ABSTRACT

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The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to provide the literature with a revised conceptualization of gender beliefs that will better explain variance in public opinion. When trying to operationalize feminist attitudes in the past, the public opinion literature has relied on measures of abortion or one-dimensional index scores- basically collapsing attitudes into a false dichotomy of feminist/antifeminist. This is problematic for many reasons. I argue that the feminist belief system should be treated as a multidimensional concept comprising at least three distinct dimensions: belief about women's opportunity; belief about assertive women; and belief about the changing family structure and role of the mother. The second half of the dissertation applies this new approach within the areas of abortion attitudes, candidate evaluations (both experimental and real world), and party affiliation. Overall, the findings support the thesis that there are at least three distinct gender beliefs with varying degrees of explanatory power.

GENDER BELIEFS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

By

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
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Dedication

For Sandra and Joseph Bell

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Introduction

> It's the Mommy Wars: Special Campaign Edition. But this time the battle lines are drawn inside out, with social conservatives, usually staunch advocates for stay-at-home motherhood, mostly defending her [Palin], while some others, including plenty of working mothers, worry that she is taking on too much.
>
> (Kantor and Swarns, *New York Times*, 2008)

The 2008 election, with the unprecedented performance of two national woman candidates, was a salient reminder to political scientists that understanding gender role attitudes and their effect on political evaluations are important to contemporary politics. No longer are dichotomies such as feminist/antifeminist accurate in the study of public opinion; this categorization in contemporary politics "masks the complexity of … attitudes toward the women's movement" (Buschman and Lenart 1996). While normative theorists and activists work to establish a blueprint for what feminism should mean in the abstract, this dissertation investigates how the American electorate understands and forms opinions about gender roles and equality and how those gender beliefs affect political choices. A better understanding of how the American electorate forms opinions dealing with the complex issue set falling under the umbrella of feminism will allow for a more accurate study of how such beliefs influence a range of political activity from candidate evaluations, party affiliation to policy attitudes.

The first part of this dissertation focuses on the conceptualization and measurement of gender beliefs. While previous public opinion scholarship examining gender opinion treats it as a one-dimensional belief, this project will show that, in fact, it is multidimensional. The contemporary American electorate embodies at least three different kinds of gender beliefs that, for some people, are unrelated. I will establish the distinctiveness of three gender related predispositions and will also show that the factors that predict them are distinctive as well.

The first dimension deals with beliefs about women's opportunities, the second dimension focuses on the evolving role of the mother and family structure and, finally, the third dimension focuses on beliefs about assertive women. The second half of this dissertation explores the relationship between gender beliefs and candidate evaluations, party affiliation, and abortion attitudes. I rely on data from the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES), the Cumulative American National Election Study, and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).

I choose, and do so throughout the dissertation, to focus only on whites and remove African-Americans and Hispanics from the sample and analysis (with the exception of Chapter 5 due to concern for sample size, however, race is controlled for). Historically, African-Americans and Hispanics have had a different experience with civil rights and equality compared to whites. I suspect that this differentially interacts with their feminist belief system. The relationship between African-Americans and Hispanics to the thesis presented in this dissertation is important to the overall story of women in America and deserves investigation as well. Dedicating one chapter would **not be sufficient** to address the unique history and mechanisms at work; therefore, it remains a

fruitful topic that shall be addressed in future work stemming from the dissertation. For the sake of not sounding repetitive, when I refer to the electorate throughout the dissertation, I mean white Americans.

While the women's movement has evolved over time, our scholarly understanding of the gender belief systems has lagged behind. In order to better understand public views on women's equality in the public and private spheres of life, it is essential to reinvestigate how Americans form and utilize gender values particularly as they pertains to political choices.

Chapter One

The Contemporary American Electorate and Women: A Snapshot

Only a day after reports went public that 2012 Presidential candidate Herman Cain had a history of sexual harassment allegations his fundraising soured, in fact, "his campaign collected 644 itemized donations — more than four times what it received on an average day" (Levinthal *Politico* February 1, 2012). This news is somewhat surprising given just four years earlier the American public embraced two national woman candidates from each side of the political aisle. This combination of events illuminates the complex relationship between the contemporary American public and feminism. On the one hand, a historic year for women in politics, on the other, a demonstration that suggests we have progressed little in our views toward sexual harassment since the Anita Hill hearings in 1991. Beyond the campaign trail, questions of women's role in society, motherhood, gender and women's advancement and sexual harassment, to name just a few, prove to be prevalent in everyday politics.

In this chapter, I will present a snapshot of the contemporary American electorate's feminist attitudes. Overall, the measures neither paint a picture of an American electorate completely at terms with equal roles for men and women, nor stuck

in the past. Rather, we see that the electorate has developed a complex conception of women's role in society. This comes as no surprise because the women's movement and feminism have never experienced a clear, linear trajectory in regard to either progress or goals (although few social movements do). Unlike minority groups fighting for equal rights, women's personal lives are heavily intertwined with and interdependent with men's. As shown in the following figures, this complex history and interdependence has contributed to a fragmentation of opinion about gender roles within the American electorate.

There are seven measures on the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) capturing attitudes dealing with a woman's place in society, in addition to ratings of feminists as a social group, that are regularly used by political scientists.[1] ANES participants were read several statements and asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed. The first statement reads: "It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever and the woman takes care of the home and family."[2] As shown in Figure 1.1, 51% of respondents disagreed. Close to 20% choose neither to agree nor disagree, while 30% agreed with the statement. This question is relatively new; the standard measure used for the past decade has read: "Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with

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[1] This dissertation deals with beliefs about women in society and how those beliefs affect political choices, such as party affiliation, candidate evaluations, and attitudes toward certain gender policies; therefore, attitudes toward gender policies (for example, federal funding of programs that impact women) will not be used as proxy for beliefs about women (as often done in previous work).

[2] The order of the statements read is randomly assigned.

men running business, industry and government [suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1]. Others feel a woman's place is at home [suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 7]" And of course, some people have opinions somewhere in between (at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) As shown in Figure 1.2, there is less variation in response compared to the new measure. Even when the categories in Figure 1.2 are collapsed into a 3 point distribution for ease of comparison with Figure 1.1, there is still little variation with over 75% of respondents choosing the highest value.

The increased variation in Figure 1.1 is most likely a result of the new measure's avoidance of phrases that evoke social desirability, such as "Women *should* take care of the home,"[3] and substitution with: "It is better for everyone involved if…" In other words, respondents recognize that they will be perceived negatively if they admit they believe a woman should stay at home. Changing the wording provides the respondent with a psychological out, so to speak, but yet still reaches the same conclusion. Given the lack of variation in the answer the ANES only administered this statement to half of the sample.[4]

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[3] Italics added.

[4] This measure is problematic, not only due to lack of variation, but plagued by both social desirability and the conflation of two issues (the role of the mother and women's ability to perform as well as men professionally) into one question.

Figure 1.1: Distribution 'Achiever' Question

It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home
and the woman takes care of the home and family

Figure 1.2: Distribution 'Role' Question

Some people feel women should have an equal role with men in running business
industry and government. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home

The second statement reads: "Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination." Interestingly, as demonstrated in Figure 1.3, there is less variation in the response as with other measures reviewed in this chapter. Generally speaking, most American believe that women do miss out on good jobs because of discrimination, with over 65% either agreeing strongly or agreeing somewhat with that statement. The remaining respondents chose one of the three other responses. Among respondents, less than 10% disagree strongly.

Figure 1.3: Distribution 'Discrimination' Question

Figure 1.3 illustrates that a two-thirds majority of the Americans accept that women face discrimination. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 1.4, those same respondents are uncomfortable with the idea of women attempting to rectify this situation. When respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "When women are demanding equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors," we see that there is almost an even distribution among the available responses. Close to 20% respectively agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, and neither agree nor disagree. About 30% disagree strongly, and less than 10% agree strongly.

Figure 1.4: Distribution 'Equality' Equation

Figure 1.5: Distribution 'Harassment' Question

Carefully attempting to gauge feelings in the area of harassment and women in the workplace, an issue area cloaked in political correctness and social desirability, the ANES cleverly presents this statement to respondents: "Women who complain about harassment cause more problems than they solve." As seen in Figure 1.5, respondents are conflicted about their opinion on women who complain about harassment, with close to 50% of respondents disagreeing strongly or somewhat with the statement and close to 50% agreeing strongly, agreeing somewhat or neither agreeing nor disagreeing.

Returning again to motherhood, respondents were read the following statement: "Working mothers can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with their children as a mother who does not work." In Figure 1.6, there is slightly less variation in response

to this measure than previous ones. A little over 60% of respondents believe that working mothers can establish comparably warm relationships with their children as mothers who stay home, and close to 30% neither agree nor disagree, or outright disagree with that statement. Future questions dealing with voter's feelings toward working mothers should attempt to gauge feelings toward working mothers within context of different careers choices. Research has documented that one of the factors perpetuating the wage gap between women and men is that women overwhelmingly choose fields, such as teaching and nursing, with low value for human capital and that allow them to leave and re-enter the labor market with little penalty. A more informative measure would place the hypothetical mother in a position that requires more capital and defies gender norms (i.e. a position with masculine characteristics such as a cop or C.E.O).

Figure 1.6: Distribution 'Working Mom' Question

A working mother can establish just as secure and warm a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work

Figure 1.7: Distribution of Ratings of Feminists

Finally, I look at the electorate's attitude toward feminists. As seen from the
previous measures reviewed, the contemporary electorate has developed a nuanced
approach to the many questions dealing with women and their rights in the workplace, the
evolving role of motherhood, and so on. As shown in Figure 1.7, feeling thermometer
rating of feminists is consistent with the trajectory of the previous data presented,
illustrating a conflicted approach to a movement that has experience unprecedented
success but almost equal vilification as a social group. Figure 1.7 shows a normal
distribution of responses. Most respondents place themselves down the middle of the
road at 50 on the feeling thermometer scale (ranging from 0-100 with 0 representing cold
feelings and 100 warm feelings). Previous research has shown a positivity bias may exist
(see Wilcox, Sigleman, and Cook, 1989); therefore, to correct for this bias, a mean score

was generated from the remaining group thermometer scores on the ANES and then

subtracted from the thermometer score for feminists to create a normalized score.

Chapter 2:

Gender Beliefs

The chapter begins with a review of the literature on gender and public opinion and then continues with a critique of current measures. Whereas past public opinion scholarship approached gender attitudes as a one-dimensional belief, hoping to capture an individual in the false dichotomy of feminist/anti-feminist, I introduce three general beliefs in regard to women that better account for variance in public opinion: beliefs about women's opportunities, beliefs about motherhood and the family structure, and beliefs about assertive women. I conclude the chapter by empirically demonstrating that each belief is distinct and originates from different core values and characteristics.

2.1 Gender and Public Opinion: State of the Literature

The answers differ from one scholar to the next, from one discipline to another, and from year to year, not cumulating as they might, not reaching consensus about what should be kept in mind when analyzing gender … There are many good studies of gender and public opinion. But as it stands now, the literature is not yet more than the sum of its parts. That's not anyone's fault. It is a structural problem: This disconnected character

comes from the fact that the literature on gender and public opinion has emerged not as a self-contained literature but, rather, in the nooks and crannies of separate literatures. (Burns & Gallagher, 2010, p. 426)

Unfortunately, Burns and Gallagher's description of the literature as disconnected is correct. There is a clear struggle to label sub-groups as feminist or anti-feminist, and to understand not only the mechanisms of feminist opinion but how that opinion affects political choices. Currently, recent research generally describes an American public that fully acknowledges the historical discrimination against women and current obstacles toward equality but yet refrains from identifying as feminists, and while collectively moving toward nontraditional gender attitudes, the public tends to hold only moderately progressive attitudes toward feminism (see Renzetti, 1987; Buschman & Lanart, 1996; Bennett and Bennett, 1999; Hudy, Neely, & LaFay, 2000: Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Aronson, 2003).

2.1.1 Feminist Identity and Opinion

"I'm not a feminist, but…" is the oft heard phrase muttered by many contemporary American women. This phrase is so prominent that it has almost become cliché in some academic circles studying public opinion and feminism. The irony is not lost on scholars that a movement that has become so successful has also been almost equally vilified. How is it that Americans have developed more progressive attitudes towards feminist values but less positive attitudes toward feminism as an identity? Previous research would tell us that feminist identity and values are two distinct concepts—each developing independently of the other (Rhodebeck, 1996; Hudy, Neely, & LaFay, 2000).

Rhodebeck (1996) looks into the difference between feminist identity and feminist opinion using pooled American National Election Study (ANES) cross-sectional data from 1972 to 1992 and finds that the two are distinct (although somewhat related) constructs and that this is true over time regardless of gender. In addition, Rhodebeck found that "identity has a stronger causal effect on opinion than vice versa. Opinion, however, is the more stable construct" (p.400). So whereas identifying as a feminist and/or having positive feelings toward the women's movement predicts feminist opinions, Rhodebeck's findings suggest that holding feminist opinions does not lead to identification or support of feminism as a group. There are a few problems with this study, however, that call for further work.

Although the author looks at the relationship between feminist identity and feminist opinion and the impact of time and sex, the study is limited to data from 1972 to 1992. Since 1992, much has happened that would suggest that the results might not be generalizable to 1992 through 2008. In addition to being slightly out of date, Rhodebeck (1996) included attitudes toward abortion as a measure of feminist opinion. Given, empirically, the recent debate surrounding the relationship between abortion attitudes and other feminist measures, it would be prudent to run the model again with a substitute measure (see Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992; Heatherington & Weiler, 2009). Finally, Rhodebeck herself called for further research investigating the relationship between feminist identity and feminist opinions "vis-a-vis other groups" (p. 401).

Nonetheless, Rhodebeck (1996) is far from the only scholar pointing out the need to conceptually distinguish between identification and opinion. In fact, as Huddy, Neely, and LaFay (2000) point out, it is fairly common for political scientists hoping to capture

gender consciousness to utilize variables that both measure attitudes toward feminist objectives/goals as well as feminist identification (see Cook, 1989; Cook & Wilcox, 1991; Sapiro & Conover, 1997). The conventional wisdom in the literature is that measures relying on attitudes toward feminists as a group are no longer a reliable predictor of feminist values, and it is now rare to see researchers do so.

Social identity theory, a social psychological theory, has been applied in recent work to help explain the growing disconnect between feminist opinion and feminist identification (see Huddy, 1997 and 2001). Political scientists often use this theory to help explain public opinion and political behavior. It posits that "social identity is derived from an individual's self-categorization, the process by which the individual cognitively redefines the self in terms of group norms and the associated stereotypes of particular social categories" (Monroe, Hankin, & Van Vechten, 2000, p. 434). The self-categorization theory, an extension of social identity theory, relies on group stereotypes. The more an individual sees themselves like the socially constructed prototype of a group—in this case the prototype feminist—the more an individual will see themselves a part of that group. This is why, as Huddy (2001) argues, women may hold feminist opinions but disassociate themselves from the movement because they do not "see" themselves as similar to the feminist prototype. Huddy also points out that both in-group and outgroup members can contribute to the construction of the group prototype:

> During the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment, Phyllis Schlafly helped to define the meaning of feminism for many women by demonstrating that homemakers and women who were not pursuing careers were outside the feminist label. The notion that outgroups help to

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define category membership is linked to Barth's (1981) view that much of the meaning of identity is created at its boundaries in interaction or dialogue with outgroup members. One obvious political implication of this finding is that group identity may be more diffuse and less intense in the absence of a clear outgroup to sharpen the meaning of group membership and identify the kinds of people who lie outside the group boundary. (Huddy, p. 145).

Currently, a relatively small percentage of women and men consider themselves feminists (Huddy, Neely, & LaFay, 2000). What do scholars expect will predict feminist self-identification? To begin with, the more obvious indicators: a positive evaluation of feminists, a lack of conservative beliefs, and belief in collective action (Myaskovsky &Wittig, 1997; Liss, et al., 2001). But as discussed, identification really boils down to how the individual "sees" the feminist prototype. "Just over a third of men and women think feminists dislike men, and just under fifty percent think feminists do not respect women who stay at home with their children" (Huddy, Neely &LaFay, 2001). Huddy (2001) went on to show that while the salience of feminism as an identity can be conditioned based on context, the cultural meaning cannot. Cultural meaning, or rather prototypes, takes a long time to change.

2.1.2 Gender Policy

Often, policies advancing the rights of women are used as a proxy for feminist opinion; therefore, attempting to understand how feminist opinions influence support or opposition for gender policy issues becomes quite complicated. Within the realm of political science, little research focuses on the factors contributing to attitudes on gender

policy (with the exception of the large amount of work done on abortion) (but see Wilcox & Sigelman, 201l; Wilcox, 1992). There is, however, a large literature on the gender differences concerning support for different policy in general, often referred to as the "gender gap" literature (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Conover, 1988; Wirls, 1986; Welch & Sigelman, 1992; Conover & Sapiro, 1997; Dolan, 1998; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999).

Previous work on gender policy breaks it up into two groups: policy dealing with gender equity and policy dealing with role change (Gelb & Paltlet, 1982). Gelb and Paltley make the case that this is the most effective way to study gender issues, because gender equity tends to be 'legalistic,' while role change policy touches on core values. Gelb and Paltley first offer this categorization (as quoted in Burns & Gallagher, 2010):

> Role equity issues are those policies which extend rights now enjoyed by other groups (men, other minorities) to women and which appear to be relatively delineated or narrow in their implications, permitting policy makers to seek advantage with feminist groups and voters with little cost or controversy. In contrast, role change issues appear to produce change in the dependent woman role of wife, mother, and homemaker, holding out the potential of greater sexual freedom and independence in a variety of contexts. The latter issues are fraught with greater political pitfalls, including perceived threats to existing values, in turn creating visible and often powerful opposition. (p. 6)

Both Burns and Gallagher and Sanbotmatsu (2002) are quick to point out that there is some subjectivity involved in determining what is a 'role change' issue and what is a 'role equity' issue.

> Where an issue stands—whether it is about roles or equity or both—depends on the tools ordinary Americans use to think about the particular issue. We do not think it is possible to "read" equity or roles from an actual policy. As an example, early on, scholars read the ERA as an equity issue (Carden, 1977), whereas later scholars read it as a role-change issue (Gelb & Palley, 1982). (Burns & Gallagher, p. 431)

2.1.3 Mechanisms of Public Opinion

Bozendahl and Meyers (2004) most recently looked at what factors contribute to the formation of feminist opinion. Interestingly, they find a variety of results depending on which feminist "issue" they are examining. In some cases, certain characteristics predict feminist (or progressive) opinion within one issue area and *anti-feminist* views in another. Bozendahl and Meyers capture their dependent variable, feminist opinion, through measures on attitudes toward abortion, sexual behavior, public sphere gender roles, and family responsibilities. Instead of collapsing the measures of feminist opinion into an index score, the authors ran a separate model for each dependent variable, or as they refer to it, each issue domain.

For women, Bozendahl and Meyers (2004) found that employment is a strong predictor of feminist attitudes across all issue domains. This comes as no surprise as even Bozendahl and Meyers note that the relationship between women's employment and feminist attitudes is "one of the most robust findings within this literature" (p. 763) (see

also Glass, 1992; Klein, 1984; Banaszak & Plutzer, 1991; Rhodebeck, 1996). Bozendahl and Meyers also found an effect for the respondent's family structure, with divorced women more likely to hold feminist attitudes, particularly when it came to issues of sexual behavior and family responsibility. In addition, the authors found mixed results based on the number of children for both men and women. Moreover, the more children an individual has, the more likely he or she will have traditional views on sexual behavior and abortion; *however*, there is an "emerging" positive effect on attitudes toward family responsibility and public sphere gender issues. In addition to the respondent's family structure, Bozendahl and Meyers found that religious traditionalism only matters on certain issues as did age. The variation of results across dependent variables suggests that more work should be done on how we conceptually understand feminist opinion. The fact that certain variables contribute to feminist opinion on some measures but traditional opinion on others suggest that feminist opinion should no longer be approached as a one-dimensional concept.

Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) propose the idea of two distinctive types of feminist beliefs within the electorate, what they call "private" and "public" feminism in *Between Two Absolutes: Public Opinion and the Politics of Abortion*, when discussing the relationship between gender role attitudes and abortion. Cook et al. describe public feminism dealing with issues regarding women's participation in politics and/or business, (for example, whether women are emotionally and intellectually capable), whereas private feminism deals with questions of woman superiority in terms of care giving and child rearing. However, they provide no empirical support for these beliefs.

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Other research has gone on to show that women who experience sexual discrimination are much more likely to hold feminist attitudes as well as self-identify as one compared to those who have not (Buschman & Lanart, 1996; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997). Context, which comes as no surprise, continues to play a role with research demonstrating that not only is experience with discrimination a predictor of feminist attitudes, but employment in the workplace is as well. Smith (1985) found that women who work outside the home tend to hold more feminist attitudes on employment and familial roles as well as sexual behavior and general rights. In addition, the husbands of women who work outside the home were also found to hold more feminist attitudes across the board. Although Smith did not establish causation, it can be expected that the relationship is most likely reciprocal.

In addition to determining what factors predict gender opinion, scholars have also struggled to form a consensus when it comes to labeling sub-groups. Gallagher (2004) found that it was misleading to label Evangelicals as either feminists or anti-feminists because of the complexities of their views as illustrated through one of her many in-depth interviews: "I believe women had to gain rights because women were walked on. ... They were treated horribly. They're under-paid, they still are in a lot of areas. But I think feminist groups now try to take the pants off the husband. ... In the work world, go for it. But I think the feminist movement kind of hurt the home structure a little bit, the family structure" (29-year-old charismatic father of one, Ohio) (p. 463). Though social conservatives may have once held monolithic traditional views on gender roles, economic necessity and practical need may have begun to thwart this attitude, or at the very least, have complicated it (see Gallagher & Smith, 1999). Structural economic changes are

making the possibility of a single-family income less and less attainable. Gallagher (2004) found that although Evangelicals were critical of the "radicalization" of feminism, the majority were "cautiously appreciative" of the gains made by feminism (p. 460). There are still, however, recent studies that found the opposite in terms of results, that Evangelicals can be categorized as anti-feminists (see Wilcox & Larson, 2006). According to Wilcox and Larson, white Evangelicals are much more likely to believe working mothers cannot form warm and caring relationships with their children when compared to stay-at-home mothers.

2.1.4 What is Wrong with the Literature

The concept of feminism, or gender equality, means so many things to so many people. Therefore, scholars often use a variety of composite measures and scales to capture feminist attitudes with the implicit assumption that any measure capturing attitudes towards any women's issue is an equal and sufficient measure for all gender beliefs (for variation on measurements see Renzetti, 1987; Liss, O'Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; Aronson, 2003; Wilcox, 1989; Cook, 1989; Cook & Wilcox, 1991; Cook, Wilcox, & Jelen 1992; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999; Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; McCabe, 2005; Wilcox & Larson, 2006; Heatherington & Weiler, 2009).

Unfortunately, this overly simplistic approach does not taken into account that the American public has formed a multi-dimensional conception of gender equality. By doing so the academic community runs the risk of masking important political phenomenon. No longer are "dichotomies such as feminist/antifeminist" appropriate in studies of attitudes toward feminism; this categorization in contemporary politics "masks the complexity of … attitudes toward the women's movement" (Buschman & Lenart,

1996, p.59). For example, Catholic women in the 1970s were frustrated with pay discrimination but yet were turned off of the women's movement by discussions of abortion and sexuality (see Leege et al., 2002).

Gender beliefs have been assessed using a variety of empirical measures over the years from attitudes toward abortion (see Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999) to attitudes toward working mothers (see Wilcox & Larson, 2006). Often, this is the result of a limited data set as well as a lack of dialogue within the subfield, which means that much of the previous empirical work on gender beliefs was dictated by data availability, not theory.

The reason that public opinion specialists' conceptualization of gender opinion is limited to a single dimension can be attributed to the failure of political science to provide for any discussion on gender (Silverberg 1990). According to Virginia Sapiro (1983); gender is the "sociocultural manifestations of being a man or woman … [the] learned characteristics, expectations, and patterns of behavior. Gender is learned significance of one's sex" (as quoted in Silverberg, 1990, p. 889). Silverberg goes on to describe gender, as understood in political science, as simply "the outcomes of socialization processes that take place in a range of social institutions such as the family, the school, and the church" (p. 898). Silverberg urges political scientists to approach gender the same way other disciplines do, as the relationship between the sexes, a private struggle for power. Political scientists often neglect anything outside of the public realm and therefore have failed to really engage in any discussion of gender equality.

The other reason that political scientists treat gender opinion as one-dimensional can be attributed to the possibility that the public opinion field has overlooked (and understudied) the fact that the women's movement evolved and fragmented over time.

The women's movement, as described by Leege et al. (2002), "addressed both a broad range of policy issues and the daily life experiences dealing with the economy, the military, language, the construction of history, family, and sexuality" (p. 209) and as such was fought not only on the policy front but quickly became entangled with symbolic politics and the culture war.

As the movement grew in different directions and developed a broader scope, we have failed to see that a citizen's gender values are not necessarily driven alone by beliefs about a woman's proper place, but are also informed by general attitudes toward family needs and expectations of opportunity. To dismiss gender opinion to the simple dichotomy of feminist/anti-feminist misses the evolution of public opinion into separate domains of attitudes with distinct influence that fall under the umbrella of gender opinion.

Though I draw on Burns and Gallagher (2010), as well as Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1992), for theoretical support in arguing for a complex model of gender opinion, I differ in two ways: (1) I propose three distinct dimensions of gender opinion among the electorate: beliefs about women's opportunities, beliefs about assertive women, and beliefs about the evolving family structure; and (2) In addition to my theoretical argument for a three- dimensional conception of feminism in the electorate, I also provide empirical support. I see these three beliefs as distinct, separate constructs. In other words, simply because an individual is more progressive in one dimension (say the beliefs about women's opportunities), this does not necessarily mean the same individual can be characterized as progressive when it comes to the remaining two dimensions (assertive women or family structure).

In the following section, I will elaborate on the three dimensions of gender opinion and will explore the theoretical underpinnings of each dimension as well as introduce empirical support. More importantly, I will conclude by identifying the different core values, personality traits, and socio-economic factors that influence each dimension, highlighting the distinct origin of each.

2.2 Gender Beliefs

In this chapter I propose a new way to conceptualize feminism for those who study mass public opinion—as a multi-dimensional concept composed of three distinct clusters of attitudes.[5] As discussed in the previous chapter, the contemporary American electorate develops beliefs and subsequent attitudes about women and their role in society in three dimensions—referred to as dimensions throughout the dissertation. As this chapter demonstrates, each dimension is conceptually separate with differing predictive power and influenced by different core values and demographics—although, naturally, I do allow for some overlap.

The first dimension deals with the beliefs about opportunities for women, in other words, belief about the difficulties women face and the importance of opportunity. The second dimension consists of attitudes toward the evolving family structure and role of the mother and will be referred to as the family structure dimension. The third dimension deals with attitudes towards assertive women, those who are seen as likely to "complain" and bring attention to areas of perceived inequality. In other words, women who seek to

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[5] I propose three distinct gender beliefs, but I leave open the possibility of additional gender beliefs. The main argument put forth here is that there are at least three gender beliefs.

empower women and defy gender norms. This dimension will be referred to as beliefs about assertive women.

2.2.1 Dimension One: Beliefs about Women's Opportunities

When theorizing how the mass public would think about gender, it is helpful to begin with one of the most basic requirements of feminism: the recognition that some sort of institutional and/or cultural discrimination actually exists and the desire to achieve equality between the sexes. The first dimension, therefore, deals with the beliefs about opportunities for women *and* the desire to see women achieve full equality with men, not only in terms of pay and representation but in all areas of inequality.

> It is certainly possible to construct a base-line definition of feminism and the feminist which can be shared by feminist and non-feminist. *Many would agree that at the very least a feminist is someone who holds that women suffer discrimination because of their sex*, that they have specific needs which remain negated and unsatisfied, and that the satisfaction of these needs would require a radical change (some would say a revolution even) in the social, economic, and political order. But beyond that, things immediately become more complicated (Delmar, 1986, p. 8)

As activist and writer Rosalin Delmar also notes, a baseline definition of feminism includes recognition of discrimination against women. It is not uncommon, however, for both men and women to believe that the feminist movement successfully achieved parity for women that women no longer face obstacles, and the movement is now obsolete. This argument has been the justification for those wishing to see the abolishment of many policies set in places to help secure the advancement of women, such as Title IX and

certain affirmative action policies. At the same time, there are many Americans, pointing to discrepancies in pay between men and women and unequal representation in various levels of government as examples of contemporary issues, who feel strongly that women are not treated equally.

The 2008 presidential primaries, with the historic contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination, almost inevitably, brought about the debate of who "had it worse": blacks or women. The sentiment that women, as a social group, no longer face barriers is present in the elite, the media, and the electorate as well. Even the most recent American National Elections Studies in 2008 found that, when surveyed, 30% of the respondents did not agree with the statement that women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.

Additionally, some people may believe that equal opportunity for women is simply not that important or that it is not a priority and this, as well, makes up an important component of the opportunities dimension. The recognition that equal opportunities for women are important is an argument many activists feel they have to make to a growingly disinterested or skeptic younger generation of women.

2.2.2 Dimension Two: Beliefs About the Evolving Concept of Motherhood and Family Structure

> …It doesn't help matters when primetime TV has Murphy Brown, a character who supposedly epitomizes today's intelligent, highly paid professional woman, mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it just another lifestyle choice. (Dan Quayle, speaking at

a San Francisco political event in 1992 as reported by Rosenthal, *New York Times* 1992)

It has been well over a decade since Former Vice President Dan Quayle took on the fictitious character Murphy Brown in a quest to bring national attention to what he saw as dwindling family values. The debate, however, over the evolving structure of the American family, marches on; from issues over single-motherhood and working mothers to stay-at-home moms. The family structure dimension has received *a lot* of attention. The so-called 'mommy wars,' clearly striking a nerve with society, has become a media and publishing industry sensation. As E.J. Graff in a 2007 online *Washington Post* article describes it:

> The Mommy Wars sell newspapers, magazines, TV shows and radio broadcasts, as mothers everywhere seize on the subject and agonize, in spite of themselves. "Every other week there's an article saying that if you don't work, you're in trouble financially, and if you do work, your child is at risk," a single mother of three who works part time told me. An especially inflammatory article or episode can increase Web site hits, achieve "most e-mailed" status, drag more outraged viewers or listeners to the phone lines.... (Graff 2007)

The 'mommy wars,' as played out in the media, is an extension of a larger debate within feminism over the role of 'choice feminists' in the movement. Choice feminists are women who believe that the feminist movement was fought to provide women with choices and that no woman should be faulted for the private choices she makes within her own life—ranging from decisions to become a stay-at-home mom to the decision to pose

in *Playboy*. Recently, *Perspectives on Politics* (March 2010) ran a symposium on choice feminism. Jennet Kirkpatrick (2010) summarized the *Perspectives* symposium and noted that: "Choice feminists are best known for their argument that a woman who leaves the remunerated labor market to care for her children is a feminist in good standing; she makes a feminist decision" (p. 241). The symposium goes on to discuss the validity of the argument made by choice feminists, who feel that as long as a woman has the choice to pursue a career and the choice to stay at home then she does not violate feminist values. Critics point out that choice feminists do in fact hurt the movement. If women continue to perpetuate the "opt-out" revolution, employers will begin to see women as potential liabilities.

The dimension of feminism dealing with motherhood and family structure is much more complex than the simple belief or disbelief that women are best suited as mothers and that their value is measured by their ability to get married and to raise children. It deals with questions of juggling both career and child, what we as a society should expect of fathers, and, most importantly, how much motherhood should really be a part of a woman's identity, of her self-worth—if at all.

Dimension 3: Beliefs about Assertive Women

When I hear a statement like that coming from a woman candidate with any kind of perceived whine about that excess criticism or you know maybe a sharper microscope put on her, I think, 'man that doesn't do us any good'—women in politics, women in general wanting to progress this country, I don't think it bodes well for her, a statement like that. Because, again, fair or unfair, it is there, I think that's reality, and I think it's a given.

I think people can just accept that she is going to be under the sharper microscope. So be it. I mean, work harder, prove yourself to an even greater degree that you're capable, that you're going to be the best candidate, and that of course is what she wants us to believe at this point. So it bothers me a little bit hearing her bring that attention to herself on that level. (Sarah Palin, discussing Clinton's claims of sexism in the media as reported by *Think Progress* "Flashback: Palin Said that 'Women Complaining About Excess Criticism Don't Do Us Any Good' " 2009)

The third dimension of gender beliefs captures attitudes towards women empowering themselves and bringing attention to perceived inequalities. Feminism was fought not only within the public sphere by activists and leaders like Gloria Steinem, but also in everyday interactions of the private sphere. In order for policies meant to prevent discrimination and sexual harassment to be successful, women have to take advantage of of them and call attention to the practice when it happens report such occurrences, but they are reluctant to do so because of the stigma of appearing to be "whiny," or asking for special favors when doing so. Therefore, it is appropriate to include a dimension capturing attitudes toward women empowering themselves—in other words, speaking up.

Kinder and Kam's (2009) recently published in-depth investigation into the role of ethnocentrism, *Us vs. Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*, found that it had no effect on most of the measures used for women, such as women's issues, abortion, and women—that is until they measured for "a certain kind of woman." When they looked into the effects of ethnocentrism on attitudes toward women, they get results for what they called (characterizing the public's view, not their own) "pushy women."

If this is right, at least to a first approximation, then ethnocentrism might still be activated by women of a particular kind …[who] see harassment and discrimination everywhere, and are constantly pushing for change. … One question present in the 2004 NES gets close to what we have in mind. There, respondents were asked whether women who complain about sexual harassment cause more problems than they solve. The issue here would appear to be not women in general, and not even sexual harassment as a problem, but rather the trouble made by the kind of woman who complains about sexual harassment. And on this proposition we find a very powerful effect for ethnocentrism. … Nothing else in our analysis of issues raised by the women's movement is remotely like this. Not women in general, but women of a particular kind, trigger ethnocentrism. (p. 179-180)

Kinder and Kam's findings further suggests that Americans have a distinct cluster of attitudes toward out-spoken, "pushy" women in the area of women's equality.

While at first glance the discrimination dimension and the empowerment dimension may seem similar, they are very much separate constructs. Although individuals may acknowledge discrimination, they may still develop negative attitudes toward the attempts to remedy the situation; they may perceive these individuals as seeking special favors or weak. The aforementioned quote from Sarah Palin, criticizing Clinton for bringing up sexism, illustrates the feelings that many men *and* women have toward women who draw attention to areas of perceived injustice, even if they agree discrimination is present.

2.3   The Three Dimensions: Empirical Evidence

To test the argument that gender opinion is best studied in three distinct dimensions, I turn to confirmatory factor analysis and the 2008 ANES, the most recent one.[6] Throughout the 2008 ANES a total of seven indicators were discovered, which—although not ideal—adequately capture what I had in mind for each dimension. Two indicators measure the belief about women's opportunities. The first asks respondents whether they believe "women miss out on good jobs because of discrimination." And the second asks: "Do you personally hope that the United States has a woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the United States does not have a woman President in your lifetime, or do you not hope either way?"

Three indicators address the second dimension, beliefs about motherhood and the evolving family structure. The first asks respondents whether they believe "a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work." The second asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family." Finally, the third asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "The world would be a better place if people focused on traditional family ties more."

Finally, two other indicators measure the third dimension, beliefs about assertive women. Although potentially the most difficult to measure because the indicators prod respondents to give socially undesirable responses, the ANES utilizes two cleverly

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[6] The ANES sample used is comprised of whites only due to the unique history of African-Americans and equality.

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constructed questions that get at the heart of this dimension. The first indicator asks respondents whether they agree with the following statement: "Women who complain about harassment cause more problems than they solve." The second asks respondents whether they agree with the following statement: "When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors."

When all of the available measures of gender attitudes in the 2008 ANES are run in an exploratory factor analysis, three distinct factors appear. Two of the three retained factors had an eigenvalue > 1 with the final eigenvalue falling right under the 1.0 cutoff at .998. Each measure loads as expected.[7] The variance is displayed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Factor Loadings

	Beliefs about Women's Opportunities	Beliefs about Motherhood	Beliefs about Assertive Women
'Women who complain about equality…'	.1559	.1191	**.7527**
'Women who complain about harassment…'	-.0314	-.0074	**.8281**
'Women face discrimination'	**.8801**	-.0315	-.0121
'Important to see woman President…'	**.5769**	.3035	.2357
'Moms who work…'	.0661	**.8224**	-.0981
'Better if the man achieves'	.0214	**.6357**	.3951
'Focus on traditional Family ties…'	-.1112	**.5056**	.3850

Source: 2008 ANES. Sample only contains whites. N=1,295. Orthogonal rotation.

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[7] Orthogonal rotation was used and results are presented in Table 2.1. The analysis was also run with oblique rotation and produced no substantive difference in the loadings.

To compliment the earlier factor analysis, I turn to confirmatory factor analysis to test the significance of the factor loadings as well as the fit of the overall model compared to other possibilities, such as a one-factor or two-factor model. It is especially important to compare the fit of the two-factor compared to the three-factor model, given the third retained factor had an eigenvalue just slightly under 1. As demonstrated in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, the confirmatory factor analysis supports the earlier findings that the mass public conceptualizes feminism as three-dimensional.

Though the hypothesized three-factor model does not pass the chi square test, it is a good fit according to the remaining four out of five fit tests. Given the large sample size (1,295), the chi square test may be unreliable anyway. The four remaining tests all indicate a goodness of fit for Model 1, the hypothesized three-factor model. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) which specifies the amount of unexplained variance, is below the .06 cut-off at .053 (Bentler & Hu, 1999). The Bentler's Comparative Fit Index (CFI) as well as the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) are all larger than the .95 criteria for a goodness of fit. Finally, the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) is under the .9 criteria. Therefore, I am able to accept the model in regard to the fit statistics.

The goodness of fit for two additional factor solutions was tested as well. Confirmatory factor analysis was run with a one-factor and two-factor solution, in addition to the hypothesized three-factor model. The original three-factor solution with the hypothesized observed variables was the best fit as seen in Table 2.2. Both the one-factor and two-factor solutions failed to meet the RMSEA and WRMR cutoff.

Each of the path coefficients is statistically significant, and each of the standardized estimates is larger than .32, as seen in Table 2.3 (Hatcher, 1994; Billings & Wroten, 1978). Therefore, all the hypothesized paths have been confirmed.[8]

Table 2.2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Goodness of Fit Statistics

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	(three factor)	(one factor)	(two factor)
Chi^x	50.118	213.822	140.096
	df=10	df=13	df=12
	Pr<.000	Pr<.000	Pr<.000
RMSEA	**.053**	.104	.086
CFI	**.997**	**.985**	**.991**
TLI	**.996**	**.986**	**.991**
WRMR	**.804**	1.730	1.370

N=1,295

Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only Note: ran in MPLUS; ordinal variables specified

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[8] The distribution for each factor score, re-scaled 0-1, can be found in the appendix.

Table 2.3: CFA with Standardized Estimates and Errors

	Standardized Estimates	S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Values
Discrimination				
Women miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.	.667	.014	46.299	p<.000
Would you like to see a Woman president?	.874	.015	56.504	p<.000
Family Structure				
Working Mom	.823	.013	62.547	p<.000
Man achieves	.884	.010	86.269	p<.000
Family Ties	.736	.013	57.494	p<.000
Empowerment				
Harassment/Problems	.789	.012	68.485	p<.000
Equality/Favors	.841	.012	69.898	p<.000

Source: 2008 ANES; N=1,295;
Note: CFA was ran in MPLUS and specified for ordinal indicators.

2.3   Gender Opinion: The Impact of Demographics, Core Values, and Personality Traits on Gender Predispositions

How can Americans hold contradictory attitudes on many issues that fall under the realm of feminism? Although the knee-jerk reaction for some political scientist might be the 'Conversian' lack of constraint among gender ideology, the real reason is that a different set of core values, demographic characteristics, and personality traits heavily influence each cluster of beliefs. Therefore, it is not unreasonable (nor surprising) to find groups of individuals who, for example, believe that women deserve equal pay for equal work, but also believe that working mothers hurt the family structure and unfairly neglect children. As demonstrated in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, a different compilation of core values and demographics predict each dimension with varying degrees of influence. The dependent variables presented in Table 2.4 are the scores from the factor analysis for each dimension of gender beliefs ranging from -2 to 2. Because the dependent variables are treated as continuous, the appropriate statistical tool is OLS. [9]

Included in Table 2.4 are core values, the fundamental building blocks of attitudes and belief systems. They are our very general, abstract approach to larger questions about life and how we should live and heavily influence our beliefs and attitudes (Jacoby, 2002). In the following models, I investigate the effect of three commonly studied core values within the electorate: moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and limited government (sometimes referred to as individualism) on the three dimensions of feminism. As you will see, each core value plays a different role depending on the particular dimension.

In addition to core values, I have included personality traits and characteristics that may influence our predispositions in regard to the dimensions of feminism.

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[9] Details regarding the coding of both the dependent and independent variables are located in the Appendix.

Authoritarianism, a characteristic similar to a core value, but perhaps more appropriately described as a personality trait, has been described as "hav[ing] a greater than average need for order. In contrast, those who score lower in authoritarianism have more comfort with ambiguous shades of gray, which can allow for nuanced judgments" (Heatherington & Weiler, 2009). In Heathering and Weiler's recent in-depth investigation of authoritarianism, *Divided We Stand: Polarization, Authoritarianism, and the Contemporary Political Divide*, it was often compared to approaches on disciplining children (i.e. individuals who are authoritarian lean toward spanking, while those who are not often prefer using time-outs).

The second important characteristic is religious traditionalism. Measured through one's church attendance, reliance on religion for guidance, and frequency of prayer, it captures a respondent's adherence to religious beliefs and commitment. Some have described religiosity as capturing the difference between devout Catholics and the "cafeteria Catholics," as some might say. It is important to include religiosity when investigating the factors influencing gender beliefs because traditional religion is often depicted as being in conflict with the women's movement. "Although other issues became part of the mix, emancipated women and morally traditionalist churches best represent the clash between emerging and settled moral orders that loomed so large in the 1980's and beyond" (Leege, Wald, Krueger, & Mueller, 2002, p. 203). Gallagher and Smith (1999) and Gallagher (2004) suggest, however, that in regard to white Evangelicals, attitudes toward feminism are more nuanced than previous literature has acknowledged and that the antiquated labels of feminist/anti-feminist are no longer accurate. This would suggest that religiosity has varying influence on gender beliefs. In

addition to core values and characteristics, each model includes a set of potentially influential aspects of demographics, which are gender, age, income, education, residency in the south, race, and marital status. [10]

Table 2.4: The Effect of Socio-Demographics and Core Values on Beliefs about Women's Opportunities

	Coefficient Women	P Value	Coefficient Men	P Value
Socio-Demographics:				
Age	.005	.139	.007	.179
	(.003)		(.005)	
Income	-.014	.108	**-.023**	**.070**
	(.009)		**(.030)**	
Education	**.086**	**.055**	.002	.953
	(.044)		(.048)	
South	.174	.132	.185	.217
	(.115)		(.149)	
Married	-.026	.842	-.079	.722
	(.135)		(.223)	
Core Values:				
Moral Traditionalism	**-.134**	**.021**	**-.153**	**.021**
	(.053)		**(.065)**	
Egalitarianism	.122	.107	**.227**	**.006**
	(.075)		**(.082)**	
Limited Government	**.298**	**.050**	.251	.171
	(.151)		(.183)	
Personality Traits				
Authoritarianism	- .151	.476	-.180	.585
	(.213)		(.330)	
Religious Traditionalism	**-.287***	**.000**	.040	.673
	(.073)		(.096)	
Constant	.194	.610	-.683	.153
	(.380)		(.476)	
	R2= .185		R2=.183	
	N=259		N=184	

Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only
Note: OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable coded so that the higher value represents the more progressive approach.

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[10] Each model presented in Tables 2.4 -2.6 was checked for multicollinearity. VIF scores were low (never exceeding 2.0) indicated there is no concern for multicollinearity. Additionally, the low sample size is due to the low number of cases in the religious traditionalism index. Given the theoretical importance of the index, it was important to leave the index in the model.

Table 2.5: The Effect of Socio-Demographics and Core Values on Beliefs Regarding Motherhood and Family Structure

	Coefficient Women	P Value	Coefficient Men	P Value
Socio-Demographics:				
Age	-.000	.809	**-.009**	**.018**
	(.003)		**(.004)**	
Income	**.017**	**.082**	-.007	.567
	(.010)		(.013)	
Education	**.108**	**.015**	.068*	.143
	(.044)		(.046)	
South	**-.214**	**.065**	.158	.241
	(.115)		(.134)	
Married	-.156	.248	.028	.893
	(.135)		(.214)	
Core Values:				
Moral Traditionalism	**-.165**	**.002**	**-.193**	**.004**
	(.053)		**(.066)**	
Egalitarianism	.155	.123	.056	.450
	(.074)		(.074)	
Limited Government	**.262***	**.079**	.036	.841
	(.148)		(.182)	
Personality Traits				
Authoritarianism	**-.550**	**.018**	**-1.19**	**.000**
	(.232)		**(.316)**	
Religious	-.121	.112	-.026	.788
Traditionalism	(.076)		(.099)	
Constant	.331	.385	**.885**	**.052**
	(.381)		**(.453)**	
	R2= .232		R2=.247	
	N=259		N=184	

Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only

Notes: OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable coded so that the higher value represents the more progressive approach.

Table 2.6: The Effect of Socio-Demographics and Core Values on Beliefs about Assertive Women

	Coefficient Women	P Value	Coefficient Men	P Value
Socio-Demographics:				
Age	-.002 (.003)	.493	-.001 (.004)	.731
Income	.015 (.010)	.128	.015 (.014)	.283
Education	**.182 (.041)**	**.000**	.062 (.046)	.182
South	.029 (.132)	.791	-.049 (.139)	.724
Married	.078 (.134)	.560	**-.315 (.157)**	**.047**
Core Values:				
Moral Traditionalism	.056 (.056)	.341	.016 (.066)	.807
Egalitarianism	**.246 (.074)**	**.001**	**.164 (.088)**	**.067**
Limited Government	.171 (.148)	.250	.224* (.165)	.178
Personality Traits				
Authoritarianism	**-.718 (.198)**	**.000**	-.429 (.276)	.275
Religious Traditionalism	.018 (.067)	.780	.002 (.091)	.977
Constant	**-.816 (.376)**	**.031**	-.479 (.456)	.296
	R2= .255 N=259		R2=.187 N=184	

Source: 2008 ANES; Whites only

Notes: OLS coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable coded so that the higher value represents the more progressive approach.

Table 2.7: Conceptual Table of Influences on Gender Beliefs for Men and Women

	Dimension 1) Belief about Women's Opportunities		Dimension 2) Belief about Motherhood		Dimension 3) Belief about Assertive Women	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Feminist	Higher Educational Attainment Individualism	Egalitarian Values	Higher Income Higher Educational Attainment Individualism		Higher Educational Attainment Egalitarian Values	Egalitarian Values
Anti-Feminist	Residency in the South Religiosity	Higher Income Moral Traditional-ism	Residency in the South Moral Traditionalism Authoritarian-ism	Moral Tradition alism; Authoritarianism	Authoritar-ianism	Married

As we can see from the results presented in Tables 2.4-2.6, core values, characteristics, and demographics influence the three dimensions. For instance, residency in the South influences women attitudes about motherhood, but that's it. Being Southern has no effect on what you feel about women's opportunities or what you think about assertive women. And though making more money leads most women to hold more progressive attitudes toward motherhood, it comes close to statistical significance for

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predicting more dismissive attitudes about women's opportunities. As seen in Table 2.7, a summary table, each belief, for both men and women, is a separate construct influenced by distinctive factors.

Before I investigate the predictive power of each dimension within the context of political choices and evaluations, I pause to examine how this new approach illuminates what we know about the electorate. The following tables present the mean factor scores (factor scores were re-coded 0-1 for ease of interpretation) by demographics.

Table 2.8: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Sex

	Women's Opportunities	Motherhood	Assertive Women
Man	.63	.56	.53
Woman	.68	.61	.58

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response. Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.

Table 2.9: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Household Income

	Women's Opportunities	Motherhood	Assertive Women
Under $75,000	.67	.58	.56
Over $75,000	.65	.59	.56

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response. Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.

Table 2.10: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Residency in the South and Sex

		Women's Opportunities	Motherhood	Assertive Women
South	Man	.64	.55	.51
	Woman	.69	.57	.56
Non-South	Man	.63	.56	.54
	Woman	.67	.64	.60

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response. Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.

Table 2.11: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Party Identification and Age

		Women's Opportunities	Motherhood	Assertive Women
Democrat	Less than 30	.65	.66	.63
	30-50	.69	.64	.63
	50+	.70	.58	.56
Republican	Less than 30	.56*	.63*	.52*
	30-50	.62	.57	.57
	50+	.66	.50	.48
Independent	Less than 30	--	--	--
	30-50	.63*	.56*	.58*
	50+	.65*	.56*	.50*

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response. Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.

Table 2.12: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Party Identification and Sex

		Women's Opportunities	Motherhood	Assertive Women
Democrat	Man	.66	.60	.58
	Woman	.71	.64	.61
Republican	Man	.60	.52	.49
	Woman	.64	.56	.54
Independent	Man	.64*	.54*	.53*
	Woman	.66*	.63*	.55*

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response. Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.

Table 2.13: Mean Score for Gender Beliefs by Educational Attainment

	Women's Opportunities	Motherhood	Assertive Women
No college degree	.67	.55	.50
B.A.	.65	.61	.60

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Notes: cells include mean scores ranging from 0-1 with 1 representing the most progressive response. Cells with less than 50 respondents were not included and cells with less than 100 respondents were noted with an asterisk.

Overall, on average, the electorate proves to be the most progressive when it comes to beliefs about women's opportunities. As Tables 2.8-2.13 demonstrate, this is consistent across demographics. The electorate also appears to be slightly more progressive when it comes to beliefs about motherhood compared to beliefs about assertive women; however, this difference is often small. When I examine the difference between sexes, Table 2.8, it is clear women are more progressive on each dimension of gender beliefs than men. Further examining this break between southerners and non-southerners by sex, Table 2.10, it is evident that there is almost no difference between southerners and non-southerners when it comes to beliefs about women's opportunities. Moreover, there is no substantive difference between Southerners and Non-Southern men in regard to beliefs about motherhood. Non-Southern women, however, prove to stand out in their progressive views on motherhood. Finally, there does appear to be a difference between Southerners and non-Southerners when it comes to beliefs about assertive women with Southern men the most conservative and Non-southern women the most progressive—Southern women and Non-Southern men are somewhat similar and more moderate than their counter-parts. Finally, as shown in Table 2.12, party identification trumps sex with Democrats proving to be more progressive than Republicans within each dimension regardless of sex. On average, Democratic men are slightly more progressive on each dimension (albeit the difference is small).

Considering the women's movement has progressed overtime it is natural to expect some variation within each age cohort and dimension. As shown in Table 2.11, younger cohorts prove slightly more progressive than the next in each dimension *except* belief about women's opportunities (and this is true across parties as shown). For

Democrats respondents over the age of 50 have a mean score .05 points higher than those under 30 years of age (score ranging from 0-1). Republicans over the age of 50 have a mean score .1 higher (on a 0-1 scale) regarding belief about women's opportunities compared to Republicans under the age of 30. So while young age contributes to more progressive beliefs within two dimensions of feminism dealing with beliefs about motherhood and assertive women, it also contributes to more traditional beliefs in regard to women's opportunities. Given that many young women have yet to start fully pursuing careers, attempting to balance motherhood and home demands, and really begin to engage in a struggle for power and success they have yet to experience the struggles of the women before them. For that matter, the same is true for men in that they have yet to witness this imbalance of power of their sisters, women friends and wives.

There appears to be no substantive difference between the three dimensions of gender beliefs in regard to household income as shown in Table 2.9. Households making over $75,000, on average, are no different than household making under $75,000. Moreover, there appears to be difference within educational attainment between those with college degrees and those without within the context of beliefs about women's opportunities. There does, however, appear to be a difference between those with college degrees and those without when it comes to beliefs about motherhood and belief about assertive women—with the college educated more progressive.

Feminism is a loaded term that has evolved over the past century in American politics. As the elite, activists, and normative theorists grapple with what it actually means to be a feminist, this chapter looked into how the American electorate processes and structures these beliefs. As my results show, as far as the American public is

concerned, feminism, gender equality, is a nuanced and multi-dimensional concept with beliefs about women and gender roles clustering around three key areas: belief about women's opportunities, motherhood and the family, and assertive women. Because beliefs and opinions have formed in such a way, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable to find citizens with varying beliefs across the dimensions. After all, as tested in this chapter, a different set of demographics and core values predict each dimension. The question left unanswered is *how* these dimensions influence our political evaluations and choices and *when* they matter. This shall be explored in the following chapters.

Chapter Three

Gender Beliefs and Abortion Attitudes:
The Misunderstood Relationship

3.1   Introduction

Abortion has a long standing history as a contentious and polarizing issue within American politics. The debate surrounding abortion has led individuals to mobilize, groups to form, and in some extreme cases, it has even led to terrorism and assassinations. For example, in 2009, Dr. George Tiller, one of the few doctors providing abortions in Kansas, was gunned down in broad daylight. Needless to say, abortion has a major impact on American politics and will continue to shape it for some time.

Scholars have dubbed abortion an "easy issue" (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Carsey & Layman, 2006) because people tend to hold consistent views and need little technical information to form an opinion; instead, most Americans have a 'gut' response. Unlike many other issues, attitudes toward abortion remain steady over time for both the individual and the aggregate (Converse & Markus, 1979; Sharpe, 1999; Wilcox & Norrander, 2002; Wilcox & Riche, 2002). Highlighting the influential power of abortion within the world of public opinion and political behavior, Jelen and Wilcox (2003) point out, "[It] has incited ordinary people to take extraordinary political action that is far

greater than any that our standard models would predict" (p. 489). Thus, it comes as no surprise that within the intersection of the gender and public opinion sub-fields, the issue of abortion has dominated the literature—not just as the subject of study, but sometimes as the all-encompassing proxy for gender attitudes (Wilcox, 1989; Rhodeback, 1996, Emerson, 1996; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999).

I demonstrate in this chapter that this past approach of confounding gender and abortion attitudes (while often the result of limited data sets) is misleading and fails to fully illuminate the relationship between the two. More specifically, I demonstrate that beliefs about women's opportunities and assertive women have no relationship with abortion attitudes at all. Beliefs about motherhood, however, play an important role in the formation of abortion attitudes.

3.2   The American Public and the Abortion Debate

Abortion has not *always* been the major cultural issue it is today. Luker (1985) reminds us that there was a time, women could not tell if they were pregnant until far into the pregnancy. Luker notes that women were neither constantly being updated on the status of the fetus nor receiving sonogram pictures or other various information now considered normal during pregnancy. Tests were not available, so a woman could only confirm pregnancy when she could clearly feel the baby moving inside her, which is far into a pregnancy. Historically, women simply did not have the same relationship with their pregnancies that they do today. Therefore, women often engaged in activities referred to as "returning the menses" before quickening occurred. It was not considered abortion, was not illegal, and there was no stigma.

The criminalization of abortion did not happen until the nineteenth century. During this time period, some feminists opposed abortion. They believed (at a time when not only contraception but also dissemination of information on contraception was illegal) that women should have access to contraception in order to eliminate the need for an abortion all together (Coryell & Faires, 2012). At this time, Women were denied access to birth control, birth control information, and abortion, but yet women who conceived out of wedlock carried a heavy stigma and often faced repercussions such as expulsion from school. Therefore, it was not uncommon for women to seek out illegal abortions or take the matter into their own hands. History tells of women who would throw themselves down stairs, hit their stomachs, consume a variety of potions, or carry out a variety of other dangerous attempts to terminate a pregnancy. Coryell and Faires note that 23% of all pregnancy related hospital visits in 1969 were a result of an illegal abortion (or an attempted illegal abortion).

Women's organizations really began to push for and succeed in securing abortion rights and access to contraception in the late 60s. In 1969, the first abortion law repeal group, the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) formed (Coryell & Faires, 2012). In 1970, both Hawaii and Alaska ended restrictions placed on abortion procedures, and in certain states, like Texas, the state courts overturned laws banning abortion. It was not until 1973, however, that a woman's right to abortion was secured with the *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision. It established that women have a constitutional right to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy based off the previous *Griswald v. Connecticut* Supreme Court decision, which ruled for a constitutional right to privacy.

Abortion, at that time, had been growing as a hot-button issue, and the *Roe v. Wade* decision sparked an even more heated debate that stills continues to this day. Powerful groups, such as EMILY's List, NARAL, NOW, Susan B. Anthony List, and the Family Foundation, were born from this debate and continue to mobilize, recruit and engage citizens to this day—they make up some of the most powerful women's groups in the political arena.

Given that abortion is such a long-standing, contentious issue hijacking much of the political debate and spurring unprecedented political activity, it is important to thoroughly grasp what influences abortion attitudes. What are the core values and characteristics that lead to such strongly held opinions? For as much attention as abortion attitudes has received, the literature leaves important areas, such as the role of gender attitudes, unclear and underdeveloped.

3.3   Capturing Abortion Attitudes

Though measures exist for more nuanced circumstances surrounding abortion (traumatic abortions v. elective abortions)—these particular circumstances have been shown to matter for opinion formation—for the purposes of this chapter, I am not concerned with highlighting each particular situation categorized as a traumatic abortion on *its own* because they are relatively uncommon. A survey found that of all abortions reported in 1992 only seven percent were considered non-elective (or traumatic) abortions (Cook, Jelen & Wilcox, 1992). Therefore, I will use the standard four point abortion measure, ranging from always prohibit, to only legal in the case of rape, incest and in the interest of a woman's health (all of the 'traumatic' instances collapsed), to only

if a need has been established, to always allow as a matter of choice. This measure allows for some variation within the 'conditional sphere'—between the two extremes—but does not get into situational specifics like the new American National Election Studies (ANES) measure, which asks more questions specifically about abortions, such as those pertaining to financial considerations and concern with the fetus's gender. As shown in Figures 3.1-3.3 (using the 2008 ANES), this approach provides a useful amount of variation within the measure.

Figure 3.1: Contemporary Abortion Attitudes by Sex

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: Sample does not include African-Americans

Figure 3.2: Contemporary Abortion Attitudes by Party Affiliation

Figure 3.3: Contemporary Abortion Attitudes by Education

As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, a plurality of Americans (39%) believes abortion should be allowed at all times as a matter of choice, with only 16% reporting that abortion should always be prohibited. Circumstances surrounding abortion condition most Americans' attitudes, with 28% of respondents allowing abortion in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother's health and 17% allowing abortion in cases in which a need has been established. If we were to collapse these two categories, almost half of Americans would fall into the conditional category.

When breaking the general white population into groups, it is interesting to see that although men are slightly less restrictive when it comes to abortion (13% of men say always prohibit, whereas 16% of women say always prohibit), they are also much less permissive (32% of men say abortion should always be allowed compared to 42% of women.) Though Democrats are most likely to support abortion in all cases as a matter of choice (46%), Independents are most likely to be least restrictive, with less than 10% prohibiting abortion in all cases compared to 12% of Democrats who feel abortion should be prohibited in all cases. Moreover, 2008 ANES data, as shown in Figure 3.3, is consistent with previous research that suggests higher education leads to higher rates of support for abortion rights in all cases as a matter of choice.

3.4   Social Characteristics of Abortion Attitudes

Education, especially for women, plays a key role in shaping attitudes across demographics toward abortion. It has appeared as a robust predictor of attitudes toward abortion since the issue first exploded into the world of public opinion. Naturally, as an extension of the influence of education, both higher job prestige and higher income

households are more supportive of abortion rights (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox 1992). Wilcox and Jelen (2003) note, however, that the relationship between education and abortion has been declining; the correlation has dropped from .31 in the 70s to .14 in 2000. Nonetheless, education remains, across the electorate, a stable and robust predictor of attitudes when compared to other demographic characteristics. It is not the only predictor of abortion attitudes that has shifted over time. For example, religious denomination (such as Catholicism) tended to predict abortion attitudes; however, that has waned over time, and religious traditionalism has taken its place (Strickler & Danigelis, 2002).

While gender might seem like an intuitive, natural predictor of abortion attitudes, given that whether abortion stays legal or become illegal disproportionately affects women, Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1992) demonstrate otherwise. If anything, men are *slightly* more likely to be supportive of abortion rights, but generally speaking, there is no significant difference. In addition to gender, Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox do not really find an effect for race. Despite the fact that on average, African-Americans are less likely to be supportive of abortion rights than whites, the authors point out that this difference is not inherent in race but is rather due to the social characteristics surrounding each race. For instance, African-Americans tend to be less educated and more religiously orthodox—two characteristics that contribute to less support for abortion rights. The authors conclude that if we compared white Evangelicals with only a high school education to African-Americans, there would be no difference in support for abortion policies. In fact, when the authors control for religious traditionalism and education, they find that African-Americans are actually more supportive than whites.

Geographic location, another social characteristic, also plays a role in predicting abortion attitudes for two reasons: (1) Like-minded people tend to cluster (O'Reilly & Webster, 1998; Gimpel, 2004); and (2) individuals raised in the South are exposed to social networks with particular cultural attitudes and therefore have more restrictive attitudes toward abortion rights (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992).

Probably one of the most important social bases in the formation of abortion attitudes is age. As Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) point out, there are two different processes for how age could affect abortion attitudes and produce differences across age cohorts. The first looks at age as a "linear process"—the older an individual becomes the less likely they are to need abortion (this is true for both men and women.) The second is generational differences. Those who come of age during a certain period will develop different values and experiences and therefore develop different attitudes than another age cohort.

3.5   Values and Attitudinal Bases for Abortion Attitudes

Scholars have come back to two core values that—aside from gender equality—currently appear to play a role in predicting abortion attitudes across all groups: individualism and a type of Judeo-Christian morality (Jelen, 1984; Jelen, 1988; Cook et al., 1992; Jelen & Wilcox, 2002). Individualism is, as Wilcox and Jelen (2002) note, not only a core value, but it might be "the core value" (p. 494) in the American electorate. Given that the debate over abortion is whether a woman has the right to terminate a pregnancy, it is only natural that individualism plays such a strong role. Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) make the case for both individualism and Judeo-Christian values:

"Two diverse elements in American political culture lead to strong reactions by individuals to the abortion issue. First, is the American commitment to Lockean individualism, which provides that the freedom to do as one pleases is an important value. The philosopher Brian Berry has described an Anglo-American commitment to the "harm-principal" in which people are to be permitted to do as one pleases as long as they do not harm anyone else is an important value … A second element of American political culture is a tradition of private and civil religion, with most people adhering to a somewhat vague Judeo-Christian values … In these cases the religious value may take precedence over the American commitment to individual liberties." (p. 4)

Judeo-Christian values are important because they contribute to belief about the start of life and acceptable sexual behavior- both important predictors of abortion attitudes. Some argue that allowing easy access to abortion is means of promoting (what some might view as) sexually permissive behavior. The debate over when life actually begins has recently come to dominate the abortion debate and has changed the framework to some degree from one of women's rights to one of religion v. science.

Ideology, best described as an individual's world view, is an important player in predicting attitudes toward every policy and subject area. Conservatives are less accepting of abortion rights, while liberals are more accepting. Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox (1992) describe the relationship between conservatives and restrictive attitudes toward abortion policy as one of nostalgia for a time when such issues were neither permitted nor even a subject of discussion—"'good people' were simply not associated with such

sordid matters" (p. 70). Liberals by definition, on the other hand, , take a more open and tolerant approach to new ideas and life styles.

Finally, gender equality is also an attitude characteristic sometimes included in models of abortion attitudes, and as noted earlier, it is often used by scholars as a proxy for gender attitudes (Wilcox, 1989; Rhodebeck, 1996, Emerson, 1996; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). Recent literature, however, has seen mixed results when attempting to establish an empirical relationship between gender equality and abortion attitudes.

3.6   Abortion Attitudes as Proxy for Gender Beliefs

Given the very tangled stories of the women's movement and abortion policy, various measures of attitudes toward abortion are often seen as an appropriate way to operationalize gender beliefs (or feminism) by many scholars (for example see: Wilcox, 1989; Rhodebeck, 1996, Emerson, 1996; Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999). Abortion attitudes have been used as a measure of feminist attitudes not only in the behavior/public opinion literature but in the institutional literature as well (see Swers, 2002).

According to some scholars, there is a strong relationship between gender beliefs and abortion attitudes. Kristin Luker (1985) has argued that the abortion debate is very much driven by the gender debate at the elite level. Pro-choice activists feel that abortion helps women control how they are seen as agents of reproduction, that by having the freedom to control reproduction, women are freed from the proverbial chains of fertility. Women and men can now compete in the labor market. According to Luker, pro-life activists argue that women do not wish to be liberated from their essential natures as women (as Marilyn Quayle once famously put it), that it de-sexes a woman and hurts the

family structure. Jean Reith Schroedel (2000) also frames the abortion debate in terms of appropriate gender roles in the oft cited *Is the Fetus a Person?* Some research has found a statistical relationship between gender role attitudes and abortion attitudes (see Emerson, 1996).

Recently, however, gender beliefs have begun to be seen as a weak predictor of abortion attitudes (and vice versa) (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992; Jelen & Wilcox, 2002; Jelen, 2003). Although Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1992) acknowledge the relationship between feminism and abortion at the elite level, they argue this connection does not exist as strongly at the mass level; rather, attitudes toward sexual morality and individual liberty drive attitudes toward abortion. Jelen (2003) later establishes that this holds true regardless of employment status and other categories.

Wilcox, Cook, and Jelen (1992) are not the only scholars to treat abortion attitudes as conceptually distinct from gender beliefs.Heatherington and Weiler (2009) also treat abortion as a separate dimension from women's rights (consisting of measures for the Equal Rights Admentment, feminism, and familial roles) in their new book exploring the origins and applications of authoritarianism in American politics.

Both approaches to the relationship between gender beliefs and abortion are wrong because they are asking the wrong question. Often scholars focus on whether gender equality predicts abortion attitudes when they should be asking what aspects (beliefs) under the umbrella of gender equality affect abortion attitudes. Each approach conceptualizes gender beliefs as a fundamental, one-dimensional value which, in turn, produces results that are inconsistent and therefore leads scholars to different conclusions.

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Only one gender belief, which deals with the social primacy of motherhood and the evolving structure of the family, affects abortion attitudes. The remaining gender beliefs, because they are distinct, do not. Therefore, it is incorrect to treat abortion attitudes as representative of general gender equality, and it is equally incorrect to assume that there is no longer a significant relationship between gender beliefs and abortion attitudes.

3.7   The Evidence

As shown in Figure 3.5, there is no long-term change in abortion attitudes. The mean score for both men and women from 1980 to 2004 are almost exactly the same (around 1.87 on a scale ranging from 0-4). On the other hand, as seen in Figure 3.4, there has been a significant progressive shift in attitudes for both men and women when it comes to equal roles for women. Whereas the mean score for the overall population and abortion attitudes stayed relatively the same, there was a one unit increase for attitudes towards women's role (scale ranging from 0-6).[11]

The fact that the American public continues to develop more progressive gender beliefs but yet fails to do so with abortion attitudes suggests that, though related, abortion attitudes are not a straightforward byproduct of gender beliefs; they are instead a policy attitude developed by values such as individualism, characteristics such as religious traditionalism, and most importantly for this dissertation, beliefs about motherhood.

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[11] Unfortunately, the seven point women's role question is the only gender belief question that is consistently asked from 1980 until 2004. Please note, however, there is no data for 1986.

Figure 3.4: Attitudes toward A Woman's Place over Time

Source: Cumulative ANES. Note: Abortion variable ranges from 0-4 with the progressive response coded higher.

Figure 3.5: Attitudes toward Abortion over Time

Source: Cumulative ANES. Note: Abortion variable ranges from 0-4 with the progressive response coded higher.

To investigate the relationship between each gender beliefs and abortion attitudes, I rely on data from the 2008 ANES. This offers two benefits: (1) It is one of the more recent national data sets and therefore allows me to capture contemporary attitudes; and (2) it includes all of the same indicators for the gender beliefs used in earlier chapters (allowing for consistency throughout the dissertation). The primary independent variables of interests, gender beliefs, are each captured through a factor score. Because characteristics, such as religious traditionalism[12], ideology, gender, individualism, and education, as described earlier, would potentially affect attitudes toward abortion, controls are included in the model (coding for all controls and the dependent variable are available in the appendix). Finally, the dependent variable is measured using a four point scale ranging from always prohibited to always allow. Given the dependent variable is an ordered variable, ordered logit is the most appropriate statistical analysis.[13]

Table 3.1, below, shows the change in predicted probabilities for the statistically significant variables in the model (the full model is available in the appendix). Though beliefs about women's opportunities and beliefs about assertive women are statistically insignificant, beliefs about motherhood and family structure, proved statistically and substantively significant. As shown in Table 3.1, as you move from the minimum

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[12] Religious traditionalism is serving as a proxy for Judeo-Christian values (which include attitudes to sexual morality as well as belief when life actually begins).

[13] Since the "old" abortion attitudes question was utilized in the ordered logit model, the sample size was greatly reduced given it was only asked of a few hundred respondents in the sample. After including the other necessary variables the sample is 382. While small, the sample size is still large enough to produce reliable results.

(traditional) to the maximum (progressive) value on the motherhood beliefs factor score

(a range from -2.7 to 1.9), the change in the predicted probability of choosing either

always prohibit, only allow in cases of rape/incest/women's health, to only when need

has been established, or always allow as a matter of choice decreases by 21% and 25%,

and increases by 4% and 42%, respectively.

Table 3.1: Change in Predicted Probability for Abortion Attitudes

	Always Prohibited	2	3	Always Allowed
Progressive belief About Motherhood	-21%	-25%	4%	42%
Education	-21%	-28%	2%	46%
Religious Traditionalism	19%	26%	-1%	-44%
Democrat	-8%	-14%	1%	23%
Liberal	-17%	-26%	4%	44%
Age	-8%	-16%	-1%	25%

Source: 2008 ANES. Note all variables are coded with the progressive response as the highest value.

As we saw in Figures 3.1-3.3, presented earlier in the chapter, a plurality of

Americans fall into the middle 'conditional' categories of abortion attitudes. Even here

where one could argue, conceptually speaking, there are small differences between the

categories, we see a large effect for motherhood beliefs between the two categories.[14]

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[14] A model was also run with the dependent variable, attitudes toward abortion, coded as a three

point scale with 0 representing always prohibit, the categories for permit in cases of rape, incest

and woman's health and only in cases when a need is established into one category, the second

Moving from traditional to progressive on the motherhood belief score means that the average individual is 25% *less likely* to only permit abortion in the cases of rape, incest and the mother's health and 4% *more likely* to permit abortion in cases where a need has firmly been established—a 29% net difference. As activists within the abortion debate spend more time dealing with abortion regulations and abortion *access* and less time on general legality, this finding within the vague world of conditions and circumstances has strong implications.

The other statistically significant factors contributing to abortion attitudes—religious traditionalism, party identification, age and ideology, education—are also included in the table. As religious traditionalism shifts from completely secular to traditional, the likelihood of the respondent choosing always prohibited increases by 19%, and choosing always allowed is 44% less likely. Next, Democrats are 8% less likely to choose always prohibit abortion and 23% more likely to choose abortion should always be allowed when compared to a Republican. Ideology, alongside beliefs about motherhood, religious traditionalism and education, appear to be the strongest predictor of abortion attitudes, with liberals 17% less likely to choose always prohibited and 44% more likely to choose always allow when compared to conservatives. Moreover, younger

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point on the scale and, finally, always prohibit as a matter of choice as the third point on the scale. There was no change with regards to significance in the model (Table A1 in the appendix) with the exception of whether the respondent considered themselves born again. Given the substantive difference in predicted probability of support of abortion depending on whether it was a case of rape, incest, or the woman's health and when a need is firmly established I choose to present the former model.

individuals are 8% less likely to choose always prohibit and 25% more likely to always allow when compared to some of our oldest citizens. Finally, education, which has been found recently to be declining in influence (see Jelen and Wilcox's 2003 review of scholarship on public opinion and abortion), comes back into play as a major predictor of abortion attitudes once beliefs about motherhood are included in the model. Those with a graduate degree are 21% less likely to choose always prohibit and a whopping 46% more likely to choose always a matter of choice.

The substantive significance of motherhood beliefs is clear when compared to other factors that contribute to abortion attitudes. Beliefs about motherhood contribute more to predicting abortion attitudes than both age and party affiliation and hangs in there with ideology, religious traditionalism, and education. As demonstrated in Table 3.1, only religious traditionalism, ideology, and education are comparable in regard to the dramatic change in predicted probabilities across the abortion attitudes scale.

3.8   The Social Primacy of Motherhood and its Effect on Abortion Attitudes

The results presented in this chapter support Luker's assertion that the social primacy of motherhood is a major player in the formation of abortion attitudes. This chapter, however, takes the investigation a step further and empirically demonstrates that the other two gender beliefs, beliefs about women's opportunities and views on assertive women have no relationship with abortion attitudes for Americans.

Kristin Luker's classic investigation into abortion politics makes clear that the debate over the 'social primacy' of motherhood very much influences the debate over abortion rights. As Luker points out, the more women opt out of motherhood, the more

the 'social primacy' of motherhood takes a hit; therefore, abortion, allowing women control over whether they become a mother or not in the case of an unwanted pregnancy or a later decision to terminate for various other reasons, becomes a key battle in the war over the place of motherhood in a woman's identity.

It would be misleading or a blanket statment, however, to say that gender attitudes, or feminism, affect abortion attitudes. The results presented in this chapter make clear that is not the case. Only a particular predisposition under the umbrella of feminism affects abortion attitudes—beliefs about motherhood. Therefore, it would be incorrect to use abortion attitudes as a proxy for gender attitudes just as it would be incorrect to completely dismiss a relationship between gender attitudes and abortion attitudes.

The findings of this chapter also have implications for a larger discussion about the debate over abortion and feminism. As the findings in this chapter demonstrate, the beliefs that cultivate and mold the electorate's strongly held beliefs on abortion are distinct from feminist beliefs that mold their attitudes toward other gendered issues like women's pay and sexual harassment. While the normative debate surrounding the appropriate relationship between feminism and abortion rages on, these findings suggest (and explain) that it is not inconsistent for an individual to hold traditional views on abortion attitudes, but yet progressive gender attitudes in other policy arenas as a result of the distinct gender beliefs. Keep in mind, as discussed in chapter two, different core values and personality characteristics influence gender beliefs.

The findings in this chapter highlight the need for the literature to give gender beliefs the nuanced treatment it deserves. While Americans appear to becoming at peace

with women in the workplace and women being just as capable as men, the belief about motherhood is still something that the electorate not only grapples with, but it also plays a role in the evaluations of woman candidates (as shown in Chapters Four and Five), as well as the issue of abortion.

Chapter Four

The Curious Case of Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, And the 2008 Election

4.1   Introduction

It was an early evening in September 2008 when Sarah Palin walked on stage at the Republican National Convention and accepted her place on the ticket as the Republican Party's first woman Vice Presidential candidate. The offer to Palin, as some have speculated, was an attempt to capitalize on the disenfranchised woman supporters of Hillary Clinton, who had just watched her fight a hard battle and lose the democratic nomination to Barack Obama. The quick popularity of Sarah Palin among social conservatives was somewhat surprising given that historically her supporters have been characterized as anti-feminist. It had only been 16 years earlier when Marilyn Quayle stood on the same stage and asserted that "women do not wish to be liberated from their essential natures as women" (Matalyn, Carville, & Knobler, 1994).

    "Sarah Palin Feminism" (Riley, 2008), "The Newer Feminism" (Cupp, 2008), "The Palin Puzzle" (Krauthammer, 2008), these are just a few of the headlines highlighting the debate among pundits, editorials, and elites about Palin's stance as a

feminist. The emergence of Sarah Palin from social conservative groups presented political scientists with a puzzle: how to reconcile the popularity of a woman candidate among groups once thought of as holding traditional gender role attitudes.

While the success of both Clinton and Palin demonstrates a partial fulfillment of feminist goals, the community of public opinion scholars has been dealing with an antiquated and oversimplified conception of how Americans develop gender beliefs (as demonstrated in earlier chapters), which leaves us unable to explain certain political phenomena (as seen with Palin's success) and inconsistent results in general (see Burns and Gallagher, 2010 for a review). In this chapter, I apply the three dimensions of gender beliefs introduced in chapter two to the 2008 evaluations of Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton and then compare the results. This chapter's contributions to the literature are two-fold: (1) It provides further support that the dimensions of gender beliefs proposed in this dissertation influence evaluations of woman candidates in *distinct* ways; and 2) that voters' progressive belief about women's opportunity produced higher ratings of Clinton and traditional views on motherhood produced higher ratings of Palin, which illuminates the nuances of the dynamics surrounding the 2008 candidates..

4.2   The 2008 Election

The popularity of both Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin left many within the punditry confused and unsure how to discuss the two candidates, particularly Palin, in the context of beliefs about gender and public opinion. The media and pundits seemed to agree that the presence of both Clinton and Palin would stir the proverbial pot when it came to questions of gender. As we can see in Table 4.1, both Palin and Clinton seemed to have

polarizing effects. This was the case particularly for Palin, and even more so when compared to her male counterpart. She generated more distance between those who strongly supported and opposed her when compared to ratings of John McCain.

The historic 2008 election proves to be an optimal case study with a national sample to explore the relationship between gender beliefs and candidate evaluations because of the national prominence of two woman candidates from opposing parties and opposing ends of the ideological spectrum running during the same election. Not only do these two woman candidates differ in political backgrounds, they also have strikingly different social profiles that inevitably condition the effect of gender beliefs among sub-groups. For instance, the younger Palin who is still actively parenting young children represents a different generation of women. More importantly, each campaign chose to approach the issue of gender differently, which eventually activated (or attempted to activate) gender beliefs in an advantageous way for each campaign. Ultimately, I will be unable to control or account for all of the nuances of differences between the candidates and campaign. The overall purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the distinct role that each gender belief played (or did not play) in ratings of Clinton and Palin in order to contribute to the larger argument of this dissertation and shed light on the mechanisms at work in the 2008 election—a historic year for women in America.

Table 4.1: Average Post-Election Ratings of the 2008 Candidates

	Democrat Women	Democrat Men	Republican Women	Republican Men	Independent Women	Independent Men
Hillary Clinton	75.81	72.45	40.04	34.59	57.93	52.92
Barack Obama	80.90	77.91	43.88	36.81	63.81	58.42
John McCain	40.00	45.78	70.94	68.47	54.32	51.71
Sarah Palin	34.57	37.96	74.08	70.17	51.59	49.50

Source: ANES 2008 (sample contains whites only).

Notes: Scale ranged from 0-100 with ratings closer to 100 representing warmer feelings. Only post-election ratings may be used for comparison. There is no pre-election measure available for Sarah Palin. It is important to note that Clinton has a slight increase in average ratings from the pre-election measure to the post-election measure. Because the literature has established the existence of a positivity bias with thermometer scores, a mean score was generated from the remaining group thermometer scores on the ANES and then subtracted from the thermometer score for each candidate to create normalized scores (Wilcox, Sigleman, & Cook, 1989).

4. 3   Hillary Clinton

Even before Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the political scene as a candidate for public office, she was viewed as a political figure challenging traditional gender roles. Breaking out of the "proper" role as First Lady during the Clinton Administration, she demonstrated unprecedented involvement in policy-making decisions. Focusing especially on areas regarding women's issues, Clinton led the taskforce to reform healthcare and worked on a variety of other policy projects. "She symbolized the increasing assertiveness and presence of career women whom many people, including men in elite, professional positions secretly or not so secretly fear and hate… ." (Skocpol, 1997, p. 152-153 as quoted in Winter, 2006).

At the time of the election, Clinton, unlike Palin, had been a national figure for almost two decades. She is the only national woman figure who has consistently appeared on public opinion polls and remained in the public eye. The ups and downs of Clinton's popularity can be attributed to: (1) her evolving role and image in the public eye from first lady, to senator, to the first woman to ever win a state presidential primary; and (2) to an electorate developing more progressive views toward gender.

Clinton has long been a public champion of the advancement of women. Though many public figures can make the same claim, over time Clinton has publicly (and consistently) spoken about or taken on issues dealing with women's opportunities. She has done so on multiple platforms with many different audiences. In 1995, as First Lady, she traveled to Beijing, China, for the United Nation's Fourth World Conference on Women where she famously declared, "If there is one message that echoes from this conference, let it be that human rights are women's rights … and women's rights are

human rights once and for all" (Clinton, 2003, p. 305). The media, constantly referring to Clinton's efforts to champion modern-day women, supported this image. She continued to break the mold of First Lady by leading the task force to reform health care, as previously mentioned.

After leaving her role as First Lady, Clinton successfully ran for a New York Senate seat. Upon entering the Senate, contrary to what many pundits had predicted, Clinton assumed a less visible role as the junior senator from New York, which both quieted her image as a "radical feminist" and improved her appearance as a moderate. Nonetheless, she had left her mark on the minds of many Americans as a champion of the women's movement. Her presence in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary has become somewhat symbolic of a generation of women defying traditional gender roles; therefore, I hypothesize that:

H_1: Beliefs about women's opportunities will affect evaluations of Hillary Clinton with
progressive beliefs producing higher ratings of Clinton.

Although Clinton certainly did not reject her role as a mother and wife, it was not an identity associated with her political image—and in politics it's all about perception. More importantly, public comments, such as "I guess I could have stayed home and baked cookies," intensified her image as a career-focused woman bucking traditional gender roles. On the one hand, this drew heavy criticism from many leaders within the social conservative community. On the other hand, this earned Clinton support and popularity among progressives. Conservative leaders in the mid-90s attempted to

capitalize on the offending of this particular demographic—women with traditional approaches to motherhood. Women mobilized and often showed up in protest at Clinton events while wearing aprons and carrying roller pins to underline their frustration with what they perceived as a lack of respect for traditional mothers. For the past decade, however, Clinton has not received any (notable) media attention in regard to comments on motherhood. She has avoided the topic, and for that matter, the topic has avoided her. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H_2: Beliefs about motherhood will affect evaluations of Clinton with traditional beliefs producing lower ratings of Clinton.

H_3: Though significant, beliefs about motherhood will maintain the lesser role compared to beliefs about women's opportunities in ratings of Clinton—evident with a smaller coefficient.

Even though Hillary Clinton has always brought attention to inequality faced by women, particularly in politics, Clinton and her advisors made the choice to avoid discussing double standards within the media and challenges she faced as a woman running for office during the 2008 election for strategic purposes (Kornblut, 2009). Already, Clinton had faced criticism from the media after two decades of women's advocacy for being too pushy. Conservative commentator Tucker Carlson once infamously claimed that when Clinton walks into a room he involuntarily crosses his legs (Media Matters 2007) and a John McCain supporter quickly went viral when she asked publicly how he was going to

"beat the bitch" (Condron 2007). The campaign, perhaps wanting to stay away from statements that may have made Clinton appear "whiny" or seeking special favor—for fear they would play into stereotypical negative images—never highlighted double standards, even when they were blatant within the media. For example, the media paid little attention to the benchmarks passed by the Clinton campaign in regard to women's advancement. Anne Kornblut, *Washington Post* reporter who covered both the Obama and Clinton campaigns and author of *Notes from the Cracked Ceiling: Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin and What it Will Take for a Woman to Win*, observed that when Barack Obama won the Iowa primary, the media went crazy with headlines noting the accomplishment for the African American community. Obama, however, was not the first African-American to win a presidential primary—Jesse Jackson was. When Clinton won the New Hampshire primary, she was the first woman ever to win a presidential primary, but the historical accomplishment went unremarked by the media. Advisors, concerned with overcoming prejudices that a woman would not be "tough" enough to run for office, did not want to remind voters that she was a woman and kept the main focus of the campaign on establishing Clinton as a resolved leader. The one time the Clinton campaign did point out an unfair occurrence due to Clinton's gender—during an unsuccessful debate performance in Philadelphia in 2007, the rest of her opponents, all male, teamed up against her—backfired. She received bad press as a result and was deemed "whiny." Her opponents declared that she was ganged up on because she was the front-runner, not because she was a woman (see Kornblut for a review, 2009). The Clinton campaign made strong efforts not to cue beliefs about assertive women; therefore I hypothesize that:

H$_4$: Beliefs about assertive women should play no role in 2008 ratings of Hillary Clinton.

4.4   Sarah Palin

Alaska Governor Sarah Palin stormed into the national scene during the 2008 Presidential election when she was introduced during the Republican nominating convention as the first woman on a Republican ticket. Quick to set the right political image, she introduced herself to the world as the hockey mom from Alaska who stumbled into the limelight—deflecting any attributes of ambition. For the most part, this image was accurate. Palin had begun her involvement through the city council in her hometown. She soon ran for mayor of Wasilla and went on to serve as the governor of Alaska before joining the national Republican ticket.

Though Palin does not have the history Clinton has of championing women's rights and advancement, she is the first woman to ever serve as Governor of Alaska as well as the first woman to be nominated for Vice President on the Republican ticket. In addition, Palin was a star athlete while growing up in her hometown playing basketball. Her athletic competiveness is known to have landed her the nickname "Sarah Barracuda," which was touted by both the campaign and media when building a background on her. Additionally, Palin, championing equality in funding and opportunities in boys and girls sports (although Title IX has much broader policy implications), herself has openly supported Title IX. Therefore, when it comes to beliefs about women's opportunities, I suspect:

H$_5$: Attitudes toward women's opportunities affect evaluations of Sarah Palin with progressive attitudes toward women's opportunities leading to higher ratings of Sarah Palin.

Unlike Clinton, who has been on the national stage for the last two decades, Palin was unfamiliar to most voters. Her role as a mother was immediately highlighted and kept up front and center for most of the campaign. The media and Republican elites strengthened her maternal image by focusing attention on the recent birth of her fifth child, Trig. During Palin's pregnancy, it was discovered that Trig had Down's Syndrome. Much attention was paid to her choice to continue on with the pregnancy, which kept her role as a mother of five salient throughout the campaign. While questions were raised about her ability to raise her children and run for national office at the same time, surprisingly, they often came from opponents on the left and not the usual base of stay-at-home mothers or social conservatives. Nevertheless, I suspect that:

H$_6$: Beliefs about motherhood affect ratings of Sarah Palin with progressive beliefs about motherhood producing higher ratings of Sarah Palin.

In 2008, when first asked if she would label herself a feminist during a major interview with Brian Williams on NBC Nightly News, Palin   said she would not, only to contradict herself later in the campaign. To complicate matters a little more, Palin (noted in the earlier quote) has stated in an interview, when asked about Clinton's claims of sexism, that Clinton should just "work harder" and that she didn't like to see her "bring

attention to herself on that level." Given Palin's public comments and disassociation with the feminist identity, it can be expected that Palin is seen as an alternative to assertive women; therefore, I hypothesize that:

H_7: Views toward assertive women affect ratings of Sarah Palin with traditional views toward assertive women leading to higher ratings of Sarah Palin.

4.5 Data and Methods

The 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES), the most attractive dataset for this study, includes thermometer scores for both Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin immediately following the 2008 election. Both dependent variables, feeling thermometer scores for Clinton and Palin, are scaled from 0-100.[15] It has been demonstrated that a positivity bias may exist when using raw thermometers scores (see Wilcox, Sigleman, & Cook, 1989). Therefore, to correct for this bias, a mean score was generated from the remaining group thermometer scores on the ANES and then subtracted from the thermometer score for Clinton and Palin to create normalized scores. Because both of the dependent variables are continuous, the appropriate statistical tool is OLS.

Americans sometimes hold contradicting viewpoints on gender equality; therefore, a single-item measure would be inadequate as demonstrated in Chapter Two. Again, as discussed in earlier chapters, there are three separate dimensions driving gender

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[15] While some may argue, given her history as First Lady, that it would be difficult to disentangle ratings of Clinton from Bill Clinton, research has determined that public opinion of Clinton is distinct and not simply a reflection of public opinion on Bill Clinton (see Burden & Mughan, 1999).

values: belief about women's opportunities, family structure and motherhood, and views on assertive women. Factor scores were generated for each dimension, recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation, and included as the primary independent variables in the OLS model.[16]

Besides attitudes toward the different dimensions of feminism, other variables may theoretically affect evaluations of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin; therefore, a set of control variables is included. Party identification, likely the most important predictor of evaluations of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin, is included. It is made up of three categories: Republican, Independent, and Democrat. Socio-demographic variables that may also affect evaluations of Clinton and Palin are also included: age, educational attainment, income, whether or not you reside in the South, and religious traditionalism. The sample size for the Clinton model is 396 and the sample size for the Palin model is 391 which is particularly low given the sample of whites in the ANES is at a little over a 1,000 cases (who answered either of the dependent variables). The religious traditionalism index (more specifically the church attendance variable) appears to be pulling the sample down with only 584 cases among the white sample. I choose to leave the index intact in the model given its theoretical importance in ratings of both Palin and Clinton.

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[16] All of the variables were coded so that the most progressive response has the higher value. See Table 1A in the appendix for further details on coding.

Table 4.2: The Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin

	Hillary Clinton Coefficient and robust standard error	P value	Sarah Palin Coefficient and robust standard error	P value
Party Identification	**10.79** **(1.88)**	**.000**	**-8.95** **(2.20)**	**.000**
Religious Traditionalism	**-3.02** **(1.61)**	**.061**	.788 (2.01)	.696
Retrospective Economic Evaluations	.034 (3.67)	.993	2.92 (2.58)	.259
Limited Government	**9.58** **(3.35)**	**.005**	**-9.12** **(3.86)**	**.011**
Residency in South	-2.51 (2.58)	.330	**9.19** **(2.78)**	**.001**
Household income	.153 (.254)	.547	.396 (.307)	.197
Ideology	**2.54** **(1.30)**	**.053**	**-3.04** **(1.54)**	**.048**
Educational Attainment	-1.19 (.961)	.215	**-1.57** **(.845)**	**.063**
Age	**.175** **(.070)**	**.014**	-.022 (.069)	.743
Sex (woman)	1.51 (2.59)	.560	**4.93** **(2.77)**	**.076**
Beliefs about Assertive Women	8.43 (6.66)	.207	-8.30 (6.49)	.202
Beliefs about Motherhood	3.70 (5.90)	.531	**-12.17** **(5.85)**	**.038**
Beliefs about Women's Opportunity	**15.55** **(7.90)**	**.050**	2.93 (7.61)	.700
Constant	13.57 (10.30)	.189	**78.53** **(12.22)**	**.000**
	N=396 R^2=.414		N=391 R^2=.396	

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

4.6   Analysis

To test the effect of the feminist dimensions on candidate evaluations, we must first estimate the equation:

Ratings= β + β1 relevant demographics + β2 beliefs about assertive women + β3 beliefs about motherhood + β4 beliefs about women's opportunity + e.

Table 4.2 presents the coefficient estimates of each model with robust standard errors. The sample size for the Clinton model is 396 respondents and 391 for the Palin model. As shown in Table 4.2, the only gender belief that predicts ratings of Hillary Clinton is beliefs about women's opportunities, which confirms hypotheses 1. A positive one unit change in beliefs about women's opportunities predicts slightly over a 15 point increase in ratings of Clinton. This is a very strong effect—particularly when compared to other factors. Ideology, also statistically significant in the model, only has a coefficient of 2.54. For every one unit change in ideology, ratings of Clinton only increase by a little over 2 points. Ideology, as noted earlier, is measured on a seven point scale, which means that even the maximum shift, from very conservative to very liberal (a seven point shift) increases ratings of Clinton by 17.5 points—only somewhat higher than a one unit shift in belief about women's opportunities (recoded to 0-1). Neither beliefs about motherhood nor beliefs about assertive women predict ratings of Clinton. The data do not support hypotheses 2 or 3, but do support hypothesis 4. In addition to both beliefs about women's opportunities and ideology, partisanship, religious traditionalism and individualism are significant predictors of ratings of Clinton.

Like the Clinton model, when we turn to the Palin model we see that only one gender belief predicts ratings of Palin; however, beliefs about women's opportunities do not affect ratings of Palin. Beliefs about motherhood proved to be a strong predictor of ratings of Sarah Palin with *traditional* views on motherhood predicting higher ratings of Palin (which fails to confirm hypothesis 2 and 3). As shown in Table 4.2, a one unit change in beliefs about motherhood produces slightly over a 12 point change in ratings of Palin. In addition to beliefs about motherhood, partisanship, individualism, residency in the South, educational attainment, and sex affected ratings of Palin as well. The data do not support any of the hypotheses laid out earlier in regard to ratings of Palin.

Given the prominent role partisanship plays in candidate evaluations (see Campbell Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960), it is important to include a control for party identification in both models. As shown in Table 4.2, partisanship does indeed play a major role in ratings of Clinton and Palin as expected. A one unit change in party identification (coded as a three point measure from Republican, to Independent, to Democrat with Democrat represented by the higher value) leads to an almost 11 point increase in ratings of Clinton, and a one unit change in partisanship leads to an almost 9 point decrease in support for Palin. Given the prominent role partisanship plays in candidate evaluations and the unique relationship each party has with the women's movement, it is expected that partisanship conditions the effect of gender beliefs on ratings of each candidate. The equation was modified to explore any potential interactive effect between party identification and gender beliefs on evaluations of Clinton and Palin:

Ratings= β + β1 relevant demographics + β2 Party Identification + β3 belief about women's opportunity + β4 beliefs about assertive women + β5 beliefs about motherhood + gender belief * party identification + e.

As shown in Table 4.3, the expectation that party identification conditions gender beliefs' influence on candidate ratings is not completely represented in the data. Partisanship does not condition gender beliefs' effect on evaluations of Sarah Palin at all. Not one of the interactive terms or constitutive terms is statistically significant. There is some interaction effect, however, between gender beliefs and party identification for Hillary Clinton. As shown in Table 4.3, progressive views toward assertive women matter more for Republican ratings of Hillary Clinton when compared to Democrat ratings; Republicans holding progressive views on assertive women are likely to rate Clinton higher and vice versa. A one unit positive change in belief about assertive women translates into an almost 16 point increase in ratings of Clinton among Republicans. Even though beliefs about women's opportunities matter for the general electorate's evaluations of Clinton, beliefs about assertive women matter for Republicans' ratings of Clinton. Also of note in Table 4.3, for individuals who are traditional in all three realms of gender beliefs, partisanship matters with anti-feminist Democrats and Independents rating Clinton higher when compared to anti-feminist Republicans.

Table 4.3: Interactive Effect of Party Identification & Gender Beliefs on Candidate Ratings

	Hillary Clinton		Sarah Palin	
	Coefficient and Robust Standard Error	p-value	Coefficient and Robust Standard Error	p-value
Party Identification	**13.15 (7.79)**	**.092**	3.009 (8.05)	.709
Religious Traditionalism	**-2.95 (1.58)**	**.063**	.692 (1.99)	.729
Retrospective Economic Evaluations	-.219 (3.60)	.952	2.83 (2.68)	.292
Limited Government	**10.33 (3.35)**	**.002**	**-10.01 (3.94)**	**.011**
Residency in South	-2.78 (2.57)	.280	**8.98 (2.78)**	**.001**
Household income	.208 (.248)	.402	.403 (.307)	.191
Ideology	**2.58 (1.31)**	**.050**	**-2.79 (1.59)**	**.079**
Educational Attainment	-1.11 (.967)	.249	**-1.47 (.849)**	**.084**
Age	**.182 (.070)**	**.010**	-.022 (.069)	.747
Sex (woman)	1.49 (2.63)	.571	**5.41 (2.74)**	**.049**
Beliefs about Assertive Women	**15.51 (8.50)**	**.069**	-1.03 (8.09)	.899
Beliefs about Motherhood	7.78 (7.86)	.323	-6.07 (6.91)	.380
Beliefs about Women's Opportunity	9.55 (12.14)	.432	-4.87 (9.33)	.601
Assertive Women*Party ID	-8.08 (5.84)	.167	-7.97 (7.02)	.257
Motherhood*Party ID	-5.05 (5.58)	.367	-7.84 (6.35)	.218
Women's Opportunity*Party ID	7.48 (8.91)	.402	-4.87 (9.33)	.601
Constant	9.49 (12.56)	.450	**67.79 (12.22)**	**.000**
	N=396 R²=.420		N=391 R²=.402	

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1.

4.7   The New Mommy Wars?

> It's the Mommy Wars: Special Campaign Edition. But this time the battle lines are drawn inside out, with social conservatives, usually staunch advocates for stay-at-home motherhood, mostly defending her [Palin], while some others, including plenty of working mothers, worry that she is taking on too much.(Kantor & Swarns, *New York Times*, 2008)

The results presented in Table 4.2 support the claim that Palin received support from an unlikely source: voters with traditional views on motherhood. At first glance, this finding appears counter-intuitive. Campaigning for one of the most powerful positions in the nation, Palin, a mother of five, violated the norms of motherhood. However, Palin did not experience the wrath of the voters who hold traditional views on motherhood; she garnered their support.

Although Palin campaigned outside the house, she very much included motherhood into her political identity. She introduced herself to the nation as a hockey mom, was often seen campaigning with her children, and it is worth noting that she has a large number of children (five), which is higher than the national average. Perhaps the "mommy wars" has moved beyond whether mothers should work outside the home or not; rather, the focus has shifted to the social primacy of motherhood (see Luker 1985), and given Palin's strong identification with motherhood, she never violated the gendered social norms. Though Clinton is also a mother, this was not an identity that she incorporated into her political identity; therefore, she was neither penalized nor rewarded by beliefs on motherhood. It simply was not salient issue in the case of Clinton. The role of motherhood beliefs is something that will be explored further in Chapter Five.

4.8   "How do you explain Sarah Palin?"

When studying women and politics, particularly gender attitudes within the mass electorate, it is inevitable that one will be asked, "So, how do you explain Sarah Palin?" This comes as no surprise given that the phenomenon of a woman becoming quite popular among a subset of the electorate often associated with traditional views on gender has captured the attention of the country. Political scientists, perhaps, would be quick to point to party affiliation as the answer—strong party ties simply trump anti-feminist beliefs that could potentially affect her popularity; however, this is simply not born out in the data. If party affiliation drove her popularity among socially conservative groups, then measures of gender beliefs should have no effect at all. We know, however, that they do, specifically beliefs about motherhood do. It was *not* that Palin proved popular *in spite* of traditional gender views, it was that she was popular partly *because of them* (motherhood to be specific).

Table 4.4: Belief about Women's Opportunities Effect on Evaluations of Sarah Palin

	Sarah Palin	
	Coefficient with robust standard error	p-value
Age	.009 (.066)	.893
Household income	.353 (.310)	.255
Residency in the South	9.40 (2.78)	.001
Ideology	-3.91 (1.49)	.009
Education	-2.12 (.829)	.011
Party Identification	-9.09 (2.20)	.000
Woman	3.04 (2.69)	.260
Religious traditionalism	.957 (1.97)	.629
Individualism	-10.14 (3.09)	.010
Retrospective economic evaluations	3.01 (2.71)	.268
Belief about women's opportunities	5.09 (7.52)	.499
Constant	70.19 (10.42)	.000
N=391 R^2=.387		

Source: 2008 National Election Studies Note: All entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sample contains only whites.

Table 4.5: Effect of Views toward Assertive Women on Ratings of Sarah Palin

	Sarah Palin Coefficient with robust standard error	p-value
Age	.013 (.069)	.851
Household income	.336 (.308)	.276
Residency in the South	9.66 (2.77)	.001
Ideology	-3.68 (1.53)	.017
Education	-1.89 (.846)	.025
Party Identification	-8.73 (2.15)	.000
Woman	3.79 (2.66)	.155
Religious traditionalism	.844 (1.96)	.668
Individualism	-9.94 (3.89)	.011
Retrospective economic evaluations	2.75 (2.60)	.291
Beliefs about Assertive Women	-5.12 (6.17)	.407
Constant	74.38 (10.04)	.000
N=391 R^2=.387		

Source: 2008 National Election Studies Note: All entries are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Sample contains only whites.

4. 9   Implications

Most importantly, the results from the Clinton and Palin models highlight the importance and need to account for each gender belief—particularly in elections that involve woman candidates. Had I relied on measures that tapped into beliefs about women's opportunities or views on assertive women, I would have incorrectly concluded that views on gender equality played no role in this historic candidacy as demonstrated in Tables 4.4 and Table 4.5. We know, however, that is not the case. While the more traditional approach, measuring beliefs about women's opportunities (primarily dealing with discrimination), plays no role in evaluations of Palin, belief about motherhood does. As we see, the story is slightly more nuanced than past conceptions of feminism (*conceptions of feminism within the public opinion literature)* or gender beliefs would have accounted for.

The findings presented in this chapter have important implications for woman candidates and the role gender values play in political assessments. Even in the very same national election, different gender values were cued depending on the candidate. Though the findings from the 2008 case study are enlightening and provide some insight into a historic year for women and politics, future work should focus on experimental situations to control for idiosyncrasies associated with particular elections. The following chapter will further explore the relationship between traditional motherhood beliefs and woman candidate evaluations. I will test my suspicion that woman candidates who do not conform to traditional gender norms in regards to motherhood actually cue traditional motherhood beliefs, and woman candidates who clearly establish the primacy of motherhood as part of their political image benefit from these traditional views.

Chapter 5

**The Mommy Wars: an Experimental
Test on the Effect of Gender Cues on Candidate Evaluations**

5.1   Introduction

When 2010 congressional candidate Krystal Marie Ball (VA-1) first sought out advisors within the campaign world, one told her, "Krystal, I've got two pieces of advice for you: Cut your hair and stop talking about your kid. No one cares" (as reported in an August 2010 newsletter from the Ball campaign). While some woman candidates have been advised to play down certain feminine characteristics of their personal profile, in this case motherhood, others have played them up. The "grizzly mom" slogan has been growing in popularity among Republican women who are also mothers. Moreover, Senator Patty Murray made a lasting impression with her "mom in tennis shoes" campaign.

Perhaps the political consultants are on to something: The idea that the gendered characteristics of women cue certain gender beliefs to be taken into consideration when assessing the candidate. Whether to play them up or down depends on the audience she is reaching out to. Recent research demonstrates that the social profile of a candidate significantly matters, even when partisanship is taken into consideration (Miller, Wlezien, & Hildreth, 1991; Green, Palmquist, & Shickler, 2002; Campbell, Green, & Layman, 2010).

We see in Chapter Four, certain gender beliefs play a role in 2008 ratings of former vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin, but different gender beliefs play a role in ratings of former presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Why is this? The answer is that gender beliefs exist among a sea of group identities, beliefs, and attitudes, and *when* they matter, like many things in politics, depends on the mixture of cues and context. We see in Chapter Four that, despite the intense media buzz about the 'mommy wars,' beliefs about motherhood were not a major factor in post-election ratings of Clinton or Palin. This chapter will more closely investigate the relationship between the social profiles of woman candidates and voters' views on motherhood.

5.2   Gender Bias in Candidate Evaluations: Indirect and Direct Bias

5.2.1 Indirect Bias: Gender Stereotypes regarding Gender Beliefs and Gender Traits

It is not uncommon for voters to utilize stereotypes when evaluating candidates. Stereotypes often act as an information shortcut in a world overflowing with information and pressed for time. Just like party identification, the background and profile of a candidate acts as a heuristic for voters (Stokes & Miller, 1962; Popkin, 1991). Much work has been done demonstrating the impact of a candidate's gender, race, and religion on voters' assessment and support (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990; Carsey, 1995; Koch, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Campbell, Green, & Layman, 2010).

Voters rely on gender to make inferences about the candidate's traits, ideological orientation, position on issues, as well as his or her performance in office (Leeper, 1991;

Koch, 2000; Dolan, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2002). Voters assume woman candidates are more liberal than male candidates (Alexander & Anderson, 1993; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993) and more capable of handling "compassion" issues (such as poverty, childcare and healthcare); whereas male candidates are assumed to be more capable at dealing with issues regarding defense and foreign policy (Alexander & Anderson, 1993; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Koch, 1999).

Subsequent research has recognized that the party affiliation of the candidate conditions the application of gender stereotypes (see Dolan & Sanbonmatsu, 2009; Matland & King, 2003; Koch, 2002). Koch (2002) found that gender stereotypes associated with Democratic woman candidates increased distance between the candidate and voter, whereas gender stereotypes actually decreased distance between the Republican woman candidates and voters. Matland and King (2003) found, however, that Republican women were often seen as more ideologically liberal when compared to Republican men; therefore, the former suffer more within their own party from gender stereotyping but benefit from Democratic and Independent voters.

The study of gender stereotypes is important because it not only sheds light on how voters view woman candidates, but also on how woman candidates, as a result, run their campaign (Herrnson, Lay, & Stokes, 2008; but see Dolan, 2005) and subsequently, how men run their campaign in response (Fox, 1997). Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes (2008) found that women are more successful when they run "as women." In other words, by running on and focusing on "woman" issues like healthcare and education, women gain an advantage. Gender stereotypes are not necessarily a detriment for some women in certain cases and may even work to the advantage of some woman candidates. If women

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are assumed to be better at compassion issues, they are going to run on compassion issues.This activity is sometimes referred to as "gendered adaptiveness" (Banwart & McKinney, 2005). Yet, Dolan (2005) found that when looking at elections across the country, women tend to focus on the issues at hand and do not strategically attempt to focus only on issues that benefit woman candidates.

5.2.2 Direct Bias: Gender Beliefs and Support for Women

Generally speaking, the academic consensus is that *direct* gender bias plays little to no role in the evaluations of woman candidates (Burrell, 1996; Chaney & Sinclair, 1994; Ekstrand & Eckert, 1981; Sapiro, 1981-1982; Matland & King, 2002), and the focus of recent research has been on indirect voter bias or institutional bias. Relying on a standard measure which has appeared repeatedly on the ANES, scholars have seen the percent of Americans willing to vote for a woman president improve dramatically. In fact, the percentage of Americans who would be *unwilling* to vote for a woman president has dropped from 20% in the 70s to 9% in 1993 (Shrieber, 1978; Fox & Smith, 1998).

While much of the literature tends to dimiss explicit voter bias and instead focus on the effects of gender on trait and issue inferences (Alexander & Anderson, 1993; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Koch, 1999), Fox and Smith (2002) argue that the literature has moved on too quickly. They observe that previous work focuses on sub-samples of the population within one region and therefore fails to take into account the attitudes of certain regions or groups. In addition, Streb, Burrell, Frederick, and Genovese (2008) look at the measures used to asses direct bias, specifically the oft used measure on the ANES that asks whether respondents would be willing to "vote for a woman for president." Social desirability, Streb et. al argue, skew any real results. In fact, when

employing a list measure, they find that 26% of the electorate is "angry" at the prospect of a woman president.

Most importantly, for this study, previous work on gender bias simply assumes direct bias take place in the context of 'sex' and fails to really consider 'gender.' As Kathleen Dolan (2004) points out in *Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates*:

> …we must also consider the differences between the terms sex and gender. While these terms are often used interchangeably, I would argue that doing so conflates two different considerations. While sex refers to biological distinctions between woman and male, gender is a more complex and socially constructed reference to the categories "feminine" and "masculine." Gender involves ideas about the behaviors, roles, and activities that are considered feminine and masculine as well as beliefs about which people (women or men) appropriately occupy those spaces.
>
> (p. 7)

It would be wrong to assume all women candidates are created equal in regard to *gender*, and it is this variation in gender where gender bias may affect political decision making and evaluations. In other words, how a woman candidate presents herself regarding children, career, and other traits that may or may not make her appear more or less feminine, or violate gender norms, may affect voters' assessment.

5.3   The 'Mommy Wars' and Gender Norms

Feminist scholars have grappled with the subject of motherhood and family for decades. Even Betty Friedan, famed feminist, was critical of her own seminal work the *Feminine Mystique* (1963) in a later publication, *The Second Stage* (1981), for being too "anti-family" (Snitow, 1992). From cries of oppressive pronatalism from feminists to accusations of detrimental effects on the family from the anti-feminists, the debate over the role of motherhood has clearly seeped into the electorate and fallen somewhat along the existing cultural divide. As we see in Figures 1 and 2, respondents who identify as Republicans were less likely to hold progressive views toward motherhood when compared to respondents who identified as Democrats. Whereas most Democrats fall on the most progressive response on the 'motherhood' index, the largest distribution of Republicans fell right in the middle of the index.

The 'mommy wars' is more than the battles over the merits of having children v. not having children or working mothers v. stay-at-home mothers; rather, it is often about a woman's social identity and the importance of motherhood or gender norms. Social identity theory is a social psychological theory that is often used by political scientists to help explain public opinion and political behavior. Social identity theory posits that "social identity is derived from an individual's self-categorization, the process by which the individual cognitively redefines the self in terms of group norms and the associated stereotypes of particular social categories" (Monroe, Hankin and Van Vechten 2000 p.434). The self-categorization theory, an extension of social identity theory, relies on group prototypes. The more individuals see themselves like the socially constructed prototype of a group, in this case the prototype homemaker or the successful career

woman, the more individuals will see themselves as part of that group—*regardless* of their personal situation.

Wilcox (1991) found that working Evangelical women maintained their social identity as homemakers, even after they entered the workforce. Though participation in the workforce usually leads to more egalitarian gender roles for women, Wilcox found that was not the case for Evangelical women because of the their strong social identification as homemakers. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a woman candidate who (although technically working) could still present herself in such a way that it does not violate the social identity of homemaker or violate any traditional gender norms. For instance, Phyllis Schlafly, a prominent advocate of mothers staying at home, ironically, worked outside the home campaigning for the cause. Schlafly successfully incorporated motherhood into her social identity and therefore became symbolic of traditional views on motherhood.

In *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* Kristin Luker (1984) makes the argument that the debate over abortion is driven by views on when life begins, but it also, for women, very much taps into an ongoing debate over the importance of motherhood in their identity. As Luker tell us: "Women who oppose abortion and wish to make it officially unavailable, are declaring both practically and symbolically, that women's reproductive roles should be given social primacy … the act of conception therefore creates a pregnant woman; rather than a woman who is pregnant" (p. 200). A woman who has chosen not to have children may violate certain norms, not only about family, but about womanhood as well. As Luker points out, the more women succeed in the male sphere and opt of motherhood, the more the 'social primacy' of motherhood takes a hit.

Therefore, a woman candidate with no children may subconsciously appear as a threat to the identity and values of some men and women.

5.4   Priming, Beliefs about Motherhood, and Political Choices

Within this chapter, I argue that the social profile of a woman candidate, specifically her marital status and role as a mother (or lack thereof), activate gender beliefs during the candidate evaluation process. To help build my theoretical case, I borrow slightly from the race and politics literature on cues and priming, specifically from Mendelberg's (2001) theoretical approach to racial priming. Mendelberg (2001) argues that racial cues make racial attitudes more accessible in memory and therefore are employed during political decisions. Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) also find support for the argument that racial cues increase accessibility to racial schemas. This same approach is applicable to gender attitudes and women: that particular gender cues makes gender attitudes more accessible in memory, and they are therefore employed during the decision process.

Gender beliefs exist among a sea of attitudes, group associations, and emotions within the average voter, and they are not always employed during the evaluation process. I propose that certain cues, in this case the social profile of a woman candidate, prime gender beliefs to be taken into consideration when evaluating a woman candidate. Given the theoretical proposition that woman candidates who violate traditional gender role norms prime motherhood beliefs in the evaluative process, I offer the following hypotheses:

H_1: When women candidates violate gender role norms and voters are aware of this violation, motherhood beliefs become salient in the evaluative process.

H_2: When women candidates violate gender role norms and this violation is made salient, voters with conservative motherhood beliefs will be less approving than voters who hold progressive beliefs.

H_3: Women candidates who conform to traditional gender roles (e.g., married mothers) will not typically prime motherhood beliefs as a consideration in the evaluative process.

5.5   The Experiment

This study utilizes data from an original survey experiment collected through the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, an online national stratified survey conducted in the fall of 2010 by Polimetrix. The study surveyed 30,000 respondents and was conducted in two waves: The first wave, the pre-election wave, was administered prior to the 2010 election during three time periods: late September, middle October, and late October. The second wave, the post-election wave, was administered immediately following the 2010 elections. The experiment was designed to isolate the effects of motherhood on support for hypothetical female candidates.

The first wave of the online study asked respondents two questions dealing with motherhood and the evolving nature of the family. Beliefs about motherhood and the evolving family structure were captured using two of the original three measures presented in Chapter Two.[17] The first measure posed the following statement to respondents: "It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever and the

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[17] Space limitations on the CCES prevented use of all of the original indicators.

woman takes care of the home and family."[18] Respondents were then asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed. The second measure posed this statement to respondents: "Working mothers can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with their children as a mother who does not work." Respondents were then asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed. I created the "Motherhood Beliefs" measure by constructing an additive index of these questions that ranges from 0 to 4. The distribution of the Motherhood Beliefs Measure is presented in Figure 5.1. As evident from the distribution, beliefs are somewhat skewed toward the liberal end of the scale. Approximately half of the sample scored below 3, with the other half scoring 3 and above.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of Motherhood Beliefs

Notes: Data labels are the percentage of the sample who score in the respective category. Motherhood Beliefs scale is scored from conservative to liberal. n=330 *Source:* 2010 CCES

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[18] The order of the statements read is randomly assigned.

The second phase of the online study was administered to the same group of respondents after the 2010 election with anywhere from one to eight weeks in between (depending on when the respondent was administered the first wave). In the second phase, respondents received a description of a hypothetical woman congressional candidate. As shown in Table 5.1, there were two possible treatments in addition to one control. The first treatment presents a woman candidate and explicitly mentions that she is married with children. The second treatment presents a woman candidate and explicitly mentions that she is not married, has no children, and is devoted to her work. The final treatment, the control, presents a woman candidate with no explicit mention either way regarding the candidate's marital status and whether she has children or not. With the exception of the manipulation, the description of the candidate's role as a mother and wife, the rest of the description presented a qualified candidate with no mention of partisan affiliation or issue stance.[19]

Since there was a time period of at least one week or more between the two phases of the survey, I can be confident that the first phase, which measured gender beliefs, was not priming these values to be taken into consideration during the candidate evaluation. In other words, the *act* of answering the questions on beliefs about motherhood is not itself priming the belief, but the cues in each treatment are doing the priming. After receiving the treatment, respondents were instructed: *We'd like to get your feelings toward Amy Smith. Please rate her on something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable*

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[19] While the randomization of the experimental design was largely successful and does not necessitate my including the control variables to correct for sampling errors, I include controls in the models to establish the significance of the treatments and motherhood beliefs above and beyond traditional predictors of political behavior.

and warm toward her. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't care much for her. Ratings of 50 mean that you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward her. Please see Table 5.1 for the description of each treatment.

5.6 Data & Analysis

Table 5.1: Description of Treatment

Treatment A	Amy Smith, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, is a successful businesswoman. Amy graduated cum laude from a top university with a degree in business and politics. She is happily married and has three children. Amy was elected five years ago to serve on the city council. She is moderate politically and has worked with people from both parties.
Treatment B	Amy Smith, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, is a successful businesswoman. Amy graduated cum laude from a top university with a degree in business and politics. She is not married, has no children, and is devoted to her work. Amy was elected five years ago to serve on the city council. She is moderate politically and has worked with people from both parties.
Control	Amy Smith, a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, is a successful businesswoman. Amy graduated cum laude from a top university with a degree in business and politics. Amy was elected five years ago to serve on the city council. She is moderate politically and has worked with people from both parties.

Table 5.2 presents the results from the model. Given that the dependent variable, thermometer score ratings of the hypothetical congressional candidate Amy Smith, is a continuous variable, OLS is the appropriate statistical model. Overall, the model has a sample size of 234 respondents. Each treatment variable is coded so that the treatment=1 and the comparison group, in this case the control treatment and the other treatment, =0. For example, Treatment A is coded so that 1= all those who received treatment and 0 = all the respondents who received the control treatment or treatment B. Treatment A has

98 respondents with a mean score of 61, treatment B has 117 respondents with a mean score of 63, and the control group has 116 respondents with a mean score of 61.

The primary independent variable, beliefs about motherhood, is an index score ranging from 0-5. It was created from the two questions administered on the first wave of the experiment dealing with beliefs about motherhood. An interaction term was created for each treatment, treatment A and treatment B, with motherhood so that I may test the conditioning effect of each treatment on the relationship between beliefs about motherhood and candidate evaluations.

In addition to the primary variables of interest, there are other factors that can be expected to affect the evaluations of woman candidates, such as: age, gender, education, family income, partisan identification, ideology, race, and finally, religious traditionalism. Each was included as a control variable in the model.[20] Age, naturally, represents the generational cohort of the respondent. Older respondents grew up and raised families during a time period where women were valued more as mothers and were less prevalent in politics and leadership positions in general, and therefore, it is included in the model. It is important to include education because past research has shown that education produces more egalitarian views in general. Past research shows that citizens sometimes infer partisanship or ideological leanings from gender; therefore, it was critical to include because respondents in the experiment were rating a woman candidate. Finally, religious traditionalism is included in the model given the tenuous relationship between religion and the women's movement suggests the more religious a respondent the lower that respondent may rank a woman candidate—particularly one who is not a mother (see Leege, Wald, Krueger, & Mueller, 2002).

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[20] Details on the coding can be found in the Appendix.

5.7   Results

Table 5.2: The Effect of Motherhood Beliefs on Candidate Evaluation

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Robust Standard Errors	P Value
Treatment A*Motherhood	1.15	4.12	.781
Motherhood Beliefs	-1.03	3.00	.732
Treatment A	-5.41	12.53	.666
Treatment B* Motherhood	9.11	4.03	.025
Treatment B	-28.17	12.16	.022
Age	.174	.102	.089
Educational Attainment	.047	1.43	.974
Family Income	.088	.500	.860
Sex (woman)	-2.32	4.19	.580
Party Identification	-.258	1.13	.821
Ideology	-2.65	2.20	.229
Race	4.28	6.73	.525
Religious Traditionalism	.090	1.32	.946
Constant	61.0	16.9	.000
			N=221 R^2=.085

Notes: Dependent Variable is the feeling thermometer score for the hypothetical candidate (0 to 100). Sample includes respondents from Treatment A, Treatment B and the control group.
Source: 2010 CCES

The interaction between beliefs about motherhood and the second treatment, treatment B, however, is statistically significant with a coefficient of 10.10. For every one unit increase on the motherhood scale, ratings of the hypothetical candidate Amy Smith, who was not married and does not have children, improved by 10.10 points. Conversely, for every one unit decrease on the motherhood index, scale ratings of Amy Smith dropped by 10.10 points. Substantively, as seen in Figure 5.2, this finding is significant.

As we can see from the constituent term included in the model, treatment B, which is also statistically significant, the strongest effect is for men and women with very traditional beliefs about motherhood. In other words, for individuals who scored 0 on the motherhood index and thereby hold very traditional views on motherhood, the description of a woman candidate with no husband or children is likely to produce significantly lower ratings.

This finding holds even after controlling for age, ideology, partisan identification, education, income, race, and even religious traditionalism. According to Table 5.2, a woman candidate who is not married and has no children triggers beliefs about the evolving role of motherhood within the electorate. Men and women who hold progressive views in the domain of motherhood are likely to rate a woman candidate higher, and men and women who hold traditional views about motherhood are much more likely to rate a woman candidate who is not married and has no children significantly lower compared to the base category (no mention of children or marriage either way). The findings from Table 5.2 support hypotheses 3 and 4.

5.8   Implications

The results of this study are clear: American citizens' beliefs about motherhood play an important role when evaluating woman candidates who did not choose the more traditional route of marriage and children. Men and women with progressive views toward the changing dynamic of the family are more likely to rate a childless woman candidate higher, whereas men and women with traditional views toward motherhood and the changing family dynamic are much more likely to rate a childless woman candidate lower. In fact, it is the latter of the two driving the results with a substantively large coefficient.

Figure 5.2 Marginal Effects of Treatment B on Candidate Evaluations by Motherhood Beliefs

Notes: The predicted marginal effect of Treatment B as conditioned by Motherhood Beliefs (0 to 4) was estimated using the regression results from Table 5.2.

While a childless woman candidate cues beliefs about motherhood during the evaluation process, beliefs about motherhood do not come into play when evaluating a woman candidate who is married with children. I attribute this finding to the fact that a mother who is running for office does not necessarily violate any gender norms or offend social identities in the same way. She maintains motherhood as a key component of her social identity and thus does not violate the social primacy of motherhood. Even though she is running for office, she does not violate the views of progressive men and women in terms of beliefs about motherhood. As a result of not violating anyone's norms, beliefs about motherhood are never cued. The findings from this study are important and two-fold: (1) Certain characteristics of a woman candidate's social profile activate gender beliefs to be taken into consideration during the evaluation process; and (2) woman candidates with no children, as demonstrated from the findings, are disadvantaged among more traditional groups within the citizenry.

The literature on direct gender bias would benefit from readdressing the topic of gender role attitudes' effect on support for woman candidates. Instead of approaching gender beliefs as a one-dimensional, linear belief, breaking gender beliefs into different topic clusters allows for the field to understand the nuances of gender beliefs and their effect on political choices. A woman candidate's social profile is not limited to her marital status or children, and there are other characteristics that contribute to the social construction of gender—future research should continue to explore gender beliefs in isolation and their relationship with woman candidate's social profile.

5.9   Conclusion

As women continue to be underrepresented in the U.S. House and Senate, not to mention numerous state legislatures, it is imperative that scholars continue to explore the factors that may affect citizen's evaluations of woman candidates. By limiting analyses to the differences between male and female candidates in terms of biological sex, scholars have overlooked a critical gap in the literature dealing with gender (the social construct of what it means to be a woman). Whether a woman candidate does or does not have children not only activates gender beliefs but in some cases has a negative effect on evaluations and therefore limit her chances for success. This is particularly troublesome for woman candidates running in conservative parts of the country. Findings from this study have implications for how women should run their campaigns as well as implications for broader discussions about contemporary women and their opportunities in U.S. politics.

Chapter Six

Gender Beliefs and Partisanship: The (lack of) Relationship between Motherhood Beliefs and Party Identification

6.1   Introduction

In this dissertation we have explored the relationship between the three dimensions of

gender beliefs, candidate evaluations (both experimental and the 2008 election), and

reproductive policy—specifically abortion attitudes. This dissertation would be severely

lacking if I did not touch on one of the most important, if not the most significant, factor

within political behavior and public opinion: partisanship. To what extent does each

dimension of gender beliefs affect the American public's relationship with the two

political parties is a question left unanswered by most of the existing literature. In an

environment where voters are overwhelmed with policy preferences and social

attachments to either party, do the dimensions even matter? And if so, which ones? Why?

These are a few of the questions I attempt to answer in this chapter.

6.2   Literature Review & Expectations

The American Voter (Campbell Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960) tells the story

of detached voters not really involved in political life, and unsophisticated ones unable to

view issues in abstract terms (this inability is closely tied to education.) Voters hold long-

term psychological commitments to a political party. The psychological attachment of the individual is very important to the Michigan model.

> "Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachments of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of the electoral strength within the competition of particular campaigns take place … Most Americans have this sense of attachment with one party or the other. And for the individual who does, the strength and direction of party identification are facts of central importance in accounting for attitudes and behavior."
>
> (Campbell Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960, p. 121)

According to *The American Voter*, party identification (ID) remains stable, and when there is change, it is a gradual one that occurs over the span of an individual's life. Formed early in life, party ID tends to resist change. Partisanship does much more than guide an individual's vote choice; it informs the way a person receives and retains information. It affects how the individual views the political world. For example, Leah, born and raised in a Republican household in the South saw herself as a Republican early in life, and this has influenced the way she receives information on the Iraq war. She is more likely to have processed the 2008 troop surge in Iraq as a success and disregard commentators' concern with its long-term success. According to *The American Voter,* "Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be" (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960, p. 133).

Although scholars have traditionally treated party ID as a long-standing psychological attachment, a "revisionist" school treated party identification as a product of retrospective evaluations and issues (see Fiorina, 1981; Franklin & Jackson, 1983; MacKuen, Erickson, & Stimson, 1989; Neimi & Jennings, 1991). Because the "traditional" school, prompted by the *American Voter* (1960), accepted that party ID shapes opinions and attitudes, politics was assumed to have little effect on the stability of party ID. The "revisionist" school, on the other hand, does see partisanship as being affected by politics and policy preferences.

The revisionist school began to appear in the late 70s. Of particular importance to the movement was Morris Fiorina's *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (1981). Fiorina introduced the concept of the "running tally" as an interpretation of party ID that saw it as an endogenous factor, affected by issue positions and political evaluations. How we view the parties continually shifts, hence the name "running tally." This approach, also referred to as the online processing model, is not a complete 180 in regards to understanding party ID as it was traditionally understood. Though Fiorina argues that issues and evaluations affect party ID, he also observes that it is not a completely unstable construct that changes with the political breezes as one might initially interpret. Because previous party ID does influence what information we receive and its interpretation, party ID often serves to simply re-enforce partisanship.

Chris Achen (1992) builds off of the retrospective model with the Bayesian approach. Achen claims that party ID cannot be modeled through linear equations because age mediates how political events affect partisanship. For example, a twenty-something Republican in 2006 may be more swayed by the constant negative attention

the GOP had been receiving and the low approval ratings of President Bush than a 50 year-old Republican who has seen, as a result of her age, the success of the Gulf war and a popular Republican president, like Reagan.

Just as Achen (1992) modified the retrospective model, Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) along with Layman and Carsey (2006) have updated and built upon the Michigan model. Green, Palmquist and Shickler's *Partisan Hearts and Minds* provides a thorough and convincing argument that party ID essentially boils down to identity—a "psychological process of self-categorization and group evaluation" (p. 13). In others words, voters associate with the political party made up of social groups they identify with. For any type of significant change to occur, there would need to be a substantial change in what groups the electorate associates with each party.

Layman and Carsey's (2006) findings provide support for the argument that individuals move their policy preferences to align with their political affiliation on issues that are not important, but where the respondent is aware and perceives parties have taken a clear stance. They also found evidence suggesting that individuals move their party affiliation to meet their policy preferences on issues that are both salient and where the individual is aware the parties have taken clear, distinctive stands. "In short, party identification is a prime mover of other political attitudes under typical conditions, but it is not an unmoved mover in all circumstances…It is only individuals who are aware of distinctions between the parties and placed considerable importance on the issue who should be likely to change their party identifications based on their policy preferences" (467-472). We should expect, therefore, that if the parties present a clear and distinct

position on a gender issue important to American voters that at least one of the dimensions of gender beliefs will affect identification.

6.2.1 Party Politics and the Gender Debate

Figure 6.1: Distribution of Gender Beliefs by Partisanship

Source: 2008 ANES (sample only contains whites). Each gender belief is a factor score recoded 0-1 with the higher value representing the more progressive response.

As shown in Figure 1 below, and more thoroughly flushed out in Chapter Two, some variation exists between Democrats, Republicans and Independents with regard to each dimension of gender beliefs. Democrats prove more progressive on all three dimensions and Republicans more traditional with Independents falling in between the two parties; additionally, there is also variation across the dimensions, with all three parties proving more progressive when it comes to women's opportunities compared to

their respective views on motherhood and similarly more progressive in regard to motherhood compared to beliefs about assertive women. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the need to isolate the three dimensions of gender beliefs. For instance, members of the Republican Party are more progressive when it comes to women's opportunities than members of the Democratic Party are on motherhood and assertive women. Figure 6.1 suggests that Americans do see a difference, albeit small, between the two political parties and gender equality, given that members of the Democratic Party were consistently more progressive on all three domains compared to the members of the Republican Party.

As shown in Figure 6.2 the American public, on average and over time, sees a difference between the two political parties when it comes to a woman's place in society. Perceived difference was at its smallest in 1972, with less than half a point difference, and at its peak in 1980, with more than a point and half difference between the parties (on a seven point scale). Table 6.1, shown below, shows the average placement of each party on the woman's role scale by strength of party affiliation from 1972-2004. Unfortunately, the cumulative ANES only includes a party placement question with the old gender equality measure and not with any of the measures used as indicators for the current gender dimensions in the 2008 ANES. Nevertheless, while not ideal, the measure is still somewhat informative for the purposes of this chapter.

Figure 6.2: Distribution of Party Placement Women's Role Scale From 1972-2004

Source: Cumulative ANES (sample only contains whites). Women's Role scale ranges from 0-6 with 6 representing the more progressive response. Note: Respondents were only asked to place political parties on the women's role scale on years shown above.

Table 6.1: Average Perception of Political Party in Regard to Women's Role 1970-2004 By Strength of Party Affiliation

	Average Placement of Democratic Party on Women's Role Scale (0-6)	Average Placement of Republican Party on Women's Role Scale (0-6)
General Population	**4.04**	**3.25**
Democrats	**4.03**	**2.98**
Strong Democrats	4.19	2.86
Weak/leaning Democrats	3.95	3.04
Republicans	**4.14**	**3.63**
Strong Republicans	4.25	3.71
Weak/leaning Republicans	4.08	3.60
Independents	**3.76**	**3.27**

Source: Cumulative ANES (sample only contains whites). Women's Role scale ranges from 0-6 with 6 representing the more progressive response. Note: Respondents were only asked to place political parties on the women's role scale on the following years: 1972, 1976,1978,1980,1982,1988,1998,2004.

There are some scholars who would describe the major parties as having taken clear, distinct positions on the wide scope of women's issues (Freeman, 1989, Baer &

Bosistis, 1988; Costain, 1991 and 1992). But as Sanbonmatsu (2002) points out, these are often qualitative studies with little to no empirical support. On the other hand, Kira Sanbonmatsu's *Democrats, Republicans and Politics of a Woman's Place* (2002) argues that, outside abortion, parties have not taken a clear stance on a majority of gender issues—rather both parties, often failing to prioritize gender issues, have moved to the middle.[21] To support this claim, Sanbonmatsu performs content analysis on the parties' statements, including party platforms, convention speeches, and state of the state and state of the union addresses, and finds that the parties have been vague on women's issues. This is important to understand, as Sanbonmatsu herself finds, because there are certain gender issues that have the potential "to disrupt the existing cleavage between Democrats and Republicans" (p. 62-63).

Even though Sanbonmatsu's investigation into the parties' convention speeches, state platforms, state of the state and state of the union addresses was thorough and clearly demonstrates the parties' inability to present clear, distinct positions on gender issues, it is still possible for voters to see differences between the parties when it comes to gender equality. As Green, Palmquist, and Shickler (2002) have demonstrated, party affiliation sometimes comes down to which groups are associated with which parties. While the parties may not have taken clear and distinct policy positions, outside of abortion, on gender issues, this chapter contends that parties have *symbolically* always taken clear and distinct positions on women's role in society in both the private and public sphere.

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[21] Sanbonmatsu, however, notes that though both parties have moved to the middle on gender issues, the Democratic Party has paid more attention to the gender debate.

Based on Layman and Carsey's (2006) finding that individuals will shift their partisanship to meet policy preferences only when an issue is both salient and important and when the parties have presented clear and distinct differences and Sanbonmatsu's finding that parties have only presented clear and distinct positions on the issue of abortion in terms of gender issues, we should expect that that the only gender belief that should affect partisanship is beliefs about motherhood (since Chapter Three tells us that beliefs about motherhood does affect abortion attitudes):

H_1: On average, progressive beliefs about motherhood have a statistically significant and positive relationship with identification as a Democrat, all else equal.

H_2: On average, progressive beliefs about motherhood have a statistically significant and inverse relationship with Democratic ratings of the Republican Party and Republican ratings of the Republican Party, all else equal.

H_4: On average, progressive beliefs about motherhood have a statistically significant and positive relationship with Democratic ratings of the Democratic Party and Republican ratings of the Democratic Party, all else equal.

H_3: Neither beliefs about assertive women nor beliefs about women's opportunities have a statistically significant relationship with neither party identification nor party ratings, all else equal.

6.3   The Evidence

I now turn to multivariate regression analysis to test hypotheses 1-3. For consistency across the dissertation, in regards to the gender beliefs indicators, the data

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used for this analysis comes from the 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES). The independent variables of interest, the three gender beliefs (views on assertive women, motherhood, women's opportunities) are captured through factor scores created by the same indicators used in earlier chapters and more thoroughly reviewed in Chapter Two (see Chapter Six Appendix or Chapter Two for full details on coding). The factor scores were re-coded to 0-1 for ease of interpretation with one representing the most progressive position and zero the most traditional.

Because other factors have been shown to affect party affiliation, controls were included in the model. Controls were divided into two sets: attitudinal/value variables that may affect party affiliation and socio-economic variables that may affect partisanship. Attitudinal/value variables include: congressional approval ratings, gay rights, national security, individualism, social welfare spending, and ideology. Socio-economic variables include: age, sex, household income, religious traditionalism and educational attainment. Finally, a seven point party identification scale, with Democrat coded as the higher value and Republican as the minimum value, serves as the dependent variable. VIF scores were computed for the model to check for multicollinearity (none of which exceed 2) indicating multicollinearity is not a concern. The model presented in this chapter utilizes OLS as the statistical tool, however, the model was also run in ordered logit and there are no substantive differences in the results. Therefore, for ease of interpretation, the OLS model is presented.

Table 6.2: The Effect of Gender Beliefs on Party Identification

	Coefficient with Robust Standard Error	p-value
Attitudinal Variables		
Gay Rights	.046 (.212)	.826
Social Welfare	.089 (.052)	.086
National Security	-.352 (.118)	.003
Congressional Approval	.006 (.213)	.975
Individualism	-.312 (.195)	.111
Ideology	.862 (.082)	.000
Women's Opportunities	1.91 (.559)	.001
Assertive Women	-.005 (.469)	.991
Motherhood	.138 (.433)	.751
Demographic Variables		
Religious Traditionalism	-.024 (.069)	.725
Woman	-.033 (.174)	.849
Educational Attainment	-.020 (.065)	.750
Age	.007 (.005)	.186
Household Income	-.040 (.017)	.024
N=357 R²=.567		

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

The only statistically significant dimension is beliefs about women's opportunities. On average, it has a significant and positive effect on party identification (with Democratic affiliation coded as the higher value). A one unit positive change in beliefs about women's opportunities translates in to 1.91 positive shift on the seven point party identification. On the one hand, the more progressive an individual is in regard to beliefs about women's opportunities the more likely he or she is going to identify as a Democrat. On the other hand, the two other dimensions of feminism, beliefs about assertive women and beliefs about motherhood have no relationship with party identification. These findings fail to confirm Hypotheses 1&4.

The other attitudinal/value variables that are statistically significant in the model are ideology, national security, and social welfare spending. The only significant demographic variable is household income. On average, higher household income decreases the likelihood an individual will identify as a Democrat, all else equal.

6.4   Gender Beliefs and Feelings of Warmth toward the Parties

I am also interested in how gender beliefs affect feelings of warmth toward either party by both their members and opposing party members. Utilizing the same 2008 ANES dataset, I investigate this question. To capture feelings of warmth toward each party, I use thermometer scores ranging from 0-100, with 100 representing feelings of warmth. Since the dependent variable is continuous, OLS is the appropriate statistical tool. I assume the same variables that contribute to party identification listed in Table

Table 6.3: Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Democratic Party by Democrats

	Coefficient with Robust Standard Error	p-value
Attitudinal Variables		
Gay Rights	-.929 (4.67)	.848
Social Welfare	2.54 (1.13)	.026
National Security	-1.53 (2.39)	.522
Congressional Approval	3.43 (3.89)	.380
Individualism	-4.47 (4.05)	.271
Ideology	-1.96 (1.68)	.245
Women's Opportunities	22.90 (9.79)	.021
Assertive Women	16.00 (9.75)	.103
Motherhood	8.35 (8.43)	.323
Demographic Variables		
Religious Traditionalism	-1.00 (1.64)	.540
Woman	-.941 (3.63)	.769
Educational Attainment	-.390 (1.26)	.758
Age	.146 (.125)	.245
Household Income	.041 (.355)	.908
Constant	32.09 (14.16)	.025
N=171 R^2=.163		

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

Table 6.4: Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Republican Party by Democrats

	Coefficient with Robust Standard Error	p-value
Attitudinal Variables		
Gay Rights	.137 (5.94)	.982
Social Welfare	-.749 (.980)	.446
National Security	4.77 (2.22)	.034
Congressional Approval	.222 (3.70)	.952
Individualism	8.85 (3.38)	.010
Ideology	-.823 (1.79)	.647
Women's Opportunities	-16.01 (9.66)	.099
Assertive Women	-17.05 (9.23)	.067
Motherhood	-15.46 (7.80)	.049
Demographic Variables		
Religious Traditionalism	1.97 (1.54)	.204
Woman	6.92 (3.16)	.030
Educational Attainment	-1.50 (1.17)	.202
Age	-.187 (.111)	.095
Household Income	.651 (.317)	.042
Constant	59.38 (15.04)	.000
N=172 R²=.310		

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

Table 6.5: Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Democratic Party by Republicans

	Coefficient with Robust Standard Error	p-value
Attitudinal Variables		
Gay Rights	-.538 (4.28)	.900
Social Welfare	2.41 (1.26)	.058
National Security	-1.59 (2.50)	.525
Congressional Approval	3.30 (4.99)	.510
Individualism	2.70 (4.28)	.529
Ideology	7.29 (1.88)	.000
Women's Opportunities	26.47 (10.38)	.012
Assertive Women	14.73 (8.07)	.070
Motherhood	2.30 (7.19)	.749
Demographic Variables		
Religious Traditionalism	2.72 (1.25)	.032
Woman	-1.74 (3.29)	.596
Educational Attainment	-3.68 (1.11)	.001
Age	-.021 (.120)	.859
Household Income	.467 (.416)	.264
Constant	-4.31 (15.67)	.784
N=155 R^2=.329		

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

Table 6.6: Effect of Gender Beliefs on Ratings of Republican Party by Republicans

	Coefficient with Robust Standard Error	p-value
Attitudinal Variables		
Gay Rights	.137 (5.94)	.982
Social Welfare	.234 (.928)	.801
National Security	3.95 (1.99)	.049
Congressional Approval	.222 (3.70)	.952
Individualism	-.862 (3.31)	.784
Ideology	-6.23 (1.72)	.000
Women's Opportunities	10.28 (9.84)	.298
Assertive Women	-7.26 (7.66)	.345
Motherhood	4.09 (6.48)	.528
Demographic Variables		
Religious Traditionalism	-2.51 (1.32)	.060
Woman	11.34 (2.94)	.000
Educational Attainment	-.077 (1.03)	.940
Age	-.069 (.101)	.495
Household Income	-.028 (.326)	.931
Constant	76.48 (11.78)	.000
N=155 R^2=.293		

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

6.2 also affect feelings of warmth toward the party; therefore, I use the same attitudinal and socio-economic controls and run each model for each party's base (creating an inherently interactive model).

Interestingly, even though beliefs about assertive women do not affect identification, as shown in Table 6.2, they do, however, affect feelings of warmth for the opposing party. On average, for Republicans, beliefs about assertive women have a statistically significant and positive relationship with feelings of warmth toward the Democratic Party. When it comes to Democrats, we see an inverse relationship. On average, for Democrats, progressive beliefs about assertive women have a statistically significant and inverse relationship with feelings of warmth for the Republican Party. All three dimensions of gender beliefs proved statistically significant with an inverse relationship. Progressive beliefs within each dimension lead to lower ratings of the Republican Party by members of the Democratic Party. This is a powerful finding—especially since ideology does not affect Democrats' feelings toward the Republican Party.

When it comes to party members' feeling toward their own party, beliefs about women's opportunities, which do affect party identification for both Republicans and Democrats, also affect how Democrats rate their own party. On average, beliefs about women's opportunities have a statistically significant and positive relationship with ratings of the Democratic Party by Democrats. For Republicans, none of the gender dimensions included in the model affects how they feel toward their own party.

Beliefs about motherhood neither affect party identification nor does it affect how voters rate either party. In the case of Democrats' feelings toward the Republican Party,

beliefs about motherhood affect ratings, Democrats with progressive views toward motherhood rate Republicans lower on average. These findings fail to confirm hypotheses 1-3. It does suggest, however, that for Democrats the issue of abortion is a reason to feel negatively toward the Republican Party but not necessarily one to feel favorably toward their own party.

6.5 Implications and Conclusion

"According to suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt, women won the right to vote despite—not because of—the major parties" (Freeman, 2000 in Sanbonmatsu, 2002, p. 32). The relationship between the major political parties and women's advancement has played out over the years on both the national stage as well as at state and local levels. The findings presented in this chapter begin to shed light on how American's feminist belief system related their relationships with the two major political parties.

The electorate proves to be the most progressive in their beliefs about women's opportunities, which also informs party identification and feelings of warmth Democrats form toward their own party. Issues and symbolism that trigger voters' beliefs about women's opportunities are more long-standing, compared to issues and/or symbolism that trigger voters' beliefs about motherhood or assertive women, and therefore, they have built this association with the parties—particularly the Democratic Party over time. Additionally, there are more Woman national figures who have championed women's opportunities associated with the Democratic Party (even though the efforts of these women may not be reflected by party priorities). These findings are consistent with findings from Chapter Four that suggest beliefs about women's opportunities were a

significant predictor of ratings of Hillary Clinton (a contender for the Democratic presidential nomination), all else equal.

The fact that beliefs about motherhood do not play a major role in party identification is an interesting and somewhat surprising finding, not only because abortion is argued to be the only gender issue that the parties have presented clear and distinct positions on, but also because of the importance of motherhood beliefs on candidate evaluations (both 2008 evaluations of Sarah Palin and experimental) and on abortion attitudes. While the parties have taken clear, distinct positions on abortion (a policy preference shown in Chapter Three to be affected by motherhood beliefs), they otherwise have not dealt with, either substantively or symbolically, other topics that voters might associate with motherhood and the evolving family structure in a major way. Consequently, beliefs about motherhood do not play a major role in either party identification or feelings of warmth toward either party, generally speaking.

Beliefs about motherhood come only into play concerning members of the Democratic Party's feelings toward the Republican Party (but not vice versa and not toward their own party). One possible explanation for this finding is the amount of activity surrounding abortion rights and the Republican Party. In 1973, *Roe v. Wade* confirmed a woman's right to an abortion during the first trimester (among other things). Since that landmark decision, the Republican Party has worked toward appealing that decision and regulating it. The Democratic Party need only stand firm in its support of a woman's right to choose, whether they voice their support or work to curb legislation that seeks to thwart that right—in other words, simply focus on protecting the status quo. In other words, while the Republican Party may be the familiar "villain" when it comes to

reproductive rights for members of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party itself

does not necessarily play the role of hero within its member's eyes.

Conclusion

This project first began as a seminar paper with the simple goal of measuring the extent to which feminist attitudes affected ratings of Hillary Clinton in her 2008 bid for the Democratic nomination. My results were robust—anti-feminist attitudes do in fact contribute to lower ratings of Hillary Clinton. Ah-ha, I knew it! I was set to present my results and my case that, in fact, the American electorate was simply not ready to put a woman in the White House (particularly within socially conservative groups), that Clinton has been the victim of discrimination, and that anti-feminism had reared its ugly head into an American election. And then a funny thing happened. Those anti-feminist social conservatives began to rally around a female nominee for Vice President, Sarah Palin. Not only did they support her, Palin was quickly becoming the darling of the right. How is it, I found myself wondering, that individuals whose antifeminist beliefs contribute to their strong resentment of one Clinton, rate Palin so highly? Could it be she just represents anti-feminist values? If so, how do we reconcile that with the fact she is asking supporters to do a very non anti-feminist thing and place her in one of the most powerful positions in the country.

I then began to examine my operationalization of "feminist beliefs" and began to pay attention to how everyone seemed to think and talk about women and gender norms. Quickly, I began to notice the nuances and complexities within individuals and their own

positions on women's issues and as I more heavily dove into the literature on public opinion and gender attitudes I also quickly realized the wide array of inconsistencies. My seminar paper than evolved into a much larger project asking a very important, but yet unanswered question: how do American voters think about gender?

The most important take away from this dissertation is that an individual's gender belief system is multi-dimensional and, at the very least, there are three distinct dimensions with differing predictive power. Why is this important? For several reasons:

1) **Consistency:** Future work that hopes to include measures of gender attitudes should theoretically justify their use of a measure and present and digest the results keeping in mind that their indicator(s) may only be representative of one or two dimensions. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, had I been un-aware that the feminist belief system is multi-dimensional and used a single measure dealing with women's discrimination or equality I would have *incorrectly* concluded that gender attitudes in no way, good or bad, affect ratings of Palin. Hopefully, this will contribute to consistency within the sub-field when it comes to the role of feminist attitudes in political choices and evaluations.

2) **Understanding:** Isolating each gender belief allows for political scientists to develop a more thorough understanding of each dimension and its relationship with political phenomena. For instance, we learn in Chapter Five women with small children who run for public office are not penalized by traditional views on motherhood as one might have previously thought, quite the opposite. Women who violate gender norms

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(i.e. childless women) and run for office are seen as threat by individuals with traditional views on motherhood. Isolating each gender belief allows political scientists to develop a much deeper understanding of each dimension on its own.

3) **Accuracy:** Accounting for and isolating each dimension of gender beliefs is critical in painting an accurate picture of the American electorate and feminism. As noted earlier in the dissertation, the feminist/antifeminist dichotomy is no longer a useful way to conceptualize the American public and relationship with feminism. Once we account for each dimension we can develop a clearer picture of different demographic groups and where they stand in relation to feminism. For example, it would be incorrect to say that younger cohorts are more feminist. As seen in Chapter Two, while younger cohorts are more progressive when it comes to views on assertive women and beliefs about motherhood, older cohorts are more progressive when it comes to women's opportunities.

As I've noted in the introduction, I make the case that the feminist belief system is multi-dimensional and that there are at least three distinct dimensions dealing with women's opportunities, motherhood, and assertive women. As my research progressed, I began to realize that there may be a fourth dimension dealing with women's sexual liberty that also affects political choices. Unfortunately, this dissertation heavily relies on existing public data and there are not sufficient measures publicly available to appropriately investigate this potential dimension at this time. This is something I would like to address

in future work. Again, as noted in the introduction, gender beliefs among African Americans and Hispanics is an important research question still left unanswered. This, as well, is a project I hope to pursue using this dissertation as a foundation in the future.

As the campaign world gets ready to head into the 2012 general election cycle, issues surrounding women have taken center stage. Many interest groups and media outlets tagging the recent events surrounding women's issue, such as the debate over contraception, Sandra Fluke's testimony, mandated ultrasounds before abortions, and the Komen and Planned Parenthood debacle as the "war on women." What does this mean exactly for upcoming election? The findings in this dissertation will better equip political scientists as they being to understand and tackle the many questions and nuances stemming from the "war on women" this upcoming election season.

Appendices

Chapter Two Appendix

Measurement of Gender Beliefs

All variables were coded so that the most progressive responses have the highest value

Belief about Women's Opportunities

Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Do you personally hope that the United States has a woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the United States does not have a woman President in your lifetime, or do you not hope either way?

Motherhood& Family Structure

It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.'
(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.'
(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or

	DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)
Beliefs about Assertive Women	Women who complain about equality are really seeking special favors. (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)
	Women who complain about sexual harassment are causing more problems. (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

<u>Measurement of Demographics, Core Values, and Personality Trait</u>
DEMOGRAPHICS

Age	Actual value
Woman	1- Woman, 0-Male
South	1- South, 0- Not South
Income	1. A. None or less than $2,999 210
	2. B. $3,000 -$4,999
	3. C. $5,000 -$7,499
	4. D. $7,500 -$9,999
	5. E. $10,000 -$10,999
	6. F. $11,000-$12,499
	7. G. $12,500-$14,999
	8. H. $15,000-$16,999
	9. J. $17,000-$19,999
	10. K. $20,000-$21,999
	11. M. $22,000-$24,999
	12. N. $25,000-$29,999
	13. P. $30,000-$34,999
	14. Q. $35,000-$39,999

15. R. $40,000-$44,999
16. S. $45,000-$49,999
17. T. $50,000-$59,999
18. U. $60,000-$74,999
19. V. $75,000-$89,999
20. W. $90,000-$99,999
21. X. $100,000-$109,999
22. Y. $110,000-$119,999
23. Z. $120,000-$134,999
24. AA. $135,000-$149,999
25. BB. $150,000 and over

Education	0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-MA and Higher

CORE VALUES

Egalitarian	*Society should make sure everyone has equal opportunity.* (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)
	We'd be better off if worried less about equality. (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)
Limited Government	The less government, the better or there are more things that government should be doing? (1. The less government the better 2. More things government should be doing)
	The main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger. (1. Gov't bigger because it's involved in things people should handle Themselves 2. Gov't bigger because problems bigger)
Moral Traditionalism	The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

PERSONALITY TRAITS

Authoritarianism

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: independence or respect for elders.

(0-Independence 1-Both 2-Respect for elders)

Please tell me which one you think is more important for
a child to have: CURIOSITY or GOOD MANNERS
(0-Curiosity 1-Both 2-Good Manners)

Please tell me which one you think is more important for
a child to have: OBEDIENCE or SELF-RELIANCE
(0-Obedience 1-Both 2-Self-reliance)

Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: BEING CONSIDERATE or WELL BEHAVED

(0-Being considerate 1-Both 2-Well behaved)

Religious traditionalism   Index score
coded so the higher value represents higher levels of traditionalism.

Would you say your religion provides SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day life?

People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, or NEVER?

Do you go to religious services EVERY WEEK, ALMOST EVERY WEEK,ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER?

Factor Score Distributions

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
Table A1: Ordered Logit Results for Abortion Attitudes Model

|	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P Value
Attitudinal Bases for Abortion Attitudes			
Belief About Motherhood	**.450**	**.144**	**.002**
Religious Traditionalism	**-.512**	**.099**	**.000**
Ideology	**.337**	**.187**	**.007**
Beliefs About Women's Opportunities	.114	.131	.382
Views on Assertive Women	.116	.129	.368
Individualism	.235	.286	.410
Social Bases for Abortion Attitudes			
Education	**.378**	**.088**	**.000**
Age	**.015**	**.008**	**.000**
Party Identification	**.166**	**.078**	**.033**
Household Income	-.008	.027	.769
Residency in the South	.247	.244	.311
Sex	.258	.262	.324
N=382 R^2=.150			

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

Table A2: Ordered Logit Resulults for Abortion Attitudes (3 point scale) Model

	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	P Value
Attitudinal Bases for Abortion Attitudes			
Belief About Motherhood	**.516**	**.151**	**.001**
Religious Traditionalism	**-.492**	**.100**	**.000**
Ideology	**.328**	**.123**	**.008**
Beliefs About Women's Opportunities	.044	.135	.740
Views on Assertive Women	.135	.139	.332
Individualism	.234	.297	.431
Social Bases for Abortion Attitudes			
Education	**.356**	**.097**	**.000**
Age	**.015**	**.008**	**.000**
Party Identification	**.176**	**.079**	**.027**
Household Income	-.012	.029	.667
Residency in the South	.325	.262	.214
Sex	.287	.273	.295
N=382 R^2=.150			

Source: 2008 ANES. Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables have been coded so that the highest value represents the progressive response (if applicable). All factor scores have been recoded 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

All variables were coded so that the most progressive response has the highest value

Gender Beliefs:

Women's Opportunities:	Factor score made up of the following questions:

Women often miss out on good jobs
because of discrimination.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Do you personally hope that the United States has a
woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the
United States does not have a woman President in
your lifetime, or do you not hope either way?

Motherhood:	Factor score made up of the following questions:

It is much better for everyone involved if the man is
the achiever outside the home and the woman takes
care of the home and family.

(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR
DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

 A working mother can establish just as warm and
secure a relationship with her children as a mother
who does not work.

(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR
DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Views on Assertive Women: Factor score made up of the following questions:

Women who complain about equality are really seeking special favors.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?

Women who complain about sexual harassment are causing more problems.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Measurement of Demographics:

Age   Actual value

Sex   1- Woman, 0-Male

South   1- South, 0- Not South

Income   1. A. None or less than $2,999 210
                            2. B. $3,000 -$4,999
                            3. C. $5,000 -$7,499
                            4. D. $7,500 -$9,999
                            5. E. $10,000 -$10,999

6. F. $11,000-$12,499
7. G. $12,500-$14,999
8. H. $15,000-$16,999
9. J. $17,000-$19,999
10. K. $20,000-$21,999
11. M. $22,000-$24,999
12. N. $25,000-$29,999
13. P. $30,000-$34,999
14. Q. $35,000-$39,999
15. R. $40,000-$44,999
16. S. $45,000-$49,999
17. T. $50,000-$59,999
18. U. $60,000-$74,999
19. V. $75,000-$89,999
20. W. $90,000-$99,999
21. X. $100,000-$109,999
22. Y. $110,000-$119,999
23. Z. $120,000-$134,999
24. AA. $135,000-$149,999
25. BB. $150,000 and over

Education	0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-MA and Higher
Ideology	0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2-Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the Road) & "I haven't thought too much about it", 4-Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6- Extremely Liberal
Party Identification	0- Republican, 1-Independent, 2-Democrat
Religious Traditionalism following measures:	Index score ranging from 0-4 made up of the
	People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray SEVERAL TIMES A DAY,ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, or NEVER?

Would you say your religion provides SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day life?

Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals?

Individualism

Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your own views….

0- there are more things that government should be doing,

1- the less government, the better

Chapter Four Appendix

<u>Coding Details</u>

All variables were coded so that the most progressive response has the highest value

Gender Beliefs:

Women's Opportunities: Factor score made up of the following questions:

Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Do you personally hope that the United States has a woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the United States does not have a woman President in your lifetime, or do you not hope either way?

Motherhood: Factor score made up of the following questions:

It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.

(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.

(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Views on Assertive Women: Factor score made up of the following questions:

Women who complain about equality are really seeking special favors.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?

Women who complain about sexual harassment are causing more problems.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Measurement of Demographics:
DEMOGRAPHICS

Age   Actual value

Sex   1- Woman, 0-Male

South   1- South, 0- Not South

Income   1. A. None or less than $2,999 210
                             2. B. $3,000 -$4,999
                             3. C. $5,000 -$7,499
                             4. D. $7,500 -$9,999
                             5. E. $10,000 -$10,999

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6. F. $11,000-$12,499
7. G. $12,500-$14,999
8. H. $15,000-$16,999
9. J. $17,000-$19,999
10. K. $20,000-$21,999
11. M. $22,000-$24,999
12. N. $25,000-$29,999
13. P. $30,000-$34,999
14. Q. $35,000-$39,999
15. R. $40,000-$44,999
16. S. $45,000-$49,999
17. T. $50,000-$59,999
18. U. $60,000-$74,999
19. V. $75,000-$89,999
20. W. $90,000-$99,999
21. X. $100,000-$109,999
22. Y. $110,000-$119,999
23. Z. $120,000-$134,999
24. AA. $135,000-$149,999
25. BB. $150,000 and over

Education	0-no high school,1- high school graduate, 2- some college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-MA and Higher
Ideology	0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2- Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the Road) & "I haven't thought too much about it", 4- Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6-Extremely Liberal
Party Identification	0- Republican, 1-Independent, 2-Democrat
Religious Traditionalism	Index Score (*coded so the higher value represents higher levels of traditionalism.*)

Would you say your religion provides SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day life?

People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, or NEVER?

Do you go to religious services EVERY WEEK, ALMOST

EVERY WEEK,ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER?

Individualism — The less government, the better or there are more things that government should be doing?
0-More things government should be doing 1- The less government the better

Retrospective economic — Now thinking about the economy in the country as a Evaluations whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten

0- gotten worse, 1- stayed about the same, 2-gotten better

Chapter Five Appendix

<u>Gender Belief Measurements:</u>
Women's Opportunities: Factor score made up of the following questions:

Women often miss out on good jobs
because of discrimination.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE
SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR
DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or
DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Do you personally hope that the United States has a
woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the
United States does not have a woman President in
your lifetime, or do you not hope either way?

Motherhood: Factor score made up of the following questions:

It is much better for everyone involved if the man is
the achiever outside the home and the woman takes
care of the home and family.

(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR
DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

A working mother can establish just as warm and
secure a relationship with her children as a mother
who does not work.

(Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR
DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)

This country would have many fewer problems if
there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Views on Assertive Women: Factor score made up of the following questions:

Women who complain about equality are really seeking special favors.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?

Women who complain about sexual harassment are causing more problems.

(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Primary Independent Variable:

Beliefs about Motherhood   Index Score:
Higher value represents most progressive response

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not   work.'

0-Disagree, 1-Niether Agree or Disagree, 2-agree

This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.

0-Agree, 1-Niether Agree or Disagree, 2-Disagree

Race	White 1, other 0
Age	actual value
Party ID	0- Strong Republican, 1- Republican, 2-Leaning Republican 3-Independent, 4- leaning Democrat, 5-Democrat, 6- Strong Democrat
Ideology	0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2-Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the Road), 4- Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6- Extremely Liberal
Woman	1- Woman, 0-Male

Household Income

1. A. None or less than $2,999 210
2. B. $3,000 -$4,999
3. C. $5,000 -$7,499
4. D. $7,500 -$9,999
5. E. $10,000 -$10,999
6. F. $11,000-$12,499
7. G. $12,500-$14,999
8. H. $15,000-$16,999
9. J. $17,000-$19,999
10. K. $20,000-$21,999
11. M. $22,000-$24,999
12. N. $25,000-$29,999
13. P. $30,000-$34,999
14. Q. $35,000-$39,999
15. R. $40,000-$44,999
16. S. $45,000-$49,999
17. T. $50,000-$59,999
18. U. $60,000-$74,999
19. V. $75,000-$89,999
20. W. $90,000-$99,999
21. X. $100,000-$109,999
22. Y. $110,000-$119,999
23. Z. $120,000-$134,999
24. AA. $135,000-$149,999
25. BB. $150,000 and over

Religious Traditionalism   Index Score:

People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?

0-Never, 1-Seldom, 2-A few times a month, 3-Once a week, 4-A few times a week, 5-A few times a month, 6-Once a week, 7- Once a day, 8- Several times a day

How important is religion in your life?

0-Not at all important, 1-Not too important, 2-Somwhat important, 3-Very important

Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

0-Never, 1-Seldom, 2-A few times a month, 3-Once a week, 4-A few times a week, 5-A few times a month, 6-Once a week, 7- more than once a week

Education   0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-MA and Higher

Chapter Six Appendix

All variables were coded so that the most progressive responses have the highest value

Gender Beliefs:

Women's Opportunities:

> Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.
> (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)
>
> Do you personally hope that the United States has a woman President in your lifetime, do you hope the United States does not have a woman President in your lifetime, or do you not hope either way?

Family Structure & Motherhood:

> It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.'
> (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)
>
> A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.'
> (Do you AGREE NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?)
>
> This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.
> (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

Views on Assertive Women:

> Women who complain about equality are really seeking special favors.
> (Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE

SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?

Women who complain about sexual harassment are causing more problems.
(Do you AGREE STRONGLY, AGREE SOMEWHAT, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, DISAGREE SOMEWHAT, or DISAGREE STRONGLY with this statement?)

DEMOGRAPHICS

Age	Actual value
Sex	1- Woman, 0-Male
South	1- South, 0- Not South
Household Income	1. A. None or less than $2,999 210
	2. B. $3,000 -$4,999
	3. C. $5,000 -$7,499
	4. D. $7,500 -$9,999
	5. E. $10,000 -$10,999
	6. F. $11,000-$12,499
	7. G. $12,500-$14,999
	8. H. $15,000-$16,999
	9. J. $17,000-$19,999
	10. K. $20,000-$21,999
	11. M. $22,000-$24,999
	12. N. $25,000-$29,999
	13. P. $30,000-$34,999
	14. Q. $35,000-$39,999
	15. R. $40,000-$44,999
	16. S. $45,000-$49,999
	17. T. $50,000-$59,999
	18. U. $60,000-$74,999
	19. V. $75,000-$89,999
	20. W. $90,000-$99,999
	21. X. $100,000-$109,999
	22. Y. $110,000-$119,999
	23. Z. $120,000-$134,999
	24. AA. $135,000-$149,999
	25. BB. $150,000 and over

Education	0-no high school, 1- high school graduate, 2- some college/no degree, 3- AA degree, 4- BA, 5-MA, 6-MA and Higher
Party Identification	0- Strongly Republican, 1-weak republican, 2-independent-republican, 3independent-independent, 4-independent-Democrat 5-weak Democrat, 6-Strong Democrat
Religious Traditionalism	Index Score (*coded so the higher value represents higher levels of traditionalism.*) Would you say your religion provides SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day life? People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, ONCE A DAY, A FEW TIMES A WEEK, ONCE A WEEK OR LESS, or NEVER? Do you go to religious services EVERY WEEK, ALMOST EVERY WEEK, ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH, A FEW TIMES A YEAR, or NEVER?

ATTITUDES/VALUES

Individualism	The less government, the better or there are more things that government should be doing? 0-More things government should be doing 1-The less government the better
Ideology	0- Extremely Conservative, 1- Conservative, 2-Slightly Conservative, 3-Moderate (Middle of the Road) & "I haven't thought too much about it", 4-Slightly Liberal, 5- Liberal, 6- Extremely Liberal
Congressional Approval	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job? 0-Srongly disapprove, 1-somewhat disapprove, 2-somewhat approve, 3-strongly approve

Gay Rights | Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Services or don't you think so?

0-Strongly should not be allowed to serve, 1-somewhat strongly should not be allowed to serve, 2-somewhat strongly should be allowed to serve, 3-strongly should be allowed to serve

Social Welfare Spending | Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased or kept the same?

0-Decreased, 1- kept the same, 2- Increased

National Defense | Do you think the government should spend more on national defense, less on national defense, or about the same on national defense it does now?

0-more, 1-about the same, 2- less

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