables Apelles to conceive of his desire as both natural and unnatural. Initially, he remarks that “art must yield to nature,” but swimming “against the stream” suggests that his desire for Alexander’s favorite is unnatural. Apelles’ locutions are capacious within the physical struggle domain; they also reveal the different “natures” with which he struggles (individual human nature versus the natural order of princes and subjects) and the extent to which they too are at odds.

Alexander and Apelles are still drawing upon the physical struggle domain when the play comes to a close. Apelles decides to “Dispute not the cause [...] but yield to it; for better it is to melt with desire than wrestle with love” (5.2.12-14). He gives in to the struggle between reason and desire, preferring the experience of surrender to “wrestling.” Alexander, however, begins to tease out the differences between the source and target domains, realizing that he “cannot subdue the affections of men though he conquer their countries” (5.2.141-43). Perhaps it is necessary for Alexander to draw this distinction because of his political power. For him, the domain of physical struggle is not simply a source for the target experience of desire; as a king and conqueror, Alexander engages in physical struggles regularly. As it happens, Alexander’s decision to allow Campaspe to marry Apelles is itself seen as a conquest, the conquest of a prince’s duty over his desires. Hephestion compliments him on his restraint in his last line in the play: “The conquering of Thebes was not so honorable as the subduing of these thoughts” (5.4.166-67). In his introduction to the play, G.K. Hunter notes Lyly’s elevation of “the denial of love as a sufficiently heroic value.”²⁵ Together with conquest, denial and abstinence develop the experience of erotic desire in *Campaspe* by means of the domain of physical struggle.

That the erotic struggles in *Campaspe* are shaped by social and political conflicts among its characters does not quite account for the breadth or capaciousness of Apelles’ metaphors. The physical struggle domain enables Apelles (who speaks at much greater length than Alexander about his love for Campaspe) to test the scope of his power in the various conflicts in the play – art against nature, reason against desire, subject against king. Apelles imagines himself both as a conqueror over reason (“reason [must yield] to

²⁵ G.K. Hunter, Introduction to *Campaspe* in *The Revels Plays John Lyly Campaspe and Sappho and Phao*, 1-43, 21.

appetite” [3.5.20-21]) and as a captive to desire (“dispute not the cause...but yield to it” [5.2.12-13]). His conflicting metaphors dramatize his inner struggle not only for self-mastery but also for the mastery of his beloved through art. Although he wins Campaspe at the end of the play, Apelles conceptualizes what should be a triumph as a defeat. While Alexander’s loss is considered a conquest, a king’s victory over desire, Apelles’ victory entails “melt[ing] with desire” (5.2.14), like a contented prisoner of conquering love. Just as primary metaphors exemplify how cognitive structures are often based on physical realities, the metaphors in *Campaspe* reveal how the language of desire is borne out of the characters’ social realities, even as they work against their prescribed roles. The sociology of cognition, more than its physiology, shapes erotic desire throughout the play. In a world where Apelles cannot be a king, where he cannot escape the realities of his social status, his metaphors allow him to play both the king and the subject of his desire – sometimes in the same moment – even as they confirm his status as a poor painter. His natural and yet unnatural love, his mastery of and enslavement to Campaspe, are all dramatized through his metaphors of desire as a physical struggle, where power and control are contested but ultimately reaffirmed in *Campaspe*.

Physical struggle is also central to the experience of desire in Lyly’s *Galatea*, where the nymphs of Diana’s order are actually pierced with Cupid’s arrows. The once-chaste minds of Telusa, Ramia, Eurota, and Larissa become instantly infected with thoughts of love. Discovering the sensations of sexual desire, Telusa asks, “What new conceits, what strange contraries, breed in thy mind?” (3.1.1-2). Telusa first feels and describes the experience of erotic desire as an act that occurs not in the body, not in the forest or at court, but rather, in the scene of the mind. For any dramatist or scholar of

drama, “the mind” is a problematic setting: outside of the medieval psychomachia, how can one dramatize an act that takes place in the immaterial “space” of the mind?

Following Burke, who in his work on dramatism, correlates acts and the scenes which contain them, we might consider what sorts of acts are set in a mind like Telusa’s, and how these acts can be expressed on the stage.

The conversations among Diana’s nymphs expose their difficulties in expressing desire. Although they all share roughly the same experience (and often, their desire is directed at the same objects), they seem to be unable to communicate it: not only are they unable to tell us *what* it is, but Lyly’s drama is unable to show us *where* it is. Ramia tells her friends, “If myself felt only this infection, I would then take upon me the definition, but being incident to so many I dare not myself describe it” (3.1.86-88).²⁶ The women come closest to describing or defining desire when they identify with each other’s inability to fix the experience in language. Eurota tells her friends that she is in love, “yet swear that I know not what it is” (3.1.51-52), only that she is “myself in all things unlike myself” (3.1.55). To this paradoxical description, Telusa responds, “Thou hast told what I am, in uttering what thyself is” (3.1.57). The nymphs share this indirect, circuitous language, defining themselves and their desires by negation and self-comparison. They relate to each other in their failures to express desire, so much so that they become these failures (e.g., Telusa = Eurota = “unlike myself”).²⁷ Yet we have reason to attribute some

²⁶ Ramia implies that there is something presumptuous about “defin[ing]” or “describ[ing]” her desire to the other nymphs because they are experiencing it too. Ramia’s reluctance suggests that the act of describing desire has a power, perhaps the power of deepening attraction, over those who are experiencing it. I will explore the implications of this suggestion in Chapter 3, which considers erotic language as an instrument of desire.

²⁷ In Judith Butler’s discussion of the ways desire eludes linguistic expression, she writes that language “is forced to seek modes of indirection, and that the writings of and on desire that we might consider are ones which seek, in the end, to cancel themselves as writing in order to better approximate the desire they seek to know” (Butler, “Desire,” 370).

modicum of success to the nymphs' conversation, since they appear to understand each other. As Telusa indicates, Eurota has in fact "told what I am" by "uttering" her own experience, however imprecisely she does so.

The imprecise, yet strangely effective, nature of the nymphs' conversation suggests that there may be a way of dramatizing if not defining desire, and that this may be it: staging the experience of trying to express desire and necessarily falling short of the precision that we hope to find. That is to say, the dramatic language of desire is metaphor. Robert Y. Turner argues that Lyly's indirect dialogues about love stage "conversations not about love but conversations that dramatize love."²⁸ Turner has noted that Lyly is the first English playwright to dramatize love, the first successfully to negotiate the delicate balance between action and language. This balance is subtle and difficult to maintain. If it tips to the side of action, Turner observes, "love" can be dramatized as a series of chivalric feats; if it tips too much to the side of language, love becomes lyrical and therefore undramatic. "Lyly avoided both extremes of direct statement and irrelevant action," Turner writes, "by creating dialogues which contribute to the plot while still expressing the emotions of love."²⁹ Lyly's is an art of indirectness. Characters who are in love talk around the topic, or, to put it in cognitive linguistic terms, they use different domains to elaborate their experience of desire. In *Campaspe*, Apelles and Campaspe use the metaphor of painting; in *Sappho and Phao*, the eponymous characters avail themselves of the language of disease to express love. In *Galatea*, Turner notes, the lovers' dialogues make use of ambiguous speech and asides in order to dramatize the conflicted experience of desire.

²⁸ Robert Y. Turner, "Some Dialogues of Love in Lyly's Comedies," *ELH* 29, no. 3 (1962): 276-88, 276.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 277.

Although there are several sets of desiring characters in *Galatea*, the principal pair is comprised of two women, Galatea and Phillida, who are both disguised as boys by their fathers in order to avoid a being taken by the monster Agar, sent by Neptune. When the girls first meet they fall in love instantly, but they are unable to reveal their desires because of their male disguises. Their first conversation hardly qualifies as a dialogue, since almost every line appears to be spoken in aside:

Gal: I would salute him, but I fear I should make a curtsy instead of a leg.

Phill: If I durst trust my face as well as I do my habit, I would spend some time to make pastime; for say what they will of a man's wit, it is no second thing to be a woman.

Gal: All the blood in my body would be in my face if he should ask me (as the question among men is common), 'Are you a maid?'

Phill: Why stand I still? Boys should be bold. But here cometh a brave train that will spill all our talk. (2.1.25-35)

This "dialogue" of alternating asides is cut off by the entrance of Diana and her nymphs. Although it does not appear that the girls have actually spoken a word to each other, Phillida worries that the intruders "will spill all our talk" (2.1.35). Perhaps Phillida is acknowledging that their "talk" exists only in their minds (precisely where Telusa locates the experience of desire later in the play), and the intrusion of the nymphs will cause their thoughts to "spill" out and be heard. Galatea and Phillida's first encounter is not the only one which dramatizes love as a solipsistic act which occurs in the scene of the mind. When they meet for a second time in the woods, the girls continue to talk in asides, perhaps because they have begun to suspect each other's disguises, each girl seeing her own situation reflected in the other. Kent Cartwright observes that the dramatic energy and dynamism of the scene comes from the women's deferred acknowledgment of what they know to be true: that they are, in fact, both women in disguise. "For the two girl-boys," Cartwright notes, "pleasure and titillation arise from unknowing, postulating,

guessing, hypothesizing – that is, deferring certainty.”³⁰ Not only does this conversation dramatize love’s indirection, but, as Cartwright points out, it dramatizes the pleasures of desire as well.

Cartwright argues that much of the play’s dynamism is to be found in moments that stage indirectness, such as we see in Galatea and Phillida’s conversations. But even in soliloquy, the young girls use dynamic language to conceptualize their situations. Galatea and Phillida both appear alone onstage, contemplating their love for each other and deciding whether to “act” on their desires. In her soliloquy, Phillida conceptualizes her desire for Tityrus (Galatea’s male name) as a state that she is in, about which she needs to “do something.” Her speech is replete with stops and starts, dramatizing the conflicts in her mind. She wavers as she tries to decide if she should go into the woods to follow Tityrus: “I will – I dare not. Thou must – I cannot. Then pine in thine own peevishness. I will not – I will. Ah, Phillida, do something – nay anything, rather than live thus” (2.5.8-11). Phillida’s soliloquy is her call to action. She shifts from conceptualizing love as a state (pining “*in thine own peevishness*”) to “do[ing] something” instead. On the continuum of desire, Phillida’s locutions shift from “desire as scene” to “desire as act,” at which point she finally decides to “go” (2.5.12) into the woods after her love. Galatea’s soliloquy ends with a similar resolution to do something instead of pining away: “Let me follow him into the woods, and thou, sweet Venus, be my guide” (2.4.13-14). Instead of going on her own, Galatea “follow[s]” Phillida, and only will do so with Venus as her guide. Even grammatically, Galatea is not the subject

³⁰ Kent Cartwright, *Theater and Humanism: English Drama in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 179. Cartwright’s observation about the pleasures of deferring certainty accounts for the pleasures of using metaphor to conceptualize erotic experience. Metaphors often cloak the experience of desire in complex and provocative garments (pardon my own metaphor here), which suggest that a naked erotic truth lies beneath them.

of her sentence, placing the authority to “let me follow him” in the hands of the fates. Here and elsewhere, the language in Galatea’s soliloquy reveals the loss of control that is so much a part of the experience of desire.³¹ Earlier in her speech she says, “Oh, would, when I hunted his eye with my heart, he might have seen my heart with his eyes!” (2.4.7-8). The parallel structure of this line gives equal weight to Galatea’s hunt and Melbeus’ (Phillida’s male name) acknowledgment of her desire. The active language of hunting is tempered in the second half of the line by the passive experience of being seen and acknowledged by one’s prey.

The metaphor of desire (and wooing) as hunting, found throughout *Galatea*, takes on added significance when Cupid appears. As he plans to pierce Diana’s nymphs with his love darts, Cupid declares, “Let Diana and her coy nymphs know that there is no heart so chaste but thy bow can wound, nor eyes so modest but thy brands can kindle, nor thoughts so staid but thy shafts can make wavering, weak, and wanton” (2.2.2-6). The chaste hearts of Diana’s maids were initially “staid” and fixed in their virtue, but Cupid plans to set them in motion with his dart. As we might expect, the nymphs describe themselves as “unstayed” (3.1.53) and “unbridled” (3.1.58) once they are launched into the sexual scene. Although Diana chastises them, imploring that “the more [your thoughts] are assaulted with desires, the less they should be affected” (3.4.25-26), the women are still moved by desire.

In the final scene of the play Diana and Venus confront each other face to face, trading accusations and insults that reflect the metaphors of stasis and motion established

³¹ Cartwright regards this loss of control as another way Lyly’s plays achieve their theatrical liveliness. Characters who acknowledge the loss of identity and control in their experience of desire also suggest an emotional and psychic interiority. Cartwright notes, “as Gallathea and Phillida sense an alienation from their own identities they suggest an inchoate subjectivity” (*Theater and Humanism*, 178).

earlier in the play. Diana accuses Venus of having “untamed affections” (5.3.44), telling the goddess of love that “your tongue is as unruly as your thoughts, and your thoughts as unstayed as your eyes. Diana cannot chatter; Venus cannot choose” (5.3.59-61).

Unruliness is metaphorized as both physical motion and verbal activity, or “chatter.” In the binary relation between Diana and the goddess of love (one that Venus appears to accept), love is a moving force which only Diana can resist. Venus describes her nemesis as “she that hateth sweet delights, envieth loving desires, masketh wanton eyes, stoppeth amorous ears, bridleth youthful mouths...” (5.3.31-34). Venus sets things in motion. Diana retards motion. Where Diana argues that love is a scar, Venus corrects her, saying that love causes “bleeding wounds” (5.3.50-51), ever fresh and in motion.

While the fixed-chastity moving-desire binary runs throughout the play, the metaphor of hunting complicates the nature and quality of mobility in *Galatea*. Although Cupid is conceptualized as a hunter constantly on the move, Diana and her company of chaste nymphs are themselves huntresses. Moreover, even though Lyly’s lovers often conceptualize their desire as immobilizing, they use the metaphor of hunting to do so. The nymphs, once pierced by Cupid’s darts, find their “conquering modesty [turned] to a captive imagination” (3.1.3-4). Their thoughts are free and suddenly “unbridled,” but the nymphs also feel stuck, captivated, and imprisoned, by desire. The hunting metaphors allow Lyly to interrogate the quality of desire’s mobility. By their very nature, Diana and Cupid both hunt, pursue, attack. Both are mobile. Yet the quality of Diana’s mobility is contrasted sharply with Cupid’s. Cupid is described as “wander[ing]” (5.3.86) by Venus, and “idle” (4.2.64) by the nymphs. Love’s arrows, according to Diana, “drib...up and down Diana’s leas” (3.4.6-7), instead of surging forward. His appetites are “loose and

untamed” (3.4.77). In short, Cupid’s movements are notable for their laziness, carelessness, sloppiness.

When Cupid first meets one of Diana’s nymphs, he assumes that she has “strayed” (1.2.1) from the group, and now “wander[s] solitarily” (1.2.2), narcissistically describing the nymph in language that characterizes his own movements. The nymph responds that “these woods are to me so well known that I cannot stray though I would” (1.2.4-5). Diana’s nymphs are incapable of drifting because their aim is sure and their movements deliberate. Later in this scene, Cupid describes love to the nymph and asks her if she will yield to it. She replies, “I have neither will nor leisure, but I will follow Diana in the chase, whose virgins are all chaste, delighting in the bow that wounds the swift hart in the forest, not fearing the bow that strikes the soft heart in the chamber” (1.2.25-29). Anything but idle, this is movement with a purpose. We might say that Diana’s movements have a *telos*, whereas Cupid “straggleth up and down these woods” (3.4.7), seemingly without a goal. In his work on dramatic action, Burke captures the difference between motion and action by drawing on Aristotle’s stipulation that action is a specific kind of motion, one with a deliberate goal.³² Hence Cupid is in motion throughout the play, but he is never quite “active.”

The final scene of the play returns to the nuances of the motion-action ambiguity when Galatea and Phillida reveal their true identities. The gods intervene in the girls’ plight, eventually turning one of them into a boy so that they may marry. Before this happens, however, Neptune mocks the objects of the women’s desires, calling their love

³² Burke extends his analysis of the motion-action distinction when he considers “The Pathetic Fallacy,” where human beings (presumably members of an audience) assign purpose to seemingly random movements, making every movement an “action” through empathy (*GM*, 233-34). Within the context of *Galatea*, this fallacy may explain our tendency to think of Cupid as “active” in his movements and deliberate in his choice.

“[a]n idle choice, strange and foolish, for one virgin to dote on another and to imagine a constant faith where there can be no cause for affection” (5.3.139-41). The language of “constant faith” signals that whatever “unstead” affections were at work must now stabilize with marriage. The word “constant,” derived from the Latin “constare,” to “stand together,” indicates a stasis in desire, a standing still. Deciding whether she will change one of the maidens into a boy, Venus picks up on Neptune’s language, asking the pair, “[i]s your loves unspotted, begun with truth, continued with constancy, and not to be altered till death?” (5.3.145-47). Venus, who was described as “unruly” and “unsteady” less than one hundred lines earlier in this scene, now insists that the girls’ love is “not to be altered till death.” If Venus and Diana must resolve their quarrel in the final scene, so too must errant desire reconcile itself to something more permanent and fixed. The word “constant” is an accommodating one, since it is often used to describe motion. What it excludes, in Venus’s account, is change.

The ending of *Galatea* stages an attempt to discover a *telos* for desire, making Cupid’s arrows more like Diana’s. Venus’s uncharacteristic language of constancy in the final scene gestures toward such a recovery, though it never quite gains momentum. The word “constant” crops up one final time in *Galatea*’s epilogue, addressed to the women in the audience, imploring them to “[y]ield ladies, yield to love, ladies” (5), even though love is described as dangerous and enervating. *Galatea* notes that “Venus can make constancy fickleness, courage cowardice, modesty lightness...” (2-3). The *telos* that was almost at hand has once again receded: yet again, “constancy” is “fickleness” under Venus’s government. The nuances of desire, motion, and action finally escape resolution; indirection once again prevails.

Indirectness is not merely a property of the language in *Galatea*; it is fundamental to the experience of desire in the play. If we imagine an ideal love relationship as an unbroken line or connection between two lovers, the lack of direct interaction in *Galatea* must give us pause. What are we to make of so many conversations in which characters emphasize their private experience of love instead of a particular beloved? When Cupid first schemes to pierce the nymphs, he plans to entangle them in their own emotions, boasting that “while [the nymphs] aim to hit others with their arrows, they shall be wounded *themselves* with *their own eyes*” (1.2.35-37, emphases mine). The reflexive pronouns in Cupid’s line imply that love is a solitary enterprise; instead of relating to “others,” the attentions and aims of the nymphs will turn inward. Later in the play, Cupid plans to “confound [the nymphs’] loves in their own sex” (2.2.7-8), again suggesting that desire in *Galatea* is more about the self than about another.³³

Although Galatea and Phillida are not stricken by Cupid’s arrows, their love relationship is likewise characterized by a kind of enforced solipsism. From their first “dialogue” of asides in which they hardly interact, we witness a depiction of love that is almost unbearably lonely. Romeo and Juliet make a sonnet together upon their first encounter in a crowded room. Galatea and Phillida, all alone onstage, can hardly exchange a single word. In their later dialogues, each girl is preoccupied with defining the other in terms of herself. As the layers of their disguises slowly peel back, their interactions become increasingly opaque. Galatea, suspecting Phillida’s disguise, tells her to “Admit that I were as you would have me suppose that you are” (3.2.25-26),

³³ These reflexives circulate back to Cupid later in the play when he is captured and tortured by Diana, who intends to turn all of his wickedness back onto him, shooting “thine own arrow...into...thine own bosom” (93-94). She threatens, “Thou that fattest others with hopes shalt be fed thyself with wishes, and thou that bindest others with golden thoughts shalt be bound thyself with golden fetters” (86-89). Both Cupid and Diana punish their enemies by inflicting this kind of inwardness upon them.

causing Phillida to fear that “he is as I am” (3.2.31-32). For each mention of the other girl, the speaker conjures herself in this dizzying language, as though the girls are in love with their own images rather than someone outside of themselves.³⁴ Desire in *Galatea*, whether imposed by Cupid or by the girls themselves, is dramatized as an affair with love itself (or Love himself) rather than a beloved. Whereas characters in *Campaspe* experience desire in terms of their social roles, desire in *Galatea* is asocial and reticent, isolating characters in speech and in action.³⁵

This isolation has been interpreted by scholars such as G.K. Hunter as “static and passive,”³⁶ since it leads characters to contemplation more than it prompts overt stage action. While it is true that Lyly’s characters are not likely to slay dragons (or each other) in the name of love, there is an important distinction between “static and passive...contemplation” and what *Galatea*, Phillida, and the nymphs do. Lyly’s characters act and react, but the direct object of Lylyan desire is also the subject of it – the desirer herself. Stage action alone will not do to dramatize the tensions that are particular to this private experience. Just as two objects in conflict, exerting powerful yet equal force against one another, appear to be static, so might characters who are fraught with tension suffer this fate in the eyes of the audience or critic. The only way to dramatize such desire is to open it to our ears where our eyes cannot behold it, to speak it

³⁴ In Act 4, the girls conflate their self-descriptions with descriptions of each other as they argue over who is fairer. Phillida finally says to herself, “Poor Phillida, what shouldst thou think of thyself, that lovest one that I fear me is as thyself is?” (4.4.39-40). Her elliptical pronouns and reflexives entangle their identities, making Phillida seem quite alone in her desire, just as the nymphs are.

³⁵ Daniel Juan Gil argues for an early modern sexuality that is asocial, conceived as “a special class of interpersonal relations” which are neither “seamlessly congruent with the whole complex welter of early modern social life (as the notion of homosocial desire suggests)” nor “radically transgressive of it (as the notion of sodomy suggests).” See Gil, *Before Intimacy: Asocial Sexuality in Early Modern England* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), xii.

³⁶ G.K. Hunter, Introduction, 15.

where it cannot be seen. Its language, like the nymphs' arrows and like desire itself in *Galatea*, is "aim[ed]" at "others," but never quite reaches this *telos*.

IV. "Our Raging Motions": Metaphors of Desire in Shakespeare

If Lyly explores the directionality of erotic desire, Shakespeare gauges its intensity. Shakespeare raises the stakes of motion and stasis, amping up his metaphors to those of escape and imprisonment, chaos and death. Armado wants to "take desire prisoner" (*Love's Labors Lost* 1.2.57) with his sword; Cleopatra is Antony's "conqueror" (*Antony and Cleopatra* 3.11.66); Demetrius and Chiron rape Lavinia with "their worse-than-killing lust" (*Titus Andronicus* 2.3.175); Proteus is "yoked" (1.1.40 *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*) by the fool Love; Juliet "should kill [Romeo] with much cherishing" (*Romeo and Juliet* 2.1.227). These metaphors charge motion with turbulent force and stasis with paralyzing tension, prompting Shakespeare's characters to explore not only the power of desire itself, but they also offer characters a means for testing their own power over erotic desire. Whether casting themselves as captors or as victims, characters find agency on both sides of the verb. Take, for example, Shakespeare's Helena, as she navigates the formidable currents of desire in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. Desire is never a static business in the forest, where lovers shift their attentions as quickly as they shift their gazes. And yet, Helena feels stuck, lamenting the helplessness of her position. She begs Hermia to "teach me how you look, and with what art / You sway the motion of Demetrius' heart" (1.1.192-93). For Helena, desire is something that can be controlled, directed through particular actions, or "art" as she puts it.

Needless to say, the play itself is less confident. Shakespeare saddles Helena with metaphors of motion and attraction that restrict her desire. Although she wants to learn Hermia's seductive "art," in her speeches to Demetrius, Helena admits her powerlessness:

You draw me, you hard-hearted adamant,
But yet you draw not iron; for my heart
Is as true as steel. Leave you your power to draw,
And I shall have no power to follow you.
(2.1.195-98)

Magnetism complicates our account of action and stasis. Is Demetrius's magnetism the same as action? Kenneth Burke addresses the distinction between action and motion, following Aristotle's example. Action, in Burke's view, is deliberate and purposive motion, although deliberation may be difficult to ascertain.³⁷ Helena seems to confer all agency on Demetrius: he has the "power to draw" her; if he relinquishes this power, she will "have no power to follow" him. What does it mean to have the "power to follow" someone who draws you? Does not the one who follows a magnetic pull submit passively to the force of attraction? Is this a case in which motion develops into action? If to follow Demetrius's pull is to act, then even as she casts herself as a pure object of desire, Helena cannot quite cancel out her agency.

The agency that Helena finds on her side of the magnet corresponds with Aristotle's notion of passive power. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle defines passive powers in his discussion of *dunamis* ("strength" or "power"). Aristotle's ontology accounts for two types of *dunamis*: the power to cause a change in something else, and the "power of

³⁷ According to Burke's version of the "Pathetic Fallacy," we typically assign agency to things that move because we "empathetically move them with our imagination" (*GM*, 233).

suffering” a change.³⁸ The latter, which Charlotte Witt describes as “the power of being perceptible,” applies to Helena’s relation to Demetrius. Throughout the play, Helena wields passive power in order to be perceived and acknowledged by Demetrius. She famously demands that Demetrius “spurn me, strike me, / Neglect me, lose me; only give me leave, / Unworthy as I am, to follow you” (2.1.205-07). Here, her authority and abjection collide. To insist that Demetrius spurn and beat her is to affirm her passive power, to command him to command her. Helena’s passive power falls in line with Aristotle’s example in *The Metaphysics*: “For that which is oily can be burnt and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed.”³⁹ The power to yield or be crushed is Helena’s *dunamis* in the play; it abets her pursuit of Demetrius in the forest.⁴⁰ Hence for Shakespeare, submission—a mix of action and stasis—is always a form of erotic agency. Characters acknowledge the loss of control that is part and parcel of erotic desire; they submit to desire, instead of being overcome by it. They choose.

Erotic agency is interrogated still more shrewdly through metaphors of illicit sex and desire in *Measure for Measure*, a play where characters are hard at work analyzing the etiology and significance of their lustful impulses. Analytical, often reproachful, speeches crop up early in the play, structured by metaphors that obscure rather than illuminate the origins and *telos* of erotic desire. A particularly dense example is provided by Claudio, who has just been sentenced to death for the crime of fornication. On his way to prison, he explains to Lucio that his “restraint” comes “from too much liberty”

³⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1046a 10-14. Charlotte Witt argues that Aristotle’s *dunamis* also refers to “potentiality,” a way of being that opposes *entelechia* or “actuality.” See Charlotte Witt, *Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 38-58.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1046a 20-25.

⁴⁰ Helena prefers this passive power to the act of wooing, since women are “not made to woo” (2.1.242) in her estimation.

(1.2.105). To describe the nature, causes, and consequences of this sexual liberty, Claudio draws from a series of conflicting domains of experience:

As surfeit is the father of much fast,
 So every scope, by the immoderate use,
 Turns to restraint. Our natures do pursue,
 Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,
 A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.
 (1.2.106-10)

In these lines Claudio weaves together several different stories of what has happened to him, and more generally, what happens to any of us when we fall prey to erotic desire. Untangling these stories allows us more fully to understand how different domains combine to create Claudio's experience, and the mechanics of the rich, complex language that expresses it. An analysis of the placement, structure, and entailments of Claudio's metaphors will reveal the subtle tensions between unlawful sex and illicit desire, frenzied motion and purposive action, volition and compulsion, which Claudio assumes animate erotic desire in all of us when he speaks of a universal "we," of "every scope," and of "our natures."

Claudio twice depicts sexual liberty as something else. In lines 106-108, it is filed under the category of "every scope." In 108-110, it is "a thirsty evil." Each metaphor – of sex as scope, sex as thirst, and sex as evil – comes with entailments that highlight different aspects of Claudio's situation. Taken together, the different domains of experience answer to conflicting rules governing lust and sex. At the structural level, then, Claudio's speech consists of a set of metaphors which themselves rely on similes (overeating, fasting, drinking poison), all of which elaborate the target domains of illicit sex, desire, and prohibition.

At the same time, Claudio explores some of the most vexed aspects of erotic desire: Who or what calls the shots? What choices are available? What role does necessity play? What role ethics? By mapping the features of concrete domains (eating and drinking, animals and poison, kinship and death) onto experiences like desire or restraint, Shakespeare produces something of an elucidation-effect. But in Claudio's case, each simile, each new source domain, takes us further from the discrete object that is desire. Broadening the target domains of sex, desire, and prohibition, Claudio reveals new roles and new relations between them. Like a camera that keeps pulling back, Claudio's story gradually widens our field of vision at the cost of blurring the focus within the frame.

What, then, do Claudio's metaphors say about his evaluation of his experience of desire, and how do they bear upon our understanding of that experience? Claudio begins by comparing scope (prior fornication) and restraint (immanent imprisonment) with surfeit and fast. Below I emphasize the relationship terms that connect these experiences to one another:

As surfeit *is the father of* much fast,
So every scope, by the immoderate use,
Turns to restraint.

(1.2.106-08)

Claudio begins by using a metaphor of kinship, cued by the word "father," to describe how "surfeit" causes "much fast." Surfeit, in Claudio's account, begets fast like a father begets a child. According to Mark Turner, this is a "causation as progenation" metaphor.⁴¹ In order for Claudio's simile to match up with the experience it profiles,

⁴¹ Kinship metaphor is the subject of Mark Turner's *Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). One of Turner's claims is that kinship metaphor is

scope ought to be the “father of” restraint. But it is not. Claudio says that scope “turns to” restraint because of “immoderate use.” Instead of begetting a separate entity, a child, like surfeit did for fast, scope here *becomes* restraint by engaging in an action (immoderate use). This is a “causation as action” metaphor, which Turner defines as “someone directly manipulating some preexisting objects from one state into another state... *Causation as action* requires an initial state, a transformation, and a consequent final state.”⁴² Begetting turns out to be quite different from turning.

What does this discrepancy tell us about Claudio’s (and the play’s) conceptualization of illicit sex and imprisonment? It would appear that the “causation as progenation” metaphor expresses a more intimate affiliation between scope and restraint than the “causation as action” metaphor. After all, what two entities could be closer than father and child? But the “causation as action” metaphor does not express an affiliation between two separate entities – scope and restraint are the same entity at different points in time and experience. Although father and child also share essential features, in the end, they are ontologically separate. Both metaphors prompt us to consider the intimacy between scope and restraint, but the “causation as action” metaphor takes this a step further and treats them as the same entity, the same person. And, in *Measure for Measure*, they are. Angelo, “[a] man of stricture and firm abstinence” (1.3.12), turns into someone who “give[s] [his] sensual race the rein” (2.4.160). Isabella’s zeal for “a more strict restraint / Upon the sisterhood” (1.4.4-5) is a testament to the scope of her

essential to our basic understanding of metaphor itself: “We explain metaphor to ourselves in terms of what we know about *family*” (12), since Aristotelian metaphor is defined in terms of relations and resemblances.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 141.

abstinence.⁴³ Katherine Eisaman Maus has observed that “the concepts of restraint and transgression, discipline and capitulation... profoundly structure the experience of desire in *Measure for Measure*.”⁴⁴ Thus, Angelo conceptualizes his attraction to Isabella as a “desire to raze the sanctuary” (2.2.175). Thus, the “duke of dark corners” (4.3.157) dons the habit of a friar as he arranges a sexual tryst. And thus Claudio seems to cling to his chains as he is carted off to prison, noting how “just” (1.2.122) his punishment is, how even “to speak of [his offense] would offend again” (1.2.136). But Claudio does speak of his offense, however obliquely, in the lines that follow.

The ratsbane simile in the second part of Claudio’s speech ostensibly builds upon the description he gives in the first part. We might expect the metaphor of overeating to arise again, or the causal link between sex and imprisonment to be developed. In general, we expect the constraints of the first few lines to hold true for the rest. The first part of Claudio’s speech depicts his pursuit of illicit sex as more or less volitional – surfeiting, fasting, and “immoderate use” are predominantly voluntary acts, since they imply a will and choice on the part of the agent. The kinship metaphor in the opening line reinforces this conclusion since surfeit does not always compel one to fast, although it might well lead one to make this choice. However, the second part of Claudio’s speech is marked by an abrupt shift in agency:

⁴³ Isabella’s eagerness for bondage and discipline reveals the interdependence of scope and restraint in her fantasies. Theodore Leinwand writes, “When Isabella thrills to the idea of wearing ‘th’impression of keen whips . . . as rubies’ and stripping herself ‘to death as to a bed / That longing have been sick for’ (2.4.100-02), the play is interested in her aspirations toward Catholic martyrdom *per se* but equally in their proximity to sadomasochistic fantasy.” See Theodore Leinwand, “Shakespeare against Doctrine,” *Literature Compass*, 3 (March 2006): 513-28, doi: 10.1111/j.1741-4113.2006.00324.x. Sadomasochistic fantasy, as well as fantasies of bondage (“a more strict restraint”), account for a particular affinity between scope and sexual restraint, where an increase in discipline causes an increase in arousal.

⁴⁴ Katherine Eisaman Maus, *Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 160.

Our natures do pursue,
 Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,
 A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.
 (1.2.108-10)

Here Claudio tells us that our own natures compel us to pursue evil – an evil which is somehow “proper” to us –which in turn leads us to the restraint of death. The ratsbane metaphor marks not only a shift in agency, but also a shift in intensity. The stakes of fasting and restraint are high, but they pale in comparison to “thirsty evil” and death. Lines 108-110 turn our attention from people to rats (to our rat-like natures), from overeating to drinking poison, and from restraint to death.

Although the first half of Claudio’s speech depicts volitional acts, it makes no mention of human agency. There is no person who surfeits, no person who “uses” immoderately. The second sentence, although it strips away volition, introduces rat-like human agents. Where there is no obvious human agency there is volition, but where there appears to be human agency there is compulsion. Is this because Claudio, like many of us, can imagine controlling erotic desire only in the abstract?⁴⁵ Rat-like Claudio is doomed to drink the “thirsty evil,” imagining that the poison he drinks is “proper” to him. Shakespeare ratchets down from tidy sententiae to graphic and grotesque bodily metaphors. Claudio devolves from a father to a rat, and the puritanical deputy who “scarce confesses / That his blood flows” (1.3.51-52) turns into an erotically charged character who actively pursues a “strong and swelling evil” (2.4.6).

Still more is going on in Claudio’s story than the shift from abstract volition to concrete compulsion. The first part of his speech is conspicuously devoid of action

⁴⁵ Also in the abstract, desire and sex are subjected to Vienna’s “most biting laws” (1.3.19), which presume that erotic desire is volitional and thus hold its citizens accountable for it. Of course, the law at the beginning of *Measure for Measure* has been “dead to infliction” (1.3.28), an abstract threat with no practical consequence. When a human agent actually enforces it, he too degenerates.

verbs. The first two roles in the source domain, surfeit and fast, are connected by the linking verb “is.” Then three roles—scope, immoderate use, and restraint—are joined by another linking verb, “turns to.” Something transpires, but it does so in a notably passive, and static, fashion. Then Claudio ramps up the active terms. Suddenly all of us are said to “pursue,” “ravin,” and “drink.” “And when we drink, we die.” This is especially dynamic; it takes place in a concrete moment (Claudio doesn’t say, for example, “*if* we drink, we die”), and it depicts a surprisingly clear chain of action. What accounts for this shift? If we trace the progression of Claudio’s metaphors across all five lines, we discover that each new source domain introduces a new character, or role, which must be mapped onto the target. Beginning with only two roles (surfeit and fast), he makes his way toward the source domain of ratsbane, which tells its own, much more complicated, story.

Ratsbane, after it is ingested, induces unquenchable thirst. Rats typically die from overhydration; the water that they compulsively drink to slake their thirst eventually causes their bodies to burst. While the ratsbane domain entails four roles – the rat, the poison, the water, and death – it is clear only that the rat profiles us and that death profiles “restraint.” Poison and water are more difficult to map. Instead of consuming a single substance that would clearly profile illicit sex, the rats glut themselves on both poison and water. Both substances have a hand in killing the rat. Although the poison is ultimately responsible for the death, Claudio tells us “when we drink [water, presumably] we die.” Claudio’s metaphor adds depth and complexity to the story of sex and restraint, since he opens up a new slot (poison or water) to be filled in the target domain. So, what can poison and water profile? Water, a natural and essential substance that fuels life, is

tainted by the ratsbane that then corrupts the judgment of the one who drinks it. The rats, no longer able to calibrate how much water is too much (they “surfeit”), are never satisfied, and effectively kill themselves under the misapprehension that they are nourishing themselves. Water, then, seems to profile sex, since both (in moderation) are natural, essential, and promote life. Something else (something “proper” to us) beguiles us before we take a drink, poisoning our relation to what might otherwise have been healthy, infecting our judgment.

What comes before sex and ruins it for us? What poison did Claudio “ravin down” before bedding down Juliet? As Angelo marvels after his first encounter with Isabella, “What’s this” (2.2.167)? Angelo’s poison seems to be a kind of original sin. In his opening soliloquy, he decides that Isabella is not at fault for his lust: “Not she... but it is I / That, lying by the violet in the sun, / Do, as the carrion does, not as the flower, / Corrupt with virtuous season” (2.2.169-72). For Angelo, the “proper bane” is in his own carrion-like nature, which condemns him to rot just as Claudio’s rat-like nature condemns him to chase after the “thirsty evil.” Although Angelo’s metaphor has a different starting point than Claudio’s – the carrion is already poisoned – the two metaphors run a similar course. Angelo and Claudio conceive of their natures as both contaminated and contaminating. The sunshine, another natural and life-promoting substance, only deepens the effects of the poison, “corrupt[ing]” Angelo further, just as the water does to the rats. For Claudio and Angelo both, ratsbane profiles erotic desire.⁴⁶ In *Measure for Measure*, desire is suicidal; it causes characters to lose their judgment, to surfeit, to pervert

⁴⁶ Angelo’s “ratsbane” may also be restraint or prohibition itself. In her introduction to the Norton edition, Katherine Eisaman Maus suggests that “the habits of restraint can themselves provoke sexual excitement.” See Maus, introduction to *Measure for Measure*, in *The Norton Shakespeare Based on the Oxford Edition*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, et al. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1997), 2021-27, 2023.

something “healthy” like sunlight or water. The first part of Claudio’s speech details causal relationships but never really accounts for the prior cause or assigns agency. Finally, with ratsbane, we encounter desire in the form of a thirst-inducing poison that sets us in motion towards a painful, gluttonous, but “proper” death.

Claudio’s metaphors illuminate the difference between abstractions and dramatizations, stasis and action. They distinguish abstract notions of sex and its consequences (exemplified by the domain of Viennese law) from the actions of erotic desire and sex that are part of the drama itself. Once human agents enter the field of metaphor, action verbs follow. Desire enters the picture not only through the ratsbane role but also through words like “pursue” and even “thirsty” in the second half of Claudio’s speech, words that signal intention and motive. But what sort of action is erotic desire in Claudio’s account, or in the play at large? Where might we plot it on the continuum in Section 1 of this chapter, and how can this help us to understand the nature and consequences of desire in *Measure for Measure*? In Claudio’s account, desire is an active business that causes us to pursue the ostensible relief of sex again and again until it kills us. We may plot motion of this sort somewhere near the middle of our continuum. But over desire which moves in this way – as a compulsive ravining – we have no control at all. Passivity affords *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*’s Helena a modicum of power, but nothing like this is available to the rats or to Claudio. Their very frenzy renders them powerless.

The ratsbane metaphor, like the hunting metaphor in *Galatea*, interrogates the quality of desire’s mobility. If desire is an action in this play, what is its *telos*? Is desire entelechic; is its goal achieved in process? Claudio’s lines suggest that our inability to

understand our *telos* undoes us; scurrying along the path towards the goal of survival, relief, and satisfaction, we end up guzzling our way to the gluttonous demise that we have coming to us (“proper”). As with Lyly’s Cupid, erotic desire in *Measure for Measure* suffers from its misguided *telos*.⁴⁷ Like hamsters on a wheel, we tirelessly if assiduously move from thirst to drink, thirst to drink. But unlike in *Galatea*, in *Measure for Measure* there is nothing idle about motion. Neither is there idleness in Angelo’s “going to temptation” (2.2.63) nor in Isabella’s “moving graces” (2.2.36). An excess of motion, erotic desire in *Measure for Measure* is, for Angelo, a “fall” (2.1.18). Mariana’s thirst for Angelo is also described as unquenchable, uncontrollable, and it, too, is without a *telos*. The Duke remarks that Angelo’s “unjust unkindness, that in all reason should have quenched her love, hath, like an impediment in the current, made it more violent and unruly” (3.1.238-41).⁴⁸ Mariana’s unruly current, Angelo’s downward plunge, and Claudio’s misguided pursuit of a thirsty evil, constitute hyperactive forms of desire, lacking any *telos* except for death.

Erotic desire in *Measure for Measure* shares properties of entelechic desire, since the *telos* of death is achieved in process. Restraint is part of the experience, often fuelling sexual attraction for characters such as Mariana and the Duke. But paradoxically, restraint only increases the velocity of desire in *Measure for Measure*. Where we expect to see characters immobilized by their feelings and actions, they move like the rats, with

⁴⁷ The Duke in *Measure for Measure* describes Cupid’s arrows as idle and weak. Like the nymphs in *Galatea*, he tells the Friar, “Believe not that the dribbling dart of love / Can pierce a complete bosom” (1.3.2-3).

⁴⁸ The Duke’s description of Mariana’s love as a current takes the form of an event structure metaphor – Mariana’s longing for Angelo is conceptualized as motion along a path, and his rebukes are conceptualized as impediments to motion. The event structure metaphor implies that such an impediment would slow her down, but Angelo’s “unkindness” strengthens Mariana’s “violent” love. These lines reconfirm the interdependence of desire and restraint in *Measure for Measure*, not only in repressed characters such as Isabella and Angelo, but also in ones who openly experience and pursue their desires, like Mariana.

violent speed. For a character like Angelo, whose lust for Isabella both “stirs [his] temper” (2.2.189) and “subdues [him] quite” (2.2.190), erotic desire is in motion, spurred on even further by the habits of restraint. Later in the play when Angelo is praying, the metaphors of stasis and motion again collide. His “invention . . . [a]nchors on Isabel” (2.4.2-3), and yet his heart contains “the strong and swelling evil / Of my conception” (2.4.6-7). At once “swelling” and “anchor[ed],” both “stir[ring]” and “subdued,” desire in *Measure for Measure* seems only to billow and blister under the pressure of death.

Angelo is not the only Shakespearean character who feels subdued by the force of erotic desire. The word “subdue” appears six times in *Othello*. In its first two appearances, aggression is emphasized. Brabantio furiously orders the guards to “subdue” (1.2.81) Othello, by force if necessary, so that he may be brought before the Senate. The first Senator then asks Othello if he “by indirect and forced courses / Subdue[d] and poison[ed] this young maid’s affections” (1.3.111-12). These charges against Othello recall Claudio’s metaphor of erotic desire as a poison. Where we might expect to hear that Desdemona’s “affections” were inflamed or aroused, control and contamination are instead anticipated. In its succeeding four appearances, “subdue” is a marker of conjugal generosity and affection. When asked if Othello obtained her love by witchcraft, Desdemona responds that “My heart’s subdued / Even to the very quality of my lord” (1.3.249-50).⁴⁹ A subdued heart suggests a quiet stillness, preferable to both the “raging motions” of lust described by Iago (1.3.325) and the “chaos” that Othello predicts

⁴⁹ In the First Quarto of 1622, Desdemona says “utmost pleasure” instead of “very quality.” I cite from the Folio text as it appears in *The Complete Pelican Shakespeare* and I fall into line with “most editors and textual scholars [who] have agreed that F is the superior text.” (See Russ McDonald’s Introduction to the play in *The Complete Pelican Shakespeare*, 1400). In the Quarto, Desdemona’s line here reads as a sexual submission, whereas the Folio line can be interpreted more broadly. The “very quality” of Othello has both social valences (“quality” could include his profession, his status, his militarism) and inherent ones (his natural gifts, his disposition, his character). In context, Othello’s “very quality” seems to belong to the latter category – Desdemona’s heart is subdued to his very essence.

will “come again” (3.3.93), when he falls out of love with Desdemona. Othello imagines the unruly energy of chaos as an agitating force opposed to the subduing counterforce of marriage or love. Chaos is frenzied action in its own right, but Othello anticipates the whole force of it “com[ing]” towards him in the absence of Desdemona’s love.

According to the event structure metaphor, in which an external event is conceptualized as a large moving object, Othello, minus Desdemona’s love, will be surrounded and then finally subdued by chaos.⁵⁰

Although Desdemona describes her heart as “subdued,” the other parts of her body seem to resist this subjection, even in Othello’s accounts. In his speech to the Senators, Othello describes his courtship of Desdemona, the life stories he told her, and her enthusiastic response to them:

These things to hear
 Would Desdemona seriously incline
 . . . and with a greedy ear
 Devour up my discourse . . .
 (1.3.144-45, 148-49)

On the one hand, Desdemona is said to have been a submissive listener. On the other hand, she “seriously incline[d]” to hear his stories, leaning forward or, as Keats puts it, “winning near the goal.”⁵¹ Hardly passive, this Desdemona listens “with a greedy ear” that “devour[s]” like a mouth. Stephen Greenblatt has noted that Desdemona’s love here has “a quality. . . that unsettles the orthodox schema of hierarchical obedience and makes Othello perceive her submission to his discourse as a devouring of it.”⁵² Here and elsewhere, Othello’s alludes to the active, even aggressive and excessive quality of

⁵⁰ Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor.”

⁵¹ Later in the play, Iago refers to “th’inclining Desdemona” who is “most easy . . . / to subdue / In any honest suit” (2.3.327-29).

⁵² Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 240.

Desdemona's sexuality. Her "subdued" heart has the capacity to overwhelm what Othello feeds it, challenging Orsino's claim in *Twelfth Night* that there is "no woman's heart / So big, to hold so much. They lack retention" (2.5.93-94).

In general, metaphors of movement, change, and increase are ominous in *Othello*. Even before the temptation scene, Othello expresses a fear of change, of augmented love. When he arrives at Cyprus after enduring a harsh storm at sea, he tells his wife that he would be "most happy" to die now, because his soul is absolutely content with the way things are. Life could just end here, Othello muses – things are as good as they can get. Desdemona responds,

The heavens forbid
But that our loves and comforts should increase
Even as our days do grow.
(2.1.190-92)

For Othello, love and desire are bounded experiences; for Desdemona, their "loves and comforts" ought steadily to grow. Othello is happy to die now because his content is "absolute" (2.1.188); his desire has peaked. Greenblatt notes the contrast between the chaos of the tempest that Othello has just endured and the calmness which follows it: "The 'calmness' of which [Othello] speaks may express gratified desire, but, as the repeated invocation of death suggests, it may equally express the longing for a final *release* from desire, from the dangerous violence, the sense of extremes, the laborious climbing and falling out of control that is experienced in the tempest."⁵³ What Greenblatt calls "gratified desire" and "*release* from desire," Iago calls "satisfaction."⁵⁴ Derived

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 243.

⁵⁴ Patricia Parker describes Othello's repeated demands for satisfaction ("Would I were satisfied!" [3.3.390]), as his "impatient and even compulsive rushing to end or conclusion." I examine Parker's notion of "dilatatory time" later in this chapter. See Patricia Parker, "Shakespeare and Rhetoric: 'Dilation' and

from the Latin *satisfacere*, “to make enough,” satisfaction –intellectual, sexual, psychic, or any other kind – implies a completion which falls in line with Othello’s desire for “stops” (2.1.194), and which is at odds with Desdemona’s seemingly boundless “increase.” In the temptation scene, Othello demands certain knowledge of Desdemona, a satisfying truth that only Iago possesses.⁵⁵ This kind of knowledge, according to Stanley Cavell, is often metaphorized as a kind of ownership or a violence that Othello wishes to exact on his wife, and as a dominion that he fears Desdemona has achieved over him.⁵⁶ Another kind of stasis, stasis as attainment, is something Othello both aspires to (in his relation to Desdemona) and fears (in her relations with him).

According to Desdemona’s more dynamic conceptualization, their “loves and comforts should increase” with time, apparently without end.⁵⁷ For Desdemona, as for Juliet, love is dynamic.⁵⁸ However, the dynamism to which she subscribes corresponds neither with the tempest Othello has come from, nor the “chaos” which he predicts.

‘Delation’ in *Othello*” in *Shakespeare and the Question of Theory*, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Methuen, 1985), 54-74, 66.

⁵⁵ Iago repeatedly asks what he can do to “satisfy” Othello during the temptation scene: “You would be satisfied?” (3.3.398), “how satisfied, my lord?” (3.3.299), “Where’s satisfaction?” (3.3.406).

⁵⁶ Cavell refers to Heidegger on the “violence in human knowing” since Heidegger’s philosophy has always “conceived of knowledge under the aegis of dominion, of the concept of a concept as a matter, say, of grasping a thing.” See Stanley Cavell, *Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare*, updated ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 9. Cavell later notes that “Desdemona’s acceptance, or satisfaction, or reward, of [Othello’s] ambition strikes him as being possessed” (10).

⁵⁷ Desdemona makes it difficult to know precisely what view of love she endorses. The difficulty arises from the double negative of “the heavens *forbid* / *But that* our loves and comforts should increase.” Although it appears that Desdemona is saying that the heavens demand that their loves continue to increase with time, she uses very oblique language. The indirect quality of her response may indicate that she is uncertain of her feelings on the matter, or it may signal her hesitancy to tell Othello that she expects (and wants?) more from their love.

⁵⁸ Edward Snow notes the similarities between Othello and Romeo, and Desdemona and Juliet, particularly in this *Othello* exchange about absolute content and increase. Romeo’s (and Othello’s) “tendency to think of love as moments of satisfaction rather than a process of growth, and hence to experience happiness within it against a backdrop of apocalyptic loss, is something Romeo shares with the male protagonists in Shakespeare’s darkest treatments of love and sexual desire.” See Edward Snow, “Language and Sexual Difference in *Romeo and Juliet*,” in *Shakespeare’s “Rough Magic:” Renaissance Essays in Honor of C.L. Barber*, ed. Peter Erickson and Coppélia Kahn (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986), 168-92, 172-73.

Thus, to describe Desdemona's lines as "a vision of unabating increase" of love and desire is to miss the stability and regularity of the love she imagines, the loves and comforts that will grow in proportion to time.⁵⁹ Desdemona's ability to reach toward the future without crushing the present, her patience and measuredness, distinguish her desire as entelechic. She finds a way to imagine and anticipate the future without doing violence to it or to the present, a violence that Othello succumbs to. Othello also misses Desdemona's commitment to order by "increase," doubting as he does that any change in their loves could be positive. When he responds to Desdemona, he continues to speak the language of stasis, describing his happiness as so overwhelming that "It stops me here, it is too much of joy" (2.1.194). Othello's static metaphors of love and happiness entrap him every bit as much as Iago does.

What is responsible for Othello's "stops"? Male anxiety in the face of female sexuality is frequently adduced as "the cause" for Othello's uneasiness.⁶⁰ When Iago hatches his plan to "abuse Othello's ears," his ambiguous pronouns suggest that he will encourage Othello to identify with Cassio as a defiler of Desdemona. Iago plans to mislead Othello into believing "That *he* [Cassio? Othello?] is too familiar with his wife" (1.3.388; emphasis mine). Greenblatt finds that "the dark essence of Iago's whole enterprise. . . [is] to play upon Othello's buried perception of his own sexual relations with Desdemona as adulterous."⁶¹ Likewise, Snow writes that Othello has "released the

⁵⁹ Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, 243.

⁶⁰ Among others, see Greenblatt, Snow, and Edward Pechter, "'Have you not read of some such thing?': Sex and sexual stories in *Othello*," *Annual Survey of Shakespearean Study and Production* 49 (1996): 201-16.

⁶¹ Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, 233. Stanley Cavell also discusses Othello's suspicion that he has contaminated himself and his wife: "The torture of logic in his mind we might represent as follows: Either I shed her blood and scarred her or I did not. If I did not then she was not a virgin and this is a stain upon me. If I did then she is no longer a virgin and this is a stain upon me. Either way I am

sexual flow in her, and transformed her from a chaste object of desire into a sexually demanding woman.”⁶² Having unlocked what he perceives to be Desdemona’s overpowering and sometimes even repulsive sexuality, Othello resorts to metaphors of stillness (subduing, stopping, satisfying) to control the apparent chaos of Desdemona’s “increase.” Yet even as Othello is committed to stasis, he too is set in motion by the sexual anxieties that he has unleashed in himself by (presumably) deflowering his wife.⁶³ The man who in 2.1 was ready to “die now” first falls into a fit described as both “a trance” and “an epilepsy” (a physiological manifestation of stillness and motion combined) and then barrels toward the play’s murderous conclusion.

Set in motion by his own anxieties and suspicions, Othello is also propelled by Iago’s insinuations. Twice within ten lines, Iago perceives that Othello has been “moved” by talk of Desdemona’s adultery (“But I do see you’re moved” [3.3.217], “My lord, I see you’re moved” [3.3.224]). Although Othello denies these charges, his agitation grows. Toward the end of the temptation scene, Othello’s thoughts are indeed violently in motion:

Like to the Pontic Sea,
Whose icy current and compulsive course
Ne’er feels retiring ebb, but keeps due on
To the Propontic and the Hellespont,
Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace
Shall ne’er look back, ne’er ebb to humble love,
Till that a capable and wide revenge
Swallow them up. (3.3.453-60)

contaminated.” See Cavell’s “Othello and the Stake of the Other” in *Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 125-42, 135.

⁶² Snow, “Sexual Anxiety,” 392.

⁶³ Edward Pechter (208-10) points out the grotesque images that evoke Desdemona’s sexuality in the play: “a cistern for foul toads / To knot and gender in” (4.2.63-64) and “the slime / That sticks on filthy deeds” (5.2.155-56), as well as language that evokes Desdemona’s “nasty smell.”

The “compulsive course” of Othello’s bloody thoughts contrasts starkly with his earlier “stops” of joy with Desdemona, just as the “violent pace” of the temptation scene itself disturbs what Iago calls “dilatatory time” (2.3.360), time that unfolds slowly and expands steadily. Patricia Parker has noted that Iago’s insinuations in this scene are examples of rhetorical dilation; he offers glimpses of a narrative which prompt Othello to flesh out a fuller story of Desdemona’s infidelity. Dilation and “dilatatory time” are responsible for the dramatic progression of much of the play, its expansiveness recalling Desdemona’s desire, which also steadily “increase[s]” with time.⁶⁴ Yet dilatatory time also governs the rhythms of Othello’s own jealousy, which, according to Parker, “is also founded on a principle of enlargement (‘Trifles light as air / Are to the jealous confirmations strong / As proofs of holy writ’ [III.iii.322-24]).”⁶⁵ Othello’s jealousy causes him to inflate the intensity and the frequency of Desdemona’s adulterous encounters with Cassio. As Edward Snow points out, “once planted in his mind, the adulterous relationship quickly grows into something Cassio and Desdemona have committed ‘a thousand times.’”⁶⁶ Iago’s “trifles” turn into full-blown actions. The “violent pace” of Othello’s thoughts reaches an apex in Act 4, when he falls into his epileptic fit. In a speech full of “stops” (“—Handkerchief—confessions—handkerchief!—” (4.1.37)), Othello first “tremble[s]” (4.1.39), then “shakes” (4.1.41), and finally falls into a fit. Unable to keep up with the wild pace of his own thoughts, Othello’s body suffers passively, immobilized by the chaos within.

⁶⁴ According to Parker, “dilation in the handbooks is a principle of fertility, *copia*, and increase: but the prescriptions for it – including the forms of its marshalling in the service of a cause, accusation or proof – repeatedly caution towards its ordering or disposition as at least in part a means of keeping that potential fertility, or expansion, within bounds” (“Shakespeare and Rhetoric,” 68). Desdemona’s dilatatory sexuality poses a similar threat to Othello.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁶⁶ Snow, “Sexual Anxiety,” 398.

Perhaps Othello's father suffered similarly – perhaps it was the function of the handkerchief to subdue his chaos to love, too. Othello tells Desdemona that, “while [his mother] kept it / ‘Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father / Entirely to her love” (3.4.61-63).⁶⁷ The quality of being subdued (somewhat captured by the modern-day idiom “settled down”) is crucial to Othello's conception of his marriage. When he begins to suspect Desdemona of infidelity, he imagines her in motion, changing: “she can turn and turn, and yet go on / And turn again; and she can weep, sir, weep; / And she's obedient, as you say, obedient; / Very obedient” (4.1.250-53). These lines are prompted by Lodovico's request that Othello call his wife back to speak with them. What begins as a test of Othello's power to “make her turn” (4.1.249) ends as an image of Desdemona spinning out of control.⁶⁸ Paradoxically, Othello imagines Desdemona's very obedience – her willingness to be subdued in their marriage – as a kind of motion that prompts her to “go on / And turn” without his bidding.⁶⁹ Here, as in the scene of Othello's trance, stillness and motion collide.

When the play arrives at its “bloody period” (5.2.357), violent action and stillness coalesce one last time in the act of suffocation. Parker observes that “there is, finally, as the tragedy moves towards its ending, an increasing sense of the need to keep ‘dilation’ itself under control, both to prevent further amplification or unfolding and to bring an end

⁶⁷ On the handkerchief's symbolic significance, see Lynda Boose, “Othello's Handkerchief: ‘The Recognizance and Pledge of Love,’” in *Critical Essays on Shakespeare's Othello*, ed. Anthony Gerard Berthelemy (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1994), 55-67.

⁶⁸ When Othello conceptualizes Desdemona's changing affections as a kind of physical turning, he taps into a special case of the event structure metaphor called “Changing Is Turning” (Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 207).

⁶⁹ Snow points out that once Desdemona starts to turn, Othello believes that she will “turn again,” exercising the autonomous sexuality he has unleashed and which is now “beyond his capacity to satisfy.” See Snow, “Sexual Anxiety,” 398.

to delay.”⁷⁰ Othello appears to endorse static love when he avows, “Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee / And love thee after” (5.2.18-19). This is to stop her life only to set things in motion again by loving her “after.” What can it mean that Othello gives equal rhetorical weight to the verbs “kill” and “love” and what can it mean that the former must precede the latter? Othello’s necrophiliac fantasy suggests that to love Desdemona is an act of violence similar to “knowing” her in Cavell’s account, where knowledge is conceptualized as an act of conquest, possession, or assimilation.

Emmanuel Levinas, who defines knowledge similarly, observes that human beings are never able to know one another.⁷¹ For Levinas, knowledge falls within the provenance of “Sameness” because it is an act of totalization by which we try to possess ideas, to synthesize the universe, to claim the outside world as our own. But the provenance of (erotic) relations between human beings is the “Other” because such relations are “non-synthesizable.” The Other is always infinite, wholly separate, and therefore unable to be assimilated.⁷² Stanley Cavell has noted that Desdemona is “everything [Othello] is not,” and that the two of them “together form an emblem of human separation” that is too much for Othello to bear.⁷³ Othello’s inability to assimilate or to know Desdemona prompts a crisis marked by both sexual and epistemological anxiety; his problem of knowledge centers on his failure to know female sexuality. This crisis also gives rise to Othello’s necrophiliac fantasy, his dream of total erotic assimilation. Once she is dead,

⁷⁰ Parker, “Shakespeare and Rhetoric,” 67.

⁷¹ See Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonse Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Also see chapters 6 and 7 in Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985).

⁷² Levinas defines desire as antithetical to knowledge or assimilation. In *Ethics and Infinity* he writes, “the relation to the Infinite is not a knowledge, but a desire” (92).

⁷³ Cavell, *Disowning Knowledge*, 136, 142. According to Cavell, it is the realization of Desdemona’s otherness that tortures Othello: “He cannot forgive Desdemona for existing, for being separate from him, outside, beyond command, commanding, her captain’s captain” (136).

he need not grasp or keep her; finally he can possess her as if she were indeed made of “monumental alabaster” (5.2.5).

Othello’s desire to possess Desdemona, his desire to “know” her with certainty, and especially his desire not to desire (“Would I were satisfied!” [3.3.390]), are all conceptualized by the same metaphors of motion and stillness that govern erotic desire in the play. As we have seen, Othello is in his element either when he is stopped or when he moves at a “violent pace.” Iago’s slowly unfolding “dilatatory time” and Desdemona’s steady “increase” are uncongenial to Othello’s psychology of “honorable stop[s]” (2.3.2). According to Snow, “‘Killing’ Desdemona (either again and again or once and for all) is a way of extinguishing what threatens to turn her from a passive object of desire into an actively dangerous lover; at the same time it is a displaced means of killing the feelings that threaten to engulf his own inner being.”⁷⁴ Othello’s vulnerability in the face of female sexuality is hardly unique in Shakespeare’s plays, and it has been much commented on.⁷⁵ The First Witch in *Macbeth* plans to “drain [a sailor] dry as hay. / Sleep shall neither night nor day / Hang upon his penthouse lid. / He shall live a man forbid” (1.3.18-21). Like a succubus, she will deplete him, leaving the sailor “a man forbid.” According to Enobarbus, Cleopatra “makes hungry / Where most she satisfies” (2.2.247-48). Once again, female sexuality presents men with a paradox; in this case not so much both turning and obeying, but stimulating and allaying at the same time.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Snow, “Sexual Anxiety,” 394.

⁷⁵ See especially Janet Adelman, *Suffocating Mothers*, 38-75.

⁷⁶ Levinas defines desire as “a paradoxical structure.” Using language close to Enobarbus’s words about Cleopatra, Levinas notes, “I have tried to describe the difference between Desire and need by the fact that Desire cannot be satisfied; that Desire in some way nourishes itself on its own hungers and is augmented by its satisfaction; that Desire is like a thought which thinks more than it thinks, or more than what it thinks” (*Ethics and Infinity*, 92). Cf. Ovid *Metamorphoses* 3.466: “inopem me copia fecit” (abundance makes me want).

Orgasmic release is itself an engine of desire. For Cleopatra, as for Desdemona, desire is entelechic. For them, satisfaction (*telos*) and desire (process) are irreducibly bound up with one another. And so it is with others of Shakespeare's women. Juliet's desire strengthens as it ebbs: "boundless as the sea, / My love as deep; The more I give to thee, / The more I have, for both are infinite" (2.2.133-35). In his analysis of metaphors of desire in *Romeo and Juliet*, Edward Snow argues that Juliet's metaphors are "extravagantly metamorphic" and "overflowing;" her experience of desire is correspondingly active and in motion. "Juliet's images," Snow writes, "exist in an urgently desired future, and are charged with an erotic energy that makes the experience they invoke present and actual in her imagination."⁷⁷ Juliet's erotic imagination, capable of crossing the grammatical boundaries of tense and mood, conjures the future in the present. For Levinas, the future is the temporal equivalent of the Other in its mystery and its inability to be assimilated through knowledge. The erotic relation, according to Levinas, is a relation with the future. He writes, "It is neither a struggle, nor a fusion, nor a knowledge. . . . It is the relationship with alterity, with mystery, that is, with the future, with what in the world where there is everything, is never there."⁷⁸ Juliet's desire for Romeo takes place in what we have seen Burke refer to as "an eternal present" and it, too, is entelechic.

Snow (an unavowed first-wave French feminist) argues that Juliet's expansive metaphors of desire are particular to female ontology in their generative, fluid nature.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Snow, "Language and Sexual Difference," 176.

⁷⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, *Le temps et l'autre* (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1979), 81, quoted in *Ethics and Infinity*, 68.

⁷⁹ Levinas also describes infinity, alterity, futurity, mystery, or "Other" as feminine. His philosophy was received with a great deal of skepticism and elicited many objections from feminists, most famously in Simone de Beauvoir's footnote in *The Second Sex* in which she charges Levinas with "deliberately tak[ing] a man's point of view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject and object." See Simone de Beauvoir, *The*

Juliet's "bounty," Desdemona's "increase,"⁸⁰ and Cleopatra's "infinite variety" share these generative qualities of movement, flux, pregnancy, entelechy. This is not to say that entelechy is a mode of erotic desire accessible only to female characters, but rather that it is made possible by them. Cleopatra stimulates entelechic desire, according to which satisfaction is part and parcel of desiring. If entelechic desire is most often articulated through paradoxical metaphors—satisfaction in hunger, having in giving—it is because primary metaphors cannot account for this kind of action.⁸¹ Entelechy crosses logical boundaries, so it is unsurprising to find that its metaphors are often paradoxical, betraying the basic physical principles of the domains they elaborate: hunger does not succeed satisfaction, at least not within the domain of eating. Janet Adelman describes paradox in *Antony and Cleopatra* as a poetic form which "demands an act of faith" to give it credence.⁸² Such a requirement is especially well-suited to conceptualizations of love, which is itself an act of faith.

Faith and belief are characteristics of entelechic desire, which occurs in the subjunctive mood and in the present tense, ever "inclining" towards the future as Desdemona and Keats' lover both do. Belief implies an acceptance and anticipation of the future in the present, and I suggest that it serves as an alternative to knowledge or "satisfaction," the violence of which we see in Othello's example. Juliet's fear that she

Second Sex, trans. and ed. H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxii. For more recent examinations of Levinas's relationship to feminism, see *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas*, ed. Tina Chanter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

⁸⁰ Hamlet describes Gertrude's desire for his father in the same terms: "Why she would hang on him / As if increase in appetite had grown / By what it fed on" (1.2.143-45).

⁸¹ In terms of conceptual metaphor theory, a paradoxical metaphor may be defined as (1) a metaphor that does not adhere to the constraints of the source domain, or (2) a metaphor whose entailments are incompatible. (See Appendix A for examples, marked by the conjunction "or" to emphasize the incommensurability between two domains, or between two entailments within a single domain.)

⁸² Janet Adelman, *The Common Liar: An Essay on Antony and Cleopatra* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 113. Adelman describes Cleopatra's Egypt in entelechic terms: "Everything here is in process . . . everything is becoming" (144).

“should kill [Romeo] with much cherishing” (2.1.227) is her acknowledgment of this violence. To cherish Romeo is to keep him, to possess or assimilate him in Levinas’s terms, that is, to force him into Sameness rather than to preserve his Otherness. While Juliet seems to resist pursuing this knowledge of her lover, other characters fixate on this knowledge. The women of *Galatea*, for example, spend the majority of the play hampered by the epistemological problems of desire. They desperately seek knowledge of themselves through knowledge of each other. Galatea and Phillida are entangled in the realm of Sameness— they spend the play trying to figure out if the other is “as I am” (3.2.31, 34), trying to assimilate each other only to uncover their sameness in the end. The nymphs, too, are mostly concerned with telling “what I am” (3.1.57) in their conversations about desire. This sharp focus on *knowledge* as the goal of desire (knowledge of the love-object or of oneself) is what separates the acts of desire in *Galatea* from Juliet’s entelechic desire.

When Juliet tells Romeo that “This bud of love, by summer’s ripening breath, / May prove a beauteous flow’r when next we meet” (2.2.121-22), metaphors of growth indicate that her desire will flourish even in Romeo’s absence.⁸³ Juliet does not even need Romeo around to experience desire as process, growth, action. Unlike the women of *Galatea*, whose solitary experiences of desire entrap them, Juliet’s solitude will nurture her love for Romeo. Where Galatea seems always to be alone, even in the company of others, Juliet is never alone. In her endless anticipation and in her ability to experience the full force of her love by herself on her balcony, Juliet’s desire is

⁸³ Snow compares these lines to Romeo’s response, where he worries that his evening with Juliet will fade into a dream after she leaves. Whereas she is capable of sustaining and developing her desire in Romeo’s absence, he fears that it will fall apart altogether once she is out of his sight. See Snow, “Language and Sexual Difference,” 178-80.

comprised of both hunger and fulfillment; it contains its *telos*. She does not even need stage action—language alone is up to the task of expressing desire. Oftentimes, to dramatize desire, as Lyly and Shakespeare do, is to speak its metaphors. Via metaphors of mobility—scope, increase, bounty—the language of erotic desire itself serves as dramatic action. Metaphors of desire draw simultaneously upon multiple domains of experience, many of which are apparently incompatible. Hence for some characters, these often incompatible metaphors figure desire as dissonance, as what Othello calls “chaos.” For others, such as Juliet, desire can be an integrating, unifying experience which conjures the future in the present, and which evokes the infinite in finite acts.

Infinity, the term that Levinas assigns to the Other and that exemplifies erotic relations, crops up again and again in metaphors of desire. Troilus’s “will is infinite” (3.2.75), Juliet’s bounty and love “both are infinite” (2.2.135), Cleopatra’s “variety” is “infinite” (2.3.248). In *The Physics*, Aristotle notes that “infinity is not a permanent actuality, but consists in a process of coming to be, like time and the number of time.”⁸⁴ To dramatize such a process is to contend with the tensions between stasis and motion, the will and the act, the present and the future, that are fundamental both to the experience of erotic desire and to theater. “At the heart of artistic endeavor,” writes P.A. Skantze, “is the preoccupation of creating an aesthetic work that will last forever while offering its power and vision again and again, without growing stale. Like Cleopatra the art of representation and crafted language seeks a timeless stability, ‘age cannot wither it,’ but neither can it be lifeless in its repeated display, for then might ‘custom stale its

⁸⁴ Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (The Internet Classics Archive, 1994) III.6, 207a7. <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.3.iii.html>.

infinite variety.’’⁸⁵ That Skantze finds a language for these aesthetic tensions in the paradoxical description of Cleopatra’s erotic power reveals the power of this language itself to approximate, to activate, and to dramatize the still and moving experiences of erotic desire.

⁸⁵ P.A. Skantze, *Stillness in Motion in the Seventeenth-Century Theatre* (London: Routledge, 2003), 17.

Chapter 2

“More than all the world” Intimacy and the Scene-Agent Ratio

Valentine: And why not death rather than living torment?
To die is to be banished from myself.
And Silvia is myself; banished from her
Is self from self, a deadly banishment.
What light is light, if Silvia be not seen?
What joy is joy, if Silvia be not by?
Unless it be to think that she is by
And feed upon the shadow of perfection.
Except I be by Silvia in the night,
There is no music in the nightingale;
Unless I look on Silvia in the day,
There is no day for me to look upon.
She is my essence, and I leave to be,
If I be not by her fair influence
Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept alive.
I fly not death to fly his deadly doom:
Tarry I here, I but attend on death,
But fly I hence, I fly away from life.

(The Two Gentlemen of Verona 3.1.170-87)

Alone onstage, Shakespeare's Valentine mourns his banishment from Milan, and more importantly, from his beloved Silvia. Forced outside Milan's city limits, he questions the boundaries in his life, those that separate him from Milan, from his lover, and even from death. At first, Valentine draws on the domain of banishment to conceptualize death and separation; but not for long. Apparently, this domain's clear delineation of inside, outside, and the boundary between them is too rigid to accommodate Valentine's relationship to Silvia, who constitutes both his inner self and the world outside it. "Silvia is myself" (172), but she is also Valentine's scene, the light in his world, the "day for me to look upon" (181). Craving her nearness, he reiterates three times in four lines his need to be "*by* Silvia"; yet somehow she also is his "essence"

(182), inextricably part of or inside him. Although the famous questions in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* are “*Who is Silvia? What is she?*” (4.2.39; my emphasis), Valentine himself turns out to be preoccupied with the question, *where* is Silvia? Is she outside or is she inside him—is she the scene or the agent or both?

This chapter argues that Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s characters experience erotic desire as an erosion of the boundary between agents and their scenes. When characters such as Valentine conceptualize their lovers as identical to their scenes, they conform to a tendency that Kenneth Burke recognized when he observed that characters can be “treated as scenic conditions or ‘environment,’ of one another.”¹ I begin by considering different theories of place (or “scene”) pertinent to the dynamics of desire in Lyly and Shakespeare, focusing in particular on *Two Gentlemen of Verona*. While at first glance this may seem like bloodless cartography, it will become obvious that the stakes of erotic desire shift when we open ourselves to the beloved as place. When our boundaries are so fiercely compromised, we risk displacement from our own secure sense of self. To become vulnerable to a lover’s “fair influence” is to contend not just with possibilities for betterment but with the frightening, downright ontological prospect that we might “leave to be” in his or her absence. No wonder, then, that the threat of displacement, along with the vulnerability that it provokes, is often conceptualized in terms of metaphors of permeability. Permeability, which may leave at least some version of our selves intact, is in Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays typically accessed through domains of fluidity, melting, disrobing, or, more generally, metamorphosis. I survey these metaphors in Lyly’s *Endymion*, a play in which erotic intimacy is imagined largely as an interior experience, and in Shakespeare’s *Antony and Cleopatra*, in which the lovers make worlds

¹ Burke, *GM*, 7.

of each other. Permeability has the capacity to be a more accommodating host to conceptualizations of desire than full-blown displacement. After all, some of its source domains highlight the generative properties of erotic desire. But because fluidity can lead to dissolution, it can also turn destructive. Feeding and nurturing shade into cannibalism. Sexual penetration becomes violent. These and other such conceptual metaphors dramatize the unstable frontiers between agents and the scenes of erotic desire.

I. Where is Silvia?: Containment and Permeability

Valentine's struggle to distinguish the agent from the scene illustrates what Kenneth Burke calls "the paradox of substance." Burke notes that philosophically, substance is an ontological word, one which refers to the intrinsic quality of beings. Substance is the literal stuff of agents; it is what we are made of and what defines us. But etymologically, as Burke points out, substance is an extrinsic and therefore a scenic word: "Literally a person's or a thing's sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or supports the thing."² Since substance refers both to the thing itself and what is outside the thing (what it is *not*), this term presents what Burke calls an "unresolvable ambiguity" that illustrates the interdependence of the intrinsic and the extrinsic.³ Even the most basic distinctions between "scene" and "agent" must contend with this paradox, and yet Burke relies on these tenuous categories throughout his study of motives.⁴ His scene-agent ratio, which maintains that the nature of agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene, both depends on and subverts the distinctions between agents and

² Ibid., 22. For Shakespeare and Lyly, this definition of "sub-stance" includes the stage itself.

³ Ibid., 24.

⁴ In his introduction to *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke addresses the ambiguity among the five terms of the pentad, clarifying that "what we want is *not terms that avoid ambiguity*, but *terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise*" (Ibid., xviii).

scenes which make the ratio useful. So too with Valentine, who is not so much consistent with his scene as he is conflated with it. In the throes of erotic desire, he embodies the paradox of substance. In dramatic terms, his desire renders him an agent suddenly and acutely vulnerable to his scene.

Although critics such as Stanley Wells have charged Shakespeare's early play with "organic deficiencies" with regard to putatively authentic characterization and genuine erotic experience (George Eliot was famously "disgusted" with the ending), it is noteworthy that Valentine's speech often is cited as an exception.⁵ Charles Hallet's critique of the play's many "reversals" softens when he considers the "touching sentiment" of Valentine's soliloquy. "Though the process of reversal lacked credibility," he writes, "Shakespeare's Valentine feels its effects deeply."⁶ Inga-Stina Ewbank proposes that this credibility is a result, somewhat paradoxically, of the formal features of Valentine's speech, "in which verbal patterning is functional and central." Familiar poetic conventions that take on new meaning for Valentine lead Ewbank to hear "a genuine ring of agony as the metaphors in Valentine's speech stop being conceits and become live reality."⁷ The authenticity that Ewbank identifies is an effect not of an overwrought poetic metaphor, but of a conceptual metaphor that emerges from Valentine's lived experience.

⁵ See Stanley Wells, "The Failure of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*," *Shakespeare Jahrbuch* 99 (1963): 161-73. Wells is quoted on page 153 in Charles A. Hallet, "Metamorphising Proteus: Reversal Strategies in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*," in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona Critical Essays*, ed. June Schlueter (New York: Garland, 1996), 153-77. For a discussion of George Eliot's reaction to the play, see Inga-Stina Ewbank, "'Were man but constant, he were perfect': Constancy and Consistency in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*," in *Shakespearean Comedy*, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies 14, ed. Malcolm Bradbury and David Palmer (New York: Crane, Russak, 1972), 31-57, reprinted in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona Critical Essays*, 91-132. Citations refer to the latter edition.

⁶ Hallet, "Metamorphising Proteus," 172.

⁷ Ewbank, "Constancy and Consistency," 103-4.

Valentine's confusion about where he ends and the world begins raises the at once alluring and frightening probability that lovers inhabit one another and the world at the same time. He wrestles with this prospect when he declares that "She is my essence, and I leave to be, / If I be not by her fair influence / Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept alive" (182-84). Valentine equates Silvia with himself ("She is my essence"⁸), only immediately to conceptualize her as a source of life and sustenance outside himself, using the domains of maternity and astrology. Because both of these domains elide the paradoxical potential of the scene-agent divide, they offer Valentine alternative ways to conceptualize Silvia's place in (or out of) his world. Verbs such as "fostered," "cherished," and to a lesser extent, "kept alive," draw from the domain of maternity, allowing Valentine to conceive himself as a part of Silvia but not co-extensive with her. Likewise, the words "illumined" and "influence" tap into the domain of astrology, specifically the power of the stars to affect beings under their sway.⁹ These source domains, like erotic desire itself, threaten Valentine's integrity as an agent, but they also allow him to imagine various relationships with Silvia that range in their degrees of interdependence, separateness, and power.

When Valentine abandons the domain of banishment in favor of domains that obscure, or perforate, the boundary between scene and agent, he raises questions about

⁸ Like "substance," the word "essence" presents a paradox that obscures the distinction between scene and agent. Entry four in the *OED* defines "essence" as "'substance' in the metaphysical sense; the reality underlying phenomena; absolute being" (emphasis mine). The fifth entry, which cites Valentine's lines, even more explicitly defines "essence" as a scenic word: "that by which anything subsists; foundation of being." See "essence, *n.*" *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, 4 Oct. 2009 <<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50078144>>.

⁹ The *OED* defines "influence" first as "the action or fact of [water] flowing in," and also as an astrological term: "the supposed flowing or streaming from the stars of an ethereal fluid acting upon the character or destiny of men, and affecting sublunary things generally." See "influence, *n.*" *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, 4 Oct. 2009 <<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50116443>>.

how erotic desire changes our relation to the world around us. Where do our lovers exist for us? Valentine admits that Silvia does not even have to be physically present to him in order to nourish him. If she “be not by” (175), he would be satisfied simply “to think that she is by / And feed upon the shadow of perfection” (176-77). In this instance, the domain of eating/nourishment tests the borders between agent and scene.¹⁰ Disquieting here is the possibility that Valentine might consume Silvia, or at least, her shadow.¹¹ The domain of cannibalism extends and perverts the nourishment of a mother’s “foster[ing]” care, but however perversely, Valentine activates a primary metaphor when he conceives of his lover as a meal to be eaten. Erotic activity from kissing to nibbling to oral sex entails physical ingestion of a part of our lovers. Claude Rawson notes that the overlap between gastronomic and erotic metaphors, exemplified in the Ovidian kiss, signals a desire for the “amorous intermerging” of lovers.¹² But all-consuming, total incorporation would prove a “deadly banishment” indeed.

Of course, permeability makes sense only where there are boundaries. And, as I have noted, Valentine conceptualizes boundary through the domain of banishment:

And why not death rather than living torment?
To die is to be banished from myself.
And Silvia is myself; banished from her
Is self from self, a deadly banishment.

(3.1.170-73)

¹⁰ Janet Adelman has pointed out the centrality of this metaphor in Coriolanus’s relationship with his scene: “The metaphoric process suggests the psychological fact that is, I think, at the center of the play: the taking in of food is the primary acknowledgement of one’s dependence on the world, and as such, it is the primary token of one’s vulnerability.” See Adelman, “‘Anger’s my meat’: Feeding, Dependency, and Aggression in *Coriolanus*,” in *Shakespearean Tragedy*, ed. John Drakakis (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1992), 353-73, 356.

¹¹ The domain of eating is often used to conceptualize sexual activity as a threat to the boundary between self and world. See Claude Rawson, “I could eat you up: the life and adventures of a metaphor,” *The Yale Review* 97, no. 1 (2009): 82-112. For a broader anthropological context for this metaphor, see also Claude Levy-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked*, trans. John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

¹² Rawson, “I could eat you up,” 107.

Banishment requires a border line, a this side/that side schema. But Valentine's fear of being "banished from myself" (171) tells us that he conceptualizes himself both as the boundary and as the entity which breaks through it—the container and its contents.

Cognitive linguists argue that the container schema shapes our most basic conceptualizations of ourselves and our relationship to the world.¹³ This schema belongs to a category of primitive conceptual structures, called image schemas, which emerge from our sensorimotor experience and orient us in space. The container schema allows us to conceptualize bounded regions in space via inside, outside, and boundary.

Any analysis of the relationship between scenes and agents necessarily draws upon the container schema, and this is certainly evident in Burke's writing on the subject. In *A Grammar of Motives*, the scene-agent ratio is discussed in a chapter titled "Container and the Thing Contained," in which Burke notes that "both act and agent require scenes that 'contain' them."¹⁴ This conception of scene as a kind of vessel or container has a rich philosophical history in its own right. In *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, Edward Casey cites Aristotle's *Physics* as the foundational work that connects place to containment. Aristotle defines "place" as the inner surface of a tight-fitting container which envelops a being. For Aristotle, "a material thing fits snugly in its proper place, a place that clings to that thing."¹⁵ Because Aristotle emphasizes the fixed contours of surfaces and the snugness of the fit, his notion of "scene" depends on impermeable boundaries. Aristotelian place is disciplinary: it encloses and it binds.

¹³ See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 337-90.

¹⁴ Kenneth Burke, *GM*, 15.

¹⁵ Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 58.

Were we to imagine lovers as (Aristotelian) scenes, they would contain one another, but they would never threaten to break through or shatter each other.

Such an account of scene is inapplicable to Valentine's desire not only because Silvia penetrates his boundaries, but because his scene is also his own body (hence "to die is to be banished from myself"). Valentine's articulation of his desire reminds us that erotic language is always embodied. Embodiment, in turn, is fundamental to all spatial relations concepts, including the container schema. According to Lakoff and Johnson,

Our bodies are containers that take in air and nutrients and emit wastes. We constantly orient our bodies with respect to containers—rooms, beds, buildings. We spend an inordinate amount of time putting things in and taking things out of containers. We also project abstract containers onto areas in space, as when we understand a swarm of bees as being *in* the garden.¹⁶

If the body as a container is abundantly familiar on the primitive level that Lakoff and Johnson point out, it has special significance in light of early modern notions of embodiment. The early modern body is a container of humors, but it is permeable through the eyes, ears, and mouth. Gail Kern Paster describes humoral bodies as "earthly vessels defined by the quality and quantity of liquids they contain."¹⁷ As for their permeability, Paster conceives of "the passions and the body that houses them in ecological terms—that is, in terms of the body's reciprocal relation to the world."¹⁸ For Paster, the study of emotion is the study of how early modern bodies inhabited the phenomenal world. What she calls the ecology of the passions, or the reciprocal relation between inner and outer, Burke calls the scene-agent ratio. Reciprocity, vulnerability,

¹⁶ Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 36.

¹⁷ Gail Kern Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 6. Paster herself points to similarities between modern cognitive science and the early modern psychophysiology of the passions. Both models reject post-Enlightenment mind-body dualism, emphasizing instead biological materialism and the embodied mind. See pages 17-21, 25-27. Mary Thomas Crane draws upon Paster's work, as well as Lakoff and Johnson's theories, when she emphasizes "the importance of spatial image schemas of the body as a container, vulnerable to various kinds of penetration and impressionability." See Crane, *Shakespeare's Brain*, 161.

¹⁸ Paster, *Humoring the Body*, 18.

and permeability characterize much of our experience in and of the world. This is especially true for the early modern agent who is “in the throes of strong feeling.”¹⁹ The reciprocity to which Paster calls our attention runs throughout the opening lines of Valentine’s soliloquy. Contemplating his banishment from Milan prompts Valentine to place himself in all three slots of the container schema—inside, outside, and the boundary itself—rather than just outside the city walls. Ecologist of desire that he is, Valentine collapses the distinctions of the container schema only to reconstruct them with Silvia at the center. If “Silvia is myself” (3.1.172), then she both inhabits him and contains him.

Hence Valentine’s conception of Silvia as scenic is after all Aristotelian, but in Irigarayan terms.²⁰ Whereas Aristotle sees place as an opaque and solid container, Irigaray insists on the sort of reciprocity that Paster describes. For Irigaray, who has famously written, “as for woman, she is place,” the porousness and permeability of woman-as-scene is made possible by erotic desire.²¹ The female body is always slightly open and yet also able to contain and envelop her lover. Edward Casey compares Irigaray’s complicated definition with Aristotle’s: “place as enclosure is affirmed [in Irigaray], but only insofar as the elements that make up place inhabit and suffuse the universe as a whole, now considered as a gigantic sievelike vessel—which, though entirely enveloped, leaks throughout.”²² Irigaray’s emphasis on permeability derives from her consideration not only of woman-as-place, but also of the role that sexuality plays in our relation to the world. “There are times,” she writes, “when that relation of places in the sexual act gives rise to a transgression of the envelope, to a porousness, a

¹⁹ Ibid., 19.

²⁰ Luce Irigaray, “Place, Interval: A Reading of Aristotle, *Physics IV*,” in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, trans. C. Burke and G.C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 31-48.

²¹ Ibid., 35.

²² Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 336.

perception of the other, a fluidity.”²³ Sexual permeability, marked physically by the exchange of fluids in orgasm, signals an openness to the world, incarnated by the other.

When Valentine is forced out of the world, he has only language with which to conjure the absent Silvia. For better or for worse, it is not easy for Valentine to “feed upon the shadow of perfection” (3.1.177) in his banishment:

O thou that dost inhabit in my breast,
 Leave not the mansion so long tenantless,
 Lest, growing ruinous, the building fall
 And leave no memory of what it was.
 Repair me with thy presence, Silvia.
 Thou gentle nymph, cherish thy forlorn swain.
 (5.4.7-12)

Although Valentine identifies Silvia as “thou that dost inhabit in my breast” (7), she is a curiously absent tenant. Where Silvia’s overwhelming presence once permeated Valentine’s self and world, her absence now hollows him out. And with a “mansion so long tenantless” (8) in his breast, Valentine fears that the container itself will begin to collapse. Permeability, once an instrument for conceptualizing desire, has become for Valentine a vehicle for conceptualizing loss.²⁴ The boundary between agent and scene is compromised as much by Silvia’s “fair influence” (3.1.183) as it is by her absence. Where is Silvia when the walls of the mansion are on the brink of crumbling, “leav[ing] no memory of what it was” (10)? Where is anyone when there are no boundaries (not even the memory of a boundary) to distinguish one place from another, or from ourselves? Taken to this extreme, permeability gestures toward both the dream and the

²³ Irigaray, “Place, Interval,” 41.

²⁴ Whereas metaphors of permeability in 3.1 offered Valentine the freedom to imagine a range of relationships with Silvia, permeability at this point in the play has become an imperative for Valentine—either Silvia is present both inside and outside, or she exists in neither place. It is no surprise, then, to find Valentine turning to imperatives in his speech, commanding Silvia to “[r]epair me” and to “cherish thy forlorn swain.”

nightmare of desire: that Silvia is everywhere, if indeed she is anywhere. And if Silvia is everywhere, then where is Valentine?

Before he meets Silvia, Valentine appears to know where he is and where he wants to be. The opening words of the play establish his independence of mind: “Cease to persuade” (1.1.1), he commands his protean friend before leaving him to strike out on his own. But Valentine’s discovery of Silvia among “the wonders of the world abroad” (1.1.6) jeopardizes his own place in that world. His servant Speed is the first to notice the difference in him: “now you are metamorphosed with a mistress, that when I look on you, I can hardly think you my master” (2.1.29-31). And yet, contra Speed, metamorphosis does not fully account for Valentine’s particular experience of desire—he isn’t so much *changed* by Silvia as he is *lost*, cancelled or emptied out by his longing for her.

Valentine responds in kind when he laments his banishment in the following act, refusing even to answer to his own name:

Pro: Valentine?
Val: No.
Pro: Who then? His spirit?
Val: Neither.
Pro: What then?
Val: Nothing.

(3.1.193-98)

Where and what is Valentine? No spirit, no name, not even a thing. The nightmare of desire is that Silvia has so overwhelmed Valentine that even his “spirit” is banished. And this loss in particular cues our sense that he is spent, that he has been reduced to a state of post-coital depletion. Once, Silvia could replenish or even constitute his essence. If she can still do so now, it takes the paradoxical form of filling him with emotions that empty him out. When Valentine and Proteus volley the words “No Valentine” four times in five

lines (3.1.210-14), his absence is rendered glaringly, and again paradoxically, present. Hence the metaphor of the ruinous, tenantless mansion of Valentine's breast; barely standing and dismally empty, it exists only to bear the mark of a tenant who no longer lives there. This haunting image of the empty container poses a quiet but palpable threat to any metaphor of desire as openness, receptivity, or permeability.²⁵

In the following pages, I investigate metaphors that dramatize the reciprocal relation between agents and their scenes, as it is tested and shaped by erotic desire. John Lyly dramatizes Endymion's unrequited desire through metaphors of painful exposure and of utter envelopment. For Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*, the loss of a lover-as-scene is tantamount to banishment from oneself. Erotic desire reveals the dependence of agents on their scenes to the extent that any separation is a small death. In both plays, metaphors of permeability mark characters who are vulnerable to, hungry for, and humbled by, their scenes. As Gaston Bachelard writes, "On the surface of being, that region where being *wants* to be both visible and hidden, the movements of opening and closing are so numerous... that we could conclude on the following formula: man is half-open being."²⁶

II. "A petty world of myself": Permeability and Desire in Lyly's *Endymion*

At the end of Act 2, John Lyly's *Endymion* is bewitched into an onstage slumber in which he remains for nearly half of the play. Among the minor plots that unfold around his slumbering body is the comic episode featuring Sir Tophas, the *miles*

²⁵ The image of the empty mansion corresponds to what Edward Casey calls "place-panic: depression or terror at even the idea, and still more in the experience, of an empty place" (Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 6).

²⁶ Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space: The Classic Look at How We Experience Intimate Places*, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 222.

gloriosus of Lyly's play. Infatuated with a geriatric sorceress, Tophas announces to his page, Epiton, that he is no longer a complete "noun substantive" (3.3.16), but instead has become "a noun adjective...because I cannot stand without another" (3.3.17-19).²⁷ Although Tophas's passionate desire for the old hag is ridiculous, his suggestive declaration of his reliance upon her resembles Valentine's line about depending on Silvia's "fair influence" to be "kept alive." Epiton, who considers himself impervious to love, chides his master's foolish behavior, calling him "an amorous ass" (3.3.120). He eventually falls out of favor with Tophas, but he tells his fellow pages not to worry, for he can be "complete" (4.2.15) even while he is in disgrace with his master: "I am an absolute microcosmos, a petty world of myself. My library is my head, for I have no other books but my brains; my wardrobe on my back, for I have no more apparel than is on my body; my armoury at my fingers' ends, for I use no other artillery than my nails; my treasure in my purse. *Sic omnia mecum porto*" (4.2.40-45).²⁸ Epiton describes an agent who carries his scene on his back; the absolute microcosmos is sealed up, complete and impenetrable. He needs nothing and desires no one.

Although this fantasy of self-containment is as unattainable as the moon herself (Epiton promptly sets off to appease Tophas and mend their relationship), it is a powerful counterpoint to the plight of characters in the play like Endymion and Eumenides, who "are in love up to the ears" (1.3.1). To be an agent who contains his own scene, "a petty world of myself," is to escape the vulnerability consequent upon opening oneself to

²⁷ For Tophas, substance is the quality that allows an agent to stand on his own, rather than the ground he stands on. He taps into Burke's ontological definition of substance again when he confesses that his love for Dipsas has depleted him, "milk[ing] my thoughts and drain[ing] from my heart the very substance of my accustomed courage" (3.3.23-25). Unlike Valentine, who is filled with Silvia, Tophas's substance leaks out when love strikes.

²⁸ *Sic omnia mecum porto*: "Thus I carry all things with me." The word "microcosmos" is doubly significant in these lines, since the Tophas and Epiton subplot functions as a kind of microcosm of the main action in *Endymion*.

desire. Bachelard writes of “half-open” beings; but what does this mean? Is not even the smallest aperture, the slightest perforation, a categorical openness? Is the only way to avoid the threat of displacement to seal oneself within the chaste embrace of Aristotelian place? The improbable fantasy that any of us could be perfectly finished or “complete” looms large in a play whose eponymous hero falls hopelessly in love with the moon, “whose figure of all is the perfectest” (3.4.165).

Early in the play, Endymion declares that his love for Cynthia has taken him out of the world. Addressing her in soliloquy, Endymion begs Cynthia to “[r]emember my solitary life, almost these seven years. Whom have I entertained but mine own thoughts and thy virtues? What company have I used but contemplation?” (3.1.15-18). For Endymion, as for so many of Lyly’s protagonists, to fall in love is to sink inside himself, to dwell in fantasy, speak in soliloquy, hence choose solitude over sociability. Unlike Shakespeare’s Valentine, who pines for his beloved’s nearness and “influence,” Lyly’s Endymion *requires* a vast distance separating him from the one he loves.

This unexpected scene-agent ratio is apparent in the play’s first scene, when Endymion confesses that he has fallen hopelessly in love with the moon, a “dotage” which his friend Eumenides considers “monstrous” (1.1.30). Certainly Endymion’s passionate desire for the moon is bizarre and confusing, if not quite “monstrous”: we never do comprehend the precise nature of his beloved. Whether Cynthia appears in Lyly’s play as a queen, as a deity, or as the moon, she is always a powerful but strange love-object. Scholars typically identify Cynthia as a figure for Queen Elizabeth (many argue that *Endymion* is Lyly’s panegyric for the queen) and explain that Cynthia’s

unintelligibility “represents the enigma of Elizabeth’s position.”²⁹ As Christine Neufeld has argued, “the Queen’s power lay in the creative potential of her contradictions, not in her concretisation of a stable identity—a condition Lyly seeks to celebrate in Cynthia.”³⁰ Her ability to elide the boundaries of singular identity helped the Queen to emphasize the great distance between herself and her admirers. Lyly’s play explores the erotics of this distance by tapping into the “creative potential” of the Queen’s contradictions to dramatize a unique form of erotic desire for a beloved who is unknowable and unattainable.³¹ What better object for such a desire than the moon itself?

David Bevington writes that “the Cynthia in Lyly’s play is certainly like the moon,” and that Endymion creates “an elaborate conceit comparing his mistress to the moon.”³² But Endymion makes no such comparison: he avers only that he “love[s] the moon” (1.1.20-21), and then praises her “settled course” (40), her “increasing and decreasing” (45), and that she “waxeth young again” (59). His predicament is peculiar and yet it is familiar: *Endymion* dramatizes the simultaneously isolating and unraveling

²⁹ Christine M. Neufeld, “Lyly’s Chimerical Vision: Witchcraft in *Endymion*,” *Forum for Modern Language Studies* 43, no. 4 (2007): 351-69, 365. Most scholarship on *Endymion* approaches the play in this manner. Natalia Khomenko has recently noted that the play was “presented as a panegyric” (Khomenko, “‘Between You and Her No Comparison’: Witches, Healers, and Elizabeth I in John Lyly’s *Endymion*,” *Early Theatre* 13, no. 1 [2010]: 37-63, 56). According to Michael Pincombe, “For Lyly, the very creation of the panegyric figure of Eliza tends to suppress the erotic drama that he was really more interested in and more committed to” (Pincombe, *The Plays of John Lyly*, 79). I will demonstrate that the erotic drama does, in fact, hold up against the panegyric, because Elizabeth’s example offers an opportunity for Lyly to stage a unique form of sexual desire based on distance and isolation.

³⁰ Neufeld, “Lyly’s Chimerical Vision,” 365.

³¹ Natalia Khomenko writes of the “impassible gap” between Cynthia and the other characters in the play: “Even in praising the queen, Lyly...firmly isolat[es] her from other women” (Khomenko, “Between You and Her No Comparison,” 39). The Queen takes on “scenic” qualities elsewhere in Lyly’s works. For example, Philipa Berry observes that Lyly associates the queen in *Euphues* with imagery of the tower and sheath: “In visual terms, these images have a phallic appearance; but their function in Lyly’s passage is as receptacles—they serve as containers of the aggressivity normally deemed proper to a male monarch, imaged here by the sword and armour” (see Berry, *Of Chastity and Power: Elizabethan Literature and the Unmarried Queen* [London: Routledge, 1989], 113). Such suggestive imagery calls to mind descriptions in Aristotle and Irigaray of woman as place or container.

³² Bevington, Introduction to *The Revels Plays John Lyly Endymion*, ed. David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 16.

experience of consuming, in this case, unrequited love. People who do not reciprocate love are as distant as the moon. They confirm the boundary between self and world, agent and scene, by reminding us of what we cannot have, of what is always outside our grasp. But unrequited love is also conducive to pleasure. Endymion may be said to fall in love with someone outside his grasp, and so to suffer. Or we may say that he *chooses* to love someone he can never have, and that he does this because there is something in it for him. His would be a case of desirable pain, a pain he seeks every time he imagines Cynthia precisely in her strangest and most distant incarnation.³³

Perhaps Endymion puts the whole night sky between them because it is what he must do to conceive of Cynthia's majesty. Stepping back and elevating her may be the only way he can hold all of her in his mind, or in his regard. Bachelard writes about the experience of looking at a village from different vantage points. From close up, we cannot conceive of the entire village—we see it only in small slivers until we pull back far enough to capture the whole. For Endymion, Cynthia is too big to behold unless from far away. He praises her for magnifying the distance by “detract[ing] from thy perfections” (1.1.71) and modestly “decreas[ing] thy gleams” (1.1.73) most nights of the month. It would be simply too much to behold all of her “fullness” (1.1.69) all the time. But no matter how much space separates Endymion from Cynthia, he is never quite able to possess her in the irenic way that Bachelard imagines: “Distance disperses nothing, but, on the contrary, composes a miniature of a country in which things become reconciled. They then offer themselves for our ‘possession,’ while denying the distance

³³ Endymion is not alone among Lylyan protagonists who augment the space between themselves and the objects of their desire. The distance that Lyly puts between Galatea and Phillida, via indirect insinuations and repeated asides, is what allows the girls to continue loving one another. Without these buffers, there might be no difference between the girls at all.

that created them. We possess from afar, and how peacefully!”³⁴ Endymion finds no peace in looking up at the sky. And although he dreams early in the play of “possess[ing] the moon” (1.1.18-19), he either cannot or will not deny the distance that separates them. Instead he appears to relish the distance, praising Cynthia for her strangeness above all else, eroticizing the very things that stand in the way of his dream.

Such a decisive boundary separating him from Cynthia should crystallize Endymion’s sense of self, his agent-ness, but these boundaries have the opposite effect: they cloud his identity.³⁵ Defending himself from this loss of self, Endymion conceptualizes erotic desire through the domain of exposure—as a need to be seen and known by Cynthia—even as he submerges himself in his interior life, forsaking the company of others. Endymion’s desire, then, is set in a scene, a “region where being *wants* to be both visible and hidden.”³⁶ In his first soliloquy, Endymion describes his alienated existence as that of a man “who, divorcing himself from the amiableness of all ladies, the bravery of all courts, the company of all men, hath chosen in a solitary cell to live only by feeding on thy [Cynthia’s] favour” (2.1.44-47). Deeply isolated and self-contained, Endymion nonetheless “feed[s]” on the moon—he is not completely alone. Like Valentine, who “feed[s] upon the shadow of perfection,” Endymion reveals his permeability to Cynthia even from the confines of his “solitary cell.” He soliloquizes, but he also addresses his words to Cynthia. This makes for an intimacy with her that is oddly

³⁴ Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 172.

³⁵ While the early modern “self” has been a subject for scholarly debate, I find common cause with those who argue that at the very least, an *embodied* self was acknowledged in the early modern period. On the self and interiority, see Katharine Eisaman Maus, *Inwardness and Theater*, Elizabeth Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Michael Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

³⁶ Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 222.

predicated on the distance between them, both theatrically (he *is* speaking in soliloquy) and spatially (she is present but distant).³⁷

At the end of his soliloquy, he reveals his wish that Cynthia will recognize his isolation as evidence of his love: “Thus mayst thou see every vein, sinew, muscle, and artery of my love, in which there is no flattery nor deceit, error nor art” (2.1.48-50).

Retreat from the world’s gaze is nonetheless tantamount to utter exposure to the object of desire, to a wish to be stripped barer than naked, stripped even of his skin. Lyly could have figured Endymion’s exposure as an act of disrobing, shedding clothes rather than flesh, baring his naked body instead of his innards.³⁸ But he opts for a more disturbing level of exposure: Endymion’s desire makes visible that which ought to be hidden from Cynthia’s penetrating gaze. The image that Endymion conjures in his desperate attempt to assert his identity does violence to it. Indeed, Endymion aspires to still greater visibility than this. In conversation with Eumenides, he laments that his “thoughts have no veins, and yet, unless they be let blood, I shall perish” (1.1.31-32).³⁹ Swollen with thoughts of desire, Endymion seeks his remedy in another act of exposure, this time of

³⁷ Soliloquies have often been charged with creating theatrical distance and detachment. On this dynamic in Shakespeare, see Michael Mooney, *Shakespeare’s Dramatic Transactions* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 1-22, and Kent Cartwright, *Shakespearean Tragedy and its Double: The Rhythms of Audience Response*, (College Station: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 11-20.

³⁸ The domain of disrobing finally appears in the Epilogue, which recounts the fable of a man who is at odds with his scene. As the man journeys abroad, “the wind and sun strove for sovereignty; the one with his blast, the other with his beams” (1-3). The wind’s blast causes the man to pull his garments around him more tightly, but the sun’s warmth ultimately prompts him to take off his gown. The sun’s sovereignty over the wind (“‘I yield,’ said the wind, ‘for if thou continue shining he will also put off his coat’” [Epilogue, 9-10]) explores a milder form of permeability than Endymion experiences throughout much of the play. The wind loses out to the sun because it tries to force the man’s nakedness rather than to inspire it.

³⁹ Images of veins appear in several speeches throughout the play, and in each case, they convey a kind of permeability that is painful and unnatural. In the scene of Endymion’s waking, he recounts a dream that features a cluster of beetles that suck the blood from an eagle’s vein in order to kill it. Tellus also mentions veins in her account of her passion for Endymion, which caused her to feel “a bursting in almost every vein” (5.4.87-88). Veins are especially well-suited as a source domain for permeability because they are containers (of blood) and also contained (by the skin).

his blood. The restorative powers of bloodletting call to mind the relief of ejaculation, another potential purgation for Endymion's thoughts of love.⁴⁰ On the one hand, he imagines a kind of orgasmic release at knifepoint. On the other hand, he would expose himself by peeling back layer after layer until nothing at all is left.

Endymion nearly gets his wish at the end of Act 2, when he falls into a slumber so deep that it threatens to obliterate him altogether. His onstage coma, his present absence (where is Endymion?), recalls the image of the empty mansion that is the emblem of Valentine's displacement. Cynthia and Eumenides both refer to Endymion's slumber as a "dead sleep" (3.1.2; 3.4.19) after decades pass without any change in his condition. But it turns out that Endymion's sleep is quite lively, filled with vivid dreams that are dramatized first in dumbshow (2.2) and then narrated by Endymion in the scene of his waking (5.1). Sleep, even a deathly one such as Endymion's, can be an unusually receptive and creative state of being.⁴¹ In a study of onstage slumber in medieval and Renaissance plays, David Bevington argues that Endymion's prolonged sleep dramatizes his inner conflict. Bevington notes that sleep comes to dramatize defenselessness. "In several late Elizabethan plays," he writes, "sleep is presented not as slothful or inattentive, as in so many medieval dramatizations, but as the innocent rest of those who

⁴⁰ Humoral physiology establishes a link between blood and semen through the process of transmutation. Elaine Hobby notes the commonly held belief that "special vessels in the men's stones (testicles) turned blood into semen," in her "Note on Humoral Theory" from Jane Sharp, *The Midwives Book, Or the Whole Art of Midwifery Discovered*, ed. Elaine Hobby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), xxxiii. An excess of bodily humors was believed to cause frenzied erotic desire, which could be relieved with bloodletting as well as ejaculation. Catherine Belling explores the political consequences of such purgation in Shakespeare's *The Rape of Lucrece*. See Catherine Belling, "Infectious Rape, Therapeutic Revenge: Bloodletting and the Health of Rome's Body," in *Disease, Diagnosis, and Cure on the Early Modern Stage*, ed. Stéphanie Moss and Kaara L. Peterson (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 113-32.

⁴¹I am indebted to William Sherman for introducing me to the creative properties of sleep in his paper, "Revisiting the House of Sleep" at the Shakespeare Association of America meeting (Washington, DC: April 2009).

are about to be victimized.”⁴² Right before our very eyes, Endymion’s onstage slumber dramatizes vulnerability, openness, and displacement just as profoundly as his metaphors do.

Sleep itself is a permeable state, but the moments just before and after sleep are especially so. These in-between states often foster “hypnagogic” experiences, which Andreas Mavromatis defines as “hallucinatory or quasi-hallucinatory events taking place in the intermediate state between wakefulness and sleep.”⁴³ One of the most common features of hypnagogia is a heightened state of receptivity and suggestibility. According to Mavromatis, hypnagogic experiences open the subject to both external suggestion (from the experimenter) and internal suggestion (from the subject’s own imagination).⁴⁴ Endymion’s uncharacteristically long sleep and protracted scene of waking render him especially vulnerable to Cynthia, and perhaps more significantly, to his own imaginings of her.⁴⁵ If, following Mavromatis, a “*loosening of ego boundaries (LEBs)*,” or “egolessness,” lies “at the root of all hypnagogic experiences,” then Endymion’s precarious grasp on his own identity before falling asleep in Act 2 and then just after waking in Act 5, testifies to his loosened ego boundaries, boundaries which are conceptualized in terms of dissolution or melting away.⁴⁶

⁴² See David Bevington, “Asleep Onstage,” in *From Page to Performance: Essays in Early English Drama*, ed. John A. Alford (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 52-83, 66.

⁴³ Andreas Mavromatis, *Hypnagogia: The Unique State of Consciousness Between Wakefulness and Sleep* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987), 3. Mavromatis notes that Aristotle used the term “psychagogia” in his *Poetics* to account for the audience’s experience of captivation in the theater.

⁴⁴ Receptivity to internal suggestion, or autosuggestibility, characterizes subjects who are unable to tell whether an idea or image came from their own minds or from the “real” world. Autosuggestibility poses a particular challenge to Burke’s scene-agent ratio, since it blurs the boundary between the mind and the observable world.

⁴⁵ This vulnerability may also extend to the actor who plays the sleeping Endymion; he becomes the object of the audience’s gaze without being able to look back.

⁴⁶ Mavromatis, *Hypnagogia*, 68.

At the end of Act 2, Endymion desperately seeks an escape from the inner world that preoccupies him, resolving to “beguile myself with sleep; and if no slumber will take hold in my eyes, yet will I embrace the golden thoughts in my head and wish to melt by musing” (2.3.4-7). Such sleep may offer Endymion escape, but it also intensifies his solitude, at once opening him to the world and removing him from it. Even his private dreams are open to the audience’s gaze, and again later to Cynthia’s inquiry. When Endymion recounts his dreams for Cynthia, we discover that the “golden thoughts” he longed to indulge took a darker turn in sleep. His first dream features a lady “passing fair but very mischievous” (5.1.88-89); holding a knife in one hand and a looking glass in the other, she threatens to cut his throat. Although her two attendants try to sway her—one in the direction of cruelty, the other towards mercy—the lady finally curbs her violent impulse upon seeing her reflection in the mirror. The dream elicits a conflicted reaction from Endymion: “I started in my sleep, feeling my very veins to stretch and my sinews to swell with fear, and such a cold sweat bedewed all my body” (5.1.98-101). The lady’s knife—at once penetrative and castrating—arouses both fear and lust in Endymion’s sleeping body, apparently in equal measure.⁴⁷ Act 2’s “embrace” is now, in Act 5, first threatened by violence and then preempted by a nocturnal self-embrace that reaches beyond the dream world of “golden thoughts” into the physical world in which Endymion’s “sinews...swell” and he then “bedew[s]” his body.

⁴⁷ The erotic aspects of this dream have not been addressed in Lyly scholarship. Bevington interprets the dream as a *repudiation* of Endymion’s “lusts,” which he argues “are not expressly erotic; indeed, we have seen how he turns to Cynthia as a release from his own carnality” (Introduction, 23). Eros enters Bevington’s analysis of the dream with respect to Tellus rather than Cynthia. In Endymion’s dream, he argues, “the errant protagonist must learn to eschew... fleshly desire (in the person of Tellus)” (26). My reading of the dream diverges from Bevington’s on this point. Unless we are to believe that she is figured in one of the women who accompany the lady, Tellus is absent from the dream. And although we hear that Endymion once loved (and perhaps lusted for) Tellus, we never see this in Lyly’s play. What we do see, both in the dream and in the larger play, is Endymion’s expressly erotic infatuation with Cynthia.

Endymion's alarming dream (along with his charged reaction to it) becomes the play's own nightmare to sort out.⁴⁸ What can it mean that the Cynthia figure in Endymion's vision carries a knife in one hand and a *looking glass* in the other? Although these two implements may seem like strange bedfellows, the image of a powerful woman wielding the mirror and knife would have been familiar to early modern audiences—and was certainly familiar to Lyly. The lady in Endymion's dream evokes *Anatomia*, “the reductive deity of division” who presided over the dissecting room.⁴⁹ Jonathan Sawday describes *Anatomia* as “a mistress of erotic reduction—a fantasy expression of male surrender—whose chief attribute was the power to divide.”⁵⁰ While she dissects with her knife, *Anatomia* studies the body with a looking glass, exposing and cataloguing its mysterious inner workings. It comes as little surprise that Endymion conjures this deity in his nightmarish fantasy of Cynthia, whom he had implored to “see every vein, sinew, muscle, and artery of my love” (2.1.49-50). This crucial episode in Endymion's dream conjures the terrifying fantasies, or are they realities, that inform his desire to be made

⁴⁸ Although Cynthia promises Endymion that “Gyptes at our better leisure shall expound” the dream (5.1.102-3), he never does. Bevington notes that “the audience is left to interpret for itself” (*Endymion*, 167).

⁴⁹ Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London: Routledge, 1995), 3. Lyly's familiarity with anatomy is evident in his prose work *Euphues, The Anatomy of Wit* (1587), as well as the play *Love's Metamorphosis* (c. 1586-88). Of the latter play, Mark Dooley writes, “*Love's Metamorphosis* develops the links between the emerging medical discourse of anatomy and the use of texts to explore or anatomize particular concepts” (Dooley, “The Healthy Body,” 3.2). Dooley compares the character of Famine in *Love's Metamorphosis* with Sawday's *Anatomia*, since both women offer “a picture of the interior of a body; a picture which is designed to place emphasis on its physical workings in order to better understand its requirements” (3.13). In *Love's Metamorphosis*, Famine is described as having “skin so thin that thou mayest as lively make an anatomy of her body as she were cut with surgeons” (2.1.24-25).

⁵⁰ Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned*, 184. *Anatomia's* accouterments have a rich history in their own right, originating with a monstrous woman who inspired many a nightmare: “The attributes of *Anatomia*—the knife and the mirror—return us to the Medusa myth, and that structure of reflective glances and reductive instruments associated with the donations of Athene and Hermes to Perseus—the hunter of the Medusa” (183). Freud associates Medusa's head with the terror of castration in his essay, “Medusa's Head”: “To decapitate—to castrate. The terror of the Medusa is thus a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of something.” See Sigmund Freud, “Medusa's Head,” in *Sexuality and the Psychology of Love*, ed. Phillip Rieff (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963), 213. This “terror of castration” is cued by Endymion's horrified response to the lady's knife as it angles toward his outstretched throat.

visible, knowable, and vulnerable to Cynthia's piercing gaze. Vulnerability, from the Latin *vulnerare*—to wound—is recast from an emotional or psychic experience into a physical reality in Endymion's dream.⁵¹

Of all the dream material that Endymion recounts, this stands out as the only episode that animates his sleeping body. If Endymion's slumber indeed represents a kind of living death, then his dream truly exemplifies the permeability of this state, poised as it is between his real and fantasy worlds, with material effects that extend beyond his imagination. In his dream, Endymion finally gets his wish: at last, the lady sees him. But at what cost? She threatens to see him as meticulously and comprehensively as he wants to be seen—beneath the clothing that covers him and under the flesh that contains him. The lady is not the only one who threatens to scrutinize and dissect him. His dream affords Endymion the opportunity to turn the mirror back on himself and see his desire reflected there, following his need for exposure all the way through to its terrifying and fatal conclusion. When the lady relents, she re-establishes the distance Endymion praised Cynthia for—diminishing her glow and her “fullness” (1.1.69). From this new latitude, her gaze permits him to exist. By choosing the mirror over the knife, the lady upholds the emblem of re-established distance; where the knife promises full disclosure, the mirror signifies indirection or mediation. It offers only reflection and representation.⁵²

⁵¹ Within the early modern “culture of dissection” (Sawday, 3), the physical wound was often conceived in profoundly erotic terms. Sawday cites the episode from Golding's translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, complete with Lylyan sinews and veins, in which Apollo flays the satyr Marsyas: “Nought else he was than one whole wounde. The grisly bloud did spin / From every part, his sinews lay discovered to the eye, / The quivering veynes without a skin lay beating nakedly” (qtd. in Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned*, 186, from W.H.D. Rouse, ed, *Shakespeare's Ovid Being Arthur Golding's Translation of the Metamorphoses* [1902 rpt. London: Centaur Press, 1961], 128.) Sawday describes Marsyas' body as “caught in a moment of violent homoerotic possession,” his entire body made vulnerable and visible as it transforms into a “whole wounde” (186).

⁵² The mirror's reflection of an object recalls dissection: Sawday writes that “it is, perhaps, this very impossibility of gazing within our own bodies which makes the sight of the interior of other bodies so

As it turns out, the lady's mercy protects Endymion not from her malicious companion "who provoked her to execute mischief" (5.1.95), not even from the lady's own violent impulses, but rather, from *himself*—from his overwhelming and destructive desire for a level of exposure that is tantamount to self-effacement.

It bears remembering that Endymion is not alone in his desire for self-effacement; his masochistic urge plagues the other lovelorn characters in the play.⁵³ His best friend Eumenides, who has fallen hopelessly in love with the recalcitrant Semele, apparently desires a similar escape: "Ah, I faint, I die! Ah, sweet Semele, let me alone, and dissolve by weeping into water!" (3.4.79-81). Eumenides' wish, first to be "let...alone" and then to dissolve by weeping into a well, echoes his friend's desire for solitude and "to melt by musing." Although David Bevington glosses Eumenides' line as a wish for his own dissolution ("let me dissolve...") the subject of the verb is unclear. Eumenides could either desire his own dissolution into water, or he could wish that "sweet Semele" would dissolve as a result of his weeping. This ambiguity reflects—and moreover, enacts—Eumenides' desire for dissolution; it also brings him dangerously close to Semele, gesturing toward an intimacy unlike any that Endymion can share with Cynthia, one that might render Eumenides indistinguishable from his beloved.

Endymion melts away not only in sleep, but also in the scene of his waking. He is released from the soporific spell that has bound him for decades by a kiss from Cynthia's mouth, which she proclaims "hath been heretofore as untouched as my thoughts" (5.1.25). He receives her kiss while in a state of heightened permeability—in sleep—and

compelling. Denied direct experience of ourselves, we can only explore others in the hope (or fear) that this other might also be us" (*The Body Emblazoned*, 8).

⁵³ Later in the play Cynthia curses Tellus, "who is made all of love" (4.3.131), with a fate similar to Endymion's "wish to melt by musing" (2.3.7): she will be left to "melt herself in her own looseness" (4.3.131-32).

the kiss ushers in a hypnagogic suggestibility that opens Endymion to her influence in ways that equally threaten and confirm his sense of self. Although Cynthia's lips cause Endymion "to stir" (5.1.30), he wakes with a feeble grasp on his own identity. Distraught by his friend's inability (or unwillingness) to speak upon waking, Eumenides asks, "hath this long sleep taken away thy memory?" (5.1.36), and again, "Hast thou forgotten thyself, Endymion?" (5.1.43). Although Endymion is uncertain about his own name (his first words are, "Endymion? I call to mind such a name" (5.1.42)), he recognizes Cynthia's name as soon as it is uttered. Only after she names him properly—"I am Cynthia, and thou Endymion" (5.2.52)—does he take possession of himself. A slumber that turned Endymion into an "absolute microcosmos" now leads him to a disorienting and overwhelming dependence on his beloved to secure his identity, to will him back into existence with her mouth and voice.

Sleep and hypnagogic waking are both destructive (egoless) and generative. Mavromatis writes that creativity is linked to hypnagogia (in his chapter on creativity, he has a section on "Openness"), citing examples of artists from Goethe to Keats who believed that sleep provided them with a creative spark either in dreams or upon waking.⁵⁴ The scene of Endymion's waking reveals sleep's destructive and constructive properties. His loss of self creates an opportunity for Cynthia to claim and reconstitute him with her voice. Endymion already anticipated this creativity in an earlier address to Cynthia, when he identified himself as "that fish—thy fish, Cynthia, in the floor Araris—which at thy waxing is as white as the driven snow and at thy waning as black as deepest darkness" (2.1.35-37). This tiny fish, utterly responsive to the changes of the moon, evokes the profound intimacy and vast distance between Endymion and Cynthia. It also

⁵⁴ See Mavromatis, *Hypnagogia*, 186-218, for the chapter entitled, "Creativity."

confirms Endymion's egolessness and his receptivity to Cynthia across the ever-widening space that separates them. In Act 5, Cynthia names him and in Act 2, the moon colors "thy fish" in her image. Endymion's openness to Cynthia correlates with the fish's visibility to the moon, since the fish brightens only when the moon is out. But the moon also is exposed to this fish, which not only has special access to her, but which absorbs her light.

Bachelard discusses the "intimate immensity" of such a relationship. Endymion's connection to the moon answers to our own private relationship with the immensity of the world:

One might say that immensity is a philosophical category of daydream. Daydream... contemplates grandeur. And this contemplation produces an attitude that is so special, an inner state that is so unlike any other, that the daydream transports the dreamer outside the immediate world to a world that bears the mark of infinity.⁵⁵

Bachelard's daydreamer must be at once removed from the object of contemplation and also vulnerable to the influence of the "immense" scene that surrounds her or him. To be transported in this manner requires both distance and openness, the coincidence of which defines Endymion's relation to Cynthia's grandeur, especially in his sleep. Accounts of hypnagogia extend the category of contemplation in ways that recall Bachelard's description. Mavromatis defines contemplation as "an attitude of placing a spatial and/or temporal distance between oneself and objects," and notes that hypnagogia traverses this distance through the experiences of "fascination" and "absorption."⁵⁶ The hypnagogic subject's active absorption in "imaginal activities" results in a kind of reciprocal absorption—what Mavromatis calls "*a subjectification of the object*," wherein the

⁵⁵ Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 183.

⁵⁶ Mavromatis, *Hypnagogia*, 70. Mavromatis describes these phenomena in response to John Paul Sartre's accounts of hypnagogia. See Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination* (London: Methuen, 1978), 48-51.

dreamer “internalizes” the object of fascination.⁵⁷ Like the fish who absorbs the light of the moon, the hypnagogic subject absorbs the object of his fascinated attention, even across a vast distance that “bears the mark of infinity.”

Such absorption in “imaginal activities” risks displacement, but Endymion never loses his place in the world or in the play. Although he comes close to death in his slumber and his dream, his prolonged sleep is what captures Cynthia’s attention, making him most visible to her after all. She secures his fragile identity when she names him, and he comes as close as he will get to possessing her physically when she kisses him. When Endymion awakes to her kiss as an old man, he begs Cynthia to allow him to continue in his solitary “sweet contemplation” (5.4.173). He promises her that he will “softly call it love” (171-72) only to himself; he will “name it honour” (173) to anyone who can hear. He longs to continue dreaming of “impossibilities; with imagination of which I will spend my spirits” (170-71). Bevington glosses “spend my spirits” as “expend my breath”; but surely Endymion once again suggests masturbation and orgasm.⁵⁸ What once seemed like a condemnation—a life of imagining and daydreaming with no hope of “possess[ing] the moon”—now sounds like a consummation. Endymion assures Cynthia that this contemplative existence will allow him to “live of all men the most content, taking more pleasure in my aged thoughts than ever I did in my youthful actions” (5.4.174-76). As a reward to Endymion for his constant love, Cynthia restores his youth. Just as the fish absorbs and reflects Cynthia’s fullness and color, now Endymion waxes young again.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁵⁸ *Endymion*, 189.

Endymion's situation at the end of the play looks remarkably like it did in the very beginning. Although the other characters have paired off in typical comic fashion, Endymion is (again, still) alone with his thoughts. Lyly acknowledges the generic problem of his play: his Prologue notes that "[w]e present neither comedy, nor tragedy, nor story, nor anything, but that whatsoever heareth may say this: 'Why, here is a tale of the Man in the Moon'" (Prologue, 9-12). But what sort of dramatic protagonist ends right where he begins? Not simply a man who falls in love with the moon, Endymion has apparently become a microcosm of the moon herself.⁵⁹ Even his solitude recalls the moon's singular place in the sky; Cynthia's perfection, according to Endymion, "alloweth no companion nor comparison" (2.1.29). But the difference between Endymion's solitude and his youth in Act 1 and in Act 5 is that these qualities have been reconstituted as gifts from and reflections of Cynthia. Thus Endymion finds a way out of his earlier nightmare: like the lady in his dream, he chooses the mirror over the knife. An open container receptive to the erotic scene that surrounds and overtakes him, Endymion has been renamed and remade by Cynthia, in her image.⁶⁰ He now *shares* his solitude with her.

Endymion achieves what Valentine cannot sustain during his banishment: an ability to feed upon shadows and find nourishment there. Just as Silvia is both scenic and partial agent to Valentine, so Cynthia is Endymion's consummate scene (the moon is, of course, everyone's scene). Now she inhabits him as well. For Valentine, distance erases

⁵⁹ Phillpa Berry associates this transformation with a tradition of courtly imitation: "in *Endimion: or the Man in the Moone*, the male courtly lover was called upon to imitate his queen, through a meditative withdrawal into the private, emotional and feminine sphere of experience symbolized by the moon—the planet which was now becoming the privileged emblem of her courtly cult" (Berry, *Of Chastity and Power*, 111).

⁶⁰ Cynthia's kiss can be understood as a version of the Ovidian kiss that Claude Rawson singles out for its "attempted incorporation" (Rawson, "I could eat you up," 107; Cf. footnote 12). Because Cynthia is divine, such a kiss poses no threat to her life. Taking from the moon does not diminish her glow.

even the memory of his beloved, but Endymion carries Cynthia's "unmovable" (1.1.36)⁶¹ presence with him always; she never leaves the mansion of Endymion's breast. He opens himself to Cynthia in the way Bachelard's dreamer brings the infinite grandeur of the world into his consciousness through contemplation. Bachelard's description of intimate immensity is based on a version of permeability that is both catastrophic and constructive: "It would seem, then, that it is through their 'immensity' that these two kinds of space—the space of intimacy and world space—blend. When human solitude deepens, then the two immensities touch and become identical."⁶² The mutuality that Bachelard describes pertains to Endymion's regenerated inner life, now no longer purely solipsistic or narcissistic. If, as Paster argues, the relation between self and world is reciprocal, it need not be equal or balanced.⁶³ If the asymmetry between Endymion and Cynthia separates them, it also allows them to participate together in an imaginative union.

When Cynthia rejuvenates Endymion, she praises his constant affections, commanding him to "[p]ersevere, Endymion, in loving me, and I account more strength in a true heart than in a walled city" (5.4.179-80). Although this is a command, Endymion has been primed to receive it as a gift. "Love me," he hears her say. Think about me. Take me into your imagination. *I give myself to your imagination.* What she offers him is not possession as Endymion initially conceived of it; rather, by sanctioning

⁶¹ In the first scene of Lyly's play, Endymion defends Cynthia against charges of inconstancy by noting that she is "unmovable" in her course. By the final scene, Tellus uses this word to describe Endymion, claiming that he had "an unmovable desire to Cynthia" (5.4.133).

⁶² Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, 203.

⁶³ In his study of Irigarayan place, Edward Casey writes about this kind of reciprocity "in the capacity of each sex to 'receive the self and envelope the self.' Between men and women there has to be reciprocal (albeit asymmetrical) transport: 'mutual enveloping in movement'" (328). Quotations in Casey are from Irigaray, "The Envelope: A Reading of Spinoza, *Ethics*, 'Of God,'" in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, 93, and in "Place, Interval," 54, respectively.

his fantasies, Cynthia gives him an imaginative claim on her. He has her permission to make and remake her in his mind, just as she has remade him in fact. Surely this kind of shared authorship is erotic; so to imagine Cynthia is for Endymion to be generative and possessive, too. Endymion's bond with Cynthia recasts Levinas's claim that infinity cannot be synthesized or assimilated, perhaps because Endymion is first assimilated *by her*.⁶⁴ It is, after all, Endymion's very egolessness that finally secures his purchase on Cynthia. His receptivity inspires Cynthia's receptivity to his "true heart" in return.

Cynthia's comparison of Endymion's heart to "a walled city" recalls boundedness and self-sufficiency, the "absolute microcosmos" of Epiton's imagining. Although I began this study by dismissing Epiton's image as the stuff of dreams, I return to it in order to suggest that the fantasy of the absolute microcosmos may be attainable not as an escape from desire, but instead as an indulgence of desire. Endymion's desire for Cynthia seals him off from the rest of the world, but it also binds her to him, keeping her within the sturdy walls of his imagination where he can feed on her shadow. In other words, Epiton's microcosmos is, for Endymion, a *form* of desire. One can only love perfection from a great distance; intimacy with infinity takes place in the imagination, where Endymion can claim Cynthia entirely, where she never loses her glow. She is Other, but she is also his—container and contained, inside and outside, both. Desire for something infinite and immense, for someone perfect and unattainable, can only ever take the form of imaginative pleasure. Lyly's *Endymion* insists that this pleasure is also profoundly erotic.

⁶⁴ See my discussion of Levinas in Chapter 1, section IV.

III. Binding the Void: Erotics of the Scene in *Antony and Cleopatra*

Cleopatra's vision of Antony on his horse is unmistakably erotic:

Where think'st thou he is now? Stands he, or sits he?
 Or does he walk? Or is he on his horse?
 O happy horse, to bear the weight of Antony!
 Do bravely, horse! For wot'st thou whom thou mov'st?
 The demi-Atlas of this earth, the arm
 And burgonet of men. He's speaking now,
 Or murmuring "Where's my serpent of old Nile?"
 For so he calls me. (1.5.18-26)

As Cleopatra imagines Antony standing, sitting, walking, and then riding, her relation to him changes from contemplative and spectatorial to active engagement. Not content simply to observe him mounted on his horse, Cleopatra would herself *become* this "happy horse," would herself happily "bear the weight of Antony" (20).⁶⁵ Of course, much later in the play Cleopatra must cope with the arduous physical reality of overcoming Antony's weight when she and her women hoist his body into her monument. But here in Act 1, she takes pleasure in her fantasy of Antony's body bearing down on hers, and in the reciprocating prospect of supporting his weight from beneath him. If her fantasy is palpably erotic—perhaps sodomitical, or submissive, or bestial, or idolatrous—it is also manifestly scenic. Her longing to bear him up makes her Antony's scene or (according to Burke's etymological definition of this word) his "sub-stance."⁶⁶

Cleopatra would have it that she can both *be* Antony's place and *place* him, that is, fix him in time and space ("Ah, ha! You're caught!" [2.5.16], she later dreams). If only in her mind, she efficiently accounts for his scene (or substance) and situation (or

⁶⁵ Lisa Starks cites this passage as an example of how Cleopatra "displaces rather than reverses the male subject/female object binary" that is typical of Petrarchan conceits: "she takes the position of the object—the 'bottom' (the submissive or passive role) rather than the 'top' (the dominant or active role)—but in so doing, she makes the bottom a powerful position of supreme control and sexual gratification." See Lisa S. Starks, "Immortal Longings: The Erotics of Death in *Antony and Cleopatra*," in *Antony and Cleopatra: New Critical Essays*, ed. Sara Munson Deats (New York: Routledge, 2005), 243-58, 250.

⁶⁶ Burke, *GM*, 22.

circumstance). Indeed, her deictic “now”—Antony is “speaking now”—vivifies her fantasy, bringing Antony into her presence, maybe ours, too. Cleopatra’s playfulness competes with her longing; it becomes clear that erotic self-indulgence is in contention with a compulsion to locate her lover. Her “Where think’st thou he is now?” is just one among many iterations of what we might call interrogative place deixis. At her entrance in 1.2, she asks, “Saw you my lord?” and “Was he not here?” (1.2.79). “Where is he?” (1.3.1) are her first words in the following scene, then “See where he is” (1.3.2). Even in her dream, Cleopatra imputes to Antony an answering version of her recurring compulsion: “*Where’s my serpent of old Nile?*” (1.5.25; emphasis mine). So compelling is the question of “where” for Cleopatra that she voices it in her fantasy of her lover’s private murmurs.

Of all the murmurings that she could dream into the mouth of her “demi-Atlas” (22), Cleopatra’s “where” confirms our readiness to charge love with the daunting task of anchoring or placing us in the world. Often conceptualized through spatial schemas, love can create for us a sense of place, but it can also produce a profound anxiety about displacement. We observed this with Valentine, and Cleopatra, too, appears to suffer from what Edward Casey calls “place-panic.”⁶⁷ At the very start of the play, Cleopatra is already concerned about boundaries. Antony must specify precisely “how much” (1.1.14) and then “how far” (1.1.16) he loves her. She, in turn, will “set a bourn how far to be beloved” (1.1.16). John Gillies identifies Cleopatra’s desire for a bourn as part of

⁶⁷ Casey defines place-panic as the fear of being without a place, and consequently lost in the void of space (Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 6). Valentine’s empty mansion contrasts with Antony’s reassurance that “Our separation so abides and flies / That thou residing here goes yet with me, / And I hence fleeting here remain with thee” (1.3.102-4). Antony’s bit of metaphysical love poetry, his image of a “fleeting” yet “abiding” absence, offers an optimistic, if unconvincing, alternative to the empty abode in Valentine’s breast.

the classical trope of orbic limits, and he comments that “this image of limits is also an image of desire.”⁶⁸ To impose limits is to define and therefore enable desire.

As we have seen elsewhere in both Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s plays, erotic desire threatens the possibility of contained place more often than it confirms it. As Janet Adelman observes, “the dissolution of personal boundaries is both our greatest fear and our highest desire.”⁶⁹ The language of desire in the play stubbornly invokes the container schema only immediately to reveal that its limits are inadequate. Like Endymion’s wish for veins to contain but ultimately to purge his thoughts, the boundaries of Antony and Cleopatra’s affair seem to exist only to be breached. Permeability is cued at every turn, from the swelling of the Nile (2.7.20) to Antony’s own body, unable “to hold this visible shape” (4.14.14). Even the play’s opening image of Antony’s “dotage... o’erflow[ing] the measure” (1.1.1-2) depends upon the container schema and violates its limits. Given Shakespeare’s insistent dramatization of Antony and Cleopatra’s affair as boundary-breaking, it is reasonable to ask, *to where* exactly does Antony’s dotage overflow? What exists outside place, beyond “measure”? Would the “new heaven, new earth” (1.1.17) of Antony’s imagining more effectively contain desire? Or is it uncontainable? Perhaps it is an undifferentiated and unbounded void into which Antony’s “captain’s heart... hath burst” (1.1.6,7), and in which Cleopatra will find herself if she fails to heed Charmian’s caution to “keep yourself within yourself” (2.5.75). Casey writes that “the prospect of a strict void, of an utter no-place, is felt to be intolerable. So intolerable, so undermining of personal or collective identity is this prospect, that practices of place-fixing and place-

⁶⁸ John Gillies, *Shakespeare and the Geography of Difference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 68.

⁶⁹ Janet Adelman, *The Common Liar*, 149.

filling are set in motion right away.”⁷⁰ It is this daunting prospect of empty space that prompts Cleopatra’s frequent inquiries into Antony’s whereabouts. If he is someplace, any place, then the “great gap” (1.5.5) of his absence can be contained.

In this section, I explore the erotics of “measure[d]” Aristotelian place and of limitless space in *Antony and Cleopatra*. I build on Edward Casey’s philosophical history of place and space to consider the erotic implications of these scenes (or anti-scenes) for characters as well as for audiences. The snug fit and “bourn” of bounded place in *Antony and Cleopatra* gets its erotic charge from the domain of sexual bondage, drawing as it does from the formal and temporal features of masochism. When Antony and Cleopatra emplace one another or become each other’s place, they typically enfetter and embrace one another. The crowds of people who witness their affair, both within the fiction of the play and in the theater audience, also take part in this place-making exercise, which culminates inside Cleopatra’s monument where death “*shackles accidents and bolts up change*” (5.2.6; emphasis mine). This language of sexual bondage responds to the threat of the infinite and empty space that looms just beyond the bounded places in the play. In the second half of this section, I consider the precise nature of this threat and discuss the ways in which Antony and Cleopatra eroticize the void, imposing the sturdy boundaries of place onto vacant space. Binding the void allows the lovers to *present* this vacancy to one another, enabling pleasurable experiences of self-loss and self-forgetting. It is, finally, at Cleopatra’s monument in Act 5 that the erotic dynamics of place and endless space converge, “find[ing] out” (1.1.17) for the lovers a “new heaven, new earth” within its walls.

⁷⁰ Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 6.

It is perhaps easiest to conceptualize place (as opposed to space) as erotic. It is already erotic in Aristotle's description of its "snug fit," but also in Bachelard's intimate nooks and corners, and in Irigaray's "as for woman, she is place." Place, which has always been a rich and generative domain, is

like a boundary in the special signification that Heidegger detects in the ancient Greek conception of *horismos*, 'horizon,' itself derived from *horos* (boundary): "that from which something *begins its presencing*." For a place is indeed an active source of presencing: within its close embrace, things get located and begin to happen.⁷¹

But what we find in *Antony and Cleopatra* is that "close embrace" can take the form of the "Egyptian fetters" that Antony "must break / Or lose myself in the dotage" (1.2.115-16). On the one hand, there is disability; on the other, the pleasure that Antony anticipates when he commands Cleopatra to "Chain my armed neck" (4.8.14) after he triumphs in battle. Or the pleasure of embrace and the pain of captivity entwine, like "a lover's pinch, / Which hurts, *and* is desired" (5.2.295-96; emphasis mine). For the infinitely various Cleopatra, there is no contradiction here. The erotic appeal of circumscribed place is augmented even as (or because) it closes in on her. The strength of its hold only confirms our place in the world, staving off what Edward Casey refers to as "the existential predicament of place-bereft individuals... depression or terror even at the idea, and still more in the experience, of an empty place."⁷²

The erotics of place are tellingly captured in Enobarbus's account of Cleopatra on her barge on the Cydnus. The pleasures of this speech are primarily scenic; that is, we are seduced more by the desiring scene than by the desired agent. Cleopatra is enclosed in her pavilion (2.2.209) and her "gentlewomen" (2.2.216) adorn her with their "bends"

⁷¹ Ibid., 63. Casey quotes Martin Heidegger from "Building Dwelling Thinking," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 154.

⁷² Ibid., 6.

(2.2.218). The scene overpictures Cleopatra even as she overpictures Venus—her barge “burned” (2.2.202); gold is “beaten” (2.2.202); oars “stroke” (2.2.205) and “beat” (2.2.206) the water; and perfume “hits the sense” (2.2.222). Such aggressive verbs reveal the masochistic charge of Cleopatra’s eroticism, which in turn provokes the violent scene that Enobarbus describes. Yet Cleopatra herself is apparently impervious or oblivious to the fierce bondage of her surroundings. She “set[s] a bourn” (1.1.16) by functioning as a limit rather than a boundary. According to Casey, whereas boundaries are imposed from outside, and so belong to the container, limits are internal properties of the contained agent. In a commentary on Euclid’s *Elements of Geometry*, Proclus describes limits in terms of the agent: “the limits surrender themselves to the things they limit; they establish themselves in them, becoming, as it were, parts of them and being filled with their inferior characters.”⁷³ It is counter-intuitive but eminently logical that infinitely various Cleopatra should be restricted or finite, even a source or seeker of limits. Her bondage is part of a collaborative undertaking; beyond the limit that Cleopatra establishes within herself exists the boundary that corrals her from outside, in both Enobarbus’s captivating words and our collective imagination.⁷⁴

Amidst the tumult of beating oars, the surge of lustful water, and the flutter of “divers-colored fans” (2.2.213), Cleopatra is exceptionally still. Like an inanimate portrait of Venus, she is a fixed point around which “pretty dimpled boys” (2.2.212) and

⁷³ Proclus, *A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements*, ed. and trans. Glen R. Morrow (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 71, qtd. in Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 63.

⁷⁴ Donald Freeman’s work on metaphorical patterning in *Antony and Cleopatra* traces the bondage domain back to the link schema, one of three key image schemas in the play (the other two are the container and path schemas). According to Freeman, “the dominant feature of the links projections in *Antony and Cleopatra* is that of imprisonment, constraint of movement.” See Donald C. Freeman, “‘The rack dislimns’: Schemas and Metaphorical Pattern in *Antony and Cleopatra*,” *Poetics Today* 20, no. 3 (1999): 443-60, 450.

“gentlewomen” (2.2.216) constellate.⁷⁵ Even when we hear that she “O’erpictur[es] that Venus where we see / The fancy outwork nature” (2.2.210-11)—as if Cleopatra’s “own person” (2.2.207) breaks through the barge’s aesthetic and Enobarbus’s narrative frame—we never quite see that “person” as opposed to its ornate, enclosing scene. Enobarbus imbues her scene (or is it his?) with erotic longing, with masochistic pleasure (“the oars...made / The water which they beat to follow faster, / As amorous of their strokes” [2.2.204-7]) and with phallic arousal (“the silken tackle / Swell with the touches of those flower-soft hands” [2.2.219-20]). What can account for the pleasure that we (along with Enobarbus and his onstage audience) take in this imaginative exercise of placing Cleopatra if not the pleasures of sexual bondage? In our collective desire for her—our longing to know her, to “word” (5.2.192) her, to “encloud” her in our “thick breaths” (5.2.212-13), to pin her down and so fix her in space and time—we too occupy this scenic frame, binding Cleopatra in our fantastic embrace. To bind one’s lover is to prolong desire on the part of the binder and the bound, drawing out the moments before sexual gratification.⁷⁶ The account of Cleopatra on the Cydnus has a similar effect: it removes us from the present scene in Rome and brings us into a state of arrest, engaging but stymieing our desire, inciting but not quite appeasing hunger. This is true not only for the audience but also for Antony and for the crowd that gazes on Cleopatra within the narrative frame. Indeed everyone who watches her approach is bound up in the same Burkean, lyrical state of prolonged desire. A collective state of arrest prevails within the

⁷⁵ A fixed point is Casey’s primary example of a limit, as opposed to a boundary, because it is self-enclosed, self-contained, and isolated. Yet Casey also asks, “but, isn’t a point something that is *always* surrounded—indeed, *totally* surrounded in the space in which it is placed and thus as fully ensconced in its own surrounder as any sensible body?” (*The Fate of Place*, 60).

⁷⁶ Kenneth Burke describes a similar state of arrest in lyric poetry and its dramatic counterpart, incipient action. “From the lyric point of view,” he writes, “the state of arrest is itself an end-product... From the dramatic point of view, the moment of arrest that characterizes the attitude is a kind of ‘pre-act’” (*GM*, 245).

theater. No one is immune. So it is with sexual bondage, which begins with a clearly delineated captor and captive but leads to both participants being absorbed in the experience of suspended desire and deferred gratification.

The slow and deliberate erotic pace of this scene corresponds to the aesthetic and temporal rhythms of masochism. Cleopatra's lyrical approach on the Cydnus forces her audience(s) into the attitudes of waiting and suspense which Gilles Deleuze identifies as "essential characteristics of masochistic experience."⁷⁷ According to Deleuze, "This is partly because the masochistic rites of torture and suffering imply actual physical suspension (the hero is hung up, crucified or suspended), but also because the woman torturer freezes into postures that identify her with a statue, a painting or a photograph."⁷⁸ Enobarbus's description casts Cleopatra in the role of both the captive and the captor: she is enfettered by the "silken tackle" (2.2.219) of Enobarbus's scenic frame, but she is also frozen in the posture of Venus, the woman torturer of Deleuze's description.⁷⁹ It is Cleopatra's "infinite variety" (2.2.246) that seems to allow her to occupy both roles within the masochistic relationship throughout the play. From Act 1, when she repeatedly inquires into Antony's whereabouts, through Acts 4 and 5, when she awaits Antony's (and then death's) arrival in her monument, we are accustomed to seeing Cleopatra in the masochist's posture of waiting. Waiting is arguably Cleopatra's main action in the play.

⁷⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty* (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 71. Cleopatra and Antony both conceive of pleasure according to this slowed lyrical rhythm. The opening scene of the play features an Antony who feels pleasure as a kind of prolonging of time: "There's not a minute of our lives should *stretch* / Without some pleasure now" (1.1.46-47; emphasis mine). Time bends to pleasure in the masochistic aesthetic Deleuze describes, and both lovers are subject to this suspense at various points in the play. Along these lines, Catherine Belsey has argued that Cleopatra's "imagined, promised, deferred presence" is what characterizes her seductiveness throughout the play. See Belsey, "Cleopatra's Seduction," in *Alternative Shakespeares*, vol. 3, ed. John Drakakis (London: Routledge, 1996), 38-62, 43.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁷⁹ Deleuze's depiction of the woman torturer is based on his study of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch's 1870 novel *Venus in Furs*. See Deleuze's *Coldness and Cruelty*, pp. 47-80.

Her imaginative engagement with Antony—her ability to conjure him and the pleasure she takes from placing him with her mind—depends upon his absence, and upon her experience of suspended time.⁸⁰ What is so unique about the barge scene, then, is that now she makes *Antony* wait. She even makes the air around Antony wait for her, unable as it is to leave him and look on her without making “a gap in nature” (2.2.228). Her erotic power threatens to undo nature, and yet here it emerges from her captivity. Being placed so firmly and securely in Enobarbus’s account releases an answering mobility for Cleopatra; bondage affords her erotic freedom, a power over time and space that she can command from within the scenic frame.

Although Enobarbus can describe Cleopatra’s scene with painstaking detail, “her own person” (2.2.207) is ineffable; it “beggared all description” (2.2.208). As Jonathan Gil Harris has argued, the Egyptian queen is glaringly absent from Enobarbus’s account.⁸¹ She is framed by his words, but the picture inside is blank: “her ‘cloth of gold’ thus encloses what is effectively ‘a gap in nature.’” The speech serves as a rhetorical counterpart of a rococo mirror, its extraordinarily ornate and copious frame enclosing a subtly camouflaged glass in which Enobarbus’s Roman listeners glimpse whatever they want to see.⁸² While Harris contends that Cleopatra’s absence functions as a mirror for Roman desire, I believe that her corporeal absence—which, like her statuesque stillness, is itself a source of masochistic power—signifies nothing more nor less than empty

⁸⁰ Deleuze writes, “Pure waiting divides naturally into two currents, the first representing what is awaited, something essentially tardy, always late and always postponed, the second representing something expected and on which depends the speeding up of the awaited object. It is inevitable that such a form, such a rhythmic division of time into two streams, should be ‘filled’ by the particular combination of pleasure and pain. For at the same time as pain fulfills what is expected, it becomes possible for pleasure to fulfill what is awaited” (Ibid., 71).

⁸¹ Jonathan Gil Harris, “‘Narcissus in thy Face’: Roman Desire and the Difference it Fakes in *Antony and Cleopatra*,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (1994): 408-25.

⁸² Ibid., 418.

space, a “gap”—and *not* a mirror—“in nature” (2.2.228). Enobarbus encourages us to entertain this possibility, to take Cleopatra out of the picture but not to replace her, not even with an object of our own imagining (as Harris suggests). What do we imagine, for example, when we hear these words:

The city cast
Her people out upon her; and Antony,
Enthroned i’ th’ marketplace, did sit alone,
Whistling to the air; which, but for vacancy,
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature.

(2.2.223-28)

Enobarbus’s description of the city violently displacing her people evokes a deeper and more profound void than just an empty place. To confer agency upon the city is to emphasize the scene’s power over the agent. Drained of air, the marketplace becomes a vacuum—an active and aggressive negative space that reinforces the threat of the void which dominates a great deal of the play, especially the early scenes.

For all the bounty, surfeit, fecundity, and overflow that we hear about in Act 1, Antony and Cleopatra draw frequently upon the domain of vacancy in those early scenes. The cues are multiple: “absence” (1.2.171), “oblivion” (1.3.90), “idleness” (1.3.93-95), “vacancy” (1.4.26), and “gap” (1.5.5). Such gaps—in nature and time—pose a particular threat within the context of early modern scientific and religious thought. Speculations by early modern theologians and scientists gave rise to what Edward Casey has called “the ascent of infinite space” over localized place in medieval and Renaissance philosophy.⁸³ The rise of spatiality resulted in part from a list commissioned in 1277 by Pope John XXI of 219 condemnations of doctrines that limited the power of God,

⁸³ See Casey, Chapter 5, “The Ascent of Infinite Space: Medieval and Renaissance Speculations,” in *The Fate of Place*, 103-29.

including God's ability to move the world to a different location. Edward Grant describes the cosmological ramifications of the 219 condemnations in his study of the conceptual history of voids and vacuums:

After 1277, scholastics at Paris were compelled to concede that God could create as many worlds as He pleased and to allow that He could move our entire spherical universe rectilinearly even though a vacuum remained in the place it vacated... If God did make other worlds, it was assumed that void space would intervene between them; and if God moved the world rectilinearly, it was further assumed not only that a void space would be left behind but also that the world itself moved into and out of other empty spaces that lay beyond.⁸⁴

To defend God's power, then, was to acknowledge at least the *potential*—if not the real presence—of infinite and endless space.

Not surprisingly, the concept of a void or vacuum has proved difficult to accept or even to conceive. The existence of a sheer void—the existence, that is, of empty space with no fixed referent at all, no boundaries to mark anything—comes at a high ontological and epistemological cost, and thus has been hotly contested from antiquity to the present day. Edward Grant summarizes the debate over the void's existence, its physical features, and its philosophical, religious, and scientific implications:

The void was from the outset, and almost inevitably, subjected to a double entendre. Was it an unintelligible, total privation incapable of existence—a true 'nothing'? Or was it a nothing conceived of as a something, a something with definite properties that could range from a pure dimensionless emptiness to a three-dimensional magnitude, and even be conceived of as God's infinite and omnipresent immensity?⁸⁵

According to Grant, all of these conceptualizations have existed at one time or another, in fact, many at the same time. While Aristotle's definition of the void as "place bereft of body" depends upon the void's container-like properties (i.e., his void shares some basic

⁸⁴ Edward Grant, *Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 109.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

features of place), the Stoics imagined a void without bounds, defining the universe as “a finite material world surrounded by an infinite extended void space.”⁸⁶ The void was debated on the basis of its dimensionality (can it be measured?), its conceivability (can it be imagined?), and even its location in the cosmos (are vacuums positioned in between bodies within the bounded universe, or are they extracosmic, stretching beyond the known horizon?). Historically, the range of responses to these questions has been as broad as the array of questions themselves, and the stakes of the different claims have been high.

We have already seen Antony and Cleopatra invoke multiple definitions of void space throughout the play. They too are exploring dimensions and implications of the void that preoccupied the philosophers and scientists who preceded them. As we might expect, the prospect of an utterly boundless and dimensionless void is so daunting for Shakespeare’s characters that it is unimaginable in its purest form. Valentine comes close when he envisions the walls of the empty mansion in his breast crumbling down “and leav[ing] no memory of what it was” (5.4.10). Without the memory of a boundary, he begins to approximate what a pure void might be like—but even here, Valentine *places* this bleak spatiality within his breast. More often than not, then, vacuity is conceptualized via the domain of displacement, specifically the threat of being cast out of a place whose boundary (or memory, at least) persists.

In *Antony and Cleopatra*, displacement is often couched in hypothetical language, marking the void specifically as a threat or a potential. Cleopatra invokes the threat when Antony leaves her in Act 1 and she pledges to write him every day, “Or I’ll unpeople

⁸⁶ Ibid., 199. Grant notes the historical tendency of scholastics to reject the existence of three-dimensional void space, and the tendency of non-scholastics to accept it. Aristotle’s definition of the void is found in his *Physics*, 208b25-26, quoted in Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 17.

Egypt” (1.5.78). Her image of an “unpeople[d] Egypt” anticipates Enobarbus’s account of Cleopatra’s strange ability to provoke a city to cast out its entire people. The empty space, the remainder, is perhaps best described by Francesco Patrizi of Cherso: “When [space] is filled with a body, it is *locus*; without a body, it is a vacuum.”⁸⁷ To “unpeople Egypt” is to evacuate its bodies; Cleopatra’s verb reminds us of the people who once lived there even as it emphasizes the negative space that remains. Her verb is also noteworthy for its disproportionality, for such wholesale depopulation constitutes a displacement that is glaringly incommensurate with the act of writing Antony a letter every day. This imbalance only heightens the void’s status *as a threat*; clearly Cleopatra has no intention of “unpeopl[ing]” her country, so we are only meant to consider the void in hypothetical terms, as a kind of present absence. She raises the same threat in Act 3, when Antony accuses her of being “[c]oldhearted toward me” (3.13.158). If her assurance in Act 1 is disproportionate, her response in Act 3 is outrageously so:

Ah, dear, if I be so,
 From my cold heart let heaven engender hail,
 And poison it in the source; and the first stone
 Drop in my neck: as it determines, so
 Dissolve my life! The next Caesarion smite!
 Till by degrees the memory of my womb,
 Together with my brave Egyptians all,
 By the discandying of this pelleted storm,
 Lie graveless, till the flies and gnats of Nile
 Have buried them for prey!

(3.13.158-67)

Again Cleopatra paints a picture of utter desolation, of “graveless” Egyptian sons and daughters subject to a power so great that it banishes bodies from their places with

⁸⁷ From Francesco Patrizi, *Nova de universis philosophia* (1587): “Qua plenum corpore est, esse locum. Qua vero sine corpore est, esse vacuum” (Benjamin Brickman, trans., *An Introduction to Francesco Patrizi's nova de universis philosophia*, [New York: 1941], 231). Patrizi’s definition of the void relies on spatial and placial properties: it is vacuous, a quality of infinite space, but it is also a three-dimensional container, a feature we associate more with place.

tempestuous violence. Again, her wildly disproportionate response to Antony suggests that this bleak vacancy exists as an idea rather than as a reality. Nonetheless, by conjuring it for Antony (and for herself, and for us), Cleopatra insists on its potentiality just beyond her “bourn.” The intensity, detail, and sheer length of her description—ten lines in response to Antony’s three-word question—demonstrate the self-indulgence of such imaginings. Like looking out at a threatening storm from the safety of an enclosed shelter, the terror of the void reinforces the necessity and the pleasures of being confined within the “snug fit” of the place she creates with Antony.

Cleopatra speaks of the void in hypothetical, distanced language; but near the end of the play, Antony experiences this threat viscerally when his identity is at stake. He conceptualizes his loss of identity as a self-inflicted banishment from the “frail case” (4.14.41) of his body or self—a loss, that is, of place. As Donald Freeman has observed, the container schema plays a vital role in Antony’s conceptualizations of this loss.⁸⁸

From the depths of his sorrow and shame, Antony looks up at the changing shapes of the clouds: “That which is now a horse, even with a thought / The rack dislimns and makes it indistinct / As water is in water” (4.14.11).⁸⁹ The grammar of the phrase “water...in water” gives the illusion of containment in a place, but the image itself—water in

water—overtakes all the specificity of agent and place, leaving formless space in its

⁸⁸ Many scholars link Antony’s inability to “hold this visible shape” (4.14.14) to his loss of identity. In his study of conceptual metaphors in *Antony and Cleopatra*, Donald Freeman argues that the container schema plays a central role in structuring Antony’s sense of Roman, masculine, and military identity: “he fully plays out his association of a containing and defining shape with his status, his standing in the world, and his very existence” (Freeman, “The rack dislimns,” 457). Where Freeman argues that “Rome represents the sharply defined ‘measure’” (447) that cannot contain Antony’s passion, I argue that the desire for a “bourn” emerges from the lovers themselves, even as they put pressure on the boundaries of place. Cynthia Marshall has argued that Antony’s identity loss (and his difficulty negotiating among multiple identities) is a symptom of melancholia; she describes Shakespeare’s protagonist as “a character displaced by melancholy.” See Cynthia Marshall, “Man of Steel Done Got the Blues,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (1993): 385-408, 406.

⁸⁹ The likeness of the horse—once the source of Cleopatra’s placial fantasy—is the final image that loses its shape in Antony’s grief.

wake.⁹⁰ Although Antony experiences his loss of self as banishment from place, he looks out into the cosmos for analogs for this emptiness. Searching beyond the clouds, he laments that “my good stars that were my former guides / Have empty left their orbs and shot their fires / Into th’ abysm of hell” (3.13.145-47). Antony’s scene, no longer an Aristotelian, circumambient enclosure (“Chain my armed neck”), has become abyssal space; the barrenness of “th’ abysm of hell” beneath him rivals the vacant orbs above. His empty orbs speak directly to the early modern interest in cosmic space, in vacuums and in gaps in nature.⁹¹

Antony’s “good stars” orient us along a vertical axis, with the “empty” heavens above and “the abysm of hell” below. According to Francesco Patrizi, the dimension of depth distinguishes the void from previous conceptualizations of space. He dwells on the three-dimensionality of void space, adding depth where Aristotle had accounted for only breadth and length. As Patrizi writes, “the vacuum itself is nothing else than three dimensional Space.”⁹² The addition of depth (*profundum*) invests the concept of vacuity with an evaluative or hierarchal quality—things have higher value as they move up in vertical space and become “baser” (5.2.290) as they move downward.⁹³ Antony’s

⁹⁰ Donald Freeman analyzes the particularity of the shapes that Antony finds in the cloud formations before “the rack dislimns.” Although Antony begins with vague forms such as “dragonish” (4.14.2) and “sometime like a bear or lion” (4.14.3), they become more sharply defined and detailed as he continues, ending with a “blue promontory / With trees upon’t” (4.14.5-6). Freeman observes that Antony’s gestalt perception—however highly developed—can be shattered instantly by a single change in the background. See Donald C. Freeman, “The rack dislimns,” 457-58.

⁹¹ As Casey observes, “At stake here is the question, what would happen if the world were moved, even ever so slightly, in a lateral direction along an imaginary line? In moving from position *A* to position *B*, would it not vacate position *A*, leaving it strictly empty? Would it not move *into* position *B*, which must have been empty for it to be occupied by this movement?” (Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 108).

⁹² Patrizi defines space without bodies as a vacuum: “this vacuum, like *locus*, must have three common dimensions—length, width, and depth. And the vacuum itself is nothing else than three dimensional Space [*spacium*]” (qtd. in Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 126, and Grant, *Much Ado About Nothing*, 386).

⁹³ This correlation exemplifies the workings of primary metaphor: the sensorimotor domain of vertical orientation structures our system of subjective judgment (“more is up,” “happy is up,” “good is upright,” “moral weakness is falling”). For more on the cognitive structure of basic philosophical ideas—and of

experience of the void's verticality, then, highlights the bleakness and sense of gloom of empty space. Depth and verticality shape much of the catastrophic language in *Antony and Cleopatra*. Cleopatra imagines the threat of the void as a downward movement when she envisions "half my Egypt...submerged" (2.5.94) and when she later yearns to "[s]ink Rome" (3.7.15). When she dares to envision her reality of the void—death itself—she does so along the same vertical axis. At Antony's death, she laments that "[t]he crown of the earth doth melt" (4.15.64), whereas Cleopatra rises up, becoming "fire and air; my other elements / I give to baser life" (5.2.289-90). Death is often conceptualized in terms of this vertical spatial domain because of the associations of heaven and hell with height and depth, respectively; bodies are lowered down into the ground, and spirits ascend. Unlike Cleopatra, Antony retreats to the place-setting confinement of bondage when he acknowledges that "force entangles / Itself with strength" (4.14.48-49), then imagines his death as a "seal" (4.14.49) rather than as a dissolution. This is to seal a document, but it is almost as if Antony imagines himself covered in wax. Unlike Cleopatra, who commands the asp to "untie" "this knot intricate / Of life" (5.2.304-5), Antony longs to be blanketed by death, envisioning it as "a lover's bed" that he can "run into" (4.14.100-101).

Antony's eroticized image of being "a bridegroom" enveloped "*in my death*" (4.14.100; emphasis mine) is unsurprising in light of the pleasures he takes from bondage in life, especially life with Cleopatra. The place that Cleopatra offers him as his "substance" does not neutralize the threat of the void, but instead contains it and thus permits them both to explore its erotic appeal. Binding the void imposes limits on its length and

morality in particular—see Chapter 14 of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 290-334.

breadth but preserves its depth, allowing Antony to lose himself within the place Cleopatra makes for him.⁹⁴ In *Antony and Cleopatra*, the experience of self-loss is imagined in two ways. The first is a kind of displacement, where people are “cast... out” (2.2.223-24) of cities and even out of their bodies; these agents without a scene leave only an empty frame (“frail case” [4.14.41]) or “gap” (1.5.5) in their wake. Because displacement forces the lovers to contend with the daunting prospect of empty and unbounded space, this experience is rarely imagined as a source for eros. The second type of loss in the play is distinctly erotic, conceptualized as a bounded void. Bounded loss still draws from the features of space—depth, vacuity, verticality—but it allows the agent to remain in her scene. Rather than being cast out, Antony and Cleopatra are lost *within* the scenes they make for one another—overwhelmed, even, by their scenes. This type of loss depends upon the domain of verticality (depth is what enables experiences of “loss within” or being *overwhelmed*), but unlike displacement, bounded loss plumbs the erotic potential of depth. We have already noted Cleopatra’s fantasy of being Antony’s “sub-stance”; there is also her fantasy of drawing him up on her fishing line.

Even in their first meeting, Cleopatra is imagined as a deep but bounded place in which Antony can reside: “When she first met Mark Antony, she pursed up his heart” (2.2.196-97). Somehow Cleopatra is able to capture and contain Antony’s famously swollen heart, itself so big that it “hath burst / The buckles on his breast” (1.1.6-8). If to “purse up” his heart is to envelop it, then here, at least, Cleopatra’s erotic power eclipses Antony in an enclosed place wherein his heart can disappear. A still more telling account

⁹⁴ This notion of a “bindable” void draws from the Stoics’ definition: “Void space was thus conceived as a three-dimensional receptacle for the finite cosmos” (Grant, *Much Ado About Nothing*, 107).

of her erotic power over Antony's heart emerges from his own fantasy, in Act 4, just after he has defeated Caesar in battle:

O thou day o' th' world,
Chain mine armed neck; leap thou, attire and all,
Through proof of harness to my heart, and there
Ride on the pants triumphing!

(4.8.13-16)

Where Antony once lamented Cleopatra's "strong Egyptian fetters" (1.2.115), he now entreats her to "chain my armed neck" (4.8.15) in celebration. His identity as a soldier and a Roman newly reaffirmed, Antony takes pleasure in placing himself within Cleopatra's chain-like embrace, casting her as his erotic scene: "thou day o' th' world" (4.8.13). The armor around his neck is apparently not binding enough for Antony; his demand that she "chain" his already "armed neck" conjures another (apparently pleasurable) heavy restraint. Such an image recalls Antony's instructions to his soldiers from a few lines earlier, to "clip [hug] your wives" (4.8.8). With their roles as victors secure for the time being, Antony's place-affirming talk of "clip[ping]" and "chain[ing]" seems apt.⁹⁵

This time around, Antony—or his heart, at least—is the horse and Cleopatra is the imagined encompassing rider. But what exactly does it mean to "leap thou, attire and all, / Through proof of harness to my heart, and there / Ride on the pants triumphing" (4.8.14-16)? How does one "ride on the pants," and why "attire and all"? Unlike Cleopatra's whimsical dream of being his horse, Antony describes a startling fantasy of a

⁹⁵ In this speech, Antony also explores the pleasures of permeability, openness, and penetration. The tidy image of his soldiers "clip[ping]" their wives is followed by the messier, more disturbing language of congealing wounds; Antony no sooner talks of embrace than he instructs soldiers to let their loved ones "kiss / The honored gashes whole" (4.8.10-11). Does this mean that the kisses will repair the gashes, making the broken flesh "whole" again, or does Antony imagine the wives covering the gashes with their "whole" mouths just as Cleopatra later hopes to "quicken" the wounded Antony "with kissing" (4.15.40)? Whatever erotic content we find in Antony's image, the pleasures he describes arise from the domain of permeability: tears mingling with blood, lips pressed against gashes.

completely clothed Cleopatra riding his naked panting heart as though it were a steed. At the outset, they are both attired (he in harness, she in what?), but in due course, he becomes vulnerable, exposed, and stripped down to his beating heart, while she, appareled, mounts what would have to be a grossly oversized heart if it is to bear her weight.⁹⁶ This fantasy draws from the placiality of Cleopatra's happy horse but it introduces a degree of vulnerability nowhere present in her daydream. In what is arguably his unique moment of triumph in the play, Antony submits his heart to Cleopatra's enveloping thighs.

Why would Antony choose this particular moment—the afterglow of an identity-affirming, place-fixing, heroic battle—to indulge in a fantasy of submission and envelopment, his heart receding into Cleopatra's embrace? Has this latest conquest offered him enough security and stability to stave off place-panic? Is this what provokes his fantasy of displacement without any fear of the destructive reality behind the dream? Or is there something else about having one's outward identity confirmed that inspires a longing for erotic dissolution? In his 1591 tract titled *De vinculis in genere (On Bonding in General)*, Giordano Bruno contends that the desire to remain intact comes from the same source as the desire “to be completely transported into the loved one.”⁹⁷ According to Bruno, who writes about intimacy in terms of bonds and bondage, the principal effect

⁹⁶ Joan Lord Hall argues that the multiple connotations of “heart” capture the play's division between Roman manly courage on the one hand, and Egyptian passions on the other. According to Hall, Antony's desire to resolve these competing Roman and Egyptian ideals is evident in his flexible use of the word “heart.” She contends that the image of Cleopatra riding Antony's heart exemplifies “the exuberant sense of wholeness--of an Antony whose love affair is not at odds with his heroic zeal” (70). My reading of these lines diverges from Hall's with respect to Antony's sense of wholeness: Antony's exuberance is a product of his vulnerability, not his intactness. His initial emphasis on attire and armor only heightens his eventual exposure in the face of Cleopatra's wholeness, and it is precisely this contrast that excites him. For a fuller account of the competing meanings of “heart” in the play, see Joan Lord Hall, “To the Very Heart of Loss: Rival Constructs of ‘Heart’ in *Antony and Cleopatra*,” *College Literature* 18, no. 1 (1991): 64-76.

⁹⁷ Giordano Bruno, *Cause, Principle, and Unity, and Essays on Magic*, ed. and trans. Robert de Luca and Richard J. Blackwell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 171.

of Cupid's bond is a wish to be placed—for lovers to “remain firm...*in* themselves” (emphasis mine)—and to be displaced—“unrestrained, opened up and thrown wide open”—at the same time: “Thus it happens that the bond by which things wish to be where they are and not to lose what they have also causes them to wish to be everywhere and to have what they do not possess.”⁹⁸ For Bruno, the desires to be placed and to be lost are compatible rather than competing. Moreover, he identifies permeability as a primary feature of the erotic bond, which is strongest when part of the object “is in the bonding agent, or when the bonding agent controls it by one of its parts.”⁹⁹ In Antony's fantasy, his heart is once again “pursed up,” but here it comes into contact with the most intimate parts of Cleopatra's body. His heart is not so much *displaced* as it is *replaced* between her spread legs. Each lover creates an erotic scene in which the other can live: as the steed beneath Cleopatra, Antony's heart is the “sub-stance” which bears her up, and Cleopatra's body provides a scene for him as well, offering him the feminine body-as-place that Irigaray describes.¹⁰⁰ Cleopatra's body enables a mitigated type of erotic loss for Antony—his heart is exposed (for neither the first nor the last time in the play), but rather than being displaced from his body with no destination, it is relocated between her legs. Antony is only lost insofar as he is given over to her pleasure.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Bruno continues, “From this it follows that a finite potency in some definite material body simultaneously experiences the effects both of being drawn together and of being pulled apart, dispersed and scattered by the same bond” (Ibid., 171).

⁹⁹ Ibid., 157.

¹⁰⁰ Irigaray poses the question, “But what am I for you, other than that place from which you subsist? Your subsistence. Or substance” (Luce Irigaray, *Elemental Passions*, trans. J. Collie and J. Still [New York: Routledge, 1992], 17).

¹⁰¹ Antony's reputation for “bounty” suggests that he is familiar with giving in order to gain (see 4.6.32 and 5.2.88-89).

Early in the play, we learn that Cleopatra's body-as-place has inspired pleasurable loss in previous lovers. When she recounts her affair with Gnaeus Pompey, Cleopatra portrays herself as a container in which he would lose himself:

...great Pompey
 Would stand and make his eyes grow in my brow,
 There would he anchor his aspect, and die
 With looking on his life.

(1.5.31-34)

Cleopatra describes a kind of self-loss that is made possible within a bounded but deep place. Pompey can indulge in the obliterating erotic pleasures of what Jonathan Gil Harris calls "narcissistic self-contemplation" only after she has given him a locus wherein he can "anchor his aspect."¹⁰² She draws from the container schema when she recalls Pompey's eyes growing "*in* my brow." The loss that Cleopatra inspires is imagined as a disappearance *into* a bounded but deep body that is capacious enough to "purse up" her Roman lovers' ever-expanding bodily organs, from Antony's "burst[ing]" heart to Pompey's "grow[ing]" eyes. Hers is the same body that can bear up and even give birth to idleness itself: "Tis sweating labor / To *bear* such idleness" (1.3.93-94, emphasis mine). Pregnant with idleness, her body contains the languor and hollowness it engenders.

Less corporeal but no less coveted is the place Antony provides as a scene for Cleopatra's self-loss. The motives for Cleopatra's urge to forget herself differ from Antony's: where he is only able to access bounded loss once he has confirmed his martial identity, Cleopatra longs for this experience precisely when she perceives that her place in Antony's world is threatened. When Antony leaves her, or when her life is at stake—

¹⁰² Harris, "Narcissus in thy Face," 421.

that is, when Cleopatra is faced with the prospect of empty space—she seeks out the anesthetic pleasures of a bounded place into which she can disappear:

Courteous lord, one word.
 Sir, you and I must part, but that's not it;
 Sir, you and I have loved, but there's not it:
 That you know well. Something it is I would—
 O, my oblivion is a very Antony,
 And I am all forgotten.

(1.3.86-91)

Although it sounds like she is saying that she has forgotten what she was about to say, it is apparently *herself* that she cannot remember, or be mindful of. “I am *all* forgotten,” she announces, and yet she names her oblivion “*a very Antony*.” Such particularity reflects her own need to impose limits on the void of oblivion. To remake her oblivion in the shape of Antony—to make, as it were, a place out of empty space—is to forget herself *in* her lover rather than in the endlessness of oblivion.¹⁰³ It is not difficult to see the appeal of binding the void, of shaping it as one's home or one's lover. The erotic pleasures of bondage and discipline—the pleasures of setting and reinforcing limits—paradoxically liberate Cleopatra, enabling her experience of self-loss. In his research on masochistic practices such as bondage and pain, Roy Baumeister suggests that “masochism may be a means of escaping from high-level awareness of self as a symbolically mediated, temporally extended identity.”¹⁰⁴ Bondage slows time and restricts even the vastness of “oblivion” within its confines. In effect, binding the void is what allows Cleopatra to *inhabit* it. From within its “bourn,” she can forget herself by

¹⁰³ Cleopatra's ability to make a place out of her oblivion reveals the erotic and generative potential of the void. Edward Casey notes, “even the utter void... retains the dynamic property of being a scene of emergence, a proscenium on which things can arise as taking place and having their own place” (Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 19-20). By recasting her oblivion as an Antony, Cleopatra takes up the poet's role of “giv[ing] to airy nothing / A local habitation and a name” (*A Midsummer Night's Dream* 5.1.15-17).

¹⁰⁴ Roy E. Baumeister, “Masochism as an Escape from Self,” *Journal of Sex Research* 25, no. 1 (1988): 28-59, 28.

“sleep[ing] out this great gap of time / My Antony is away” (1.5.5-6). To call Antony’s absence a “gap” is to settle it within boundaries, to postulate a starting and an ending point.

Of course, the play’s most extraordinary contained setting is the monument, its final scene of bounded loss for both Antony and Cleopatra. The monument’s sturdy walls (Plutarch describes “gates that were very thick and strong, and surely barred”),¹⁰⁵ along with its height and depth, figure this scene as the ultimate circumscribed void, a scene of both forgetting and remembering, a place for death and a space for poetic birth. Although theater historians debate the location and appearance of the monument (did Cleopatra appear in the gallery above the platform stage, or was a free-standing structure brought onto the stage?), it seems clear that its height and boundedness were among its prominent features.¹⁰⁶ One particularly rich dramaturgical source for this monument is the *locus* of the early modern stage (also known as the *domus* or *sedes*), which Robert Weimann describes as an enclosed, illusionistic playing space separated from the audience, often by a raised scaffold.¹⁰⁷ Unlike the generalized, undifferentiated *platea* which is level with the audience, the upstage *locus* is a delimited and identifiable place such as a home or palace. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, the monument is *locus*-like in its

¹⁰⁵ See Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch’s *The Life of Marcus Antonius* (1579), cited in Michael Neill’s edition of *Antony and Cleopatra* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 356. In Plutarch, the monument is depicted as a kind of fortress, where Cleopatra “locked the doors unto her, and shut all the springs of the locks with great bolts” (cited in Neill, 354).

¹⁰⁶ I am indebted to Theodore Leinwand for his research and for his summary of the monument’s staging history in “The Shakespearean Perverse,” forthcoming in *The Yale Review*.

¹⁰⁷ Weimann contends that actors in medieval and Renaissance drama made use of two playing spaces on the stage: the upstage *locus* and the downstage *platea*. Audiences in Elizabethan London would have been familiar with a divided playing space, which is traditionally defined by the specificity, or placiality, of stage locations. See *Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theater: Studies in the Social Dimension of Dramatic Form and Function*, ed. Robert Schwartz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). Scholars such as Michael Mooney and Erika Lin have revisited and reinterpreted Weimann’s argument in order to illuminate the actor-audience relationship in early modern English theater. See Michael Mooney, *Shakespeare’s Dramatic Transactions*, and Erika T. Lin, “Performance Practice and Theatrical Privilege: Rethinking Weimann’s Concepts of *Locus* and *Platea*,” *New Theater Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (2006): 283-98.

specificity, its distinctiveness, and of course, its placiality. Raised up high, the seat of a queen (*sedes*) and wife (*domus*), the monument provides the bourn Cleopatra desires and it offers Antony a “visible shape” (4.14.14) at last. For Cleopatra, the monument is more hospitable than death “on Nilus’ mud,” where she would lie “stark nak’d” while “water flies / Blow me into abhorring!” (5.2.58-60).¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the monument’s secure walls will save her from loathsome “sweet dependency” (5.2.26) on Caesar.¹⁰⁹ For Antony, the monument provides a refuge from the empty “abysm of hell” (3.13.147) that Stanley Cavell has described as the retreat of the world.¹¹⁰ When Cleopatra hoists Antony up to her, she provides him with a place in which to die, in which to bind the void.

Over the course of the play’s final scenes, the monument gains enormous psychic and representational force. Marriage bed and deathbed, throne (“put on my crown” [5.2.280]) and grave, fortress (“I am safe” [4.15.27]) and prison, the monument has multiple spatial, placial, and erotic meanings. It is where Cleopatra experiences “immortal longings” (5.2.281) and her ever-foolish wishes (4.15.38); it is built to withstand the relentless pressure of Roman temporality; and ultimately, it must become the “new heaven, new earth” (1.1.17) of which the lovers dream, and for which they die. But before Cleopatra reconceives of the monument as an intimate erotic place in which to “quicken” (4.15.40) her “husband” (5.2.287), she must first cope with its stubborn materiality, and with the way it initially keeps eros *out* rather than encloses it within.

Whatever was the size of the monument, Cleopatra’s language suggests that she takes solace from the fact that it binds and restricts her. Caesar may implore her to

¹⁰⁸ Cleopatra’s image of death and decay as a form of displacement recalls her vision of “graveless” (3.13.163-66) Egyptians from earlier in the play.

¹⁰⁹ Cleopatra’s description of the monument as a place of “desolation” (5.2.1) in which she is able to shut out “dependency” calls to mind the image of the “absolute microcosmos” from *Endymion*.

¹¹⁰ Cavell, *Disowning Knowledge*, 28.

“make not your thoughts your prisons” (5.2.186), but Cleopatra sees herself as a voluntary captive. Her sense of confinement is most evident when twice in two lines she says she “dare[s] not” (4.15.22 and 23) leave the monument’s compass to kiss Antony. But to take refuge in the monument’s cold embrace is also, masochistically, to defer eros. For Antony’s part, eros is not so much deferred as it is denied when he first approaches Cleopatra’s monument. If, as I have been suggesting, placiality is the primary source for eros in *Antony and Cleopatra*, and if the monument represents the play’s most contained and defined place, then Antony’s struggle to enter its bounds reflects his inability to access the erotics of bounded loss. Although there is little doubt that Antony has experienced a sense of loss when we see him in 4.15, this loss is felt as a displacement rather than a loss *within* a place, which can evoke pleasurable self-forgetting. His heart, once imagined as an erotic organ that Cleopatra could ride, now occasions his displacement. He imagines himself dying, not from a broken heart, but when his strong and intact heart is displaced from the container of his body: “O, cleave, my sides! / Heart, once be stronger than thy continent, / Crack thy frail case” (4.14.39-41). In 4.15, it is not his heart that is responsible for his displacement so much as it is his weight and the daunting height of the monument up to which he is heaved. The dimension of depth enables pleasurable self-loss, but initially, the monument’s verticality is what keeps Antony from reuniting with Cleopatra, and thus stands in the way of his pleasure.¹¹¹

The lovers’ struggle to overcome the monument’s height recasts Cleopatra’s fantasy of drawing Antony up with her “bended hook” (2.5.12) in an entirely different

¹¹¹ The domain of verticality now poses a specific and serious threat for Cleopatra, one that is utterly devoid of eros. Antony first alerts her to the possibility that Caesar will “hoist thee up to the shouting plebeians” (4.12.34), and she recurs to this image twice from within the monument: “Shall they hoist me up” (5.2.55); “Mechanic slaves... shall / Uplift us to the view” (5.2.210-12). The shame that Caesar plans to inflict on her will be experienced along the same vertical axis that once spelled pleasure.

register. Now, the best on offer is clumsily to hoist his bloodied, dying body up into her monument. This awkward, even comic, staging of Antony's suspended body bound in ropes and chains spectacularly travesties the play's earlier ecstatic images of sexual bondage. However we imagine the performance of the play's stage direction, "*They heave Antony aloft to Cleopatra*" (4.15.38), it is likely that some type of apparatus would have been necessary to bind Antony and then hoist his body up to Cleopatra's level.¹¹² Have the "silken tackle" from Enobarbus's account of Cleopatra's barge rematerialized at her monument, now less erotic and even more functional? Certainly his heart, now panting simply to keep him alive, is no longer a horse or chariot that she can mount. Theodore Leinwand writes that Antony's wounded body in 4.15 is utterly impassive, indifferent to meaning or any signification at all—"more lump than human, more brute than affect-laden."¹¹³ Oblivious to the monument's verticality and to its layers of meaning and significance, Antony's impassive body is more closely associated with horizontal breadth than with vertical depth. And at his death, Cleopatra imagines Antony along the same horizontal axis:

The crown o' th' earth doth *melt*...
O, *withered* is the garland of the war;

¹¹² The types of apparatus vary. Theodore Leinwand refers to David Garrick's production in which "Cleopatra, and her Women, throw out certain Tackle" (see Richard Madelaine, ed., *Antony and Cleopatra*, Shakespeare in Production [Cambridge University Press, 1998]). Other possibilities include chains, ropes, pulleys, and strips of fabric. North's translation of Plutarch's *The Life of Marcus Antonius* mentions "certain chains and ropes, in the which Antonius was trussed" (quoted in Leinwand, "The Shakespearean Perverse").

¹¹³ In "The Shakespearean Perverse," Theodore Leinwand also draws upon Gilles Deleuze's account of perverse structure to describe the superficiality of Antony's body in 4.15. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze defines perversion as "the autonomy of the surface, independent of, and against depth and height" (Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, [New York: Columbia University Press, 1990], 132). Deleuze conceptualizes different philosophical schools in terms of space: "As we ask, 'what is it to be oriented in thought?', it appears that thought itself presupposes axes and orientations according to which it develops, that it has a geography before having a history, and that it traces dimensions before constructing systems" (127). According to Deleuze, height (conversion) is the orientation of the Platonic philosophy of Ideals, depth (subversion) is correlated with the pre-Socratic philosophy of the cave, and surface (perversion) is associated with the Stoic philosophy of the event.

The soldier's pole is *fallen*. Young boys and girls
Are *level* now with men.

(4.15.64-67; emphasis mine)

This gives the lie to Cleopatra's fantasy of an erect and towering Antony who "stands... or walk[s]" (1.5.18-19) at her bidding. His collapse ratifies her rueful acknowledgment that "wishers were ever fools" (4.15.38).

Cleopatra's assertion in 5.2 that her "desolation does begin to make / A better life" (5.2.1-2) marks a shift in the monument's significance, particularly in its ability to host Cleopatra's final and ultimate experience of bounded loss. The monument's physical characteristics—its boundedness and specificity—enable Cleopatra to lose herself within the expansive scene she dreams for Antony. The association of the early modern *locus* with the *domus*, or domestic sphere, illuminates the monument's placial significance to the couple. Cleopatra offers herself as Antony's wife ("Husband, I come" [5.2.287]), making for him a home and marriage bed within the monument. "The invention of marriage," writes Cavell, "*is* the (is Cleopatra's, whoever that is) response to Antony's abandonment; it is a return of the world through the gift of herself, by becoming, presenting herself as, whatever constitutes the world."¹¹⁴ According to Cavell, Cleopatra produces her own theater in this act of emplacement: "the return of the world after its abandonment of Antony (the 'solution' to the skeptical state) has required the theatricalization of the world. It has to be *presented* to him."¹¹⁵ In order to present the world, Cleopatra must reframe its borders (make a new heaven and earth) and make a present of it as a bounded place, a discrete entity that can be given and received. And yet

¹¹⁴ Cavell, *Disowning Knowledge*, 28. Cavell argues that Antony's skeptical crisis is scenic in nature: "The recession of the world is this play's interpretation of what I have called the truth of skepticism, that the human habitation of the world is not assured in what philosophy calls knowledge" (25).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

there is something perversely selfish in Cleopatra's gift to Antony, since she ends the play without him, alone as the giver and the recipient of the world she dreams and presents for him. Placing Antony is another act of erotic self-indulgence, creating a scene in which she can pleurably lose herself.

This type of pleasurable bounded loss is most poignantly evident in Cleopatra's dream of Antony, an imagining that draws from the domains of both place and space. She begins with an image of Antony as container: inside the confines of his face "stuck / A sun and moon" (5.2.80-81). Rather than imagining a scene that contains him, like Enobarbus's earlier speech about her, Cleopatra remakes Antony himself as the cosmos—his body forms every placial boundary she envisions. As her integrating anti-blazon progresses, building him vertically from top to bottom, her images become more capacious.¹¹⁶ And yet each scene she creates in her dream is bound by his flesh, his limbs, his voice, even his "livery" (5.2.91). Antony's "legs bestrid[ing] the ocean" (5.2.83) call to mind Antony's earlier fantasy of Cleopatra straddling his panting heart. Here his legs form an oversized (and, again, eroticized) frame, binding the vast scene of the ocean. Antony's enormous limbs seem to defy gravity; the indifferent mass of flesh she struggled to lift is transubstantiated. The immensity of Antony's body compels Cleopatra to broaden her ever-widening imaginative scope, and yet it also acts as a limit—each time his limbs stretch outward, they punctuate and cap the scene she dreams for him ("his reared arm / *Crested* the world" [5.2.83-84; emphasis mine]).¹¹⁷ The

¹¹⁶ Lisa Starks writes of Cleopatra's anti-blazon, "the degeneration of Antony is followed by his regeneration as a Colossus through Cleopatra's poetic imagination, making the severed flesh whole again through the word" (Starks, "Immortal Longings," 249). This image of a woman rebuilding a man piece by piece stands in stark contrast to the figure of *Anatomia* who threatened Endymion in his dream. It also recalls Isis's reassembly of Osiris.

¹¹⁷ John-Paul Sartre writes of the lover: "I must be the one whose function is to make trees and water exist, to make cities and fields and other men exist, in order to give them to the Other who arranges them into a

pleasures she takes from placing Antony are doubled because her imagination binds an Antony who, in turn, binds the world. As Cleopatra reinvests Antony's body with erotic and affective significance piece by piece, she finally arrives at Antony's "delights," which "[w]ere dolphinlike, they showed his back / Above the element they lived in" (5.2.89-91). "Above" his "element" and "past the size of dreaming" (5.2.98), Antony at last belies her lament that "wishers were ever fools" (4.15.38), and reveals the capacity of Cleopatra's imagination to bind and place even the most colossal of men.

Cleopatra's dream ushers in a final scene of bounded loss in the play—her suicide by the asp, a death she envisions as "a lover's pinch, / Which hurts, and is desired" (5.2.295-96). To imagine "the stroke of death" as a "lover's pinch" (5.2.295) is, once again, to conceptualize suicide shaped by a masochistic erotics of bondage. Early in this final scene, Cleopatra imagines her death in the monument as a placial limit, a "thing that ends all other deeds, / Which shackles accidents and bolts up change" (5.2.5-6). Her conceptualization of death draws from the monument's physical features—its boundedness and rigidity—which she ultimately takes on herself: "My resolution's *placed*... I am *marble-constant*" (5.2.239 and 241; emphasis mine). The domain of bondage structures the words and images we are left with during Cleopatra's final moments of the play—she invokes the bonds of marriage ("Husband"), of orgasmic reunion ("I come") and even of maternity ("see my baby at my breast, / That sucks the nurse asleep").¹¹⁸ Within this context, the visual spectacle of asps slithering on her body

world... In one sense if I am to be loved, I am the object through whose procuration the world will exist for the Other; in another sense I am the world, I am the ground-as-object on which the world detaches itself. Thus I am reassured" (John-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes [New York: Citadel Press, 1969], 369).

¹¹⁸ There is some debate about when the word "come" was first used to connote sexual orgasm; the *OED* places its explicitly sexual definition several decades after Shakespeare's death. Entry seventeen, which defines "come" as "to experience sexual orgasm," gives 1650 for the first usage in this context. (See

recalls either her barge's "silken tackle" or her own "strong toil of grace." Cleopatra's language suggests that death's firm "pinch" and painful sting can lead to pleasurable self-loss. She implores the asp to "[b]e angry" (5.2.306), but the pain of its "sharp teeth" (5.2.304) gives way to the soothing mildness of self-loss, "as sweet as balm, as soft as air, as gentle—" (5.2.312). Only after Cleopatra's place-affirming dream of Antony from within the monument's bourn, and only with her destination in the afterlife resolutely fixed ("Methinks I hear / Antony call" [5.2.284]), does Cleopatra imagine her life unraveling, the bonds loosening at last, imploring the asp "this knot intricate / Of life at once untie" (5.2.304-5).

Does Cleopatra "return" the world to Antony, as Cavell suggests, or does she create a "new heaven, new earth" (1.1.17) for them to dwell in? What world could they inhabit if he keeps growing "by reaping" (5.2.89)? The erotics of the scene she imagines derive from the scene she occupies in 5.2—the monument's boundedness, much like Antony's place-affirming battle with Caesar in 4.8, inspires Cleopatra's erotic dissolution and self-loss at the end of the play. The generative properties of the monument recall Giordano Bruno's account of infinite space, which is endless because it is always potentially filled.¹¹⁹ Bruno, along with Nicholas of Cusa and others, wrestled with the powerful and puzzling claim that the universe has its center "everywhere" (*ubique*) and

"come, v.," *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, 17 June 2012 <<http://dictionary.oed.com/view/Entry/36824?>>.) I follow Stanley Cavell's reading of Cleopatra's line as her "presentation of orgasm" (*Disowning Knowledge*, 31). Aside from Cleopatra's suggestive use of the word, there is some evidence of its sexual connotations elsewhere in Shakespeare's plays. Gordon Williams lists "come" as a slang term for "experience orgasm" in his glossary of Shakespeare's sexual language, citing a bawdy use of the term in *Much Ado About Nothing*. Upon Margaret's suggestion to "call Beatrice to you, who I think hath legs," Benedick replies, "And therefore will come" (5.2.23-25). See Gordon Williams, *Shakespeare's Sexual Language: A Glossary* (London: Continuum, 2006), 75.

¹¹⁹ In Casey's analysis of creation myths across cultures (e.g., Judeo-Christian, ancient Greek, tribal), he notes that the void is often conceptualized as a scene of potentiality or "emergence" (Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 20; Cf. footnote 103).

its circumference “nowhere” (*nullibi*).¹²⁰ Bruno expands on this claim by flipping the two terms, considering the possibility both “that the centre of the universe is everywhere and the circumference is nowhere” and “that the circumference is everywhere, but the center is nowhere.”¹²¹ He imagines a universe in which we are always on the edge of things, creating new centers of perspectival viewing from each new position we inhabit on the periphery. Center and circumference collide, according to Casey: “the freedom of reaching out from successive centers is thereby counterpoised with the inhibition of being hemmed in by a series of circumferences.”¹²² Every time we stretch out, we extend the circumference to accommodate our reach, a process that is infinitely repeatable and thereby leads to a conceptualization of infinite space.

Bruno’s notion of space pertains to Antony and Cleopatra’s experiences of bounded loss because although it is infinite and endless, it still has “circumference... everywhere.” Like Cleopatra’s dream of Antony, Bruno’s cosmic vision is infinite without being vacuous.¹²³ The erotics of circumference are best captured in Cleopatra’s expansive image of Antony’s “delights” as “dolphinlike” (5.2.89 and 90). She dreams of an Antony whose pleasures extend beyond the reach of his scene—“above the element he

¹²⁰ This complex and famous assertion (as Theodore Leinwand has reminded me, cf. Hamlet’s placing of another absent presence, the Ghost: “*hic et ubique*”—1.5.159) has been put to various uses, including as a cornerstone for a kind of early modern phenomenology: if there is no stable center of the universe (such as the earth or the sun), then everywhere is a possible center, depending on the perspective from which the universe is being perceived. This idea led Nicholas of Cusa to establish a relativistic approach to cosmology (“the perception of the universe is relative to the place of the observer” [Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 117]). For a play such as *Antony and Cleopatra*, which features a torrent of perspectival shifts during the first four acts, the idea of a constantly shifting center is particularly relevant. Janet Adelman has suggested that the “movement of perspectives, rather than the revelations of a psychodrama or the certainties of a morality... is most characteristic of *Antony and Cleopatra*” (Adelman, *The Common Liar*, 30).

¹²¹ See Giordano Bruno, *Cause, Principle, and Unity*, 89.

¹²² Casey, *The Fate of Place*, 123.

¹²³ “Infinite space,” Bruno writes, “is endowed with infinite quality” (quoted in Casey, 121). The “infinite quality” of Bruno’s space stands in opposition to the emptiness that leaves Antony “unqualified with very shame” (3.11.44). See Giordano Bruno, *On the Infinite Universe and Worlds* (1584) in *Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought*, trans. D.W. Singer (New York: Greenwood, 1958), 225-380, 258.

lived in”—but who contains his own limit, creating a new placial boundary out of his capacity for erotic pleasure. The very image of Antony’s dolphinlike back emerging from the water, its curvature and upward reach, calls to mind Bruno’s sprawling but steady circumference. That Cleopatra summons this image to describe Antony’s capacity for *sexual pleasure* in particular reveals the play’s investment in the erotics of binding, even (and perhaps most importantly) in Cleopatra’s famously immense dream. Binding and then presenting the immensity of infinite space—to Antony, to herself, and to us—is what makes it erotic.

Chapter 3

“Love’s use” Agency and Purpose of Erotic Desire

I. Subject, Object, Instrument

Near the start of Act 2 of John Lyly’s *Campaspe*, Diogenes tells his servant “*non egeo tui vel te*” (2.1.44). Preserving the Latin grammar, his line translates as “I have no need of you, nor do I need you.” Diogenes’ grammar joke derives from William Lilly’s *Grammar*, where it models verbs that can take objects in both the genitive and the accusative cases.¹ The subject (“I”) and the object (“you”) are grammatically linked in a part-to-whole relationship, and yet they are also marked as two separate entities. Diogenes’ *egere* (“to need”) belongs to a special class of Latin verbs of “filling” or “lacking.” When *egere* takes an object in the genitive case, it indicates incompleteness or a missing part. Thus Diogenes’ haughty attempt to declare his independence from his servant loses some of its steam.

John Lyly’s more profound grammar lesson about love in *Campaspe* raises the question, what is the relationship between the subject and the object of need? Is the object separate from the subject, or, by virtue of a felt need, is the subject part of the object? Need, or desire, challenges our intactness, our separateness from the outside world, because there is something “out there” that we want to take into ourselves. That Latin verbs of needing and wanting take objects in the genitive case is a testament to

¹ Most Latin verbs take an object in the accusative case, whereas the genitive case is typically used to pair nouns together in a possessive relationship, often translated into English by using the preposition “of.” Most likely, the sentence invokes the partitive use of the genitive case, in which the genitive marks a part-to-whole relationship (e.g., *pars civitatis*, “part of the state”). For other instances of this type of genitive, see Bridgette L.M. Bauer, “The definite article in Indo-European: Emergence of a new grammatical category?” in *Nominal Determination: Typology, Context, Constraints, and Historical Emergence*, ed. Elizabeth Stark et al. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2007), 103-40.

these objects' power over subjects; in Diogenes' locution, "I have no need of you" is contradicted by its own grammar, which reveals that "you" possess "me."² The part-to-whole relationship that grammatically marks the object implies an intrinsic interdependence. The object of need can be part of the self *and* part of the world. At the same time that the accusative indicates a clear break between subject and object, the genitive highlights their shared *genus* ("I" am "of you"). Even at the most basic level of grammar, then, need undermines the separateness and integrity of the desiring subject and desired object. In an erotic relation, this means that space opens up for a third term, which often proves to be a mediating noun—a filter, a buffer, or an instrument—between ourselves and our beloveds.

Kenneth Burke comments on this instrument in his section on Agency in *A Grammar of Motives*. He cites an anecdote from Victor Lenzen's *Procedures of Empirical Science* to illustrate the fluid relationship of subject, object, and instrument:

If one taps an object with a stick held firmly in the hand, "the stick is an apparatus that may be viewed as part of the observer." (Note the term "part of," which here gives us merger.) But if the stick is held loosely, the stick itself becomes the perceived object, "and the partition is between stick and hand." (The stick here is "apart from" the observer.)³

When I hold it tightly, the stick is a part of my body; it serves as a prosthesis, an instrument that enables my engagement with objects in the world. When I hold it loosely, the stick is a part of that outside world. A slack grip allows me to *feel* its apartness from my body: I sense it *in* my hand, its temperature, its weight, and its firmness. But the moment I tighten my grip in order to do something with the stick (i.e., to use it on an object, to push aside a curtain, to nudge a horse), it becomes a part of me

² G.K. Hunter's gloss provides the following translation of Diogenes' line: "... I don't need you or [*by another construction*] you" (Hunter, 75).

³ Burke, *GM*, 415.

again. A slight difference in my grip radically changes the stick's ontology. The capacity of the instrument to shift back and forth, and my own power to bring about that shift by subtly changing my deportment, confirm the instrument's instability and mutability.

Between subject and object, then, Burke places an instrument, the *means* by which we affect, or engage with, the world. What does Burke's example tell us about the role of an instrument in an erotic subject/object relation? We might imagine an erotic instrument to be merely the means by which a desiring subject pursues a beloved object, such as an instrument of seduction or courtship (say, flowers or gifts). Considered in this narrow way, the instrument is categorically distinct from the subject and the object. It is incidental to the experience of desire because of its separateness, and because it is a means of *pursuit* rather than part and parcel of desiring itself. Gifts or flowers are deployed as a way of obtaining a beloved, not a means of desiring her. Burke's anecdote, by contrast, emphasizes the instrument's categorical connection, its potential fusion, with the desiring subject who deploys it. The prosthetic stick in Burke's example functions as an intimate part of the desiring subject; in an erotic relationship, it closes the gap that separates would-be lovers and can itself be said to be responsible for their relation, their relatedness. Such an erotic instrument might take the form of a shared language (verbal, gestural, physical), a shared set of rituals (lovemaking, bondage or submission), or a shared imaginary (mutual fantasies, beliefs or even lies). Such instruments are not left behind; rather, absorbed into the relationship, they enable it. They become a medium both shared by and coextensive with the desiring subject and object. Instrumentality,

then, becomes the very *way* we access and express not only our own erotic capacities but those of our lovers.

The erotic relation adds a layer of complexity to Burke's instrument, because unlike the example of a stick opening a curtain, the object of erotic desire is no mere inanimate thing—our desires are directed at other desiring subjects. A vital part of a dynamic relation, an erotic instrument necessarily partakes of its vitality. To consider instrumentality, then, is to consider the ways in which desire itself is a creative act—we *make* desire just as we say we make love. Take for example the erotic instrument of a shared fantasy: anything but a static object, it is what lovers craft, reshape, and refine as their very means of desiring. Such fantasies both create desire and prove themselves to be the evolving creative products of desire. As is the case with a shared language, a mutual fantasy *makes* the lovers just as it is made by them: "Therefore I lie with her and she with me / And in our faults by lies we flattered be" (Shakespeare, Sonnet 138.13-14).

In this chapter, I explore the role of the erotic instrument as a medium of mutual creation and love-making. Although instruments are first used to initiate erotic relations, thereafter they are absorbed into those relations. They exercise a creative power over the lovers who find themselves transformed by this dynamic process. When they undergo or enact such processes, Lyly's and Shakespeare's characters release a capacity inside themselves and one another that amounts to a virtuosity, a sense of divinity, even. My account of the erotics of making stands in opposition to traditional accounts of the sonneteer or artist who narcissistically falls in love with his own creative work. I reveal a surprisingly anti-narcissistic process that constantly reminds us that to need, *egere*, is to make ourselves "a part of," *tui*, a process that reminds us that we cannot, and do not, go it

alone. The other gives herself (I refer to the beloved as “her” with Lyly’s characters in mind) to the creator’s brush, pen, voice, or imagination and, as would a muse, she releases the artistic skill that is within him. Whereas Chapter One was built on Burke’s term Act, and Chapter Two on his Scene-Agent Ratio, this chapter’s analysis of erotic desire is guided by his terms Agency (how do we desire?) and Purpose (why do we desire?). For a character like Lyly’s Apelles, the means and the ends are conjoined—the instrument is *a part* of the object. Apelles falls in love not quite with himself as he has known himself but with that newly discovered part of himself which is enabled by, inflamed by, even *created by* the act of erotic desiring.

This chapter considers the erotic instruments in Lyly’s *Campaspe* and Shakespeare’s *Taming of the Shrew*. In both plays, the process of erotic creation begins when lovers activate a dormant artistic capacity in one other. The process of painting instrumentalizes Apelles’ erotic relation with Campaspe, and the process of storytelling (making fiction, twisting language, telling lies) instrumentalizes Petruchio’s erotic interactions with Kate. Campaspe and Kate are shaped by these creative processes, but they become co-creators as well: Campaspe as a model who willingly submits to the artistic process and Kate as an interlocutor whose words verify the pair’s mutual lies. As long as the lovers continue to create together, their erotic relationships flourish, exceeding the sum of their parts. Painting and storytelling—the instruments that they employ—are absorbed into their relationships, shaping their interactions according to particular artistic features (pigment and canvas, verb tense and mood), more generally, by defining eros as a dynamic and creative process. In time, however, a finished product—a completed portrait or a fully realized story now untethered to the lovers’ imaginations—

emerges. No longer their intimate instruments, no longer *a part of* their shared imaginary, these finished products become objects in their own right, objects defined first and foremost by their *apartness*, their remove from the lovers and from the processes of creation. Once Alexander, as patron and king, acquires Campaspe's portrait, and once Kate and Petruchio's fictional language is turned into propaganda for marital propriety, the "supernal effects" (*Campaspe* 1.3.32) of erotic creation dull and diminish. The best the lovers can do is try to defer this melancholic outcome—Apelles will add blemishes to Campaspe's portrait in order to prolong the artistic process; Kate and Petruchio will enlist their fictions to beguile time by denying or suspending the present tense and indicative mood. The effort and energy given over to the dilation of the creative process testify to its transformative power over the lovers, to its ability to awaken and elevate their creative capacities, and so to the significance of instrumentality to erotic relations.

II. The Means and Ends of Erotic Desire in Lyly's *Campaspe*

Like many of Lyly's plays, *Campaspe* is at once replete with eroticism and devoid of physical consummation. Apelles and Campaspe fall in love almost instantly, and yet they spend their scenes with a paintbrush and canvas lodged firmly between them, not to mention all of the words that fill the gaps that remain. What is Lyly showing us about the nature of erotic experience (Apelles' and Campaspe's in particular) on a divided stage such as this? To begin, he dramatizes what we already know: that erotic experience comprises much more than just physical contact or sexual intercourse. Lyly confirms this by scrutinizing the roles that instruments—easel and canvas, pigments and words—play in Apelles' and Campaspe's erotic relation. While anything that stands between two

lovers may be an obstacle to the fulfillment of their erotic desire, it may also prove an instrument of desire. An object placed between two bodies in some kind of dynamic relation invariably increases the friction between them. It creates drag—it obstructs—but it also generates heat, a potential source of erotic pleasure. As Lyly demonstrates, such friction is felt within imaginative, linguistic, and conceptual realms, not just in the physical world. A goodly portion of the play consists of Apelles and Campaspe employing artistic and linguistic media that both bring them into relation and keep them apart. The portrait of Campaspe that Apelles paints is more than the sign of their erotic relationship, it is its medium. That which stands between them provides the means by which they love one another, by which they reorder their own world and the world outside them, imbuing both with the creativity, richness, and nuance that characterize Lyly's own art no less than Apelles'.

The opening scene between Apelles and Campaspe occurs in and around the painter's workshop, a setting that visually binds their dialogue together with the act of artistic creation.⁴ It is perhaps this backdrop that prompts the lovers to recognize each other's creative capacities almost instantly. As early as their first exchange, Apelles and Campaspe acknowledge their individual artistic talents and ambitions, but perhaps more importantly, their first few lines together establish the artful medium that will distinguish all of their dialogues. Theirs is a language of ambiguity and nuance that subtly grafts the lovers' artistic sensibilities onto their erotic relationship.⁵ In their dialogue, they reveal that each is wise to the other's artistry; each is attentive to the instruments, or in

⁴ Hunter notes that in 3.1, the couple's first scene together, "there is some likelihood that the *Entry* involves a *Discovery*. The opening dialogue suggests that we first see Apelles actually engaged in painting Campaspe" (*Campaspe*, 86).

⁵ The linguistic component of this type of erotic relation is the subject of Section III of this chapter, which focuses on Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew*.

Campaspe's words, the "device[s]" (3.1.16), that the other employs.⁶ In this scene of flirtation, their language is highly crafted and stylized in its form, equivocal and sprawling in its meaning, careful and measured in its delivery. Indeed, Apelles and Campaspe *talk art* even as they talk artfully—their flirtation consists of talk about each other's artfulness. In a few short lines, Campaspe and Apelles establish art as their erotic medium. Together they arrive at and deploy a metaphor—"Desiring is Creating"—which will enable their erotic relationship throughout the play.

Apelles begins by confessing his doubt that there could possibly "be any colour so fresh that may shadow a countenance so fair" (3.1.1-2). This sounds like the familiar conceit about "fair[ness]" that exceeds the capacities of pigment, brush, and canvas. Still, there is something odd about "fresh," the adjective that Apelles chooses to describe the quality that his paint lacks. What is a "fresh" color, or "fresh" paint? Is it new, or is it vigorous and lively (as the *OED* would have it)?⁷ Apparently it is Campaspe's *aliveness*, not only her beauty, which Apelles sets out to capture. He is in the line of Zeuxis (to whom Apelles' servant alludes), who could paint such lifelike grapes that "birds... have been fatted by [them] in winter" (1.2.67-68). Of course, Campaspe is not a painted grape. And Apelles' interest in his subject's "fresh[ness]" is no less erotic than it is artistic. His opening lines make the tight connection between art and eros that characterize his subsequent interactions with the lady. Apelles' painting also differs from

⁶ The word "device" itself incorporates the ideas of desire and instrumentality. According to the *OED*, its complex etymology results from the mingling of two Old French and Middle English words, *devis* and *devise*. Entry 3a defines "device" as "will, pleasure, inclination, fancy, desire." See "device, *n.*," *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2012 <<http://dictionary.oed.com/view/Entry/51464>>.

⁷ See "fresh, *adj. I*" (esp. entry 10) in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2011 <<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/74535>>. Apelles will later compare Campaspe with Venus and note that the lady's countenance is "somewhat fresher" (3.5.47) than that of the goddess.

Zeuxis' in terms of the type of artistic skill it requires. Where Zeuxis strives to make something artful out of something relatively plain—a mere grape—Apelles' task is to bring out the “fresh” quality that already resides within Campaspe. He illuminates his subject in paint, suffusing her with a vital glow that captures the luminosity that radiates from within her. His talent and his desire later “maketh [her] ears to glow with thoughts” (4.2.4). According to E. H. Gombrich, the historical Apelles was famous for the luminosity of his paintings, and for using a thin line of white paint to create the three-dimensional effect whereby an object appears to glow and protrude outwards.⁸ This technique, which Gombrich calls “the line of Apelles,” enables Apelles both to honor his subject's form and to enhance it with an extraordinary luster.

If Apelles elevates his model, making her into art by prizing her “fresh[ness]” above his own artistic capacities, Campaspe reciprocates by diminishing herself. She responds to Apelles' opening lines by referring to her own features as ill formed: “a hard favour, which maketh you to despair of my face” (3.1.6-7). In order to be remade by Apelles, Campaspe fashions herself as “hard” and unattractive (later she worries that her “disordered countenance” will result in a “deformed counterfeit” [3.4.71-72]) so that Apelles can build her back up and elevate her through the artistic process. Such self-fashioning is an artistic talent in its own right. Although Campaspe herself is not a painter, she adopts an active role in the creative process as Apelles' model. Wendy Steiner's recent study of the model's role in the artistic process characterizes “her”

⁸ See E.H. Gombrich, *The Heritage of Apelles: Studies in the art of the Renaissance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 4-15. Gombrich cites an anecdote from Pliny's *Natural History* in which Apelles competes with the famous painter Protogenes, each drawing a thinner line than the other on a panel. Gombrich interprets their competition as a parable of the invention of three-dimensional luster in classical art: “Apelles returning would have bisected [Protogenes' line] by an even thinner line that suggested gleam or splendour, and to this nothing could be added now without spoiling the appearance of the line, which would have begun to stand out from the panel as if by magic” (15).

creative power as a particular type of virtuosity: “The model, in short, can play every role in aesthetic communication. She is a polyfunctional virtuoso.”⁹ What roles are available to Campaspe as she sits for Apelles’ portrait? As a participant in the artistic experience, Campaspe interprets the artwork and the significance of the creative process itself. As the sitter for the portrait, she contributes artful, stylized, and subtle poses, and thus takes on the role of co-author of the work. By degrading her own physical features, Campaspe makes it possible for Apelles to reshape and illuminate her in paint. She artfully diminishes herself and he augments her with his art—they reciprocally if asymmetrically contribute to a shared process of artistic creation.¹⁰

Even before Campaspe exposes her virtuosity at what we might call self-deprecation, she reveals another skill that distinguishes her role in the artistic and erotic process: she interprets the lovers’ interactions by employing a language that bridges art and eros. While Apelles is busy crafting her portrait, Campaspe is deftly crafting the “Desiring is Artistic Creation” metaphor that will ignite and sustain their erotic experience together. She begins quite simply and subtly by using a parallel and euphuistic structure to compare Apelles’ painting and his flirting: “Sir, I had thought you had been commanded to paint with your hand, not to gloze with your tongue” (3.1.3-4). To paint and to “gloze” are both artful techniques, but Campaspe uses the former verb to

⁹ See Wendy Steiner, *The Real Real Thing: The Model in the Mirror of Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 27.

¹⁰ Lakoff and Johnson identify the metaphor, “Love is a Collaborative Work of Art,” as a “particularly forceful” example of metaphors that are creative and imaginative (rather than conventional), and thus “are capable of giving us a new understanding of our experience” (*Metaphors We Live By*, 139). As with all metaphors, “Love is a Collaborative Work of Art” highlights certain aspects of erotic experience while obscuring others. According to Lakoff and Johnson, this metaphor is unique because “the active side of love is brought into the foreground through the notion of work... This requires the masking of certain aspects of love that are viewed passively. In fact, the emotional aspects of love are almost never viewed as being under the lovers’ active control in our conventional conceptual system” (141). For a complete list of this metaphor’s entailments, see Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 140.

describe portrait making and the latter to describe seduction. Placing these techniques side-by-side bridges the gap between them, drawing attention to their shared connotations (one can “gloze” with a paintbrush, too), grafting the features of art-making onto their experience of love-making.¹¹ Such a metaphor recasts desire as something *made* rather than something felt, something that depends upon each lover’s skill. Hence they fall in love with each other’s virtuosity. It is Apelles’ “device” of flattery that Campaspe finds seductive. Her metaphor also activates an erotic relation that privileges ornament over plainness, and complexity over artlessness, indicating her tacit recognition that the first technique in each of these antitheses stands the best chance of producing the friction responsible for erotic pleasure.

Campaspe exposes Apelles’ artfulness, but she employs similar techniques of her own, and he is quick to detect them. According to Apelles, Campaspe’s lament about her “hard favour” is a display of her skill at diminishing herself even though she “know[s] her] own perfection” (3.1.10). He identifies her technique as an affected modesty in which “you seem to dispraise that which most men commend” (3.1.10-11). Apelles’ art of “gloz[ing]” and Campaspe’s art of “seem[ing]” are their highly self-conscious instruments of love-making. He identifies the seductive quality of her art: its affected modesty “draw[s men] by that mean into an admiration, where feeding themselves, they fall into an ecstasy” (3.1.11-13). Connecting her art to eros (acknowledging its erotic power), Apelles merely reinforces the relationship Campaspe has already established

¹¹ “Gloze/gloss” also refers to the artistic activity of adding glaze or sheen. See “gloss, v.2” in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2012 <<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/79133?>>. Campaspe deploys a similar technique when she admonishes Apelles in the following scene: “If you begin to tip your tongue with cunning, I pray dip your pencil in colours” (3.5.53-54). Here, the parallel arrangement of her euphuistic line binds Apelles’ artistic instruments (his pencil dipped in colours) together with his erotic instruments (his tongue tipped in cunning).

between artistic and erotic creation. Apelles' recognition of her artistry should inoculate him; that is, it should set him apart from the men who fall into "admiration" and "ecstasy" in response to Campaspe's affected modesty. But Apelles still falls in love with her. Or he falls in love with her artfulness, with the *seeming* in her seeming modesty, the process of her artistry rather than its product.¹²

In the remainder of their opening dialogue, the couple plays on various meanings of the word "colour"—whether hue, paint, blushing, artifice, rhetoric, or complexion—culminating with Campaspe's teasing assertion that Apelles is "so long used to colours you can do nothing but colour" (3.1.16-17). This claim patently reinforces the connection between art and eros that has been steadily building to this point. Apelles' "colours" are of course his paints, but now Campaspe insinuates that his art of "colour[ing]" is a seductive "device" which she can "withstand" (16). And yet, she falls in love with him. Like Apelles, her ability to detect artfulness allows her to withstand its effects even as she falls in love with the virtuosity that inspires them. The lovers' instrumentality is itself a chief source of eros; moreover, their erotic relation requires the *exposure* of this instrumentality. Instrumentality becomes erotic when its "how" is laid bare; seeing each other's devices or instruments reminds the lovers that they are engaged in an evolving process. The counter-intuitive goal of such exposure is not to disarm one's lover, nor to strip her of her devices, but rather to batten on those devices. He lies with her and she with him. Such is their love-making.

At the same time that Apelles and Campaspe collaborate on her portrait, they craft a language that transforms artistic into erotic gestures, gestures that have the power to

¹² By contrast, Alexander is quite taken with what he perceives to be Campaspe's "curst yielding modesty" (3.4.142), which suggests that the king resembles the other men to whom Apelles refers in this dialogue.

transform the lovers themselves. Often it is Campaspe who initiates this process, such as when she taps into a shared language according to which “colours” can mean painting, talking, and still more than this. Apelles’ response to the lady’s play on “colour” adds yet another layer of meaning: “Indeed the colours I see, I fear will alter the colour I have” (18-19). Using the same word to describe the object (“the colours I see” in Campaspe’s complexion), the instrument (“any colour so fresh,” i.e., paint), and now himself as the subject, confirms the overlap among subject, object, and instrument of desire. Artistic process transforms the lady from mere “earthly mettle” (2.2.81) to paint, and it can also “alter” the painter’s own “colour.” But what sort of alteration does Apelles imagine here? Hunter writes that the line can be read as a premonition that Apelles will turn pale or blush, but blushing is more apt since Apelles uses the verb “alter” rather than “lose.”¹³ Apelles fears that his own flesh is susceptible to change; if it reddens with desire—if, that is, Campaspe’s beauty stirs his blood so that it rises to the surface—his flesh, like Campaspe’s, will be made legible, acquiring its own “fresh[ness]” through the artistic process. Through the inter-animating experiences of painting and desiring, Apelles and Campaspe remake themselves.

Apelles’ excellence in the erotic relation is to illuminate and elevate the potential of Campaspe’s artistry. For her part, Campaspe’s self-deprecating postures paradoxically augment her artistry as their erotic interaction progresses. With each detail Apelles adds to the portrait, Campaspe becomes more adept at refining their metaphor: he saturates the portrait with “colours” and she saturates their words, gestures, ideas, and images with erotic meaning. In this way, she is truly being *made*—not only as an erotic object, but

¹³ Hunter favors pallor over blushing in his gloss of Apelles’ line: “The beautiful colour of your complexion will, I fear, so affect me that I will turn pale (or blush)” (*Campaspe*, 87).

also an erotic subject—with each stroke of Apelles’ brush, shaped in the same way he sketches the contours of her face and form.¹⁴ Hence it is not only Campaspe’s language but also her role in their erotic relationship that becomes more artful, rich, and stylized. In her later scenes with Apelles, Campaspe taps into the full measure of her “polyfunctional virtuos[ity]” as a model, subtly shifting her postures from receptive to interpretive, from creative to responsive. Such postures carry more than artistic significance—each reveals Campaspe adopting new erotic attitudes that broaden and elevate her experience of desire.

This breadth is evident in their second scene together, when Apelles and Campaspe explore new ways to fashion themselves as artists and artificers. Campaspe’s opening line reflects her responsive role as the model in their creative collaboration. She tends not to initiate conversation but to respond to what Apelles says, and she directs her erotic responses into portrait making, collapsing artistic process into erotic posturing:

Apelles. I shall never draw your eyes well, because they blind mine.
Campaspe. Why then, paint me without eyes, for I am blind. (3.3.1-2)

Campaspe’s eyes have blinded Apelles; but what is the source of her purported blindness? Hunter remarks that “It is not clear what Campaspe means by this.”¹⁵ She apparently absorbs and reflects his sensory experience in her own body, which now functions as a portrait of *Apelles*, or at least, of Apelles’ erotic experience, registered here as blindness. Again the roles of subject, object, and instrument are conflated in their erotic relation, and again, Campaspe directs Apelles to capture this relation on the canvas

¹⁴ When Alexander asks Apelles, “Where do you first begin, when you draw any picture?” (3.4.81-82), Apelles replies that he starts with the outer contours (“the proportion of the face, in just compass” [83]) and adds subtle details and adornments only after establishing this initial shape.

¹⁵ “It is not clear what Campaspe means by this, unless it is ‘I too am blinded by love’; but such a remark would seem insufficiently modest for Campaspe. David Bevington suggests an oblique reference to the traditional blindness of Cupid” (*Campaspe*, 91).

when she implores him to “paint me without eyes.” Campaspe’s virtuosity as a model has been to convert self-deprecation into art. Now she turns an even more destructive force—mutual- and self-blinding—into an aspect of creation.¹⁶

In the rest of this scene, Campaspe assumes the role of aesthetic and erotic interpreter, reflecting Apelles’ art back to him as she does in their opening exchange, and continuing to develop the relationship between art and eros that the lovers have initiated together. Campaspe’s power to make art by interpretation is not hers alone; the theater audience shares in this erotic and creative potential as interpreters of Lyly’s play. The play’s prologue invites the audience to use their imaginations to co-create the visual experience of *Campaspe*: “Whatsoever we present we wish it may be thought the dancing of Agrippa his shadows, who in the moment they were seen were of any shape one could conceive” (The Prologue at the Court 13-15). Chloe Porter has recently identified similarities between the “discourses of making” in the prologues in *Campaspe* and in Shakespeare’s *Henry V*. Of *Campaspe*’s prologue, Porter writes, “the royal audience is encouraged to engage with the play as a representation of unfixed meaning which may be reshaped according to individual spectator perspective.”¹⁷ In a play that dramatizes the erotics of creating art from the multiple perspectives of the painter, the model, and the

¹⁶ Campaspe later confesses her desire to be diminished even further, to be rendered invisible in paint: “would you could so now shadow me that I might not be perceived of any” (3.3.5-6).

¹⁷ Chloe Porter, “Idolatry, Iconoclasm, and Visual Experience in Works by Shakespeare and Lyly,” *Literature and History* 18, no. 1 (2009): 1-15, 2. Porter is primarily interested in the agency that Lyly ascribes to his audience within the context of post-Reformation visual culture: “Lyly’s treatment of visual experience seems to fit perfectly into a context in which a suspicion of images combines with a state-endorsed worship of royal imagery and an interest in individual constructive engagements with visual items” (7). Although Porter’s focus is on the subversive and iconoclastic effects of the audience’s engagement in the creation of visual experience, her observations also speak to their erotic potential. The theater audience takes on a role similar to that of Campaspe—along with her, they are invited to interpret (or, to invoke the visual metaphor, they are invited *to see*) the lovers’ artistic process as a means of making love.

interpreter, the theater audience is presented with a unique opportunity to participate in the lovers' collaborative process, sharing in the erotics of making throughout the play.

Campaspe's role as interpreter and critic becomes more pronounced as Apelles points out classical scenes depicted in portraits in his studio, nearly all of which feature Jupiter ravishing an unsuspecting woman (Leda, Alcmena, Danaë, Europa), and Campaspe sustains the couple's reciprocal mode of speech. Their dialogue follows the call and response pattern of their slant rhyme couplet about blindness; however now, each time that Apelles introduces an erotic episode from a painting, Campaspe proffers commentary. Rather than address the quality of the artwork, Campaspe consistently refers to the episode of ravishment itself, moralizing on the impropriety of the gods. Once again, they instrumentalize art in the service of seduction; the paintings become Campaspe's means of flirtation. Nor does it escape our notice that, as was the case with Apelles in the previous scene, so here it is Jupiter who changes shape. The artificer who ravishes is himself ravished, palpably "alter[ed]" by erotic desire.

Of course, whereas Jupiter hides his artifice from the objects of his desire, Apelles and Campaspe display their artifice to one another. They even anatomize it. Campaspe queries the broader implications of each scene, asking Apelles if "all gods [were] like Jupiter" (3.3.24), and wondering about love and lust as they pertain to "men on earth" (3.3.26). Then they not quite chiastically generalize about falsity:

Campaspe: Were women never so fair, men would be false.
 Apelles: Were women never so false, men would be fond.
 (3.3.30-31)

Such generalizations about human falseness seem to degrade their own erotic medium.

But the lovers' earlier acknowledgement of their own artifice distinguishes them from the

men and women to whom they refer. This is not to say that they are somehow more genuine than the others, only that they are *better* at artifice and undeceived by its effects.

Campaspe's virtuosity lies in her ability subtly to guide their artistic process, playing the various roles of art object, interpreter, and artist all at once. At the end of their dialogue, she figures herself as an art object by representing herself once again in terms of lack, this time in response to Apelles' question, "But were you never in love?" (3.3.45). Campaspe replies that she has never been in love "nor love in me" (3.3.46). Again, the lady portrays herself as diminished. On the one hand, Campaspe presents Apelles with a freshness and vitality that he struggles to capture; on the other hand, with no love "*in*" her, she is vacant inside, resembling a piece of art more than a person. Steiner shrewdly describes the "life model [who] typically constructs herself as an image, however much the artist may feel he is the one posing her and determining what aspects of her will be represented. Many models... fashion themselves as the image to be rendered."¹⁸ Campaspe is both that which is interpreted and that which interprets. She is void of love so that Apelles can fill her and she hollows herself in a gesture of shared artistic (and erotic) making. Apelles responds by praising Campaspe's aptitude, her capacity to experience love: "It is not possible that a face so fair and a wit so sharp, both without comparison, should not be apt to love" (3.3.51-52). "Apt to love" tells us that she is predisposed or inclined both to love (as subject) and to be loved (as object).¹⁹ Her agency—as co-creator, as artist in her own right—derives from her beauty and wit.

¹⁸Steiner, *The Real Real Thing*, 22.

¹⁹ For "apt," *OED* 2.b and 4.c read "fit, prepared, ready" and "customarily disposed, given, inclined, prone," respectively. (See *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2011 < <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9969>>.) If love is something one can be "apt to" then it is as much a skill or talent as it is an emotion or state of mind. To align love with aptitude is to emphasize the "how" of desire. Apelles' gift of painting, his ability to create Campaspe in pigment, makes him "apt to love" as well.

In their later scenes, Apelles and Campaspe enhance each other's ability to employ and interpret artifice together when they refine her portrait, their "Desiring is Artistic Creation" metaphor, and their erotic relationship all at once. Campaspe continues to expose Apelles' techniques of artifice: "you...commend...for fashion sake" and "call them beautiful whom you know black" (4.2.29-31). Apelles responds that men "dissemble... / Not in love, but their love" (4.2.37-38). Hunter glosses this as Apelles' assertion "that he does not wish men to tell lies to those they love, but would like the power to conceal that he is in love (since his suit to Campaspe is bound to be hopeless)."²⁰ Apelles may also be saying that dissembling is a *way*, or means, of loving; according to the grammar of his sentence, dissembling is the action that is performed on love. That Apelles distinguishes this artifice from the techniques employed by men like Jupiter who dissemble "in love" confirms the difference he sees between his own creative enterprise with Campaspe and the "common thing" (4.2.29) men do when they lie to women.

Campaspe enacts this same distinction in her style of speech: Even as she confesses her mistrust of men who do not "speak as they think" (4.2.34), she employs artful and equivocal language. It is Apelles, not Campaspe, who breaks off from their measured and stylized mode of dialogue to ask his beloved plainly to "give me leave to ask you a question" (4.2.38-39) and then proceeds to inquire, simply and directly, "Whom do you love best in the world?" (4.2.42). Carefully, subtly, and with distinctive art, Campaspe replies, "He that made me last in the world" (4.2.43). Her response confers upon Apelles the creative power of the artist, but it also laconically, even gnomically, connects their artistic process to their erotic relation. By answering Apelles'

²⁰ Hunter, *Campaspe*, 113.

question about love with a statement about art, she reconfirms her role alongside his in the erotic and artistic enterprise they have undertaken together. Of greater ontological import is her contention that it is not her portrait but rather *she herself* who has been “made” by Apelles. Campaspe imagines things differently from Roland Barthes, who “experience[s] a micro version of death” when photographed, at which time he becomes a “subject who feels he is becoming an object.”²¹ For her part, Campaspe asserts that her portraiture gestures toward the kind of afterlife that Harry Berger describes in his response to Barthes: “what happens after . . . is that sitters begin to rouse themselves, to shake off this death, and to help painters represent them as living subjects by seeming to either try for, or to resist, the effect of objectivity.”²² Giving herself up to the “effect of objectivity,” Campaspe participates not in her death but her rebirth. She has enabled “he that made me last in the world.”

Campaspe speaks this pointed but poignant line in their penultimate scene together. The metaphor they have created is finally equipped to bear this rich and powerful expression of erotic longing and belonging. Campaspe’s language is still artful and stylized, but rather than employing euphuistic, parallel structure to connect art and eros in a sentence all of her own, she puts *Apelles’* line to this use. Campaspe’s assertion gestures toward climax, a consummation of their scenes of verbal chafing—what Stephen Greenblatt identifies as a “system of foreplay” in Shakespeare’s comedies.²³ Utterly

²¹ Quoted in part in Harry Berger, Jr., *Fictions of the Pose: Rembrandt against the Italian Renaissance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 226. See Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 13-14.

²² Berger, *Fictions of the Pose*, 226.

²³ Greenblatt writes, “Shakespeare realised that if sexual chafing could not be presented literally onstage, it could be represented figuratively: friction could be fictionalised, chafing chastened and hence made fit for the stage, by transforming it into the witty, erotically charged sparring that is the heart of the lovers’ experience” (Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988], 63-93, 89). This analysis of Shakespeare’s

receptive to his “Whom do you love best in the world,” Campaspe’s “he that made me last in the world” typifies the artful balance we have come to expect of their language. But in this instance, Campaspe tenderly if not quite undemonstratively completes his line. She employs both the form and content of his line only to replace his “love” with her “making.” Her acknowledgment of her love and of her own made-ness are for this moment, at least, inseparable. To love Apelles is to have been remade by him, but only she can confirm this and only by way of a metaphor that credits instrumentality (mutual making) in their relationship. It turns out that they are both and equally lovers and makers.

Apelles continues to reflect on the transformative power of his and Campaspe’s artistic process even after it has ended. Alone with the finished portrait, he employs and extends the metaphor that Campaspe developed. Apelles identifies the act of painting as the instrument of his desire for Campaspe in the opening lines of his soliloquy: “Has thou *by drawing* her beauty brought to pass that thou canst scarce draw thine own breath?” (3.5.14-15; emphasis mine).²⁴ Like the word “colour” in the couple’s earlier dialogue, “drawing” and “draw” here blur the distinction between the lovers.²⁵ Polysemy weaves the language of art into the experience of desire. Metaphor enables the lovers to access eros through art. And the balance and measure of Lyly’s euphuistic structure, as in

erotic dialogues can be extended to Lyly’s language as well. Both playwrights invest their drama with what Greenblatt calls “sexual energy” (87) without staging bodies in physical contact, and both employ verbal chafing and friction to generate erotic heat onstage. This is especially true for *Campaspe*, where the lovers’ creative media intensify the friction between them.

²⁴ The preposition “by” (in Latin, this is denoted via the ablative case, specifically the ablative of means) is the grammatical marking of instrumentality, allowing Apelles to identify specific causes for the “supernal effects” of his desire.

²⁵ The polysemy of “draw” also suggests that Campaspe’s gain is Apelles’ loss: breathing life into her image obstructs the painter’s own ability to breathe. Once again, the metaphor uncovers the imbricated artistic processes of creation and depletion, of elevation and diminishment, which constitute Apelles and Campaspe’s erotic relation.

Apelles' next line, further bridges the gap between art and eros: "by so much more hast thou increased thy care by how much more thou has showed thy cunning" (3.5.16-17). So Apelles' "increased . . . care" stems not just from Campaspe's beauty but from his own "cunning," too. She has contributed her "apt[ness]" and he meets it with his "cunning"; their erotic relation depends on both. Moreover, Apelles' acknowledgment of his skill (his cunning) once again reminds us that not just art, but eros is something made, something responsive to aptitude. Apelles' emphasis on his own cunning may at first suggest that he is more interested in himself, attracted more to his own artistic skill and to his process of artistic creation, than he is attracted to the object of his desire, to Campaspe. If this is so, then why has he not fallen in love with the Venus he has been painting, or with any of his other portraits for that matter? Apelles may give us something of an answer when he tells us that he "*showed* [his] cunning" (17). While cunning is inherent, painting Campaspe, and apparently only Campaspe, has rendered it visible. Visible to Apelles and visible to Campaspe, too. At the core of their erotic relation is their mutual exposure of their cunning and artfulness. This is what keeps Apelles' erotic desire from aligning with the familiar narrative of the narcissistic artist who falls in love with his own skill. Yes, his cunning has been shown in the portrait, but once it is revealed to Campaspe, she sees, matches, and inspires his creative potential with her own. Her self-deprecation, her freshness and color, her beauty and wit, her aptness to love, her discovery of a language that binds artistic to erotic creation, all of

these gifts activate and release Apelles' "cunning," thereby distinguishing this act of artistic reproduction from any other.

But what happens once the painting is complete? What happens, that is, when the product succeeds the process? No longer *a part of* the lovers' erotic relation, the finished painting stands *apart from* the lovers. Like the stick in Lenzen's anecdote, the lovers' loosened grip on the instrument turns it into an object; whereas the process of painting bridged the gap between the lovers, the completed painting becomes an obstacle between them. Apelles begins to explore the stakes of this shift when he compares himself to Pygmalion, another artist who fell in love with his creation. Of course, what makes Apelles different from Pygmalion (as Hunter points out in his gloss) is that Pygmalion did not work from a model.²⁶ Hunter writes that Apelles' reference to Pygmalion is a flawed comparison: "The analogy with Pygmalion is defective unless we suppose that Apelles, despairing of the living Campaspe because she belongs to Alexander, wishes to have his painting turned into a second Campaspe."²⁷ If Hunter is correct, then Apelles' flawed comparison reveals that the object of his desire is no longer just Campaspe; he now longs for the creative process itself, a once mutual but now solitary act.

²⁶ Victor Stoichita notes that Pygmalion's story differs from other narratives of artists whose works came to life. Pygmalion's statue constitutes a simulacrum rather than an image copied from nature: "Pygmalion's statue is the fruit of his imagination and of his 'art,' and the woman whom the gods gave him for a spouse is a strange creature, an artifact endowed with a soul and a body, but nevertheless a fantasy. A simulacrum, precisely." See Victor I. Stoichita, *The Pygmalion Effect: From Ovid to Hitchcock*, trans. Alison Anderson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3.

²⁷ Hunter, *Campaspe*, 102. The desire for Apelles to create a second Campaspe is also voiced by Alexander, who exclaims earlier in the play, "Would he could colour the life with the feature!" (3.4.73). Like Apelles' allusion to Pygmalion, Alexander's desire for another Campaspe is puzzling: why should Alexander want another version of the lady if she is already his? Perhaps Alexander is fascinated more by the instrument of artistic creation than by the object of his desire, Campaspe herself.

The completion of the portrait, then, poses a double threat to Apelles and Campaspe's erotic relation—it enforces Apelles' solitude, since his model is no longer present, *and* it signals stasis, the end of the creative process.²⁸ By comparing himself to Pygmalion, Apelles reminds us what happens to fantasies and rituals that grow static—they risk becoming artifacts rather than instruments of erotic desire. He desires Pygmalion's ability to animate a lifeless work of art because he wants to resuscitate the erotic instrument that has enabled his love for Campaspe. But in his determination to continue creating Campaspe, now that she is no longer present to do the same for him, Apelles is prepared to sidestep the shared artistic process that has instrumentalized their erotic experience.²⁹ It is fitting, then, that Apelles begins to test the limits of his creative power in soliloquy, a solitary speech act. His longing to animate Campaspe's portrait reveals Apelles' desire for an artistic capacity beyond his means, and in his solitude, he also stretches the bounds of the language that the lovers have forged together. At this point, the generative power of the lovers' shared metaphor of painting gives way to a language of sculpture that turns out to be destructive; now Apelles, not Campaspe, undergoes a loss of self.

Apelles contrasts his situation and Pygmalion's, not, as one might expect, in terms of the differing objects of their desires, but instead in terms of means—he contrasts his own artistic medium of painting with Pygmalion's choice of sculpture. Apelles wonders if painting is “so far inferior to carving, or dost thou, Venus, more delight to be hewed with chisels than shadowed with colours?” (3.5.24-26). Although sculpture is the

²⁸ In the scene just before Apelles delivers his soliloquy, the painter insists that he will “never finish” (3.4.93) the portrait, because Campaspe's beauty exceeds the bounds of art.

²⁹ Apelles seems to recognize the transgressive potential of his divine aspirations when he asks himself, “Was it not sufficient to behold the fire and warm thee but with Satyrus thou must kiss the fire and burn thee?” (3.5.18-20).

medium that produces a live woman for Pygmalion, Apelles reminds us here that it is ultimately a destructive art. The sculptor hews and chisels; the painter applies pigment to canvas.³⁰ Curiously, once Apelles introduces the example of carving, it recurs again and again in his soliloquy. This shift from adding “shadows” to chipping away at “substance” illustrates the predicament Apelles faces now that his painting is finished. The metaphorical entailments of sculpturing answer best to the destructive turn that Apelles’ desire takes when he tries to use the portrait as an instrument of divine conjuration, disturbing the balance of the heretofore shared artistic process by seeking to create Campaspe all by himself.

Apelles’ turn to sculpture corresponds with a shift in the sensory domains that he uses to conceptualize his interactions with Campaspe. A painter, Apelles begins by considering their interactions in terms of vision. Apelles gazes on his model in order to paint her, and of course, he gazes on her beauty—“the colours I see” (3.1.18)—in admiration and desire. But as his soliloquy goes on, he begins to think in terms of tactile erotic activity: optics (“behold” [3.5.18]) give way to haptics (“kiss...and burn” [3.5.19]). The historical Apelles is cited in Pliny and Vasari as an exemplar of artistic and erotic decorum, largely because the artistic medium of paint keeps him within the safe zone of “behold[ing]” rather than caressing. Recently, Victor Stoichita has contrasted Apelles with Pygmalion, the sculptor who transgresses the bounds of art:

[Apelles] creates a fairly sharp distinction between the erotic attraction of the model and the phantasm with which the painting is imbued—which is why Vasari tacitly accepts it.... In the context of the *paragone*, pictorial creation and the two dimensional projection of desire do not prevent the artist from making a distinction between his model and his phantasm-representation, whereas

³⁰ Apelles’ question about Venus’s “delight”—does she derive more pleasure from being “hewed” than from being “shadowed?”—is suggestive of a violent sexual act, one that entails destruction and creation all at once. His desire to stimulate Venus’s “delight” suggests that to do so might stimulate the hewer as well.

sculptural creation, three-dimensional and palpable, is an invitation to confuse the limits and, hence, to transgress.³¹

For Lyly's Apelles, the shift from optic to haptic language signifies his departure from conventionality and correctness; he transgresses the limits of his art when he conjures substance from shadows and caresses from "colours."³²

Apelles' desire to bring Campaspe to life by animating her portrait reflects the early modern belief in the power of eros to conjure an image of a beloved's soul, known as a phantasm. According to the early modern psychology of erotic desire, a separate conceptual apparatus mediates between the sensory and non-sensory realms.³³ This apparatus belongs to a third ontological category that can translate between the corporeal and the incorporeal worlds, and it is composed of the same spirit (*pneuma*) that comprises the stars. In order to mediate between body and soul, the spirit translates sensory images into "phantasms," pneumatic images that can be understood by the soul. Ioan Couliano has argued that this third category is fundamental to the early modern psychology of eros, in which desire is defined as "the pursuit of a phantasm" rather than the pursuit of a love object who exists apart from the desiring subject.³⁴ Apelles' desire to animate the portrait reveals that Campaspe's phantasm has replaced Campaspe as the object of his creative enterprise.

³¹ Stoichita, *The Pygmalion Effect*, 56.

³² In his final soliloquy of the play, Apelles comments on his shift from visual to tactile erotic activity, admitting that he has betrayed his own art in his desire for the lady: "O Campaspe, I have painted thee in my heart—painted? nay, contrary to mine art, imprinted; and that in such deep characters that nothing can raze it out unless it rub thy heart out" (5.2.16-19).

³³ This psychology, largely Aristotelian, attempts to bridge the division between body and soul that was decisive for Plato. The apparatus that Aristotle identifies in *De Anima* has conceptual and linguistic properties.

³⁴ See Ioan P. Couliano, *Eros and Magic in the Renaissance*, trans. Margaret Cook (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 38-39. Couliano repeatedly notes that the object of desire is the phantasm, rather than the beloved herself: "the love object plays a secondary role in the process of establishing the phantasm: it is only a pretext, not a real presence... We do not love *another* object, a stranger to ourselves... We are enamored of an unconscious image" (31).

Perhaps it is his unnatural creative ambitions that prompt Apelles to compare his love for Campaspe to a series of seemingly unnatural attractions: “Thou mayst swim against the stream with the crab, and feed against the wind with the deer, and peck against the steel with the cockatrice” (3.5.39-41). The parallel structure suggests that Apelles’ comparisons are all fundamentally alike; but the final example in his series is nothing of the sort. While the crab and deer movements resist the natural order prevalent in their respective habitats, the cockatrice’s pecking is more closely aligned with art than with nature, and it is decidedly violent. Of course, the cockatrice—a deadly combination of cock and serpent—is itself an artifice. Hunter notes that Alexander was said to have killed a cockatrice by placing a mirror (“steel”) before it, prompting it to “peck against” its own image and ultimately die from its own reflected lethal gaze. The mirror produces a new image and at the same time causes the demise of the cockatrice. Unlike what transpires when Venus is hewn, it is now Apelles—the artist rather than the model—who risks destruction in the course of artistic creation that once again collapses the distance between the artist and his object.³⁵ In his earlier premonition that Campaspe “will alter the colour I have” (3.1.18-19), Apelles hints at this destruction. The change that both lovers undergo necessarily entails a kind of self-loss, but now that Campaspe is gone, “alter[ation]” gives way to destruction.

It is fitting that Apelles compares the cockatrice’s self-destructive behavior—its assault on a reflected image, and its sculptural mode of attack—with his own just when he begins to pursue Campaspe’s phantasm. As it happens, early modern writings about the erotic phantasm also employ the metaphor of sculpture. In his empirical philosophy,

³⁵ Apelles conceptualizes the pain of his desire through the language of carving, specifically as a penetrating wound and canker. The symptoms of his “affections” include “deep and hollow sighs,” as well as “wounds and slaughters of conceits” (3.5.51-53).

Marsilio Ficino conceptualizes the phantasm as being carved or engraved on the lover's soul: "the lover carves [*sculpit*] into his soul the model of the beloved," and the phantasm takes up a residence there, monopolizing it and ultimately exiling the lover from his own soul.³⁶ Couliano describes the consequences of this erotic transaction as dire: "the subject, bereft of his soul, is no longer a subject: the phantasmic vampire has devoured it internally."³⁷ Ideally, the beloved will undergo the same process, making room for the lover's phantasm within her soul so that the subject and object effectively switch places, each continuing to exist within the other's soul. However, in reality, one can never be sure that the beloved will accept one's phantasm, making the experience of erotic desire inherently risky. Like the process of artistic creation, creating a phantasm of the beloved requires the lover to hazard his own subjectivity. And as with the artistic process, it is the loss or lack of mutuality (in the case of phantasmic creation, it is the lack of reciprocal exchange) that poses the greatest threat to the desiring subject.

With his subjectivity at stake, it is unsurprising that Apelles' desires turn inward. His transformation, from artist to lover and finally to conjurer or magician, correlates with a comparable shift in the nature of the objects he plans to paint. Now that he has finished the portraits of Campaspe and Venus, Apelles discloses the artistic achievements that await him:

Blush, Venus, for I am ashamed to end thee. Now must I paint things impossible for mine art but agreeable with my affections: deep and hollow sighs, sad and melancholy thoughts, wounds and slaughters of conceits, a life posting to death, a death galloping from life, a wavering constancy, an unsettled resolution, and what not, Apelles? And what but, Apelles? (3.5.49-56)

³⁶ *Amans amati suo figuram sculpit in animo* (Marsilio Ficino, *Amore*, II, 8, quoted in Couliano, *Eros and Magic*, 31).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

To paint sighs, thoughts, conceits, life, death, constancy, and resolution will require Apelles to engage in an activity aligned more with magical conjuration than with artistic invention. Apelles ascribes to his art a Pygmalion-like generative and life-giving power; to paint “life” itself is to *bring to life*. Moreover, painting “things impossible for mine art but agreeable with my affections” marks a decisive shift in the nature of the painting’s subject matter. Heretofore, his portraits have depicted objects of desire: a striking goddess and a captive woman. Apelles’ new, self-imposed mandate to paint sighs, conceits, and thoughts suggests that the sighs and thoughts that Campaspe has drawn out of him have themselves become the objects of his affections. Absent Campaspe, Apelles feels compelled to paint the markers of her absence, redirecting his erotic and creative attentions toward his own longing. Thus Apelles begins to desire his own conceits and thoughts—things that typically constitute the *means* by which a person desires—and so to fall in love with the “how” of his own erotic desire. That Apelles has begun to desire himself is unsurprising in light of the self-loss he risks in his pursuit of Campaspe’s phantasm. What Campaspe once elicited from him, he will now formalize in paint.

Apelles’ list of new painting subjects concludes with a puzzling pair of questions that reflect this inward turn: “and what not, Apelles? And what but, Apelles?” In his first question, the painter acknowledges the staggeringly vast scope of subjects he will need to cover if he is to paint things “agreeable with my affections.” And yet, his second question distills the range of possibilities to a single subject: himself. The comma after “but” is Hunter’s emendation. He explains that he has “altered the punctuation and the sense from Q1’s ‘what but *Apelles*’. I take the meaning to be, ‘And what but sighs,

thoughts, conceits etc. will I be able to depict?”³⁸ This is plausible, but the Quarto punctuation is much more suggestive. When Apelles asks himself the question, “and what but *Apelles*?” his shift from painting women to painting thoughts takes another sharp turn: The final object of his erotic desire is himself. Apelles is not so much dismissing his desire for Campaspe as he is acknowledging the effects of their artistic process on his sense of self. His role as Campaspe’s maker has “alter[ed]” Apelles to such an extent that he, too, has been remade by the artistic process. To create Campaspe (or, to create sighs, conceits, life, resolution) is to recreate himself: “what but Apelles?” To desire Campaspe is to desire the version of himself that she unlocks when she inspires him to create. His lines about painting “impossible things,” and about eventually painting himself, reveal Apelles’ desire not only to become more intimate with the artistry Campaspe has aroused in him, but also to recover the part of himself that he hazards when he tries to conjure the lady’s soul by way of her portrait.

If, as it turns out, Apelles is never quite able to use the portrait for this purpose, then it must be because his artwork is the result of a collaborative process that resists independent instrumentalization like Pygmalion’s. That the painter spends the remainder of the play searching for a means—in prayer, in sculpture, in song—by which to conjure Campaspe is evidence of the importance of such creative instruments to their erotic relation. Yet all of Apelles’ attempts result in weak substitutions for what he achieves when he collaborates with Campaspe.

The importance of mutuality is especially evident when Apelles finally succeeds in summoning Campaspe’s phantasm in the song he sings at the end of his soliloquy. He conjures her simply by imagining her, by animating her in his mind. But the phantasm he

³⁸ Hunter, *Campaspe*, 104.

creates is almost a negative image of Campaspe herself, and thus proves to be a poor replacement for the lady. Apelles' song is about a game of cards between Cupid and Campaspe in which Cupid stakes everything he has, and loses it all to the lady. In the beginning of the song, Cupid wagers his familiar accoutrements ("his quiver, bow and arrows" [3.5.73]), but once he loses these, the stakes become more severe:

then down he throws
 The coral of his lip; the rose
 Growing on's cheek (but none knows how),
 With these the crystal of his brow,
 And then the dimple of his chin;
 All these did my Campaspe win
 At last he set her both his eyes;
 She won, and Cupid blind did rise.
 (3.5.75-82)

Minus his coral lip and his blushing cheeks, Cupid is effectively de-blazoned and un-painted. This Campaspe really does have the power to "alter . . . colour" (3.1.18)—but where the lady once summoned blushes, her phantasm now suppresses them. Couliano writes, "When Eros is at work, the phantasm of the loved object leads its own existence, all the more disquieting because it exerts a kind of vampirism on the subject's other phantasms and thoughts."³⁹ The imagery in Apelles' song suggests that Campaspe's phantasm poses this vampiric threat; she is literally appalling. Effectively preying on Love, Campaspe's phantasm now decimates the very erotic relation that the lady had been so instrumental in co-creating with Apelles.

Although Apelles' song conjures a woman who wields considerable power over Eros, that is where the similarities end between the phantasm and lady he has fallen in love with. The phantasm exerts a much more destructive power as it creates, a power signaled by the language of carving. Once Cupid is deprived of his "coral" cheek and

³⁹ Couliano, *Eros and Magic*, 31.

“rose” lip, his face is subjected to carving and chiseling. Cupid keeps raising the stakes, wagering his brow, then the dimple on his chin, and finally his eyes, but he loses it all to Campaspe’s winning hand. Having initially risked only his “freshness” and vitality, Cupid now suffers a loss of his identifying facial features. And yet, as is the case with the other examples of destruction in Apelles’ soliloquy, the scene between Campaspe and Cupid proves generative as well. Campaspe’s phantasm effectively *makes* Cupid what he is best known for by taking from him, until at last “Cupid *blind* did rise” (3.5.82). In conjuring Campaspe’s phantasm, then, Apelles re-imagines the lady’s creative power, but with a difference that extends beyond the artistic medium of paint versus sculpture. Whereas the lady’s virtuosity lies in her ability artfully to diminish herself, the phantasm diminishes Love itself. She remains perfectly intact in the course of her interaction with Eros; Apelles imagines her chipping away at Cupid instead of risking any loss of her own.

Apelles’ soliloquy dramatizes his attempt to recover what is unrecoverable—a once-collaborative creative process that enabled the painter’s erotic relation with Campaspe. The completed portrait simply cannot do the work of remaking the lady, nor can Apelles’ “cunning”; thus the portrait and his cunning both become objects of his erotic desire in the hope that they can lead him back to the lady. Even Apelles’ apparent success in creating Campaspe in song is overshadowed by the phantasm’s profound differences from the woman. The sum total of these differences—in their creative power and artistic medium, in their skill and even their temperament—results in the most profound distinction of all: the phantasm lacks Campaspe’s “apt[ness] to love.” The phantasm, although triumphant over Cupid, is manifestly unresponsive to the process of

erotic creation. Where Campaspe suffered blindness in response to Apelles' wounded eyes, the phantasm is impassive and invulnerable; in his song, Apelles sees her as an agent of Love's blindness rather than its victim. Although the phantasm's aggression could signal her active engagement in the gambling match, in truth she does very little in the song other than play her cards well. If anyone is doing anything, it is Cupid: the subject of Apelles' song, Cupid independently and seemingly without prompting hazards various aspects of his character. But even the erotic quality of the card game quickly dissipates. In the opening lines of the song we learn that the game is being played "for kisses" (3.5.72), but these stakes are never mentioned again. And blindness, which had been evidence of the erotic love between Apelles and Campaspe, is seemingly sapped of its erotic significance in the newly risen blind Cupid. Unlike kisses given or received, Cupid's blindness is hardly a prize, since the phantasm does not stand to gain anything from it. The phantasm's erotic detachment reveals the limits of Apelles' creative power now that the lady herself is absent. Presumably Apelles could have imagined any version of his beloved in his song—a yielding Campaspe, a receptive Campaspe, a kissing Campaspe—but the indifferent woman he conjures suggests that the phantasm has taken on a life of its own. As Victor Stoichita observes, "the 'life' of a masterpiece—already implies, albeit still implicitly—...the death of the model."⁴⁰ The qualitative difference between Campaspe and her phantasm suggests that the lady suffers a kind of death as Apelles turns his attentions to recreating her in his solitude.

It makes sense, then, that Apelles is in no rush to move beyond the bounds of his art, that he wants to prolong his time painting Campaspe until Alexander at last demands the finished product. Unable to tolerate the prospect of ending their artistic and erotic

⁴⁰ Stoichita, *The Pygmalion Effect*, 65.

interaction, Apelles resolves to extend it by adding blemishes to the portrait. This may be a subtle act of homage to Campaspe, whose own intention it was artfully to desecrate herself, to create what she calls a “disordered countenance” (3.4.71) conducive to a “deformed” painting (3.4.72). But Apelles’ deformations also reveal the importance of process over product in an erotic relation. That a great painter, famed for his ability to create unparalleled works of art, is willing to damage his portrait in order to prolong the artistic process testifies to the dangers of imagining any artistic or erotic relationship as perfect or complete. The lovers’ mutual creativity depends on imperfect and incomplete portraiture. It is this that makes Campaspe’s skill at diminishment so vital to their relation; her affected modesty stimulates the creativity, betterment, and art that alone are the instruments of their love-making.

When Campaspe returns to Apelles’ studio for a final time, their artistic metaphor takes on its deepest erotic significance. Their need to co-create is nowhere more pronounced. When he puts the final touches on the portrait at the end of Act 4, Apelles tells Campaspe that he has “almost made an end.” Her poignant response is that “You told me, Apelles, you would never end” (4.4.1-2). Their barely veiled language works as it often does in plays which feature forbidden love; the painting (both the activity and the resulting portrait) communicates their illicit feelings. Campaspe’s recourse to the metaphor they have crafted once again instrumentalizes the process of painting, making it a linguistic prosthetic for the things they are unable to say. And like her earlier rejoinder (“he who made me last in the world”), her gentle yet wistful reproach again completes Apelles’ line. Once again, Campaspe imbues his words with the balance and symmetry that have constituted their erotic medium, binding together painting and loving as

coincident experiences that “never end.” But Lyly subtly demonstrates that Campaspe’s line *is* an ending—it is her response to and her completion of Apelles’ opening words. And this scene is, likewise, an ending. Apelles may have it in mind to prolong the process by entering into an endless loop of blemishing then retouching the portrait. But his aspiration to conjure substance from shadows now far exceeds anything he set out to accomplish with Campaspe as his co-creator.

The simultaneously futile and transgressive nature of Apelles’ ambition comes out in his dialogue with Campaspe as they prepare to part from one another at the end of Act 4. When she asks him what he will do if Alexander forbids him to see her, Apelles replies that he will “gaze continually on thy picture” (4.4.10). But not for long. In his next line Apelles explains that “the sweet thoughts, the sure hopes, thy protested faith, will cause me to embrace thy shadow continually in mine arms, of the which by strong imagination I will make a substance” (4.4.12-15).⁴¹ Apelles’ preposition “by” cues the idea of agency, but now the instrument of desire is neither his artistic skill nor his cunning—it has become Apelles’ desire itself, his “strong imagination.” Having divested the art of “shadowing” of its erotic instrumentality, Apelles re-imagines the shadow-portrait, animated by the strength of his own desire, as the means by which he can conjure the lady’s substance. Even though Campaspe stands right beside him, Apelles dreams of summoning her phantasm via the portrait. His erotic attentions are now directed at the portrait, “the thing that is likest you” (4.2.47), in Apelles’ words. Eros

⁴¹ Hunter suggests that “Apelles seems to have in mind the Pygmalion story” (*Campaspe*, 116). The relationship between Apelles and Pygmalion here is doubly significant; not only does Apelles yearn to bring his artwork to life, but he also refers here to the medium of sculpture (“substance”) over painting (“shadow”). “Substance” is subject to kisses and “embrace[s]”; shadows are not.

was once the *telos* of their artistic interaction, but now Apelles imagines an erotic embrace that will create Campaspe out of her “shadow.”

In order to explain Apelles’ fixation on the portrait, the king’s counselor Hephestion recounts to Alexander the traditional story of the artist’s narcissistic desire: “commonly we see it incident in artificers to be enamoured of their own works... poor souls, they kiss the colours with their lips, with which before they were loath to taint their fingers” (5.4.15-16 and 22-24). Upon observing Apelles’ “perplexed” (5.4.12) looks and his inability to concentrate, Alexander has begun to suspect that “the painter is in love” (5.4.14), presumably with a live person. But apparently Hephestion sees no difference (or he pretends that there is no difference) between Apelles’ love for Campaspe and his desire for her shadow.⁴² Alexander picks up on this pretense when he devises a love test to “find it out” (5.4.25), “it” being Apelles’ desire for the substance or the shadow: “Page, go speedily for Apelles. Will him to come hither, and when you see us earnestly in talk, suddenly cry out, ‘Apelles’ shop is on fire!’” (5.4.25-27). Later in the scene, Apelles’ reaction to the charade apparently gives him away as a lover: “Ay me, if the picture of Campaspe be burnt I am undone!” (5.4.92-93). Of all the love tests Alexander could devise, why would he chose this particular scenario to expose Apelles’ desire for Campaspe? Why not endanger the lady herself instead of her portrait? It seems that Alexander either views Apelles’ attitude toward the painting as symptomatic of the painter’s feelings for Campaspe, or that, like Hephestion, the king sees no difference between the lady and the “shadow” at all.

⁴² Hephestion is the mouthpiece for conventional (and often misogynistic) beliefs about love; it is no surprise that he is the character who most readily refers to the narcissistic, autoerotic activity of “painters... playing with their own conceits” (5.4.19).

Apelles' simultaneously dispiriting and decorous response to Alexander is to insist that he is in love with his painting rather than the lady who inspired it: "Not love her. But your Majesty knows that painters in their last works are said to excel themselves, and in this I have so much pleased myself that the shadow as much delighteth me, being an artificer, as the substance doth others that are amorous" (5.4.99-103). Of course the king is unconvinced, and Lyly cleverly awards him the play's final painting metaphor when he expresses his doubt: "You lay your colours grossly" (5.4.104), he tells Apelles, with a pun on yet another meaning of "colours," as rhetorical flourishes. It would appear that Alexander completely rejects the play's conviction that artifice can serve as the instrument of erotic experience. In commonsensical Alexander's mind, art and eros are fundamentally different. The most that he will concede is that Apelles has used the former to hide the latter.

When Alexander resolves to join Apelles and Campaspe together in love at the end of the play, he employs the straightforward and unadorned language we have come to expect from him, informing the lady, "Campaspe, here is news: Apelles is in love with you" (5.4.115-16). This plain speech is bracing, if for no other reason than that neither Apelles nor Campaspe has made any such artless declaration. Alexander has no choice but assertively (and comically) to prompt the conspicuously tongue-tied lovers: "Apelles, take Campaspe. Why move ye not? Campaspe, take Apelles. Will it not be?" (5.4.131-32). The lovers do eventually acquiesce (admitting their feelings in uncharacteristically simple language: "Pardon, my lord, I love Apelles" [5.4.135]), but their reticence cannot be explained by their fear of inciting Alexander's anger. He has repeatedly consented to the match, not to mention encouraged the pair forthrightly to profess their feelings.

Evidently it is the lovers themselves who stand in the way of a happy union at the end of the play. Absent the language of painting as the medium through which to conceptualize and communicate their desire, they are stymied. Without their secret language, the lovers hardly have any language at all.

What the lovers do have is Alexander's plain speech, a language that portends not just the loss of artistry, and not just silence, but more ominously, the extinction of eros. Because Apelles and Campaspe's erotic relation is something they have made, it is necessarily artificial. When the lovers replace their own stylized mode of speech with Alexander's plain style, they loosen their grip on the erotic relation they have crafted together. Plainness for them is tantamount to dullness; as Cleopatra says, "there is nothing left remarkable" (4.15.68). Once the lovers stop artfully making their erotic relation, they begin, artlessly, to break it. Because eros is always in process for them, there can be no middle ground, no stasis. Hence even the ending of the play—with its fusion of union and reticence—indicates a desire, on Lyly's part no less than the lovers', to prolong the creative process.

This correlation between the lovers' creative process and Lyly's own dramatic art reminds us that Apelles and Campaspe inherit their self-conscious artifice from Lyly. All of what I have been arguing about the erotic instrument—its dual capacity to bring lovers into relation and to keep them apart; its self-conscious artificiality and made-ness; its responsiveness to process and attenuation upon consummation; its dependence on mutuality—is true of Lyly's dramatic language.⁴³ In particular, the features of the erotic

⁴³ Michael Pincombe has suggested a likeness between Apelles' portrait and Lyly's own art: "Lyly, I think, uses the device of the defaced portrait as an emblem of the way he felt his own art might be deformed by the pressures of writing in a political context such as that of the court, in which, as his own play shows, one had to be very careful what one said or wrote." See Michael Pincombe, *The Plays of John Lyly*, 46.

instrument are hallmarks of Lyly's euphuistic and antithetical prose style.⁴⁴

Traditionally, euphuism is defined as an ornamental verbal pattern distinguished by its symmetries and antitheses, especially isocolon (clauses of the same length), parison (clauses with corresponding grammatical structures), and paramoion (words with similar sounds, such as alliteration).⁴⁵ Euphuistic balance, antithesis, and doubling make Lyly's language an especially apt instrument in its own right: these are the media through which we encounter Apelles and Campaspe's erotic experience, and art-making is the medium through which they access eros. The linguistic density and abundance typical of Lyly's style contribute to the rhythms of deferral and delay that are so vital to Apelles and Campaspe's relation.⁴⁶ The tendency of euphuism and antithesis to frustrate closure and delay consummation reflects the pace of Apelles and Campaspe's erotic experience, which can only flourish for as long as the lovers can protract their artistic process.

Perhaps more telling than its resistance to closure is euphuism's capacity to bring distinct conceptual and experiential domains into relation with one another. Antitheses are euphuistic stock in trade, but Lyly also has penchant for conjoining *unrelated* concepts or ideas.⁴⁷ Leah Scragg writes that the balance, symmetry, and ornamental

⁴⁴ Jonas Barish claims that *Campaspe's* "weak and inconclusive ending" is a result of Lyly's "peculiar... logical style," endemic to the playwright's euphuistic prose. According to Barish, "the force that has disjoined character or analyzed feeling to create dramatic tension can do little to fuse or recombine them." See Jonas A. Barish, "The Prose Style of John Lyly," *ELH* 23, no. 1 (1956): 14-35, 34.

⁴⁵ Barish (14-15) cites traditional definitions of euphuism in Morris William Croll and Henry Clemons' edition of *Euphuus: The Anatomy of Wit and Euphuus and his England* (London, 1916).

⁴⁶ Leah Scragg argues that these rhythms emerge from Lyly's antithetical language, which creates ambivalence and thus unsettles meaning:

The development through a series of antithetical propositions draws the reader not towards an irresistible conclusion, but into a series of branching avenues leading progressively further from an inevitable goal, frustrating the drive of the narrative towards finality and closure, and proliferating the positions from which a judgment might be reached.

See *Euphuus: The Anatomy of Wit and Euphuus and his England*, ed. Leah Scragg (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 5.

⁴⁷ Such odd and unrelated pairings have often unsettled readers and scholars of Lyly's work. Carter Daniel's introduction to his 1988 edition of Lyly's plays cites various indictments of the "preposterous,"

features of euphuism often “yok[e] disparate areas of experience.”⁴⁸ It is unsurprising then, that euphuism becomes an instrument of Campaspe’s own creative and interpretive process throughout the play, from her use of polysemic language (“colours,” “draw”) to the symmetries she finds between Apelles’ flattering words and his artful brushstrokes. Jonas Barish argues that Lyly uses the “more general logicity” of euphuism “to express the composite nature of experience.”⁴⁹ To Barish’s final phrase, I would add the word “erotic”: for Apelles and Campaspe, euphuism formalizes *a composite experience of eros* that artfully draws on the artist’s pigment *and* words, on the model’s gestures *and* judgments. This “composite nature” is especially evident in the deployment of instruments as a means of accessing eros; the artistic instruments that stand between Lyly’s erotic subject and object are also what bring them together. Euphuism and instrumentality both illuminate symmetries *and* preserve basic divisions between subject and object. The result is a heterogeneous “composite” erotic experience; euphuistic terms are always held apart by the structure of the sentence, brought together only to be placed on parallel tracks. Such tension and drag is, of course, a prominent feature of instrumentality itself—the greater the adornment, the greater the friction. This is the tension which is constitutive of the erotic process Lyly dramatizes—it is what Apelles longs to preserve in his attempts to blemish and correct the painting, to keep it firmly in place between himself and his beloved. A play like *Campaspe*, in which eros is so self-consciously artful and highly wrought, reveals the unique capacity of Lyly’s dramatic style to act as an erotic instrument in its own right.

“strained,” and “unnatural” quality of his euphuistic pairings. Daniel finds in Lyly’s euphuistic language evidence of the playwright’s “comic spirit” (See Carter Daniel, introduction to *The Plays of John Lyly*, ed. Carter Daniel [Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1988], 12-13).

⁴⁸ Scragg, *Euphuus*, 19.

⁴⁹ Barish, “Prose Style,” 27.

Beyond Lyly's own creative project, what can the domain of artistic creation tell us about the properties of erotic desire? Although painting serves many practical purposes in Lyly's play—it is Apelles' profession, the reason he meets Campaspe in the first place, and the activity that accompanies all of their other interactions—it also serves a conceptual purpose. It provides the lovers with more than a vocabulary; it affords them a structure, a conceptual system, which gives their experience of erotic desire its shape, its medium, and its meaning. The roles, relationships, and entailments of the domain of artistic invention—artist and model, pigment and paintbrush, “aptness” and “cunning,” gazing and posing, “glorz[ing]” and “seem[ing],” representation and reflection—highlight the *creative* features of the erotic experience. The lovers *make* their desire together by means of the metaphor. And metaphor in turn sustains their erotic experience, just as much as the act of painting, as much as the lovers' newly discovered “cunning” or “apt[ness].” Deprived of their metaphor in the final scene of the play, they have no means of knowing or experiencing desire. Artistic creation is the only way they can access eros, which is why Apelles clings so desperately to the creative medium in Campaspe's absence. But his problematic attempts at conjuring Campaspe's phantasm, by way of the song or the portrait, reveal the importance of collaboration in making an erotic relation that remains vital and “fresh” (3.1.1). No sooner do the lovers relinquish their shared metaphor of artistic process than they forfeit eros itself.

III. “You lie, in faith”: Making Marriage in *The Taming of the Shrew*

In the final section of this study, I turn to the instrumental role of language itself as a medium of erotic experience. The “Desiring is Creating” metaphor in *The Taming of the Shrew* depends upon the creative power of words, rather than an artist's pigments or a

model's gestures, as erotic instruments. The subject of language is by no means new to this chapter; we already have seen Campaspe's euphuism and polysemy weave the lovers' artistic and erotic experiences together. But unlike Lyly's lovers' instruments, Kate and Petruchio's art is itself an art of language; they creatively recruit words, stories, and lies to make a marriage together. In *The Taming of the Shrew*, then, erotic language is a kind of dramatic action. Words themselves *act* in *The Taming of the Shrew*—for Petruchio and Kate, they *create*—and this dynamic quality makes their language something more than solely instrumental. As Kenneth Burke explains,

Those who begin with the stress upon *tools* proceed to define language itself as a species of tool. But though instrumentality is an important aspect of language, we could not properly treat it as the *essence* of language. To define language simply as a species of tool would be like defining metals merely as a species of tools. Or like defining sticks and stones simply as primitive weapons. Edward Sapir's view of language as 'a collective means of expression' points in a more appropriate direction. . . . Language is a species of action, symbolic action—and its nature is such that it can be used as a tool.⁵⁰

Burke's close affiliation of "Agency" with "Act" informs this chapter's study of erotic language. The "Desiring is Creating" metaphor dramatizes the dynamic quality of words: erotic language creates, and is thus "a species of action." Since language is the characters' medium of creation, it is also their agency.

As it happens, the "Desiring is Creating" metaphor encompasses more than these two terms from Burke's pentad. Apelles and Campaspe's artistic process remakes them as *agents* even as they use instruments (*agency*) to create their erotic relation; and when they discover the importance of dynamic process (*act*) to their experience of love-

⁵⁰ Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 15.

making, they try to prolong it, making process an end in itself (*purpose*).⁵¹ When we turn to erotic instrumentality in *The Taming of the Shrew*, we encounter the fifth term of Burke's pentad. Kate and Petruchio's marriage-making project requires them to build a private world—a *scene*—through language. Their language becomes as self-consciously artificial as the synthetic scene they create, not only in its often elaborate and even hyperbolic style, but also in its content—Petruchio and Kate's words are artfully styled, but they also are false in their substance, belying the truth of the real world.

Early on in *The Taming of the Shrew*, it becomes clear that Petruchio is a liar of the highest order. Even before he gets down to the business of taming Kate by fabricating flaws with the meat at their dining table, his words have more swagger than substance. Bombarding Baptista with a slew of metaphors before he even meets Kate, Petruchio begins the process of creating his and Kate's relationship through words: "I am as peremptory as she proud-minded, / And where two raging fires meet together / They do consume the thing that feeds their fury" (2.1.132-34). Of course, those "two raging fires" quickly become Kate's "little fire" (135) striving against his "extreme gusts" (136), then *Kate's* "winds" (141) blowing against Petruchio's "mountains" (141). The pace and fluidity of his metaphors reflect Petruchio's talent for telling stories, and in particular, for lying. He creates and amends, only to re-revise his relation to Kate by means of conflicting metaphors, figures that when taken together, can in no way represent a single truth. Each of his successive metaphors fashions an alternate world—in the first world, the lovers meet as one fire and so move together; in the second, he moves more forcefully than she, and in the third, he does not move at all ("She moves me not" [1.2.71]). Such

⁵¹ When the creative process is both an erotic action and its *telos*, as it is for Lyly's lovers, it may be described as entelechial: "Desiring is Creating" accomplishes its end *in process*.

figuration either dispenses with truth—certainly no one of his metaphors *has* to be true—or it confirms that the only truth that matters is the truth of Petruchio’s linguistic virtuosity, his talent for *making* truths. Like Campaspe and Apelles, Petruchio traffics in self-advertising artifice, in a style that aims for flourishes over plainness, fulsomeness over brevity.

It comes as no surprise, then, that Petruchio aims to woo Kate with lies, describing her not as she really is but as he would have her be. His goal is presumably to warrant the truth of his assertions—“thou art pleasant, gamesome, passing courteous” (2.1.236)—*by* assertion.⁵² And yet, there is something decidedly off about Petruchio’s plan. To begin with, there is some question as to whether he actually desires these qualities in a wife. When he hears about Kate’s wild behavior with Hortensio—the “impatient devilish spirit” (2.1.152) with which “she struck me on the head” (2.1.154)—Petruchio responds with an eagerness to meet her: “Now, by the world, it is a lusty wench. / I love her ten times more than e’er I did. / O how I long to have some chat with her!” (2.1.161-63). Although Petruchio’s words have already been exposed as overinflated and equivocal (his “ten times” greater “love” for a woman he still has not actually met is dubious), his excitement is palpable.⁵³ Petruchio has already declared his desire to gaze upon Kate, “to make mine eye the witness / Of that report which I so oft

⁵² According to the conventions of speech act theory developed by J.L. Austin and John R. Searle, Petruchio intends to speak with declarative illocutionary force—that is, his words are meant to bring about a change in the world by asserting that change. See John R. Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things With Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

⁵³ Laurie E. Maguire observes Petruchio’s desire to preserve Kate’s wildness when he declares his plan to “curb”—but *not* to break—her “headstrong humor” (4.1.199). Maguire refers to Coppélia Kahn’s identification of “the most cherished male fantasy of all—that the woman remain *untamed*” (Kahn, *Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981], 117). See Laurie E. Maguire, “‘Household Kates’: Chez Petruchio, Percy, and Plantagenet,” in *Gloriana’s Face: Women, Public and Private, in the English Renaissance*, ed. S. P. Cerasano and Marion Wynne-Davies (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 129-65.

have heard” (2.1.52-53); but here he reveals that his interest lies in her conversation: her “chat” is what he “long[s]” for. Then, too, it is the “lusty” quality that he finds in her aggressive and rebellious behavior and speech that attracts him. While early modern English “lusty” connoted sexual desire or fervor, it also spoke to liveliness and vigor.⁵⁴ Petruchio’s “long[ing]” for Kate’s vigor—sexual or otherwise—calls into question his so-called desire for “peace...and quiet life” (5.2.112) in marriage. “[Q]uiet[ness]” apparently makes for as tepid and lackluster an erotic relation in Shakespeare as in Lyly. Like Apelles, who is first attracted to the “fresh” quality in Campaspe, Petruchio’s response to Kate’s liveliness is to employ it in the service of a mutual and erotic end. To “chat” with her will be to put her vigor *to use* alongside his own.

Still, none of this explains why Petruchio woos with false descriptions. What does he hope to accomplish by blatantly lying to Kate about how she is behaving? Does he really believe that his praise of her “mildness” (2.1.192) will magically induce her to retract her claws and become mild? Corinne S. Abate has argued that Petruchio’s “tactics of positive reinforcement” create an affective bond with his future wife. But since Petruchio hatches his plan with the expectation that Kate will display no such “positive” behaviors to reinforce, Abate’s assessment is probably too generous.⁵⁵ The most prominent feature of Petruchio’s seduction scheme is the gap between his words and Kate’s actions: by deliberately mislabeling her behavior, Petruchio conspicuously

⁵⁴ See “lusty, *adj.*,” *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. 1989, *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2011 < <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/111424>>. Entries 3 and 4 give “full of desire, desirous” and “full of lust, sexual desire,” respectively. The fifth entry, which cites Shakespeare’s *Richard II* among its sources, defines the term as “full of healthy vigor.”

⁵⁵ Abate writes, “Petruchio’s tactics of positive reinforcement in his unconventional wooing of Katherine allow her in turn to create a private space for herself within her marriage” (See Corinne S. Abate, “Neither a Tamer Nor a Shrew Be: A Defense of Petruchio and Katherine,” in *Privacy, Domesticity, and Women in Early Modern England*, ed. Corinne S. Abate [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003], 31-44, 31). Rather than creating this private space by reinforcing Kate’s actual behaviors, I believe that Petruchio and Katherine create privacy through their mutual faith in the fictions they make together.

introduces the element of *artifice* into his relation with Kate. Describing Kate in language that stands in such stark contrast to her actions loosens the connection between Petruchio's words and the world they putatively reflect. The result is that his assertions create the possibility of a different world—one that, for all that it is a lie, nonetheless can conjure a privately and mutually constituted truth. Or, it can do this if Kate confirms his untruths. Petruchio may believe that he must “tame” Kate if he is to secure her confirmation, but Shakespeare reveals that only their mutual erotic and affective experiences enable them to inhabit the shared reality that becomes their marriage. Love and marriage are creative acts for Petruchio and Kate—they *make* marriage just as we say we make love. Their lies are inseminating; from them germinates an intimate, erotic, shared, and ever-so-private imaginary in which “men and women are alone” (2.1.313). To inhabit such a world requires of them a mutually constitutive faith in their lies.

Petruchio's storytelling power is tested as early as the couple's first encounter, when he realizes that his plan to bring about a series of truths by lying is more difficult to execute than he imagines. Although he intends to woo Kate by responding to her language (“Say that she rail . . .” [2.1.171]), it is Petruchio who speaks first, Petruchio who speaks eleven of the first thirteen lines of their exchange. Once their lines begin to split more evenly, he struggles to maintain his fictions. When he calls her “young and light” (2.1.206) and Kate twists his words in reply, Petruchio veers away from his script and betrays his frustrations (“Should be? should – buzz!” [2.1.209]). Rather than praise Kate for those qualities he would have her embody, he proves unable to sustain a lie and instead responds to her actual behavior: “Come, come, you wasp, i' faith you are too angry” (2.1.212), and “you must not look so sour” (2.1.232). Apparently Petruchio's

fictions only take him so far; Kate's anger and sourness get the best of him, provoking an equally angry and sour response on his part. When she strikes him, he cannot bring himself to praise her gentle touch and instead threatens her with violence in kind: "I swear I'll cuff you if you strike again" (224). Petruchio's threat sounds more like "two raging fires" than a stoic mountain impervious to Kate's breeze. If we listen closely, we can hear that his lies fail to make truths precisely when she unsettles him emotionally: language fails him when Kate incites an anger in him that matches her own. When speech acts give way to affective experience, Petruchio and Kate, undoubtedly much to their dismay, find themselves *feeling* together.

A number of scholars have commented on Kate and Petruchio's shared dispositions and linguistic patterns, and such similarities set the tone for a marriage based on mutuality.⁵⁶ The likenesses between Petruchio and Kate's temperaments are anything but subtle; at various turns, any number of characters will refer to the pair's mutual "mad[ness]" (3.2.180) and "shrew[ishness]" ("he is more shrew than she," says Curtis in 4.1.76). All of this comports with Petruchio's image of "two raging fires" (2.1.132). But this metaphor reveals more than mere similarity between the lovers; in it, they become undifferentiated, merging when they "meet together" into a single force of nature.⁵⁷

Moreover, the rage in "raging" points to the way their commonalities constellate around

⁵⁶ Joel Fineman provides a fine account of the couple's similarities in speech and temperament. See "The Turn of the Shrew," in *Much Ado About Nothing and The Taming of the Shrew: Contemporary Critical Essays*, ed. Marion Wynne-Davies (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 123-47. Frances E. Dolan emphasizes the prominence of language and speech in the pair's mutual shrewish behavior: "Petruchio is also a shrew in that he dominates through speech" (See Frances E. Dolan, ed., *The Taming of the Shrew Texts and Contexts* [Boston: Bedford Books, 1996], 18-19).

⁵⁷ The metaphors that follow his initial description of the "two raging fires" all attempt to distinguish Petruchio from Kate, presumably establishing Petruchio's authority as the stronger force of nature. But the images that he chooses unwittingly draw them closer together. His first shift, in portraying himself as the wind, is belied by the second, which identifies Kate with the very same element. Petruchio's efforts to best his own metaphors apparently get the best of him; the lovers merge even where they are described in polarizing language.

affect, around madness, shrewishness, cholera, and passion. Despite the imbalance of power between them, Petruchio's metaphor suggests that they will eventually share their feelings. But this will take time: before they meet, Petruchio's and Kate's dispositions and qualities are similar but still *separate*. Yes, she and he are both mad, just not mad together.

But when Petruchio threatens to "cuff" (2.2.224) Kate after she strikes him, they are mad together. In that instant, however brief, they feel the same thing at the same time. Their shared affective experience apparently comes from the erotic friction that has built during the pair's verbal sparring match. Petruchio's words cannot make Kate into an obedient wife, but it turns out that they can bring about a change in the couple's world. His language makes their scene erotic by imposing on their interactions a crude sexuality which is sometimes merely misogynistic ("Women are made to bear" [2.1.203]), but which at other times, might engender erotic activity itself ("come sit on me" [2.1.201]). Of course, the imperative force of Petruchio's command is nugatory, since Kate intends neither to "bear" nor to "sit on" him. But even without her consent or her affection, Petruchio's lines infuse their interaction with erotic tension and energy.

Petruchio's sexual jokes and provocations culminate in his refusal to leave Kate "with my tongue in your tail" (2.1.221). This statement falls in line with their volley of double entendres and puns, but now Petruchio asserts that they are engaged in an erotic activity in the present tense. Rewriting their conversation as anilingus, Petruchio would have it that Kate's mouth is a "tail" that he is penetrating with his tongue. Unlike a command or solicitation ("come sit on me") that Kate can refuse, Petruchio's description insists that something sexually explicit is happening *now*. No, he cannot enforce the

physical act that he describes, but neither is he quite lying. His tongue is, after all, in her “tale” if not her “tail”, hence his language has the curious effect of making their exchange erotic merely by *asserting* that it is. The proof is that Kate now strikes him and so arouses his anger. It is the erotic charge of Petruchio’s *language* that prompts their shared affective experience of anger. When he insists that an erotic act is happening in the present tense, that it is an aural effect of their verbal exchange, Petruchio reconceptualizes everything the pair has been doing together. The imaginative power of his suggestion is enough to elicit a physical response from Kate, enough, too, to create the possibility of a private world whose erotic charge can alter the real world they inhabit.

The invention of a separate and private world that lies at the heart of Petruchio’s marriage-making project reflects the period’s changing ideas about the role of privacy and domesticity in marriage.⁵⁸ Although the category of privacy was itself unstable in early modern England—and very much so with regard to domestic life and marriage—there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that privacy was beginning to emerge as a condition or an aspiration of marriage.⁵⁹ Petruchio participates in this imaginative

⁵⁸ Although a number of scholars have argued that the concept of privacy in the West dates to the early modern period, there has been some debate about the legibility of this category during Shakespeare’s day. Jürgen Habermas finds the origins of the modern distinction between public and private spheres in the eighteenth century (See Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger [Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1989]). Other scholars find evidence of this distinction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Lena Cowen Orlin writes, “public and private did not sort themselves for early moderns in precisely the same way they do for us, but this is not to deny that a sorting process was engaged in the period” (See Orlin, *Private Matters and Public Culture in Post-Reformation England* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994], 89). The emerging divisions between public and private in the early modern period have been of particular interest to scholars of early modern women and domesticity. See S. P. Cerasano and Marion Wynne-Davies, ed., *Gloriana’s Face: Women, Public and Private in the English Renaissance* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), and Corinne S. Abate, ed., *Privacy, Domesticity, and Women in Early Modern England* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). Although there is some disagreement among scholars as to the stability of early modern divisions between public and private, it is clear that the concept of privacy is available as a rhetorical, metaphorical, and theoretical category during the period. The material, lived experience of privacy (e.g., in the early modern home) is more difficult to access.

⁵⁹ Lena Cowen Orlin has emphasized the important distinctions among lived experience, chronicled or recorded history, and imaginative literature in her study of private life in early modern England: “[D]espite

project when he uses suggestion and fabrication to conjure a private domestic scene. Since he cannot change the public world with words—calling Kate “tame” will not tame her—he sets out to create a private world that validates his words.⁶⁰ He begins this project in his initial dialogue with Kate, but the lies he tells her father at the end of the scene arguably constitute his most important tactic. Petruchio insists that Kate is infatuated with him in private but that they have “bargained ‘twixt us twain, being alone, / That she shall still be curst in company” (2.1.305-06). “[B]eing alone” itself calls into being a distinction between the couple’s private and public behavior. For Petruchio, this is the very work of marriage—the fabrication of a domestic scene or home, along with a private language suited to it. For all that it is utterly false, the private life that he describes has become a possibility simply because he speaks it into existence. Moreover, the bargain that he says that he and Kate have struck is not only a fiction in itself, it is also a bargain *about* fiction making. The two of them are said to have agreed to act one way “being alone” and another way “in company.” He goes on to praise Kate’s loving kisses and oaths, boasting how “‘Tis a world to see / How tame, when men and women are alone, / A meacock wretch can make the curstest shrew” (2.1.312-14). Stephen Orgel glosses Petruchio’s “world” as “worth a world,” but the phrase “‘Tis a world” also stipulates a private realm in which “men and women are alone” (313). Petruchio has

all efforts to codify it, to demystify it, and to find convenient ruling formulas for it, the private life of the sixteenth century was the stuff of legend as surely as was any chronicle of state or myth of nationhood. Of course its literature was shaped by culture and mediated by ideology, but this literature nonetheless gives us glimpses of interpersonal relations, forbidden pleasures, shared jokes, small tragedies, personal triumphs, and private miracles that defied doctrine” (See Orlin, “Chronicles of Private Life,” in *The Cambridge Companion to English Literature 1500-1600*, ed. Arthur Kinney [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 241-64, 260.)

⁶⁰ Speech act theory dictates that a successful declarative utterance must have a double direction of fit, from the world to the word *and* word to world: “the world is altered to fit the propositional content by representing the world as being so altered” (Searle and Vanderveken, *Foundations*, 53). Petruchio’s creation of a new world might give his declarative statements enough illocutionary force to make them successful.

begun to create a modern marriage by making a new world, mysterious and unknowable from the outside, inaccessible to anyone but himself and Kate.

When the couple leaves Padua, then, they bring with them this imagined private world, with as many erotic and affective possibilities as there are words to name them. To cohabit with him the intimate space that he describes to Baptista, Petruchio interpolates a Kate who covers him with “kiss on kiss” (309), bestowing caresses and embraces, vows and protests, in abundance. Taken together with the sodomitical kisses he insinuates into their earlier exchange, the erotic potential of this imagined world is vast, if not quite mutual. It is *Kate’s* kisses (of whatever sort) that Petruchio dwells on in his descriptions, not his own. When the couple finally does arrive at Petruchio’s country house in 4.1, he suddenly has to contend with the very real affective experience that the marriage he has made out of lies entails. All at once, he launches a sleep and food deprivation program: to keep Kate awake, he plans to “fling” (4.1.191) the bed sheets and pillows; “if she chance to nod I’ll rail and brawl / And with the clamor keep her still awake” (4.1.196-97). In the 1980 BBC film, John Cleese’s disheveled Petruchio struggles to keep his eyes open during this speech, following up “if she chance to nod” with a huge, gaping yawn of his own.⁶¹ Cleese’s performance reminds us that all of this midnight railing and brawling deprives Petruchio of sleep, too; although his taming strategies are cruel, he suffers alongside his wife.⁶² Earlier, at the dinner table, he declares, “this night we’ll fast *in company*” (4.1.167; emphasis mine). Petruchio easily could have tormented Kate by gorging on mutton while she looks on with longing, but he

⁶¹ I am grateful to Tobias Gregory for pointing out Cleese’s performance as a sleep-deprived Petruchio in the BBC production of the play.

⁶² When Petruchio first hears of Kate in 1.2, he describes his eagerness to meet her in similar terms: “I will not sleep, Hortensio, till I see her” (1.2.102).

decides to abstain. His reason: the overcooked mutton “engenders choler, planteth anger, / And better ‘twere that both of us did fast, / Since of ourselves, ourselves are choleric” (4.1.162-64). Rather than emphasize their differences in order to establish dominion over Kate, Petruchio focuses on their similar temperaments and creates a shared experience of hunger for the couple’s first night together. In the couple’s mutual experience of deprivation, Corinne S. Abate finds evidence for Petruchio’s creation of a private sphere: “While Petruchio will not allow Katherine to sit down and eat, he denies himself a meal as well, thus continuing to subject them both to the same conditions, an act of denial which by extension continues his work of constructing a private space of their own.”⁶³

I have been referring to their shared private space, but every production of the play reminds us that Petruchio and Kate are never quite alone at his country house. In fact, the only scene in the play in which just the two of them are on stage together takes place before they are married, in 2.1, when Petruchio first broaches the possibility of a private world. The country house provides no such privacy—at least, not if we define privacy in terms of physical isolation or solitude. When Petruchio denies Kate food and sleep, he does so with Grumio’s and Hortensio’s help. Even the couple’s sleepless nights are subject to his servants’ scrutiny. That Curtis delivers a report on Petruchio’s “sermon of continency to her” (4.1.173) testifies to the publicity of the pair’s “bridal chamber”

⁶³ Abate, *Privacy, Domesticity, and Women*, 35-36. My argument about Petruchio’s marriage-making techniques diverges from Abate’s in degree rather than in kind. For example, Abate continues, “[a]nything Petruchio asks of Katherine, any sacrifice or any perceived maltreatment she may experience, he subjects himself to as well” (36; emphasis mine). I believe that this overstates the degree of reciprocity and balance in the couple’s mutual suffering. Since Petruchio clearly inflicts the suffering upon Kate, it difficult to consider her “perceived maltreatment” as equally shared. As I have suggested elsewhere in this dissertation (particularly the discussion of *Endymion* in Chapter 2), mutual erotic experiences are not necessarily equal or symmetrical.

(4.1.168).⁶⁴ Curtis's report also suggests that, among Petruchio's other deprivations, he denies Kate the sexual satisfactions of married life. And of course, this privation extends to Petruchio as well. Without food, Kate will want. Without sleep, Kate will want. And as long as Petruchio stays up all night and shuns food all day alongside his new wife, he too will want.⁶⁵ In the not-so-private space of the country house, the newlyweds achieve a kind of intimacy by way of this privately shared experience—they *both* go without food, sleep, and sex, even among the servants, friends, and peddlers who surround them. For now, however, Petruchio can accomplish only so much: deprivation does not enable him to create a wife, but he can use it to create desire—a set of mutual desires that he alone has the power to enforce.

Coercion and aggression do, then, play important roles in Petruchio's private world scenario; however, it would be unwise to underestimate the creative efficacy of the couple's preeminent shared affective state—their giddiness. Giddiness is the lubricant that loosens Petruchio and Kate's ties to the public world around them. Petruchio tells us that his goal is to “curb her mad and headstrong humor” (4.1.199), presumably by weakening Kate's defenses. That two of the surest ways to *incur* madness are starvation and sleep-deprivation becomes clear when Kate later complains that she is “giddy for

⁶⁴ Laurie E. Maguire writes that Petruchio's domestic life offers glimpses at his private self: “Petruchio will distinguish between public and private behaviour in his wife's life, as he apparently does in his own. This blustering, military boor in public Padua is domestic in his country house, enquiring about his dog and his cousin Ferdinand, calling for his slippers, and expressing uncertainty rather than confidence in his private moments (‘And ‘tis my *hope* to end successfully’: IV.i.189; emphasis added)” (Maguire, “Household Kates,” 140).

⁶⁵ Deprivation is an embodied and an affective experience that the couple shares, but it is also Petruchio's response to Kate's *linguistic* withholding. Having dressed her meat, he asks for “thanks” (41). She utters “not a word” (42), and he responds by removing the dish from the table. Although we might expect Petruchio to silence Kate as part of his shrew-taming agenda, here he reveals a desire for her speech. Such a desire is not Petruchio's alone; Kate complains that Bianca's “silence flouts me” (2.1.29) and even comes to blows with her sister as a result of Bianca's unwillingness to engage in conversation. For Kate no less than for Petruchio, then, an unwillingness to engage in speech (or to say the *right* things) signals a profound refusal of affective, not to mention, social, engagement. That both Kate and Petruchio crave verbal intercourse testifies to their mirroring need for conversation partners who can confirm the truths they assert.

lack of sleep” (4.3.9). Kate apparently enters into an alternative reality within their quasi-private space. Here, she “sits as one new-risen from a dream” (4.1.175). Having severed their ties to reality, the couple begins to inhabit the private world Petruchio imagined for his married life with Kate. John C. Bean describes Kate’s bewilderment as being “immersed in chaos, in that irrational world where we lose our bearings and our old sense of truth, and [where] she is challenged to respond as Christopher Sly does in the Induction by yielding to the confusion, abandoning her old identity in favor of a new one.”⁶⁶ If, as I am suggesting, such a world is accessible only through *mutually* felt experience, then Petruchio must be giddy as well. And so it is that the widow at the wedding feast comments, in response to a quip from Petruchio, that “[h]e that is giddy thinks the world turns round” (5.2.20). By releasing them from the entailments of the real world, mutual giddiness helps Kate and Petruchio to turn the world on its head. In topsy-turvydom, they may inhabit the private world that Petruchio’s lies have made possible.

Although the couple officially weds in Act 3 of the play, the final scene of Act 4 stages their alternate marriage ceremony in their “world turn[ed] round.” Vows are made and tested, blessings are bestowed, and now their lies become the truths of their shared imaginary. On Kate and Petruchio’s journey back to Padua, this new world is revealed to be colorful and poetic, not to mention creatively and erotically charged. The lovers’ fictions, which acknowledge the realities before them, also engender a private scene with realities of its own. At last, they make for one another a marriage that is both publicly

⁶⁶ See John C. Bean, “Comic Structure and the Humanizing of Kate in *The Taming of the Shrew*,” in *The Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare*, ed. Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayle Greene, and Carol Thomas Neely. [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980], 65-78, 72.

recognized and privately meaningful, imagined and real. By distinguishing their truths from those of the outside world, they discover a new way to inhabit that world.

The exchange between Kate and Petruchio as they make their way back to Padua is straightforward enough: Petruchio makes assertions about the outside world that are blatant lies (first that the moon is out when the sun plainly shines, and second that an old man they pass on the road is actually a young maiden), and Kate slowly begins to understand that she must affirm his assertions in spite of what she knows to be true of the actual world. While this much is inarguable, it fails to acknowledge the telling poetic flourishes that Kate and Petruchio can add only and precisely because they have agreed to their own truth conditions. Take for example Petruchio's description of the scene: "Good Lord, how bright and goodly shines the moon!" (4.5.2). Kate counters that it is the middle of the day and the sun is shining—"The moon? The sun. It is not moonlight now" (4.5.3). Both lovers make a present-tense assertion, but Petruchio tells an unvarnished lie and Kate the plain truth. Plain, too, because where Petruchio embellishes (his moon shines "bright and goodly" [4.5.2]), Kate sticks to the plain facts. It takes time for her to recognize that he is soliciting her, first to grant his counterfactual premise, then to savor his embellishment of it. It is important that he signal this—a signal he sends by means of his fictions, by employing artful language rather than commanding her to do so—but it is equally crucial that she come to understand for herself that in their world that "turns round," what matters most is the truthfulness of his *description* of a moon that is nowhere to be seen.

This exchange launches Kate and Petruchio into a volley of speech acts—assertions and declarations, vows and oaths—that culminates in a shared poetic which

instrumentalizes their erotic relation. Much of the friction between Kate and Petruchio up to this point has resulted from the conflict between false speech and observable truths—that is, between saying and knowing. Petruchio’s project has been to align Kate’s speeches with the truths he would have them reflect. In 4.5, when verbs of saying and of knowing abrade one another, the friction creates an erotic spark between the lovers. Petruchio’s lesson to Kate turns linguistic when he tells her, “I say it is the moon that shines so bright” (4.5.4). This is less about whether or not the moon is in the sky than that Petruchio *says* it is. As we have come to expect, Petruchio is not interested in what is real, only in what is spoken. For Kate, however, the truth of the real world does matter—“My tongue will tell the anger of my heart / Or else my heart, concealing it, will break” (4.3.77-78)—it being the only thing she still can claim for herself. Insisting, “*I know* it is the sun that shines so bright” (4.5.5; emphasis mine), she mirrors the structure of his line, but she substitutes knowing for saying, thereby writing her truth of the sun over his lie of the moon. To bring her into what he has envisioned as their private world, Petruchio must sever Kate’s ties to the truth of the public scene by securing her “faith” (2.1.186) in his fictions.

Kate’s reluctant affirmations of Petruchio’s lies constitute her renewed wedding vow in the topsy-turvy world they have created. After their initial round of stipulations about the sun and the moon, their verbs shift from the indicative to the subjunctive mood, broadening to include the future tense alongside the present. Such are the qualities of verbs in the marriage ceremony, in which couples make plans and promises. Even Petruchio’s oath, “by my mother’s son, and that’s myself” (4.5.6), calls to mind the wedding ceremony’s confirmation of lineage and its deference to the authority of a higher

power. Here, Petruchio as author and deity creates a present and a future reality with his “*It shall be moon*” (4.5.7). Kate mirrors his language—another feature of the wedding ceremony—in a reply that also features the subjunctive mood, and that culminates in a promise: “be it moon or sun or what you please. / An if you please to call it a rush candle, / Henceforth I *vow* it shall be so for me” (13-15; emphasis mine).⁶⁷ Carefully conjoining saying and being, Kate weaves the couple’s fictions together with the private realities they create: whatever Petruchio “*call[s]* it... it shall *be* so for me.” Co-opting Petruchio’s earlier declaration of “it shall be,” but adding the ever-crucial “for me,” Kate comes closest to a marriage vow in this line. She promises her husband a future in which reality “for me” can stand apart from that of the observable world.

Taken together, Kate’s renewed vow, the couple’s mutual giddiness, and the fictions that instrumentalize their private world all offer the lovers some creative latitude in their experiences together. When they meet Vincentio in the street, Petruchio’s insistence that the old man is actually a “fresh... gentlewoman” (4.5.29) is as effusive and rich as ever. In his familiar style, Petruchio waxes poetic about the rosy cheeks, bright eyes, and “heavenly face” (32) of the “fair lovely maid” (33). Much less expected is Kate’s *still more* effusive response, as fanciful and silly as Petruchio’s characteristic bombast, but with marked variations on his established theme. Petruchio focuses solely on the “maid’s” beauty, which comports with his focus on the couple’s earlier

⁶⁷ Several scholars have commented on the allegorical significance of the sun and moon as figures for a husband and a wife. Frances E. Dolan describes this ideal relationship as one in which the wife reflects her husband like the moon reflects the sun: “Katharine begins to mirror her husband’s moods and perceptions, to govern her conduct with an eye to his inclinations, to say as he says. It is hardly accidental that they establish this relationship as person and mirror, source of light and authority versus reflection through a debate about the sun and the moon. In discussing the sun and the moon, they become them” (Dolan, *Taming*, 31). Laurie E. Maguire, on the other hand, reads the mirroring in the couple’s dialogue as evidence for mutuality in the marriage they create together: “Petruchio’s victory is first illustrated in a scene which demonstrates the verbal interchangeability of sun and moon, and hence the equivalent status of the two bodies” (Maguire, “Household Kates,” 148).

conversation about the sun and the moon—Petruccio is mostly interested in making observations (typically false ones) and having Kate confirm them as true. But Petruccio’s lies merely build a scene; Kate’s fictions *animate* that scene by imbuing it with plot and setting, invigorating its matter with action. She assigns the old man a place in the world and a reason for being, addressing him as a “Young budding virgin” (36). The old man becomes a marriageable maiden, not only a pretty face, but a character with a story that Kate protracts when she asks, “Whither away, or where is thy abode?” (37). Gathering steam, Kate next draws a web of relationships around their newly-minted virgin, asking after the maiden’s parents and “the man whom favorable stars / Allots thee for his lovely bedfellow” (39-40). In a few short lines, Kate has given Petruccio’s pretty young creation kin, social status, and an erotic role as well.⁶⁸ Kate may be mocking Petruccio’s typically elaborate if empty words, but she has manifestly freed herself (or been freed) from the constraints of the world around her, a world she has found largely unpleasant and unsatisfying up until this point. No longer consigned or resigned to “tell[ing] the anger of my heart” (4.3.77), Kate now produces new affective states, by turns playful, imaginative, and bound only to Petruccio’s fancy. As John C. Bean puts it, “Kate is tamed not by Petruccio’s whip but by the discovery of her own imagination” in this scene.⁶⁹

Corrected by Petruccio as to the proper identity of the old man, Kate continues to exercise her newfound mastery of an artful language that animates the world that

⁶⁸ John C. Bean observes that “Kate herself notes the sexual humor” in the scene (“Comic Structure,” 73).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 72. Kate’s creative agency in this scene complicates Dolan’s reading of the couple’s “relationship as person and mirror” (*Taming*, 31).

Petruchio creates.⁷⁰ Laurie E. Maguire notes “the hyperbole of Kate’s responses to Petruchio and the imaginative freedom of her addresses to Vincentio.”⁷¹ Like Petruchio’s fire and wind metaphors in 2.1, Kate’s hyperbole calls attention to the artificiality of the lovers’ creative medium. Their ornate lies recall the ornate language of Lyly’s painter and model—artifice is all four lovers’ love-making medium.⁷² Once Kate and Petruchio agree on the presence of the moon in the sky or the young girl in the street, they have access to “bright” (4.5.2) gleams and rosy “fresh” (4.5.36) beauty. Their hard won “faith” (2.1.186) in their mutual lies enables them to inhabit these fictions, and in so doing, they call to mind Curtis’s line from earlier in Act 4, when Grumio hits him rather than tell him a story: “This is to feel a tale, not to hear a tale” (4.1.56). To “feel” a tale is to occupy an affective and embodied fiction, turning empty lies into meaningful realities. Kate enacts this shift when she tells Vincentio that she mistakenly addressed him as a young maiden because her eyes “have been so bedazzled by the sun / That everything I look on seemeth green” (45-46). By cleverly referring back to the couple’s initial debate about the presence of the sun in the sky, Kate makes their words meaningful, once again animating the world Petruchio has created for them by instrumentalizing the sun, putting it to *use*.⁷³ And although Petruchio and Kate have quibbled over what is true and what is false, they end up reconfirming everything that is actually true of the scene around them.

⁷⁰ Even in Kate’s acknowledgment that Vincentio is in fact an old man, she characterizes him relationally and socially, as “a reverend father” (4.5.47), rather than making a simple observation about his physical appearance. Like Campaspe, Kate’s role in her creative partnership with Petruchio is interpretive. She invigorates his creation by giving it meaning.

⁷¹ Maguire, “Household Kates,” 135.

⁷² In a 2012 wordless production of the play in Washington, DC, the Synetic Theater Company cast their Petruchio as a painter who realizes and explores his desire for Kate by creating her portrait. In the painting scene, Petruchio is surrounded by a group of dancers, each of whom represents a pigment. The pigments dance between him and Kate, using their bodies and hands to block Petruchio’s access to Kate even as they present her to him.

⁷³ Frances E. Dolan also comments on Kate’s embellishments: “Katherine even goes the game one farther, elaborating on the identification of the old man as a young woman, and blaming her ‘mistake’ on the sun” (*Taming*, 30).

By the end of 4.5, they have agreed that the sun shines above them, and that the traveler is indeed an old man. What has been achieved at the end of the scene is a mutual understanding, a promise given, received, and tested, which cues the birth of a creative medium for marriage-making that Kate has already begun to explore and refine.

Kate and Petruchio's private world aligns much more effortlessly with the sun's beams and the man's age than it does with the social world that awaits them at Bianca's wedding feast, where *uneasy* alignment is painfully evident in Kate's final speech. In 4.5, Kate mirrors and answers Petruchio's lines. In her final speech in 5.2, Kate must go it alone. In fact, much of what she says in 5.2 appears to be self-authored: Petruchio has not complained to Kate of his "painful labor both by sea and land" (5.2.155), nor has he made mention of her "soft and weak and smooth" body (5.2.171) as a reason for his supremacy. But like the sun's beams and the man's advanced age, Kate's words *do* align with real world narratives. Is her fulsome declaration of a wife's submission another poetic flourish, a mere difference in degree from her "mad mistaking" (4.5.48) of the old man's wrinkles as the blush of a young virgin's cheek?⁷⁴

What is missing at the end of her forty-four uninterrupted lines of reproach is *Petruchio's* confirmation, *his* poetic flourishes that might animate or invigorate the story she has told. He calls her "a wench" (5.2.186), demands a kiss, and gloats about winning his bet—but there are no metaphors, puns, or assertions, however truthful, to corroborate

⁷⁴ Scholars continue to disagree about Kate's last speech. David Daniell imagines that the couple has reached a private understanding: "A special quality of mutuality grew between Katherine and Petruchio as the play progressed, something invisible to all the others in the play and sealed for them both by Kate's last speech" ("The Good Marriage of Katherine and Petruchio," in *The Taming of the Shrew Critical Essays*, ed. Dana Aspinall, [New York: Routledge, 2002], 71-84, 76). John C. Bean also emphasizes the qualities of reciprocity and mutuality in Kate's final speech, especially when it is compared to its corollary in the earlier anonymous play, *The Taming of a Shrew* (published in 1594). In contrast to the harsh tone of the speech in *A Shrew*, in which Kate blames women for original sin, Kate's speech in *The Shrew* focuses on "reciprocity of duties in marriage, based on complementary natures of man and woman" (Bean, "Comic Structure," 68).

the world she presents. All the details (of which there are many) are supplied by Kate, rather than co-authored by the pair. This is not to say that Petruchio explicitly disagrees with Kate's speech, but to suggest that his silence makes it impossible to assess his faith in the matrimonial story she tells. What we are able to assess is the marked difference in temperature between the marriage she describes in 5.2 and the one she enters into in 4.5. Although Kate scolds the other women at the table for their "frosts" (5.2.145), the picture she paints of ideal marriage has little warmth to it. The only mention of warmth or heat is in Kate's description of the wife who "liest warm at home, secure and safe" (5.2.157) while her husband is out toiling in the world. There is little heat between the couple, certainly none of the sparks that Kate and Petruchio generated in their 2.1 encounter, not even the warmth of the sun's beams that they just conjured together.

In its remoteness and its polish, its separateness and its totality, Kate's final speech resembles Apelles' finished portrait—it stands at a distance from the lovers. When Kate and Petruchio's words are no longer instrumental to their marriage making, they lose their "fresh" quality, their vigor, their friction and so their heat. Perhaps this is why so many productions add their own flourishes to the speech: physical cues from either of the lovers, knowing winks or smiles, sounds or gestures of encouragement from Petruchio.⁷⁵ Any of these choices speaks to a desire for mutuality, and an acknowledgment that such artful flourishes are the erotic instruments that enable Petruchio and Kate's private understanding. Only when Kate and Petruchio's words are placed in *relation* do the lovers generate friction and heat. A shivering Grumio reminds

⁷⁵ There is a robust theatrical tradition marked by such experimentations with Kate's final speech. Citing the 1929 Columbia Pictures *Taming of the Shrew*, where Kate "winks as she advocates a woman's submission to her husband," Diana Aspinall attributes this tradition to the "feelings of vexation regarding *Shrew*" in the twentieth century (See Aspinall, "The Play and the Critics," in *The Taming of the Shrew Critical Essays*, ed. Dana Aspinall [New York: Routledge, 2002], 3-38, 30-31).

the audience at the start of Act 4 that there is something in the *making* of heat which is itself warming: “But I with blowing the fire shall warm myself” (4.1.8-9). Grumio draws our attention to the means and ends of instrumentality; in his account, the kind of heat that comes from blowing the fire is distinct from the heat produced by the fire itself. The former, the heat of labor and creating, is what sustains Lyly’s and Shakespeare’s lovers, but only while they make their erotic relations together.

Conclusion The Success of Failure and Beyond

Throughout this dissertation, I have explored the capacity of language to create, to transform, and to dramatize the erotic experiences of Lyly's and Shakespeare's characters. I have argued that on the early modern English stage, metaphorical language constitutes the inner experience that it reveals. Characters such as Lyly's Apelles and Campaspe and Shakespeare's Kate and Petruchio employ their metaphors deliberately, even self-consciously, collaboratively *making* their erotic relations. Other characters' metaphors are less intentional and so more a product of a fundamental or prior erotic orientation. In Othello's "stops" (2.1.196) that propel him into frenzied motion, in Endymion's self-effacing exposure, and in Antony and Cleopatra's erotics of bounded loss, we find metaphors that are more cognitive than calculated, more self-making than self-made. Their metaphors create but also constrain their erotic experiences. Othello's erotic process consists of the collision between the domains of stillness and experience; Valentine's language of banishment gives way to the more flexible domain of permeability; and Endymion's metaphors of exposure produce a form of erotic intimacy that paradoxically feeds on solitude and distance. Erotic language can be extraordinarily fruitful—active, dynamic, *dramatic*—even if it takes the failure of one metaphor to spark another.

Having emphasized the creative potential of erotic language, I will conclude this dissertation by reflecting on the consequences of its failures. Exemplary are the nymphs in *Galatea*, whose inability to express and understand their desire comprises their erotic

experience, even defines their very selves.¹ Still more common is the inability of any single metaphor to dramatize eros in all of its complexity. Lakoff and Johnson note that complex concepts often require a combination of two metaphors, “because there is no one metaphor that will do the job... Thus we get instances of impermissible mixed metaphors resulting from the impossibility of a single clearly delineated metaphor that satisfies both purposes at once.”² This helps us to understand why the language of desire is marked by inconsistency and change, by a shifting and layering of different conceptual domains that make erotic experience both coherent and incoherent. Metaphors sometimes overlap, sometimes contradict one another; they open up new erotic possibilities as quickly as they cordon off others. Each linguistic shift creates erotic friction that is a form of dramatic action in its own right.³ Some inconsistencies between metaphors are relatively subtle, such as Claudio’s shift from the language of scope and restraint to the image of the ratsbane in *Measure for Measure*, but others produce large and decisive breaks between domains of experience. We saw this in Apelles’ sharp turn from metaphors of portraiture to those of sculpture. As the span between metaphors stretches, erotic and dramatic tension intensifies: it takes more and more effort to make the world cohere across gaps between conceptual domains. But as if in response, playwrights and characters manage these widening gaps with a linguistic augmentation that, in turn, creates an even broader erotic scope.

For Shakespeare’s Angelo, language gets its erotic charge from the powerful contrast between his metaphors of “scope” (1.2.126) and “restraint” (1.2.127). If we

¹ At 3.1.57, we read, “Thou hast *told* what I am in *uttering* what thyself is” (emphasis mine).

² Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 95.

³ The shifts between the terms in his dramatistic pentad that Kenneth Burke calls “transformations” result from the “inevitable ambiguities and inconsistencies” (*GM*, xviii) in which lie some of the most potent dramatic moments.

cannot say which of the two he finds more sexually exciting, it is because his most dramatic moments depend on their interplay. At the end of his first encounter with Isabella, Angelo delivers a soliloquy in which he struggles to find his way to a coherent erotic experience amidst frustrating inconsistencies among his metaphors and among the different terms of Burke's pentad. The dazzling scope of one linguistic register contends with the paralyzing restraint of another:

What's this? What's this? Is this her fault or mine?
 The tempter or the tempted, who sins most, ha?
 Not she, nor doth she tempt; but it is I
 That, lying by the violet in the sun,
 Do as the carrion does, not as the flower,
 Corrupt with virtuous season. Can it be
 That modesty may more betray our sense
 Than woman's lightness? Having waste ground enough,
 Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary
 And pitch our evils there? O fie, fie, fie!
 What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?
 Dost thou desire her foully for those things
 That make her good? O, let her brother live!
 Thieves for their robbery have authority
 When judges steal themselves. What, do I love her,
 That I desire to hear her speak again,
 And feast upon her eyes? What is't I dream on?
 O cunning enemy that, to catch a saint,
 With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous
 Is that temptation that doth goad us on
 To sin in loving virtue. Never could the strumpet
 With all her double vigor, art and nature,
 Once stir my temper, but this virtuous maid
 Subdues me quite. Ever till now,
 When men were fond, I smiled and wondered how.
 (2.2.162-86)

Angelo's opening "What's this?" is as broad in scope as it is ambiguous in meaning and rich in interpretive potential. His question gestures toward the innocence of Lyly's Phao or his nymphs when they are pierced by Cupid's arrows and experience erotic desire for the first time (in Lyly, the recurring question is "How now?"). But it turns out that

Angelo's "What's this?" is *too* broad, *too* accommodating, *too* generative. His erotic language reaches beyond what he can conceptualize. No surprise, then, that what follows is a major shift in linguistic register, from what Burke calls "scope" to "reduction."⁴ This, at least, is what we hear in Angelo's next, startlingly reductive question: "Is this her fault or mine?" At once, Angelo restricts a range of unlimited possibilities to two—from infinity to two (or even just to one: "fault"), from surfeit to fast, from scope to restraint—thereby indelibly marking both his attenuated erotic attitude and language. Conceptual metaphor theory teaches us that Angelo's erotic experience is comprised of the very shifts that he explores, even indulges in, throughout his soliloquy. His language progresses from the metaphysical "what's this" to the profoundly physical metaphor of the carrion rotting in the sun, from abstract emotional experience ("What, do I love her...") to concrete sensory experience ("...that I desire to hear her speak again, / And feast upon her eyes?").

Each linguistic scope prompts a new reduction; physical and scenic, sensory and specific metaphors aim to fix his erotic desire. Angelo seemingly compulsively ricochets between scope and reduction, all the while betraying the acute inconsistencies in his erotic experience. As hastily as he imagines Isabella as his scene (sunshine, sanctuary), he sees her as an agent (the tempter, the violet, a saint). He reconceptualizes his actions ("What dost thou?") variously as corrupting, razing, stealing, feasting, dreaming, and sinning. His cast of characters is no less variable: sometimes the devil is present ("O cunning enemy"), sometimes he is alone; sometimes he and Isabella are both saints, sometimes they are diametrically opposed (tempter or tempted, flower or carrion). His

⁴ Burke studies acts of linguistic placement in a section of *Grammar* entitled "Scope and Reduction." He describes the search "for vocabularies that will be faithful *reflections* of reality" as the pursuit of a language that "has the necessary scope. In its selectivity, it is a reduction" (*GM*, 59).

metaphorical progress traverses Burke's dramatistic pentad; but where Burke's ratios hold agents and acts to be consistent with the scenes that contain them, Angelo's are rife with tension. Within "virtuous" scenes, Angelo's *vices* flourish: his carrion flesh rots in the sunshine and he "pitches... evils" in the sanctuary. So, even as we try to keep up with his pell-mell cascade of ill-sorted metaphors, we get the impression that the sum not just of his metaphors but of his erotic desire is jagged misalignment itself.

Even, maybe especially, the most disjointed erotic metaphors create dramatic action. Angelo's speech confirms the capacity of language, in its failures no less than its successes, to unleash possibilities that amplify a character's erotic imagination and create erotic scope. Throughout this study, we have seen how metaphors offer characters *a way in*—access to even the most elusive and ecstatic aspects of erotic experience. Levinas conceptualizes these as alterity, a relation with the future and with mystery. For Bachelard, they signal immensity and grandeur. Aristotle has recourse to entelechy. Most of Lyly's and Shakespeare's characters are afraid or unable to name this experience at all, and those who "dare... describe it" (*Galatea* 3.1.88) find that only the language of infinity is sufficient to the task. Only our erotic metaphors allow us to grasp something like immensity by reframing it as intimacy; they alone locate for us a corner of that vast cosmos that we may possess and inhabit. Such metaphors bind even the inconceivable void by bringing it down to earth, into the desiring body, where lovers can share in the pleasures of oblivion and *make* eros out of the terror of nothingness. Erotic language creates suspense even in the most lyrical moments onstage, slowing time with each spacious syllable, prolonging anticipation and expectation, dreams and fantasies, and then

charging those potential or incipient acts with the kinetic energy of the metaphorical domains they employ.

It is, then, the *particularity* of language that enables erotic scope. And only a capacious erotic imagination can create and contain an infinite variety of metaphors, linguistic registers, modes of speech, and the complex interplay among them. The language of desire can be cosmic in scale and extend infinitely outward, but it also turns inward, magnifying a distinct moment in time, plumbing the depths of a single entelechic action. That such wildly expansive, richly textured, and infinitely various erotic experiences emerge from basic conceptual domains testifies to the ability of dramatic language to animate even the most prosaic metaphors, to exploit their unavoidable spatiality and stubborn corporeality. For all of the conventionality of metaphor—and of early modern poetic metaphors in particular, shaped as they are by Petrarchan and prescribed conceits—Lyly's and Shakespeare's language makes erotic experience startlingly new. The scope of their erotic metaphors makes the ordinary extraordinary: it turns a soldier into a colossus, a painter into a god, a queen into the moon. Behold Endymion, falling in love with the moon—the same moon that has sparked centuries worth of familiar verse. Reaching up to the night sky, suddenly he can touch her.

Appendix A: Desire Metaphors in Lyly and ShakespeareCHAPTER 1: DESIRE IS A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE

|
 Desirer is Prisoner/Servant ←or→ Beloved is a Prisoner/Servant
 / \
 Desirer is a Master Beloved is a Master
 \ or /
 Love/Lust/Desire is a Master

DESIRE IS A MAGNETIC ATTRACTION

/ \
 Object of Desire is Magnet ←or→ Desirer is Magnet
 / \
 Desire is Down (Falling)

DESIRING IS HUNTING

/ \
 Looks are Weapons ----- Beloved is Prey
 / \
 Sexual Pleasure is Prey ----- Beloved is Prey

LOVE IS A SIEGE

/
 Words are Weapons
 Desire is an Enemy

DESIRE IS STASIS

Love is a Trance
 Desire is Idleness
 Lust is an Obstacle
 Lust is an Immobilizing Force
 True Love is Constancy
 Desire is Heaviness

←or→

←and→

DESIRE IS MOTION

Seduction is Physical Movement
 Desire is Spur
 Emotions are Physical Motions
 Sexual Promiscuity is Aimless Motion
 and ↗

/
 True Love is Directed/Purposive Motion

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Lovers are Travelers
 Courtship is a Physical Pursuit

Sexual Consummation is a Physical Destination ----- Marriage is a Physical Destination

CHAPTER 2: DESIRE IS PERMEABILITY

|
 Intimacy is Closeness
 Vulnerability is Openness
 Emotional Exposure is Physical Visibility
 Desiring Body is an Open Container

DESIRE IS A DISEASE

←and→

DESIRE IS A DIGESTIVE PROCESS

Sex Act is Depletion ←and→ Sex Act is Remedy ←or→ Sex is Poison
 \
 Lust is Decay

Sexual Desire is Appetite
 Sexual Preference is Taste
 Object of Desire is Food Item
 Sexual Activity is Eating
 Lust is Gluttony
 End of Desire is Bodily Excretion

End of Desire is Physical Purgation ←and→

DESIRING IS BINDING


←or→

DESIRING IS OPENING

Beloved is Container ←or→ Beloved is Bound Object
 Desirer is Contained
 Desiring is Embracing
 Object of Desire is Physical Place Emotional Ties are Physical Ties
 \ \
 Desire is a Measurable Substance ←or→

Love is Overflowing
 Sexual Desire is Swelling ←or→ Desire is Sinking
 Emotion is Fluid
 \
 Lust is Excess
 Desire is Down
 True Love is Infinity
 Excessive Desire is an Immeasurable Substance

CHAPTER 3: DESIRING IS CREATING



DESIRE IS ARTISTIC CREATION

Desiring is an Aesthetic Experience
 Object of Desire is Artistic Object
 Seduction/Courtship is Artistic Virtuosity
 Sexual Pleasure is Aesthetic Pleasure
 Sexual Consummation is Artistic Achievement

DESIRING IS PAINTING

←or→

DESIRING IS SCULPTING

DESIRING IS STORYTELLING

Desirer is Painter
 Beloved is Portrait
 Instruments are Pigments/Colors

{Beloved is Model}
 {Beloved is Interpreter}

Desirer is Sculptor
 Beloved is Statue
 Instruments are Chisels

Desirer is Storyteller
 Fantasies are Stories
 Instruments are Words
 Expressing Desire is Writing

Desiring is Adding On (pigment)

←or→

Desiring is Carving Out (stone)
 Desiring is a Violent Action

Appendix B
Erotic Language in Plays by Lyly

Campaspe

Psyllus

“...many have so fed their eyes with their mistress’ picture that they never desired to take food, being gluttoned with the delight in their favours.” (1.2.68-70)

Apelles will “burn his own heart” (3.2.7)

Hephestion

is “moderate in affection.” (2.2.18)

Alex: Is love a vice?

Heph: It is no virtue. (2.2.19-20)

“Is that mind whose greatness the world could not contain drawn within the compass of an idle alluring eye?” (2.2.37-39)

“...that soft and yielding mind should not be in him whose hard and unconquered heart hath made so many yield.” (2.2.45-47)

Campaspe’s “eyes are framed by art to enamour and... heart was made by nature to enchant.” (2.2.50-52)

Alexander is “found in the hands of...a woman” (2.2.63-64)

“There is no surfeit so dangerous as that of honey, nor any poison so deadly as that of love...” (2.2.85-87)

Alexander may command “to yield to lust by force; but to consent to love by fear you cannot.” (2.2.118-19)

“You love, and therefore think anything.” (3.4.34)

“common we see it incident in artificers to be enamoured of their own works” (5.4.15-16)

“painters, who, playing with their own conceits, now coveting to draw a glancing eye, then a rolling, now a winking, still mending it, never ending it till they be caught with it” (5.4.18-21)

Alex: ...what do you think of love?

Heph: ...think it better to be seen than touched.

Alex: But what do you imagine it to be?

Heph: A word, by superstition thought a god, by use turned to an humour, by self-will made a flattering madness.

Alex: You are too hard-hearted to think so of love. (5.4.34-42)

“your heart is on fire” (5.4.94)

“it is a gentleman’s sport to be in love.” (5.4.106)

Apelles “loveth underhand...” (5.4.111)

“I am determined you shall enjoy one another.” (5.4.120)

“Alexander maketh but a toy of love and leadeth affection in fetters, using fancy as a fool to make him sport...” (5.4.147-49)

“Alexander is cloyed with looking on that which thou wonderedst at.” (5.4.155-56)

“when all the world is won and every country is thine and mine, either find me out another to subdue or, of my word, I will fall in love.” (5.4.172-74)

Alexander

“judge... if the agonies of love be dangerous in a subject, whether they be not more deadly unto Alexander, whose deep and not-to-be-conceived sighs cleave the heart in shivers, whose wounded thoughts can neither be expressed nor endured.” (2.2.99-103)

Alexander’s “affections are not to be measured by reason...” (2.2.107-8)

“Alexander doth love and therefore must obtain.” (2.2.112-13)

“...so far in love with Campaspe...” (3.4.35)

“Alexander can, when he will, throw affections as far from him as he can cowardice.” (3.4.49-51)

Campaspe has “a sweet consent in her countenance with a chaste disdain, desire mingled with coyness and (I cannot tell how to term it) a curst yielding modesty!” (3.4.139-41)

Apelles

“you seem to dispraise that which men most commend, drawing them by that mean into an admiration, where, feeding themselves, they fall into an ecstasy, your modesty being the cause of one, and of the other, your affections.” (3.1.10-14)

Jupiter “obtained his desire.” (3.4.20)

Venus “hath power to command the very affections of the heart.” (3.4.35-36)

Apelles: ...But were you never in love?

Campaspe: No, nor love in me. (3.4.45-46)

“It is not possible that a face so fair and a wit so sharp, both without comparison, should not be apt to love.” (3.4.51-52)

“Hast thou by drawing her beauty brought to pass that thou canst scarce draw thine own breath?” (3.5.14-15)

“by so much the more hast thou increased thy care by how much the more thou hast showed thy cunning.” (3.5.16-17)

“...art must yield to nature, reason to appetite, wisdom to affection.” (3.5.20-21)

“Alexander, the monarch of the earth, hath both her body and affection.” (3.5.31-32)

“stars are to be looked at, not reached at; princes to be yielded unto, not contended with; Campaspe to be honoured, not obtained, to be painted, not possessed of thee.” (3.5.41-44)

“the feeding canker of my care, the never-dying worm of my heart, is to be killed by counsel, not cries, by applying of remedies, not by replying of reasons.” (3.5.59-62)

“as good it were to utter my love and die with denial as conceal it and live in despair.” (3.5.69-70)

Campaspe: ...would you have them [men] dissemble?

Apelles: Not in love, but their love. (4.2.37-38)

“I dare not venture upon your person.” (4.2.49)

“...it is no treason to love.” (4.4.8)

will “embrace thy shadow continually in mine arms, of the which by strong imagination I will make a substance.” (4.4.14-15)

“I fear me, Apelles, that thine eyes have blabbed that which thy tongue durst not.” (5.2.1-2)

“O Love, I never before knew what thou wert, and now hast thou made me that I know not what myself am.” (5.2.9-11)

“I must endure intolerable passions for unknown pleasures.” (5.2.11-12)

“Dispute not the cause, wretch, but yield to it; for better it is to melt with desire than to wrestle with love. Cast thyself on thy careful bed; be content to live unknown and die unfound.” (5.2.12-16)

“O Campaspe, I have painted thee in my heart—painted? nay, contrary to mine art, imprinted; and that in such deep characters that nothing can raze it out unless it rub thy heart out.” (5.2.16-19)

Campaspe

“love was well ratified among men on earth when lust was so full authorised by the gods in heaven.” (3.4.25)

“Utter not that in words which maketh thine ears to glow with thoughts.” (4.2.3-4)

“Hath a painter crept further into thy mind than a prince, Apelles than Alexander?” (4.2.5-7)

“...affection is a fire which kindleth as well in the bramble as in the oak, and catcheth hold where it first lighteth, not where it may best burn.” (4.2.8-11)

“...Apelles, in whom I would there were the like affection.” (4.2.19-20)

Campaspe: You told me, Apelles, that you would never end.

Apelles: Never end my love, for it shall be eternal.

Campaspe: That is, neither to have beginning nor ending. (4.4.2-4)

“...if Alexander perceive your love...” (4.4.7)

“O Apelles, thy love cometh from the heart, but Alexander’s from the mouth.” (4.4.21-23)

Parmenio

Alexander, “whose ever-waking eyes, whose never-tired heart, whose body patient of labour, whose mind unsatiable of victory, hath always been noted, cannot so soon be melted into the weak conceits of love.” (3.4.17-20)

Diogenes

“Your filthy lust you colour under a courtly colour of love...” (4.1.39-40)

Sappho and PhaoCupid

Sappho “hath her thoughts in a string, that she conquers affections and sendeth love up and down upon errands.” (1.1.45-47)

“The gods are amorous and therefore willing to be pierced.” (1.1.50-51)

“nothing can root out the desires of Phao but a new shaft of inconstancy, nor anything turn Sappho’s heart but a new arrow of disdain.” (4.2.37-40)

“This arrow... maketh men passionate in desires, in love constant, and wise in conveyance, melting as it were their fancies into faith.” (5.1.16-19)

“Shoot this arrow among the thickest of them, whose bosoms lie open because they would be stricken with it.” (5.1.35-37)

Pandion

“Mine eye drinketh neither the colour of wine nor women.” (1.2.62-63)

Canope

“...ladies, you know how it cutteth a woman to become a wooer.” (1.4.9-10)

Mileta

“I laugh at that you all call love, and judge it only a word called love. Methinks liking, a curtsy, a smile, a beck, and suchlike are the very quintessence of love.” (1.4.16-18)

“the delight of beauty would so bind my senses as I should be quickly rocked into a deep rest.” (3.4.9-10)

“thou art passing fair, and able to draw a chaste eye, not only to glance but to gaze on thee. Thy young years, thy quick wit, thy staid desires are of force to control those which should command.” (3.4.14-17)

“think you me so dull I cannot love, or so spiteful I will not?” (3.4.25-26)

Mileta: ...will you have women’s love in their tongues?

Phao: Yea, else do I think there is none in their hearts. (3.4.30-31)

“nothing shall assuage your love but marriage...” (4.3.81-82)

“Beware of love, Favilla, for women’s hearts are such stones, which, warmed by affection, cannot be cooled by wisdom.” (4.3.98-100)

Eugenia

“Yet we, when we swear with our mouths we are not in love, then we sigh from the heart and pine in love.” (1.4.46-47)

Sibylla

“...hearken to my tale, which I hope shall be as a straight thread to lead you out of those crooked conceits and place you in the plain path of love.” (2.1.39-41)

“Love... is to be governed by art...” (2.4.61)

“...fancy, though it cometh by hazard, is ruled by wisdom.” (2.4.62-63)

“It is impossible for the brittle metal of women to withstand the flattering attempts of men.” (2.4.70-72)

“Choose such words as may—as many may—melt her mind.... [F]air words wound when they are heard for love.” (2.4.93-96)

“...women strive because they would be overcome. Force they call it, but such a welcome force they account it, that continually they study to be enforced.” (2.4.105-8)

“To fair words join sweet kisses...”(2.4.108)

Ulysses' "filed tongue made those enamoured that sought to have him enchanted."
(2.4.116-17)

"In thy love be secret." (2.4.128-29)

Phao

"Could you not settle your fancy upon any, or would not destiny suffer it?" (2.1.93-94)

"...to yield to love is the only thing I hate." (2.1.131-32)

"What unacquainted thoughts are these, Phao, far unfit for thy thoughts." (2.4.1-2)

"...canst thou not be content to behold the sun, but thou must covet to build thy nest in the sun?" (2.4.3-5)

"Doth Sappho bewitch thee, whom all the Ladies in Sicily could not woo?" (2.4.5-6)

"...the more thou seekest to suppress those mounting affections, they soar the loftier, and the more thou wrestlest with them, the stronger they wax—not unlike unto a ball which, the harder it is thrown against the earth, the higher it boundeth into the air; or our Sicilian stone, which groweth hardest by hammering." (2.4.10-16)

"love, whose deity no conceit can compass, and therefore no authority can constrain, as miraculous in working as mighty, and no more to be suppressed than comprehended!"
(2.4.17-20)

"whither art thou carried..." (2.4.21)

"enjoy thy care in covert..." (2.4.23)

"Let thy love hang at thy heart's bottom, not at the tongue's brim. Things untold are undone; there can be no greater comfort than to know much, nor any less labour than to say nothing." (2.4.28-32)

"gentlewomen are so drowsy in their desires that they can scarce hold up their eyes for love." (3.4.7-8)

"Loves are but smokes which vanish in the seeing and yet hurt whilst they are seen."
(5.3.13-14)

Sappho

Sappho: Heigh-ho! I know not which way to turn me. Ah, ah, I faint, I die!

Mileta: Madam, I think it good you have more clothes, and sweat it out.

Sappho: No, no, the best ease I find is to sigh it out.

Ismena: A strange disease, that should breed such a desire.

Sappho: A strange desire, that hath brought such a disease.

Canope: Where, lady, do you feel your most pain?

Sappho: Where nobody else can feel it, Canope.

Canope: At the heart?

Sappho: In the heart. (3.3.1-11)

“Would I had some local things to dry my brain!” (3.3.21)

“...impatient disease of love...” (3.3.86)

“...may great ladies be plagued with love?” (3.3.88-89)

“I might perish in my flowering years by fancy?” (3.3.96-97)

“Love lodgeth sometimes in caves” (3.3.102)

“Resist it, Sappho, whilst it is yet tender.” (3.3.104-5)

“...glutting myself on the face of Phao, I have made my desire more desperate.” (3.3.109-10)

“into the heart of so great a lady can any creep but a great lord?” (3.3.111-12)

“...my desires the more they swerve from reason, the more seem they reasonable.” (3.3.115-16)

“When Phao cometh, what then: wilt thou open thy love?” (3.3.116-17)

“...though thy love were greater than wisdom could endure, yet thine honor was such as love could not violate.” (3.3.120-22)

“Cupid, why didst thou wound me so deep?” (4.1.4-5)

“Methinks I feel an alteration in my mind and as it were a withdrawing in myself of mine own affections.” (5.2.3-4)

“I will direct those arrows with better aim and conquer mine own affections with greater modesty. Venus’ heart shall flame, and her love be as common as her craft.” (5.2.28-31)

“...sith I am rid of the disease, I will not be ashamed to confess the cause. I loved Phao, Mileta—a think unfit for my degree, but forced by my desire.” (5.2.33-35)

“I feel relenting thoughts, and reason not yielding to appetite.” (5.2.39-40)

“You are not worthy to be the lady of love, that yield so often to the impressions of love. Immodest Venus, that to satisfy the unbridled thoughts of thy heart transgresses so far from the stay of thine honour!” (5.2.64-67)

Venus

“O fair Phao, and therefore made fair to breed me in a frenzy!” (4.2.7-8)

“...these unacquainted torments.” (4.2.17)

“Venus must both play the lover and the dissembler, and therefore the dissembler because the lover.” (4.2.29-30)

“Venus hath young thoughts and fresh affections.” (4.4.15)

“I will love thee again when I have either business or nothing else to do.” (4.4.64-65)

Ismena

“you shall fall in love with hearing fair words.” (4.3.36-37)

“nothing can purge your loving humour but death.” (4.3.38)

“...women are scorched sometimes with men’s eyes, though they had rather consume than confess.” (4.3.102-4)

“there is as little truth to be used in love as there is reason” (5.1.56-57)

Galatea

Cupid

“is there not one [nymph] that followeth, the sweetest thing, sweet love?” (1.2.13-14)

Love is “[a] heat full of coldness, a sweet full of bitterness, a pain full of pleasantness, which maketh thoughts have eyes and hearts ears, bred by desire, nursed by delight, weaned by jealousy, killed by dissembling, buried by ingratitude.” (1.2

Love is “a pretty thing” (1.2.24)

“there is no heart so chaste but thy bow can wound, nor eyes so modest but thy brands can kindle, nor thoughts so staid but thy shafts can make wavering, weak, and wanton.” (2.2.3-6)

“I will... so confound their loves in their own sex that they shall dote in their desires, delight in their affections, and practice only impossibilities.” (2.2.7-10)

“if you see these dainty dames entrapped in love, say softly to yourselves, we may all love.” (2.2.15-16)

“If they be true love-knots, ‘tis impossible to unknit them.” (4.2.23-24)

“Love knots are tied with eyes, and cannot be undone with hands; made fast with thoughts, and cannot be unloosed with fingers.” (4.2.26-27)

“I can wound with looking, fly with thinking, burn with hearing, shoot with speaking.” (5.3.104-6)

“Venus can make constancy fickleness, courage cowardice, modesty lightness, working things impossible in your sex and tempering hardest hearts like softest wool.” (Epilogue, 2-5)

“Yield, ladies, yield to love, ladies, which lurketh under your eyelids whilst you sleep and playeth with your heartstrings whilst you wake; whose sweetness never breedeth satiety, labour-weariness, nor grief-bitterness.” (Epilogue, 5-8)

“[L]ove conquereth all things but itself, and ladies all hearts but their own.” (Epilogue, 12-13)

Nymph

Love is “but a foolish thing.” (1.2.23)

Diana’s virgins “are all chaste, delighting in the bow that wounds the swift hart in the forest, not fearing the bow that strikes the soft heart in the chamber.” (1.2.26-28)

Neptune

Neptune “hast taken sundry shapes to obtain love” (2.2.20-21)

“An idle choice, strange and foolish, for one virgin to dote on another and to imagine a constant faith where there can be no cause of affection.” (5.3.139-41)

Galatea

“I know not how it cometh to pass, but yonder boy is in mine eye too beautiful.” (2.1.46-47)

is “a slave to Cupid who liv[es] in [her] fancy” (2.4.5,6).

“Oh, would, when I hunted his eye with my heart, he might have seen my heart with his eyes!” (2.4.7-8)

“Admit that... I should with entreaties, prayers, oaths, bribes, and whatever can be invented in love, desire your favour, would you not yield?” (3.2.28)

“I...burned in the fire of mine own fancies.” (5.3.127-28)

“I will never love any but Phillida. Her love is engraven in my heart with her eyes.” (5.3.135-36)

“I wish... I may enjoy Phillida.” (5.3.158)

Phillida

“curse... the untamedness of thy affections” (2.5.1-3)

“Art thou no sooner in the habit of a boy but thou must be enamoured of a boy? What shalt thou do, when what best liketh thee most discontenteth thee?” (2.5.3-4)

“transgress in love a little of thy modesty.” (2.5.7-8)

“pine in thine own peevishness.” (2.5.9)

“I go, resolute either to bewray my love or suffer shame.” (2.5.12-13)

“I should utter my affection with sighs, manifest my sweet love by my salt tears, and prove my loyalty unspotted and my griefs intolerable...” (3.2.21-23)

“Come, let us into the grove, and make much of one another...” (3.2.63-64)

“our affection may have some show and seem as it were love” (4.4.16-17)

“I... was inflamed with a sweet desire” (5.3.129-31)

“Galatea[’s]... faith is imprinted in my thoughts by her words” (5.3.137-38)

Telusa

“What new conceits, what strange contraries, breed in thy mind?” (3.1.1-2)

“Is thy Diana become a Venus, thy chaste thoughts turned to wanton looks, thy conquering modesty to a captive imagination?” (3.1.2-4)

“Beginnest thou... to follow the hot desire of love?” (3.1.4-5, 6-7)

“can there in years so young, in education so precise, in vows so holy, and in a heart so chaste, enter either a strong desire, or a wish, or a wavering thought of love?” (3.1.9-11)

“Can Cupid’s brands quench Vesta’s flames, and his feeble shafts headed with feathers pierce deeper than Diana’s arrows headed with steel?” (3.1.12-14)

the “vain and only naked name of chastity...is infected by fancy.” (3.1.17-19)

“the game I follow is the thing I fly, my strange disease my chief desire.” (3.1.36-37)

“now that you would have some talk of love, you hit me in the teeth with love.” (3.1.48-50)

“These are my passions, Eurota, my unbridled passions, my intolerable passions” (3.1.58-59)

Love first took her b[y the eyes, my wanton eyes which conceived the picture of his face and hanged it on the very strings of my heart.” (3.1.62-64)

“love will be idle.” (4.2.63)

“love will be wanton.” (4.2.63-64)

“Diana...conquers affection.” (4.2.91)

Eurota

“If thou be in love (for I have heard of such a beast called love) it shall be cured.” (3.1.43-44)

“I confess that I am in love, and yet I swear that I know not what it is.” (3.1.51-52)

“I feel my thoughts unknit, mine eyes unstayed, my heart I know not how affected or infected, my sleeps broken and full of dreams, my wakeness sad and full of sighs, myself in all things unlike myself. If this be love, I would it had never been devised.” (3.1.52-56)

“How did it [love] take you first?” (3.1.61)

“[It took me b]y the ears, whose sweet word sunk so deep into my head...” (3.1.66-67)

“so unacquainted are the passions of love that we can neither describe them nor bear them.” (3.4.66-67)

Ramia

“Can there be no heart so chaste but love can wound? Nor vows so holy but affection can violate?” (3.1.74-75)

Virtue and chastity “both are subject to love, of all things most abject.” (3.1.76-77)

Eurota: ...what is love?

Ramia: If myself felt only this infection, I would then take upon me the definition, but being incident to so many I dare not myself describe it. (3.1.85-88)

“Servia...loveth deadly” (3.1.90-91)

“Clymene...stoopeth, yieldeth, and fawneth on the strange boy in the woods. Myself (with blushing I speak it) am thrall to that boy” (3.1.93-97)

“...shall virgins begin to wrangle for love and become wanton in their thoughts, in their words, in their actions?” (3.1.111-113)

“O divine love, which art therefore called divine because thou overreaches the wisest, conquerest the chastest, and dost all things both unlikely and impossible, because thou art love! Thou makest the bashful impudent, the wise fond, the chaste wanton, and workest contraries to our reach, because thyself is beyond reason.” (3.1.114-118)

“so divine is his [love’s] force that it worketh effects as contrary to that we wish as unreasonable against that we ought.” (3.4.63-65)

Diana

“her virgins...become unchaste in desires, immoderate in affection, untemperate in love, in foolish love, in base love...” (3.4.35-37)

“virgins [lose] all their virtues with their unchaste thoughts. ‘Unchaste’, Diana calleth that that hath either any show or suspicion of lightness.” (3.4.40-43)

“loving thoughts stain lovely faces...” (3.4.43-44)

“love’s desire corrupteth all other virtues.” (3.4.52)

“you... should now become prentices to idleness” (3.4.54)

“...how is your love placed?” (3.4.55-56)

“...are your holy vows turned to hollow thoughts?” (3.4.60-61)

Cupid “fattest others with hopes” (3.4.87) and “bindest others with golden thoughts.” (3.4.88)

Cupid “hast infected [the nymphs] with foolish love” (3.4.92)

Venus has “untamed affections” (5.3.44)

Venus’s “tongue is as unruly as your thoughts, and your thoughts as unstayed as your eyes.” (5.3.59-61)

Love is “a thing of all the vainest” (5.3.80-81)

Larissa

“Is anyone undone by fire,
And turned to ashes through desire?” (4.2.13-14)

Cupid: Is love a punishment?

Larissa: It is no pastime. (4.2.69-70)

Rafe

“with puffing, blowing, and sweating, he so plied her that he multiplied her.” (5.1.21-22)

Hebe

“chastity honoreth affections and commandeth, yieldeth to desire and conquereth.” (5.2.40-41)

Venus

Diana “hateth sweet delights, envieth loving desires, masketh wanton eyes, stoppeth amorous ears, bridleth youthful mouths...” (5.3.31-34)

“...if that be not buried which can never die—fancy—or that quenched which must ever burn—affection...” (5.3.64-66)

“...never shall it be said that nature or fortune shall overthrow love and faith.” (5.3.144-45)

“Is your loves unspotted, begun with truth, continued with constancy, and not to be altered till death?” (5.3.145-47)

Endymion

Endymion

“my affections... are so stayed, and withal so stately, that I can neither satisfy my heart with love nor mine eyes with wonder.” (1.1.3-5)

“My love is placed neither under the moon nor above.” (1.1.14-15)

is “settled either to die or possess the moon herself.” (1.1.18-19)

“O Cynthia, if thou shouldst always continue at thy fullness, both gods and men would conspire to ravish thee. But thou, to abate the pride of our affections, dost detract from thy perfections...” (1.1.68-71)

“Why troublest thou me, having neither head to conceive the cause of my love or a heart to receive the impressions?” (1.1.82-84)

“Sweet Cynthia, how wouldst thou be pleased, how possessed? Will labours, patient of all extremities, obtain thy love?” (2.1.5-7)

“Desirest thou the passions of love, the sad and melancholy moods of perplexed minds, the not-to-be-expressed torments of racked thoughts?” (2.1.9-12)

“What company have I used but contemplation? Whom have I wondered at but thee?” (2.1.17-19)

“Have I not spent my golden years in hopes, waxing old with wishing, yet wishing nothing but thy love?” (2.1.23-25)

I “hath chosen in a solitary cell to live only by feeding on thy favor...” (2.1.46-47)

“Thus mayest thou see every vein, sinew, muscle, and artery of my love, in which there is no flattery nor deceit, error nor art.” (2.1.48-51)

“will I embrace the golden thoughts in my head and wish to melt by musing, that as ebony, which no fire can scorch, is yet consumed with sweet savors, so my heart, which cannot be bent by the hardness of fortune, may be bruised by amorous desires.” (2.3.6-10)

“I was ravished with the sight above measure, and wished that I might have enjoyed the sight without end.” (5.1.107-9)

“How prospereth your love?” (5.1.172)

“My unspotted thoughts, my languishing body, my discontented life, let them obtain by princely favor that which to challenge they must not presume, only wishing of impossibilities; with imagination of which I will spend my spirits, and to myself, that no creature may hear, softly call it love.” (5.4.166-72)

“From this sweet contemplation if I be not driven, I shall live of all men the most content, taking more pleasure in mine aged thoughts than ever I did in my youthful actions.” (5.4.173-76)

Eumenides

“If you be enamored of anything above the moon, your thoughts are ridiculous, for that things immortal are not subject to affections; if allured or enchanted with these transitory things...” (1.1.8-11)

“I hope you be not sotted upon the Man in the Moon.” (1.1.15-16)

“impossible it is to make love fit to her [the moon’s] humour...” (1.1.25)

“That melancholy blood must be purged which draweth you to a dotage no less miserable than monstrous.” (1.1.28-30)

“Endymion is bewitched.” (1.1.88)

“this fancy of the moon...” (1.1.91)

“Ah Eumenides, how art thou perplexed! Call to mind the beauty of thy sweet mistress and the depth of thy never-dying affections.” (3.4.50-52)

“Semele, the possessing of whose person is a pleasure that cannot come within the compass of comparison...” (3.4.95-97)

“...when I shall first meet with fair Semele, dash my delight with some light disgrace, lest, embracing sweetness beyond measure, I take surfeit without a recure.” (3.4.101-4)

“Virtue shall subdue affections, wisdom, lust, friendship beauty.” (3.4.152-53)

“...now are my sparks grown to flames, and my fancies almost to frenzies” (5.1.177-78)

Floscula

Tellus would “rather wonder than rage at the greatness of his mind, being affected with a thing more than mortal.” (1.2.18-19)

“Suffer then Endymion to follow his affections, thought to obtain her be impossible, and let him flatter himself in his own imaginations, because they are immortal.” (1.2.35-37)

“...shall he dote forever in this delight?” (1.2.69)

“Affection that is bred by enchantment is like a flower that is wrought in silk: in color and form most like, but nothing at all in substance or savour.” (1.2.76-78)

“there cannot be a thing more monstrous than to force affection by sorcery, neither do I imagine anything more impossible.” (1.4.6-8)

Tellus

“I will entangle him in such a sweet net that he shall neither find the to come out, nor desire it. All allurements of pleasure will I cast before his eyes, insomuch that he shall slake that love which he now voweth to Cynthia, and burn in mine, of which he seemeth careless.” (1.2.44-49)

“In this languishing between my amorous devices and his own loose desires, there shall such dissolute thoughts take root in his head, and over his heart grow so thick a skin...” (1.2.49-52)

She is “a woman deluded in love.” (1.2.58)

“The prime of his youth and pride of his time shall be spent in melancholy passions, careless behaviour, untamed thoughts, and unbridled affections.” (1.2.65-67)

“...she that is so oppressed with love that she is neither able with beauty nor wit to obtain her friend will rather use unlawful means than try intolerable pains.” (1.2.84-88)

“Is it possible by herbs, stones, spells, incantation, enchantment, exorcisms, fire, metals, planets, or any practice, to plant affection where it is not and to supplant it where it is?” (1.4.16-19)

“Unhappy Tellus, whose desires are so desperate that they are neither to be conceived of any creature nor to be cured by any art!” (1.4.32-34)

“Endymion...hath my heart” (1.4.38)

Cynthia “is the lady that he delights in, and dotes on every day, and dies for ten thousand times a day.” (1.4.40-41)

“I cannot obtain the depth of his love...” (2.1.54-55)

Her “affections” are “kindled... afresh, insomuch that I find scorching flames for dead embers, and cruel encounters of war in my thoughts instead of sweet parleys.” (4.1.11-14)

Endymion “so ravished my heart with love that to obtain my desires I could not find means, nor to resist them reason.” (5.4.69-70)

“what metal was she made of, be she mortal, that is not affected with the spice, nay infected with the poison of that not-to-be-expressed yet always to be felt love, which breaketh the brains and never bruise the brow, consumeth the heart and never toucheth the skin, and maketh a deep wound to be felt before any scar at all be seen?” (5.4.73-78)

“My heart, too tender to withstand such a divine fury, yielded to love—madam, I not without blushing confess, yielded to love.” (5.4.78-80)

“Feeling a continual burning in all my bowels and a bursting almost in every vein, I could not smother the inward fire but it must needs be perceived by the outward smoke; and by the flying abroad of divers sparks, divers judged of my scalding flames.” (5.4.87-91)

“he saw the depth of my affections” (5.4.97)

“Finding continual increase of my tormenting thoughts, and that the enjoying of my love made deeper wounds than the entering into it, I could find no means to ease my grief but to follow Endymion, and continually to have him in the object of mine eyes, who had me slave and subject to his love.” (5.4.110-15)

I “fried myself most in mine affections” (5.4.116)

“I could not have an imagination to withdraw him; and finding mine own affections unquenchable, I could not carry the mind that any else should possess what I had pursued.” (5.4.135-38)

Dares

“our masters are in love up to the ears...” (1.3.1)

“is not love a lurcher, that taketh men's stomachs away that they cannot eat, their spleen that they cannot laugh, their hearts that they cannot fight, their eyes that they cannot sleep; and leaveth nothing but livers to make nothing but lovers?” (2.2.9-13)

“Why, it is impossible that into so noble and unconquered a courage, love should creep, having first a head as hard to pierce as steel, then to pass to a heart armed with a shirt of mail.” (3.3.149-52)

Tophas

“I brook not this idle humour of love. It tickleth not my liver, from whence the love-mongers in former age seemed to infer they should proceed.” (1.3.8-9)

“I cannot stand without another.”

“love hath...milked my thoughts and drained from my heart the very substance of my accustomed courage. It worketh in my head like new wine...”(3.3.23-25)

“...even as a dish melteth by the fire, so doth my wit increase by love.” (3.3.66-67)

“Sleep is a binding of the senses, love a loosing.” (3.3.138-39)

“I have but slept over my love.” (3.3.148)

“The beggar Love that knows not where to lodge,
At last within my heart when I slept,
He crept.
I waked, and so my fancies began to fodge.” (4.2.26-29)

“...love hath jostled my liberty from the wall and taken the upper hand of my reason.” (5.2.1-2)

“...love is a lord of misrule, and keepeth Christmas in my corpse.” (5.2.5-6)

“Doth Dipsas stoop? Will she yield? Will she bend?” (5.2.57-58)

“Go to the sexton and tell him Desire is dead, and will him to dig his grave.” (5.2.93-94)

“I will by piecemeal curtail my affections towards Dipsas and walk my swelling thoughts till they be cold.” (5.2.108-10)

Epiton

“Love... may lie in your lungs...” (1.3.10)

“...my master yawning one day in the sun, love crept into his mouth before he could close it, and there kept such a tumbling in his body that he was glad to untruss the points of his heart and entertain Love as a stranger.” (3.3.153-57)

“Let me... trip up the heels of your affection” (5.2.3)

Dipsas

“were it in my power to place affection by appointment, I would make such evil appetites, such inordinate lusts, such cursed desires as all the world should be filled both with superstitious heats and extreme love.” (1.4.27-31)

“I can...breed slackness in love though never root it out.” (1.4.35-36)

“thou placed thy heart...low in love” (2.3.29-30)

Samias

“...are not our masters too far in love?” (2.2.5)

Scintilla

“Their tongues haply are dipped to the root in amorous words and sweet discourses, but I think their hearts are scarce tipped on the side with constant desires.” (2.2.6-8)

Favilla

“love [is] in thy mouth” (2.2.15)

Corsites

“Can you then feed on fancy, and subdue the malice of envy by the sweetness of imagination?” (3.2.9-10)

“Tellus doteth upon me...” (4.3.2)

“I might not perceive her love...” (4.3.2-3)

“Have my weak thoughts made brawnfallen my strong arms? Or is it the nature of love or the quintessence of the mind to breed numbness, or litherness, or I know not what languishing in my joints and sinews, being but the base strings of my body? Or doth the remembrance of Tellus so refine my spirits into a matter so subtle and divine that the other fleshy parts cannot work whilst they muse?” (4.3.19-26)

“...it is no offense to be in love” (4.3.100)

Tellus’ “beauty... took my heart captive” (4.3.103-4)

“I found such combats in my thoughts between love and duty, reverence and affection, that I could neither endure the conflict nor hope for the conquest.” (4.3.105-8)

“I unfolded to Tellus the depth of my affections and framed my tongue to utter a sweet tale of love...” (4.3.113-15)

“Tellus’ beauty never wrought such love in my mind as now her deceit hath despite; and yet to be revenged of a woman were a thing than love itself more womanish.” (4.3.134-36)

“her fairness hath pinched my heat more deeply” (5.4.260-61)

Geron

“Love is but an eye-worm, which only tickleth the head with hopes and wishes; friendship the image of eternity, in which there is nothing movable, nothing mischievous.” (3.4.130-33)

“Love is a chameleon, which draweth nothing into the mouth but air and nourisheth nothing in the body but lungs.” (3.4.136-38)

“desire dies in the same moment that beauty sickens...” (3.4.138-39)

Cynthia

“...let Tellus, who is made all of love, melt herself in her own looseness” (4.3.130-32)

“...taking delight in uttering thy love...” (5.4.107-8)

“Persevere, Endymion, in loving me, and I account more strength in a true heart than in a walled city.” (5.4.179-80)

*Midas*Eristus

“Were I a king, I would wish to possess my mistress, for what sweetness can there be found in life but love? ... And who knoweth not that the possessing of that must be the most precious, the pursuing whereof is so pleasing?” (1.1.25-26, 28-30)

“...of gold there is satiety; of love there cannot.” (2.1.1-2)

Eristus: ...in love there is variety.

Celia: Indeed, men may vary in their love.

Eristus: They vary their love, yet change it not.

Celia: Love and change are at variance; therefore if they vary, they must change.

Eristus: Men change the manner of their love, not the humour, the means how to obtain, not the mistress they honor. So did Jupiter, that could not entreat Danae by golden words, possess his love by a golden shower, not altering his affection, but using art. (2.1.8-17)

“My tears, which have made furrows in my cheeks and in mine eyes fountains; my sighs, which have made of my heart a furnace and kindled in my head flames; my body, that melteth by piecemeal; and my mind, that pineth at an instant, may witness that my love is both unspotted and unspeakable.” (2.1.33-38)

“To be free from love is strange, but to think scorn to be beloved, monstrous.” (2.1.130-31)

Martius

“Love is a pastime for children, breeding nothing but folly and nourishing nothing but idleness.” (1.1.31-32)

“thy effeminate mind, Eristus, whose eyes are stitched on Celia’s face and thoughts gyved to her beauty, hath bred in all the court such a tender wantonness that nothing is thought of but love, a passion proceeding of beastly lust and coloured with a courtly name of love. (2.1.66-71)

The “untemperate humour of lust crept into the king’s court” (2.1.73)

Mellacrities

“Is it not gold that maketh the chastest to yield to lust, the honestest to lewdness...” (1.1.45-47)

Midas

“I will command both the affections of men and the fortunes. Chastity will grow cheap where gold is not thought dear. Celia, chaste Celia, shall yield... Thus shall Midas be...the commander of love.” (1.2.127-29, 131-32)

“...my affection hath been unnatural.” (5.3.68-69)

Sophronia

“they honor lust for a god” (2.1.112)

“thy tongue doth itch to talk of love, and my ears tingle to hear it.” (2.1.132-33)

“there are other things to keep one from idleness besides love; nay, that there is nothing to make idleness but love.” (3.3.25-27)

“how like you Suavia in her loving vein?” (3.3.75)

Celia

“I am free from love, and unfortunate to be beloved.” (2.1.128-29)

Amerula

“Dote he did without measure, and die he must without her love.” (3.3.41-42)

She “felt the passions of love eating into her heart, though she dissembled them with her eyes.” (3.3.44-45)

Suavia

“Dancing is love sauce; therefore I dare be so saucy as, if you love to dance, to say you dance for love.” (3.3.62-64)

Pan

“is there any instrument so sweet to play on as one’s mistress?” (4.1.13)

“Pan feels the passions of love deeply engraven in his heart...” (4.1.34-35)

“...better than Pan none can describe love...” (4.1.36-37)

“Here is flat faith, *amo, amas*, where you [Apollo] cry, *o utinam amarent vel non amassem.*” (4.1.58-60)

Apollo

“Doth Pan talk of the passions of love, of the passions of divine love?” (4.1.18-19)

“Let not love enter into those savage lips...” (4.1.28)

Petulus

“...my heart is like a hearth where Cupid is making a fire, for Sophronia shall be my wife. Methinks Venus and Nature stand with each of them a pair of bellows, the one cooling my low birth, the other kindling my lofty affections.” (5.2.85-89)

Mother Bombie

Stellio

Stellio: ...how shall I compass a match between my girl and his boy?

Risio: Why, with a pair of compasses. And bring them both into the circle, I'll warrant they'll match themselves. (1.2.33-36)

Prisius

“It is unneighbourly done to suffer your sun, since he came from school, to spend his time in love...” (1.3.1-2)

“I think this hot love hath provided but cold cheer.” (1.3.177)

“you...must be fed with love upon sops...” (1.3.218-19)

“I have tied up the loving worm, my daughter, and will see whether fancy can worm fancy out of her head.” (2.2.16-18)

“My daughter is seduced!” (5.3.157)

Sperantus

“Yet by no means, either by blessing or cursing, can I win my son to be a wooer...”
(1.3.37-39)

“...he is able to make a lady’s mouth water” (1.3.42-43)

“...I’ll keep him to his books, and study shall make him leave to love.” (1.3.62-63)

“...in love is no lack.” (1.3.178)

“You have made love a book case, and spent your time well at school, learning to love by art and hate against nature.” (1.3.179-81)

“A hungry meal, a ragged coat, and a dry cudgel have put him quite besides his love...”
(2.2.24-25)

Livia

“I will measure my love by mine own judgement...” (1.3.121-22)

Livia: Is there art in love?

Candius: A short art, and a certain. (1.3.149-50)

Candius

The “art of love” is, “First, one must find out a mistress, whom before all others he voweth to serve. Secondly, that he use all the means that he may to obtain her. And the last, with deserts, faith, and secrecy, to study to keep her.” (1.3.157-61)

“A fiend, that seeks to place affection by appointment, and to force love by compulsion!”
(2.3.1-3)

“I’ll teach him one school-trick in love.” (2.3.6)

“...if thou begin to slip at beauty on a sudden, thou wilt surfeit with carousing it at the last.” (2.3.10-12)

“You see how, unacquainted, I am bold to board you.” (2.3.33-34)

Candius: Here I do plight my faith, taking thee for the staff of my age, and of my youth my solace.

Livia: And I vow to thee affection which nothing can dissolve, neither the length of time, nor malice of fortune, nor distance of place. (4.1.51-55)

Maestius

“I find in myself passions more than brotherly.” (3.1.2)

“Yet this is our comfort, that these unnatural heats have stretched themselves no further than thoughts. Unhappy me, that they should stretch so!” (3.1.14-17)

“between strangers, custom hath bred love exquisite.” (3.1.25)

Serena

“I...find my thoughts entangled with affections beyond nature, which so flame into my distempered head that I can neither without danger smother the fire, nor without modesty disclose my fury.” (3.1.3-7)

“to combat against our own intemperate desires” (3.1.9-10)

“This is our comfort: to bewray our passions, since we cannot enjoy our love.” (3.1.58-60)

Halfpenny

“He loves thee well that would run after.” (3.4.13)

Rixula

“foul water will quench hot fire as soon as fair.” (3.4.25-26)

Dromio

“...a woman’s heart is thrust through with a feather.” (4.1.35)

Accius

“I am taken with a fit of love.” (4.2.40)

“I shall give her the humble bee’s kiss.” (5.3.294)

Synis, Beduneus, & Nasutus (Song)

“Like ivy he her fast does hold,
 And clips her,
 And lips her,
 And flips her too.
 Then let them alone, they know what they do.” (5.3.67-71)

“This night,
 In delight,
 Does thump away sorrow.
 Of billing
 Take your filling,
 So good morrow, good morrow!” (5.3.79-84)

Vicinia

The children were “too forward in affection...” (5.3.312-13)

“They increased in their loving humours... their loose demeanours.” (5.3.314-16)

Love’s MetamorphosisRamis

“in the world there is so little love.” (1.1.3)

“I [love] one that hates love.” (1.1.28)

is “constant in love” (3.1.4)

“Lust followeth not my love as shadows do bodies, but truth is woven into my love as veins into bodies... my love is endless” (3.1.5-7)

“[I]ove is a consuming of the heart and restoring, a bitter death in a sweet life.” (3.1.23-24)

“this bleeding heart, in which yet sticks the head of the golden shaft, is the lively picture of inward torments.” (4.1.9-11)

“we may possess at last the depth of their affections.” (5.3.9-10)

“Nothing can alter our affections, which increase while the means decrease, and wax stronger in being weakened.” (5.4.36-38)

“the extremity of love is madness...” (5.4.125)

Silvestris

“I do not think Love hath any spark of divinity in him, since the end of his being is earthly. In the blood is he begot by the frail fires of the eyes, and quenched by the frailer shadows of thought.” (1.1.10-13)

“I [love] one that thinks herself above love.” (1.1.29)

“a lady’s heart, though it harbour many fancies, should embrace but one love” (3.1.126-27)

“This heart, neither bleeding nor bloodless, but swollen with sighs, I offer to thy godhead, protesting that all my thoughts are, as my words, without lust, and all my love, as my fortune, without sweetness” (4.1.25-29)

Niobe

“in my affections shall there be no stayedness but in unstayedness.” (1.2.6-7)

“Give them leave to love, since we have liberty to choose, for as great sport do I take in coursing their tame hearts, as they do pains in hunting their wild harts.” (1.2.27-29)

“must I confess that oftentimes I have had sweet thoughts, sometimes hard conceits; betwixt both a kind of yielding, I know not what. But certainly I think it is not love. Sigh I can, and find ease in melancholy; smile I do, and take pleasure in imagination. I feel in myself a pleasing pain, a chill heat, a delicate bitterness; how to term it I know not. Without doubt it may be love; sure I am it is not hate.” (2.1.75-82)

Celia

“how ill love sounds in their lips, who, telling a long tale of hunting, think they have bewrayed a sad passion of love!” (1.2.24-26)

“your affection is but pinned to your tongue” (1.2.30)

“into her heart never entered any motion of love.” (1.2.64)

“Yield to love I cannot; or if I do, to thy love I will not.” (3.1.44-45)

“more good cometh of the rose than can by love. When it is fresh, it hath a sweet savour; love, a sour taste. The rose, when it is old, loseth not his virtue; love, when it is stale, waxeth loathsome. The rose, distilled with fire, yieldeth sweet water; love, in extremities, kindles jealousies. In the rose, however it be, there is sweetness; in love, nothing but bitterness.” (5.4.86-93)

Erisichthon

“your enticing eyes... drew iron like adamants” (1.2.74-75)

“foolish love would dote on [your beauty]” (1.2.92-93)

Fidelia

Virgins’ “chaste... bodies are followed in the world with lust” (1.2.127-28)

Ceres

“where such continual war is between love and virtue, there must be some parleys and continual perils. Cupid was never conquered, and therefore must be flattered; virginity hath, and therefore must be humble.” (2.1.50-54)

Diana’s nymphs “all yielded to love... I say they are yielded to love.” (2.1.90, 91-92)

Ceres: Why didst thou so cruelly torment all Diana’s nymphs with love?

Cupid: Because they thought it impossible to love.

Ceres: What is the substance of love?

Cupid: Constancy and secrecy.

Ceres: What the signs?

Cupid: Sighs and tears.

Ceres: What the causes?

Cupid: Wit and idleness.

Ceres: What the means?

Cupid: Opportunity and importunity.

Ceres: What the end?

Cupid: Happiness without end. (2.1.117-29)

“my nymphs... shall neither be so stately as not to stoop to love nor so light as presently to yield.” (5.4.178-80)

Nisa

“Into my heart, madam, there did never enter any motion of love.” (2.1.55-56)

“love [will] make me confess that Nisa is a fool” (3.1.16-17)

“[I]ove is a consuming of wit and restoring of folly, a staring blindness and a blind gazing.” (3.1.25-27)

Men’s “open flatteries make way to their secret lusts...” (5.4.75-76)

“when his love was hottest...” (5.4.123)

Cupid

“Why, Ceres, do you think that lust followeth love? Ceres, lovers are chaste! For what is love, divine love, but the quintessence of chastity, and affections binding by heavenly motions, that cannot be undone by earthly means, and must not be controlled by any man?” (2.1.138-42)

“What have you used in love?” (4.1.67)

“Diana hath felt some motions of love; Vesta doth; Ceres shall.” (5.1.21-22)

“I will make such unspotted loves among you...” (5.4.174-75)

“resist not love, which worketh wonders” (5.4.177)

Montanus

“thou hast overtaken me in love.” (3.1.40)

“yield to love, to sweet love!” (3.1.41-42)

“To be amiable and not to love is, like a painted lady, to have colours and no life.” (3.1.60-61)

“...brook my love” (3.1.71)

“disdain increaseth desire” (3.1.82)

“I present not a bleeding but a bloodless heart, dried only with sorrow and worn with faithful service” (4.1.18-19)

“This picture I offer, carved with no other instrument than love” (4.1.19-20)

“I did ever imagine that true love would end with sweet joys, though it was begun with deep sighs.” (5.3.4-5)

“nothing will turn her heart” (5.4.99-100)

Protea

Neptune’s “godhead conquered my maidenhead.” (3.2.27-28)

“hearts of men, stiffer than steel, have by love been made softer than wool.” (5.2.12-13)

Petulius

“My heart is ravished with such tickling thoughts, and mine eyes stayed with such a bewitching beauty, that I can neither find the means to remove my affection nor to turn aside my looks.” (4.2.53-56)

“Vouchsafe I may honour thee, and live by the imagination I have of thy words and worthiness.” (4.2.67-68)

“hard iron, falling into fire, waxeth soft; and then the tender heart of a virgin, being in love, must needs melt.” (5.2.7-9)

Siren

“the hot assault of love” (4.2.84-85)

The Woman in the Moon

Iphicles

“thy Utopians, poor and simple men,
As yet bewail their want of female sex” (1.1.49-50)

“Now Cyprian Queen, guider of loving thoughts...” (2.1.102)

“But waking, what sweet pastime have I had!
For love is watchful, and can never sleep.” (4.1.25-26)

“Love is deaf, blind, and incredulous.” (4.1.52)

“It was a strategem laid for my love.” (4.1.143)

“Now would I fall in Pandora’s lap.” (4.1.255)

“Pandora’s love... almost burst my heart!” (5.1.184)

Jupiter

“Danae was fair, and Leda pleased me well;
Lovely Callisto set my heart on fire,
And in mine eye Europa was a gem,
But... / in this one are all my loves contained” (2.1.13-16, 18)

“High Jove himself, who, ravished with thy blaze,
Receives more influence than he pours on thee,
And humbly sues for succour at thy hands.” (2.1.24-26)

Juno

“I thought Ganymede had weaned thy heart
From lawless lust of any woman’s love,
But well I see that every time thou strayest
Thy lust but looks for strumpet stars below.” (2.1.54-57)

Gunophilus

“As I beheld the glory of thy face,
My feeble eyes, admiring majesty,
Did sink into my heart such holy fear,
That very fear, amazing every sense,
Withheld my tongue from saying what I would,
And freezed my joints from bowing when they should.” (2.1.94-99)

“I dare not love...” (3.2.87)

“Shall I provide a banquet, and be cozened of the best dish?” (3.2.264-65)

“I would not refuse her, provided she be not clipped within the ring.” (3.2.271-72)

“Hate me a-days, and love me in the night.” (5.1.48)

“I was ne’er in love with her till now. Oh, absolute Pandora because foolish—for folly is women’s perfection! To talk idly, to look wildly, to laugh at every breach and play with a feather is that would make a Stoic in love, yea, thou thyself.” (5.1.119-23)

Stesias

“...when comes that happy hour
Whereon thy love shall guerdon my desire?” (2.1.115)

“...in thy pleasure must be my content.” (2.1.139)

“...in my death my love may find some relief.” (2.1.214)

“Lance up my side,
that when my heart leaps out,
Thou mayst behold how it is scorched with love,
And every way cross-wounded with desire.
There shalt thou read my passions deep engraven,
And in the midst, only Pandora’s name.” (2.1.215-19)

“Blest be the hand that made so happy wound,
for in my sufferance have I won thy love.” (3.1.72-73)

“I [am] in the paradise of my delight.” (3.1.77)

“in thy looks I live.” (3.1.86)

“She played the wanton with these amorous swains.” (4.1.65)

Learchus

“How long...
Before my suit obtain thy sweet consent?” (2.1.117-18)

“Oh, let thy tongue first salve Learchus’ wound,
That first was made with those immortal eyes!” (2.1.125-26)

“Love hath decreed thy word must govern me.” (2.1.144)

“Therefore only gaze, eyes, to please yourselves,
Let not my inward sense know what you see,
Lest that my fancy dote upon her still.
Pandora is divine! But say not so,
Lest that thy heart hear thee, and break in twain.” (3.2.96-102)

“Make me thy love...” (3.2.125)

“How many thousand kisses gave she me!
And every kiss mixed with an amorous glance.” (4.1.21-22).

“Oh, the iteration of my name argues her affection!” (4.1.214-15)

Melos

“How long...
Before the harvest of my love be in?” (2.1.122-23).

“The only promise of thy future love
Will drown the secret heaps of my despair
In an endless ocean of unexpected joys!” (2.1.127-29)

“Oh, grant me love, or wound me to the death.” (3.1.31)

“How oft have I leant on her silver breast,
She singing on her lute, and Melos being the note!” (4.1.23-24).

“...If Melos love not thee more than his heart!” (4.1.197)

Pandora

“...my breast yet never harboured love.” (2.1.130)

“I shall reward thy sufferance with love.
These eyes, that were like two malignant stars,
Shall yield thee comfort with their sweet aspect;
And these my lips, that did blaspheme thy love,
Shall speak thee fair and bless thee with a kiss...” (3.1.16-19)

“...the joys that I conceive in thee” (3.1.64).

“What honey thoughts are in Pandora’s brain?” (3.2.53)

“Must I be tied to him? No! I’ll be loose,
As loose as Helen, for I am as fair.” (3.2.66-67)

“I am lovesick for thee.” (3.2.83)

“I languish for thee, therefore be my love!” (3.2.85).

“...Now, sweet love, begone,
Lest Stesias take thee in this amorous vein.” (3.2.135-36)

“Now have I played with wanton Iphicles,
Yea, and kept touch with Melos. Both are pleased.” (3.2.224-25)

“Thus will I hang about Learchus’ neck,
And suck out happiness from forth his lips.” (3.2.257-58)

“Tell him I rave and languish for his love.” (4.1.114)

“Here will I sit till I see Iphicles,
Sighing my breath, out-weeping my heart-blood.
Go, soul, and fly unto my liefest love...” (4.1.146-48)

“Dost thou not love me more than all the world?” (4.1.290)

“Why call you me your love?
Love is a little boy; so am not I.” (5.1.97-98)

“...bid Love untruss...” (5.1.205)

“Venus, mad’st me love all that I saw...” (5.1.311)

Venus

“All those are strumpets that are over-chaste,
Defying such as keep their company.
‘Tis not the touching of a woman’s hand,
Kissing her lips, hanging about her neck,
A speaking look, no, nor a yielding word,
That men expect. Believe me, Sol, ‘tis more...” (3.2.19-24)

Cupid

“...you shall see her straight in love.” (3.2.34)

Joculus

“Were I a man, I could love thee.” (3.2.41)

Nature

“Let them be mutable in all their loves,
Fantastical, childish, and foolish in their desires...” (5.1.329-30)

Appendix C:
Erotic Language in Plays by Shakespeare

The Two Gentlemen of Verona

Valentine

“...affection chains thy tender days
To the sweet glances of thy honored love....
...living dully sluggardized at home,
Wear out thy youth with shapeless idleness.” (1.1.3-4; 7-8)

“you are over boots in love.” (1.1.25)

“Love is your master, for he masters you;
And he that is so yoked by a fool
Methinks should not be chronicled for wise.” (1.1.39-41)

Proteus is “a votary to fond desire.” (1.1.52)

“I stand affected to her.” (2.1.81)

“Love hath chased sleep from my enthralled eyes,
And made them watchers of mine own heart’s sorrow.
O gentle Proteus, Love’s a mighty lord,
And hath so humbled me as I confess
There is no woe to his correction,
Nor to his service no such joy on earth.
Now no discourse, except it be of Love;
Now can I break my fast, dine, sup, and sleep,
Upon the very naked name of Love.” (2.4.132-40)

“O, flatter me, for love delights in praises.” (2.4.156)

“For scorn at first makes after-love the more.” (3.1.95)

“She is my essence, and I leave to be,
If I be not by her fair influence
Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept alive.” (3.1.182-84)

Proteus

“...he was more than over shoes in love.” (1.1.24)

Pro: “Yet writers say, as in the sweetest bud
The eating canker dwells, so eating love
Inhabits in the finest wits of all.

Val: And writers say, as the most forward bud
Is eaten by the canker ere it blow,
Even so by love the young and tender wit
Is turned to folly.” (1.1.42-48)

“I [hunt] after love.” (1.1.63)

“Thou, Julia, thou hast metamorphosed me,
Made me neglect my studies, lose my time,
War with good counsel, set the world at nought;
Made wit with musing weak, heart sick with thought.” (1.1.66-69)

“What, gone without a word?
Ay, so true love should do; it cannot speak,
For truth hath better deeds than words to grace it.” (2.2.16-18)

“Even as one heat another heat expels,
Or as one nail by strength drives out another,
So the remembrance of my former love
Is by a newer object quite forgotten.” (2.4.190-93)

...“for now my love is thawed,
Which, like a waxen image ‘gainst a fire,
Bears no impression of the thing it was...” (2.4.198-200)

“How shall I dote on her with more advice,
That thus without advice begin to love her!” (2.4.205-206)

Her image “hath dazzled my reason’s light” (2.4.208)

“If I can check my erring love, I will;
If not, to compass her I’ll use my skill.” (2.4.211-12)

“O sweet-suggesting Love, if thou hast sinned,
Teach me, thy tempted subject, to excuse it.” (2.6.7-8)

“You must lay lime to tangle her desires...” (3.2.68)

“Yet, spaniel-like, the more she spurns my love,
The more it grows, and fawneth on her still.” (4.2.14-15)

Sil: “What’s your will?
Pro: That I may compass yours.” (4.2.92-93)

“...since the substance of your perfect self
Is else devoted, I am but a shadow,
And to your shadow [portrait] will I make true love.” (4.2.124-26)

“Nay, if the gentle spirit of moving words
Can no way change you to a milder form,
I’ll woo you like a soldier, at arm’s end,
And love you ‘gainst the nature of love – force ye.” (5.4.55-58)

“I’ll force thee yield to my desire.” (5.4.59)

Julia

Jul: “Wouldst thou then counsel me to fall in love?
Luc: Ay, madam, so you stumble not unheedfully.” (1.2.2-3)

“And wouldst thou have me cast my love on him?” (1.2.25)

Jul: “Why, he, of all the rest, hath never moved me.
Luc: Yet he, of all the rest, I think best loves ye.
Jul: His little speaking shows his love but small.
Luc: Fire that’s closest kept burns most of all.
Jul: They do not love that do not show their love.
Luc: O they love least that let men know their love.” (1.2.27-32)

“Fie, fie, how wayward is this foolish love
That, like a testy babe, will scratch the nurse
And presently all humbled kiss the rod!” (1.2.57-59)

“Thus will I fold them [pieces of a love letter] one upon another –
Now kiss, embrace, contend, do what you will.” (1.2.129-30)

“Didst thou but know the inly touch of love...” (2.7.18)

“...I would prevent
The loose encounters of lascivious men.” (2.7.40-41)

“She dreams on him that has forgot her love;
You dote on her that cares not for your love.
‘Tis pity love should be so contrary” (4.4.80-82)

“Alas, how love can trifle with itself!” (4.4.182)

“love will not be spurred to what it loathes.” (5.2.7)

Speed

“And now you are metamorphosed with a mistress...” (2.1.29-30)

“my master is become a notable lover... my master is become a hot lover...” (2.5.36, 42)

Launce

“I care not though he burn himself in love...” (2.5.43-44)

Lucetta

Luc: “I do not seek to quench your love’s hot fire,
But qualify the fire’s extreme rage,
Lest it should burn above the bounds of reason.
Jul: The more thou damm’st it up, the more it burns.
The current that with gentle murmur glides,
Thou know’st, being stopped, impatiently doth rage.” (2.7.21-26)

Duke

“This weak impress of love is as a figure
Trenched in ice, which with an hour’s heat
Dissolves to water and doth lose his form.” (3.2.6-8)

The Taming of the ShrewTranio

“is it possible
That love should of a sudden take such hold?” (1.1.139-40)

“Nay, then, ‘tis time to stir him from his trance.” (1.1.171)

“If you love the maid
Bend thoughts and wits to achieve her.” (1.1.176-77)

“O despiteful love, unconstant womankind!” (4.2.14)

“see how beastly she doth court him.” (4.2.34)

Lucentio

“...while idly I stood looking on
I found the effect of love in idleness...” (1.1.144-45)

“...Tranio, I burn, I pine, I perish, Tranio,
If I achieve not this young modest girl.” (1.1.149-50)

“Lucentio loves,
And let me be a slave t’achieve that maid
Whose sudden sight hath thrilled my wounded eye.” (1.1.212-14)

“you, sweet dear, prove mistress of my heart.” (4.3.10)

Baptista

“when the special thing is well obtained,
That is, her love, for that is all in all.” (2.1.129-30)

Petruccio

“where two raging fires meet together
They do consume the thing that feeds their fury.
Though little fire grows great with little wind,
Yet extreme gusts will blow out fire and all
So I to her, and so she yields to me,
For I am rough and woo not like a babe.” (2.1.133-38)

“Now, by the world, it is a lusty wench!
I love her ten times more than e’er I did.
O, how I long to have some chat with her!” (2.1.158-60)

will “woo her with some spirit when she comes.” (2.1.170)

“Myself am moved to woo thee for my wife.” (2.1.195)

“I tell you, ‘tis incredible to believe
How much she loves me. O the kindest Kate!
She hung about my neck, and kiss on kiss
She vied so fast, protesting oath on oath,
That in a twink she won me to her love.” (2.1.307-11)

“I thank you all,
That have beheld me give away myself
To this most patient, sweet, and virtuous wife.” (3.2.191-93)

Hortensio

“Methinks he looks as though he were in love.” (3.1.87)

“Kindness in women, not their beauteous looks,
Shall win my love.” (4.2.41-42)

Kate

“He does it all under the name of perfect love...” (4.3.12)

The Comedy of Errors

Luciana

“know he is the bridle of your will.” (2.1.13)

“Ere I learn love, I’ll practice to obey.” (2.1.29)

“Shall, Antipholus,
Even in the spring of love, thy love-springs rot?” (3.2.2-3)

“Shall love, in building, grow so ruinous?” (3.2.4)

“Muffle your false love with some show of blindness.” (3.2.8)

“We in your motion turn, and you may move us.” (3.2.24)

Adriana

“I know his eye doth homage elsewhere” (2.1.104)

“undividable, incorporate,
Am better than thy dear self’s better part.” (2.2.121-22)

“How dearly would it touch thee to the quick,
Shouldst thou but hear I were licentious,
And that this body, consecrate to thee,
By ruffian lust should be contaminate!” (2.2.129-32)

“I am possessed with an adulterate blot;
My blood is mingled with the crime of lust.
For if we two be one, and thou play false,
I do digest the poison of thy flesh,
Being strumpeted by thy contagion.” (2.2.139-43)

“Come, I will fasten on this sleeve of thine:
Thou art an elm, my husband, I a vine,
Whose weakness married to thy stronger state
Makes me with thy strength to communicate.” (2.2.172-75)

“...his heart’s meteors tilting in his face” (4.3.6)

“With what persuasion did he tempt thy love?” (4.3.13)

Antipholus of Syracuse

“Are you a god? Would you create me new?
Transform me then, and to your power I’ll yield.” (3.2.39-40)

“...to you I do decline.” (3.2.44)

“Sing, siren, for thyself, and I will dote.” (3.2.47)

“Spread o’er the silver waves thy golden hairs,
And as a bed I’ll take them and there lie;
And in that glorious supposition think
He gains by death that hath such means to die.
Let Love, being light, be drownèd if she sink!” (3.2.48-52)

“It is thyself, mine own self’s better part;
Mine eye’s clear eye, my dear heart’s dearer heart” (3.2.61-62)

Dromio of Syracuse

“I am due to a woman: one that claims me, one that haunts me, one that will have me.”
(3.2.81-83)

*Love's Labor's Lost*Armado

"I will hereupon confess I am in love. ... If drawing my sword against the humour of affection would deliver me from the reprobate thought of it, I would take desire prisoner and ransom him..." (1.2.53-57)

"My spirit grows heavy in love." (1.2.109)

"I do affect the very ground – which is base – where her shoe – which is baser – guided by her foot – which is basest – doth tread. I shall be forsworn – which is a great argument of falsehood – if I love. And how can that be true love which is falsely attempted? Love is a familiar; love is a devil. There is no evil angel but love." (1.2.149-54)

Moth: "Negligent student! learn her by heart.

Armado: By heart, and in heart, boy.

Moth: And out of heart, master. All those three I will prove.

Armado: What wilt thou prove?

Moth: A man, if I live; and this, "by," "in," and "without," upon the instant. By heart if you love her, because your heart cannot come by her; in heart you love her because your heart is in love with her; and out of heart you love her, being out of heart that you cannot enjoy her." (3.1.33-43)

Boyet

"God bless my ladies! Are they all in love,
That every one her own hath garnishéd
With such bedecking ornaments of praise?" (2.1.77-79)

Boyet: "Navarre is infected."

Princess: "With what?"

Boyet: "With that which we lovers entitle 'affected.'" (2.1.229-31)

[*Reads*] "Shall I command thy love? I may. Shall I enforce thy love? I could. Shall I entreat thy love? I will." (4.1.81-82)

Berowne

"And I, forsooth, in love – I that have been love's whip..." (3.1.159)

"Well, I will love, write, sigh, pray, sue, groan:
Some men must love my lady, and some Joan." (3.1.189-90)

“The King, he is hunting the deer. I am coursing myself. They have pitched a toil. I am toiling in a pitch – pitch that defiles.” (4.3.1-2)

“I will not love; if I do, hang me. I’ faith, I will not. O but her eye! By this light, but for her eye, I would not love her—yes for her two eyes. Well, I do nothing in the world but lie and lie in my throat. By heaven, I do love...” (4.3.7-11)

“But love, first learned in a lady’s eyes,
Lives not alone immuréd in the brain,
But, with the motion of all elements,
Courses as swift as thought in every power,
And gives to every power a double power
Above their functions and their offices.” (4.3.301-6)

“They are infected, in their hearts it lies.
They have the plague, and caught it of your eyes.” (5.2.420-21)

Dumaine: “O that I had my wish!”

Longueville: “And I had mine!”

King: “And I mine too, good Lord!”

Berowne: “Amen, so I had mine. Is not that a good word?” (4.3.87-90)

Nathaniel

[*Reads*] “If love make me forsworn, how shall I swear to love?” (4.3.104)

A Midsummer Night’s Dream

Lysander

Helena “dotes,
Devoutly dotes, dotes in idolatry
Upon this spotted and inconstant man.” (1.1.108-10)

“Not Hermia but Helena I love.” (2.2.119)

Lys: “Helen, I love thee; by my life I do.
I swear by that which I will lose for thee
To prove him false that says I love thee not.

Dem: “I say I love thee more than he can do.” (3.2.252-55)

Helena

“O, teach me how you look, and with what art
You sway the motion of Demetrius’ heart.” (1.1.192-93)

“And as he errs, doting on Hermia’s eyes,
So I, admiring of his qualities.” (1.1.230-31)

“You draw me, you hard-hearted adamant,
But yet you draw not iron; for my heart
Is true as steel. Leave you your power to draw,
And I shall have no power to follow you.” (2.1.195-98)

“I am your spaniel, and, Demetrius,
The more you beat me I will fawn on you,
Use me but as your spaniel; spurn me, strike me,
Neglect me, lose me; only give me leave,
Unworthy as I am, to follow you.” (2.1.203-207)

“For you in my respect are all the world.” (2.1.224)

Oberon

The flower’s juice “Will make or man or woman madly dote
Upon the next live creature that it sees.” (2.1.171-72)

“What thou seest when thou dost wake,
Do it for thy true love take;
Love and languish for his sake.” (2.2.33-35)

Titania

“Mine ear is much enamoured of thy note;
So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape;
And thy fair virtue’s force perforce doth move me
On the first view to say, to swear, I love thee.” (3.1.122-25)

“O how I love thee, how I dote on thee!” (4.1.42)

Demetrius

“I love thee not, therefore pursue me not.” (2.1.188)

“If e’er I loved her, all that love is gone.
My heart to her but as guestwise sojourned
And now to Helen is it home returned,
There to remain.” (3.2.170-73)

“all the faith, the virtue of my heart,
The object and the pleasure of mine eye
Is only Helens. To her, my lord,
Was I betrothed ere I saw Hermia.
But like in sickness did I loathe this food;
But, as in health come to my natural taste,
Now I do wish it, love it, long for it,
And will for evermore be true to it.” (4.1.166-73)

The Merchant of Venice

Bassanio

“Sometimes from her eyes
I did receive fair speechless messages.” (1.2.163-64)

“that ugly treason of mistrust
...makes me fear th’ enjoying of my love.” (3.2.28-29)

“Yet look, how far
The substance of my praise doth wrong this shadow
In underprizing it, so far this shadow
Doth limp behind the substance.” (3.2.126-29)

Jessica

“...love is blind, and lovers cannot see
The pretty follies that themselves commit.” (2.6.36-37)

Lorenzo

“Beshrew me but I love her heartily!” (2.6.52)

“...Shall she be placed in my constant soul.” (2.6.57)

“Troilus methinks mounted the Trojan walls,
And sighed his soul toward the Grecian tents
Where Cressid lay that night.” (5.1.4-6)

Jessica “with an unthrift love did run from Venice” (5.1.16)

Salarino: “Turning his face, he put his hand behind him,
 And with affection wondrous sensible
 He wrung Bassanio’s hand; and so they parted.
Solanio: I think he only loves the world for him.
 I pray thee let us go and find him out
 And quicken his embracéd heaviness
 With some delight or other.” (2.8.47-53)

Portia

“Beshrew your eyes!
 They have o’erlooked me and divided me.
 One half of me is yours, the other half yours—
 Mine own, I would say, but if mine, then yours,
 And so all yours.” (3.2.14-18)

“...confess
 What treason there is mingled with your love.” (3.2.26-27)

[*Song*]

“Tell me where is fancy bred,
 Or in the heart, or in the head?
 How begot, how nourishéd?
 Reply, reply.
 It is engendered in the eye,
 With gazing fed, and fancy dies
 In the cradle where it lies.
 Let us all ring fancy’s knell...” (3.2.63-70)

“How all the other passions fleet to air...” (3.2.108)

“O love, be moderate! Allay thy ecstasy.
 In measure rain thy joy; scant this excess.
 I feel too much thy blessing: make it less,
 For fear I surfeit.” (3.2.111-14)

“I will become as liberal as you;
 I’ll not deny him anything I have,
 No, not my body nor my husband’s bed.” (5.1.226-28)

Gratiano

“You saw the mistress, I beheld the maid.
You loved, I loved.” (3.2.198-99)

“I got a promise of this fair one here
To have her love...” (3.2.206-7)

Much Ado About NothingDon Pedro

“Thou wilt be like a lover presently,
And tire the hearer with a book of words.” (1.1.254-55)

“thou lovest,
And I will fit thee with the remedy.” (1.1.266-67)

“...in her bosom I’ll unclasp my heart
and take her hearing prisoner with the force
and strong encounter of my amorous tale.” (1.1.271-73)

Leonato

“she loves him with an enraged affection it is past the infinite of thought.” (2.3.94-95)

“the ecstasy hath so much overborne her that my daughter is sometime afeard she will do
a desperate outrage to herself.” (2.3.136-38)

Benedick

“I will be horribly in love with her.” (2.3.207-8)

“I do love nothing in the world so well as you. Is not that strange?” (4.1.266-67)

“why they [great poets] were never so truly turned over and over as my poor self in love.”
(5.2.29-30)

Bea: “for which of my good parts did you first suffer love for me?”

Ben: Suffer love—a good epithet. I do suffer love indeed, for I love thee against my
will.

Bea: In spite of your heart, I think.” (5.2.54-58)

“I will live in thy heart, die in thy lap, and be buried in thy eyes.” (5.2.86-87)

Ben: “They swore that you were almost sick for me.

Bea: They swore that you were wellnigh dead for me.” (5.4.80-81)

Hero

“My talk to thee must be how Benedick
Is sick in love with Beatrice.” (3.1.20-21)

“Therefore let Benedick, like covered fire,
Consume away in sighs, waste inwardly.” (3.1.78-79)

Beatrice

“And, Benedick, love on. I will requite thee,
Taming my wild heart to thy loving hand.” (3.1.112-113)

“I love you with so much of my heart that none is left to protest.” (4.1.184-85)

As You Like It

Orlando

“What passion hangs these weights upon my tongue?
I cannot speak to her, yet she urged conference.
O poor Orlando! Thou art overthrown,
Or Charles or something weaker masters thee.” (1.2.224-27)

“O Rosalind, these trees shall be my books,
And in their barks my thoughts I'll character
That every eye which in this forest looks
Shall see thy virtue witnessed everywhere.
Run, run, Orlando; carve on every tree
The fair, the chaste, and unexpressive she.” (3.2.5-10)

“I am he that is so love-shaked. I pray you, tell me your remedy.” (3.2.332-33)

Ros: “But are you so much in love as your rhymes speak?

Orl: Neither rhyme nor reason can express how much.” (3.2.358-59)

“Is’t possible that on so little acquaintance you should like her? That but seeing, you should love her? And loving, woo? And wooing, she should grant? And will you persevere to enjoy her?” (5.1.1-4)

Silvius

“O Corin, that thou knew’st how I do love her!” (2.4.18)

“It [Love] is to be all made of sighs and tears” (5.2.74)

“It [Love] is to be all made of faith and service” (5.2.79)

“It [Love] is to be all made of fantasy,
All made of passion, and all made of wishes,
All adoration, duty, and observance,
All humbleness, all patience and impatience,
All purity, all trial, all obedience.” (5.2.84-88)

Touchstone

“We that are true lovers run into strange capers.” (2.4.47-48)

“As the ox hath his bow, sir, the horse his curb, and the falcon her bells, so man hath his desires; and as pigeons bill, so wedlock would be nibbling.” (3.3.66-68)

Rosalind

“If I could meet that fancy-monger, I would give him some good counsel, for he seems to have the quotidian of love upon him.” (3.2.329-31)

“The sight of lovers feedeth those in love.” (3.4.51)

“Shepherd, ply her hard” (3.5.77)

“Come, woo me, woo me, for now I am in a holiday humour, and like enough to consent.” (4.1.59-60)

“Why then, can one desire too much of a good thing?” (4.1.105)

“O...that thou didst know how many fathom deep I am in love. But it cannot be sounded. My affection hath an unknown bottom, like the Bay of Portugal.” (4.1.175-77)

“Come, come, you are a fool,

And turned into the extremity of love.” (4.3.22-23)

“If the scorn of your bright eyne
Have power to raise such love in mine,
Alack, in me what strange effect
Would they work in mild aspect?” (4.3.50-53)

“for your brother and my sister no sooner met but they looked; no sooner looked but they loved; no sooner loved but they sighed; no sooner sighed but they asked one another the reason; no sooner knew the reason but they sought the remedy.” (5.2.28-32)

“They are in the very wrath of love.” (5.2.35)

Twelfth Night

Orsino

“If music be the food of love, play on,
Give me excess of it that, surfeiting,
The appetite may sicken and so die.” (1.1.1-3)

“O, when mine eyes did see Olivia first
Methought she purged the air of pestilence;
That instance was I turned into a hart,
And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds,
E’er since pursue me.” (1.1.18-22)

“unfold the passion of my love,
Surprise her with discourse of my dear faith.” (1.4.23-24)

“For such as I am, all true lovers are,
Unstaid and skittish in all motions else
Save in the constant image of the creature
That is beloved.” (2.4.16-19)

“There is no woman’s sides
Can bide the beating of so strong a passion
As love doth give my heart; no woman’s heart
So big, to hold so much. They lack retention.
Alas, their love may be called appetite,
No motion of the liver, but the palate,
That suffer surfeit, cloyment, and revolt.
But mine is all as hungry as the sea,
And can digest as much.” (2.5.91-99)

Viola

Oli: “How does he love me?”

Vio: With adorations, fertile tears,
With groans that thunder love, with sighs of fire.” (1.5.223-25)

“She loves me, sure. The cunning of her passion
Invites me in this churlish messenger.” (2.2.20-21)

“My master loves her dearly,
And I, poor monster, fond as much on him,
And she, mistaken, seems to dote on me.” (2.2.31-33)

I go “After him I love
More than I love these eyes, more than my life,
More by all mores than e’er I shall love wife.” (5.1.131-32)

Olivia

“How now?
Even so quickly may one catch the plague?
Methinks I feel this youth’s perfections
With an invisible and subtle stealth
To creep in at mine eyes.” (1.5.264-68)

“I love thee so that, maugre all thy pride,
Nor wit nor reason can my passion hide.” (3.1.142-43)

“thou perhaps mayst move
That heart which now abhors, to like his love.” (3.1.154-55)

Malvolio

“Maria once told me she did affect me, and I have heard herself come thus near, that she
should fancy it should be one of my complexion.” (2.5.20-22)

“I have limed her” (3.4.68)

Antonio

“My desire,
More sharp than filed steel, did spur me forth.” (3.3.4-5)

*Troilus and Cressida*Troilus

“And when fair Cressid comes into my thoughts—
So, traitor! When she comes? When is she thence?” (1.1.28-29)

“I tell thee I am mad
In Cressid’s love; thou answer’st ‘She is fair’,
Pourest in the open ulcer of my heart
Her eyes, her hair, her cheek, her gait, her voice” (1.1.48-51)

“But saying thus, instead of oil and balm
Thou lay’st in every gash that love hath given me
The knife that made it.” (1.1.58-60)

“I am giddy. Expectation whirls me round.
Th’imaginary relish is so sweet
That it enchants my sense. What will it be
When that the wat’ry palates taste indeed
Love’s thrice-repured nectar? Death, I fear me,
Swooning destruction, or some joy too fine,
Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness
For the capacity of my ruder powers.
I fear it much, and I do fear besides
That I shall lose distinction in my joys,
As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps
The enemy flying.” (3.2.16-27)

“This is the monstrosity of love, lady—that the will is infinite and the execution
confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit.” (3.2.75-77)

“...something may be done that we will not,
And sometimes we are devils to ourselves,
When we will tempt the frailty of our powers,
Presuming on their changeful potency.” (4.5.96-99)

“She was beloved, she loved; she is, and doth.” (4.7.176)

Cressida

“That she was never yet that ever knew
Love got so sweet as when desire did sue.” (1.2.268-69)

“my heart’s contents firm love doth bear” (1.2.272)

“They say all lovers swear more performance that they are able, and yet reserve an ability that they never perform.” (3.2.78-79)

“I love you now, but till now not so much
But I might master it. In faith, I lie:
My thoughts were like unbridled children, grown
Too headstrong for their mother.” (3.2.109-112)

“Sweet, bid me hold my tongue,
For in this rapture I shall surely speak
The thing I shall repent. See, see your silence,
Cunning in thy dumbness, in my weakness draws
My soul of counsel from me.” (3.2.118-22)

“If I could temporize with my affection
Or brew it to a weak and colder palate,
The like allayment could I give my grief.
My love admits no qualifying dross
No more my grief, in such a precious loss.” (4.5.6-10)

Ulysses

“Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.” (1.3.119-24)

“There’s language in her eye, her cheek, her lip;
Nay, her foot speaks. Her wanton spirits look out
At every joint and motive of her body.
O these encounters so glib of tongue,
That give accosting welcome ere it comes,
And wide unclasp the tables of their thoughts
To every ticklish reader, set them down
For sluttish spoils of opportunity
And daughters of the game.” (4.6.56-64)

Hector

“And the will dotes that is inclinable
 To what infectiously itself affects
 Without some image of th’affected merit.” (2.2.57-59)

Paris

“He eats nothing but doves, love, and that breeds hot blood, and hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.” (3.1.119-21)

“Sweet above thought, I love thee!” (3.1.148)

Thersites

“What’s become of the wenching rogues? I think they have swallowed one another. I would laugh at that miracle – yet in a sort of lechery eats itself.” (5.4.29-31)

Measure for MeasureClaudio

“As surfeit is the father of much fast,
 So every scope, by the immoderate use,
 Turns to restraint. Our natures do pursue,
 Like rats that raven down their proper bane,
 A thirsty evil; and when we drink, we die.” (1.2.106-10)

Duke

“Believe not that the dribbling dart of love
 Can pierce a complete bosom.” (1.3.2-3)

“This forenamed maid hath yet in her the continuance of her first affection. His unjust unkindness, that in all reason should have quenched her love, hath, like an impediment in the current, made it more violent and unruly.” (3.1.231-35)

Lucio

“...Lord Angelo—a man who never feels
 The wanton stings and motions of the sense...” (1.4.57-58)

Angelo

“’Tis one thing to be tempted, Escalus,
Another thing to fall.” (2.1.17-18)

“She speaks, and ‘tis such sense
That my sense breeds with it.” (2.2.144-45)

“For I am that way going to temptation,
Where prayer is crossed.” (2.2.63-64)

“What’s this? What’s this? Is this her fault or mine?
The tempter or the tempted, who sins most, ha?
Not she, nor doth she tempt: but it is I
That, lying by the violet in the sun,
Do, as the carrion does, not as the flower,
Corrupt with virtuous season.” (2.2.167-72)

“Can it be
That modesty may more betray the sense
Than woman’s lightness? Having waste ground enough,
Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary,
And pitch our evils there?” (2.2.172-76)

“Dost thou desire her foully for those things
That make her good?” (2.2.178-79)

“What, do I love her,
That I desire to hear her speak again,
And feast upon her eyes? What is’t I dream on?” (2.2.181-83)

“O cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint,
With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous
Is that temptation that doth goad us on
To sin in loving virtue.” (2.2.183-86)

“Never could the strumpet,
With all her double vigour – art and nature –
Once stir my temper; but this virtuous maid
Subdues me quite. Ever till now
When men were fond, I smiled, and wondered how.” (2.2.187-91)

“heaven hath my empty words
Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue,
Anchors on Isabel; God in my mouth,

As if I did but only chew his name,
 And in my heart the strong and swelling evil
 Of my conception.” (2.4.2-7)

Isa: “I am come to know your pleasure.
Ang: That you might know it would much better please me.” (2.4.31-32)

“I have begun,
 And now I give my sensual race the rein.
 Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite.
 Lay by all nicety and prolixious blushes
 That banish what they sue for. Redeem thy brother
 By yielding up thy body to my will.” (2.4.159-64)

Isabella

“He would not, but by gift of my chaste body
 To his concupiscible intemperate lust,
 Release my brother.” (5.1.97-98)

All's Well That Ends Well

Helena

“My imagination
 Carries no favor in't but Bertram's.” (1.1.84-85)

“Th' ambition in my love thus plagues itself:
 The hind that would be mated by the lion
 Must die for love.” (1.1.92-94)

“But now he's gone, and my idolatrous fancy
 Must sanctify his relics.” (1.1.99-100)

It's a pity “That wishing had not a body in't,
 Which might be felt; that we, the poorer born,
 Whose baser stars do shut us up in wishes,
 Might with the effects of them follow our friends,
 And show what we alone must think, which never
 Returns us thanks.” (1.1.180-85)

“What power is it which mounts my love so high?
 That makes me see, and cannot feed mine eye?” (1.1.218-19)

“I know I love in vain, strive against hope;
 Yet in this captious and intenible sieve
 I still pour in the waters of my love
 And lack not to lose still.” (1.3.197-200)

“The count he woos your daughter,
 Lays down his wanton siege before her beauty,
 Resolved to carry her.” (3.7.17-19)

“But, O strange men!
 That can such sweet use make of what they hate,
 When saucy trusting of the cozened thoughts
 Defiles the pitchy night; so lust doth play
 With what it loathes, for that which is away.” (4.4.21-25)

Bertram

“Stand no more off,
 But give thyself unto my sick desires,
 Who then recovers. Say thou art mine, and ever
 My love, as it begins, shall so persever.” (4.3.34-37)

“Certain it is I liked her,
 And boarded her i’ th’ wanton way of youth.
 She knew her distance and did angle for me,
 Madding my eagerness with her restraint –
 As all impediments in fancy’s course
 Are motives of more fancy – and in fine
 Her infinite cunning with her modern grace
 Subdued me to her rate.” (5.3.209-16)

Lavatch

“I am driven on by the flesh; and he must needs go that the devil drives.” (1.3.28-30)

“The brains of my Cupid’s knocked out, and I begin to love, as an old man loves money,
 with no stomach.” (3.2.14-16)

Countess

“If ever we are nature’s, these [desires] are ours. This thorn
 Doth to our rose of youth rightly belong;
 Our blood to us, this to our blood is born.
 It is the show and seal of nature’s truth,

Where love's strong passion is impressed in youth...
Here eye is sick on't." (1.3.125-29, 132)

"Come, come, disclose
The state of your affection, for your passions
Have to the full appeached." (1.3.185-87)

Parolles

"Virginity being blown down, man will quicklier be blown up; marry, in blowing him
down again, with the breach yourselves made you lose your city." (1.1.125-27)

"Virginity breeds mites, much like cheese, consumes itself to the very paring, and so dies
with feeding his own stomach." (1.1.143-45)

Macbeth

First Witch:

"...like a rat without a tail,
I'll do, I'll do, and I'll do." (1.3.9-10)

"I'll drain him dry as hay,
Sleep shall neither night nor day
Hang upon his penthouse lid.
He shall live a man forbid." (1.3.18-21)

Lady Macbeth

"Art thou afeard
To be the same in thine own act and valor
As thou art in desire?" (1.7.39-41)

"Naught's had, all's spent,
Where our desire is got without content." (3.2.5-6)

Antony and Cleopatra

Philo

"Nay, but this dotage of our general's
O'erflows the measure." (1.1.1-2)

Cleopatra

Cleo: "If it be love indeed, tell me how much.

Ant: There's beggary in the love that can be reckoned.

Cleo: I'll set a bourn how far to be beloved.

Ant: Then must thou needs find out new heaven, new earth." (1.1.14-17)

"O, my oblivion is a very Antony,
And I am all forgotten." (1.3.90-91)

"...great Pompey
Would stand and make his eyes grow in my brow,
There would he anchor his aspect, and die
With looking on his life." (1.5.31-34)

Cleo: "Hast thou affections?"

Mar: Yes, gracious madam.

Cleo: Indeed?

Mar: Not in deed, madam; for I can do nothing
But what indeed is honest to be done:
Yet I have fierce affections, and think
What Venus did with Mars." (1.5.12-18)

"My bended hook shall pierce
Their slimy jaws, and as I draw them up,
I'll think them every one an Antony,
And say, 'Ah, ha! You're caught!'" (2.5.12-15)

"I laughed him out of patience; and that night
I laughed him into patience; and next morn
Ere the ninth hour I drunk him to his bed..." (2.5.19-21)

"His delights
Were dolphinlike, they showed his back
Above the element they lived in" (5.2.89-91)

"...if there be not ever were one such,
It's past the size of dreaming. Nature wants stuff
To fie strange forms with fancy, yet t' imagine
An Antony were nature's piece against fancy,
Condemning shadows quite." (5.2.97-100)

"Husband, I come" (5.2.287)

“The stroke of death is as a lover’s pinch,
Which hurts, and is desired.” (5.2.295-96)

Antony

“...stirred by Cleopatra.” (1.1.43)

“There’s not a minute of our lives should stretch
Without some pleasure now” (1.1.46-47)

“These strong Egyptian fetters I must break
Or lose myself in the dotage.” (1.2.115-16)

“Egypt, thou knew’st too well
My heart was to thy rudder tied by the strings,
And thou shouldst tow me after. O’er my spirit
Thy full supremacy thou knew’st, and that
Thy beck might from the bidding of the gods
Command me.” (3.11.56-61)

“You did know
How much you were my conqueror, and that
My sword, made weak by my affection, would
Obey it on all cause.” (3.11.65-68)

“O thou day o’ th’ world,
Chain mine armed neck; leap thou, attire and all,
Through proof of harness to my heart, and there
Ride on the pants triumphing!” (4.8.13-16)

Enobarbus

“her passions are made of nothing but the finest part of true love.” (1.2.146-47)

“When she first met Marc Antony, she pursed up his heart...” (2.2.196-97)

“the oars...made
The water which they beat to follow faster,
As amorous of their strokes.” (2.2.204-7)

“The city cast
Her people out upon her; and Antony,
Enthroned i’ th’ marketplace, did sit alone,
Whistling to the air; which, but for vacancy,

Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too,
And made a gap in nature.” (2.2.223-28)

“Other women cloy
The appetites they feed, but she makes hungry
Where most she satisfies.” (2.3.246-48)

“Your presence needs must puzzle Antony;
Take from his heart, take from his brain, from’s time
What should not then be spared.” (3.7.10-12)

Caesar

“...he which is was wished until he were;
And the ebbd man, ne’er loved till ne’er worth love,
Comes deared by being lacked.” (1.4.42-44)

Pompey

“Epicurean cooks
Sharpen with cloyless sauce his appetite,
That sleep and feeding may prorogue his honor...” (2.1.24-26)

“...The ne’er lust-wearied Antony.” (2.1.38)

Agrippa

“She made great Caesar lay his sword to bed;
He plowed her, and she cropped.” (2.3.237-38)

Titus Andronicus

Saturninius

“Behold, I choose thee, Tamora, for my bride,
And will create thee Empress of Rome.” (1.1.316-17)

Tamora

“If Saturnine advance the Queen of the Goths
She will a handmaid be to his desires,
A loving nurse, a mother to his youth.” (1.1.327-29)

“let my spleenful sons this trull deflower.” (2.3.191)

Aaron

“fit thy thoughts
To mount aloft with thy imperial mistress,
And mount her pitch whom thou in triumph long
Hast prisoner held fettered in amorous chains,
And faster bound to Aaron’s charming eyes
Than is Prometheus tied to Caucasus.” (2.1.13-17)

Plans “to wanton with this queen...” (2.1.21)

“’Tis policy and stratagem must do
That you affect, and so must you resolve
That what you cannot as you would achieve,
You must perforce accomplish as you may.” (2.2.105-8)

“A speedier course than ling’ring languishment
Must we pursue...” (2.2.111-12)

“There speak and strike, brave boys, and take your turns,
There serve your lust, shadowed from heaven’s eye,
And revel in Lavinia’s treasury.” (2.1.130-32)

Demetrius

“[I] may, for aught thou knowest, affected be.” (2.1.28)

“She is a woman, therefore may be wooed;
She is a woman, therefore may be won;
She is Lavinia, therefore must be loved.” (2.1.82-84)

“*Sit fas aut nefas*, till I find the stream
To cool this heat, a charm to calm these fits,
Per styga, per manes vehor.” (2.1.134-36)

Chiron

“my sword upon thee shall approve,
And plead my passions for Lavinia’s love.” (2.1.35-36)

Chi: “Drag hence her husband to some secret hole,
 And make his dead trunk pillow to our lust.
Tam: But when ye have the honey ye desire
 Let not this wasp outlive, us both to sting.” (2.3.129-32)

Lavinia

“O, keep me from their worse-than-killing lust” (2.3.175)

Romeo and Juliet

Romeo

“Love is a smoke made with a fume of sighs,
 Being purged, a fire sparkling in lovers’ eyes,
 Being vexed, a sea nourished with lovers’ tears.” (1.1.183-85)

Rom: “Is love a tender thing? It is too rough,
 Too rude, too boist’rous, and it pricks like thorn.
Mer: If love be rough with you, be rough with love.
 Prick love for pricking, and you beat love down.” (1.4.25-28)

“For stony limits cannot hold love out,
 And what love can do, that dares love attempt” (2.1.109-10)

“...on a sudden one hath wounded me
 That’s by me wounded.” (2.2.50-51)

“Then plainly know my heart’s dear love is set
 On the fair daughter of rich Capulet.
 As mine on hers, so hers is set on mine” (2.2.57-59)

Benvolio

“Take thou some new infection to thy eye,
 And the rank poison of the old will die.” (1.2.47-48)

Mercutio

“This is the hag, when maids lie on their backs,
 That presses them and learns them first to bear,
 Making them women of good carriage.” (1.4.92-95)

Chorus

“Now old desire doth in his deathbed lie,
And young affection gapes to be his heir.” (2.0.1-2)

“Now Romeo is beloved and loves again,
Alike bewitched by the charm of looks” (2.0.5-6)

“But passion lends them power, time means, to meet,
Temp’ring extremities with extreme sweet.” (2.0.13-14)

Juliet

“In truth, fair Montague, I am too fond...” (2.1.140)

“I should have been more strange, I must confess,
But that thou overheard’st, ere I was ware,
My true-love passion.” (2.1.144-46)

“And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep. The more I give to thee
The more I have, for both are infinite.” (2.1.174-77)

Rom: “I would I were thy bird.

Jul: Sweet, so would I.
Yet I should kill thee with much cherishing.” (2.1.226-27)

Rom: “let rich music’s tongue
Unfold the imagined happiness that both
Receive in either by this dear encounter.

Jul: Conceit, more rich in matter than in words,
Braggs of his substance, not of ornament.
They are but beggars that can count their worth,
But my true love is grown to such excess
I cannot sum up some of half my wealth.” (2.5.27-34)

“Spread thy close curtain, love-performing night,
That runaways’ eyes may wink, and Romeo
Leap to these arms untalked of and unseen.” (3.2.5-7)

“...learn me how to lose a winning match
Played for a pair of stainless maidenhoods.

Hood my unmanned blood, bating in my cheeks,
 With thy black mantle till strange love grown bold
 Think true love acted simple modesty.” (3.2.12-16)

“O, I have bought the mansion of a love
 But not possessed it, and though I am sold,
 Not yet enjoyed.” (3.2.26-28)

Friar Lawrence

Chides Romeo “For doting, not for loving” (2.2.82)

“These violent delights have violent ends,
 And in their triumph die like fire and powder,
 Which as they kiss consume. The sweetest honey
 Is loathsome in his own deliciousness,
 And in the tastes confounds the appetite.
 Therefore love moderately. Long love doth so.” (2.5.9-14)

Hamlet

Hamlet

He was “so loving to my mother
 That he might not betwixt the winds of heaven
 Visit her face too roughly.” (1.2.140-42)

“Why, she would hang on him
 As if increase of appetite had grown
 By what it fed on” (1.2.143-45)

“Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed,
 And batten on this moor? [...]
 You cannot call it love, for at your age
 The heyday in the blood is tame, it’s humble,
 And waits upon the judgment.” (3.4.66-70)

“Nay, but to live
 In the rank sweat of an enseamed bed,
 Stewed in corruption, honeying and making love
 Over the nasty sty - ” (3.4.91-94)

Do not “Let the bloat king tempt you again to bed,
 Pinch wanton on your cheek, call you his mouse,

And let him, with a pair of reechy kisses,
Or paddling in your neck with his damned fingers,
Make you to ravel all this matter out” (3.4.182-86)

“I loved Ophelia. Forty thousand brothers
Could not with all their quantity of love
Make up my sum.” (5.1.258-60)

Laertes

“For Hamlet, and the trifling of his favor,
Hold it a fashion and a toy in blood” (1.3.5-6)

“Then weigh what loss your honor may sustain
If with too credent ear you list his songs,
Or lose your heart, or your chaste treasure open
To his unmastered importunity.” (1.3.28-31)

“And keep you in the rear of your affection,
Out of the shot and danger of desire.” (1.3.33-34)

Ophelia

“He hath, my lord, of late made many tenders
Of his affection to me.” (1.3.98-99)

Polonius

“These blazes, daughter,
Giving more light than heat, extinct both
Even in their promise, as it is a-making.” (1.3.116-18)

“This is the very ecstasy of love,
Whose violent property fordoes itself
And leads the will to desperate undertakings
As oft as any passion under heaven
That does afflict our natures.” (2.1.101-105)

Ghost

“Ay, that incestuous, that adulterate beast,
With witchcraft of his wit, with traitorous gifts –

O wicked wit and gifts, that have the power
 So to seduce! – won to his shameful lust
 The will of my most seeming-virtuous queen.” (1.5.42-45)

“But virtue, as it will never be moved,
 Though lewdness court it in a shape of heaven,
 So lust, though to a radiant angel linked,
 Will sate itself in a celestial bed,
 And prey on garbage.”(1.5.54-57)

Othello

Othello

“I will a round unvarnished tale deliver
 Of my whole course of love, what drugs, what charms,
 What conjuration and what mighty magic –
 For such proceeding I am charged withal –
 I won his daughter.” (1.3.90-94)

“These things to hear
 Would Desdemona seriously incline...
 and with a greedy ear
 devour up my discourse” (1.3.144-45, 148-49)

“my story being done,
 She gave me for my pains a world of kisses.
 She swore in faith ‘twas strange, ‘twas passing strange,
 ‘Twas pitiful, ‘twas wondrous pitiful.
 She wished she had not heard it, yet she wished
 That heaven had made her such a man. She thanked me,
 And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her,
 I should but teach him how to tell my story,
 And that would woo her.” (1.3.157-65)

“I therefore beg it not
 To please the palate of my appetite,
 Nor to comply with heat – the young affects
 In me defunct – and proper satisfaction,
 But to be free and bounteous to her mind.” (1.3.261-65)

“If it were now to die
 ‘Twere now to be most happy, for I fear
 My soul hath her content so absolute
 That not another comfort like to this

Succeeds in unknown fate.” (2.1.188-92)

“I cannot speak enough of this content.
It stops me here, it is too much of joy.” (2.1.195-96)

“Come, my dear love,
The purchase made, the fruits are to ensue.
The profit’s yet to come ‘tween me and you.” (2.3.8-10)

“Excellent wretch! Perdition catch my soul
But I do love thee, and when I love thee not,
Chaos is come again.” (3.3.91-93)

“O curse of marriage,
That we can call these delicate creatures ours
And not their appetites!” (3.3.272-74)

“This argues fruitfulness and liberal heart.
Hot, hot and moist – this hand of yours requires
A sequester from liberty; fasting, and prayer,
Much castigation, exercise devout;
For here’s a young and sweating devil here
That commonly rebels.” (3.4.35-41)

“while she kept it [the handkerchief]
‘Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
Entirely to her love; but if she lost it,
Or made a gift of it, my father’s eye
Should hold her loathed, and his spirits should hunt
After new fancies.” (3.4.61)

“...she can turn and turn, and yet go on
And turn again...” (4.1.250-51)

“Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee
And love thee after.” (5.2.18-19)

“Speak of me as I am. Nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice. Then must you speak
Of one that loved not wisely but too well...” (5.2.351-53)

Senator

“Did you by indirect and forced courses
Subdue and poison this young maid’s affections,

Or came it by request and such fair question
As soul to soul affordeth?" (1.3.111-14)

Desdemona

"That I did love the Moor to live with him,
My downright violence and storm of fortunes
May trumpet to the world. My heart's subdued
Even to the very quality of my lord.
I saw Othello's visage in his mind,
And to his honours and his valiant parts
Did I my soul and fortunes consecrate." (1.3.247-53)

"The heavens forbid
But that our loves and comforts should increase
Even as our days do grow." (2.1.192-94)

Iago

"I am one, sir, that comes to tell you your daughter and the Moor are making the beast
with two backs." (1.1.112)

"Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners; . . . If the beam of our
lives had not one scale of reason to peise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of
our natures would conduct us to the most preposterous conclusions. But we have reason
to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts; whereof I take this that
you call love to be a sect or scion." (1.3.317-27)

"It [love] is merely a lust of the blood and a permission of the will. . . . It was a violent
commencement in her, and thou shalt see an answerable sequestration. . . . These Moors
are changeable in thy wills. . . . The food that to him now is as luscious as locusts shall be
to him shortly as bitter as coloquintida. She must change for youth. When she is sated
with his body, she will find the error of her choice." (1.3.329, 337-43)

"Mark me with what violence she first loved the Moor, but for bragging and telling her
fantastical lies. To love him still for prating? – let not thy discreet heart think it. Her eye
must be fed, and what delight shall she have to look on the devil? When the blood is
made dull with the act of sport, there should be again to inflame it, and to give satiety a
fresh appetite, loveliness in favour..." (2.1.217-24)

"Lechery, by this hand; an index and obscure prologue to the history of lust and foul
thoughts." (2.1.248-49)

"He hath not yet made wanton the night with her, and she is sport for Jove." (2.3.15-16)

“Now my sick fool Roderigo,
Whom love hath turned almost the wrong side out,
To Desdemona hath tonight caroused” (2.3.44-46)

“His soul is so enfeathered to her love
That she may make, unmake, do what she list,
Even as her appetite shall play the god
With his weak function.” (2.3.318-21)

“...she reveals him for her body’s lust” (2.3.331)

“...O, what damned minutes tells he o’er
Who dotes yet doubts, suspects yet fondly loves!” (3.3.173-74)

“I see, sir, you are eaten up with passion.” (3.3.396)

“A hussy that by selling her desires
Buys herself bread and cloth. It is a creature
That dotes on Cassio...” (4.1.92-94)

Emilia

Men “are all but stomachs, and we all but food.
They eat us hungrily, and when they are full,
They belch us.” (3.4.100-102)

“Let husbands know
Their wives have sense like them. They see, and smell,
And have their palates both for sweet and sour,
As husbands have. What is it they do
When they change us for others? Is it sport?
I think it is. And doth affection breed it?
I think it doth. Is’t frailty that thus errs?
It is so, too. And have not we affections,
Desires for sport, and frailty, as men have?” (4.3.91-99)

King Lear

France

“Thee and thy virtues here I seize upon:
Be it lawful I take up what’s cast away.
Gods, gods! ‘t is strange that from their cold’st neglect

My love should kindle to inflamed respect.” (1.1.253-56)

Regan

“She gave strange oeillades and most speaking looks
To noble Edmund.” (4.5.26-27)

“I am doubtful that you have been conjunct
And bosomed with her, as far as we call hers. . . .
Be not familiar with her.” (5.1.12-13, 16)

Goneril

“O, the difference of man and man!
To thee a woman’s services are due:
My fool usurps my body.” (4.2.26-28)

“I had rather lose the battle than that sister
Should loosen him and me.” (5.1.18-19)

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